Skip to main content
Normal View

Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 18 Oct 2000

Vol. 524 No. 3

Customs and Excise (Mutual Assistance) Bill, 2000: Second Stage.

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

This is an enabling Bill to give the force of law to two EU conventions and three related instruments prior to this country adopting them at EU level. The two conventions relate to various aspects of co-operation and sharing of information between the EU customs administrations in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of customs offences. They update existing provisions which have proved to be very effective over the years and allow for new forms of special co-operation in certain circumstances.

It is a stark reality that international crime is indeed big business. Unfortunately, there is increasing evidence of linkages between drug trafficking and other forms of international organised criminal activity. No country can be immune to the full effects of highly organised and sophisticated crime, and Ireland is no exception. It is only through effective international co-operation that the activities of the multinational criminals can be tackled. This co-operation must involve the sharing of information and intelligence with other countries to the benefit of all.

The evil trade in illicit drugs causes untold mis ery, sometimes even to our young people. In order to protect the community from the ravages of drug abuse, Customs is one of the main agencies responsible for preventing the drugs from reaching their intended users. This has been achieved by seizing drug shipments and disrupting the supply network at borders. The main customs area of expertise lies in exercising controls over the movement of goods and persons into and out of a country. Drug shipments, drug couriers and the traffickers themselves are at their most vulnerable when moving across borders. Similar principles apply to the smuggling of fiscal goods such as tobacco and alcohol where there also has been a rapidly increasing involvement by the international criminal fraternity.

Through the use of intelligence, profiling and risk analysis techniques, customs administrations have remained effective in seizing drugs and other smuggled products in the face of rapidly expanding international trade, travel and transportation. To be fully effective, law enforcement agencies generally, both at domestic and international levels, need an integrated approach to tackle all of the dimensions to trans-national crime.

In Ireland, with the advent of the Single Market, the Customs National Drugs Team, CNDT, was set up within the Office of the Revenue Commissioners in December 1992. Dedicated to drugs work only, the CNDT comprises 85 staff and consists of a head office located in Dublin and intelligence units, operational units, maritime units and drug detector dog units which are strategically placed at coastal locations nationwide. The CNDT is backed up by some 640 outfield customs officials who are also responsible for the detection and prevention of drugs smuggling as part of their normal duties.

A Memorandum of Understanding – MOU – was signed on 12 January 1996, between An Garda Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners, which provides a framework to facilitate greater co-operation and allow for operational and liaison structures including a joint task force. The function of the joint task force, which has representation from the Naval Service, is to deal with intelligence-driven drug operations and controlled deliveries of drugs, with each participant agency bringing its individual expertise and competence into play. There have been a number of joint task force controlled deliveries which have resulted in the seizure of a substantial quantity of drugs and the arrest of suspects.

The CNDT has had continual liaison with the Criminal Assets Bureau since its inception. Formal exchange of information and intelligence by both agencies is governed by the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996 and the Disclosure of Certain Information for Taxation and Other Purposes Act, 1996. Intelligence and information exchanged has included details of drug and cash seizures made from individuals and the property of individuals involved in, or suspected to be involved in drug smuggling. Assistance has also been given in a number of instances to monitor the movements of certain individuals into and out of the country. I am particularly pleased that intelligence and information provided by CNDT has assisted in some of the CAB's major successes.

One other important matter is the Memoranda of Understanding Programme. This is a national initiative through which the co-operation and assistance of trade associations as well as individual companies involved in the movement of goods and persons has been enlisted by the Customs Service to deal with the drugs problem. Since the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding in June 1993, some 41 agreements have been successfully concluded, encompassing almost 6,000 diverse companies. This list is steadily increasing. A number of MOUs are currently under active negotiation with major trade interests. MOUs are aimed at heightening the awareness of employees of airlines, shipping companies, freight forwarders and others engaged in international trade and carriage, to the dangers of drugs smuggling and provide them with ready channels of communications with the CNDT. I pay tribute to those traders and their staff who are actively involved in the programme and assure them that their contribution is a very valued one.

The Bill proposes to give the force of law in Ireland to two international conventions concerning co-operation and sharing of information relating to customs issues, prior to this country adopting them at European Union level. The member states of the Union are required to adopt these conventions in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. It is also proposed to give a number of related instruments the force of law. The Bill itself, therefore, is comparatively short. For ease of reference, the conventions and related instruments are appended to the Bill in both English and Irish, the texts being equally authentic in both languages. Before turning to the detail of the individual sections, I propose to give the background to the two conventions and related instruments.

The Convention on the use of Information Technology for Customs Purposes – the CIS Convention – was signed by all EU member states on 26 July 1995. This convention provides for the establishment of a "Customs Information System". Put simply, this is a computerised central database, with terminals in each member state linked to the central database, allowing for the rapid dissemination of information and intelligence about illegal movements over internal frontiers so that effective action can be taken by customs administrations to combat smuggling, including drugs smuggling. As this database will be used to disseminate information in all areas of customs concern, a dual legal basis is necessary. To the extent that the database covers information about possible breaches of Community law, it is underpinned by Council Regulation (EC) No. 515/97. In so far as it deals with information concerning goods such as drugs – an area not within Community competence – the legal basis is the CIS Convention. The database will carry information on commodities, means of transport, businesses, persons, fraud trends and availability of expertise. Customs administrations may use the database to pass on information about suspect movements, to carry out discreet surveillance or specific checks and to report the results to the other customs administrations concerned.

