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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 7 Jun 2000

Vol. 520 No. 4

Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999: Report Stage (Resumed).

Debate resumed on amendment No. 5:
In page 3, line 34, after "both" to insert "or to 100 days community service".
–(Deputy Jim Higgins).

(Mayo): Amendments Nos. 5 and 6 seek to incorporate in legislation, as a matter of form, a recommendation of an alternative or complementary community service sanction in order to remind courts that the option is there and should be availed of as a pragmatic solution in certain situations and as an alternative to prison or a fine. In too many cases judges have omitted the community service option as an alternative sanction. The Government has been particularly remiss in addressing this problem, both in the Attachment of Earnings Bill and in its failure to bring forward the Prison Service Bill.

I fully support amendment No. 6 in the name of Deputy Howlin which proposes to reduce the penalty from a term not exceeding ten years to a term not exceeding five years. Deputy Howlin spoke of other Acts which deal with more serious situations than the one we deal with here, which is often a humanitarian gesture perhaps coupled with a few pounds, although no one wishes to see the commercial exploitation of asylum seekers. Deputy Howlin referred to the crime of soliciting a person to commit murder. I make a similar comparison with the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, which imposes a sentence of ten years and a severe financial penalty for the possession of heroin. There is no comparison between the possession of heroin and trafficking in illegal immigrants. Someone who is guilty of the possession or sale of heroin is part of a conspiracy to bring about a mass human holocaust. We have seen the cost of this in the past two weeks in the number of people who have died in this city from the effects of contaminated heroin.

I support the amendment in Deputy Howlin's name which proposes a reduction in the maximum sentence for trafficking in illegal immigrants from ten years to five. In some cases five years would be excessive. By imposing a maximum sentence of ten years the Minister is trying to send out the toughest possible message: that Ireland is a no-go area for asylum seekers or refugees from now on.

Will the Minister of State respond?

The Minister of State has already spoken twice.

(Mayo): The Minister of State did not respond to amendment No. 5.

Acting Chairman:

We are discussing two amendments together. The Minister of State may respond if she wishes.

Acting Chairman:

Deputy Jim Higgins's last contribution was the closing contribution, which he is entitled to make.

(Mayo): I have only spoken once on this amendment. I assumed the Minister would respond to amendment No. 5.

Chairman:

The Minister of State has spoken twice. In accordance with Standing Orders, I should not allow her to speak again.

Amendment put and declared lost.

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 4, line 2, to delete "10" and substitute "5".

Question "That the figures proposed to be deleted stand" put and declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.

I move amendment No. 7:

In page 4, between lines 8 and 9, to insert the following:

"(3) A common carrier shall not be deemed to have contravened subsection (1) solely by virtue of carrying a person who presents a document appearing to be a valid travel document or passport.”.

This amendment allows a defence to travel companies who are shown what appears to be a valid passport or identification document. Such companies should not be required to carry out further checks at the risk of having a plane or vessel confiscated. The amendment would not protect drivers of private vehicles.

We discussed this matter on Committee Stage and I still find nonsensical the reply given by the Minister at that stage. He argued that the Bill does not cover carrier's liability, by which I assume he means United Kingdom-style strict liability where airlines must check for visas and so on. The Minister has promised to introduce carrier's liability legislation later on.

Section 2 makes it an offence knowingly to facilitate the entry of a person who one has reasonable cause to believe is an illegal immigrant. My legal advice is that this could easily encompass airlines. Therefore the test of strict carrier's liability would not apply but an airline would be encompassed by this section. The amendment is required to ensure that does not happen.

I hope the Minister of State will accept the need for some exemption on the lines proposed in this amendment to ensure that what is envisaged to be introduced – the introduction of a strict carrier's liability – is not introduced by this legislation through a back door. On reading of the Bill, there appears to be every danger of imposing such a burden on carriers. I would welcome the Minister of State's reasoning to assure me that this is not the case.

I assure Deputy Howlin that this is not a back door way of introducing another issue. The Minister accepts the need to look at how carriers can be made more responsible for the passengers they bring here and it is his intention, after consultation with interested parties including carriers, to bring proposals to Government later this year for a range of measures to deal with that issue. It is a totally separate issue and another day's work. It has nothing to do with the matter before us. There is clearly no attempt to bring legislation in by the back door.

Deputy Howlin's amendment is not relevant to the Bill as it appears to seek to limit the responsibility of a carrier to check the documentation of a passenger. No specific responsibility to check documents is provided in the Bill. I am aware that such legislation is in place in most European countries, such as the UK, and it imposes responsibility on carriers to check the documentation of passengers to ensure they have the necessary authorisation to enter the State. If passengers are landed and it transpires that they do not have the necessary documentation, the carrier can be automatically fined. The offences created are what are commonly called strict liability offences, that is, the carrier is automatically liable once a certain result occurs.

No responsibility to check documents is created in the Bill and no strict liability offence is created. Before a trafficking offence is created by the Bill, the person must have intentionally given assistance to a person to come here whom he or she knows or has reasonable cause to believe is an illegal immigrant or an asylum seeker. Accordingly, a person cannot be proceeded against simply because he or she was the carrier who brought the person here or simply because documentation is somehow lacking. The carrier can only be prosecuted if the necessary proof of intention exists. What is relevant is whether the carrier intentionally gave assistance and whether he or she knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the person was an illegal immigrant or an asylum seeker.

I am impressed by the Minister of State's argument. I wish to take it a step further. Section 2(1) states:

A person who organises or knowingly facilitates the entry into the State [that certainly could apply to an airline or ferry company] of a person whom he or she knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be an illegal immigrant . . .

Let us tease that out in terms of the assurances the Minister of State has just given us. How will that be proved? Let us take the example of a person who arrives wearing traditional Roma dress. The Minister of State said that, under the Bill or existing legislation, the carrier has no liability to check documentation. Surely it could be argued in a prosecution case that, in the case of a person wearing traditional Roma dress, there might be a suspicion or a reasonable cause to believe that the person might be an illegal immigrant or a per son who intends to seek asylum. Why would this section not apply to carriers in that case? How can the Minister of State assure me that the letter of this provision, which seems to be clear, would not apply to carriers in the situation where a reasonable person would identify another person as someone who intends to seek asylum? It is easy to identify some of the people coming off the ferries in Rosslare. I can point out many of them long before they approach an immigration officer. How can the Minister of State assure me carriers will not be subject to this provision in those circumstances?

What is important is the distinction made. An airline such as Aer Lingus, which regularly carries passengers in and out of Dublin Airport, is in the business of carrying such passengers. A hackney driver who drives north of the Border to drive a car load of people into the South in the knowledge or with a reasonable belief that they are illegal immigrants or asylum seekers, and specifically does so for gain, is involved in the process and is not driving them in the normal course of his or her business.

The Minister of State is not answering the question I put to her. Let us take the example of an immediately identifiable person who disembarks from a ferry. Under the terms of the section, a reasonable person would have cause to believe that they were about to claim asylum. Why does this section not apply to the ferry company in that case?

Perhaps I had better give some examples to be helpful. The situation becomes remote in the context of a large carrier, such as an airline. If an airline has a—

The Minister of State should deal with the question I put to her.

Acting Chairman:

The Deputy should allow the Minister of State to reply.

I would like her to answer the question I put to her.

I am trying to make the difference clear for the Deputy. The likelihood of a carrier forming the necessary intent would, to a large extent, relate to the size of the operator. The size has a bearing on the remoteness or intimacy which the operator would have with the passengers.

