As is well known, the Nice Summit I attended, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Cowen, has entered the record books as the longest ever European Council. I hope that record stands for a long time.
Nice Summit: Statements.
I am sorry to interrupt the Taoiseach, but will Deputy Cowen be replying to the debate?
Yes, as I understand it.
How is he going to do so if he is not in the House? His script is already prepared.
He will use the same method I used to watch what Minister of State, Deputy Mary Wallace, was saying.
This is farcical.
Please, Deputy Quinn.
I will make my point, a Leas-Cheann Comhairle.
Deputy Cowen will reply to the debate.
Is he not at the UN as well?
That it took so long to reach agreement on the draft treaty of Nice is perhaps no surprise given the fundamental importance of the decisions being taken. Each member state had its own priorities but, through long and arduous negotiations, we were able to achieve our mutual objectives of laying the base for the further enlargement of the European Union. I will return in detail to the Nice treaty in the second part of my statement, but I would like to begin by outlining briefly the decisions taken on the other issues which we dealt with over the first two days of the summit.
The Council began on the morning of Thursday, 7 December, with a European conference with the applicant states. In the first working session of the Council, we formally proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights, took a number of important decisions on economic and social issues, security and defence matters, maritime safety and the establishment of the European Food Authority. We also considered the impact of recent developments on BSE on beef producers. As the House will be aware, subsequent working sessions continued throughout Friday, Saturday and Sunday until 4.30 a.m. on Monday.
The European conference was a welcome opportunity to reassure the applicant states, including Turkey, of the Union's determination to advance the enlargement process as soon as possible. It was imperative that, at Nice, EU leaders sent a positive message to assure the applicants that their difficult reform programmes would be rewarded by membership of the European Union in the near future. The greatest reassurance which was given was the successful conclusion of the intergovernmental conference because, through readying the Union, we have paved the way for enlargement to commence. Leaders endorsed the Commission's strategy paper on enlargement which outlined a road map for accession negotiations for the coming 18 months. It is now essential that we make a substantive leap forward in the negotiation process.
Together with the European Parliament and Commission, the leaders formally proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights at Nice. For the first time the Union has brought together in a single comprehensive document the rights and freedoms to which the citizens of the Union are entitled. Fundamental rights have been, and will continue to be, a priority for the Irish Government and are, in most cases, already exceptionally well safeguarded in our Constitution. Importantly, from our perspective, it was agreed that further wide consultation would be undertaken as to the future status of the charter in the context of the declaration on the future of the Union.
The European Council approved a Presidency report on European security and defence policy, including the outcome of the capabilities commitment conference. While this is a matter with which the Minister for Foreign Affairs will deal in greater detail in his statement, I was pleased the report respected the principle that any missions undertaken would be in accordance with the United Nations Charter. As I have previously stated, it is a sovereign decision for each member state to decide, on a case by case basis, whether to participate in a mission and we will only do so if it has a UN mandate. I am also particularly pleased with the emphasis in the report on developing civilian resources for crisis management.
Agreement was also reached at Nice on a package of measures which the Presidency billed as helping to achieve a citizens' Europe. I fully endorsed the establishment of the European Food Authority by the start of 2002 as this is the most effective mechanism to address food safety requirements and restore public confidence. Leaders also endorsed the package of measures agreed by the Agriculture Council to combat BSE. I argued strongly that additional funding should be provided to compensate beef producers for the fall in prices. As a result, the Commission was mandated to analyse the situation confronting beef producers. The Commission will make such proposals as it considers necessary to the Agriculture Council as soon as possible.
I gave my full support to the measures identified for reducing the risk of maritime accidents such as the sinking of the Erika oil tanker. I also joined with my colleagues in expressing regret at the failure to reach agreement at the climate change conference in The Hague, and I look forward to negotiations recommencing as soon as possible.
The European Council also considered a number of essentially economic and social issues. The special European Council held in Lisbon last March set for the Union the goal of becoming the most dynamic, knowledge based economy in the world by 2010 and to achieving greater social cohesion. The Nice Summit made further progress on reaching this goal by endorsing a new social agenda document that will guide the Union's policies in this area over the next five years. To ensure that social policy issues remain at the top of our agenda, a report will be submitted to the spring summit each year on the document's implementation.
The Nice Summit also agreed on the format for the spring summit in Stockholm and I look forward to the publication of the Commission's synthesis report and of the high level structural indicators I see as a valuable input to the discussion of economic and social priorities at the spring Council.
I will now turn to my main theme of the summit, namely, the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference. The entire Intergovernmental Conference process, which began under the Portuguese Presidency during the first six months of the year, had a clear purpose, namely, to prepare the institutions of the Union for enlargement. The agenda at the outset comprised the Amsterdam left-overs – the size and composition of the Commission, the reweighting of votes in the Council and the extension of qualified majority voting – as well as some related institutional issues. Flexibility, or enhanced co-operation as it is also known, was added to the agenda at the Feira European Council in June.
During the process, I sought to ensure that the positions which Ireland was adopting on these issues were well known domestically. I believe that from our discussions in this House, from my major addresses on European policy, delivered in March and November to the IEA and ICEM, respectively, and from the debate which ministerial colleagues aroused, there was an unprecedented level of public awareness of the issues under discussion. It is clear that the Government approached the negotiations in a positive light and against the background of the priority we attach to the earliest possible enlargement of the Union. However, in doing so we also sought to ensure that the essential characteristics of the Union were maintained, including its delicate institutional balance. While we had clear priorities, such as the retention of our Commissioner for the foreseeable future and retaining unanimity for taxation, we also wanted to make a genuine contribution to the construction of a Union adapted to the challenges it faces.
