This debate has shown the maturity of Irish democracy. It has been measured and balanced in tone and content. Even when criticisms were made they were constructive and well meant. The fact that the debate was sustained over three days demonstrates the deeply felt wish of all our people for peace. Many speakers wished for more time to explain their views and put on record their rejection of the appalling act of violence at Canary Wharf which left two innocent people dead and very many with injuries they will bear for the rest of their lives.
In particular I appreciate the thoughtful and constructive approach taken by the Leader of the Opposition, Deputy Bertie Ahern, in his speech on Tuesday. The Government is working and will continue to work assiduously to have the ceasefire restored. That is essential for progress. The Government, with the British Government, will continue its efforts to bring forward proposals which will ensure that all-party talks take place. As Deputy Ahern said, it was "a profound miscalculation for those who carried out or authorised this bombing to believe that their political case will be strengthened by last Friday's action". He also said: "The bomb has damaged the credibility of all of us who urge people to put their trust in the commitment to peace of the movement which combines Sinn Féin and the IRA".
I do not need to underscore that the argument to convince all the relevant parties to come to the negotiation table has been made much more difficult by the bombing. In an interview today in An Phoblacht, a spokesman for the IRA claims that there was a quid pro quo understanding that all-party talks would commence rapidly after a complete cessation of violence.
The spokesman says that was a clear and unambiguous understanding with the previous Taoiseach about which he was clear and of which I was informed on assuming office. Let me make it clear to the House that I was not informed of any such clear and unambiguous understanding. I was not informed of any specific understanding or deal of that kind with the previous Government in relation to talks.
In his speech Deputy Bertie Ahern said that Fianna Fáil, too, needs to be self-critical and perhaps it could and should have done more to tie down firmly Sinn Féin and the IRA on the one hand and the British Government on the other to more explicit commitments before the ceasefire, assuming this could have been achieved. The tradegy of the abrogation of the ceasefire is compounded, as I said on Tuesday, by the fact that so much progress was being made on the Irish Government's proposal for proximity talks. The path to all-party talks was being cleared slowly but steadily when this bomb shattered the lives of innocent people in London who had done nothing against Ireland to deserve their fate.
Throughout this debate Deputy after Deputy sent out a clear and unequivocal signal to all who would seek to pursue political aims by violent means. Those who sincerely wish to stand with us will never be denied a place provided violence does not form any part of their political agenda.
The key challenge for Sinn Féin is to secure the restoration by the IRA of the complete cessation of hostilities. Until that situation prevails, the Government cannot and will not treat that party in the same way it treated it throughout the IRA ceasefire. At the same time we recognise the right of Sinn Féin to bring the people it represents into politics. The Government sincerely hopes that party will bring itself back into the fold of exclusively democratic and peaceful politics. That is why we are leaving open official channels of communication.
As I said on Tuesday, both Governments must now steer the process towards our shared aim of reaching an agreed settlement. Securing the necessary allegiance to any such settlement demands that the value of parity of esteem and equality of treatment apply throughout. I use the word "values" advisedly because that conveys the sense of fairness which must apply in all societies, especially in those divided on grounds of identity, allegiance and aspirations. These values must be reflected in all the key principles and structures applying to a future talks process. In particular, therefore, the three core relationships at the heart of present divisions will need to be addressed in a comprehensive way. No one relationship can be subservient to the other two. That is vital to the accordance of equal respect for the aspirations and identities of both traditions on this island.
I agree with Deputy Raphael Burke on the integrity of the six principles set out in paragraph 20 of the Mitchell report. Those principles, with the recommendations on decommissioning, offer a new and insightful signpost to all-party talks.
As far as the Unionist parties are concerned, a unique challenge rests with the UDP and the PUP to do everything possible in the interests of ensuring that the ceasefire of the combined loyalist military command holds. Loyalists, even if they define their nationality differently, have shared the pride in the peace process and I hope that pride sustains them in the days and weeks ahead. A special onus rests on the shoulders of the two main Unionist parties. It is not good enough simply to retrospectively cite last Friday's bombing as justification for their minimalist response to the unprecedented opportunity presented by the ceasefires. The building of peace and the working towards agreement requires a greater generosity of spirit from the two main Unionist parties than was evident throughout the past 17 months.
This is a particularly difficult time for the SDLP. For many years John Hume and his party struggled, often in very difficult circumstances, to have the voice of democratic nationalism heard in Northern Ireland. They spoke the language of tolerance, forgiveness and equality. Guided by those values John Hume made a judgment to engage in face to face dialogue with the Sinn Féin leader while the IRA campaign was still under way and in that dialogue the seeds of the ceasefires were sown. I know that he and all members of his party are deeply disappointed that his courage and trust in the republican movement were dashed by the IRA bombing last Friday.