The Minister of State is beginning to see the difficulty now.

The important point is the intention of the carrier. If I am a sole operator, it is easy enough to distinguish between me and Aer Lingus. If I am a small operator, such as an individual taxi driver, and I am offered a large fare to take a non-national from Belfast to Mount Street in Dublin, common sense would suggest and, as the driver of the taxi or hackney cab, I would have reasonable cause to believe that the person is an illegal immigrant or a person trying to abuse the common travel area to enter the State. Another example would be a bus owner. A bus owner or driver on a set route from Belfast to Dublin might sell tickets to passengers as they embark—

The Minister of State is answering every question except the one I put to her.

I am giving examples because—

The Minister of State is not dealing with the example I asked her to address.

Acting Chairman:

The Deputy should allow the Minister of State to reply.

The Minister of State earlier admonished my colleague, Deputy Higgins, for broadening the scope of the debate. We have very little time and if—

This is not broadening the scope. I can see the Deputy believes he does not understand but there is a clear difference. He knows the type of person we are trying to target. He should know from the experience of the area of the country in which he lives.

We are making law, not sausages.

The Deputy knows the distinction between the individuals, there are many of them in different walks of life, and we are trying to catch the right people. That is why we specifically say – it will come before the courts to determine it – that a person must have intentionally brought another person from one place to another and gained from doing so—

It does not say that.

It does say that in section 2.

It states: "reasonable cause to believe".

It states: "knowingly facilitates the entry into the State of a person whom he or she knows or has reasonable cause to believe". It is the term "knowingly facilitates"—

Bringing them in on a boat is knowingly facilitating them.

It states "knowingly facilitates the entry into the State of a person whom he or she knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be an illegal immigrant or a person who intends to seek asylum". That is clear.

Acting Chairman:

I remind Deputy Howlin that the night is getting on and there many amendments to be dealt with.

Yes, and it may be that we will not deal with them all tonight. That is the way of legislation sometimes. Do I have an open ended response time now?

Acting Chairman:

The amendment is in the Deputy's name, so he can speak three times.

Is this my concluding time?

Acting Chairman:

Yes, I encourage the Deputy to conclude.

How long do I have?

Acting Chairman:

There is no limitation.

That is what I thought. I will not speak too long. I understand that the Minister of State has come here without bringing the Bill through Committee Stage and so on but it is not good enough to deal in sloppy language. We need to have clarity in the Bill. It is clear to me that the example I gave could well be encompassed in the words written down that the Minister of State is asking us to enact, that is, a person who organises or knowingly facilitates the entry into the State of a person. Any carrier knowingly facilitates the entry of a person into the State. If somebody is aboard your airline or your boat, you are knowingly facilitating them into the State. That much is clear. A person whom he or she knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be somebody who intends to seek asylum – one could prima facie suggest that there is a likelihood that somebody who is in traditional Roma garb will seek asylum. A reasonable person would deduce that. If one spent a few weeks in Rosslare Harbour and saw somebody coming off the boat in Roma garb, one could bet a reasonable sum of money that will happen and a reasonable person would be entitled to make that deduction. One cannot argue that is not encompassed in this section.

If that is the case then my amendment is necessary to ensure that one does not impose strict liability by the back door and for the avoidance of the penalties, which are extremely severe in the Minister's own words, falling on the carrier which is an airline company or a ferry company. They might well introduce stringent checks on the other side. If that is the Minister's intention, I invite her to be honest with the House and tell us but she should not pretend it is not her intention and that this means something that it clearly does not. It is clear in the reading of this that it could well have those implications for a carrier and a carrier would probably do well to be mindful of that potential if this measure is enacted unamended. It is important for us as legislators, and I do not mean this flippantly, to be clear in what we do and in our intention so that those to whom the law applies understand their legal obligations.

I have put a clear point to the Minister. She has talked about buses, taximen, hackneys and sailing but she has not answered the point I made. It is clear to me. I would yield to the Minister if she wanted to amplify it further but it is clear that the carriers could well be enmeshed in this provision as drafted. I have heard no cogent, coherent rebuttal of that contention from the Minister. That being the case, I appeal to her again to accept the amendment which makes it clear that a common carrier, which is an airline company or a ferry, could be exempted by simply accepting that a particular travel document presented is acceptable. It is not an argument against my amendment for the Minister to say that there is no strict imposition on a carrier to check documentation. That is clearly the case on the face of it, but there is a very clear responsibility on them to avoid being enmeshed in the provisions of section 2(1) with the consequences that are spelled out in section 2(1) (a) of a fine on summary conviction of £1,500 or 12 months imprisonment or both or on indictment, up to ten years imprisonment. Those are the bald facts and nothing the Minister has said has in any way allayed the fears I had or rebutted the contention I am putting.

Acting Chairman:

That concludes the debate.

It is a very unsatisfactory way to conclude the debate.

Acting Chairman:

I remind the Deputy that I was not in the Chair for the Committee Stage debate and I am sure this issue was teased out considerably at that stage.

It is a very bad tack for the Chair to go down.

Acting Chairman:

I just mentioned that in passing.

The bulk of what we have been doing was a recommitted Committee Stage on which there is be no Report Stage on the most contentious issues because of the way the Government has handled this legislation by parachuting in a raft of serious amendments on the eve of Report Stage. I am pressing this amendment.

Amendment put and declared lost.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 5, line 46, to delete "or could with reasonable diligence have discovered".

This amendment relates to section 4 which deals with the forfeiture of the vehicle whether it is a lorry, car, ship or plane where people knowingly facilitated the introduction of illegal immigrants into the country. In a situation such as this, there is an obligation of due diligence excessively imposed on the owner.

Section 4 states that where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence under section 2 and a vehicle was used by the person for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of the offence, the court concerned may, in addition to financial penalty or the jail sentence also confiscate the truck or the lorry. It then says in subsection (2) that this shall not apply to a person unless the person convicted is the owner, has a share in the vehicle concerned, is a director or a manager in the company or subject to subsection (3), the captain, driver or other person in charge of the vehicle concerned.

It goes on to say in subsection (3) that "where the person convicted is the captain, driver or other person in charge of the vehicle concerned, subsection (1) shall not apply unless the person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) knew or could with reasonable diligence have discovered..” That is the problem – what constitutes reasonable diligence? Reasonable diligence is very subjective and not in my opinion alone, because we have been strongly lobbied by the Irish Road Hauliers' Association about it. They have major fears aabout the way this would operate. It depends on who will operate this law when it becomes part of the Statute Book. It is very subjective and obliges the owner effectively to exercise reasonable diligence and if they do not, they forfeit the truck, the carrier, the plane or whatever it may be.

If the owner is in Dublin, based in an office, looking after the company and the truck container is in Le Havre, how can an owner exercise reasonable diligence? The owner has to trust the driver of the truck to exercise reasonable diligence. How can somebody at a remove be penalised? This imposes an undue obligation on the owner. All one has to do is examine the nature of the traffic involved. The objections from the Irish Road Hauliers' Association centre around the type of traffic involved. One is talking about containerised traffic where a truck with the container leaves here, goes to its destination on the Continent, returns via Le Havre, Roscoff or Cherbourg or wherever it may be and works its way back into this country. The containers in some cases are not even part of the truck itself. One drops the container and picks up other containers and so on.