The CIS Convention generally limits access to and use of data on the database to nominated national authorities and obliges them to take the necessary measures to protect the security of the data. Member states are required to have national law in place giving a level of protection to data which is at least equal to that in the 1981 Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection. The 1988 Data Protection Act gave effect to that convention in this country. The CIS Convention contains specific limits to the data which may be included on the database and individuals have the right to access data about themselves, to have data checked, corrected or deleted and to have their rights vindicated in the courts. The CIS Convention also provides for independent supervision of data to protect the rights of individuals. Each member state is responsible in accordance with its national law for any injury caused through the use of the database in its territory, including injury arising from inaccurate data supplied by another member state or data supplied by another member state, which should not have been included on the database. Where injury is caused as a result of data provided by another member state, the apportionment of liability will be subject to agreement between the states concerned. The CIS Convention also lays down an elaborate framework for the management and supervision of the database. I will deal with this point in more detail when speaking about specific sections of the Bill.

In addition to the CIS Convention, there are three related instruments to which this Bill gives legal effect. These are the Agreement on Provisional Application of the Convention and two protocols. The Agreement on Provisional Application allows the CIS Convention to be applied by some but not all the member states in an interim period until such time as all are in a position to adopt it. It was signed by the same date as the convention itself. This arrangement recognised that certain member states would have to introduce legislation to give effect to certain provisions in the CIS convention before they could adopt it.

The current position is that eight member states have adopted the agreement and it is due to come into operation for those countries in December 2000. The CIS Convention confers jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice to rule on disputes between member states and between member states and the Commission, regarding the application of the convention. However, at the time the CIS Convention was signed, there was no agreement between member states on what role, if any, the European Court should have relating to interpretation of the convention.

A compromise was worked out subsequently, resulting in a protocol to the CIS Convention being drawn up which enabled each member state to accept a role for the European Court on an opt-in basis. Ireland signed the protocol subject to adoption on 29 November 1996. The protocol confers jurisdiction on the European Court to interpret the convention but makes its application by national court conditional on the declaration to be made at the time of signature or at any time thereafter to the effect that the member states will accept the European Court's jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the convention. Member states which are prepared to accept the European Court's jurisdiction may specify, in relation to the application of the CIS convention, whether courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under their national law, or all their national courts or tribunals, will be in a position to ask the European Court for preliminary rulings.

In view of the serious difficulties that could arise under our legal system if criminal trials had to be suspended for lengthy periods while rulings were obtained from the European Court, Ireland made a declaration at the time of signing the Protocol to the effect that it would agree to give only those courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law the right to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court on the interpretation of the CIS Convention. This reflected Ireland's position on similar jurisdiction provisions in other EU Conventions such as the Europol Convention. The practical effect of this will be that only cases before the Supreme Court will be forwarded to the European Court for preliminary ruling.

On 12 March 1999 a Second Protocol to the CIS Convention was signed, subject to adoption, which remedied two deficiencies that had been identified in that convention. The first related to the items of information which could be placed on the database. Member states' customs administrations could not include on the database the registration number of the means of transport of smuggled goods even though this additional data element could be very useful. The second deficiency related to the information which could be placed on the database in connection with money laundering. While the CIS Convention provided for an exchange of information on money laundering in connection with illicit international drug trafficking, it did not provide for exchanges of information on money laundering which was related to other types of infringements of Community and national customs laws. In the interests of ensuring a comprehensive response to all types of smuggling, the Protocol extended the circumstances in which information on money laundering could be exchanged using the database.

The Bill is also concerned with the Convention on Mutual Assistance and Co-operation between customs administrations, known more simply as the Customs Co-operation Convention, which was signed by all member states on 18 December 1997, subject to adoption. On its accession to the EEC in 1973, Ireland became a party to the 1967 Naples Convention. That convention has been for over 30 years the principal legal instrument available for the provision of mutual assistance allowing customs administrations to exchange useful information and intelligence along with assisting in the investigation of breaches of customs law including smuggling of, for example, prohibited goods such as drugs, arms and ammunition. By the early 1990s member states decided that the Naples Convention was in need of revision so that customs administrations would have the means to tackle cross-border smuggling activities effectively in the context of a Single Market without internal frontiers. As a result, the updated Customs Co-operation Convention was concluded under Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union. The Customs Co-operation Convention updates provisions in the Naples Convention but also extends its scope, in particular in provides for special forms of co-operation between customs administrations not existing heretofore.

