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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 4 Apr 1995

Vol. 451 No. 5

Report of Sub-Committee of Select Committee on Legislation and Security: Statements.

I welcome the opportunity to make the opening statement on the report of the sub-committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security which investigated the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Fianna Fáil-Labour Partnership Government. The background to our work was unusual to say the least. What was widely considered to be an excellent Government fell in mid-term because of disagreement over a relatively routine matter, namely the appointment of a new President of the High Court. The fact that the crisis emerged within a few months of the Northern Ireland ceasefire, undoubtedly the greatest political breakthrough on this island over the last 25 years, added to the general sense of disbelief and shock.

As the crisis developed during November last, the need for openness, transparency and accountability was frequently highlighted. When asked to chair this investigation I was determined from the outset that these characteristics would be adopted in the running of the sub-committee. Consequently, despite certain dangers, I adhered to two particular principles when chairing the various sessions. First, every effort was made to allow each witness make as complete a statement as he or she considered necessary, no time limit was placed on statements. Second, members of the sub-committee were allowed pose questions and pursue lines of investigation to the fullest possible degree. A number of operational procedures were adopted at the outset, which I believe contributed greatly to the efficient running of the inquiry. If time permits I will briefly mention some of these procedures at the end of the statements.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to a number of participants in our work. I would like to warmly thank my colleagues on the sub-committee for their outstanding co-operation at all times during the proceedings. In many instances they had to develop a line of questioning within minutes of hearing evidence. I strongly recommend that in future investigations of this type statements should be made available at least a few hours before presentation. I would like to express both thanks and admiration for the witnesses who appeared before the sub-committee without legal obligation. I would like to acknowledge the key role played by the sub-committee's secretariat, other staff of the House, particularly the broadcasting unit and our advisers. Their assistance throughout was greatly appreciated.

How and why did the crisis arise? As I stated, most impartial observers agreed that we had an excellent partnership Government. While the dramatic breakthrough in Northern Ireland was, without doubt, the greatest development in the lifetime of the Government, a major improvement in the State's finances was also of great importance. Furthermore, outstanding ministerial performances were a feature of the Administration with difficult and courageous decisions being made in all portfolios. In general, a positive relationship was evident between Ministers and Deputies of the two Government parties.

However, despite all the progress, co-operation and mutual respect, the Government suddenly ran into serious trouble on the appointment of a new President of the High Court.

Has the inquiry helped us to understand why the crisis arose? A number of issues have been clarified. The process by which Mr. Whelehan was appointed President of the High Court on 11 November 1994 is now largely undisputed. It began with Mr. Whelehan expressing an interest in the post to the then Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds. Deputy Reynolds expressed his personal support for Mr. Whelehan. Deputy Reynolds's research into the matter of precedent in the appointment of the Attorney General directly as President of the High Court might possibly have been more comprehensive. A binding precedent in the case of the presidency of the High Court might have led to the current presence of Chief Justice Rogers in the Supreme Court; this of course did not happen when the presidency of the High Court last became vacant in 1984. Rather than appointing the Attorney General of the day, Mr. Rogers, directly as President of the High Court, a senior judge of the court, now Chief Justice Hamilton, was appointed.

The initial reaction of Deputy Spring to Mr. Whelehan's interest was not very encouraging. Subsequently, his public position on the matter seemed, if anything, to harden. During his contribution to the Dáil on 16 November 1994 Deputy Spring identified Mr. Whelehan's lack of judicial and administrative experience as particular reasons for his opposition to the appointment. Nobody would dispute that, as Tánaiste, he was totally entitled to have such views, irrespective of their validity or fairness to Mr. Whelehan. Significantly, however, for the fate of the partnership Government, Deputy Spring failed to take either of two vital steps during the growing controversy up to 11 November 1994. First, he did not state publicly the precise reasons for his objection to Mr. Whelehan's appointment as President of the High Court. Second, he did not take what would appear to have been the logical step, given his strong personal views on the matter, of vetoing the appointment. It is almost certain that either of those initiatives would have brought the matter to an end and saved both the Government and Mr. Whelehan from subsequent developments. However, it must also be accepted that Deputy Spring hardly could be publicly critical of Mr. Whelehan while the latter was Attorney General.

From the evidence it is clear that most people, including Deputy Albert Reynolds, the then Taoiseach, considered the matter settled when the Cabinet sub-committee arrived at an agreement. When the Courts and Court Officers Bill was drafted in retrospect, it seems clear, that Deputy Reynolds should have appointed Mr. Whelehan immediately as President of the High Court. While his sensitivity to Deputy Spring's predicament was admirable, it was not politically wise. Similarly, his agreement to various requests for postponement of the appointment ultimately paid an extremely poor dividend. By the time the Cabinet met on the fateful Friday events had been complicated further by the Fr. Brendan Smyth case.

In attempting to assess the remainder of those events, it is important to note two issues of particular relevance. Undoubtedly there was a serious difference of opinion within the Labour Party on the desirability of being involved in the partnership Government. In general Ministers seemed very committed to that Administration while a number of other influential figures within the party perceived membership of Government as a political liability. The latter perception was understandable in that the Labour Party had made an historic breakthrough in the 1992 general election and had played a key role in the ensuing excellent Government. Nevertheless, the Labour Party did not appear to be reaping political benefit from the partnership arrangement. Its performance in the European elections and various by-elections and a range of opinion polls pointed to the definite possibility of the Labour Party losing rather than gaining seats at the next general election. As the presidency of the High Court developed into a public issue, Deputy Spring was being pulled in two different directions, rendering the then Government extremely vulnerable in a crisis.

The second point to be remembered from this series of events was the fact that the Opposition parties were in an extremely poor position to pressurise the then Government. The prospect of at least another seven to eight years on the Opposition benches seemed quite probable. Since the then Government was performing exceptionally well with regard to Northern Ireland and our economy, the only realistic prospect of undermining it rested with the identification and exploitation of inter-Fianna Fáil-Labour disputes on smaller issues. The emergence of the presidency of the High Court and the complication of the Fr. Brendan Smyth case afforded such an opportunity. Not surprisingly, the Opposition parties made the most of the chance handed to them.

I have two comments to make on the Friday Cabinet meeting at which Mr. Whelehan was appointed President of the High Court. Perhaps Deputy Reynolds, the then Taoiseach, should have been more sensitive to Deputy Spring's request for postponement of the appointment in the aftermath of the Labour Party's very disappointing performance in the two Cork by-elections.

My second comment relates to the request by the Labour Party to have the appointment deferred until the Taoiseach had answered questions in this House the following Tuesday. From his report it was absolutely clear that Mr. Whelehan had no knowledge of the Fr. Brendan Smyth case while it awaited processing in his office, due to the administrative procedures in place in the office of the Attorney General on the management of extradition cases. The only matter for which Mr. Whelehan could be held responsible was that such an administrative deficiency existed. Further questions regarding the Fr. Smyth case would have done nothing to clarify the matter. The core issue to be addressed was whether Mr. Whelehan's failure to deal with the administrative problem in his office was sufficiently serious to affect his suitability to be appointed President of the High Court. The presence of the Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, and Mr. Whelehan at the Friday Cabinet meeting should have made it possible to deal with that dilemma immediately.

The events of the following Saturday and Sunday are largely self-explanatory. However, the request to the new Attorney General, Mr. Fitzsimons, to undertake a full examination of the Fr. Brendan Smyth file, can be interpreted only as indicating a determination on the part of the Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, to obtain as much information as possible on the issue for the forthcoming Dáil sitting.

Having examined all the evidence relating to the period from Monday, 14 November 1994 to the fall of the Government on Wednesday, 16 November 1994, I am certain none of the participants was involved in deliberate wrongdoings. I found Deputy McCreevy's evidence extremely convincing in terms of illustrating there had been no deliberate attempt to mislead the Dáil. While freely admitting the preoccupation of Fianna Fáil Ministers with maintaining the Government, Deputy McCreevy clearly indicated also that Mr. Fitzsimons's legal viewpoints had little impact on himself or on his Fianna Fáil colleagues. Similarly, the evidence of Mr. Tim Dalton, Secretary of the Department of Justice, clearly illustrates the honourable intention of the Minister for Justice, Mrs. Geoghegan-Quinn, to inform the House about the possible relevance of the Duggan case.

Equally I am certain many mistakes were made during that very pressured time. While one could comment at length on the evidence of all participants in the inquiry, five witnesses emerged as having played a key role in the overall controversy — the then Taoiseach and Tánaiste, Deputies Reynolds and Spring, Messrs. Whelehan, Fitzsimons and Russell. In the course of a very forthright and impressive contribution to the subcommittee Mr. Russell presented in detail the background to the delay in the Fr. Smyth case. While I remain convinced the delay was excessive and should not have occurred in any circumstance, it is only fair to acknowledge Mr. Russell's frankness and his admission of responsibility. Another important matter to be noted was the substantially increased workload placed on the staff in the Attorney General's Office. Too often staffing levels in key offices of State are reviewed very infrequently, usually whenever a serious problem arises. Despite the lapse in the processing of the Fr. Smyth case, the evidence given to the subcommittee suggests that the former Attorney General, Mr. Whelehan, Mr. Russell and their staff gave full, committed service to the State which should be acknowledged. It must be accepted also that the administrative shortcomings identified in that office, together with the inadequate application of computer technology, have been addressed in the interim, so that a delay of the magnitude which occurred in the Fr. Smyth case certainly will not recur.

Overall the episode has not been kind to Mr. Whelehan. While he may have been criticised by some people for having approached the then Taoiseach, Deputy Albert Reynolds, regarding possible appointment to the presidency of the High Court, it would seem only reasonable that he should have done so in the context of having already refused other judicial appointments. Silence on his part might have been interpreted as lack of interest. Similarly, he was criticised for not having withdrawn his candidature once it had become a controversial issue. The matter was by no means clear cut. Had he withdrawn his candidature a reasonable implication would have been that he was unfit in some way to serve in such a position which would have made his occupancy of the office of Attorney General virtually untenable.

While Mr. Whelehan's refusal on the Monday evening to postpone his swearing-in ceremony could be portrayed as insensitive to the politician who had appointed him President of the High Court, the misleading information he, Mr. Whelehan, has received in terms of the religious status of Mr. Duggan undoubtedly influenced his judgment vis-à-vis the necessity for such a postponement. Therefore, it is my opinion Mr. Whelehan served the country honourably and effectively as Attorney General and certainly was not deserving of the personal attacks he was forced to endure between autumn and mid-November 1994.