While it is important to reflect on the mistakes of the past in order that we may learn from them, it is also important that we, collectively, should not become despondent about the future. We must be neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but realistic. We must be willing to trust again, perhaps less than before, but enough to work positively. This requires a positive act of will to postpone some of the necessary reflections on the awfulness of what has happened and to try again.
The Government will leave no stone unturned in the search for political agreement in an environment of lasting peace. The British Prime Minister and I agreed last Sunday to the pursuit of two key objectives, first, to secure the restoration of the IRA ceasefire and, second, to continue our work towards the commencement of all-party negotiations. With a view to achieving those objectives I suggested five issues to the Prime Minister on which the two Governments need to work together in advance of our planned meeting later this month. The five issues include the creation of a way forward in which Sinn Féin could honourably rejoin the political process when the IRA campaign is over; a way in which this Government's proximity talks proposal might be further developed, particularly in the context of the principles and recommendations set out in the Mitchell report which affect all-party negotiations; whether and how an elective process, which would meet the Mitchell conditions, might follow from proximity talks and could lead directly and speedily to all-party negotiations; the need to consider John Hume's proposals for referenda North and South as a means of mandating all parties on this island to pursue political agreement by unequivocally democratic methods and how the active role of the United States Administration might be deepened to augment our shared efforts towards peace and agreement. Agreement, not imposition, must apply to those five issues. The principles of parity of esteem and equality of treatment for Nationalist and Unionist communities must at all times guide our actions towards the achievement of our shared aims.
The Irish Government should pursue the policy it believes is right. It should not pursue a policy designed to appease or to provoke the IRA which, unfortunately, will work to its agenda. The Irish Government must pursue the agenda that it, as a democratically elected Government, believes is right for the Irish people. It must take its stand on that basis.
I stress that the task is now immensely complex. Getting agreement between the two Governments and across both northern communities on the five issues I mentioned while violence continues is not something that can be done easily in a week. I have no illusions about that after all that has happened. I do not propose to set an impossible task. That would be of no service to the House. For those reasons I propose to be as truthful as I can with the House about the difficulties that remain in our way. We must be honest enough to admit that the unilateral revocation of the ceasefire puts in question the entire basis of the peace process as it had been operating previously. The Government had to establish a clear public distinction between the approach pursued in conditions of ceasefire and the approach it will follow now that the ceasefire has been revoked. A democratic Government cannot allow any perception to grow that it condones violence in any way. It cannot accept any blurring of the line between democratic processes and the use or threat of violence. The bomb, unfortunately, gives cause to those who questioned the genuineness of the ceasefire all along.
We must be willing to ask ourselves questions, including ones that are profoundly uncomfortable. The assumption made by some throughout the last 16 months that as long as nationalist Ireland stayed together there was little risk of an IRA bomb has not been altogether vindicated. In the last three weeks all of nationalist Ireland, as one might describe it, was actually more united than it has been for many months. We all were agreed in our opposition to what was seen as a preemptive approach to elections. Nationalist Ireland was never more united, the IRA chose to let off a bomb in London. People should reflect a while on that.
There are other questions which we must be honest enough to ask ourselves. If there was a ceasefire tomorrow and all-party talks started next week, would the IRA resume violence whenever the talks reached a difficult point from a republican point of view? Is there anything that Sinn Féin can say to convince people that this assumption would be wrong? If the republican movement's position is that there would be no split and not a single bullet will be handed over until a final settlement is reached, does this mean that a small minority can, as a matter of principle, always dictate policy to the entire movement? Is Sinn Féin willing to support unambiguously the six Mitchell principles? Will Sinn Féin do the same in relation to the Mitchell guidelines on modalities for decommissioning?
It is possible to be optimistic that this is only a short-term resumption of violence. It is possible to believe that if talks once start, the IRA will never return to violence again, no matter what setbacks republicans face in the negotiations. It is also possible, unfortunately, to be pessimistic. The House must be honest enough to consider both possibilities.
It is human to hope for the best but pessimists can point to the cancellation of the Sinn Féin Ard-Fheis. Was it postponed back in January in case a planned military operation caused difficulty? Pessimists argue that Sinn Féin needed to buy time, knowing from their talks with the Mitchell body that they might not be able to accept the principle of consent.
Speaking for myself, it would be foolish for me to sign up to such a totally pessimistic approach but equally I must be realistic. The sensible thing is to make a synthesis of both pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, pick out those things about which we can be fairly sure and proceed from there. That is what we have done. We will go on talking to Sinn Féin at official level but we will go on being suspicious of the IRA.