One needs to examine the other restrictions relating to the use of vehicles such as restricted hours and tachographs relating to the number of hours a driver may safely be in charge of a vehicle with the result that they have to take time off. Knowing the nature of the people involved in the commercial exploitation of those trying to get into European countries, people can be quite easily exploited and the containers intercepted or penetrated by those who wish to hide away human cargo in such containers. To oblige an owner in Wexford, Mayo or Dublin to be subject to the test of reasonable diligence for the work or management of the truck by a driver is most unfair and excessive. That is the reason I seek to delete the reasonable diligence provision.

In a case where the person convicted is the captain, driver or other person in charge of the vehicle concerned, subsection (1) shall not apply unless the person referred to in paragraphs (a) or (b) knew – not knew or could have, with reasonable diligence, have discovered – that the vehicle was being used for the purpose of the commission of an offence under section 2. That is a genuine concern on the part of the road hauliers. They have genuine fears in the manner in which it will militate against them. They are genuinely fearful that for something which happens on their truck of which they are totally innocent and which is the work of somebody else – either the driver knew or, in some cases, did not know – they can be subject to the maximum penalty here which is an extremely punitive penalty, that is, the forfeiture of a truck worth £60,000 or £70,000. It is excessive and the Minister of State should look at it again.

In response to Deputy Higgins's proposed amendment, I will further clarify what section 3(3) provides. Section 3 provides that where a person is convicted of an offence of trafficking, the vehicle used may be the subject of a forfeiture order by the court. This order may be in addition to or instead of any penalty imposed by the court under section 2. Subsection (3) provides that where the convicted person is the captain, driver or other person in charge of the vehicle, forfeiture will not be possible unless the owner, or where the owner is a company, a director or manager of that company, knew or could with reasonable diligence have discovered that the vehicle was being used for the purpose of the commission of the offence.

If I were to accept this amendment, it would mean that the owner of a vehicle could turn a blind eye and effectively wash his or her hands of what might be going on but I assume that the Deputy is concerned that this reasonable diligence test might create strict liability or, at least, a high level of liability for the owners. This is not the case.

There are two aspects to the provision. First, it means by implication that the owner is expected to exercise a commonly accepted standard of care as would be expected of a person in the position of the owner. That is no more than what common sense would suggest should apply. Such reasonable care would have been taken if the owner established a proper system to guard against misuse of his property by traffickers and took reasonable steps to ensure that his or her business is operated in a responsible and bona fide manner. The second aspect of the provision is that if the trafficking is such that the exercise of reasonable vigilance could not have detected it, then the owner is not considered culpable and his or her vehicle cannot be forfeited.

This provision does not impose requirements on owners other than the requirements which common sense would say the responsible owner should in any event put in place. In other jurisdictions additional requirements have been placed on owners through carrier liability legislation or through strict liability legislation in respect of stowaways. As I already indicated in reply to Deputy Howlin, such matters are not provided for in this Bill but the Minister, Deputy O'Donoghue, is considering whether such provisions should be a feature of our law and he hopes to bring suitable proposals in this respect to Government later this year after consultation with carriers, such as hauliers, shipping companies and airline companies.

I am aware, as Deputy Higgins outlined, that the Irish Road Haulage Association has called for the introduction of a code of practice for its members. The Irish Road Hauliers Association is to be congratulated on its pro-active and responsible approach to this problem. As I indicated earlier, the introduction of a package of measures in relation to carrier responsibility for the passengers they bring to this country is under consideration. I assure Deputy Higgins that at that time the Minister, Deputy O'Donoghue, intends to consult carriers, including the Irish Road Haulage Association on his proposals in this respect. I hope that has been of assistance to the Deputy and I hope he will consider withdrawing his amendment.

(Mayo): I am aware that other jurisdictions have carrier liability and strict liability provisions and that it is something which will be actively considered here. I, like the Minister of State, welcome the decision by the road hauliers to look for a code of practice. That is a very positive move and the Minister of State rightly welcomed it. From the point of view of the practicality of this, the Minister of State made a point on what constitutes reasonable diligence. She said we are talking about common sense and putting in place a proper system and reasonable checks. Maybe the Minister of State will give the House two or three examples of the kinds of checks about which she is talking.

If, as is the norm, the headquarters of a company is located here, it operates from the continent of Europe and there is a considerable remove from the driver in question and the owners who are based here, what kind of reasonable checks are needed in order to bring about the required due diligence? What kind of proper system is the Minister of State talking about in order to meet the requirements of the legislation? Is she suggesting that the owner ring the truck driver on his mobile telephone before embarkation to ask him to check the container to see if he is carrying any illicit human cargo? What kind of checks is the Minister of State talking about? We are talking about the practicality of the Bill.

It is really straightforward common sense. If one has ten trucks travelling from France to Rosslare each week, one would go through a staff training process with the ten drivers, make sure there are locks on the vehicles, ensure regular checks are carried out on the vehicles by the drivers and one would go through the drill with them. If something occurs in France, despite all the training, the locks and instructions for regular checks and if one of the ten drivers decides to operate a different system and obtain gain from it, the manager cannot be held responsible for somebody else's deeds. The key is to ensure the owner does not turn a blind eye to the possibility of this happening and to ensure that the ten trucks are not carrying passengers each week. There is a distinction between a major operation and the manager turning a blind eye and a driver doing his own thing despite all the warnings, checks, inspections and training at the company.

(Mayo): Would one of the expectations in applying reasonable or due diligence be, for example, that the owner of the truck in question would be expected to carry out spot checks here when the truck disembarks in Rosslare, Dublin Port or whichever port or terminal at which the truck arrives? According to the provisions of this section, would the company be expected to carry out checks on an on the spot or random basis? Are we talking about checks as distinct from the checks which would be carried out by the immigration officials and that checks would be carried out by owners on a random basis to see if their trucks were responsible for the infiltration or transportation of immigrants or asylum seekers from abroad?

Acting Chairman:

I advise the House that the Minister of State has spoken twice already. I might interpret this as a question which the Minister of State may or may not wish to answer.

If we thought it was the right thing to do to apply what Deputy Higgins suggests, it could be brought forward in the legislation later this year, that is, the more detailed checks about which the Deputy is talking. A specific level of detail is not set out in this legislation; it basically involves common sense and not turning a blind eye.

Question, "That the words proposed to be deleted stand", put and declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.

I move amendment No. 9:

In page 6, between lines 28 and 29, to insert the following:

"(9) In this section, ‘owner', in relation to a vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement (within the meaning of the Consumer Credit Act, 1995), includes the person in possession of it under that agreement.".

Amendment agreed to.

Acting Chairman:

Amendment No. 11 is an alternative to amendment No. 10 and both may be take together by agreement.

(Dublin West): On a point of procedure, could I propose to take amendments Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 together because all of them relate to section 5. It is prescribed that amendments Nos. 12, 13 and 14 should be taken together but, substantially, the same arguments apply to the five amendments.

Acting Chairman:

I must advise the Deputy that amendments Nos. 10 and 11 have been grouped as have amendments Nos. 12, 13 and 14. We might be better to stick to the arrangements as set out.

(Dublin West): Very well, a Chathaoirligh, you are a cautious man.

Acting Chairman:

I assure the Deputy that caution is needed on Report Stage.

