It has often been said that the first thing to do in trying to solve a problem is to establish what the problem is. There are a wide variety of versions of the problem of Northern Ireland. Some republicans take the view that the problem is that we do not have a united Ireland and that if we did, there would not be a problem. Some Unionists take the view that the problem is that the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland has never accepted the Union, that it should do so and that if it did, there would not be a problem. At a deep level, the level of core belief, far too many people hold one or other of these two irreconcilable viewpoints.
The two positions are irreconcilable in the sense that no compromise between them is possible. Northern Ireland is either part of a united Ireland or part of the United Kingdom. As long as the question continues to be posed in those terms, it cannot be solved by agreement. The holding of these irreconcilable positions contributes to sectarianism.
People are not born sectarian. Let me illustrate the point by referring to something that is happening in the Republic, the growth of racism. Racism and sectarianism are more or less the same thing. People are not born racist any more than they are born sectarian. What happens is well illustrated in an article in the Irish Independent of 3 February based on an interview with Malaysian medical students in Dublin. One student had the following to say about her recent experience in Dublin:
In the beginning when I first came it was great, everyone was really nice and hospitable but in the last few months things have changed. It has been difficult the way people stare, the looks they give you. Old women bless themselves when they see us. I have even been spat at.
That is what has been happening in Dublin in recent months. We can hardly claim, therefore, not to understand sectarianism in Northern Ireland, we are seeing how it can develop in our midst. If we could understand the reasons for the recent growth of racism in this State, we might begin to understand the roots and sources of sectarianism in Northern Ireland.
It is my guess that racism has grown in the Republic because of an underlying sense of insecurity. People feel insecure about the economic boom and frightened by the rapid pace of change. We want to revert to an old familiar Ireland of the past. Immigrants, by their presence, seem to prevent that return to the simple, uncomplicated past for which we crave in our response to the many insecurities of the present.
The same thing is happening in Northern Ireland but over a longer period. Sectarianism is growing because of insecurity about the future. People do not know where things are heading and crave for an imagined past which never existed but which appears cosy and comfortable from the perspective of the insecure present.
The answer to racism is the same as the answer to sectarianism: give people a sense of security about the future and they will no longer feel hostile to those who seem to threaten their ability to revert to an idealised past that never existed. Sectarianism and racism are attempts to revert to a past that never existed.
Racist feelings in the Republic are predicated on the assumption that we can get back to the idealised Ireland of the l950s where everybody had the same skin colour, was happy and lived in complete communion with one another. Anyone who lived through the l950s will know that that never existed.
Likewise, some Unionists have created a myth in their minds about idealised conditions that existed prior to the fall of Stormont. The truth is that prior to the fall of Stormont Northern Ireland was not such a wonderful place in which to live, either for Unionists or Nationalists, and the Union was never fully accepted by Nationalists at any stage.
Some republicans would go even further back in their search for an imagined past that they wish to recreate. They have some idea of a united Ireland of the kind that existed prior to the Norman invasion of 1169. If only we could reverse 800 years of history, the Ulster Plantation and the settlement of l921, everything would be fine. That is nonsense.
None of these versions of the imagined past can be recreated and none of them is particularly attractive. The tragedy of Northern Ireland is that sectarianism is increasing. There is more residential segregation, more people living in one religion housing estates than even before the first IRA ceasefire. There was far more residential segregation of Catholics and Protestants at the time of the IRA ceasefire than there had been at the time of the first civil rights march. It is increasingly infrequent for Protestants and Catholics to live together. In the past it was working class areas only that were religiously segregated but now, increasingly, middle class areas are segregated also. Any house sold on the Malone Road now is sold by a Protestant and bought by a Catholic. The same is happening in reverse in other areas. The fact that Alderman Andrew Davidson is leaving his home in Eglinton in Derry because of a death threat is a metaphor for what is happening throughout Northern Ireland. Ordinary Protestants and Catholics may not be the recipients of death threats but they are quietly moving to separate neighbourhoods.
These unnoticed residential movements display a profound fear of the future. They also make it much more difficult for genuine cross-community institutions to work. If people do not meet those of another religion at school or in normal social life, how can we expect them to forge political alliances? Protestants and Catholics continue to meet in the workplace, but that is the only remaining point of contact in many cases. At 5 p.m. they head home to their own neighbourhoods to meet people who are exclusively of their own religion and to be with their children who have spent the day at schools which are also exclusively attended by others of their own religion.
This slow motion segregation is also reflected in voting patterns. The centre ground has been weakened, comparatively speaking, in recent elections and preference voting across the religious divide is becoming less frequent. Even in the privacy of the polling booth people think in terms of "our" community and "their" community. The current problems in the talks stem from this growing sectarian segregation. It is very difficult to trust people whom you never meet. It is equally difficult to meet people whom you do not trust.