While the real success of the Nice negotiations can only be assessed by taking the new draft treaty as a whole, before doing so I would like to comment on each inter-related issue in the overall package. A number of the larger member states were concerned about the ability of the Commission to undertake its tasks effectively with 27 or more members. On his tour of capitals, President Chirac had even suggested that a Commission of 12 to 14 members would be the best model to follow. However, from the outset we believed it essential that at the current stage of the Union's development, each member state, particularly new members, would retain the right to nominate a commissioner. We took this position for two reasons. First, we are committed to maintaining a strong Commission which would continue to be the fulcrum for the integration and expansion of the Union. Second, it is essential for the democratic legitimacy of the Union's institutions that national links with the Commission be maintained. Together with a number of partners, Ireland successfully resisted proposals to decide on a limit for the Commission. I argued we could not anticipate the nature of developments in the Union over the next decade and so could not now decide the shape of a suitable Commission. I also argued that, while I have always accepted that a Commission of more than 30 members would be almost impossible to manage, it is only after we have experience of a Commission of 23, 24 or 25 members, acting under the direction of a more powerful President, that we should take a final decision on the appropriate maximum figure.
Against this background, I was very pleased to negotiate the final two-stage model in the draft treaty. First, there will be no change in the size of the Commission until 2005 at which time the larger member states will give up their second commissioner and, second, there will be a review when the Union reaches 27 members. The review will set a cap for the Commission of less than 27. It also provides, most importantly, that any rotation will be on the basis of strict equality among member states. This outcome reflects the position adopted by Ireland that any review should not be overly specific. We were also successful in our aim of significantly strengthening the powers of the Commission President.
I am very satisfied with the outcome on the Commission which guarantees the Irish Government's right to nominate a Commissioner for the next decade or longer, depending on how soon one believes the Union will include 27 states, and to have secured the right to equal rotation, even with the largest member states thereafter.
On the second related Amsterdam left-over, the reweighting of votes, we were open to any new model which would ensure that a qualified majority would require the support of a majority of states and a majority of the Union's popu lation. However, we recognised the importance of this issue for the larger states, particularly Germany, fully accepting that those member states who give up a second Commissioner were entitled to expect appropriate compensation in the form of additional weighting.
As I anticipated, reweighting turned out to be one of the most protracted and difficult parts of the negotiations. For existing member states the issues of absolute and relative weighting were important. A further complication was the need to decide on the voting weights for the applicant states. In Ireland's case, against the background of englargement, whereby all member states were set to lose voting weight, the outcome was very satisfactory. I am particularly pleased we maintained our ranking with Denmark and Finland, each having seven votes out of a total of 345 votes when we reach a Union of 27 states.
In an enlarged EU of 27 or more members, a substantial decrease in the number of areas where unanimity would continue to apply was required, otherwise the day to day business of the Union would grind to a halt. In recognition of this, we adopted a strongly supportive position on the extension of QMV. In advance of Nice we made determined and successful efforts to reduce our list of exceptions to a minimum. As a result, the Union was able to agree to 30 Articles moving to QMV It is worth noting that, although not previously discussed in the Intergovernmental Conference negotiations, we also agreed that in future the appointment of the President of the Commission would be subject to QMV.
However, together with the UK, Sweden and Luxembourg, we continued to insist on retention of unanimity for all aspects of taxation. We took this view because it is simply not possible to ring-fence certain aspects of taxation or to pretend that changes in one area will not have an impact across the board. The right to choose freely how one will be taxed is a fundamental aspect of national sovereignty.
Will the Taoiseach yield?
Yes.
What was the French Presidency's compromise proposal in regard to QMV on taxation?
There were a number of proposals. One of last put forward was that a tax committee would be set up forthwith and would spend the next five years examining all aspects of tax harmonisation and by 2005 would move to the full implementation of that.
(Interruptions.)
Totally.
What was the proposal on QMV?
As Deputy Quinn rightly said, we would be straight into a position after Christmas and for five years we would have rancorous debate on every aspect of tax across every code and area. There were many states in favour of that, even some who might have had different views from others. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Cowen, and I argued against that for a day and a half.
What was the proposal on QMV?
Deputy Bruton, this must be very brief as there is no provision for a question time on—
There is a yield procedure.
That was the proposal, that the outcome of that report would then move to QMV.
That the proposal would be adopted by QMV?
It was a pre-determined outcome. I hope Deputy Bruton is clear on that because it is important. That proposal would have put us straight into a position that would move to a pre-determined outcome in 2005. The conclusion was written, but we spent five years on the debate.
There is a yield procedure in the House. I am entirely in order in using it.
There is a yield procedure to ask one question but not a series of questions. The intervention must be brief, and in a debate on which a time limit applies, it must be extra brief.
I am very pleased to say that we held our line on this despite constant and heavy pressure from the Presidency to accept QMV. I also resisted applying QMV to anti-fraud measures because I genuinely believe that measures to tackle fraud are best adopted and applied on a co-operative basis with the full participation of all member states. The only way to achieve this is by unanimity.
I should also mention that the Intergovernmental Conference agreed to a proposal from Ireland to provide a clear legal base for the Union's social protection committee. We made this proposal to give further momentum to the work begun at Lisbon on social protection and felt that it had complemented the steps taken in relation to social exclusion at Amsterdam. Our proposal in this area is further evidence of the active role which Ireland has taken within the Union. As a mature member state with the Union average GNP per capita, the time has come for us to more actively shape policy in key areas of national interest.