What we cannot do is condone criminal or delinquent behaviour, not least because in the middle of a public concern about civil crime we cannot be ambivalent about political crime. What kind of example would we give our children who are tuned into television if we tell them it is all right to talk to people who knew the people who set off the bomb in London and who refused to condem it? How could we turn out lawabiding citizens if we ourselves appear to be ambivalent about crime in London? We cannot combat crime in rural Ireland and condone it in Northern Ireland or in Britain. These issues may not be the issues of the hour but commentators need to address them.
I will conclude with a few words about my personal approach to the management of the peace process. It is essential that the Dáil be realistic and honest about the huge extent of the divisions which actually exist in Northern Ireland. These divisions concern the most fundamental question of all — to what State should they belong. There is no more difficult question to resolve in politics. That fundamental division has persisted for three centuries or more and 25 years of violence has deepened it and added personal bitterness and hurt to the already divided views about the most fundamental of all political questions.
The risks that are taken to bridge this gap are not ones which are purely political or personal for those directly involved and they involve every person living on this island. We have seen civilised countries elsewhere in the world plunge into the most appalling and comprehensive barbarities because of over-ambitious handling of conflicts over national identity. Let this House not forget that. The prosperity that we enjoy in this State is built on the existence of a political consensus within it. Without the consensus underpinning our political institutions we would not enjoy economic prosperity at all.
In Northern Ireland the conflict about national identity is increased because it coincides generally with a division in respect of religious belief, which in turn creates differences about philosophy and language. At times, the two communities in Northern Ireland, even when trying to reach out towards one another to find an accommodation, speak in such radically different language that they do not understand one another. What one side sees as a gesture of conciliation is seen by the other as an aggressive proposal simply because the modes of thinking are so different. The Unionist mind approaches political problems from a literal and inductive approach, working from practical purposes backwards towards general philosophical conclusions. Due to its theological and philosophical origins, the Nationalist mind starts from general principles and then tries to put a practical form on them.
Against this background, let me outline what I believe is the appropriate road for the Irish Government. The Government is bound to lean to one side in favour of the Nationalist community. We have an obligation to do so under the Anglo-Irish Agreement but in practical terms we have an obligation to do so too because the Nationalists are in a minority. The counterpart for the granting of the principle of majority consent, which gives a majority a right to say "no", is that in the meantime the Irish Government must redress that balance in favour of the Nationalist minority through the Anglo-Irish Agreement, but it does not mean the Irish Government must see itself exclusively as seeking to understand just one community. If that was its role, the Government could not contribute to compromise.
The basis of successful negotiation is to start by seeking to understand what one's adversary wants and needs, and then try to find a way, consistent with the interests you represent, whereby your antagonist's interests can also be satisfied. This means that if the Government is to find an agreement on behalf of Nationalists, it must seek to understand and allay Unionist fears. This means, for example, if Unionists come up with an idea, we do not shoot it down the following day. The fact that Unionists often shoot down ideas which Nationalists put forward in that way is not only not an excuse but a positive reason for the Irish Government to do the opposite. If everyone took that attitude and rejected ideas because of their source, compromise would become completely impossible.
The Irish Government has an obligation to Nationalists to go out of its way to understand Unionist concerns because that is the way to reach agreement on behalf of Nationalists. That is why I have sought to understand Unionist worries about decommissioning and have sought not to shoot down Unionist suggestions about an elective process on principle. Unless the Government is seen to understand Unionist concerns about what happens to IRA arms while Sinn Féin is at the negotiating table, we will not get the Unionists to the negotiating table in the first place. If Unionists think the Irish Government is both blind and deaf to their concerns, they will not wish to negotiate with us.
At the end of the day, Unionists may not negotiate with us at all. That is the real political risk that anyone who reaches out to them is running; that is a genuine political risk which I am prepared to run. The real risk-taker in a peace process is not the person who goes out of his way to understand the worries and fears of his own supporters but one who goes out of his way to understand the worries and concerns of the supporters of his antagonists.
The same argument applies in relation to proposals for an elected body. I first heard of Unionist suggestions for an elected body at the European summit in Majorca. I then publicly asked Nationalist politicans not to reject these out of hand. I could immediately see the dangers in the elective process; that it could undermine the three-stranded approach; that it could lead to an internal solution; that it could entrench a majority-minded analysis of the problem within Northern Ireland itself. But I took the risk of saying that it should be considered because I believe it is only by considering the ideas of others and trying to turn them to good account that one ever makes a breakthrough in a genuine negotiation and, by "a genuine negotiation", I mean a negotiation based on persuasion not coercion.
