Written Answers. - Mitigation of Fines.
Michael Creed
Question:
244
Mr. Creed
asked the
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
the current position regarding a petition in respect of mitigation of court fines for a person (details supplied) in County Cork; and if he will review the request favourably as the individual involved is dependent on social welfare and unable to meet the outstanding fines.
[2415/98]
Andrew Boylan
Question:
248
Mr. Boylan
asked the
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
the reason for the long delay in reaching a final decision regarding the petition made by Deputy Boylan on 27 January 1997 regarding a person (details supplied) in County Cavan; and if he will take the Deputy's request on board and mitigate a fine (details supplied) imposed on this man in view of his circumstances.
[2504/98]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 244 and 248 together.
The operation of the petitions procedure fundamentally changed in April 1995 as a result of a High Court judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Geoghegan in the matter of Patrick J. Brennan v the Minister for Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General. The judgment was on foot of a judicial review sought by the applicant, a retired senior judge of the District Court, who contended that the then Minister in purported exercise of her powers under section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951, had been improperly reducing or remitting fines which he had imposed.
Mr. Justice Geoghegan upheld the constitutionality of the power vested in the Minister but he ruled that the exercise of the power by the Minister was ultra vires. He held the view that the petitions procedure was not an alternative or parallel system of justice to that provided by the courts and that the power exercised by the Minister should be used sparingly and for special reasons with proper maintenance of records. In this respect the judgment clearly indicates that petition should be granted only in “special cases” or “exceptional circumstances”.
The processing of petitions virtually ceased while the implications of the judgment were considered. New guidelines and procedures to give effect to the judgment were issued in late February last year for the purpose of assisting both members of the public and public representatives in ascertaining whether a case exists for the opening of a petition or not. By the time I took up office a backlog of approximately 5,200 unprocessed petitions had built up.
Last November, in an effort to tackle this backlog, I directed that a petitions clearance programme be undertaken with a view to having all outstanding petitions, including applications to have a petition opened, finalised in the shortest possible time. Substantial progress is being achieved and decisions are now in the process of issuing to petitioners. It will be appreciated, however, that given the very substantial task involved it will be several months before the process is completed.
I should point out that, unfortunately, it does not appear to have been appreciated by correspondents how very restricted the scope for intervention under the petitions procedure now is, having regard to the 1995 High Court judgment dealing with the petitions procedure. The reality is that intervention cannot be a regular or frequent occurrence and that a humanitarian or other reason does not necessarily qualify as a special case nor can it be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances, in accordance with the judgment. From the cases which are being referred to me for consideration, it would appear that very few are likely to be successful and that in future, in order to meet the criteria laid down by the High Court, the exercise of clemency under the petitions procedure will have to be very much the exception rather than the rule.
I would like to emphasise the High Court finding that the petitions procedure is not a parallel or alternative system of justice to that provided by the courts. I, as Minister, have no function in determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant or the appropriateness or otherwise of penalties imposed in the light of evidence presented in court. Such matters and other legal issues are properly the subject for appeal to a higher court. In addition, matters which have not yet come to court or are still before the courts, that is to say, where the original case is not yet finalised or where an appeal to a higher court has been lodged, are inappropriate for consideration under the petitions procedure. Other matters excluded are civil and Revenue cases, disqualification from driving and endorsement on driving licence, community service orders, costs and expenses awarded by the courts, on-the-spot-fine tickets and requests for time to pay or to pay by instalments. In addition, it will not be possible to give favourable consideration to cases which indicate no significant change in financial and other circumstances since the court hearing, where insufficient information is provided, etc.
With regard to future applications to have a petition opened, I would caution that if the information is incomplete or does not establish a probability that the matter may be a special case or be deemed to have exceptional circumstances, then a petition will not be opened. It is imperative, therefore, that individuals' expectations are not raised in the future in respect of cases which do not appear to meet the requirements of the 1995 High Court judgment, notwithstanding that they themselves may well consider that the case in which they are interested meets the relevant criteria.
In essence, as indicated above, the 1995 High Court judgment on petitions precludes the petitions procedure from being used as a parallel or alternative system of justice to that provided by the courts and it would beultra vires for me to intervene in anything other than a very special case or one with exceptional circumstances.
The petitions referred to by the Deputies are among the large number which I have already referred to and will now have to be considered in accordance with the criteria outlined above.