The Amsterdam Treaty includes flexibility provisions for a majority of member states to undertake closer co-operation in specific policy areas. However, no actual flexibility arrangements were ever proposed due to the perceived restrictive nature of the provisions. While we ourselves were not advocates for change in this area, we listened to the concerns of our partners who wished to be able to move forward. Accordingly, I gave my support for an easing of the flexibility arrangements, provided they were used as a last resort only. I also attached particular importance to confirming a role for the Commission and explicitly excluding the Single Market from the scope of closer co-operation. The draft Treaty reflects these concerns and I was satisfied to accept the proposal for eight to remain as the minimum number for participation across the Three Pillars. The Treaty also allows for the implementation of flexibility procedures on the basis of QMV.
As the House will be aware, the Government was cautious in its approach to proposals to extend the application of flexibility unconditionally to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. We believe that the strength of the EU in this area lies in its unity and coherence. Member states have worked hard to develop the CFSP, including the European security and defence policy on the basis of the 15 working together. In the interests of securing an overall package, I accepted that, under certain conditions, closer co-operation could apply to implementation of an already agreed joint action or common position but closer co-operation could not apply to measures having military or defence implications.
As regards the European Parliament, we recognised that all member states had to play their part in accommodating new member states. However, it was imperative that the burden be shared on an equitable basis among member states. The proposal from the European Parliament could have involved a drop to nine MEPs for Ireland and was not acceptable. I argued that an alternative approach, which took account of the need to ensure meaningful representation from all states, was essential. This view prevailed and within a slightly higher ceiling of 732 members, I am satisfied with an outcome that will leave us with 12 MEPs in an enlarged Union. This figure is at the very top of the range signalled in negotiations prior to the summit.
At Nice, we also agreed essentially structural changes to the working methods and composition of the Courts of Justice and of First Instance, the Court of Auditors, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, which will prepare them for an increase in the size of the Union. In the context of the overall agreement, these changes are broadly acceptable to us. Leaders also agreed to a declaration dealing with the process for taking forward issues such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Catalogue of Competencies, the inter-relationship between national parliaments and the Union and the restructuring of the Treaties.
We mandated the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies to initiate preliminary consideration of the agenda and the modalities by which it would be taken forward. At the conclusion of a fully inclusive consultation process there will be a further declaration at the EU Council in December 2001 under the Belgian Presidency which will provide a road map for the work to be carried out by way of preparation for a new conference that will be convened in 2004.
While fully supporting the declaration, we insisted that it should contain specific assurances that it would not provide any additional barriers to the accession of the applicant states.
As to whether a referendum will be required to ratify the Treaty over the coming weeks at Union level, lawyers and linguists will seek to reproduce in precise and consistent legal language the decisions taken at Nice. A decision on the referendum can be taken only on the basis of legal advice when the final text is available and examined in relation to the scope of the current constitutional provisions. As I have already indicated, my feeling is that a referendum will be necessary and I would be happy to put the outcome to the people, even if there is some doubt about whether it is actually required.
In advance of Nice, I met Austrian Chancellor, Mr. Wolfgang Schussel, Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Guy Verhofstadt and French President, Mr. Jacques Chirac, as part of his pre-Nice tour of capitals to discuss the issues arising at the summit. In addition, senior officials in my office maintained close contacts with their counterparts in other capitals in the final run-up to the summit. I also held bilateral meetings with Prime Minister Blair during the summit and maintained close contact with him during the course of the negotiations. In addition to the Intergovernmental Conference, we discussed a range of issues related to Northern Ireland.
The Nice Summit marks the conclusion of the French Presidency. Significant progress was made across a broad range of areas, including the holding of the EU-Balkans Summit in Zagreb, enlargement, the resolution of the long standing tax package and many other issues on which agreement was reached.
On the Intergovernmental Conference specifically, while I admit the negotiations in Nice were exhausting, the issues under discussion were of such fundamental importance for the future of the Union that nobody would have thanked us for taking the necessary decisions lightly or for avoiding difficult issues. President Chirac can feel proud that he managed to broker an agreement among the many competing member state positions.
In line with the new policy of even deeper engagement with the Oireachtas on European affairs, which I announced in November, the Minister for Foreign Affairs will also report on the Nice Treaty to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs at the earliest convenient date.
I would like to thank the Minister, Deputy Cowen, Mr. Noel Dorr, the Government's representative to the Intergovernmental Conference, and all of the staff in the Department of Foreign Affairs and other Departments, including my own, and the Attorney General's office, whose dedicated work over the past year contributed to the successful outcome for Ireland. I would particularly like to thank the staff of those offices, the secretarial staff in particular, who effectively worked for three nights on the trot, with the exception of a few hours. Clerical and secretarial staff who do that should be complimented for their enormous dedication, particularly when it was not expected they would have to work those hours.
While some media reports have cast the Nice outcome as one of victory for Ireland in terms of the retention of the Commissioner, the retention of unanimity on taxation matters, the number of MEPs we secured and the explicit exclusion of military and defence matters from the new enhanced co-operation procedures, I would rather consider the Nice Treaty as a victory for the Union and the applicant states.
Ireland's progressive approach throughout the negotiations, for instance, in areas such as QMV, helped to make a real contribution to the substance of the Nice Treaty and, ultimately, to the construction of a more dynamic Union. While Ireland belongs to the Union, through our shaping of the Union over the last quarter of a century, the people of Ireland can genuinely claim that the Union belongs to them.
