I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
Violence in the home is an abomination. It affects the welfare and safety of adults and children and makes life a living hell for its too many victims. People in their homes have the right to enjoy themselves without violence whether that violence is actual or threatened, physical or mental. The problem is complex and the causes are many and varied. The perpetrators are normally men and the victims women and children. It is a problem which transcends all classes and areas, city and provincial. The Domestic Violence Bill is about providing a proper legal framework to deal with the civil law aspects but it incorporates in addition new powers of arrest for gardaí. It repeals and re-enacts with substantial amendments the Family Law (Protection of Spouses and Children) Act, 1981.
The most widely availed of remedy in the area of domestic violence is the civil law remedy of a barring order which was introduced in 1976. Prior to that, the main civil law remedy available was an injunction in the High Court or Circuit Court. The barring order remedy was a radical innovation at the time, although it was, and continues to be, limited to violence by a spouse against the other spouse and children. The absence of legal aid in earlier years meant that for practical purposes recourse to the law was not available to everyone. The introduction of the scheme of civil legal aid and advice in 1979 was, therefore, of major importance.
The Family Law (Protection of Spouses and Children) Act, 1981, strengthened the law on barring orders, following representations by various women's organisations. The main changes made were the extension of the District Court's time limit from three months to 12 months, the granting of a statutory power of arrest without warrant to the gardaí for breaches of orders and the creation of a new type of order called a protection order. Protection orders were designed to provide immediate protection for the applicant spouse or child pending the determination of the barring order application. They fell short of barring the offending spouse from the family home.
Of relevance also as a remedy for violence against women in the home is the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, 1989. Among the grounds on which a decree of judicial separation may be granted are the unreasonable behaviour of one spouse towards the other. In separation proceedings, the court may grant a barring order or a protection order and the court may confer on one spouse the right to occupy the family home subject to such conditions as it thinks proper or it may transfer ownership of the home to the other spouse in suitable cases.
Facts about the operation of the barring orders procedures may also help to inform debate on the Bill. Court statistics reveal that the average annual number of applications to the courts over the past three years was 4,365 and the number of decrees granted was 2,248. This appears to indicate at first sight that just over one-half of applications for barring orders result in the granting of orders and that the courts show a marked reluctance to grant orders. However, further analysis reveals that a good number of applicants withdraw their applications or fail to turn up for the court hearing.
The experience of the Legal Aid Board is that 90 per cent of those who turn up in the District Court for the hearing of their applications for barring orders are successful and that the vast majority of orders granted are for the full 12 months period. The reasons victims do not proceed with their applications vary. It may be because of intimidation by the other spouse; it may be because of a genuine change in circumstances where the respondent spouse stops the violence; it may be that the applicant spouse does not want to go as far as to have the respondent barred from the home, or it may be that the victim spouse is prepared to give the respondent another chance. We obviously need to be careful in amending the law in this area to ensure that change will be for the best in what is a very complicated area involving family and other relationships, high emotions and, most importantly, circumstances in which the protection of life itself may be at stake.
In 1987 the Family Law (Protection of Spouses and Children) (Amendment) Bill was initiated in the House. This was intended to permit granting a long term protection order as a final remedy in appropriate cases of family violence or ill-treatment. The Bill was eventually withdrawn because of opposition from women's organisations, based on the fear that if the Bill were enacted the courts might almost invariably take the "soft option" of granting a protection order instead of a barring order, thus diminishing the existing legal protection for victims of family violence.
The one feature of the barring order remedy which has been most often criticised is that it is confined to inter-spousal violence. Increasingly, over the years, patterns of social behaviour have changed — many households are established on the basis of non-marital arrangements. It has also become clear that domestic violence is not confined in the main to spouses or indeed cohabitants; it can occur between parents and children, brothers and sisters, and other members of households. The Government accepts that the law in this area needs to be updated in the light of these realities and, as part of its programme of family law reform, is committed to the changes now provided for in this Bill.
