Vol. 551 No. 4
2 Mr. Stagg asked the Minister for Public Enterprise if the RPII has received information from the British authorities to satisfy it that the high level liquid radioactive waste stored in tanks at Sellafield can withstand a major terrorist attack; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [10692/02]
I refer the Deputy to my reply to the broadly similar Question No. 54 on 12 February 2002, in which I pointed out that while the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland did not receive any evidence from British Nuclear Fuels that the high level liquid waste storage tanks can withstand a major terrorist attack, BNFL assured it that the tanks are robust enough to endure such an attack.
Following approaches made to the UK authorities on behalf of my Department seeking infor mation on the consequences of a major terrorist attack on Sellafield, the UK Department of Trade and Industry recently conveyed an offer whereby the director of its Office for Civil Nuclear Security is prepared to meet the RPII in London to explain the processes which that office follows to assess the terrorist threat, evaluate the vulnerabilities and develop effective counter measures. In conveying this offer, the UK Department of Trade and Industry emphasised that it is not in a position to provide details of security measures being taken at nuclear sites as it is not British Government policy to disclose such details. My Department is considering the offer. While it falls short of what we sought, I regard it as a welcome development and my Department intends to respond positively to it.
I welcome the progress indicated by the Minister of State. However, we should continue to raise this issue in support of the Minister of State's actions. Does he agree that while the pernicious drip-drip of radioactive pollution into both the atmosphere and sea from Sellafield is entirely unacceptable, the very real danger of a catastrophe arises from the unnecessary storage at the plant of large amounts of highly active liquid waste in over ground tanks connected to one another by overhead pipes? Does he agree that an additional danger arises from the fact that these tanks must be continuously cooled, failing which they would explode probably causing a chain reaction? The effect of such an explosion would be in the region of 1,000 times stronger than the Chernobyl explosion.
Does he further agree that we must persist in pressing the British authorities to hasten the vitrification process whereby this highly radioactive liquid waste is turned into a form of glass which can be stored safely without the risks associated with the highly liquid gas? What further action beyond that outlined does he propose to take?
I totally agree with the Deputy's comments and I will be happy to comply with his exhortations to continue to press the UK authorities to ensure these tanks of high level radioactive waste in liquid form are vitrified. We have repeatedly informed the UK authorities of our major concerns about the storage of this liquid waste in tanks, most recently this week at an international journalists' seminar in London where I met the British Minister responsible for energy, Brian Wilson, and emphasised our demands in this regard. We will continue to demand the completion of the process of vitrification which renders this very dangerous material into a safer mode for storage. It is taking too long and we have exhorted the UK authorities to expedite the process in order that the entire contents of their storage tanks will be vitrified long before the deadline date of 2015. We have urged them to introduce extra lines with a view to expediting the process and we will continue to do so.
Will the Minister of State press the British authorities to set a date for the removal from the Sellafield site of reprocessed waste given that this has not been done despite the obligation of the British authorities under an international agreement to return it to its country of origin – in this case primarily Germany and Japan? Does he agree that the Sellafield issue is a persistent bone of contention between two otherwise friendly countries? Will he, therefore, exert political pressure on the British authorities to close the plant as a senior Norwegian Government Minister recently demanded and thus remove this bone of contention between our countries?
The Deputy's comments almost exactly match my words in London earlier this week. I informed my British colleague that the friendly relations between our two countries act as a global role model in terms of the peace we achieved on the island through the Good Friday Agreement and all that has emanated from it in terms of interaction and the other great work that is being done. Sellafield is the one area on which we are in disagreement. This must come to an end and through the UK realising the severity and seriousness of our concerns and responding to our demand to cease activities at Sellafield.