This is at the heart of the stand-off about a meeting between the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Féin. The Ulster Unionists should meet Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin has an electoral mandate. The Ulster Unionists are in the talks as is Sinn Féin, so why not a bilateral meeting? Is that really the point? The Unionists are talking to Sinn Féin in the business committee and in the round table discussions taking place today and yesterday, so why is a bilateral meeting with no one else present so important? The only reason it is important is that it has not taken place. If it took place, it would no longer be important. The controversy about the UUP-Sinn Féin bilateral illustrates the way people constantly ask themselves how empty the glass is, not how full. That in turn comes from a sectarian mind-set which in turn derives from a profound fear of the future felt by both communities equally.
Will the institutions that emerge from the current talks process reverse the fear, the segregation and the sectarianism that continues to grow as we speak? Unless these new institutions do that, they will not work because the psychological conditions will not exist to make them work. On the other hand, the sight of Unionist and Nationalist political leaders wearing the same jersey and working together as Ministers to solve practical social and economical problems will go a major distance to healing the divisions between their constituents. It will be difficult. The political leaders will need support. That is why both the settlement itself and the process by which it is reached must leave both communities feeling secure. Only if they feel secure will the fear of the future diminish. Only if the fear of the future diminishes will sectarianism diminish, and only if sectarianism diminishes will the institutions work on a day to day basis.
That is the reason I worry about the real viability of a settlement which is formalised on the basis that either side continues to insist on its ever present aspiration to something much better than the existing institutions and much more in favour of their own position. I realise that compromising on an interim settlement while aspiring to something better is common in politics. In that sense nothing is ever permanent in life, but it is rare that radically conflicting aspirations can easily co-exist on the fundamental constitutional question of the nature of the state to which allegiance is given by those co-operating in a power sharing Government.
Such aspirations, of their very nature, make the other side feel insecure. For example, a power sharing solution in which Unionists took part but continued to assert their aspiration to simple majority rule might not work very well. That can be applied in reverse also to the aspirations of other communities. A formula that the whole settlement could be overturned, on the basis of a particular interpretation of the principle of consent by just 51 per cent of the people, would be difficult to work also. The transitional nature of the institutions might, of itself, make it difficult to get the full hearted co-operation of whatever section felt threatened by the other side's aspirations.
This is not an issue that is currently at the forefront in the talks. Indeed the participants seem to accept that others have aspirations which conflict radically with their own, but it is a problem that could arise once the agreed institutions are up and running. The aim, therefore, should be to create a three stranded system of Government which will, in and of itself, command the primary allegiances of both communities. Anything that makes these institutions more difficult to operate should be avoided because any political institution can be frustrated by a recalcitrant minority. This Dáil works on the basis of consent by the Opposition. That is why the institutions in Northern Ireland will only work if there is both Unionist and Nationalist consent, but consent requires a modicum of trust. Will the new agreed institutions of themselves create the necessary trust? That is the key question. These new institutions of their very nature will be inherently difficult to operate.
The institutions to emerge from the three strands of the talks will involve what I would describe as multi-polar, variably geometric federalism. They will be multi-polar in the sense that there will be a number of poles of power provided for in the institutions. London, Dublin, Belfast, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Brussels will be recognised poles of power. There will be variable geometry in the sense that the power relationship between Edinburgh and London will not be the same as that between Cardiff and London or between London and Belfast. The relationship between Dublin and London will be of an entirely different character from that of the three relationships I have just mentioned.
We have already seen the difficulties with a much smaller amount of variable geometry created within the European Union. The British variably geometric opt-out from economic and monetary union is an example of something that is causing great difficulty for the rest of the Union and for us on this island in particular. The settlement will also involve federalism in the sense that there will be the sharing of power between different layers of Government. Such sharing of power is part of the human condition. It is a myth that any nation state was ever fully sovereign. Absolute sovereignty was a myth generated by British imperialism in the 19th century and it should never have been adopted as part of Ireland's national objectives.
Formalised federalism is not easy to operate, as we can see from the United States, Canada and the European Union. It is difficult to work out a neat, watertight division of function between different layers of Government. There will always be disputes, the results will often be messy and the decision making slow and expensive.
My concern about the outcome of the all-party talks is not that they will be insufficiently comprehensive. The three stranded approach guarantees that every aspect of the problem will be tackled; that is a great strength. Nor am I concerned that the outcome will be insufficiently fair. I believe the outcome will be very fair. My only concern is that the institutions will be so complicated that normal Government decision making will be exceptionally slow and difficult. People need Governments that can make decisions. If too many important day to day decisions have to be mediated through very complicated institutions, there is a real risk that decisions will be taken too slowly for the needs of the people. If that happens, there will be frustration and that frustration could undermine the political institutions and the overall political settlement to which they give effect.