The law in relation to the protection of victims of domestic violence has been the subject of various recommendations and submissions from, for example, the Law Reform Commission in its report on child sexual abuse, the Second Commission on the Status of Women and the Kilkenny incest investigation team and groups like AIM and Women's Aid. A number of groups have sought the extension of barring orders to cohabitants. Many have advocated more widespread availability of protection orders — not as an interim measure pending the granting of a barring order as at present — but as an alternative remedy in its own right. Other groups point to the lack of support available to victims who are faced with the trauma of having to seek protection and recommend that outside agencies should be given a role in such cases. Women's Aid has complained of the difficulties involved in obtaining a barring order where emotional rather than physical violence is involved and it expresses concern about the restrictive nature of the powers of arrest without warrant which the Garda have in dealing with violent domestic incidents.
This Bill is the result of a comprehensive review of the civil law in relation to the protection of persons from domestic violence which I have carried out in my Department. All of the criticisms which have been levelled at the present system have been taken into account in the course of my review. I am most grateful for the information which has been put at my disposal by the various organisations concerned.
As I said the Bill is for the most part about the civil law aspects of domestic violence. Criminal law sanctions are, of course, also available. Despite the presence of those criminal sanctions, the practice here, as in other countries, is that spouses seek, for the most part, recourse to the civil law rather than the criminal law. This is not difficult to understand. The criminal law is a blunt instrument which is primarily intended to punish the offender. Many victims of domestic violence are not interested in imprisonment as the solution — they want the violence to stop, and may even wish to continue to reside with the offender. The primary aim of civil law legislation on the matter should be to provide protection for victims in a flexible way which takes account of their differing needs. This Bill aims to do that but it strengthens the force of the law and is intended to reflect the abhorrence with which society rightly condemns violence in the home.
I turn now to the details of the Bill. Section 1 defines a number of terms for the purposes of the Bill, one of which, the definition of "welfare", I should like to explain further. That definition makes clear that the word includes mental and emotional welfare in addition to physical welfare. This will help allay a perception among some groups that actual physical violence is a necessary prerequisite to the granting of a barring order.
Section 2 introduces a new type of order to be called a safety order. It will in effect be a long term protection order. The 1981 Act empowers the court to grant a protection order between the making of an application for a barring order and its determination. It does not bar a spouse from the family home, but prohibits that spouse from using or threatening to use violence against, molesting or putting in fear the applicant spouse or a child. The new safety order may be granted in its own right and not as an interim measure and may, in addition, prohibit a respondent who does not actually reside with the applicant from watching or besetting the residence. Such a remedy may prove to be sufficient protection in those cases where the victim may not want a spouse barred from the home but wishes nevertheless to have the protection of a court order. The reports of the Second Commission on the Status of Women and the Kilkenny incest investigation team recommend that provision be made for the granting of orders of this nature.
Section 2 provides that a safety order procedure will be available to persons in domestic relationships. It will be available on the application of a spouse against the other spouse, a cohabitant against the other cohabitant, a parent against an adult child and an adult person against any other adult person who resides with him or her. The term "cohabitant" is not used in the Bill.
That class of person is referred to technically in various sections of the Bill as a person who is not the spouse of the respondent but has lived with the respondent as husband or wife. In the case of a safety order it must be for a period of at least six months in aggregate during the period of 12 months immediately prior to the application.
Violence in the home is not confined to violence by one spouse against another or children. It transcends all relationships. For this reason I have provided that the safety order remedy will be widely available. An exception is made where the relationship is primarily contractual in order to ensure that the remedy is confined to what are genuine domestic disputes and does not, for example, become a feature of disputes between landlords and tenants for which there are adequate alternative legal remedies. Of course, the nature of a relationship may change over time from being primarily contractual to primarily non-contractual. Each case will have to be decided by the court on its merits and subsection (1) (b) sets out some factors to which the court must have regard in reaching a conclusion. These factors include, for example, the amount of rent paid and the nature of any duties performed by one person on behalf of the other.
The section also contains a range of ancillary provisions in relation to safety orders. It provides for the variation of orders on the application of any of the parties concerned. The duration of a safety order granted by the District Court is limited to five years renewable on application for a further five years and the Circuit Court will have unlimited jurisdiction.