Customs administrations, in applying the provisions of the Customs Co-operation Convention, must act in accordance with their national legislative powers. Formal requests for assistance must be channelled through a specific contact point in each member state. In providing assistance in response to requests, which normally must be in writing, the requested administration must act as if the request had emanated from within its own country. In certain circumstances, officials from the applicant administration may visit the offices of the requested member state to obtain further information. The requested administration can be asked to carry out surveillance on suspect persons and on means of transport, goods and places. A representative of the applicant administration may be present when action is carried out by the requested administration, provided both administrations agree.

Information received under the convention must be treated as confidential and used only for the purposes specified in the convention. It can also be used as evidence in the receiving member state in accordance with national law. Data protection provisions in the convention are similar to those in the CIS Convention.

As regards the special forms of co-operation provided for in the convention, these provisions enable customs administrations to engage in special forms of co-operation in respect of certain types of infringements such as cases involving illicit traffic in drugs, weapons, munitions and serious cases of smuggling taxable goods. These special forms of co-operation are hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance, controlled delivery, covert investigations and joint special investigation teams. These provisions would allow customs officers of one State to enter another State to carry out or continue their activities.

However, the convention allows member states to opt out of applying some of these provisions, that is, hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance and covert investigations. The other provisions are mandatory. The Government proposes to avail of the opt out provision and will make a declaration to this effect when Ireland lodges its instruments of adoption of the convention. Other member states, including the United Kingdom, are also availing of the opt out provisions. If the considerations which led the Government to take this approach should alter in the future, the Bill provides that the Government may, by order, opt in to some or all of the provisions.

The Customs Co-operation Convention confers jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice to rule on disputes regarding its application between member states and between members states and the Commission. In common with the Protocol to the CIS Convention, it also confers jurisdiction on the court to interpret the convention but makes the application of this provision by the courts in each member state conditional on a declaration to be made at the time of signature, or any time thereafter, to the effect that the member state will accept the court's jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the convention. Ireland will make a similar declaration on this matter as for the CIS Convention, for the same reasons that I outlined earlier.

An important point is that a request for assistance under the convention may be refused where it is considered to be prejudicial to public policy or other essential interests and rights of the member state concerned, particularly in the field of data protection or where the action requested is disproportionate to the gravity of the presumed offence. Reasons must be given for any such refusal.

Both conventions are to enter into force 90 days after the last of the member states has adopted them. The agreement to provisionally apply the CIS Convention is to enter into force 90 days after the eighth member state has adopted it. Adoption of this agreement by those eight States will allow the CIS Convention to be applied provisionally subject to certain conditions specified in the agreement. The position is that eight member states have adopted the agreement and it is due to come into operation for those countries in December. Both the Protocol dealing with the role of the European Court of Justice and the Second Protocol dealing with deficiencies in the CIS Convention are also to enter into force 90 days after the last of the member states has adopted them but cannot be implemented during the period of provisional application of the CIS Convention.

I do not propose to spend an inordinate amount of time dealing with the provisions of the Bill since the Explanatory Memorandum, which was circulated with it, contains quite a detailed commentary on the individual sections and their provisions in the conventions and related instruments. As I have already mentioned, the purpose of the Bill is to give the conventions and related instruments the force of law in the State. Section 2 contains this core provision.

Section 3 designates the Revenue Commissioners as the national authority for the purposes of certain articles of the CIS Convention. This means that, in Ireland, direct access to the database will be exercised by the Revenue Commissioners. The infrastructure for this system is already available with 20 terminals based at, among other locations, customs offices in ports and airports around the country.

Section 4 designates the Revenue Commissioners as the competent customs administration for the purposes of Article 10 of the CIS Convention. That article requires each member state to designate a competent customs administration to take responsibility for the correct operation of the database within the member state and to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.

Sections 5, 6 and 9 are concerned with data protection. The main purpose of section 5 is to apply the Data Protection Act, 1988, to relevant provisions in the conventions and related instruments, subject to modification where necessary. As I have already mentioned, the 1988 Act gave effect to the principles contained in the 1981 Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection which is the standard of protection laid down in respect of automated data in both of the conventions to which the Bill is giving legal effect.

Section 6 designates the Data Protection Commissioner for the purposes of the conventions, so that he will be empowered to monitor implementation of the data protection provisions in respect of automated data.

Section 9 creates an offence under the 1988 Act for the improper use of data on the database. Penalties for such offences are to be the same as those set out in section 31 of the 1988 Act, namely a fine not exceeding £1,000 or 1,270 euro on summary conviction, or a fine not exceeding £50,000 or 63,487 euro on conviction on indictment.

I would point out that all of these sections deal only with automated data, that is, data which is processed automatically. I will deal later with the question of protecting non-automated or manual data.

Section 7 deals with the special forms of co-operation set out in the Customs Co-operation Convention. The convention provides for five special forms of co-operation. I have mentioned already that while two of these forms of co-operation are mandatory, member states may decide to opt out of the others. Therefore, while this Act will give the force of law to the convention, it is necessary to specify in the Act itself that this country shall not be bound by those provisions from which the opt-out is being exercised.