Similarly, I have no doubt that the then Taoiseach, Deputy Albert Reynolds, behaved honourably during the crisis. While he might be blamed for his early endorsement of the candidature of Mr. Whelehan and his political failure to anticipate the reaction of the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Spring, to the appointment of Mr. Whelehan, there were a number of mitigating factors. For example, he had been successfully leading an excellent Government, having had some outstanding recent achievements. Perhaps he could be excused for having expected a greater degree of tolerance on the part of his Government partner on this matter. In my opinion Deputy Reynolds was absolutely correct not to have mentioned the Duggan case in his Tuesday speech in the House because its potential implications were too great for its introduction without absolute written confirmation by the new Attorney General. In fact Deputy Reynolds could rightly have been criticised had he detailed the Duggan case on the Tuesday.

On Wednesday, 16 November 1994, Deputy Reynolds strongly criticised Mr. Whelehan because of the omission of a reference to the Duggan case in his report to the Cabinet, based largely on a text supplied by Mr. Fitzsimons and the Labour Party. With the benefit of hindsight, since those specific criticisms were advanced in an attempt to bestow a grossly exaggerated importance on the relevance of the Duggan case, they were extremely unfair to Mr. Whelehan. Deputy Reynolds honourably expressed regret in that regard when giving evidence to the subcommittee. The fact that Deputy Reynolds left those comments in his speech, even when the agreement with Deputy Spring had broken down, is another clear indication of the integrity of his behaviour throughout those events.

The Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, played a key role throughout. It goes without saying that he was perfectly entitled to have his own opinion regarding the appointment of a new President of the High Court. Indeed, as a member of the legal profession, it would have been surprising if he had not taken such a keen interest in the matter. When considering his performance throughout the controversy, one must take into account the strongly differing opinions within his own party in relation to the partnership Government.

The impact of these conflicting pressures showed clearly on at least four occasions. First, despite his personal lack of support for the appointment of Mr. Whelehan to the presidency of the High Court, he refrained from actually vetoing the appointment. Second, his withdrawal from Cabinet, followed by his offer of resignation to his ministerial colleagues, clearly showed his ongoing uncertainty regarding the issue. The manner in which he agreed to go back into Government on the Wednesday morning also seemed to lack conviction. Finally, having decided to withdraw his agreement shortly afterwards, his refusal to listen to Deputy Reynolds's explanation for the delay in referring to the Duggan case clearly reflected the level of conflicting pressures which were being brought to bear on Deputy Spring.

The then Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, and the Tánaiste had only recently played an historic joint role in restoring peace to Northern Ireland. In anything approaching normal circumstances, one would expect that the Tánaiste would have shown a far greater degree of willingness to at least listen to Deputy Reynolds.

The general sense of uncertainty within the Labour Party during the crisis is probably best illustrated by the comments of the Minister for Finance, Deputy Quinn, at the conclusion of the final fateful meeting on the Wednesday. The general thrust of Deputy Spring and the Labour Ministers' position was that Deputy Reynolds' failure to mention the Duggan case in his Tuesday speech made it impossible for the party to remain in Government under his leadership. Nevertheless, the clear message conveyed by Deputy Quinn's comment was that the partnership might be saved if Mr. Whelehan was removed from the presidency of the High Court.

Mr. Fitzsimons was the central figure in the events of 14-16 November 1994. Before assessing his role, it is important to fully accept the difficulty of his position. A highly respected member of the Bar, he had what can only be described as a baptism of fire on his first full day as Attorney General. His performance proved to be critical in the overall matter. In particular, his insistence on the importance of the Duggan case provided the defining issue on which the fate of the Government was eventually sealed. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Fitzsimons acted in anything other than an honourable manner throughout. However, his inexperience of the political environment, combined with his failure to keep working notes, probably contributed to the large number of instances in which his evidence seems to be a source of disagreement. I will outline some relevant examples.

Mr. Fitzsimons stated in his evidence that he met Mr. Barrett — Official C — on Monday morning. Mr. Barrett indicated that the meeting took place on Tuesday.

Mr. Fitzsimons disagreed with practically all Fianna Fáil Ministers regarding the request from Deputy Reynolds for a definitive report. Yet he supplied two reports to Deputy Reynolds on Tuesday: one prepared by Mr. Hamilton in the morning and another prepared by himself in the afternoon.

Mr. Fitzsimons rang Mr. Whelehan on the Monday afternoon to inform him of the Duggan case. There is no evidence that he informed Deputy Reynolds of the outcome of this call but it would have been quite strange if he did not since Deputy Reynolds sent him on an almost identical mission later that night. It seems extremely unlikely that Deputy Reynolds would have done so if he was aware of Mr. Whelehan's initial reaction to the Duggan case. Mr. Fitzsimons's interpretation of his meeting with Mr. Whelehan differs substantially in terms of emphasis from that given to the sub-committee by Mr. Whelehan.

When Mr. Fitzsimons communicated the existence of the Duggan case to Mr. Whelehan he seems to have introduced a serious error, namely, that Mr. Duggan was an ex-monk. This had a profound influence on the attitude of Mr. Whelehan and, in particular, on his decision not to agree to a postponement of his swearing-in ceremony. Mr. Whelehan felt that the fact that he had already previously extradited without delay a cleric accused of child sexual abuse clearly showed that he was not a protector of religious personnel involved in such crimes.

If one takes into account Mr. Fitzsimons's worries in relation to the Dáil being misled about the Duggan case, for example, it is difficult to understand either his failure to read the draft speeches provided to him beforehand or his lack of reaction to the speech later that afternoon.

I recount these examples of confusion simply to illustrate the problems of accurate recollection after a period of intense activity. Similarly, it clearly shows the different interpretations which people can place on the same conversation.

Mr. Fitzsimons disagreed with Deputy Spring in relation to the timing of their meeting on Wednesday. Similarly, the precise nature of that conversation is unclear. In his statement, Mr. Fitzsimons stated that he gave details of the Duggan case to Deputy Spring. However, under questioning from Deputy O'Malley, he indicated that the conversation lasted only a few minutes with the only substantive question relating to the time of Deputy Reynolds's initial awareness of the Duggan case.

While Deputy Spring stated that he decided to speak to Mr. Fitzsimons subsequent to receiving an unexpected call, Mr. Fitzsimons stated that he was asked by the Taoiseach or Fianna Fáil Ministers to await a call from the Tánaiste.

One could go on and on in relation to the evidence presented in the 980 page report but, no matter how one assesses the evidence, it seems clear that the crisis originated and developed because of political mistakes and misunderstandings rather than any deliberate act of wrongdoing. Hopefully, those who made extremely critical and hurtful comments in the immediate aftermath of the crisis will now generously set the record straight. I believe that our Dáil committee system can and must play an increasing role in the operation of our democratic mandate.

May I raise a point of order? Was that contribution the personal opinion of Deputy Dan Wallace or the learned conclusion of the committee?

It was the opening statement of the chairperson of the sub-committee.

I understand it was a personal contribution by the chairman, not the conclusion of the committee.

Is the Minister of State saying that Deputy J. O'Keeffe will give the same report——

The exact context in which the last statement was made——

Acting Chairman

I repeat, the opening statement——

——is an apologia for his side and his colleague, Deputy Reynolds.

He is entitled to give it as much as anyone else.

As long as they are his personal views, not the committee's conclusions.

As a former chairman of the sub-committee I indicated at the beginning the format of my comments.

I want to establish that they are the Deputy's personal comments, not the committee's conclusions.

It is fairly clear that the impartial role adopted by Deputy Wallace when he was chairman of the sub-committee no longer applies and that he is now speaking in a personal capacity. The inquiry into the events surrounding the fall of the Fianna Fáil-Labour Government marked an important chapter in the development of our system of parliamentary democracy. There are those who claim the inquiry was a failure in that it did not reach conclusions on contested facts. Those who do so miss the point.

The inquiry, as constituted, could not achieve more than it did. The sub-committee could only exercise the powers delegated to it by the Dáil. Under that order the sub-committee had power to take evidence in public and to publish the evidence in its report. It was not given specific powers to make findings based on the evidence given to it. That was just as well.

If the sub-committee were to arbitrate on the evidence or reach conclusions which would inevitably have implications for the name or reputation of witnesses it would have had to adopt judicial or quasi-judicial procedures. Legal representation would have been inevitable and the inquiry would be continuing. The result would be another expensive useless lawyers' benefit.

Instead we have had a fair and impartial hearing completed in record time at minimum cost. The general public has had an insight into the events surrounding the fall of the last Government. People who tuned in to the inquiry have been informed and, indeed, entertained. I have heard no complaints on either score. The witnesses, politicians, Attorneys General, civil servants and special advisers were given a reasonable opportunity to tell their story as they saw it. The procedures we devised meant they could be questioned but in a manner and according to a formula that was — and seen to be — fair and just.

The taxpayers were happy in that at long last they were getting a cost-effective procedure for an inquiry into matters of national interest. One day's hearing at the beef tribunal swallowed up more public money than the entire cost of this committee of inquiry. The approximate comparative figures are £35,000 as against £35 million. For every pound spent on the inquiry £1,000 was spent on the beef tribunal. One cannot beat the committee for value.

We should be clear, therefore, on what we are debating and, in particular, on what we are not debating. We are not discussing the judgment of a court established under the Constitution or a report from a tribunal established under the Tribunal of Inquiry Act. The matter before the House is the report of a sub-committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security which was charged with a specific function by an order of the Dáil and which completed its work in accordance with its terms of reference and finalised a report as required by the order. The proceedings of the inquiry and the report should be judged accordingly.

It is worth recalling that the original proposal from the then Fianna Fáil Government on 6 December last was to appoint a person of judicial or senior legal status and to give him or her the necessary powers to summon all persons relative to the inquiry and to report back to the House. Fortunately, that motion was defeated by 91 votes to 66 on 6 December. If it had been adopted, I am convinced that we would still be bogged down in quasi-legal proceedings four months later.

It is correct to say that the inquiry began in a somewhat inauspicious way. The original order of the Dáil was to the Select Committee rather than to a sub-committee and it was clear that the lack of agreed procedures resulted in the opening day in the Dáil Chamber being correctly described by a number of commentators as a "bear garden". Most people will agree that the committee was ill prepared for the work which had been delegated to it. However, the Dáil reacted quickly, enacted the necessary legislation to provide privilege for witnesses and re-established the inquiry on the basis of a small sub-committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security.

It is worth recalling that the terms of reference provided for the committee to question all persons it deemed appropriate on the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the President of the High Court on Friday, 11 November 1994, the request on Sunday, 13 November for re-examination of all details of the Brendan Smyth case, the request to the President of the High Court to resign on Monday, 14 November, the draft reply and covering letter provided to the Taoiseach in advance of the Dáil debate on 15 November and the identification of all those involved in the preparation of his speech on that date.