Provision is made to ensure that the type of objections which arose when attempts were made to introduce safety order type legislation in 1987 will not arise again. Accordingly, section 2 prohibits the court from granting a safety order where the applicant applies for a barring order. The same will also apply in reverse — the court will be prohibited from granting a barring order where the applicant applies for a safety order. This will give the applicant a degree of control over the proceedings, which, according to my Department's research, victims perceive to be lacking in such cases. The court may, of course, consider the alternatives of a safety or a barring order where the applicant chooses to apply for both remedies in the same proceedings.
I am providing in section 17 that breach of a safety order will be punishable on summary conviction by a fine of up to £1,500 or imprisonment for up to one year, or both.
Section 3 in general re-enacts the barring order procedure while providing in addition that the remedy will be available to a wider class of persons than spouses and their children. The effect of a barring order will remain — it will operate to bar a person from entering his or her home.
The class of persons who may apply for a barring order is being extended to cohabitants one against the other and the remedy will be available also to a parent against an adult child. In so far as cohabitants are concerned, they must, under section 3, have lived with the respondent as husband or wife for a continuous period of at least six months during the period of seven months immediately prior to the application.
Subsection (4) of section 3 is intended to protect the rights of property owners which the State and its laws must respect under the Constitution. Except where the applicant and respondent are spouses, the court will not be able to bar a respondent with an ownership interest in the property unless the applicant also has an equivalent ownership interest. I am advised that a proposal to bar a respondent with an ownership interest on the application of a person with any lesser interest could be open to serious constitutional challenge on the basis that it may infringe that person's property rights which the State in its laws must respect under Article 40.3 of the Constitution.
The position is different where the parties are married — an infringement of a spouse's property rights is presumed to be justified on the basis that the rights of the family founded on marriage are protected by the Constitution and take precedence over property rights. The difficulty was recognised in the report of the Second Commission on the Status of Women. It is not a difficulty with which many people may be impressed and it is something which may, following further examination and debate, require attention to ensure that the interests of justice and a proper balance of interests prevails.
Subsection (5) contains a general saver which protects the rights of persons other than the applicant or respondent who have a legal or beneficial interest in the dwelling. For example, the fact that an applicant has succeeded in having a respondent barred from a property will not render him or her immune from ejectment proceedings instigated by the landlord for non-payment of rent.
The maximum duration of a barring order granted by the District Court will be three years as opposed to one year at present. Breach of a barring order will, under section 17, be an offence punishable on summary conviction by a fine of up to £1,500 or imprisonment for up to one year or both. This is an increase on the present sanction of a fine of up to £200 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both.
Section 4 empowers the court to make an interim barring order in emergency situations and on an ex-parte basis if necessary. This power will significantly increase the ability of the courts to react quickly in situations of domestic violence. The section empowers the court to grant, subject to certain conditions, an interim barring order pending the determination of an application for a barring order. Such interim orders may be granted without notice to the respondent where the court considers it expedient in the interests of justice to do so.
Nevertheless, it is important to guard against the danger of a misconceived or malicious application particularly when one considers that a respondent could be barred from the home on the basis of an allegation which he or she has had no opportunity to refute. For this reason the granting of such orders is confined to extreme cases, that is cases where there is evidence that there is an imminent risk of significant harm to an applicant or dependent person if the order is not made immediately; it is likely that any delay will cause fear or trauma which will deter the applicant from proceeding with an application; and the court is satisfied that a protection order will provide insufficient protection.
Section 5 re-enacts section 3 of the 1981 Act and provides for the granting of a protection order pending the determination of an application for a barring order and is in substance the same as the protection order procedure under existing law, except that it may also be ordered pending the determination of an application for the new safety order that is provided for in the Bill.
Section 6 is a significant new provision which allows a health board to apply for a barring order or a safety order on behalf of a victim of domestic violence. Such provision has been recommended by the Law Reform Commission and the Kilkenny incest investigation team. The health board will be obliged to consult with the victim before applying for a barring or safety order. Subsection (1) specifies the circumstances in which a health board can apply for a safety or a barring order. The section applies where a health board (a) becomes aware of an incident or incidents which in its opinion puts into doubt the safety or welfare of the victim; (b) has reasonable cause to believe that the victim has been subjected to violence or otherwise put in fear of his or her safety or welfare; (c) has reasonable grounds for believing that the victim, or parent of a child victim, would be deterred or prevented from applying for a barring or a safety order; and (d) considers it appropriate to apply for an order having ascertained as far as reasonably practicable the wishes of the victim or parent of the victim.