If those considerations giving rise to Ireland opting out were to change at any point in the future and it was desired to avail of these provisions, this would require legislation to amend subsection 1 of this section. However, by providing in subsection 2 for possible opt-in later by way of Government order, the necessity of having to enact amending legislation is avoided. A draft of any such order would have to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas and could not be made until a resolution approving of such draft had been passed by each such House in accordance with the provisions of section 10 of the Bill.

Sections 8 and 11 contain provisions for the making of ministerial regulations, which may appear to be necessary and expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Bill and for these to be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas. While the Bill does not specifically require the making of regulations in relation to any particular aspect of its provisions, it may be necessary at a later stage to consider the making of regulations if it emerges that there is a need to give effect to protection of personal data exchanged by non-automated means. Therefore, I am making specific provision for that purpose since, as I mentioned earlier, the existing national data protection legislation only applies to automated exchanges of data. Other than in the case of that specific issue, the purpose of these sections is merely to enable incidental requirements to be met from time to time.

Section 10 provides for the interpretation of both the CIS and customs co-operation conventions by the European Court of Justice by way of preliminary rulings and for judicial notice to be taken of such rulings.

I have outlined already how both the 1996 protocol to the CIS convention and the Customs Co-operation Convention provide that member states may, by way of declaration, accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the conventions. As a further measure, those member states that accept the court's jurisdiction must declare whether they will allow all of their national courts, or only those from whose decision there is no avenue of appeal, to seek such preliminary rulings. At the time of signature of both instruments, Ireland decided on the latter option in both cases so as to ensure there will be as little disruption as possible to the progress of a criminal trial once it has commenced.

I should like to conclude by saying that the measures being introduced by this Bill are very sensible. The two conventions and related instruments represent a comprehensive package of measures to enhance the present co-operation arrangements to assist customs administrations in preventing serious smuggling, illegal cross-frontier movement of illicit substances and products and generally in improving controls. There is a very solid foundation going back over 30 years on which we are now building and I am confident these measures will also stand the test of time. The value of international co-operation between customs administrations has been well illustrated over the years.

I believe this Bill will be found acceptable by all sides of the House. Of course, I shall give careful consideration to the points which Deputies may make and to any suggestions for amendment that may be made in the course of the debate. I commend the Bill to the House.

I thank the Minister of State for introducing this Bill, which Fine Gael welcomes and which we will be supporting on Second Stage. We will not table many amendments on Committee Stage but we will give the Bill the usual scrutiny.

The Bill is principally dealing with the adoption of the EU convention on customs information systems and goes on to legislate for the provisional application of the convention. There are also two protocols to the convention which change the interpretation of key sections. A separate convention is also being adopted on mutual assistance and co-operation between customs administrations.

It is a useful Bill and will lead to a strengthening of the potential of customs and excise officials to combat international crime. We are pleased with it for that reason. All of us in Ireland have engaged in debates on the defence of Europe at various times. Some people talk about the defence of Europe as if defence and security were synonymous terms. However, after the Cold War conflicts and those in the Balkans, the issues facing Europe in the future will not be competing ideologies or internal or border wars but will be the issues relating to security and the threats posed to citizens of Europe by international terrorism and drug smuggling in its various manifestations, including the marketing of drugs, the money laundering of the proceeds and the acquisition of assets through the use of laundered money. Anything which strengthens the customs and excise officials in their fight against organised crime is to be welcomed.

It is also true that since the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Balkans, the incidence of mafia type organised international crime has increased significantly. It has been a by-product of the democratisation of eastern Europe and the introduction of the free market there. Crime is the ultimate free market activity. Mafias from Russia, Romania and other eastern European countries are operating throughout western Europe and have magnified the problems posed by organised crime.

In regard to the availability of weaponry for terrorism and violent crime, western Europe is now littered with the remnants of the armaments of armies. When the Russians moved east after the arrangement was made on the unification of Germany, it was quite common for large amounts of armaments to be passed into the black market by the retreating Russian army. These are now freely available. The various wars in Yugoslavia have led to a similar availability of armaments. Very heavy weaponry and a multiplicity of armaments are now available for crime and lawlessness throughout western Europe and Ireland is not free from this.

We had experience in the past, when the provisional IRA campaign was raging, of guns and Semtex coming in from Libya. However, these originated in the Russian satellite states, with much of the Semtex coming from the Czech Republic and many of the Kalashnikov rifles coming from Slovakia. They were channelled through various ways into Ireland.

I agree with the Minister of State that any set of international agreements which positions us better to cut off the trade in illegal drugs, which is prevalent in this country, and which reduces the possibility of quasi-republican dissident groups importing the arms which are freely available across Europe, is to be welcomed in this House. I wish the customs and excise officials every success in their efforts.

