Vol. 592 No. 4
55 Mr. Timmins asked the Minister for Defence the position on the request from the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, to supply troops to the EU battle group concept; and ifhe will make a statement on the matter. [29186/04]
I find the term "battle groups" misleading. At the European Council in Helsinki in 1999, member states set a headline goal that by 2003, co-operating together and voluntarily, they would be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks as set out in the Amsterdam treaty. These tasks range from humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management operations, including peacemaking. This included inter alia a capability to provide rapid response elements, available and deployable at high readiness. The EU’s ambition to be able to respond rapidly to emerging crises is a key objective of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. Having learned from historical experiences in the Balkans and Africa, the EU wants to be able to react faster when crises develop. Last year this was illustrated by the EU’s first autonomous military operation conducted in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The operation, undertaken at the request of the UN Secretary General and deployed in rapid circumstances, was successful in contributing to the stabilisation of the security environment and the improvement of humanitarian conditions in Bunia.
During his visit to Dublin on 14 and 15 October, the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, underlined the extent to which he believes regional organisations, such as the EU, can contribute to the UN's requirements in crisis management. At the Forum on Europe on 14 October, Mr. Annan specifically welcomed the development of EU capabilities in the context of European Security and Defence Policy. He stressed how important strengthened EU capacities, in particular rapid deployment capabilities, are to the UN. The following day, at an event in McKee Barracks, Mr. Annan paid tribute to Ireland's contributions over the years to the UN. He also highlighted Ireland's key role during our EU Presidency term in promoting co-operation between the EU and the UN in crisis management, and in particular the possible use of EU rapid response elements to support UN peacekeeping operations.
Given our long tradition of participation on UN peacekeeping operations, Ireland can make a positive contribution to EU rapid response elements. At yesterday's Cabinet meeting, the Government agreed that I should advise my EU counterparts of Ireland's preparedness to enter into consultations with partners with a view to participation in rapid response elements. A detailed analysis of the implications for an Irish contribution to a rapid response element is ongoing and will continue over the coming months. It will cover policy considerations such as potential costs, legislative aspects, questions relating to potential multilateral partners and deployability aspects. In addition, other aspects such as training and interoperability with potential partners will be analysed. Following completion of the necessary analysis, I will return to Cabinet with proposals regarding the level of such participation. Ireland's participation in such rapid response elements will remain subject to the usual requirements of a Government decision, Dáil approval and UN authorisation.
From the Minister's reply, I take it that the Government has agreed in principle to participate in the so-called battle groups. I agree it is an unfortunate term but one that will stick. The Government will analyse the arrangements to see how many Army personnel, and in what form, can be contributed to this scheme. Under the UN standby arrangements system, UNSAS, Ireland has 850 Army personnel on standby for UN operations. Will this figure be extended for the EU battle group scheme? Will changes to legislation be necessary to facilitate our involvement in these battle groups? The Defence Forces have said that for Irish troops to train on foreign soil may require legislative change.
I am glad the Government has taken this decision as it is important that Ireland makes a contribution in this area. It should in no way be clouded by reference to the existing system of Dáil and Government approval for UN mandates. However, we must return to that issue later. Battle groups will consist of 1,500 personnel. If Ireland cannot provide that number in personnel, will the contribution be made through speciality fields such as signalling, artillery or transport in conjunction with another country? Will Ireland enter into negotiations with another EU member state on this matter?
I have a detailed note from the Department on the issue of legislative change which I will forward to Deputy Timmins. There are no plans to increase the number of personnel on standby from 850. We have not yet entered discussions with other EU member states as this concept was only formulated last June at the European Council. Some member states have been quick to signal their availability. However, Ireland still has a number of questions on the matter. My Department has raised questions with the EU civil service in Brussels and our EU counterparts, such as Finland and Sweden. Clear answers must be given to these questions. Other aspects will also be taken into consideration such as the need for legislative change, extra costs and with which country or countries should we link up. I will inform my fellow Defence Ministers of this in Brussels next Monday. If Ireland participates in this scheme, every request for troops to join a battle group will be decided by, the Government on a case-by-case basis and the triple lock will continue to apply.
56 Mr. Sherlock asked the Minister for Defence if he was requested by the UN Secretary General during his recent visit to provide troops for deployment in Iraq; if so his response to this request; the types of activities in which troops may be involved in Iraq; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [29185/04]
59 Mr. Connolly asked the Minister for Defence if a request has been received from the UN for Defence Forces personnel to serve in a peacekeeping capacity in Iraq; if consideration to the deployment of Defence Forces is being given; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [29357/04]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 56 and 59 together.