On reflection, I would very much have liked to have had a specific term of reference authorising the committee to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the seven month delay in dealing with the Brendan Smyth case in the Attorney General's office. If I were to compile a list of faults and failings in relation to the inquiry I would put that issue at the head of the queue. I would have preferred a specific term of reference charging the inquiry to investigate specifically that issue and, if possible, to come to a conclusion in so far as this could be done without casting aspersions on any individual. I am dissatisfied that the inquiry failed to elicit the full story in relation the the Brendan Smyth case and, in particular, that we have not been given a specific reason for the outrageous delay in that case. Suffice it to say at this stage that I do not accept that the legal points involved were so complex that a delay of that order was justified. Sufficient priority should also have been given in the Attorney General's office to that case to allow whatever investigations considered necessary to be completed in a short time. If that had been done the case could have been dealt with and a decision made within a matter of weeks rather than months.

I have the report of the review of the office of Attorney General which was published in the last few weeks. Until recent events brought them to light, there was little understanding or appreciation of the very important work conducted in that office. I cannot recall a full debate in the Dáil on the workings of the office of the Attorney General and, in the context of the publication of the report, the time is ripe for a full and separate debate on this issue. I hope this can be arranged in the near future.

I am not sure it is the function of this debate, or that it would be proper for conclusions to be drawn at this stage in the Dáil, on the matters of fact about which evidence was given before the committee and in respect of which the committee felt it should not express a view. The comments that I make or conclusions that I have come to, therefore, will be very broadly based and as far as possible will not reflect in any way on individuals. This is in contrast to the remarks made by Deputy Wallace. As a chairman he acted in an exemplary and impartial way but, in some of his comments today, he attempted to whitewash the role of Fianna Fáil in the fall of the previous Government.

It is now clear that the appointment of Harold Whelehan to the presidency of the High Court on Friday, 11 November 1994 by the Fianna Fáil component of the Cabinet was a disastrous political mistake. I do not think that anybody will dispute this. There is no single view as to why there was such an insistence on the part of the then Taoiseach to push through that appointment. It may have been the culmination of a series of events which gave rise to bad feeling and difficulties between Fianna Fáil and Labour. It is clear that the beef tribunal and, in particular, the publication of the report and the manner in which it was dealt with by the then Taoiseach, Deputy Albert Reynolds, contributed very substantially to those difficulties. The description of the events on the evening of the publication of the beef tribunal report on Friday, 29 July 1994 is fascinating and perhaps gives a clue as to the reasons the previous Government subsequently fell apart.

There were considerable inconsistencies in relation to the evidence adduced as to what occurred in the five days following the appointment of Mr. Harold Whelehan to the presidency of the High Court on Friday, 11 November. It is not for me to adjudicate on these inconsistencies. However, it is fair to say that the evidence of Eoghan Fitzsimons, Senior Counsel, who had been appointed Attorney General in succession to Harold Whelehan, was crystal clear and was acceptable as an utterly calm and objective recollection of the events of those days. It was very clear that his calm and precise approach had a dramatic impact on the general public who were following the events at the inquiry. One need not go beyond his evidence to get a basic factual account of the events of those days in so far as he had personal knowledge of them. I strongly disagree with the comments made by Deputy Dan Wallace in that regard.

In relation to the events generally leading to and culminating in the fall of the previous Government, the proceedings of the inquiry gave the general public an opportunity to judge these issues for themselves. Effectively the inquiry was merely the medium through which light was thrown on these issues and the general public were judge and jury. I see little point in rehashing the evidence at this stage. The public has drawn its own conclusions. The events leading up to last November and subsequently culminating in the change of Government are now history.

There is one aspect worthy of mention. The inquiry could not have done its job in the way I have described if the media had not been involved to a remarkable degree. There is no doubt that the inquiry captured the public imagination and the media responded very fully. RTE adopted a cautious approach in not making available the proceedings, or at least some of them, in live form. Concern about the possibility of libel might have been one of the factors giving rise to this decision at a time when there was such public demand for live broadcast. However, the role of the media was very important in relation to the success of the inquiry. This was particularly so in the context of the general public being judge and jury. Acres of newsprint and many colour pieces were the regular diet of the papers at the time. Most of the coverage was very accurate and fair. There were a few unbalanced, ill-informed and biased articles but these were very much the exception rather than the rule. For example, Vincent Browne did not distinguish himself in some of his comments but I will say no more about that issue.

There are some lessons to be drawn for the future. New ground was broken from the point of view of effective use of Dáil committee time. Lessons were learned initially from the lack of procedures and new ones were devised. Further lessons can be learned from the experience of the inquiry. It is clear at this stage that we do not want a quasi-court system, neither do we want a committee system modelled on the type of witch-hunt proceedings which took place at the Senator Joe McCarthy hearings on unAmerican activities in the 1950s. We want reform which will ensure that the various organs of the State and holders of high office are more answerable and accountable to the Legislature. We need to ensure that the powers of the Dáil and its committees to investigate matters of serious concern are extended in a balanced way.

In developing the committee inquiry system we should therefore be clear that we are not trying to establish a substitute for court proceedings. It is not really appropriate in our system to have additional courts of justice or tribunals to adjudicate on questions of fact and in particular where people's good name and reputation may be impugned. At the same time we should accept in the future that, where committee inquiries are being conducted, an adjudication on the facts in so far as individuals are concerned is not the expected outcome. Another possibility for consideration is an extension of the role of the legal adviser to the committee. In other jurisdictions the committee Counsel has an investigative role and can produce a report to the committee which is then acted on by it. The American system is renowned for this approach. It would be a useful exercise to have that system examined in more detail to see the parallels that could be drawn here. Our constitutional requirements and restrictions could have a limiting effect on possible investigative activity by committee Counsel.

Such problems would not arise in all cases. For example, the privilege and compellability Bill which will give committees the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and provide for privilege and immunity in respect of their evidence should be completed as soon as possible and debated in the Oireachtas. The new Select Committee on Legislation and Security should now conduct an objective examination of the procedures which were developed and the process involved in the inquiry just completed. I emphasise that such an examination should not be related to the substantive issues, but rather to the process and the procedures. I am a believer that, in the cold light of day in the absence of emotion and tension, there is a better chance of dispassionate examination of such procedures leading to sensible recommendations for improvement. Furthermore, information should be obtained from other jurisdictions as to how inquiries are conducted there and lessons drawn from that experience.

My views as to the future are that more thought should be put into the framing of the terms of reference of any such an inquiry. All witnesses should be asked to submit statements in advance — it was unfair that some witnesses had the benefit of hearing the evidence of others before completing their statements. Any such opening statements should be submitted in advance to the legal adviser to check their relevance; one statement submitted to the recent inquiry contained matters which were in breach of Cabinet confidentiality. Evidence in this type of inquiry should not be given on oath. There should be more flexibility in the questioning of witnesses. Overall there should not be an expectation that any such inquiry is a substitute for a court process. The cost-effective approach of the recent inquiry should be followed as far as possible.

What happened last November involved a breakdown in trust between Fianna Fáil and Labour. The approximate causes were not necessarily the real causes of the breakdown. The inquiry which we conducted with relatively narrow terms of reference was not able to give detailed or authoritative adjudication on these matters — perhaps just as well. On the other hand, the inquiry performed a very useful role where the general public was concerned. It will be seen to have been even more useful if, in the future, we draw on the lessons and experiences of that inquiry, in particular from the point of view of process and procedures.

I compliment the sub-committee and its chairman, Deputy Wallace, on the very comprehensive job it carried out. It is generally agreed that the work of the committee shed considerable additional light on events of last November, which led to the fall of the last Government and the background to them. Rarely have the proceedings of any sub-committee of this House attracted such intense public interest. The commentators on public affairs and the political scientists were also well satisfied in terms of insights into some of the workings of Government.

The committee did an excellent job. While it showed that events had proceeded in a somewhat confused manner in an atmosphere of political crisis, there was no evidence to substantiate rumours of dark conspiracies or allegations of deception. The State has not been rocked to its foundations, no doubt much to some people's disappointment.

The method adopted for investigating these events was a matter of controversy when the legislation went through the Dáil. The committee worked well as a means of investigating events, through hearing and cross-examining witnesses with free and unimpeded access to all relevant documentation, but it was right not to attempt to draw conclusions.

It would be a very unhappy state of affairs if a committee of the House were to take it upon itself to act in a quasi-judicial manner, delivering verdicts and distributing blame. Unlike the Judiciary, Members of the House do not normally claim to be impartial. Judgments would inevitably have the partisan colour of a political majority at any time. It is right for public opinion to be the jury and make up its mind in the light of all the considerations put before it, as to whether the fall of the last Government was really necessary and whether it could not have been put together again.

It has been asked if the beef tribunal could have been conducted by a Dáil Committee at a fraction of the cost? Perhaps some of the political allegations relating to Government actions could have been so investigated, but questions of alleged fraud and malpractices in the beef industry would probably have been beyond the resources of this House to investigate, and outside parties would have felt they lacked adequate legal protection. The sub-committee worked in this instance, becauses all the witnesses were either Ministers, former Ministers, Attorneys General, senior civil servants or advisers, the lawyers remained in the background.

What the beef tribunal and the sub-committee had in common, however, was that they were both established to investigate potentially serious charges of political wrongdoing against members of my party. For many years, the enemies and rivals of Fianna Fáil, inside and outside the Dáil, have been vainly on the look-out for a major scandal that would confirm their prejudices and suspicions and prove their case about the political culture of Fianna Fáil, to use another expression of Deputy Rabbitte's. The politicisation of problems in the beef industry is turning out to be expensive for the country, with the tribunal costing £30 million to £35 million to run and its report leading to a £75 million fine by the European Union, with possibly more to come, a bill which, according to the Minister, Deputy Yates, may fall to be paid by the taxpayer. The extra few million in taxes owed will not go very far to cover these costs. The law of the land is there to investigate and prosecute fraud, wherever it exists, without political impediment. Administrative practices have been tightened up in consultation with the European Union. If there is one matter on which we are all agreed it is that there must be a better way of dealing with such issues in the future.

The sub-committee was established in highly unusual circumstances. The Government was in a minority in the House and the sub-committee was pushed through by the Opposition majority. One must wonder whether this Government with a majority, and assuming it remains united, would subject itself to this type of inquiry, however much circumstances might call for it. We all have a vivid memory of one of the most disgraceful episodes in this House, 11 years ago, when Irish Shipping was closed down in scandalous circumstances and the Minister of the time, Deputy Jim Mitchell, refused to appear before a Dáil committee and forbade any of his officials to appear.

That was the level of openness, transparency and accountability the last time Fine Gael and Labour were in Government together. I would not automatically assume things would be radically different today and it would be wrong to draw such conclusions from the establishment of this sub-committee in very unusual political circumstances. Members of the public looking forward to an early repeat are likely to be disappointed.