(Dublin West): I wish to clear up one matter which arose earlier. The Minister of State hopped up indignantly when I attributed some statements to her on the question of immigration. I believe it is important that the issue should be clarified. On 14 October 1997 when speaking on the question of asylum seekers in the House she stated:

At its core is the fact that for the most part this country is dealing not with a major influx of refugees but with a major influx of illegal immigrants . It must be noted that if one was to operate on the basis of international comparisons alone, one would expect that something of the order of 10 per cent, or less, of asylum seekers are granted refugee status at the end of the day. Even if we were to be generous and say that 25 per cent of our applicants would obtain such status, only about 900 persons for the Department's current case load would obtain asylum status.

That clarifies the position I outlined earlier.

I am sure the Minister of State wants to apologise.

(Dublin West): She probably will reflect on—

Acting Chairman:

I discourage the Deputy from visitations to previous debates.

(Dublin West): We were talking about the debate on the same Bill and I was quoting chapter and verse, as I promised I would.

I move amendment No. 10:

In page 6, to delete all words from and including "(1)" in line 29 down to and including "1998," in line 46 and, in page 7, to delete lines 1 to 25.

The main points I wish to make relate to amendments Nos. 12, 13 and 14 and the attack in the legislation on the right of asylum seekers to judicial review. Section 5 is one of the most pernicious aspects of the legislation and there are quite a number of pernicious aspects to it. It is blatantly and quite shamelessly discriminatory in making a distinction in terms of human rights and rights before the law between citizens on the one hand and non-nationals on the other. Section 5(1) contains a raft of notifications, decisions and deportation orders, the validity of which may not be questioned other than by way of application for judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

Before we move on to the question of the reduction in the time in which a case must be prepared for a judicial review application will the Minister of State explain what rights are taken away under section 5(1)? A range of notifications, decisions, etc., may not be appealed or questioned other than by way of application for judicial review. I want the Minister of State to outline the current position. What will change when section 5(1) is implemented? What methods can people currently avail of to question the validity of these orders and decisions?

As Deputy Higgins rightly said, we are dealing with the contentious issue of judicial review encompassed by section 5. My amendment seeks in page 7 to insert "or any lawful proceedings" after "order". Its purpose is to limit the outrageous suggestion that an asylum refusal can only be challenged by judicial review. As I have repeatedly said, this is a straitjacket on personal liberties and no such limit should apply. On Committee Stage I instanced an asylum seeker who is charged with a criminal offence because he is in the State illegally. As part of his defence against the criminal charge he contends and wants to prove that the deportation order was invalid. The State can say that it is sorry but under the provision of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000, he can only challenge an order by judicial review, not by way of stating a case in a criminal trial. If the limiting factors which apply under this section come into play it could well be too late to state any defence.

It is an outrageous straitjacket and is probably unconstitutional. When I posited that scenario on Committee Stage on 30 March, the Minister stated "If other procedures were to be engaged in, as suggested by the Deputy [myself], litigants would probably have to proceed by way of a cumbersome summons procedure". It ignores totally the possibility of raising the invalidity of a deportation order by way of defence in a trial and by doing so it greatly tramples on the rights of the individual to state his case in court. This section goes too far. The Minister, in his absolute desire to straitjacket as far as it is possible the avenues of judicial challenge available to anybody in this State, seeks to put a unique limit on asylum seekers whose determination has been negative.

We will certainly visit this issue again in later amendments. This is an important amendment. I hope the Minister has had a chance to reflect on the arguments made on Committee Stage, that they will be engaged more openly and that there will be an acknowledgement that we must row back on the impossible position put forward in this provision by the Minister and the Government.

Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 are opposed. Section 5 is designed to streamline into one formal procedure of judicial review, the process for query and decisions in immigration and asylum matters before the court. The effect of Deputy Joe Higgins's amendment would be to emasculate the Government proposal by making a nonsense of it.

(Dublin West): Hear, hear.

At least we are agreed on something. It would do so by having a special judicial review procedure which applied to no judicial review cases. It is clear that the generalised provision of the current order 84 of the rules of the superior courts, designed as they are to cater for the widest range of possible circumstances in which judicial review might be sought, do not rest well with the specific requirements of judicial review of immigration and asylum matters, where the delay occasioned by the court procedures can render nugatory the outcome of these proceedings. By that I mean that even though the actions of the Minister in making a particular decision may be vindicated by the court at the conclusion of the proceedings, including any appeal, the passage of time may make it impossible for the vindication decision to be followed up by the act of removing the person from the State. That is why the Minister has introduced these streamlining procedures, to ensure that court delay is kept to a minimum and will arise only where there are substantial grounds to justify such delay.

The effect of Deputy Howlin's amendment would be to undo the streamlining and to invite parties to engage in procedures which are unspecified. That will introduce a lack of certainty and serve only to confuse litigants. The judicial review procedure is a well understood procedure, which is confirmed with the possibility of flaws by the decision maker in arriving at the decision being questioned. It is a satisfactory and sensible way of having the matter brought before the court with the optimum degree of expedition and the minimum of procedural burden.

The Government proposal does not affect in any way the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the High Court enshrined in Article 40.4 of the Constitution. No statute law can interfere with that or modify it in any respect. If other procedures were to be engaged in by litigants on the basis of what is proposed by Deputy Howlin, litigants would probably have to proceed by way of a cumbersome summons procedure.

The Minister of State's script does not change much.

The plenary summons procedure, for example, is a general purpose multi-stage procedure well suited to the general one of civil proceedings, where one party seeks to recover damages from another or assert rights as against another. It is not, however, a particularly expeditious one. Proceedings by way of special, or for that matter, summary summons are special forms of the general procedure. The summary summons process is designed primarily for the recovery of debt and the special summons process relates mainly to the accession of various forms of property rights. I see no advantage for the administration of justice generally, or for the attainment of justice in particular cases, in providing for a proliferation of different procedures whereby the validity of any of the steps listed in the Government proposal might be put in issue.

The judicial review procedure, in particular with the adaptations which section 5 have put in place, is not merely sufficient to enable the rights of the matter to be determined and to be determined expeditiously, it is the procedure most suited to achieving those aims. The directions remain for the High Court in suitable cases to direct that the proceedings initiated through the direct and expeditious judicial review channel should proceed using the plenary summons process. The various procedural aids to achieve justice, such as interrogations for clarifying precisely what matters are at issue and the discovery of documents so that both sides are fully aware of the facts, are equally available in the proceedings by way of judicial review as in the plenary summons procedure.

Nothing of benefit will be added by the acceptance of Deputy Howlin's amendment, but much could be lost by allowing a climate of procedural uncertainty, a situation which section 5 is directed at avoiding. That said, I am prepared to look at the specific point raised by the Deputy as to the question of the use of a challenge to the validity of the order as a defence in criminal proceedings. I will consult with the Attorney General on that specific question. I thank Deputy Joe Higgins for clarifying what I said in October 1997, as distinct from the assertions he made earlier, when he misquoted me.

(Dublin West): I am speaking on amendment No. 10. What I read from the record of the Dáil was the same as I said earlier. It is clear the Minister of State was pre-judging the cases of asylum seekers before they were heard.

There is no point in withdrawing and then changing what was said. It is like a see-saw approach.

(Dublin West): Does the Minister of State want me to read the excerpt again?

Acting Chairman:

Let us concentrate on amendment No. 10 and not stray into other areas.

(Dublin West): I agree, but we must make members of the Government responsible for what they say, even when those things are irresponsible.

Members of the Government never used the word "bogus" and the word should not be attributed to me by the Deputy.

Acting Chairman:

I encourage the Minister of State to allow Deputy Higgins to address amendment No. 10.

(Dublin West): I will do that, but I remind the Minister of State that I did not use the word “bogus” in any exchange tonight.