The CIS convention allows for the establishment of computerised central databases, with terminals in each member state, and the inclusion on the databases of very significant information relevant to areas which concern organised crime. Areas such as commodities, means of transport, businesses, names of persons, fraud trends and so on will be included in the database. The database would be constantly updated and the flow of information would be available in each of the member countries, including Ireland. This is important given that traffic through Dublin Airport is in excess of 14 million persons per annum, and ferries, cars, wagons, trucks and articulated trucks and so on come in all the time. We are not free from this. The experience of all Deputies is that the drug problem in Ireland is no longer confined to the major cities. There are major incidents in drugs even in small country villages. When one comes to know the families involved and the parents of the young people being arrested for the possession and trade in heavy drugs one realises this is widespread. There is a certain amount of closing our eyes to how widespread the drug problem is in Ireland. It is an international trade and one which has to be combatted domestically by the best efforts of the Garda Síochána and the customs officials but it must be combatted internationally as well because it is internationally organised.

When the Criminal Assets Bureau cracked down on organised crime in this city after the murder of Veronica Guerin many of the drug barons pulled up stakes and headed for Amsterdam where they seem to be living the life of millionaires. They could not have done so if their activities had not previously been internationalised and there was a ready safe haven for them in Europe. I fully approve of our ratification of the convention because it is important to co-operate with the efforts being made to combat what I think will be the great threat to Europe for this generation – the threat from organised crime, the threat from the organised drug trade and the threat to our young people and also the possibility of further trade in armaments, guns, ammunition and explosives coming from the kind of people who caused the Omagh atrocity

The explanatory memorandum states that the customs information system will also be used to disseminate information in all areas of customs concern and will not be confined solely to the exchange of information about drugs and other sensitive goods. The Minister has not said this anywhere in his speech. Does this mean that customs and excise will be involved in exchanging information on the movement of emigrants across Europe? Is traffic in people included in this convention? If so, serious issues arise. While the primary responsibility in respect of emigrants lies with the immigration authorities, frequently customs and excise seem to be involved at the ports. At times it is difficult to distinguish who has responsibility if an articulated truck is coming into Ireland with six Romanian refugees. Is that solely an immmigration issue or a customs and excise issue? It is certainly a customs issue in many other European countries. This situation needs to be handled sensitively. The movement of especially the poor and deprived, for economic reasons or for reasons of seeking asylum because of persecution at home, is not equivalent to the international trade in drugs or international trade in armaments. Given that we are dealing with human beings we should be far more sensitive about it. The paragraph in the explanatory memorandum which states that the convention will not be confined solely to the exchange of information about drugs and other sensitive goods is not a diplomatic way of telling us it will be used for emigrants as well.

I have heard horrific stories of emigrants at the channel ports specifically in France. I have met Irish lorry drivers who told me if they stop at a café on the way to Dover they have to check the truck when they come out. There are various security forces other than the gendarmerie who use Alsatian dogs and tear gas grenades to flush people out of the back of articulated trucks at the general ports. We all know the difficulties. We also realise that emigration will be one of the great issues in Europe for the foreseeable future and will increase rather than decrease. I hope that a convention which is being put in place for one stated purpose will not be used in a way which will diminish the human rights of those who seek to leave their own country for reasons of seeking political asylum or to better themselves by establishing a new life in one of the richer economies.

The convention on mutual assistance and co-operation between customs administrations is also welcomed by my party. The provision is for mutual assistance and it allows the customs authorities to exchange useful information and intelligence in the investigation of breaches of customs law, including, for example, the smuggling of prohibited goods such as drugs, armaments and ammunition. This has not simply to do with putting information on a database. According to the explanatory memorandum it would allow member states to co-operate to the extent of agreeing to hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance, control delivery, covert investigations, joint special investigation teams. While opt out clauses are provided for, will the Minister clearly explain Ireland's position? Are we opting out or will the convention enable our customs officials to bring people from, say, the United Kingdom to Athlone to get involved in a joint surveillance activity? Will it allow hot pursuit across the Border from Newry to Dundalk if the customs officials think drugs are being imported from Northern Ireland? Will covert investigations involve the use of customs or excise officials from other European countries operating here? Certainly the convention would allow that to happen. Will the Minister make it clear if this is theory or if he envisages it being put into practice in Ireland? If it is not going to be put into practice, will he rely on the inertia of the system or implement the opt out clause which is available to him?

On two occasions recently we have had reference to the FBI assisting the Garda Síochána in joint operations. At the Abbeylara shooting the FBI seemed to be present in some kind of advisory capacity. More recently we were regaled by a series of dawn raids in the Limerick and Shannon area where factories, warehouses and private houses were entered forcibly by a joint FBI-Garda operation. They were in pursuit of aeroplane parts which would not have been manufactured by the reputable aircraft construction companies. These replica aircraft parts which may not be up to standard were in question. Local folklore is that they found nothing. The search was conducted in a high profile way with private houses being forcibly entered at the crack of dawn and doors being knocked down. In one instance a warehouse where the manager produced the key had its door knocked down because it was more dramatic to knock the door in than to open it with the key. That is an aside, a purple passage. However, it shows that what would not have happened in the past – joint operations by the security authorities of the United States and Ireland – have now taken place. What is the Minister's intention in respect of Customs and Excise? Will there be joint operations in Dublin, for example, between Dutch and Irish Customs and Excise officials in pursuit of certain organised drug gangs? Does hot pursuit simply mean crossing a land border or would it permit somebody to come from Roscoff to Rosslare in hot pursuit of somebody coming into Ireland with a supply of drugs?