What precipitated the political crisis of last November was a serious political misjudgment perhaps brought about by a degree of mutual exasperation. As I said in my evidence, we wanted to be finished with a saga that had run on for too long. I have no hesitation in saying that the Fianna Fáil-Labour Government was an excellent Government, which helped to bring about peace in Ireland and which had a fine record of economic and social achievement. Since early 1993 the Labour Party was subjected to fairly constant unfair harassment inside and outside the Dáil, purely and simply because it had decided to break with precedent and to go into Government with Fianna Fáil.

Now that Labour are in the rainbow, all is quiet on the western front. One does not hear any more about Labour Party programme managers, since Fine Gael, with cynical and breathtaking opportunism and Democratic Left, have hastened to embrace them. One does not hear much about the Government jet, because the present Opposition is not as politically childish as were Fine Gael were about necessary Government business.

It is used now only for official Government business so the Deputy has nothing to say about the Government jet.

(Interruptions.)

I even believe that the Tánaiste could now safely return to the Waldorf-Astoria in New York and, in all probability, nobody in the media would criticise him. Nevertheless, the peace and quiet purchased by the Labour Party by abandoning its partnership with Fianna Fáil, in the longer run, may also have a political price attached. Labour did not do so well in last June's by-elections or the November ones in Cork. The leadership believed they were not getting the credit for their good work in Government which created a serious political problem for them.

Modern Coalition politics has become intensely competitive, in a way that is not good for the stability or cohesion of any Government, and which distracts from concentration on the main problems in hand. We have seen a recent example of that with the competitive leaks over the budget, which led to the resignation of a junior Minister.

In the Fine Gael-Labour Coalition of the 1980s, the two parties largely cancelled each other out. Government was a zero-sum game, where if one party gained the other lost. We had our own experience with the Progressive Democrats, when we had Government by ultimatum, with the Progressive Democrats asserting themselves by threatening to pull out of Government on at least half a dozen occasions.

The Partnership Government with Labour was a much more positive experience. Ministers worked well together. Unfortunately, as time went by, there was a deterioration in the relations between the two leaders, where perhaps most of the political competitiveness was focused, and to which the rest of us did not pay enough attention. This manifested itself in the battle of political wills that developed over the appointment to the presidency of the High Court, which was not an issue that had the intrinsic importance to bring down a Government. Tough negotiating positions are often the stuff of politics, but nobody believed, particularly in the aftermath of the ceasefires, that the issue would be pushed over the brink on either side. That it was, even after we believed it had been defused, provides an object lesson for everyone in this House.

It was not an issue that should ever have gone in to the public domain, a compromise would have been much easier, if it had not. The derogatory briefing of the former Taoiseach, when he was away in Australia, poisoned the altmosphere, some of the circumstances of which represented a serious breach of trust. An agreement of understanding was later negotiated, but Fianna Fáil did not, out of consideration for its partner, press home quickly its political advantage. Machiavelli's advice to the Prince was ignored. Mr. John Rogers in his evidence testified about the continued personal opposition of the Tánaiste to Mr. Whelehan's appointment on 20 October, three days before the delays in the Fr. Brendan Smyth case were brought to public notice in the Sunday Independent. On the other hand, it could be fairly said that the Fianna Fáil side of the Government failed to see that the delays in the Fr. Brendan Smyth case involving very emotive child sexual abuse by an adult in a position of trust weakened the case for proceeding regardless with an appointment with which the Labour leadership was deeply unhappy. There was of course an agreement, but it is not always wise to demand one's pound of flesh. I also think in general that people proposed for a public appointment to which they feel they have a strong claim nevertheless, should, decline gracefully if their appointment will cause great public controversy or even a serious Governmental crisis. It is too late to step down when all the damage is done.

The concept behind the Partnership Government, which I played a key part in negotiating in December 1992, was that decisions would be made by the parties in Government by agreement or consensus. Even though we believed we had a prior agreement, the implementation of which was continually being put off, it was still a serious matter to force through a decision against the will, and in the absence, of the Labour Ministers.

This caused a very serious breach, but did not warrant or necessitate the break-up of the Government. Indeed with the peace process only two and a half months old, it was gravely irresponsible to let the Government fall apart, even if in the event the peace has held steady. To be fair to Labour Ministers, they strove hard to put the Government together again, but in the end their influence did not count for very much.

In the efforts to hold the Government together, and the events over the weeks from 14 November to 6 December 1994, the Duggan case came to assume extraordinary and unmerited significance.

The Minister for Justice asked the new Attorney General to review the files before the Taoiseach went into the Dáil to explain the handling of the Fr. Brendan Smyth case. The new Attorney presented to Ministers a previous case, which appeared to undermine one of the reasons given by his predecessor for the delay. The trouble was, as every Minister has testifed, the case was complex and not clearcut. It is clear from the evidence to the tribunal that the Duggan case had little intrinsic importance, and if there was factual error, it was of a formal rather than a substantive kind. In the light of what we subsequently know, it is not surprising that the Taoiseach and Ministers hesitated to embrace fully the view of the new Attorney General that Monday afternoon.

People have made much of the apparent conflict of evidence between the former Attorney General, Mr. Eoghan Fitzsimons, and the Fianna Fáil Ministers about whether or not he provided a definitive view that Monday. In resolving that conflict, I regard the written evidence of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, Mr. Tim Dalton, as providing decisive confirmation of the Minister's evidence. He recounts how, in conversation with him on Monday afternoon, the Minister for Justice stated her intention to make a personal statement to the House:

the Minister went on to say that she was far from clear as to the extent to which the Attorney was suggesting the consideration given to the issue of delay in the Duggan case had a relevance for the Smyth case. As I understand it, the lack of clarity related to a difference of opinion on the issue between the Attorney General and the Senior Legal Assistant in the Attorney's Office ... The Minister indicated to me that the Attorney had been asked to go off and clarify the situation.

This provides decisive independent contemporaneous confirmation of a key part of the evidence of Fianna Fáil Ministers and the then Taoiseach.

The Attorney General, Mr. Fitzsimons, was very concerned in his Tuesday letter to the Taoiseach that the Taoiseach should not state that the Smyth case was the first to be considered under the relevant section of the Extradition Act. The Taoiseach did not say that, and therefore did not mislead the Dáil, because he and his colleagues were determined not to justify the inexcusable delay in dealing with the Smyth case. Indeed, the Taoiseach was quite open and frank with the House in not advancing any excuses.

Despite incorporating all the suggestions passed to us by the Labour Ministers, the Tuesday speech did not succeed in pacifying the Labour Party. It is fanciful to suggest that a passing reference in the Taoiseach's speech to the fact that two Ministers would make statements of correction to the House, which was apparently intended at one stage, would have made any great difference to the Labour Party's reaction. The need to go further on the Tuesday evening came together with the now emphatic view of the Attorney General that an omission of reference to the Duggan case in his predecessor's report to Cabinet meant that he should not have been appointed President of the High Court or allowed to remain Attorney General. This very harsh view was adopted by the then Taoiseach on the advice of the Attorney General although he has since disowned it, and the bottom line conclusions formed the basis of a signed agreement by Deputy Dick Spring to go back into Government with Deputy Albert Reynolds.

This agreement, about which his closest adviser was deeply unhappy, was broken within less than an hour, following an interview between Deputy Spring and the Attorney General, the background to which remains unclear and mysterious. I find it extraordinary that Deputy Spring was only willing to hear one side of the case, that of a fellow-lawyer, which carried more weight than his colleagues in Government with whom he had worked far more closely. The attitude of Mr. Finlay, judging from his evidence, seems to have been that the Taoiseach could not credibly and with dignity disown the appointment made, an arguable point of view. Yet that is precisely what the Labour Party Ministers had been pressing Fianna Fáil to do, presumably in good faith, in order to preserve the Government. Obviously, Mr. Finlay had decided ahead of the Labour Ministers and even of the Tánaiste, that the Government was doomed. All that remained to be done was to rationalise this in a suitable tone of high moral indignation.

I would remind the House that it is a long-standing practice in this House that in this privileged Assembly persons outside the House should not be criticised or attacked as they are not in a position to defend themselves. I ask Members to exercise restraint in this regard.

I am being very restrained in talking about this individual. Deputy Quinn, when he said at the subsequent meeting that they had come looking for a head, rather spoiled the high moral ground effects surrounding the whole episode. Having enjoyed good relations with all my Labour colleagues, I resented and rejected the insinuation, which is what it eventually came to, that Fianna Fáil Ministers as a whole were involved in morally unacceptable conduct.

All parties in this House have on different occasions had reason to be wary of agreements entered into with the leadership of the Labour Party. In the 1980s agreements made in Cabinet with Fine Gael were not always kept, as a result of pressure from Labour Party backbenchers. In January 1987 it walked out of Government with Fine Gael after four and a quarter years together. In December 1992 the Labour Party leadership negotiated a policy agreement with Democratic Left and then abandoned it but used the agreement as a platform for negotiations with others. Its Deputy Leader announced it was opening negotiations with Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrates but this agreement was then disowned.

Successive agreements on the timing of the appointment of the presidency of the High Court were not kept last autumn. The Leader of the Labour Party, under internal pressure and without adequate objective cause, repudiated within an hour his signed agreement of 10.22 a.m. on 16 November 1994 to re-enter Government with Fianna Fáil. The Labour Party leadership then turned to Fine Gael to see if it could negotiate the office of Taoiseach for Deputy Dick Spring but Fine Gael held its nerve. The Labour Party leadership then went back to Fianna Fáil. Three weeks later, on the flimsiest of excuses, an article in The Irish Times That contained nothing new but which added to the political pressure for Deputy John Bruton the previous day, it walked away from a virtually completed agreement with Fianna Fáil. Very little was said in justification of this at the sub-committee, as it knew it was on very weak ground and had a bad conscience about it.

The Labour Party then used the draft agreement with Fianna Fáil as a basis for negotiating the programme for A Government of Renewal, large portions of which came direct from the original Fianna Fáil paper. As successive opinion polls showed, the country wanted a renewed partnership between Fianna Fáil and the Labour Party but was denied it by the vacillation and indecision of the Labour Party leadership. I gather that on the morning of 15 December 1994 the Labour Party leadership overturned a previous rainbow agreement that would have given Democratic Left two seats in Cabinet and five only to the Labour Party. As a result of this successful last minute “try on” Democratic Left ended up with one Cabinet Minister while the Labour Party retained six.

During the years the Labour Party leadership has developed "political gazumping" to a fine art. In the short term at least the Labour Party appears to have done well out of the episode, with six seats in Cabinet, including the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, let no one try to persuade us that the gyrations were all for the sake of high-minded principle when, latterly in particular, it was all about weighing up and maximising its own political advantage. The Labour Party leadership has been good at creating the impression that it has higher political standards but that is not the case. As a result of all these events we have a new Government but it is not doing as good a job as I believe a renewed partnership Government with Fianna Fáil would have done.