The Deputy did.

(Dublin West): I did not use the word.

He did not.

I will check the record.

Acting Chairman:

The Deputy has made his point. Let us continue on amendment No. 10.

(Dublin West): The response of the Minister of State is appalling. In essence, the Government is saying that we should allow applicants for asylum the same rights as Irish citizens in their recourse to the law in case they might not be successful in the application they make, in which case much time would have been lost in the business of throwing them out of the country. This approach is predicated on the general attitude of the Government, which is that 90% of applicants will be found not to have a genuine case for asylum. The Bill is a logical follow on to the Government's general approach to asylum seekers.

If enacted, the Bill will run into serious constitutional problems. It will be before the highest courts within a short period. Section 5 is contrary to Article 40 of the Constitution as it has been interpreted by the courts. Article 40.1 states: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law." The advice to us from senior barristers is that this is applied by the courts in the same way to non-nationals, and this principle has been operated by the courts for perhaps the past two decades. The Minister should, therefore, be clear that the Government would be in breach of this Article as it has been applied for almost the past 20 years. I will have more to say on this when we deal with the right to judicial review, which is implied in the cutback to 14 days on the time limit in which people may make an appeal. It is a bad day's work by the Government to introduce this proposal.

I am shocked at the response of the Minister of State. Basically she defends what is in the Bill by saying that the amendment I propose would introduce procedural uncertainty. What procedural uncertainty is she talking about? Is it that non-nationals would have the same access to the courts and the same rights of appeal as any other citizen? Is she concerned with this to such an extent that she proposes to have unique straitjacket procedures applied to asylum seekers which do not apply to others? It is outrageous, particularly when the Minister of State has responsibility for equality matters and the Department of Equality and Law Reform has been subsumed into the Department of Justice.

I welcome the revisiting of the clear anomaly that I pointed out on Committee Stage regarding the danger of a constitutional challenge to the measure that will circumscribe people's right to state a defence in a criminal case. The Minister of State said the measure will be revisited and I presume that will be before the Bill goes to the other House. If it stood, undoubtedly, it would be infirm by constitutional standards.

The Minister of State said that no statute law can interfere with habeas corpus. However, no exception to that end is implicit in the Bill. While no statute can infringe the Constitution, the right of habeas corpus should be spelled out. Undoubtedly, the Minister of State will say that constitutional rights are there simpliciter and do not need to be spelled out in any enactment.

My points relate, first, to the constitutional infirmity of the provision and how that will be addressed – it can only be addressed by acceptance of the amendment – and, second, the position regarding habeas corpus and spelling out the rights contained in the Constitution.

The Government proposal does not affect in any way the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the High Court as enshrined in Article 40. It is unnecessary to spell out in statute what is already in the Constitution. It is also bad draftsmanship to repeat it.

In case they notice.

As I stated, no statute law can interfere with Article 40.4 of the Constitution. We know the position in that regard. Statute law cannot interfere with or modify it in any respect.

The Bill states that an order can only be challenged by judicial review. This runs foul of the Constitution; it makes the measure constitutionally infirm. The Minister of State did not respond. This is becoming frustrating because I made a number of contributions. It is a negative way of dealing with the Bill. None of my points have been answered.

I pointed out two areas where this provision is unconstitutional. The Bill states that a deportation order can only be challenged by judicial review. The Minister of State cannot suggest that we know it can be challenged by order of habeas corpus because that is contained in the Constitution. That is not the way it works. The Bill states that the only way an order can be challenged is by judicial review. Clearly, that is unconstitutional. If somebody challenges it, it will be found to be infirm. Will the Minister of State's defence in a constitutional challenge be that the Government always recognised the other measure was there as well. It seeks to deny people their constitutional rights by saying an order can only be challenged by judicial review. This is wrong and it is vulnerable to judicial review, although perhaps that is no harm.

The Minister of State did not respond to my point about how the clear constitutional right to put up a legal defence in a criminal case will be met other than through the acceptance of my amendment, which states "after ‘Order'), to insert ‘or any other lawful proceedings' ". The Minister of State should revisit this matter. I believe these are the only words the Attorney General will advise to make the provision constitutional. One cannot circumscribe people's rights to access as proposed in the provision.

I have made these points twice but the Minister of State did not respond. One will be revisited, but rejected in the House, while the other has been ignored. The Constitution states that habeas corpus is the prerogative of the High Court and that is that. However, the Bill states that it will not apply and that only judicial review will apply. This strikes against the constitutional provision which the Minister of State said cannot be struck against. Surely this makes the measure infirm.

This is a difficult debating system. I have made points but they have been ignored. It is frustrating trying to argue points at this stage. The provisions are badly thought out, constitutionally infirm and subject to being struck down. I appeal to the Minister of State to remedy that position by rowing back a little through the acceptance of my amendment, which states "any other lawful proceedings". This would ensure that the normal avenues of legal redress that are open to everybody under the Constitution are available to non-nationals seeking to challenge deportation orders made by the Minister.

Question, "That the words proposed to be deleted stand", put and declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.

I move amendment No. 11:

In page 7, line 25, after "Order") to insert "or any other lawful proceedings".

Amendment put and declared lost.

Amendment No. 13 is an alternative to amendment No. 12 and amendment No. 14 is related. Amendments Nos. 12 to 14, inclusive, may be discussed together by agreement.

(Mayo): I move amendment No. 12:

In page 7, line 29, to delete "14 days" and substitute "3 months".

We will continue to rehearse the arguments just as we did in relation to amendment No. 1 on Committee Stage. These are the two core issues in the second and third instalments of the Bill. We had the initial Bill and then we had this amendment by the Minister which sent shock waves not only through the political profession but through the legal profession and the various organisations which represent immigrants and asylum seekers. This is fundamentally wrong, as Deputy Joe Higgins and Deputy Howlin said. The Minister will rue this day because as sure as the Minister of State is sitting there with her advisers in train, this Bill will be taken to court. People know it is unconstitutional. It is beyond me why the Minister of State would invite a court challenge by introducing this.

We support reasonable measures to curtail illegal trafficking in human misery which brings people into the country for commercial exploitation purposes only for them to be shown the red card. However, we want the people brought in to at least be allowed equality of access to due process in the same way as anyone living here. That has already been decided in the Constitution and in its interpretation. Mr. Justice Barrington has already made it clear in a judgment that anyone from outside the jurisdiction has exactly the same protection in terms of their constitutional right of access to the courts as an Irish citizen. I do not know how, if or in what circumstances the Attorney General could offer advice which would invite a constitutional challenge. No sooner will this Bill have passed both Houses than it will be tested in the courts. It is as obvious as day follows night that it will be found constitutionally defective.

This is legal apartheid, racism and blatant discrimination. It is beyond me why a certain category of people, particularly vulnerable people coming into the country, should be singled out for restricted access to the courts. My amendment seeks to delete "14 days", which was introduced by the Minister, and substitute the original "3 months".

The Minister, Deputy O'Donoghue, does not like to be reminded that last January his independent appeals commissioner, Mr. Peter Finlay, walked out because he could not take any more. He said that as far as he was concerned he could not stand over procedures which were farcical. When someone who has been cloistered in the inner sanctum of the Department and has been appointed to arbitrate in the procedures used decides he cannot take any more because of the manner in which the rules are being applied by the Department and the expectation on him to apply the rules in a certain way, surely it is time to reflect. We asked the Minister on Committee Stage to reflect on the fact that someone in whom he invested the supreme power of making the final decision on whether someone is entitled to asylum decided in sheer frustration that he had no option but to walk out on the man who appointed him and his Department. That was a watershed decision.