Greater clarification is required. While all Members agree in theory with the legislation, there are practical implications. Persons who have holidayed or lived abroad are aware that the practices, procedures and cultures of security and quasi-security forces differ substantially from country to country. What would be acceptable in one culture would be most unacceptable in another. Due to our history and the way we organise our affairs, people in Ireland would not take kindly to the type of rigorous policing one encounters in certain parts of the Continent. Are we just signing up to a series of measures which will not come into effect or are we signing up to a series of measures in respect of hot pursuit, cross border surveillance, controlled delivery of goods, covert investigations and joint special investigation teams which will happen on the ground in this country in the foreseeable future?

The convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes is welcomed by Fine Gael. There are considerations to be taken into account with regard to what is included in the database, how this can be corrected, whether personal rights are being transgressed and what access persons would have to the database if they felt their rights were being transgressed. If I understand the Minister correctly, the protection will be at least as strong as the protection provided under domestic law and the data protection Acts.

It has to be.

The Minister indicated that the individual about whom data is stored on the Customs and Excise computerised international system will have the right to have the data checked, corrected or deleted and subsequently to have their rights vindicated in court. I see no provision to oblige Customs and Excise officials to correct the data themselves if, in the course of an investigation, they discover that some of the data entered is erroneous. There does not appear to be such an obligation.

It is unlikely that anybody will go to Customs and Excise and ask if there is data about them stored in their computer, but there should be an obligation on the officials, in circumstances where data is included, to correct it subsequently if an error has been made. One can envisage a situation where somebody is bringing a caravan home after a couple of weeks holiday in Europe. For one reason or other a message might be put through to Irish Customs and Excise that it is suspected the caravan might be involved in carrying drugs. The suspicion might be reasonable at the point of transmission and duly goes into the Customs and Excise computer. The caravan and its occupants are stopped coming through the port, searched and nothing is found. It was a reasonable suspicion by, for example, the French police which was in error. It is unlikely the occupants could access the database so there should be a provision which obliges the Customs and Excise officials to correct information which was put in their database in error.

The Minister referred to the elaborate framework for the management and supervision of the CIS. It ranges from the committee con sisting of customs administrations in member states to a national supervisory authority and a joint supervisory authority. Those safeguards appear to be admirable and adequate to provide the overall protection that is necessary. Often, however, it is not at the macro level that individuals' rights are transgressed. It is usually at the local or micro level where a piece of damaging information is put into a database and remains there indefinitely. In a small country like ours, if it is on the computer it will be on the street before long. It will be rumoured in pubs that such and such a person was bringing drugs in from the Continent and, although nothing was found on him, he was guilty because the information was received from France. There is a genuine risk here.

Whenever we sharpen the instruments of attack against organised crime we should be aware that we do so at a cost to the personal freedom of the individual. We must continue to try to strike an appropriate balance. I hope the Minister will take my comments into account and, if the balance is not already there, see if a better balance can be provided.

The two protocols appear to be uncontroversial. We welcome the fact that the European Court of Justice will be the arbiter and interpreter of the convention. That is appropriate. The second protocol corrects an error where the registration number of a vehicle in which smuggled goods were being transported could not be included in the database. That is an obvious correction. The second deficiency being remedied by the second protocol relates to money laundering. Again, that is uncontroversial. It is appropriate that it be done.

The convention on mutual assistance and co-operation between customs administrations is wider than the other convention. Whereas the exchange of information convention deals, in effect, with the inclusion of information which Customs and Excise officials consider relevant to prevent the smuggling of goods which would be used in crime, such as drugs and ammunition, this convention appears to deal with the ordinary work of Customs and Excise officials. In cases of the normal carriage of trade goods, infringements or attempts to commit infringements on their import or export would be caught within this convention.

If I understand it correctly, it does not relate to drugs, guns or ammunition but to normal trade and whether persons engaged in trade and the carriage of goods are guilty or not guilty of infringements. It is important that there is co-operation in this area but it is also important, in the context of normal trade, that the protection of data concerning individuals would be stronger than the requirements to protect data concerning persons who might be involved in smuggling drugs or armaments. I am not clear about the scope of this convention and I ask the Minister to clarify it.

The explanatory memorandum states, "The requested authority can be asked to carry out surveillance on suspect persons and on means of transport, goods and places. A representative of the applicant authority may be present when action is carried out by the requested authority, provided both authorities agree." If one is importing Third World goods into Ireland, which would be subject to EU tariffs, and if they are transferring those by truck to the United Kingdom in a manner which would transgress the regulations concerning the particular tariffs, does this allow for joint operations in Ireland where UK Customs officials and Irish Customs officials would be involved in surveillance and where members of the other country's service would be personally involved in any operation against them? That is how the memorandum seems to read and I would like if this could be clarified.

