I move:
"That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
The purpose of this Bill is to include new provisions in the Fisheries Acts whereby the Minister for the Marine may intervene, in accordance with a strict process and subject to the approval of both Houses, to deal with the failure of a fisheries board to manage its affairs effectively.
In such circumstances, or at the request of a board, the Minister may appoint a commission for a specified period, generally speaking not exceeding two years, to take over some or all of the functions of that board.
These provisions supplement existing provisions in the Fisheries Acts which allow the Minister in certain circumstances to remove a board from office.
The principle of ministerial intervention involved in this Bill is thus not new to the Fisheries Acts. Moreover, the model proposed has already been adopted in other legislation relating to State boards.
I emphasise in the strongest possible terms that this legislation is not prompted by any general view that the fisheries boards are not being well managed. On the contrary, fisheries boards have a most difficult job to do and with present structures and resources are, by and large, making a major contribution. I have over the past number of months met representatives of all the boards and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the board members, their managers and staff.
It is only in rare and exceptional cases that one would expect central Government to intervene directly with possible serious difficulties in the management of a State board. It is reasonable in the public interest that a Minister should have such powers. This right of intervention must, however, be carefully tailored to prevent arbitrary ministerial intervention and to protect the legitimate rights of boards. This new legislation strikes the right balance.
While this legislation is not based on a view that there are serious general management weaknesses in fisheries boards, the new provisions arise from a review of existing provisions which was prompted by recurring allegations concerning the Southern Fisheries Board. Deputies will be aware that for some time, there have been allegations concerning the Southern Fisheries Board, some of which have appeared in the press, and some of which related to a Garda investigation into certain matters in that board.
When these allegations were brought to my attention, I met the chairperson and the manager of the Southern Fisheries Board. Following these meetings and an examination of the existing legislation, it became clear that the existing provision would be an inappropriate and cumbersome mechanism to deal with the issues arising. Accordingly, it was decided to prepare the Bill now before the House.
As regards the position in the Southern Fisheries Group I must repeat what the then Minister said on 9 May last.
The administration of the Southern Fisheries Board is, and remains, a matter for that board. As matters stand, Ministers have no direct function in relation to the investigation or handling of the reported allegations. We are not in a position, nor do we have a basis, to form any opinion on the allegations made. We must be particularly conscious not to prejudice the ongoing legal process, or in any way injure the rights of persons involved.
I repeat that no decision has been or could be taken by us at present on what actions we might initiate in respect of that board if and when this legislation is enacted. That matter will be considered at that time in the light of the prevailing circumstances which we do not wish to anticipate.
Before looking in more detail at the background to the Bill and commenting on its main provisions, I would like first to set the context by looking at the constitution and role of the fisheries boards.
The Fisheries Act, 1980 replaced the Inland Fisheries Trust and the 17 boards of conservators with the central and seven regional fisheries boards.
The Central Fisheries Board has primary responsibility for the overall coordination and direction, where necessary, of the activities of the regional fisheries boards in the areas of protection, conservation, management and development of the inland fisheries resource and the promotion and development of sea angling. The board also provides specialist scientific, technical, financial, personnel and engineering services to the regional boards, ensures that policy directions are carried into effect and advises the Minister on matters relating to the most effective conservation, management and development of the resource.
The seven regional fisheries boards are responsible for the management, conservation, protection, development and improvement of the fisheries within their region, and offshore to the 12 mile limit insofar as the protection of wild salmon is concerned, and for the promotion and development of sea angling.
The boards are financed primarily by way of an annual Exchequer grant which now amounts to more than £8.5 million. In recent years the boards have also had access to additional funding under the Structural Funds, INTERREG, Surveillance and other EU-funded programmes which has led to a considerable increase in their development and operational activities.
Elections to the regional boards, membership of which ranges from 20 to 22, including seven ministerial appointments, take place every five years from panels representing various interests in the region. Membership of the central board, which also has a five-year fixed term, comprises 13 members, seven of whom are ex-officio chairpersons of the regional boards and the remainder, including the chairperson, appointed by the Minister. Some 315 permanent staff are employed by the fisheries boards.
At this point. I would like to refer to the existing provisions whereby a board may be removed from office. Under section 24 of the Fisheries Act, 1980, a board may be removed from office if it has not complied with a policy direction given under section 8 (1) (b) of the Act or where its functions were not being duly and effectively performed or where the performance by a board of its functions has been unsatisfactory. In the latter two cases a formal inquiry must be conducted under section 50 of the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act, 1959, as amended by section 65 of the Fisheries Act, 1980, into the performance by a board of its functions. If the Minister is satisfied, following that inquiry, that a board has not duly and effectively performed its functions or that the performance by the board of its functions has been unsatisfactory or, as I have already stated, where a board has not complied with a policy direction, the Minister may, by order, remove that board from office and replace it with a person or persons who would carry on the functions of the board until the next elections to boards generally or a special election is held to the board in question.
Section 24 of the Fisheries Act, 1980, and related statutory provisions provide a means by which the Minister could intervene to ensure that the functions of a fisheries board are performed in the public interest. For example, if a fisheries board failed to comply with a direction given by the Minister in relation to general policy for the management, conservation, protection, development and improvement of fisheries he or she could, in accordance with section 24 of the Fisheries Act, 1980, remove that board from office and appoint a person or persons to perform its functions. Equally, if concerns are raised as to whether a fisheries board is duly and effectively performing its functions the Minister could, in accordance with section 24 of the 1980 Act, hold an inquiry under section 50 of the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act, 1959, as amended. If, on the basis of that inquiry, the Minister is satisfied that the functions of the board are not being duly and effectively performed he could remove the board from office and appoint a person or persons to perform is functions. These powers have not been used to date.