It is generally recognised that Mr. Finlay is an eminent lawyer and a man of sound and balanced judgment. He has had a long legal career and has distinguished himself at the Bar. He is also recognised as an expert on human rights. Yet his damning denunciation of the procedures used was that he could not stand over them because they were indefensible and farcical. He decided not to give any interviews but to go back to legal practice. He then volunteered to go before the joint committee and to make an oral presentation on the procedures which he felt were lamentable, inoperable, uninspired and ill-considered. That is the view of someone who saw at close quarters the way the system operated.

This was the final straw. Not only could the appeals commissioner not stand over the existing procedures but the new regime being introduced which denies someone the fundamental constitutional right to the proper time to prepare a case, apart from their constitutional entitlement, compelled him to come before the committee to offer his opinion. He offered it not only from the point of view of it being unconstitutional but also from the point of view of it being practical. As a practising lawyer who deals on a daily basis with cases for judicial review, he felt it was totally impractical and inoperable that anyone could present anything other than a substantial case in order to be entertained in the courts. One does not get to court unless there is a substantial case to present.

The fact that an eminent person such as Mr. Finlay, who has expertise, experience and knowledge and is sensitive, caring and concerned came voluntarily before the committee and offered his opinion in such a forthright fashion should have made the Minister pull back and reflect on the fact he could not continue because if lawyers were thinking in such terms, they were guaranteed to act as soon as the Bill was on the Statute Book. Mr. Finlay said the procedures were impractical, inoperable, lamentable and unconstitutional. What more does the Minister want in terms of clear evidence of the lack of wisdom, apart from the foolhardiness, of following this route?

This is an important part of the section which we visited on Committee Stage. I will rehearse the arguments put forward then because my argument has not changed and I want to revisit some of what the Minister said. It is just as well the Minister is not here because he gets upset when Deputy Jim Higgins quotes the former appeals commissioner. It aggravates him to have the truth spelled out in such graphic detail.

Amendment No. 13 seeks to delete the 14 days provision for the application for judicial review and to insert "6 months". On Committee Stage the Minister claimed that the existing time limit is three months. I am reliably informed that is an error and that it is six months for an application to quash a decision. The Minister said it is nonsensical to give six months when a person can be deported in 14 days. A number of answers can be made to that point. The Minister's argument only applies to section 5(1)(c) which is that a deportation order should be implemented within14 days and not other orders that arise in the sequencing of processes that are available to asylum seekers. In the event, he cannot guarantee that all deportation orders will take place and be executed within 14 days, especially as the Minister of State was at pains to point out that we must get the people back to the right country and not go through any other EU country which, to use her words, would be unfair. I am not sure it will be so efficient as to get everyone back to their home country in the 14 days the Minister allows. More importantly is that the general law that applies to every citizen allows six months to challenge a decision even if that decision has immediate effect let alone 14 days. It is a nonsense to say that a provision that has six months implicit in it for decisions that have immediate effect means that a provision that has 14 days to execute itself should not have a similar time frame.

We are not saying that the asylum process must stop for six months but unless a person is deported earlier the normal period that applies to every citizen to apply to the courts to quash a decision should be available to people who are subject to these orders. Both Deputy Joe Higgins and Deputy Jim Higgins argued beyond dispute that the Supreme Court holds that the same rights are available to non-nationals as to citizens. We cannot say that administrative decisions that have an effect on someone – a citizen would be entitled to six months to seek judicial review – should not and must not apply to somebody else. Six months is the normal period within which to seek judicial review to quash a decision. If anything, it could be argued that a more favourable regime should apply to asylum seekers because of all the particular difficulties that arise with language, cultural understanding, legal explanation and so on. To try to circumscribe that to a 14 day period is wrong and will not survive.

A spokesman for the Minister is quoted in The Irish Times as saying this measure is to stop vexatious appeals. The Minister told the committee, as Members will recall, that he never said such a thing. I presume he has written to The Irish Times seeking a retraction or at least admonished the spokesperson because it is an outrageous suggestion to leave unchallenged. What the Minister is alleged to have said is that there are people applying to the courts and they are entertaining vexatious appeals. Is it the assertion that judges are acting too leniently? Are judges being fooled because they must give leave? Is that the Minister's argument or is he seeking to interfere in the courts by presenting that people are bringing arguable cases to the court? In any event, this circumscribing of the time frame for the right of appeal is wrong and probably unconstitutional.

I am interested in the Minister of State's response to amendment No. 14. I tabled it after a little reflection and it might surprise us and find favour with the Minister. It is a new amendment that will allow a person to bring one judicial review at the last stage of the process. Under the Minister's amendment there will be an invitation to bring a judicial review within 14 days of each decision at every step of the process. This will happen because the time frame is so tight that there will be an inclination to do so. My amendment will allow the judicial review process, which is an examination by a judge of due process, to take place at the end as is right and proper.

Amendment No. 13 is the more important one. If the Minister is serious about deporting people within 14 days, well and good, but he will not get away with circumscribing their rights to a 14 day period. That will not stand a constitutional challenge. Since he believes they will be deported in jig time, where is the difficulty in allowing the normal procedures of appeal for those who are in the country and in a position to exercise that right?

All the arguments have been well ventilated and I hope, to use a much hackneyed phrase, on mature reflection the Minister will relent and allow this amendment to be enacted.

(Dublin West): This is one of the worst aspects of the Bill. It is pernicious and an attack on human rights and human beings. It shows up a Government that has scant regard for human rights as they relate to people on this island and those seeking the protection of this island in their plight. We objected on a number of occasions to material brought in under the Bill which had nothing to do with illegal trafficking. That is the position as regards the right to judicial review. The Government's proposal to limit to 14 days the time within which a person notified of a deportation decision can make an application for a judicial review is an attack on their rights.

In many cases the Government has piggybacked on previous legislation regarding elements relating to immigration law as a result of disorganisation and because it does not have a cohesive immigrant policy. However, there is another reason it chose to bring in this proposal. It is a sleight of hand by the Minister and the Government. It is very significant that it is being introduced in this Bill as lawyers who have briefed var ious Deputies and parties have pointed out. It is clearly the case that if the Government wished to make proposals in this regard, it should have done so under the Refugee Act, 1996. There is a clear reason that did not happen. It was an implicit admission that if it was introduced into other legislation, particularly the Refugee Act, 1996, it would not stand up in law. It is clearly laid down in legal matters in this State that any statutory restriction on the exercise of the right of judicial review must be interpreted in the context of the object and purpose of the Act wherein it is contained. The Long Title of the Refugee Act, 1996, states that it is an "Act to give effect to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on the 28th day of July, 1951, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on the 31st day of January, 1967," and other international agreements. In the context of those international agreements and international practice with regard to refugees, this proposal would not stand up because it represents an attack on fundamental rights and represents the making of a clear and invidious distinction between citizens of this State and non-nationals seeking refuge here as they stand before the law.

Article 16 of the Geneva Convention 1951 on the Status of Refugees, which is included as a Schedule to the Refugee Act, 1996, states that "a refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the Courts". It is also common practice, accepted by the bodies which deal with refugees internationally, that asylum seekers must enjoy the same presumption as refugees and, therefore, must enjoy the same rights in front of the law as accorded to refugees. Therefore, it is clear that the sleight of hand in this legislation was not possible in the 1996 Act because it would be an attack on the rights of asylum seekers and could not be included in a Bill which purported to give some measure of protection to asylum seekers. The only way the Government could find to introduce it was through legislation which deals in criminal trafficking. We have already made the point of how prejudicial it is to the rights of innocent people that matters relating to their rights in this State should be included in legislation related to criminal trafficking.