The handling of the national finances has led to a loss of confidence and contributed to the rise in interest rates. The markets see a Government that solves internal difficulties by spending more money. The strict expenditure limit of 6 per cent has been seriously breached within a few weeks of assuming office. Since we had succeeded in eliminating the current budget deficit in 1994 that should have remained the position for all time, especially as it would have meant more tax relief down the line.

The Minister for Social Welfare admitted during the weekend that the general social welfare increases were grossly inadequate and claimed, disingenuously, that he had not attempted to defend them. If socialism is supposed to be about anything, it is the fair and equal distribution of resources. To pump all available resources in a couple of favoured political directions while neglecting the old who do not vote for Democratic Left and the unemployed without children, is a betrayal of socialism. If the Minister for Social Welfare is not in a position to defend what were largely his choices and priorities, what is he doing in office?

The previous Government ensured steady momentum in the peace process. We would have enacted the convention on the transfer of prisoners a long time ago instead of having our members thrown out of the House for asking questions about it. It is time for a further initiative on Republican prisoners in Portlaoise. Issues on which movement was required were continually raised, publicly and privately, with the British. The previous Taoiseach constantly explained and promoted the peace process while his Government showed a sureness of touch and did not try to put the cart before the horse. Let me not be misunderstood. We support the Government in relation to the Framework Document and will support any efforts it makes to consolidate the peace process and move it forward. A clear understanding of the situation, a sense of direction and political energy are all needed so that a dangerous political vacuum is not allowed to develop. I was disappointed that in a recent interview the Taoiseach listed the peace process only third on his list of political priorities.

Government Ministers are trying to do their best, although many of them are very inexperienced. It has been shown, for instance, in the initial attitude of the Minister for Defence, Deputy Coveney, to barracks closures, the ultimatum of the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Deputy Lowry, to the ESB, the premature announcement of a referendum on bail by the Minister for Justice, Deputy Owen, and the lopsided welfare priorities of the Minister for Social Welfare, Deputy De Rossa. I do not think there is the close rapport between the parties in Government that developed between Fianna Fáil and the Labour Party or coherent leadership from the top. The Taoiseach tends to talk off the top of his head; when he expressed some ill-thought out ideas on Europe last week he was laughed at. This is probably the reason his exposure has been deliberately limited.

I hope the Government will preserve and build on the achievements since 1987 and not damage them, as it seems set to do. Essentially, what we have in place is a caretaker Government until the next general election when the people will have the opportunity to decide whether they want a more coherent Government with a strong sense of common purpose and led by a party that has a long proven track record of delivering which inspires confidence.

I thank all the members of the sub-committee, especially those who stayed with it. I do not want to name those who did not. I also thank my party colleague and chairman of the sub-committee, Deputy Dan Wallace, for having done an excellent job.

I am not sure what much of the last speech had to do with the topic before the House for discussion but at least I gained from it the knowledge and reassurance that Deputy Ahern has now fallen out as comprehensively with the Labour Party as he did previously with my own party. We should be happy about this.

Who fell first? The Deputy ran away from every party.

It is difficult in 20 minutes to give any kind of detailed assessment of the report of the sub-commitee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security. It is possible, however, to speak of the general significance of the inquiry carried out by the sub-committee and to demonstrate its usefulness and importance in spite of the superficial and frequently facile reaction of some of the media at the time of its publication.

This is the first time a committee of this House has ever fully and extensively investigated from start to finish a series of interlocking political events of fundamental importance. Their importance can be gauged from the fact that as a result the then Taoiseach resigned and, in spite of his best efforts to the contrary, the principle of accountability was upheld and vindicated. As a further result, the second most senior judge in the land also had to resign.

Because of the enforced resignation of Deputy Reynolds as Taoiseach the subsequent inquiry did not have the fundamental political relevance it might have had. Nonetheless, as a member of the sub-committee which spent a great deal of time on the inquiry and worked very intensively over a period of about five to six weeks, I consider it was a worthwhile exercise. This is particularly so when it is borne in mind that it was the first such inquiry of this nature undertaken by a Dáil committee. The facile reaction is because it could not make specific findings that reflected on the good name or reputation of individuals and it was claimed, therefore, that it was a waste of time. It was invaluable and a great advance in the political process here and very much in the public interest that a succession of senior politicians and senior officials, including Ministers and former Ministers, appeared before the committee to account for their actions. Light was shed on events notwithstanding the anxiety of certain members of the former Government to carry on everything in secret.

The inquiry into the events of November 1994 had less public impact than the Dáil debates in November as these events unfolded and developed. The reason for this is that the Dáil debates were televised live and had a substantial effect on the public. Because of the length of the hearings each day it was not possible to televise live the deliberations of the sub-committee. I am not blaming RTE for this because the rule to which it seemed to be subject was that if they had broadcast any of it live they would have had to broadcast all of it which would clearly have been impossible with only two television channels.

The sheer inpact of the Dáil debates enabled the public to make up its mind. Because the public was enabled to draw conclusions from those Dáil debates, the former Taoiseach resigned and the last Government fell. Without that live coverage in November, these events might not have happened. The public's ability to see events unfolding before its eyes and to see the demeanour of those involved has a much greater impact than looking at recorded highlights, reading Dáil debates or even reading the most acute commentary on debates. It is a clear demonstration of the primacy of television as a medium.

As somebody who was involved in the beef tribunal, it is a cause of great regret to me that that tribunal was not televised as it would be, for example, in the United States on a public service channel. If it had been so televised, the public at large would have had few doubts about a great many aspects of the topics covered in that tribunal, just as the handful of uncommitted people who attended the tribunal's hearings were left in no doubt as to where the truth lay.

The inability of the sub-committee, on strong legal advice, to draw conclusions arises from the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in a case called in Re. Haughey, reported in the 1971 Irish Reports when an investigation was being attempted by the Committee of Public Accounts of this House. The rules laid down in In Re. Haughey were so fundamental and all encompassing that they will inhibit future investigations of this type here unless they are changed by the Supreme Court in a further case or unless there is some form of constitutional amendment. Serious consideration will have to be given to one or other of these courses because, to hamstring committees of this House for all time in necessary public investigations, would be seriously detrimental to the public interest.

Among the advantages of this form of inquiry is that it was very expeditious and its cost negligible, in contrast to the beef tribunal which took three years and is reputed to have cost over £30 million pounds. The absence of lawyers from active involvement in the committee's hearings was undoubtedly a great advantage and led to the expeditious and inexpensive inquiry.

There is a debate beginning in the context of the criminal law, as to why the accused should appear to have all the rights and the victim none. There is a clear analogy to be drawn from this type of inquiry. Why is it that those who might be criticised or reprimanded appear to have all the rights and the public interest none? Why is it that the conduct of such an inquiry must be carried on from the point of view of protecting those being investigated, who might or might not have been potential wrongdoers?

When I was Minister for Justice 23 years ago, I made a speech querying whether the accusatorial and confrontational system of justice we inherited from the English is necessarily the best, and I asked whether we should look to countries on the Continent and to their system of investigating magistrates as a possible alternative. I was howled down at the time by all the various vested interests, principally the legal one. I am glad to see that the idea was taken up again at a seminar in County Clare last weekend by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

We tend to look down on the Italians and their public administration as appearing somehow corrupt. It may well have been so in the past but it has to be said for the Italians, and it cannot be said for us, that they have a system of courageous investigating magistrates which has led to serious scandals and corruption being uncovered and investigated fully and which is contributing in a major way to the break-up of organised crime in the underworld of the Mafia. A long succession of Ministers, including former Prime Ministers, have been charged by these investigating magistrates. No Italian head has been too high to roll. Our system does not even allow such an investigation to begin.

The peculiar English system of investigation, which we so slavishly follow, has been at least partly abandoned by the English. The Scots never allowed themselves to adopt English law. We, on the other hand, try to be more English than the English.

The English do not suffer from the same constraints on an inquiry where very senior people are involved. The proof of that is the present Scott Inquiry which has been expeditious and where legal representation is minimal. I have not heard anyone complain that injustice must necessarily be done by Lord Justice Scott because he does not follow the rules of In Re. Haughey, and let us not forget that Scott is looking into the actions of a former Prime Minister and a whole range of Ministers.

It is important that this House as a whole, and not just the Government of the day, give serious consideration to the experience of the sub-committee and to what lessons can be learned from its inquiry, not just in regard to the facts which have come to light but, even more importantly, in respect of how further inquiries of this type might be carried on in the future. This House will have to be the primary vehicle for consideration of these matters through the Committee on Procedure and Privileges because any Government of the day would like to assume that there would never have to be an inquiry into its actions and will not give any priority to devising ways of overcoming the difficulties which beset this sub-committee. Whether this House and its committees can undertake this task successfully is a matter of some doubt because of the lack of parliamentary independence and supremacy which has been a feature of our democratic institutions.

This House, now as before, is dominated by the Government of the day. Its committees are so dominated, and the chairmanship of each of its committees bar one is seen as in the gift of the Government. Any parliament that fails to assert itself as against the Government of the day in the way we do, has only itself to blame for the problems that flow from that. The fact that this debate on a fundamentally important issue will last for scarcely two hours is an indication of the priorities of the House, even at a time when there is little or no new business before it, and it has to resort to what my colleague, Deputy McDowell calls "legislative polyfilla".

There is an urgent need for the long delayed Bill introducing compellability and privilege for witnesses before committees of this House. This inquiry further underlines the desirability of this even if, as in this case, all the witnesses actually turned up.

There were many conflicts of interest in the evidence given to the sub-committee where that sub-committee as a body was not allowed to draw conclusions. The principal conflict was between the evidence given by the former Attorney General, Mr. Eoghan Fitzsimons, on the one hand, and that given by the former Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds and the former Minister for Justice, Deputy Geoghegan-Quinn on the other. Mr. Fitzsimons was of course at a major disadvantage inasmuch as he was the first witness; he did not know what evidence would be given by any other witness and his evidence was available to every other witness to seek to pick holes in it, if it suited them and their lawyers in the adjoining room.

It transpired in the course of the evidence of Mr. Fitzsimons that on no less than seven occasions on the Monday of the week in question he spoke to one, some or all of the Fianna Fáil Ministers about the Duggan case. He was assured that the Taoiseach and at least two Ministers would deal with the Duggan case in the Dáil the following day. Understandably, he saw no reason at the time to doubt that and he understood it to be Government policy, as he was entitled to do. At about lunchtime on the Tuesday he was informed by the then Minister for Justice to the effect. "We have decided not to use the Duggan case". It is hardly surprising that he was startled at this and found it necessary to write a very specific letter to the Taoiseach.