When I was Taoiseach and President of the Council of the European Union, I made it clear to all with whom I dealt that I would not accept, in any circumstances, the removal of Ireland's right to a European Commissioner. That right has now been conceded by my successor.
Hear, hear.
That the Taoiseach would have the lack of self-knowledge to quote media reports describing the outcome of Nice as a victory for Ireland, media reports I can only regard as sycophantic, shows how little in touch he is with what he did. He conceded that Ireland, at a point in the determinate rather than the indeterminate future, will have no Commissioner. He will be remembered for that for a long time. He will be remembered for many good things but when the time comes, as it will, that Ireland has no Commissioner for five years, people will remember that it was Deputy Ahern, as Taoiseach, and Deputy Cowen, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sold the pass for Ireland as far as a Commissioner is concerned. It will be for those five years that they will be remembered.
I would not have agreed to that and I speak as someone who is passionately in favour of further European integration and who has no backward look about Ireland pooling its sovereignty with others. I have always believed that it is essential we have a Commissioner and I said so clearly to my friends in the European People's Party and to those of other parties, particularly socialist parties, who were members of the European Council with me. Whatever we would concede, we would not concede that but it has been conceded by my successor.
It was conceded at a time when he also conceded a reduction in the number of MEPs Ireland would have and a proportionate reduction in the number of votes Ireland would have on the Council of Ministers. This is one of the weakest negotiating outcomes achieved by an Irish Government in the European forum since Ireland joined the Union and it is a direct result of the fact that Fianna Fáil has no friends in Europe and has not cultivated any friends in Europe. Fianna Fáil is a party seen as being provisionally in Europe in terms of its emotional commitment.
The Commission loss is a serious blow because the Commission is the originator of all legislative and other proposals. The Commission alone has the power of initiative and initiatives, if they are to be taken in a legal area, must be taken on the basis of a degree of political acceptance. While I am strongly in favour of European federalism I recognise that Europe is a union of states also and that Ireland is one of those states. There will not be the same level of Irish acceptance of proposals emanating from a Commission which has no Irish Commissioner.
That is not the only negative outcome of the compromise accepted in Nice. A time will come when there will be no German Commissioner and 90 million Germans will not be represented by a Commissioner for five years. That will happen as a result of the Nice outcome. It may not be of much concern to those who have presented the outcome as, to use the Taoiseach's quote from a sycophantic media, "a victory for Ireland" but people should reflect on how they expect the European Commission to work in terms of having the support it needs for the institution which has the sole power to take initiatives, the Commission itself, if the largest nation, Germany, is not represented among the 27 Commissioners around the table. There will not be one German Commissioner and, at another time, not one Irish Commissioner. Does anyone believe that would work?
The only way this will work is if the Commission ceases to matter and if we move towards intergovernmentalism. If the Commission is to have the sole power of initiative it must represent everyone. As a result of Nice and its late night compromises, the Commission will now operate, at all times after a date not too far away, on the basis that some countries will not be represented on the Commission. That is not tenable and the only way it will be politically acceptable will be if the Commission ceases to be the influential body it has to be.
The reason for the success of the European Union is the unique institution of the Commission. There is no precedent in constitution building or federations elsewhere for an institution like the Commission. It is a body that is semi-political and semi-non-political, it is representative yet above national politics and it has the sole power of initiative, a power it does not share with anyone else. That is the engine that has made the Union work and by agreeing to a situation in which the Commission will no longer have some countries represented there, the Commission has been eviscerated. That is a very bad day for Europe.
I do not know what kind of self-congratulatory atmosphere people exist in at meetings like this but I do not doubt the Taoiseach sincerely believes he had a triumph in Nice, as does the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will no doubt robustly claim the same. However, they are not living in the real world. It is not realistic to think the Germans will accept a Commission proposal in which there will be no German hand. It is not real to think that Irish people will accept with the same alacrity a Commission proposal in which there is no Irish hand.
It has been truthfully stated that one of the outcomes of Nice was to enhance the position of the bigger States in decision making. As Reuters put it "The main outcome was to increase the weight of the four big countries, Germany, Britain, France and Italy". At a time when the European Union is being enlarged to take in a lot of small countries, some of which already doubt whether they should join, what sense does it make to increase the voting strength of the big countries? Very little.
The Taoiseach may feel, as other Members do, that it was right to make a sacrifice on the Commission and to make a big stand, at least for the optics, on taxation. That was not the right order of priority. The proposal, for instance, to allow QMV in regard to fraud in tax does not threaten anybody. No nation state in the European Union, that is a true European state, would be willing to see its national status used to defraud the revenues of other European treasuries. Why should there not be the possibility of at least majority voting with regard to fraud? Bear in mind that we have had a very expensive tribunal of inquiry in this jurisdiction because our own authorities could not detect fraud in the beef industry. Fraud is widespread in Europe. It undermines the citizen's confidence in the European Union and needs to be acted upon decisively, firmly and vigorously. It should not be possible for one country to prevent the rest of the Union acting on fraud in the tax area, particularly where one country could actually benefit through fraud being committed against the treasuries of other countries. That is why there is a reasonable case for looking favourably enough at the concept that there should be majority rather than unanimity with regard to decisions on tax. If there was a trade-off and the Taoiseach had a choice, to dig his heels in on holding our commissioner or on allowing qualified majority voting in regard to tax fraud and he chose to dig his heels in to require unanimity on majority voting on tax fraud and to sell the pass on the commissioner, then he made the wrong choice. He made the wrong choice for Ireland and Europe and a political mistake of serious magnitude.