Lawyers who appeared before the Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights dealt with this in some detail. On the question of frivolous and vexatious cases being brought for judicial review, it was pointed out that 30 cases had come for judicial review until a month ago. Far from being frivolous or vexatious, the Minister won only one of those cases and either settled or lost all of the others. There is no evidence from the High Court that frivolous and vexatious cases were being brought by people seeking to remain in this jurisdiction.

The real scandal about this legislation is the chasm it opens up between the rights accorded to citizens of this State and to those applying for asylum. That is shameful when one considers that these are poor, vulnerable people who have had to uproot themselves from their homes and cultures, as Irish people had to do in their millions. When they come here they find a Government going to extreme measures to cut down on their rights. This legislation will end up before the courts because of that and the Minister will have a very rough ride.

By reducing the time to 15 days with the proviso that, in effect, a substantial case is made within that period of time, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister of State will create severe practical difficulties for those who will be called upon in the courts to represent asylum seekers seeking a judicial review. The High Court may not grant the right to judicial review unless it is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or order is invalid or ought to be quashed. If it is a requirement on the High Court that it should refuse such an application except when there are substantial grounds, then the substantial case will, effectively, have to be argued at the point of application for judicial review. That is clearly the case.

What effect will that have? If the Minister is trying to frog march people seeking judicial review, he will find this will have the opposite effect. Normally the process for seeking a judicial review does not take a long time. A basic case is laid out and on that a judge makes a decision to hold a hearing of the substantive grounds of the case at a later stage. If the judge has to be satisfied that there are substantial grounds for an appeal, the barristers representing the asylum seekers will have to make the substantial case at that point.

This will cause mayhem in the courts because, instead of the ten minutes an application for the right to a judicial review takes up, there will be cases that will run into hours. The barristers and solicitors representing the asylum seeker seeking a judicial review will have an obligation to make the case substantially at that point because so much will depend upon it. This is a serious attack on civil rights. How will the barristers and solicitors, who have a heavy case load in many instances, be able to prepare a substantial case in 14 days? There will be extraordinary difficulties, difficulties that will not be faced by Irish citizens. Deputy Howlin mentioned the language barrier – it can be a severe impediment. The rights of those with extra difficulties are being attacked in comparison with the rights accorded to Irish citizens in the time allowed for a judicial review.

The denial of an appeal to the Supreme Court is a further attack on civil rights and a further exacerbation of the distinction the Government is attempting to make between non-nationals in this State seeking justice before the law and citizens of the State. It is only under the planning Acts – this may apply in one or two other exceptional cases – that the period in which judicial review applications must be made has been foreshortened. In the case of the Planning Act, 1993, it is foreshortened to a two month period. The planning Acts deal with matters involving land, property, etc., but we are discussing human beings, human rights and people who face deportation to, in many instances, extremely difficult circumstances in their countries of origin. However, the period in which an application for a judicial review must be made under the Bill is foreshortened to 14 days. That is disgraceful.

Most of those who will be affected by the legislation, if passed, are poor people without means. These individuals will require legal aid. Anyone who knows anything about the free legal aid system, will be aware that this will place intolerable pressure on the Legal Aid Board. In my opinion these people's rights will again be severely compromised because lawyers will be forced or pressurised into preparing cases. As part of their code, lawyers stress that they will not present cases unless they are sure that they will have ample time in which to prepare and present them properly. If the legislation is passed, I foresee a situation where lawyers will be obliged to go before judges and state that they could not prepare cases for judicial review applications within the 14 day period. Under a further provision in the Bill, judges will be obliged to consider this as a good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. That provision is self-defeating.

We are faced here with the inclusion in legislation of provisions which are inimical to civil and human rights and which are a disgrace to this country, particularly in terms of the way it treats non-national poor people. In many instances those provisions might prove unworkable in practice. Mar shaoránach na tíre seo teastaíonn uaim a rá as Gaeilge go goileann sé go mór orm go bhfuil ionsaí fíochmhar á dhéanamh anseo ar dhaoine a tháinig chun na tíre seo ag lorg dídean ón tír seo, ó Rialtas na tíre agus ó mhuintir na tíre. Daoine bochta go mór mhór atá i gceist, daoine nach bhfuil rachmas nó saibhreas acu, daoine ón Afraic, ó oirthear na hEorpa agus ó thíortha eile, Daoine iad atá ar aon bhonn leis na deoraithe ón tír seo a chuaigh go gach tír ar domhan.

Tá sé náireach amach is amach alt 5 den Bhille seo a thabhairt isteach fé mar atá sé agus go mbainfí de na daoine bochta úd ceartanna atá ag saoránaigh na tíre seo in ionad a gceartanna a chosaint agus gach iarracht a dhéanamh ar a laghad na ceartanna céanna a thabhairt dóibh is a thabharfaí do shaoránaigh na tíre seo. Tá súil agam go dtacóidh an Dáil leis na leasaithe atá againn, ar a laghad go ndéanfaí an t-achar a leathnú go tréimhse níos faide nó a choimeád ag trí mhí, nó bheadh sé mhí níos fearr fós.

These proposals are being inserted in the Bill in line with the procedures established by the Dáil. The advice from the Attorney General's office is that it is a suitable legislative instrument in which to do so. I see no argument in law or logic which states that a provision inserted in one item of legislation would be offensive to our obligations to refugees and asylum seekers under the 1951 Geneva Convention but that, as Deputy Joe Higgins argued, the same provision inserted in another instrument somehow circumvents this obligation.

The Government would not bring forward a proposal unless satisfied that it was in line with the Constitution and our obligations under international law. As if that were not enough, the argument made by Deputy Joe Higgins blithely makes the assumption that the judicial review proposals are directed exclusively at the asylum process. It does not take a practised legal mind to recognise, from a casual glance at the list of decisions, orders and other administrative steps comprehended by section 5(1) that asylum matters form only part of the remit of the provision.

All of the issues debated here this evening were discussed at length on Committee Stage. As I stated in respect of the previous amendment, the purpose of the Government proposal is to provide a judicial review procedure which is tailored to the particular requirements of the matters in issue in the areas of immigration and asylum. An important aspect of that specific adaptation to those requirements is the incorporation of realistic time limits which are related to those applying to the decisions, orders and other steps listed at section (5)(1)(a) to (n).

It has not yet been satisfactorily explained why, in circumstances where an order, if unchallenged, will be executed within 14 days, the law should nonetheless allow a period of three months – or even more illogically, in the case of Deputy Joe Higgins' and Howlin's amendment, six months—

It is the normal law of the land in every other jurisdiction.

—within which a challenge can legitimately be brought. The reason it has not been explained satisfactorily is, I suspect, because it is not susceptible to rational explanation. It simply does not make sense.

That is a frightful assertion.

The Deputies are asking the House to accept that, notwithstanding the fact that there are time limits of two and three weeks built into the legislation governing the various steps covered under subsection (1) of the Government proposal, the law should, in effect, say, "Don't mind those time limits at all; you have loads of time within which you can take a case to the High Court challenging the validity of the decision or order."

Administrative decisions that have immediate effect are subject to a six month time limit.