As a member of the committee that heard the evidence of all the witnesses, except one, and who read that evidence, I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion at the end of the inquiry that the evidence given by Mr. Fitzsimons was correct in everything except some trivial and irrelevant details. I still believe that to be the case and I am not impressed by the prolonged efforts of former Fianna Fáil Ministers to try to persuade the sub-committee that while they had heard about the Duggan case, they did not appreciate its significance. They appreciated it sufficiently on the Monday for three members of the Government to indicate their intention to refer to it and to clarify the position the following day and for one of those three subsequently to offer her resignation as Minister because of her failure to have it clarified. My impression of Mr. Fitzsimons is that he is somewhat innocent and politically naive and was horrified to find himself in the centre of a den of people with whom he then discovered he had little or nothing in common.

As well as the evidence that they had all been informed of Duggan on Monday, and some of them several times, there is the further evidence of Dr. Mansergh, their chief adviser, that he had in his possession on the Monday evening a full written document on the Duggan case from the Attorney General. Dr. Mansergh afterwards sought to suggest that, in saying that he had it in his possession, he really meant by those words that he did not have it in his possession. It seems remarkable that those who did not understand, as they claim, the significance of Duggan should have asked the then Attorney General to request the recently appointed President of the High Court to resign his office because of his failure to tell the Government of it.

The Chair has already indicated that reference to persons outside the House should be made responsibly which I reiterate. I ask that a responsible approach be taken in naming persons outside the House in view of the fact that we are speaking from a privileged position.

I am dealing with the report which mentions the names of all these people who were examined at length.

As late as 5 December last some of these Ministers pleaded with Mr. Fitzsimons, who was asked to prepare a note on what had happened, to give them a fool's pardon. This he attempted to do in the addendum to his report of that date by saying that on the Monday they were behaving in a very disorganised manner and that no one appeared to be in charge. As a Fianna Fáil Attorney General it seems unlikely that Mr. Fitzsimons would have set out to be antagonistic to Fianna Fáil. I believe that Mr. Fitzsimons simply set out to tell the truth and succeeded in doing so.

Notwithstanding all its detail, this inquiry leaves certain questions unanswered and we are entitled to ask now why they remain unanswered in spite of all the efforts to secure answers. Why was the extradition request for Fr. Brendan Smyth not dealt with after seven months in the Attorney General's office? If Fr. Smyth had not gone to the North, would that request even still have been dealt with? Why was the sexual abuse of children by an adult in a position of trust regarded as of such little importance by the Attorney General's office it could be effectively ignored over a lengthy period?

Why was the then Taoiseach so obsessed with appointing Mr. Whelehan as President of the High Court in spite of cogent reasons to the contrary? Why was Mr. Whelehan so obsessed with being appointed? Why did the then Taoiseach take steps — that even he must have realised could lead to the downfall of his Government — to have Mr. Whelehan appointed to his office against the strong opposition of his partners in Government who left the Cabinet room in protest? Did this obsessive loyalty to Mr. Whelehan have its roots somewhere in the recesses of the beef tribunal, where great favours were done for the then Taoiseach?

That is a disgraceful statement.

Was it a price that had to be paid at any cost? How could it be remotely argued that the appointment of Mr. Whelehan to this office would be publicly beneficial or necessary?

There are other people who have questions to answer which were never answered in this committee's inquiry. Why were the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, and some of his colleagues anxious to go back into Government with Fianna Fáil early in December after all they had discovered about the events of November? Why was the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, deflected from that course of action only by an article in a newspaper, the factual substance of which he may have been aware of all along? What sort of man changes his mind because of public disclosure of facts but is prepared to live with the principles involved if they are not publicly disclosed?

Why did the then Taoiseach and his colleagues seek to conceal so much from the Dáil? Why did the then Taoiseach change his mind, or at least change his public utterances, about Mr. Whelehan so often even though he had all the relevant information on the Monday? What credibility has someone who supports you on Tuesday, abandons and excoriates you on Wednesday and says a month later at the committee of inquiry that you were really a fine fellow after all? Is the changing assessment of Mr. Whelehan by people in Fianna Fáil no more than a reflection of their own personal interests or welfare at a particular time? If Fianna Fáil's old reliable friend, Harry Whelehan is readily expendable, who is not?

It was abundantly clear from the evidence to the sub-committee by Deputy Spring, several other Ministers and Mr. Finlay that the then Taoiseach's manner of handling the report of the beef tribunal was the first and principal cause of the breakdown in relations between Fianna Fáil and Labour. The beef tribunal, and the events that led to it, loomed large over this committee's inquiry and indeed continue to loom large over several aspects of public affairs.

If Fianna Fáil Ministers could change their mind about Mr. Whelehan when it suited them, naturally they did the same about Mr. Russell in the Attorney General's office. Shortly after taking office Mr. Fitzsimons was asked to fire Mr. Russell from his position as the senior official in the office, equivalent to the secretary of a Department. When Mr. Whelehan sought to stand over Mr. Russell's handling of the Brendan Smyth affair, Deputy Reynolds and his colleagues were furious, but when it came to the committee's hearing Fianna Fáil changed its mind again and decided it was more expedient to agree with Mr. Russell. Mr. Russell was more fortunate than his antagonist Deputy Reynolds. While Deputy Reynolds has been forced out of office, Mr. Russell has apparently been reinstated surrounded with the benefit of computers to make him more businesslike.

Since, incidentally, we are told that Duggan had nothing to do with the delay, it is interesting to discover from the correspondence that passed between the parties that the British Attorney General thought it had and specifically drew the attention of the Irish Attorney General to that fact. Constant and well rehearsed repetition by certain Fianna Fáil former Ministers that Duggan was not relevant, sought and partly succeeded in embedding that belief in the public mind. The fact that it may reside in a vague way in the public mind does not make it correct because the facts are otherwise.

What he says is untrue; what the Deputy says is true — it is the same old story.

My belief is that for the future the ideal would be that committees investigating serious matters of this type should be smaller than this sub-committee, even though I can see that creates difficulties of representation. Ideally such committees should, if possible, be chaired by someone with legal knowledge and experience. Given the difficulties he laboured under, Deputy Wallace did a good job as chairman but I do not see why the chairman should be inhibited or prevented from taking part in questioning of witnesses. A judge can do so in court without prejudicing or forfeiting his independence or open-mindedness. In looking at how further inquiries should be run, it is worthwhile for this House to study the experience of the Committee of Public Accounts which has had a relative degree of success over the years, even with limited resources and powers.

Some things never change.

First I wish to pay tribute to Deputy Dan Wallace who carried out an extremely important role as Chairman of the Sub-committee on Legislation and Security and who produced a most important report which reveals a substantial amount of information on the way the State functions, particularly the way Government functions. He undertook a difficult role and handled many of the points raised in the fairest way possible, considering the political nature of the inquiry and the difficulties that could have arisen in terms of his position. Despite all the difficulties he carried out his role in an extremely professional and competent manner.

It would be a mistake to rehash the whole inquiry. The role of the committee was to inquire into events during the period concerned and to make the results available to the public for consideration and decision. The point was made by me and other members of the committee that criticism would be levelled at the inquiry to the effect that conclusions arrived at would not be to the satisfaction of certain people. It was pointed out by most members of the committee that the public is the jury on this issue and, if given access to the information gleaned from the inquiry, it would make up its own mind on the conclusions.

It is important that RTE and the media be given due recognition for the work they did in the course of this inquiry. Most people forget that it took place during the Christmas when they were enjoying the festivities. People had hoped to get away from the hustle and bustle of political life. RTE and the media covered one of the most important inquiries we have had for some time in such a way that it made a substantial impact on the public, as the viewing numbers attest. That is a tribute to both RTE and the print media who gave it substantial coverage in a format which enabled the public to adjudicate daily on the evidence put before them.

The members of the committee who worked with Deputy Dan Wallace gave a service second to none. The proceedings were reported speedily and this made the work of the committee extremely pleasant and easy to undertake.

I would like to put some aspects of the proceedings in perspective. Most people criticise the Tánaiste. Deputy Spring, for his failure to inform the public of his reservations regarding the appointment of Mr. Harry Whelehan to the position of President of the High Court. During the evidence given by the Tánaiste at that inquiry he outlined the reason and stated:

In June or July 1994 the Taoiseach informed me that Mr. Whelehan had expressed an interest in the High Court appointment, possibly the presidency if it became available. I informed the Taoiseach that I did not consider it wise to appoint Mr. Whelehan directly to any administrative position within the courts and that it would be more satisfactory to appoint a person with judicial experience. I also said that I would agree to Mr. Whelehan being appointed as a judge of the High Court or to the European vacancy, if he wished.

I think that statement is an expression of concern about that appointment.

I will now refer to the events that unfolded on the night of Thursday, 10 November 1994 and through the weekend to the following Wednesday. The concerns expressed by the Tánaiste on the appointment of the then Attorney General, Mr. Whelehan, to the presidency of the High Court were repeated in two letters which were sent to the Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, expressing serious reservations about proceeding with the appointment of the Attorney General to the presidency of the High Court on Friday, 11 November 1994. On that Friday the Labour Ministers in Government expressed their reservations about proceeding with the appointment but, despite those clear signals of political danger, the Taoiseach persisted with the appointment. At that point the die was cast. That is the point of breakdown of a partnership that had been so successful. The trust in Government began to dissipate from that moment and it became virtually impossible to repair the damage. That is the crucial point that has emerged from reading the evidence of the committee report.

Expressions of concern about the appointment and the breakdown of trust continued on that Saturday and Sunday. A special parliamentary Labour Party conference was called on Sunday to deal with the issue and throughout that day party members gave their total commitment to support the Tánaiste and Labour Ministers in whatever action they decided to take in the developing political situation. The Tánaiste had a clear mandate from the party.

On that Sunday night and Monday the new Attorney General, Mr. Eogan Fitzsimons, made serious attempts, on instructions, to find out the background reasons for the seven months' delay in handling the Smyth case and to provide the information as quickly as possible so that it could be made available to the political parties and to the public who were seriously concerned about the progress of events. It must be recognised at this point that the credibility of Mr. Eoghan Fitzsimons, the then Attorney General, was called into question. This was unfortunate because he is a man of high integrity who had been a short time in a job and had done his utmost to be of assistance to the Government. It is a pity that he was not recalled by the committee. The report is over 1,000 pages but it could be summarised as the statement of Eoghan Fitzsimons versus the rest and if he had come back he might have answered some of the questions. We know he was not interested in doing so and unfortunately people will have to draw their own conclusions.

We should consider the terms of reference when holding committees of inquiry because they will enable us to do the job correctly or restrict the work we may want to do. In this case we found that the terms of reference were not adequately considered in order to allow the work to proceed in the way most members said it should. We must be careful about this in future. It also puts a great deal of strain on members who do not have large resources for research. They coped effectively but in future there should be research facilities that members may call upon irrespective of the resources of individual Deputies.

On one occasion the committee met far too long, almost 11 hours. It was done with the best of intentions because of pressure on the committee. This was difficult for witnesses and Members but served as a marker for the future. In future we must make sure that we provide adequate time for the work of the committees.