I am not clear what the Minister of State said in respect of this convention and the opt out clauses. When he referred to the opt out clause under this convention, was he referring to the opt out clauses provided under Article 28 where a request for assistance may be refused if it is considered to be prejudicial to public policy or other essential interests and rights of member states, or where the action requested is considered to be disproportionate to the gravity of the offence? Is he confining the Irish opt out simply to the provisions of Article 28 or is he exercising the right to a wider opt out, which I understand is available to member states as a result of the negotiations which took place on the convention?

The Bill consists of just ten sections. By weight it is a heavy Bill but the heaviness and bulk of it results from the schedules and the copies of the conventions. I do not believe there will be a problem processing the ten sections on Committee Stage. The Bill raises interesting issues about which this House has an obligation to ask questions.

I compliment the parliamentary counsel's office and the departmental officials for a full and very well laid out explanatory memorandum. In complicated Bills such as this, many Members rely on the explanatory memorandum. As this is a particularly good one, I compliment all those involved.

I wish I had Deputy Noonan's capacity to read the explanatory memorandum and then speak for half an hour on the basis of it. I will not attempt to imitate that in my contribution.

This Bill ratifies two conventions, the 1995 EU convention on information technology and the use of information technology for certain purposes and the mutual assistance convention two years later. In a sense, there is not a great deal Members of this House can say or do about it because negotiations have taken place and the agreement has been made intergovernmentally. It is for us to decide whether we wish to subscribe to the conventions at this stage and whether we wish to authorise Government to sign the conventions.

On behalf of the Labour Party, I have no difficulty with the thrust of the conventions. As Deputy Noonan said, the workings of the conventions and how they will be used will be very interesting and raise important issues. There is always a balance to be struck in these matters between the human, civil and legal rights of individuals and the need to give the greatest possible capacity to national and international services to deal with issues of international crime and international smuggling. I travelled recently by plane from Brussels to Munich and I was very struck when I arrived in Munich that I went straight from the arrivals lounge to the taxi rank and there were no Customs and Excise or passport controls. This is a feature of the Schengen Convention to which Ireland is not yet a signatory. It brought home to me the reality of the Single Market where one can now travel from one Schengen country to another without the need for identity cards or customs checks. While this is a great convenience for people travelling as tourists and those engaged in legitimate trade, it is a great opportunity for those engaged in illegal trade and smuggling.

This raises two major points, first, the need to co-ordinate within the EU by giving the facilities to the national services to co-operate and exchange information and, if necessary, to mount joint investigations and joint operations and, second, the need to ensure that the EU borders are secure and that the individual national services employ the same rules and regulations in manning these borders. The notion of a fortress Europe is somewhat distasteful but the reality is that if we are to break down internal borders within the EU, we have no choice but to put in place clearly understood regulations which are underpinned by joint co-operation along the borders of the EU with eastern Europe and beyond.

Unfortunately, Ireland has recently become a place to where goods, particularly drugs, are smuggled as a base not just for the Irish market but for further export within the EU. A couple of days ago I saw information provided to us by the Revenue detailing drugs seizures in this country on foot of questions raised by Deputy Noonan on the Estimates debate. It is quite clear from the volume of the seizures that the drugs were not intended to service just the demand for drugs in this country. It is clear some of it was intended for further export. This brings into clear focus the need for international co-operation.

On the convention dealing with information technology, I have no problem with the principle of the Bill. However, I would like the opportunity on Committee Stage to tease out how this will work in practice. I had a quick read through the convention and Article 2 states in fairly bald terms what the information can be used for. It reads, "The aim of the Customs Information System . shall be to assist in preventing, investigating and prosecuting serious contraventions of national laws by increasing, through the rapid dissemination of information, the effectiveness of the co-operation and control procedures of the customs administrations of the Member States." On the face of it, no one could have a problem with that. It is also very broad and allows the Revenue Commissioners in our case quite considerable latitude in defining how and for what purpose they will effectively trade information or put information on the system. Article 3 of the convention goes on to set out the information that can be provided through the system. Clauses 5 and 6 are fairly broad in talking about fraud trends as to the sort of information that can be made available.

I have no difficulty with relevant national authorities trading information. This is a good thing. Nevertheless, I believe we are taking the whole business of information being provided by individuals a little bit further if we are putting what could be potentially a substantial amount of information on an international system, as I believe there is no conviction involved in most cases and the individuals concerned are merely suspects who have been engaged in suspicious activities or whatever. I would like to know how this will work in practice and how broad will the net be cast. Will the details of tens of thousands of citizens appear on the system and be available to the Dutch and German police and so on or are we talking about people who are likely to have been engaged in serious crime here or abroad? How broad is it intended the information should be?

What struck me when looking at the details of the drugs seizures – this is probably a matter of national policy – was the relatively small amount of heroin seized during the course of 2000. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform stated in this House that he believes, as I do, that Garda and Revenue activity should focus on heroin because it is destroying communities in Dublin and elsewhere, as Deputy Noonan said. Heroin is the addictive substance behind a great deal of crime in Dublin. The bulk of drug seizures this year in terms of value and volume involved cannabis resin and herbal cannabis. Cannabis should not be decriminalised because there are attendant dangers involved and it should not be the primary focus of the drugs activities of the Garda or the Revenue. They should focus on the heroin problem.