Institutions earn respect only if they work. There has been no detailed public analysis of how the three stranded institutions would work on a day to day basis. Taking the example of the North-South bodies, will they come within the remit of the Irish Comptroller and Auditor General or the British Comptroller and Auditor General? Will the funding for those bodies be agreed by the Department of Finance in Dublin, the treasury in London, the Department of Finance in Belfast or some joint creation? How will the funding of those bodies be divided between the UK Exchequer and the Irish Exchequer? Will the North-South bodies have their own civil servants or will civil servants be seconded to them from the UK and Irish Administrations? Seconded officials will tend to look over their shoulders to the employer to whom they will eventually return. The European Commission would never have worked if it had been staffed by officials seconded from national administrations. The European Commission only worked because it created a new European Civil Service. Exactly the same questions I posed about the North-South bodies will also have to be posed about the Council of the Isles and there is also the Northern Ireland internal administration. The working of the internal Northern Ireland institutions is crucial to the whole edifice. If they do not work, neither the North-South body nor the east-west body will work.
Within the North the probability is that all decisions would have to be taken by what is called "sufficient consensus". According to the ground rules "sufficient consensus" means that any decision has to be supported by parties which, taken together, obtain a clear majority of a valid poll, which between them represents a clear majority in both the Unionist and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. In practice that means a minority in Northern Ireland could prevent an agreement that a majority supported if the minority was large enough to represent a majority within one of the two communities. That means in practice that the Northern Ireland involvement in the Council of the Isles, which the Unionists want, could be paralysed by parties representing barely 51 per cent of the Northern Nationalist community. Likewise, it means the Northern Ireland participation in the North-South bodies, which the Nationalists want, could be paralysed by parties representing only 51 per cent of the Unionist vote in Northern Ireland, even though a majority of the population in Northern Ireland wanted the North-South bodies to work.
I am not making those points to test the three stranded approach to destruction. The truth is there is no better option available than the present three stranded approach. There is no better option available than the present talks and the present talks' participants have the necessary goodwill to do business. I know that, having spoken to them last week. I made those points because it is important to find solutions to those difficulties in good times and to stress that the institutions, no matter how brilliantly devised, will only work if there is willingness at grass roots level to allow them to work. That is why the fundamental cancer of sectarianism must be tackled in Northern Ireland just as the fundamental cancer of racism must be tackled in our State.
The Christian churches need to take a much more active role on the issue of sectarianism. I am a supporter of denominational education but in the situation of Northern Ireland I believe the Christian thing to do is to support integrated education. Separate education is a luxury Northern Ireland cannot afford. Children in a divided society, who are sent to separate schools, will not get to know one another sufficiently well to work in harmony with one another politically as adults. All clergymen should withdraw from outside organisations that are exclusive to one religion or political view. It is wrong that Protestant clergymen are members of the Orange Order. It would be equally wrong if Catholic clergymen were to associate themselves too closely with one political party or one political point of view or aspiration. The role of a Christian church is to give moral leadership based on the universal teachings of Christ and not to associate itself too closely with its community as against the needs of some other communities of believers or unbelievers. The best inspiration the people of Northern Ireland could find at present is to be found in the life of Gandhi. He stood up against anti-Muslim sectarianism in his Hindu community. He went on a fast to his death to stop it. He was willing to sacrifice his life to oppose sectarianism in his community. That is the sort of example that is needed, the example of self-sacrifice, anti-sectarianism and anti-racism, not an example set by finger wagging at others, but an example set by sacrificing oneself.
Regarding the recent developments in the talks, at present the negotiators in Belfast are dealing with strand one on the basis of a series of questions put by the British Government to the participants. I regret it appeared up to yesterday at least that Sinn Feáin had not taken part actively in those strand one discussions. I understand Sinn Féin listen and take copious notes, but as yet has offered no contribution. It must engage in strand one discussions. The negotiations were set up on a three stranded basis and Sinn Féin entered them on the basis that there were three strands, one of which was within Northern Ireland. It cannot opt out now for ideological reasons. Last week in London the participants started to deal with strand two, the North-South dimension. I understand the Unionist engagement in those discussions was less than total, but there was a measure of engagement with the strand two questions posed by the two Governments. Strand three has yet to be addressed.
I read through the series of questions posed by the Governments for strands two and three. Those strands affect the powers of the Dáil considerably. It seems that all parties in the Dáil should be involved in an appropriate way in the discussion of strands two and three issues. This Dáil debate while welcome does not allow for any real engagement by the Opposition parties in the House on strands two and three issues. I suggest a forum be provided within the House for that purpose.