No request has been received from the UN for the provision of Defence Forces personnel for the UN assistance mission in Iraq. The question of deploying Defence Forces personnel to Iraq will not be considered at this time.
During the UN Secretary General's visit to Ireland last month, we discussed the security situation in Iraq and the difficulties this was creating for the UN assistance mission there. We both recognised the need for a much, expanded UN operation to support the rebuilding of Iraq. The UN Secretary General expressed the view that it would be difficult to mount an expansion of the UN mission in Iraq in the absence of greater security and stability in the region. The barbarous events of recent days have extended the timeframe in which it will be possible to reach stability.
In the event of the situation stabilising and becoming more secure with an expanded UN peace support mission with an appropriate Security Council resolution, the Government would consider a request from the UN for troops. Such consideration would be treated like all requests for support and the response would be within available resources and capabilities. Any deployment would be subject to the triple lock mechanism involving UN authorisation, Government and Dáil approval.
During his recent visit here the UN Secretary General asked the Minister to provide Irish troops for deployment in Iraq. Has the matter been discussed at Cabinet level and can the Minister assure the House that any decisions will require what he referred to as the triple lock? Does the triple lock refer to the Department and the Dáil or whatever? Will the Minister please explain what it means?
Triple lock means that three elements must be satisfied before we commit troops on a foreign peacekeeping, peacemaking or humanitarian mission. First, the Government must decide that it is appropriate to commit the troops; second, both Houses must authorise it after debate in the Dáil and the Seanad; third and very important, it must be a UN-established mission. It is not sufficient that it be a mission supported by the majority of UN countries or that it has widespread support within the United Nations. It must be established by the United Nations and for that to happen, the Security Council, which consists of five members, must decide unanimously that it will proceed. If any country vetoes it, the mission is no longer deemed to be established by the United Nations and the triple lock will come into play.
We have not discussed this at Cabinet because the situation remains hypothetical. I spoke generally to Kofi Annan and we agreed that the situation in Iraq is depressing and out of control. Kofi Annan said that the United Nations has a mission in Iraq to help the country claw its way back to some form of democracy. If the mission is successful, some form of democracy is established in Iraq and some form of stability or relative stability returns, the United Nations might decide that it would be desirable to send in a peacekeeping force. If that stage were reached, and the United Nations so decided, and the Government had to decide whether to contribute to that peacekeeping force, it would discuss the decision at Cabinet.
If that request were made, how would the deployment of Irish troops in Iraq differ from the role of Defence Forces in other UN peacekeeping missions? What is the Minister's view of the latest US offensive in Falluja?
It would not differ to any degree from present peacekeeping missions. The idea of peacekeeping is to keep the peace and to keep warring factions apart.
If the request came to send troops into Iraq, what would the Minister do?
If the United Nations made such a request, the Cabinet would decide on it. The Cabinet studies various factors to inform such decisions, for example, how many troops are requested, how many are available, whether a peacekeeping mission at that time would achieve the desired result and whether it is the most appropriate response. It would also consider the degree of risk to our own troops. That is important and would weigh heavily with the Cabinet.
Did the Deputy ask another question?
What are the Minister's views on the latest US offensive in Falluja?
That does not arise under the terms of the question as asked.
I thought the Minister would be more clear in his answer. If the request came and went to Cabinet, what would he do? Will the Minister please tell the Dáil what his views are on the deployment of troops to Iraq at this time?
There is no question of deploying troops to Iraq at this time. I thought I made that clear. There is no question of deploying troops to Iraq on a peacekeeping mission at this time. Kofi Annan admitted that to me. He said it may take several years for the situation to stabilise sufficiently to justify the United Nations making a request to supply troops to Iraq. At that hypothetical time in the future, if the situation were sufficiently stabilised and the request were to be made, the Cabinet would decide on the basis of the criteria I have outlined.
My views on the war in Iraq are well known and well ventilated in the public domain. I did not agree with unilateral action in Iraq and that remains the position.
In that hypothetical situation, which may not be too far away, does the Minister agree that any peacekeeping in Iraq would be classified as high risk from an Irish point of view in contrast with the previous low-risk peacekeeping in Cyprus, Croatia, Bosnia, Lebanon and Liberia? Does he agree that people from the West, especially those who speak English, which would include Irish people, are perceived as or equated with US and UK invasion forces? Ireland effectively facilitated the US by allowing troops to land at Shannon Airport, so much so that the US Government named Ireland as part of the "coalition of the willing".