Virtually all the seizures took place at airports. What does that tell us about the nature of smuggling into Ireland and our capacity to intercept drugs and other smuggled goods at ports or at sea? The White Paper on Defence stated there was no case for broadening the role of the Naval Service or expanding it. The Naval Service comprises eight ships which spend most of their time on fishery protection duty and have little time to do anything else. Does the Revenue envisage a role for the Naval Service in terms of interception of smuggled goods?

I recall during the prelude to the White Paper there was a debate between the Departments of Finance and Defence regarding what should be the role of the Naval Service. The Department of Finance was to the fore in arguing for a coastguard service and a service which could undertake activities such as interception of smuggled goods. That would be relevant to the operation of this legislation. Does the Minister of State have any comments on this?

The Customs Co-operation Convention has a much broader remit than exchanging information and it provides for special activities such as hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance, controlled delivery, covert investigations and joint special investigation teams. Ireland has decided to opt out of the hot pursuit and cross-border surveillance provisions. The Minister of State said if the considerations which have led the Government to come to that conclusion change, it would like to be able to reverse that position without coming into the House. He did not outline the considerations and why the Government has decided to opt out of those special activities and forms of co-operation. I am interested to hear his comments on that.

In the recent past there has been debate in a somewhat different context about hot pursuit across the Irish Border. There is no doubt there is political sensitivity attending thereto. None of us want a scenario where British troops cross the Border in pursuit of smugglers or where regulations that ostensibly dealt with smuggling were abused for other purposes. The context under this legislation is different and in circumstances where the Border has been used for smuggling cattle over the years, for example, a case can be made for the joint surveillance and hot pursuit activities contemplated under the convention. Why has the Minister of State decided not to opt into the convention? What will the considerations be in future in deciding to reverse that position?

Will the Minister of State comment on the interaction and co-operation between the CAB, the Revenue Commissioners, the CNDT and the Garda? He mentioned this was covered by a written agreement. There have been instances – I cannot recall one in recent years – in the past where one body was trying, at least in terms of public perception, to be more to the fore in dealing with, for example, drug smuggling. I would like the Minister of State to spell out more clearly as the legislation passes through the House how the co-operation between the Garda, the CAB, the CNDT and so on works in practice.

Almost 700 people work in the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. The traditional notion of Customs and Excise officers was guys on the Border trying to intercept unfortunate shoppers returning from Belfast with 200 or 300 extra cigarettes in their car boots. We have moved on a long way since then and we are now dealing with serious international crime but I am not clear what the individuals employed by the Revenue Commissioners as Customs and Excise officers do, and how they are deployed. Few are deployed along the Border anymore. How does Customs and Excise operate as a unit within Revenue?

Joint co-operation with other international bodies is interesting. I do not have a difficulty in principle with the notion, as Deputy Noonan said, of Dutch customs officials being involved in a joint operation in Ireland but their powers should be clear. I recall a senior garda telling me once that he was quite envious of some of the powers of customs officers. Their powers to stop and search are broad and are arguably much broader than those of a garda. If Ireland is to engage in joint operations, it must be clear what are the powers of the officers with whom Ireland is co-operating. For example, would a Dutch officer have the same powers to stop, search and question as a customs officer from this jurisdiction? I hope the Minister of State will tease out that issue.

The Data Protection Officer will become the national supervisory authority to safeguard individuals' rights under the conventions. How effective is the role of the officer currently? Bodies have information about me and many other citizens and most of us would not dream of contacting the Data Protection Officer. How do those safeguards operate? How many people investigate the information maintained about them and seek to have it corrected, for example, on an annual basis? I do not know whether the system already in place is terribly effective, but, if it is not, broadening its scope into this area is also not likely to be effective.

If details which identify an individual as a quasi-criminal, suspect, or somebody who is thought likely to engage in illegal activities, are loaded into an information system, what are the implications in terms of libel, for example? Is it possible for an individual to take a case in which he or she can claim he or she has effectively been identified as a potential criminal because his or her details were on the information system? Do such issues arise?

Deputy Noonan asked whether trafficking in people, which unfortunately is an experience we have had recently, is covered by the conventions and the legislation. Another interesting issue is whether Revenue offences are covered. Will the exchange of information that will be possible when Ireland subscribes to the convention include tax offences, for example? If it comes to light through a CAB investigation, for instance, that somebody may have been guilty of tax evasion will such information be made available to the national authorities in other countries? There is considerable scope for acquiring information which might not otherwise have been possible.

The protocol deals with the jurisdiction of the European court. However, I am not clear about whether the accepted jurisprudence of the European court as it is built up has force of law in Ireland or if the Irish courts will continue to have power in the first instance to interpret the con vention. Once the European court has decided what it means, is that binding on the Irish courts or can they decide for themselves? I support the thrust of the Bill but I would like to hear more, either in the Minister's reply or a later stage, about the operation of individual sections.

Debate adjourned.
Sitting suspended at 1.30 p.m. and resumed at 2.30 p.m.
Top
Share