I am not sure whether the sub judice rule should apply to proceedings, with members and journalists forbidden to discuss matters concerning the inquiry, until its work has been completed. The committee faced many dilemmas which the chairman had to address as to whether it was correct for Members to speak to the media about the issues they had dealt with that day. The consensus was that Members should refrain from speaking to the media except for some who acted as substitute members for a short time and felt obliged to comment on the workings of the committee. We must consider how we should proceed in that area. It would be wrong to make it into too much of a judicial inquiry. It is a political inquiry, perhaps the rules are too strict, and we must decide if they are relevant.

All parties should have been asked to make written submissions in advance. This would reduce the time spent on hearing oral contributions and all parties would have knowledge of all the testimony of contributors. We first heard the former Attorney General, Eoghan Fitzsimons, and used his contribution as the guideline for questioning on the events to be looked at. It would be a big improvement if those appearing before us submitted written statements. Committee members should be allowed to contribute and whether their information should be heard in public or private session is a matter we must consider. The chairman should have a greater opportunity to intervene and contribute to the work of the committee.

Some questions are left unanswered. When we create committees of inquiry we could easily fall into the trap of constructing forums that would resemble courts of law. We should avoid that and ensure committees are not guided predominantly by judicial rules. The public, who charge us with the responsibility of looking after its affairs, can make up its mind on the evidence. It is in a position to decide at the next general election whether it is appropriate to take certain steps and will decide who is right and who is wrong.

I propose to share my time with Deputies Treacy and Cullen. While we all hope that any future tribunal or inquiry set up by the Dáil will be more broadly based than the previous one, we are constrained by the Haughey case. I quote the well thought out principle which Mr. Justice O'Dálaigh outlined:

Where it is considered necessary to grant immunity to witnesses appearing before a tribunal, then a person whose conduct is impugned as part of the subject matter of the inquiry must be afforded reasonable means of defending himself.

The then Chief Justice identified four minimum protections: the person accused should be furnished with a copy of the evidence which reflected on his good name; he should be allowed cross-examine, by counsel, his accuser or accusers; he should be allowed give rebutting evidence and be permitted to address again, by counsel, the tribunal in his own defence. We cannot get away from that whether we like it or not. That is part of our law.

We made that point clear in the House when the sub-committee was set up, yet we were accused by the then Opposition of having something to hide. Even Deputy Walsh will acknowledge that those who took a particular stance at the beginning changed their view by the time we finished the report on the basis that, as a body, we did not have the proper Order of the House and were legally constrained from making any findings or expressing opinions.

I agree with Deputy O'Keeffe about the committee's failure to find out about the seven month delay in the Father Brendan Smyth case. When we started our deliberations I insisted, as Deputy Walsh will acknowledge, that part of what we had to do was find out about that delay. Other than the evidence of Mr. Russell, we were not able to find out why there was a seven month delay. That is what the public wanted to know. Some Deputies and political supporters wanted blood on one side or the other but, for the public, the reason for the delay was the core issue. Unfortunately, there were people within the House who were more interested in political mudslinging.

I am not trying to rewrite history, as others have attempted to do today but as the inquiry progressed, I was satisfied the core problem was that, as a result of certain actions by Deputy Reynolds in relation to the beef tribunal report, Deputy Spring decided he would get his revenge. By chance, the débâcle of the Harry Whelehan appointment and the Father Brendan Smyth case fell into the lap of the Labour Party and they milked it. On the Sunday night when the Labour Party held a meeting, Deputy Quinn told the nation on television that this case was about child sexual abuse. I knew then that the Government was finished and the Labour Party would use this as their opportunity. It was a means to an end and the committee became far less relevant once Fine Gael, Democratic Left and the Labour Party went into Government and got the Mercs and perks.

Deputy Ahern stated that the State was not rocked to its foundations by the committee's report. There is no doubt about that. I insisted, unsuccesfully, that Deputy Rabbitte be called before the committee simply because it was his statement in the House which "rocked the foundations of the State". He referred to a non-existent letter. Both Deputy Spring and Dr. Martin Mansergh confirmed conclusively in their evidence that what really built up the political pressure was Deputy Rabbitte's statement which had the effect of preventing the Labour Party going back into Government even though the next day it was prepared to sign a document to that effect.

I compliment the chairman, Deputy Wallace, on his handling of this difficult task even though we disagreed with him on occasion. I pay my regards also to the other Members of the committee who sat for endless hours. A special word of thanks must go to the secretariat who showed how civil servants work extremely well on ours and the State's behalf. They did a magnificent job. I also thank the media. By and large — there are one or two exceptions as members of the committee will know— the media and some of the better known names and political correspondents sat through our deliberations and reported them verbatim.

The reality is that this was not an impartial sub-committee, and that is one of the reasons it could not reach conclusions. A number of speakers on the far side of the House said when they were in Opposition we should introduce the privilege and compellability Bill. The ball is now in their court. They have talked about it for weeks, and we have asked questions about it on a daily basis, yet members of the Government continue to say it will be introduced shortly. The Government should introduce the Bill when we will be able to establish more effective sub-committees with broader terms of reference.

I am pleased to have an opportunity to contribute to these statements. I am one of the few Deputies who attended every sitting of the sub-committee. It is regrettable that the committee was not allowed to complete its good work and establish the truth or otherwise of many unsubstantiated statements by some of our present Ministers and their minders. Why was the Minister of State, Deputy Rabbitte, not made to account for his outlandish statement in the Dáil forecasting that the foundations of the State would be rocked by information available in the Attorney General's office? That was shown to be irrational and irresponsible and should be withdrawn from the record by the Minister of State. It is a fabrication and it is unworthy of any Member to mislead the House in that way. Why was the chief in the Government Information Services not called to account for his disgraceful "High King of Ireland" Labour-sourced stories to the media in September 1994?

Those statements were designated to, and could only result in, undermining the Taoiseach and the Government, actions apparently supported and condoned by the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring. Trust can have a strange meaning sometimes, but we must always remember that trust is a two-way thing. It broke down in the previous Government when the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, led his colleagues out of a Cabinet meeting on Friday, 11 November 1994. That contrasts with Deputy Spring's signing a document at 10.22 a.m. on 16 November stating that he would lead his colleagues back into Government to complete the Programme for Government. History now shows that neither the written nor spoken word mattered. However, verbum scriptum stat.

From my inquiries I have established that there was no lockout or the use of secret code knocks on a particular door in Government Buildings, neither was that ordered on 29 July 1994 or any other day by the then Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, during his term of office. The personnel concerned freely admit that. They felt maligned by such spurious allegations and thought some further questions could have been raised by members of the sub-committee on this issue. Deputy Reynolds confirmed to me that he had never seen that particular door locked during his term as Taoiseach. Staff members also confirm that the then Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, was out of his office for a period on that particular night having tea with other officials in another office. I can only conclude that such statements were figments of Finlay's fantasies designed to attract media headlines in a dramatic way, and they succeeded. I hope this rebuttal will attract the same attention. Those are some of the many false assumptions made by Mr. Finlay.

Regarding the beef tribunal report, it has also been confirmed to me that two copies were handed to the then Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, Deputy Joe Walsh. He retained one in his Department for copying and the other was sent to the then Taoiseach at approximately 9.15 p.m. on the day in question. The tribunal report was not with the Taoiseach from 6 or 7 o'clock as alleged by the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, and his many aides. It is well known that Deputy Spring's copy was available for collection in the Government's Secretary's office from 10.15 p.m. However, it was not collected until about an hour later. I wonder why. Nobody was keeping that report from him. He was in Tralee and Government business and beef reports did not seem to be a priority for him on that day.

The Government's decision regarding the report was that there would be a meeting the following week to discuss it. There was not a Government decision that it would not be commented on by anyone, as alleged by the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, on a number of occasions. In the interests of truth and honesty it is important to set the record straight. How could the Tánaiste say that he never accepted Mr. Harry Whelehan would be appointed to the presidency of the High Court when he had already agreed to his replacement? Where did he think Mr. Whelehan was going at that stage of his career?

The people now realise there was no conspiracy and that a political execution was carried out without any trial or evidence, based purely on innuendo and driven by rumour and counter-rumour engineered by a small cadre of people working with a latent agenda for the achievement of their selfish ends. It must now be clear to everybody that no conclusion should have been drawn or action taken to break up the previous Government until the facts had been absolutely established. This exercise of breaking up the previous Government was designed to inflict maximum damage on the Fianna Fáil Party. Those low political and personal actions failed miserably. It was also hoped that it would obliterate any memories of the humiliating route of the Labour Party in the two Cork by-elections held that same week. It has had short-term success in that regard, but the real jury is still out and I am confident that it will prove in due course that those who claim to own the high moral ground will find their share of it has diminished substantially.

I welcome the opportunity to make a short contribution to these statements. I attended almost all of the hearings of the sub-committee and found it an enlightening experience and of great interest given the maelstrom in which we had all been involved at the end of 1994. As a consequence, we have reached a watershed in Irish politics and I do not believe things will ever be the same again. I do not believe that any public appointments to whatever area will be made by a Government in future without the utmost scrutinty either by Members of this House, people in the public domain or by the media. Whenever an issue arises in future that has a certain connotation, I will always look for a political agenda behind it. I will never believe when an issue gathers momentum, as did the one last year, that it was not somehow motivated by somebody's political agenda.

From watching and listening to the facts that emerged during the hearings of the sub-committee, it became clear to me that the conspiracy that was supposed to have existed, orchestrated by the Fianna Fáil Party, certainly did not exist. There never was a conspiracy and a party in Government which was enjoyed great success with its then colleagues during the life of that Government had its eye taken off the agenda by a so-called important appointment objected to by the Tánaiste. We have never found out what was his and the Labour Party's substantive objection. What we did find out was that we were dealing with three different parties in Government. There was the Labour Party of the Tánaiste and his advisers, a clearly separate Labour Party of Ministers and another Labour Party of backbenchers.

There is no doubt that there was a political agenda set by the Tánaiste and his advisers to pull out of Government. They seized an opportunity they saw arise, they coloured what was happening, took the high moral ground and abused a sensitive issue, about which everyone in this House and throughout the country was concerned, the question of the delay in dealing with the Brendan Smyth case. They used that issue, compounded by the Duggan case, which we now know had little bearing on the Brendan Smyth case.

When we recall the events as they unfolded, Members of the House were as confused as the media about what was happening. It is easy to understand how Fianna Fáil members of a Cabinet could not understand, and did not want to believe there was a real political agenda being driven by the Labour Party. The real impetus to this confusion was given by the Minister of State, Deputy Rabbitte, who, as it were, injected steroids into this issue when he spoke about the rocking of the State to its foundations when the contents of some letter, which we now know never existed, would be revealed. That is the type of colourful language for which the Minister of State, Deputy Rabbitte, has become known in this House.