The questions posed by the Governments in their paper are non-directive. They read a little like an exam posed by a teacher to a class with a view to demonstrating to them how little they know so that when the exam is over and the teacher produces his or her version of the answers he or she will appear to be much more knowledgeable than the students. I believe the two Governments have ready made answers to all the questions they are posing and are simply giving the participants enough time to fail to answer them in order that the Governments will bring forward their proposals in the most favourable conditions possible. That sort of gamesmanship might be inevitable and necessary, but it is not healthy. The two Governments have a clear obligation to produce much more detailed scenarios for the working of those various institutions. I can understand the Governments' reluctance to produce a prescriptive formula at this stage for the North-South body or the Council of the Isles, but the Government should at least produce three or four different and potentially workable scenarios for each of the two strands. Then the participants would have something to get their teeth into.
I will illustrate the difficulty facing the participants in dealing with that Government questionnaire by referring to what happens in the Dáil. The Government does not produce a series of questions on crime, housing or health and get us to fill them out in an opinion poll manner in the House. It produces legislative proposals which the Dáil can agree, disagree or amend. In reality it is only on the basis of detailed and fully worked out proposals from the Government that the Dáil is able to function as a deliberative assembly, yet the two Governments who operate in that manner at home are expecting the talks' participants in Belfast to function as a deliberative and negotiating body, not on the basis of solid proposals, but on the basis of a type of open-ended questionnaire. That is not realistic politics.
We should know what the two Governments' realistic scenario is for the conclusion of the talks by May. They are currently working on the basis that by May there will be agreement in the three strands to create interlocking institutions between those strands which will put in place multi-polar variably geometric federalism — I am waiting for a better definition, but I believe that is an accurate one. It is obvious the agreement will have to be very detailed because it will have to be put to the people in a referendum. A scheme that was not detailed could not withstand the sort of criticism that occurs in contested referendum campaigns, and this campaign will be contested. Unless every question can be adequately answered, including hostile trick questions, proposals may be rejected in a referendum in the North or the South on the grounds of caution alone.
No loose ends can be left in any of the three strands, if the overall agreement is to be put to a referendum. Given the present state of the negotiations, this raises questions about the timetable. It is realistic to expect that by May the negotiations will have reached some form of outline agreement, but an outline agreement is not enough to put to the people in a referendum for the reasons I have given. There is another difficulty. Included in strand three is the establishment of an institution which is supposed to interact with the Welsh and Scottish assemblies. However, these assemblies do not exist. Presumably their consent will be required for any institutions involving them. Will we be ready to put proposals to referendum involving strand three institutions until this is clarified?
I am not suggesting the Governments should unilaterally abandon their May timetable for the conclusion of the present phase of the talks but there must be substantial progress by May if the process is to remain viable. In that sense, the Governments are right to continue to inject a measure of urgency into proceedings. However, I have doubts about the views expressed by the Secretary of State in the past few days when she seemed to imply we would have a referendum immediately after May. We will not be ready for a referendum at that stage. The talks will have to resume in September to finalise some of the details on the heads of agreement which I hope will have been reached by May.
There is a considerable length of life left in the talks process. It is not simply a question of keeping them on the road for another two months. We may have to keep them on the road until the end of the year at least. This means that the enforcement of the Mitchell Principles is not an academic matter. We need to ensure the Mitchell Principles are enforced throughout the full likely duration of the talks process.
The talks process is, historically, by far the best hope for a comprehensive settlement. However, there will be no settlement unless positive leadership is shown in both communities to end sectarianism. The best leadership is leadership by example. We need visible, strong and anti-sectarian leadership, directed at their own communities, from Sinn Féin, the Ulster Unionists, the SDLP and all participants in the talks. Each of the parties must confront the sins of their supporters, not those of their opponents. If Unionist leaders are to confront and disown Orange sectarianism, Nationalist leaders must confront and disown the legacy of IRA violence.
The agreed institutions should command the allegiance of every section of the community. The three stranded institutions — not an aspiration to something better — should be the primary focus of the allegiance of all the people. Only in that way will the fear of the future, the genesis of sectarianism, be banished from Northern Ireland forever.
The words "what about" should be banished from the vocabulary. When an inquiry into Bloody Sunday was announced, the Unionist reaction was to ask, "What about the arms crisis of 1970?". When Unionists engage with Sinn Féin in round table talks, Sinn Féin's reaction is to ask "What about a bilateral?". When Nationalists look for progress on North-South bodies, the Unionist reaction is to ask "What about the Northern Assembly and its powers?". The "what about" mentality is to be found in both communities and displays a deep-seated unwillingness to discuss anybody's agenda but one's own.
A settlement will work only if each side deliberately sets out to address the other side's agenda as a first priority and seeks to achieve its own objectives by means of the other side's agenda.
That, in my experience, is the key to successful negotiation.
