Written Answers. - Court Sentences.
Seymour Crawford
Question:
367
Mr. Crawford
asked the
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
his views on the many court decisions taken where only token sentences are given in many sexual assault cases in view of the fact that his Department's discussion paper on the Law on Sexual Offences, published in May 1998, stated that the offence of rape carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment the same as the crime of murder; if his attention has been drawn to the fact that the Supreme Court held in 1998 that normal sentence for rape should be a substantial prison sentence; and if he will make a statement on the matter.
[27163/99]
The House will be aware that the courts are, subject only to the Constitution and the law, independent in the exercise of their judicial functions and I, as a member of the executive, am precluded from intervening directly.
Under our legal system, the law provides generally for maximum penalties for criminal offences. The law enables the judge to exercise his-her discretion, within the maximum penalty, by reference to the conclusions he-she has reached after trying the case, hearing all the evidence and assessing the culpability and circumstances of the accused. Our system of recruitment to all levels of the judiciary is based on the concept of bringing in experienced and trained legal practitioners and, consequently, judges, on appointment, have a wide knowledge of the law and its application. In so far as consistency of sentencing is concerned, I consider it important to mention that the Criminal Justice Act, 1993, provides that the Director of Public Prosecutions may apply to the court for a review of what appears to the director to be an unduly lenient sentence.
The complex question of sentencing policy was addressed at length by the Law Reform Commission which specifically recommended against the introduction of statutory sentencing guidelines. Its report pointed out a number of differences of opinion among members of the commission in relation to some of the recommendations in that report which tends to underline the obvious complexities which arise in relation to sentencing policy.
The Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995, enables me to provide funds for judicial training courses arranged by the judiciary and, this year, I made £60,000 available to the Judicial Studies Institute, which was established by the Chief Justice for the purposes of judicial training. I understand that the issuse of sentencing has been examined by the Institute in the context of its training programme.
Section 36 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961, makes provision for meetings of District Court Judges to discuss,inter alia, the avoidance of undue divergence in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court and the general level of fines and penalties. While there is no similar provision in the case of other courts, I understand they hold similar meetings.
The sixth report of the working group on a courts commission also made reference to the issue of sentencing. The working group suggests that judicial education could be addressed by a judicial standards body in liaison with the Judicial Studies Institute. This new body could,inter alia, provide a monitoring and analytical service on matters such as sentencing along the lines of the Judicial Commission in New South Wales. The House will be aware in this regard, that the Chief Justice has established a judicial committee to consider, inter alia, the recommendations made in the working group report.