That is all I have to say on this matter. I wish to share what remains of my time with Deputy Jim O'Keeffe. However, I am deeply disappointed with this outcome. It would not be fair, although he is the person who is here and has to take the rap, to lay all the blame for this very poor outcome on the shoulders of either the Taoiseach or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. They were only one of 15 delegations present. However, it is obvious that the preparation for the summit by the French Presidency was less than it ought to have been in its thoroughness. It would appear that the French are good at talking but not so good at listening, they do not hear what is said and they produce compromises which, if they had been listening to what had been said, they would know were not compromises at all. That may be to do with internal politics in France over which we have no control here. Be that as it may, this was a bad four days' work.
Today the Taoiseach reports to the House that he is very satisfied with the outcome on the Commission which guarantees the Irish Government's right to nominate a commissioner for the next decade or longer. He tells us that he and his delegation had clear priorities at the Nice Summit "such as the retention of our Commissioner for the foreseeable future". The Taoiseach is revising and rewriting history. What were the priorities established by this Government in relation to Nice? I can only quote his own words. The Taoiseach in a major statement he made in Dublin Castle last month made it quite clear that "in our view, it is essential that we agree at Nice that each member state retain the right to nominate a commissioner." He established the priority in clear and unequivocal terms. How he can now come in and tell us he is satisfied with a result that involves us losing that automatic right, is beyond me. Deputy Bruton also mentioned the issue of other major member states not having the right in the future to nominate a commissioner. That also was covered by the Taoiseach in his Dublin Castle speech. He said "Very frankly, however, I would fear for the authority and credibility of the Commission in a period where, for example, there was no French or German – or, indeed, Polish – Commissioner." These are the words of the Taoiseach. Yet that is the very deal to which he agreed.
My concern is that what came from Nice, from the Irish camp, has been a great deal of posturing, PR effort and phoney wars on issues which were not issues at all. Whether that was purely because the Taoiseach was trying to give the impression of fighting the good fight or because he took his eye off the ball, I am not sure at this stage. However, he requires to give an explanation to the House. I have no doubt that the outcome at Nice was achieved at very considerable cost to this country. There was a cost in the loss of our automatic right to a commissioner and in relation to the European Parliament.
On that matter, apart from the loss of three seats for us, which possibly will focus on Leinster and Munster – I am not sure where the third one will go – before the summit I also asked that particular attention be paid to the situation in Northern Ireland. As of now, although it is not in our quota, there are three seats in Northern Ireland out of the current allocation to the UK. I am concerned that in the reduced allocation to the UK, there should still be three seats in Northern Ireland. We have had no report on that. Do we consider this country at all just beyond our own borders? I asked that that issue be looked at. It has not even been touched on. Has there been any arrangement or discussion with the UK authorities on that issue, which is of importance to this island?
On the question of the cost to us, as a small member state, perhaps the real loss is the dilution of our voting strength at Council of Ministers level. No matter now one dresses it up, there is a huge dilution because there is now a permanent shift in the balance of power at Council of Ministers level, away from the smaller member states like ourselves, to the larger member states. The Taoiseach could explain and defend all these matters but to come back and suggest that this is an outcome for which he deserves an enormous clap on the back is something which I cannot accept.
I am hugely concerned that with the media focus on the great fight on taxation, the reality of the situation was not touched on. That was, in many ways, a phoney war. In a situation where the UK, in particular, made it absolutely clear that it would not, under any circumstances, accept any change on the issue of taxation, how was it that we spent so much time having to focus on that? Having read the international media on this issue, the name of Ireland as a potent issue was only entered in as an afterthought, coat-tailing on the UK. How is it that the Irish media approach was that the Taoiseach was spending his time fighting that issue, when what was happening was that we were building up the huge cost to us on the institutions as already detailed?
I have just one other concern at this stage. The Taoiseach in his speech talks about the unprecedented level of public awareness. I challenge that. Many months ago I pointed out the need for a high level of public awareness because of the probable need for a referendum to ratify any treaty that would be agreed. I challenge the Taoiseach on the issue of public awareness. If one wants to use the phrase "what people are dis cussing before their breakfast", I doubt that qualified majority voting is high on the agenda. My concern is that there is a very low level of awareness, and responsibility for that lies with this Government. The Government should have been aware of the need for a much greater public consultation in a situation where it may be necessary to convince the people that this treaty should be accepted on a constitutional basis.
The Government should have been aware of the need for much greater public consultation, particularly where it may be necessary to convince people that the treaty should be accepted on a constitutional basis. No great marks are due to the Government on its negotiations. It was not a game that was well played.
I wish to share time with Deputy Sargent.
That is agreed.
It gives me no great pleasure to say that what was agreed and conceded by the Taoiseach and the delegation he led, no matter how well intentioned, and I do not doubt the goodness of his intentions, was a travesty. I agree with what has already been said. No doubt the Taoiseach felt under pressure in respect of the real issue. I have said consistently the taxation issue was a Trojan horse, a phoney war, set up to draw the Taoiseach's fire and he gave it all. It was never going to happen. The Taoiseach and I spent time on the ECOFIN Council and we know the strength of feeling about unanimity in respect of taxation. It was a target set up for the Taoiseach to fire at and, having fired successfully, he felt obliged to concede.
Yes.