An aim of the section also is to allow a child stay in its home where possible and to have the perpetrators of violence rather than the child removed from the home. However, in making any order where children are concerned the court will have to be satisfied that there remains a parent in the home who is willing and able to provide reasonable care for the child. This will avoid a situation where a child could be left in the home with a parent whose capacity or willingness to provide care is suspect.
Section 7 empowers the court to adjourn proceedings for a barring or a safety order which affects the welfare of the child where it considers that a care order or a supervision order under the Child Care Act might provide a more appropriate remedy. It may order a health board to investigate circumstances with a view to arriving at the best possible solution in the child's interests. The objective here is to ensure that the barring or safety order solutions are not viewed in isolation but are considered against the backdrop of other services which can be provided by a health board.
Many of the remaining provisions of the Bill are based on the provisions of the 1981 Act and mirror those provisions closely. There are some important exceptions, however, with which I intend to deal specifically.
Section 9 empowers the court to deal with maintenance, barring, family home protection and child care applications in the one set of proceedings. This provision reflects the fact that the problem of domestic violence is often intertwined with a variety of other problems. For example, a wife who is being abused by her husband may also find herself in the position that she is unable to obtain maintenance from him for herself and her children. The purpose of this section is to allow the court to deal with all of these matters as a package.
Section 13 provides for the discharge of orders on the application of any of the parties concerned. The court will not be empowered to discharge an order unless it is of the opinion that the safety and welfare of the victim is no longer at issue. This represents a stronger test than the safety or welfare test which is currently applied. If the courts are asked to discharge an order which was originally made on safety grounds, they must be satisfied that the mental and emotional welfare of the victim as well as his or her physical safety no longer requires it.
Section 16 requires that civil proceedings under the Bill should be heard in private as is the case under the 1981 Act and under other family law legislation. This provision will not apply to proceedings for breaches of orders which will continue to be subject to the general criminal law provisions and be heard in open court. The section also provides that civil proceedings under the Bill shall be informal as is practicable and consistent with the administration of justice and that judges and barristers in such proceedings shall not wear wigs or gowns.
I have already indicated that section 17 of the Bill makes contravention of orders under the Bill a criminal offence and that the fine and term of imprisonment will be higher than under the present law in the 1981 Act. The gardaí will continue to have a power of arrest without warrant for breaches of barring and protection orders and that power is being extended to the new safety order and interim barring order procedures.
The powers of arrest without warrant of the Garda in domestic violence situations are unclear. The Garda can arrest for breaches of barring and protection orders but where those orders do not exist and violence has occurred they are not in a position to arrest for many of the acts of violence which occur. The difficulty arises because of the common law distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours. Section 18 (2) makes clear that a power of arrest without warrant will exist for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm.
The Garda will have power, if need be by force, to enter any place where they suspect the perpetrator to be. At present when the Garda are called to a scene of domestic violence they may not be able to gain entry. The perpetrator may have forced or convinced the victim not to let the Garda in. Scenes of domestic violence are difficult, but too often it may be said the Garda are not in a position to investigate fully the violence against the victim, be it adult or children, and this new provision in the law to enter by force, if necessary, is deemed essential by the gardaí and the victims of violence.
These are the main provisions of the Bill. Other Departments as well as my own have responsibilities in relation to the problems of domestic violence. The Department of the Environment makes special provision for the housing of victims of domestic violence, the Department of Health provides, through health boards, financial assistance to organisations involved in providing assistance to victims, and is also responsible for reform of the law in relation to the care of children. The Department of Justice has responsibility for the criminal law and the Garda Síochána operates special policies to deal with domestic violence.
Counselling, for funding which my Department has responsibility, must continue to have a part to play. Over the past two years I have more than doubled State funding to the many groups who are engaged in marriage counselling throughout the country. The aim is to give a boost to these organisations with a view to enabling them, where possible, to expand and develop their services. It is my intention to continue to address in a legislative and non-legislative manner the problem of marriage breakdown — a problem that includes domestic violence.
I hope this Bill will commend itself to Deputies on all sides of the House. I look forward to a good and constructive debate on the Bill and I commend it to the House.