Good training.

I hope he has learned serious lessons from his contribution during those fateful days.

He is not a Minister.

Why will the people opposite not accept him?

I am satisfied — and more importantly the public is satisfied — that the Fianna Fáil Party was not involved in endeavouring to hide any facts during those days. Perhaps we were tripped up, having failed to realise there was a political agenda, hidden from Labour Party Ministers, by the Leader of their party and his advisers, to ensure they broke up the then excellent Government, went about the formation of another, seeking to remain in power. As we know to our cost, this agenda was fulfilled. However, I warn him that it is a long road without a turning and the Labour Party will reach that turning eventually.

Even in a Merc.

This is a very unruly debate, one would expect grown men to behave in a better manner——

Hear, hear.

And women. The Deputy should know about behaviour.

Despite the production of this lengthy report and public reaction it is amazing that Fianna Fáil still do not realise the State was rocked to its foundations and is still quaking. It appears that quake has overtaken the Fianna Fáil Party which is why it has not yet found its feet in Opposition.

I do not know which scale Deputy Lynch is using but it is a very strange one.

Why is Deputy Gilmore not contributing?

Or Deputy Rabbitte?

They will find it very difficult to fully realise what happened.

Let us have the same order that pertained for other speakers.

I know the gentlemen of the Fianna Fáil Party do not consider women have as much to contribute as men to politics but I assure them that I will adequately fill my ten minute slot. I do not need Deputy Gilmore or Deputy Rabbitte to speak for me because there is equality in our party. I know it is difficult for Fianna Fáil to understand, but when a female member of our party wants to contribute she is allowed to do so.

It is amazing the Fianna Fáil Party still do not realise the State was shaken to its foundations; they are still reeling from its effects.

The report of the sub-committee is comprised of almost 1,000 pages. When its statements and counter-statements are stripped of their rhetoric, we are left with the bare facts — that a Catholic priest abused a number of children, as yet unknown, in the Republic and Northern Ireland. The authorities in Northern Ireland issued an extradition warrant which was allowed to gather dust in the Attorney General's office for almost seven months.

When one subtracts the political manoeuvrings, the extraordinary events surrounding the appointment of Mr. Harry Whelehan as President of the High Court and his resignation; if we subtract the note passed to the Taoiseach in the House reading: "If pursued on this matter keep repeating the above", we are left with a sordid case of child abuse and official neglect of a sector of our society assured of our protection, a neglect it appears that went right to the Office of the Attorney General.

One of the most positive by-products of the events of November 1994 was the highlighting of the overall issue of child abuse, which has remained in the public arena, something we should not forget. We also learned much that had been hidden from public view, for example, how the office of the Attorney General operates. We also learned more about the relative powers of civil servants and their political masters.

If for no other reason the establishment of the sub-committee was valuable, in stripping the veil from public administration. It is regrettable the sub-committee was unable to reach a conclusion although ultimately I am not so sure that was necessary. It has been left to Member and the public at large to draw conclusions from the events and evidence presented to the sub-committee. I, for one, have no difficulty in drawing a conclusion from both; I suggest neither has the electorate.

We shall soon see.

The evidence to the sub-committee has two main thrusts — one which might be described as the Eoghan Fitzsimons' line, the other the Fianna Fáil line. For what it is worth, not only I but I believe the majority of the electorate believes Mr. Fitzsimons and it is not difficult to understand why. Mr. Fitzsimons did a great service to our democracy. Having identified what had gone wrong in the office of the Attorney General, he made a number of points relating to the conduct of the then Government, painting a picture of a Fianna Fáil Party in disarray. I can vouch for that picture which I found very frightening when I entered this House. I had always been under the impression that somebody in Government was in control but I discovered there was then nobody in control.

It is very easy to frighten Deputy Lynch.

I will not be drawn, Deputy O'Dea will never have that pleasure. I discovered a Fianna Fáil Party in disarray, instantly obvious to anybody who witnessed the events of that time. Disarray is one thing but Fianna Fáil Ministers also stand accused of duplicity and deceit.

The Dáil was misled on the Duggan case. The then Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, defended Mr. Whelehan's appointment as President of the High Court the day after he had apparently asked him to resign. To put it mildly, Fianna Fáil Ministers were less than honest with their Labour partners. Those are the facts that emerge not only from the report of the sub-committee that inquired into those events but from the media reportage of them at the time. It is not a pretty picture but at least it was hung out in public for everybody to see.

Bearing in mind that Deputy Dan Wallace and I represent the same constituency, I thank him for the balanced, judicious manner in which he chaired the proceedings of the sub-committee. Here I am sure I speak on behalf of those Members who participated, the public who watched its proceedings in their homes and other Members here who followed them.

The collapse of the last Government should not be availed of to throw stones but to draw lessons for the future; we are inclined to keep looking backwards, seeking scapegoats, not looking to the future. The first lesson has been from the establishment of the sub-committee which, for legal and constitutional reasons, was precluded from presenting any findings in relation to the evidence presented. Such preclusion, although understandable legally, does neither the State nor witnesses any service. In effect, the sub-committee returned a verdict of "not proven", always very unsatisfactory to all concerned. What is important is not what the inquiry found but that it was held.

I agree with the report of the sub-committee that the preclusion of presenting findings should not be used as a precedent for future sub-committees. The previous Government entered office promising, in the words of the Taoiseach, to ensure that the business of Government was carried out as transparently as though behind a pane of glass. The hearings of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security were an exercise in such transparency. Members of this House and others involved in the bizarre events leading to the fall of the last Government were called to account for their actions and the public allowed to draw their own conclusion. In itself that represents a sizeable advance for our democracy.

Perhaps the conclusions of the sub-committee, or lack of them, are irrelevant at this stage. Accountability is fundamental to the practice of democracy and the proceedings of that sub-committee were an example of that accountability I should like to see continue. Despite the 1,000 pages of this report and the excellent procedures put in place, we have a choice — to believe Mr. Eoghan Fitzsimons or Fianna Fáil. I believe the people have already decided who they believe.

With the permission of the Chair I wish to share my time with Deputies O'Donoghue and O'Dea.

I am sure that is satisfactory and agreed.

I compliment the Chairman on the wonderful work he did on this sub-committee. In the short time available to me I will make some pertinent points. The committee of inquiry showed the public and every honest Member involved in it that the collapse of the last Government was about many things but was not about the Father Brendan Smyth case or the Duggan case. The truth is that the Labour Party had decided, at some stage, to get out of Government. With the Labour Party Leader being pulled by his Ministers and Deputies on the one side and his Labour Party handlers on the other the only question throughout those traumatic weeks was which side would win. We know that the handlers won. One can draw no other conclusion as evidenced by the fact that the Labour Party Leader and his party pulled out from negotiations with Deputy Bertie Ahern on the most flimsy excuse possible.

Subsequent to that, for reasons of political expediency and political jack-boot tactics, Fianna Fáil was put on trial. Many people inside and outside this House were sorely disappointed as the committee began to unravel the truth. It was established beyond a shadow of doubt that at no stage was there a conspiracy between Fianna Fáil Ministers.

The jury, the general public, in this case has reached a verdict different from that Deputy Lynch would have us believe. The jury accepts that this was a political business, that it was about political expediency on the part of the Labour Party, in particular, who had decided earlier to pull out of Government. There is considerable evidence to this effect throughout the report. The then Taoiseach, Deputy Reynolds, was described as the High King of Ireland on a roll while he was out of the country. There are many other examples in the report.

Nothing confirms it more than the enlightening evidence of the Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, when he mentioned the beef tribunal and clearly placed the blame for the collapse of the Government on it. It gives me no pleasure to say there was a considerable amount of political hypocrisy involved in all of this. Neither does it give me any pleasure to say that those who came calling for a head — when they could not get one they had to get the other — will be answered by the people in their wisdom in due course. In their electoral sophistication the people will make the correct decision. All honest people involved in the committee of inquiry and the general public know what the result will be.

Though the sub-committee did not reach conclusions for legal reasons, certain conclusions have been reached by every independent fair-minded commentator because the evidence is clear. One conclusion is that the Duggan case was of little or no significance. Another conclusion is that there was no conspiracy to deceive anybody and there was no document and no event occurred which would tend to rock the foundations of the State. Consequently, as has been said, this House was misled by Deputy Rabbitte who is now a super Minister of State. A third conclusion is that no definitive view of the significance of the Duggan case was ever given by Mr. Eoghan Fitzsimons to Fianna Fáil Ministers on that fateful Monday, 14 November, 1994. There was no lock-out. Another conclusion, of which everybody is now certain, is that there was nothing new in Geraldine Kennedy's article in The Irish Times which would justify the Labour Party pulling out of negotiations with Deputy Bertie Ahern at the last moment to form a Government.

The sub-committee's report, and the events which led to it, are proof positive of the old adage that the problem with facts is that there are so many of them. Though we did not reach conclusions certain things are clear. The public will be the final jury. As far as the Fianna Fáil Party is concerned, I am confident of the verdict of the public on it but I am not certain others will be so lucky.

I thank all who contributed to the debate for their kind remarks about me and the manner in which the business of the sub-committee was conducted. This was not due merely to me: I had tremendous co-operation from all sides of the House. The inquiry, which was broadcast live on television, brought home to all Members the importance of this sub-committee and the importance to the members who represented the different parties on it of ensuring that its work proceeded in a constructive manner.

The public got an insight into the workings of Government when officials came before the sub-committee and outlined in detail, honestly and sincerely, their views on the events of that time. The fact that the committee compiled a report of almost 1,000 pages may not be attractive to the public but certainly will be of interest to historians. The details that emerged showed the issues that brought down a Government.

I pay tribute to the Members on whom there were certain constraints. They had to put questions to witnesses at short notice although they did not have sufficient time to digest the statements made. A very efficient job was done.

I said in my introductory remarks that I would endeavour, if time permitted, to mention a few points which I thought were of assistance to the sub-committee, the public and the press on the workings of the sub-committee. Every effort was made by the secretariat to ensure the availability of a full transcript of proceedings at the end of each day. This policy was adopted in response to the need to demonstrate openness from the outset. The second procedure involved the relatively frequent use of private meetings to resolve unforeseen problems quickly and effectively with the minimum of conflict. Another important element involved the prior agreement of the order and duration of questioning by the sub-committee members. In this regard the policy of using a single spokesperson for each political group was particularly efficient.

It is important to point out that witnesses were not compelled to attend the inquiry. Each witness who was asked to attend did so, which certainly enhanced the work of the committee. The co-operation in regard to the statements made and the questions answered can only enhance the role of the Oireachtas. When the necessary changes are made to the terms of reference, future committees can play a vital role on behalf of the House and its Members.

That concludes statements on the report of the Sub-Committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security.

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