While the existing statutory provision in the 1980 Fisheries Act relating to the removal and replacement of a board provide a means of ministerial intervention in circumstances in which a fisheries board, among other matters, has failed to manage its affairs effectively, I do not consider these provisions to be sufficiently flexible or sufficient to deal with the range of specific circumstances which can arise. In particular, the requirement to hold an inquiry, which would be subject to the detailed provisions set out in the Fisheries Acts and in High Court Rules governing notice, the summoning and examination of witnesses, the service of documents, etc. could be unduly protracted. It would also be open-ended and prone to litigation. Such a process could also be extremely costly and could shift the focus from the immediate problem giving rise to the inquiry in the first place.
The existing legislation does not provide, therefore, for circumstances in which the Minister may be obliged to move quickly, and without removing a board, to relieve that board of some or all of its functions. In addition, there may be circumstances in which a board may request the Minister to relieve it of some or all of its functions. It is of the utmost importance that the fisheries boards are in a position to perform their statutory functions effectively both at a general level and in specific circumstances and that the State can intervene effectively on those occasions, which admittedly will be rare, when those functions are not being duly and effectively performed.
The Bill is designed to address the shortcomings in the existing legislation outlined already. It provides that the Minister may, by order, appoint a commission to perform some or all of the functions of a board where a board has so requested or after considering the report of a person appointed by the Minister to examine the management and organisation of a board and the performance by it of its functions generally or in particular. The provisions of the Bill are similar in many respects to those in the Regional Technical Colleges (Amendment) Act, 1994, relating to the appointment of a commission to a college. That Act provides a mechanism whereby the Minister for Education can act quickly in a case of emergency caused by deficiencies in the governance or management structures in a college.
I wish at this point to outline the main provision of the proposed Bill. Section 1 governs the interpretation of terms used in the Bill. Section 2 provides for the appointment by the Minister of a person or persons to report to him on the management and organisation of a board and the performance by it of its functions and for the inspection by such person or persons of a board's records or documents.
Section 3 provides for the establishment by the Minister, following a request by a board or after consideration by him of a report of a person or persons appointed under section 2, of a commission to carry out one or more functions of a board as he may determine. Section 4 makes provision for the furnishing of notice to a board where the Minister proposes to appoint a commission following consideration of a report under sections 2 and 3 and for the making of representations by that board. Section 5 lays down detailed provisions in relation to the appointment, membership and removal of a commission. Section 6 provides for co-ordination between the commission and a board where one or more but not all of the functions of a board have been conferred on a commission and for the resolution of any dispute or disagreement which may arise therefrom. Section 7 provides for the furnishing of information and documentation by a board or its officers to a commission.
Section 8 provides for the removal of board members for failure to comply with sections 2 and 7 insofar as compliance with a request for documentation or records is concerned. Section 9 governs the making of orders by the Minister and provides, among other matters, that such orders, drafts of which shall be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas, may be annulled by a resolution of either House. Section 10 provides that the powers conferred by this Act to a board are not in substitution for any other powers conferred on the Minister or any other person in relation to the board immediately before the passing of the Act. Section 11 provides that expenses incurred by the Minister in the administration of this Act shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas. Section 12 makes provision for the short Title of the Bill.
The central provision of this Bill is the proposed granting to the Minister of the power to appoint a commission to carry out some or all of the functions of a board. As the appointment of such a commission would be an exceptional measure, a number of safeguards have been provided for in the Bill. First, section 4 makes provision for the furnishing of notice to a board where it is proposed to appoint a commission and for the making of representations by that board. Second, unless a board has so requested, a commission can be appointed only after consideration of a report made under section 2 thus making it a statutory requirement that a decision to appoint a commission must always have some objectively determined basis.
A third safeguard is that a commission can, in accordance with section 3 (5), be appointed for a maximum period of two years thus preventing the indefinite transfer of a board's functions and ensuring that board members cannot be left without knowledge of their future role for any lengthy period. The fourth and final safeguard is the requirement, under section 9, for Oireachtas approval of any order providing for the appointment of a commission. As such an appointment is an exceptional measure and is defensible only by reference to the common good it is appropriate that both Houses of the Oireachtas should consider orders which provide for the appointment of commissions while leaving in situ the bodies whose functions they are to exercise.
I have outlined in detail the background to the proposed legislation and its broad provisions and implications. This legislation must also be seen in the wider context of the more general review of policy and strategy and the major development programmes now being pursued by the boards. Last March a fundamental overhaul of marine policy was initiated with a view to tapping the full potential of the marine sector in the interests of coastal development, leisure and tourism and increased national economic and social prosperity. This review, being undertaken in full consultation with the sectoral interests in the marine sector, will involve a series of public seminars to focus public debate on the issues, the establishment of a marine advisory council to advise on longer-term strategic options in marine policy and a major review of the organisational and management structure of the fishery service.
The review will examine the institutional framework for the development and regulation of sea fisheries, acquaculture and inland fisheries sectors and recommend any changes necessary. The central and regional fisheries boards are encompassed by this review and particular account will be taken of the important role they play. National policy on wild salmon is also being reviewed as part of our review of general policy.
I again express the Government's appreciation of the valuable contribution the fisheries boards have made, often in difficult circumstances and subject to resource constraints, to ensure that our valuable inland fisheries resource is managed, conserved and developed in its own right and to exploit its economic potential.
The considerable developments in the inland fisheries sector, the challenges arising from pressures on stocks and the freshwater environment and the obligation on the State to ensure that State agencies operate efficiently and effectively require that the State be in a position to intervene in cases where a fisheries board cannot, or is not, duly and effectively performing its functions. The proposed new legislation provides a well balanced and measured means to allow such interventions. I commend the Bill to the House.