The logic of such a provision is that there should be a three month gap between each step in the asylum process in which the staff of the Department, or, as soon will be the case, the staff of the Refugee Applications Commission and the Refugee Appeal Tribunal, give the applicant the full entitlement of time to question the validity of the process so far in the High Court.

Every administrative decision is subject to judicial review.

If we are to follow the logic of amendment No. 13, any person refused leave to land in the State would nonetheless have to be allowed to remain in the State for six months in case they wished to challenge the validity of the refusal. Each step in the deportation process would have to be followed by a long interval to give the potential deportee the opportunity to avail of the period provided by law for the taking of judicial review proceedings.

That is profoundly ignorant.

That is no way to operate. In the immigration context, the Deputies' proposals would, if I might put it this way, introduce an open door through the back door.

The fact is that the three month limit – in some cases, as Deputy Howlin stated, it is six months – provided for in the Rules of the Superior Courts is in many cases more theoretical than real. The requirement of promptness of action is the first requirement set out in the rules, at Order 84, Rule 21, paragraph (1). That requirement overrides, in practice, any time limits which the rules may set or which may be set in this Bill. If I, as a person involved in an administrative procedure with some organ of the State, am not happy that a step in that procedure was carried out properly in accordance with law or principle, the onus is on me to act promptly before any subsequent step is taken on foot of the one with which I take issue. Otherwise, the court will simply throw me out.

What the Government proposal does, in setting the limit at 14 days, is to reflect the real world. The limits which the Deputies' amendments seek to insert are all very fine in the general circumstances which Order 84 of the rules of the court must cater for but, in the areas of immigration and asylum to which the Government proposal is designed to apply, they are patently out of kilter with reality. There is no point in incorporating a theoretical, unreal and unworkable time limit in the Government's proposal. To do so would only cause confusion because of the obvious conflict between that limit and those set in the various provisions listed in subsection (1) of the Government proposal.

On amendment No. 14 in the name of Deputy Howlin, I have already spoken of the need for a person to act promptly in relation to a particular step in an administrative process to which objection is taken to the effect that it was not properly carried out. Let us take, for example, the case of a person who has applied for asylum and whose application is being investigated under the Refugee Act by the Refugee Applications Commissioner. I, as an asylum applicant, may find myself unable to turn up for interview because I am ill in hospital and, notwithstanding my explanation to the Refugee Applications Commissioner, another date may be fixed on which I still cannot attend for the same reason. If the commissioner then proceeds to find that my application was manifestly unfounded on the basis that I obstructed the application or did not offer sufficient evidence to back up my application, in spite of my producing medical evidence of my inability to attend for interview, then the correct remedy for this breach of proper procedure and of the provisions of the Act is immediate judicial review. It is not right that I should have to wait to see how my appeal against the commissioner's decision is determined by the appeals tribunal because it is a procedural flaw of which I am critical, not something which goes to the substance of the case.

In such a case as I have outlined, of course, there would be such an obvious breach of procedure that the very mention of the words "judicial review" would prompt corrective action on the commissioner's part but, if not, then it would be proper to commence the proceedings in order to rectify the error. Of course, there are other circumstances in which the line between what is properly a matter to be settled in the normal way at the next stage of the process on the one hand, and what, on the other hand, should be the subject of judicial review proceedings is more blurred. I have no desire to encourage a proliferation of judicial review proceedings at every hand's turn; quite the contrary. That is an issue this debate has failed to address.

(Mayo): There will be a glut of proceedings.

(Dublin West): The Minister's argument is vexatious.

It is clear that it is better that prompt action be taken the moment a procedural error becomes apparent than to wait until a series of subsequent steps are taken before raising the procedural point. Promptness of action is critical.

The Minister is supported in this view by the awareness that the High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to defer consideration of a judicial review matter in suitable cases to allow the administrative process to proceed on the basis that at the end of the administrative process there may no longer remain an issue which depends on the outcome of the judicial review proceedings.

It may be, once again in suitable cases, that the court may exercise the discretion provided at section 5(2)(a) to extend the time beyond 14 days for the making of an application for judicial review in a situation such as that for which the Deputies are seeking to provide in this amendments.

In all, I am satisfied that the requirement for prompt invocation of the court's jurisdiction outweighs any advantage that might arise in a limited number of cases from the Deputy's amendment and that the court has the discretion and common sense to ensure, in the right cases, that the applicant for judicial review will not be disadvantaged by pursuing the judicial review route as against following the normal immigration or asylum related processes.

(Mayo): I intend to withdraw amendment No. 12 and to support amendment No. 13 in the names of Deputies Howlin and Higgins.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 13:

In page 7, line 29, to delete "14 days" and substitute "6 months".

Question put: "That the word and figure proposed to be deleted stand."

Ahern, Michael.Ahern, Noel.Aylward, Liam.Blaney, Harry.Brady, Johnny.Brady, Martin.Brennan, Matt.Brennan, Séamus.Browne, John (Wexford).Byrne, Hugh.Callely, Ivor.Carey, Pat.Collins, Michael.Cooper-Flynn, Beverley.Coughlan, Mary.Cowen, Brian.Daly, Brendan.Davern, Noel.de Valera, Síle.Dempsey, Noel.Dennehy, John.Doherty, Seán.Ellis, John.Fleming, Seán.Flood, Chris.Fox, Mildred.Gildea, Thomas.Hanafin, Mary.Haughey, Seán.Healy-Rae, Jackie.Jacob, Joe.Keaveney, Cecilia.

Kelleher, Billy.Kenneally, Brendan.Killeen, Tony.Kirk, Séamus.Kitt, Michael.Lenihan, Brian.Lenihan, Conor.McCreevy, Charlie.McDaid, James.McGennis, Marian.McGuinness, John.Martin, Micheál.Moffatt, Thomas.Molloy, Robert.Moloney, John.Moynihan, Donal.Moynihan, Michael.O'Dea, Willie.O'Donnell, Liz.O'Flynn, Noel.O'Keeffe, Batt.O'Keeffe, Ned.O'Kennedy, Michael.O'Rourke, Mary.Reynolds, Albert.Smith, Michael.Treacy, Noel.Wade, Eddie.Wallace, Dan.Wallace, Mary.Woods, Michael.Wright, G. V.

Níl

Barrett, Seán.Belton, Louis.Browne, John (Carlow-Kilkenny).Bruton, John.Burke, Ulick.Carey, Donal.Clune, Deirdre.Connaughton, Paul.Cosgrave, Michael.Crawford, Seymour.Currie, Austin.D'Arcy, Michael.Deenihan, Jimmy.Dukes, Alan.Durkan, Bernard.Enright, Thomas.Finucane, Michael.Gormley, John.Hayes, Brian.Higgins, Jim.Higgins, Joe.Howlin, Brendan.

McCormack, Pádraic.McGinley, Dinny.McGrath, Paul.Mitchell, Olivia.Naughten, Denis.Neville, Dan.Noonan, Michael.Ó Caoláin, Caoimhghín.O'Keeffe, Jim.Owen, Nora.Penrose, William.Perry, John.Ring, Michael.Sargent, Trevor.Shatter, Alan.Sheehan, Patrick.Stagg, Emmet.Stanton, David.Timmins, Billy.Upton, Mary.Wall, Jack.Yates, Ivan.

Tellers: Tá, Deputies S. Brennan and Callely; Níl, Deputies Barrett and Stagg.
Question declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.
Debate adjourned.
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