Let me put it quite bluntly: no Nationalist leader pursuing an exclusively Nationalist agenda has solved the Irish problem. I could name the great leaders of Irish nationalism, both of the constitutional and of the physical force traditions, for the past two centuries. None actually solved the divisions between the two sections of our people in the ancient Province of Ulster. That is a fact. Their approach, while eminentely successful in separating this part of Ireland from Britain, unfortunately, was not successful in reconciling the two sections of the people who live on this island one of which is concentrated primarily in Ulster. That is why I believe that a different approach — learning the lessons of history — is a risk worth taking.
I have gone out of my way in this debate to listen to the ideas of others rather than become an over vigorous proponent of my own. I hope I do not sound overly vigorous in what I am now saying. I have lent an ear, I lend an ear to the concerns of the republican community, I understand that the republican community in Northern Ireland have suffered more through violence than anyone else. I understand that it is their lives that have been disrupted most of all. I understand that there are many others who live in comparative comfort who can afford the luxury of saying "no" but equally I understand that, if there is to be an agreement, we must bring all together. And I understand the key to democratic politics is patience.
This House has shown great patience throughout this debate. It is a great compliment to this House that so many Members have contributed; I have not heard the criticisms voiced elsewhere about this House over the past three days. This House has done itself credit for the past three days. The speeches have been of a very high quality, the concern has been genuine; the disagreements reasonable. While not physically present for all this debate because of other responsibilities, I can assure every Member that I am intent on taking careful account of everything that has been said in this debate and on paying as much attention to what has been said from the Opposition benches as to what has been said from this side of the House because I believe that, in this manner, this House can set an example as to how a peace process really works.
A peace process works by putting oneself in the mind of one's traditional antagonists. It is my regret that the republican movement, while undoubtedly sincere in its decision to give up violence, has not sufficiently educated its own supporters that the giving up of violence is not merely a political tactic; that the giving up of violence and the choosing of a political path means that, at the deepest possible level, one has to accept the principle of consent, not necessarily consent in the particular form spoken of in debates here in a constitutional form, but consent in a more profound form, consent in the sense that you respect the right of other people to differ from you; consent in the sense that you will never use violence to make them change their mind, not just in practice but in principle.
In that sense I regret that over the past 16 to 18 months there would not appear to have been the internal debate that ought to have taken place within the republican movement. It is regrettable that there were not more meetings within the republican movement at which the actual logic of peace could have been debated because, to my mind, the logic of peace points in no other direction than that of the ultimate and gradual removal of the military arm of the republican movement.
Given the principle we are adopting of respect for other people's views, of course, that is a decision one must let the movement take for itself. Any attempt to force that decision on it from outside is liable to be counter-productive because of what we know about the way people react to coercion from outside anyway. That was the mistake about the Washington 3 condition, not that it was unreasonable in itself, which it was not, but that it was being imposed from elsewhere, from a source that did not command the sort of sense of support and trust that the people who needed to make the decision required. But that does not mean that it is not a decision that the republican movement ought to be able to take for itself by itself. It is regrettable that the republican movement did not have that debate with itself. It is a debate that sections of virtually every party in this House have had with themselves at some stage in the history of this island in this century — crossing the path from physical force to exclusively peaceful methods. It is a hard road to follow — the logic, the comradeship of the physical force tradition are difficult to shake off. The bravery undoubtedly shown is difficult to forget, but these must be shaken off, they must be passed into the past if true peace and reconciliation are to be brought about.
My regret — having listened carefully to representatives of Sinn Féin in the many meetings I have had with them — is not one which prompts me to doubt their sincerity, certainly not of the people I met — I do not doubt their sincerity — but I do regret that they did not engage in the necessary serious self-analysis to pass from a strategy of the armalite in one hand and the ballot paper in the other to a strategy that says it has grasped the ballot paper with both hands.
In the present traumatic reflection undoubtedly taking place in republican areas I hope the people will reflect on the logic of the peace process, which is the total abandonment of violence. I do not expect republicans to necessarily appreciate that message when put to them in trenchant tones by people who, to their mind, have never experienced any of the sacrifices they have experienced — therefore, I do not expect them to accept that from me — but I do expect them to think about it for themselves because I can see no other way back. This time, when the republican movement come back — as I hope they will — to the path of peace, for their own sake it must be for good; for their own sake it must be the result of a thorough and conscious decision to change, not just their tactics but the entire philosophy of its movement. This time the peace process must not be superficial, it must be radical.