It was a disaster. That was my first reaction. The Taoiseach could have stopped this. I know, given the isolation of the Taoiseach's party – I say that in a factual rather than an observational or political sense because this is more about the part and parcel of politics – it was a long, hard four days and his staff were under considerable pressure. However, he could have consulted Deputy Bruton who has links as vice-president of the European People's Party or me as vice-president of the Party of European Socialists. He would have had the comfort of knowing in the councils in Nice that he had support for holding the line he enunciated in Dublin Castle. Time will march quickly and we may find ourselves in the future blocking the enlargement beyond 27 so as to ensure member states have a commissioner, but that would not be right. We do not yet know the final legal text of the treaty but a major concession was made which cannot, with the knowledge we have at present, be replaced or put back on the table.
Why the Taoiseach chose to concede on what he recognised was a fundamental issue is inexplic able. He has, in part, built his entire political reputation around his ability to negotiate and extract a good deal when it seemed, on occasion, impossible to find. However, he did not do it in Nice. As a result, not only will Ireland's interests be damaged but those of every small State because the concession made by the Taoiseach and others, which he could have blocked, means that he has irreparably damaged the role and function of the Commission. Therefore, he has damaged the interest of every other country in the European Union, big and small. When history is written about what happened in Nice it will be said that was the point at which the spirit of the founding fathers during the Coal and Steel Treaty, the Treaty of Rome and the unique creation of Schuman, Monnet and De Gasperi was neutered in a particular way. None of us can prophesy the future or determine what the outcome is likely to be but, as a result of what was conceded in Nice, the debate in this country on the future development of Europe will change dramatically. I regret that.
Like Deputy Bruton, I share a passionate commitment to the European project, the idea of enlargement and the construction of a platform of permanent peace in Europe. But it will not come about through some new form of European inter-governmentalism. We have started down that slippery slope. We have been there before. Perhaps in architectural terms, one of the most aesthetic monuments to European inter-governmentalism of the past 300 years stands in the centre of Paris, the Arc d'Triomphe. It was because of the list of battles on that monument and other monuments across continental Europe and on this island, North and South, that the unique role of the Commission became the key stone in that delicate arch that is the European project. I do not know why the Taoiseach conceded or why he was conned into going for the Trojan horse, the phoney target of taxation. But conned he was and I regret that. The time will come when he, too, will regret it.
I am glad the Taoiseach is saying there must be a referendum and that, on balance, he has moved to the Labour Party position, which was not conceded earlier, that irrespective of the legal advice – I have heard the political view expressed professionally and diplomatically by people in the Department of Foreign Affairs giving their personal view that a referendum should not be held unless it is strictly legally necessary – there is now a swing by the Taoiseach, if I detect it correctly, in political terms towards a referendum. This is not over. We do not know if the European Parliament will ratify this treaty. We know that the Belgian and Italian parliaments will refuse to ratify it if it is not ratified by the European Parliament. We have a long way to go on this issue.
There is nothing particularly wrong with a delay other than – this is the difficult position into which the Taoiseach has put people like myself and others who support clarity with respect to enlargement – that it will be a slap in the face to applicant countries, the democratic Governments that are attempting to take the painful path away from command economies not having a tradition of democracy, towards requiring their citizens to climb the very high mountain of acquis communitaire. It is much higher than when we joined the European Union and much more difficult in a globalised economy than anything we had to confront after 1973.
I am torn between the difficulties of ensuring that process of painful and difficult progress, whether it be in Hungary, Poland, Estonia or Slovenia, and am acutely aware of the geo-political position in which those countries find themselves and the imperative they require to convince their citizens to take painful measures. We had that through the 1980s. It is particularly difficult when there is an Opposition that is saying to those people that health cuts hurt the old, weak and sick, which is what is happening in those countries at present. Not every Opposition in every parliament is as constructive as the one the Taoiseach confronts. He has made our task, as well as his position, extremely difficult by the sell out in relation to his declared position in Dublin Castle less than four or five weeks ago. Why did he do it? I would like Deputy Cowen to answer that. I respect the ability of both the Taoiseach and the Minister on this matter and their overall political ability. Yet, it is inexplicable that they agreed to this.
There are many other things in relation to the Intergovernmental Conference and its outcome – we have to await the text to see what precisely is written into it – and, indeed, the summit. Many good things have come from it and I acknowledge those. However, they are absolutely secondary to the core issue of what we are talking about. It is imperative that the Taoiseach clarifies why he conceded on his own declared principle. What does the Taoiseach envisage will now happen? Does the Taoiseach think this treaty will go through right across the 15 member states? Does he expect it to be ratified by the Parliament in Strasbourg? The groups which will decide to ratify it will not be influenced by the voice of Fianna Fáil in the European Parliament, and that for us, in some respects, is a difficulty as well.
I am confident that had the rainbow coalition been in Government, this treaty would not have been accepted by us last weekend. It is an appalling set-back. I am not sure where we will go from here in respect of it. The Taoiseach has created the mess and the difficulty and he has sold his own negotiating standing point. I await with interest to hear his explanation because this is the beginning of a debate the parameters and the profile of which are as yet very unclear. That is not to do injustice to the many other things in the conclusions.
I would say – this is not a reflection on either of the two gentlemen representing the Government or on the people in Iveagh House – that one thing is emerging very clearly, we need much more staff in Iveagh House and much more resources for the Department of Foreign Affairs. We need an accelerated programme of creation of new embassies within the applicant countries which we do not have them. At last we have the resource to do this. The Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs know that I am not making this point for the first time. I am saying, in the light of the major mistake to concede on this point, that the necessity to strengthen and enlarge the resources available to whoever happens to be in Government is an absolute imperative and that has to be informed by a presence in all the capital cities of the applicant countries.
I dtús báire, ba mhaith liom mo bhuíochas a ghabháil le Páirtí an Lucht Oibre agus lena cheannaire, Ruairí Quinn, as ucht a chuid ama a roinnt liom. Given that we have only been able to read the Treaty of Nice in French, the Green Party is not only disappointed but alarmed at the outcome of the Nice Council and the treaty. We are alarmed at the erosion of basic principles such as democracy and transparency, at the increased centralisation of power in a few big countries, at the extension of qualified majority voting and the elimination of Ireland's veto in over 30 new areas and at the beginnings of a two tier Europe because of new flexibility rules allowing sub-groups of states to proceed on certain issues.
The Green Party is, as the House well knows, strongly opposed to the militarisation of the EU, to the development of the European reaction force as a result of the last EU treaty and the establishment of permanent military committees and structures in the EU.
Nice was supposed to assist EU enlargement, correcting the failures in Amsterdam to facilitate the accession of new states. It is not clear how the proposals put forward in Nice will greatly help the EU applicant countries, but they have certainly harmed a number of the current EU members, including Ireland. The real beneficiaries are the big countries, Germany, Britain and France, in particular. The reweighting of votes means that Ireland's voice in the Council of Ministers has been greatly weakened while the big three will be able to form what is effectively, according to yesterday's The Guardian, a directly “able to block virtually anything they want as the enlargement process gets under way”. Meanwhile, not only has Ireland's position been weakened in the Council of Ministers but Ireland will also lose three MEPs in the Parliament and our automatic right to a Commissioner.
This has been an onslaught on democracy. There is already a severe democratic deficit in the EU. Now the EU institutions will be even more remote from the people. The European Parliament, the most democratic institution in the EU, will not only have three fewer MEPs directly elected by the people, but it will not be given co-decision powers for all the new areas to which qualified majority voting has been extended.
The approval of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is also extremely worrying from a civil liberties point of view and is viewed by many as an embryonic constitution for the evolving EU super state, something which the Green Party opposes. The Green Party would be greatly concerned that this charter is undermining the Council of Europe and the Council's European Convention on Human Rights. We believe that instead of reinventing the wheel, the EU should be acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights.
We also believe that the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights is a misnomer. It should be renamed the charter of conditional rights because Article 52 contains a highly dangerous clause negating all the rights that have gone before. The article states that any and all freedoms might be limited, even suspended, in the name of the general interest of the Union. This raises a horrifying spectre.
I wish to reiterate the Green Party's total rejection of the EU's Petersberg Tasks, the rapid reaction force established to carry them out and all the military hardware committee structures that have been put in place by the EU. At what point does crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement turn into warfare? Despite what the Government says, this rapid reaction force is undermining the United Nations. Nowhere in any EU treaty does it state that this force requires a UN mandate. That is because it is not the case.
The Government may say that Irish troops legally require a UN mandate, but lawyers whom we have consulted say that this is highly debatable. The Green Party believes that the Government should insert a protocol into the Nice Treaty, comparable to the one Denmark has in the Amsterdam Treaty, exempting Ireland from involvement in EU military efforts. In addition, we want an amendment to the Constitution stating that Irish troops cannot serve abroad without a UN mandate. Let us make it a constitutional requirement.
We are also very concerned at the influence of NATO on these new EU defence structures. It is interesting that Tony Blair argues that this is not a euro-army being developed because the rapid reaction force will be relying on NATO and can only operate with NATO's permission. This, however, should not be satisfactory to the leaders of a neutral country. I wonder how long it will be before we hear from the Taoiseach what the people from neutral Sweden are now hearing from their Prime Minister that the days of neutrality are numbered.
The Green Party would welcome a referendum on the Nice Treaty. It would be the ultimate in undemocratic behaviour to deny such a referendum. We look forward to putting these issues and many more to the people. Ireland is losing MEPs, its veto and its ability through its MEPs to have an additional say on the qualified majority voting areas which include areas such as international trade agreements covering most services, investments and intellectual property rights, a move which will harm developing countries and increase the destructive tendencies of globalisation. We will be affected by asylum and immigration issues and justice and homes affairs. These issues do not seem to have been given the full airing and debate they need. I hope when the treaty text comes out, we will have more time to debate these issues in greater detail with the full weight and knowledge of legal opinion to deal with them in full.
I thank those who contributed to the debate. I am glad to take up some of the questions which have been raised. Deputy Bruton made the point that he was prepared to veto the Treaty of Nice on the basis that the right to a Commissioner was not being made available for all time. That was his clear position. Deputy Bruton suggests that he knows how to win his friends in Europe on the basis of vetoing the Treaty of Nice on that issue. I would say to him that is probably the most naive comment I have ever heard him make. Even sorrier than that is that Deputy Bruton went on to conduct—
I said that to the people.
I listened intently to what Deputy Bruton had to say.
I said that to the people at the time – back in the 1990s.
The Deputy spoke very highly about his Presidency of the European Council. He had that privilege and the very best of luck to him on that. He also went on to say that the Commission has the sole right of initiative. That is not correct. Whether he is President of the European Council, leader of the Fine Gael Party or vice-president of the European People's Party and thinks that is the situation in relation to the treaties we were negotiating, I am afraid it shows an enormous lack of knowledge about what are the institutional capacities. I will tell him why because it is not the sole right of initiative, it is fundamentally correct. Therefore the Deputy's argument is based on a totally inaccurate assessment and understanding of what is the Commission's capacity or what is the capacity of the Council of Ministers. An initiative can be taken by member states without reference to the Commission. It requires two thirds of the member states and a qualified majority vote procedure for that initiative to be passed by the Council, without any direct input by the Commission. If we are to have a debate on where the Commission goes for the future, let us display some rudimentary understanding and knowledge of the issues. That is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Commission works and its relationship with the Council. On that basis alone, I dismiss Deputy Bruton's argument because he has shown a basic misunderstanding of what the treaties contain. I cannot be more blunt than that. The Deputy is suggesting that by his Europeanism he would win more friends for Ireland by vetoing the Treaty of Nice. That is his contention here in the House because when one strips away the rhetoric and the cant, that is what is left.
We would never have got into the position.
I have simply put to the Deputy the direct consequence of what he had to say. Deputy Quinn said he is torn about the competing instincts he has on this matter. What message would that send to the accession countries, about whom we are claiming to be so mindful, if we vetoed the Treaty of Nice?
It would have shown that small countries count.
No. It would have shown that the euro would tumble and that one had not undertaken—
The Minister—
Allow me to speak. It would have shown that one would not have been able to exercise the collective political will agreed at Helsinki when the Deputy was not present.
The Minister is talking through his hat.
I will tell the Deputy who is talking through their hat. The Deputy has been exposed as talking through his hat. It is a sad day, after such an important European Council which was arranging for the enlargement of the European Union that the Deputy could come in and make the comments he did, based on his political experience. I will say no more about it. I will let the record speak for itself.
It was the Minister who said it.
Let us have a debate on it.
The Minister—
Allow the Minister to continue.
We held a hard negotiating line on each of the elements up for debate, as is our job, throughout the whole intergovernmental conference meeting. We then went to the intergovernmental conference on the basis of the options that were to be put by the Presidency. No country emerged from the Nice negotiations having maintained in every respect every negotiating position they held on all the issues. Had they done so, we would not have a Treaty of Nice. Those are the facts. It is easy when one does not have the responsibility to step back and say to me that this, that and the other was a failure. We take the negotiating package as a whole and as such it was a successful outcome. It had as successful an outcome for Ireland as any other country can claim for itself. More importantly, regardless of whether Members like it, it represents the consensus that was negotiated among those 15 member states in Nice during those four days.
They are not—
That is what it represents. No individual country, including Germany and France, has emerged from the Treaty of Nice with every element of their negotiating strategy intact.
Germany did very well.
I would remind Deputy O'Keeffe that in relation to QMV, it did not do well. One can go through every individual country and I can confirm that disappointment will be expressed by many as to the level of QMV which they obtained, which was not our position. I listened to what Deputy O'Keeffe had to say and if he wants to contend, as is his luxury in opposition, that his Leader would veto the Treaty of Nice on the basis of that issue, that is fine. Let the people know that, it is articulated and understood. I ask the Deputy not to come into the House in the future and talk about his commitment to the European project again because at the end of the day that assessment had to be made in those negotiations.
On what people have said in relation to the Deputy's partners who are heads of state and Deputy Quinn's partners who are heads of state, Socialists or Christian Democrats, the Irish delegation fought that negotiating principle harder than any. The reason was that in the overall consensus that emerged we had to make a decision, as had other member states.
This is republicanism.
If there are people who are prepared to step back and say, "No, we will maintain our own national interest in every respect, regardless of the common European interest that emerges in the consensus", that is fine. They have that luxury. Let there be no doubt that the Commission did not hold to the position articulated by us throughout these negotiations. We have fought tooth and nail a rearguard action from many states and the Commission on this issue. People wonder why we did not get an outcome that would not prejudge the review. At the end of the day we ended up at a position where we had to look at the whole negotiating package available to us. That is the political reality. There was an alternative in relation to the Benelux question where Guy Verhofstadt negotiated tremendously well for his interest. At the end of the day a compromise had to be reached and the Belgian delegation decided to go forward on that issue. They were very disappointed on QMV issues, for example. Let us not suggest that on the one hand there are ten small member states all with a common interest in every issue and on the other there is the big five. That is not the reality.
That is—
If Deputy Stagg attended some of the debates he would know this. At the last Question Time I confirmed to Deputy O'Keeffe that that analysis was wrong. Of course we have allies in large states on major issues of national interest. The suggestion that it is ten minnows against five giants suits the media presentation of events, but those of us who have had the privilege of representing Ireland in the negotiations know that is not the case. We can pander to a stereotype or we can deal with the facts. Overall we got a package which was part of a consensus that was hard won. Let nobody be in any doubt that it could have gone either way.
(Interruptions.)
It was never a case of the influence of Ireland being determined by three out of 87 or three out of 132 if we had reweighting of votes, or now seven out of 339. It is based on the goodwill we generate by reason of the position we hold. It is based on trying to reach common positions which, of course, involve defending national interests, but are not exclusively so. I look forward to the new year when we can debate this matter in greater detail. I look forward also to the debate on Friday on the foreign affairs committee. It is about recognising that a historic commitment was made at Helsinki, that a commitment was re-emphasised in Biarritz, a decision had to be made and an outcome reached. It was not one of the prettiest negotiations in the world. People can have their discussions about to what extent—
It was not a victory.
It was a victory for the European interest which has emerged. We have never claimed, as others have, that it is Ireland in isolation from Europe. I ask Deputy Quinn not to be torn. I met an ambassador from one of the candidate countries this morning and they are satisfied and happy that the European Union 15 rose to the challenge to enable acceleration of the accession process to take place where peace, democracy and human rights might flourish in a much greater part of the European Union than is currently the case.