Does the Minister agree that Iraqi resistance would regard Ireland and its UN peacekeeping troops as hostile and we would be committing them to enter what the fanatics have called "the gates of hell"? Does he share the concerns of the families of these peacekeepers? What are his concerns? He should voice his concerns at Cabinet and should enter into talks with Defence Forces personnel in the event that they are called upon. Under what circumstances would the Minister consider a commitment of Irish troops to a UN peacekeeping force in Iraq?
The Deputy is talking about a hypothetical situation which might not ever occur.
It might not be that hypothetical.
I do not share the Deputy's view that it is just around the corner. Anybody who glances even cursorily at the stories about Iraq in the newspapers or elsewhere in the media knows that if ever the United Nations wanted to send troops, it would be a long way into the future. It would be madness for the United Nations to send in troops and expose them to risk in the present situation in Iraq. They would simply be lambs to the slaughter. The level of risk at a time in the future when such a request would come will have to be assessed.
I have already outlined to Deputy Sherlock and the House the yardsticks the Government uses in deciding whether to commit troops to the peacekeeping mission. Primary among those is the level of risk and danger to which we expose troops. I cannot answer Deputy Connolly's question about whether it would be riskier in Iraq than in the other areas he listed to which we traditionally sent our troops because I do not know what the situation in Iraq will be at this hypothetical time in the future when such a hypothetical request might be made. It would depend on the situation there at the time.
Does the Minister regard the US forces there at the moment as peacekeeping forces?
No. Let us be clear on this. Our position on peacekeeping is that we do not get involved in military alliances or mutual defence pacts. We get involved in peacekeeping when the United Nations establishes a peacekeeping mission and when the Government decides and the Oireachtas authorises. There is no question of the United Nations having authorised what is happening in Iraq at the moment. Obviously I do not regard the present American activities in Iraq as peacekeeping.
57 Aengus Ó Snodaigh asked the Minister for Defence his views and the evidence he has reviewed on the question of whether to issue less lethal weapons to the Defence Forces. [28805/04]
The issue of less lethal weapons for use by the Defence Forces was previously raised by, the Deputy in a parliamentary question on 19 October 2004. As I informed the Deputy in my reply to that question, the introduction of less lethal weapons for use by the Defence Forces in the course of aid to their civil power duties is the subject of ongoing consideration in my Department. The issue remains under consideration and no decision has yet been made.
As I previously explained to the Deputy, the consideration of the use of a limited less lethal capacity by the Defence Forces follows the proposal of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, noted by Government in November 2002, to authorise the introduction of a limited range of less lethal weapons for use by the Garda emergency response unit where this is necessary to avoid the use of firearms. The less lethal weapons for use by the emergency response unit are the bean bag shot, a pepper spray device and a ferret pepper spray shot. Any decision to introduce less lethal weapons for use by the Defence Forces acting in aid to the civil power will be on the basis that the capabilities of the Defence Forces in this area will not exceed those of the Garda emergency response unit. Should a decision be taken to provide the Defence Forces with less lethal weapons, the lead will be taken from the Garda Síochána. We will provide the Defence Forces with the same weapons and they will deploy them only when acting in aid to the civil power in the same limited situations that the Garda intends to use them.
The Defence Forces have recently conducted evaluation tests on 40 mm bean bag ammunition. I await receipt of the evaluation report when a decision will be made on whether to proceed with the purchase of a small amount of such ammunition with which the Defence Forces can provide a graduated response acting in aid to the civil power while adhering to the principle of absolute minimum force at all times.
The Minister should be aware that the use of less lethal weapons on this island by military forces acting as a so-called aid to the civil power is a very controversial and emotive issue. Their use has resulted in the deaths of 17 Irish people in the Six Counties, eight of whom were children. There have been many more serious injuries and deaths throughout the world due to these weapons. As we know, these weapons are open to abuse. Last month, an unarmed female sports fan was killed by police in Boston, using so-called less lethal pepper spray, a weapon that the Garda have been authorised to use and which is being looked at by the Department of Defence. The PSNI have regularly used this same CS type spray in attacking nationalists in Derry in recent months.
In deciding to consider the introduction of these weapons for use by the Defence Forces against the Irish population, the Minister potentially has a major human rights issue on his hands. Has he consulted the human rights commission on this issue? Has he looked at the research compiled by the Pat Finucane Centre or the Committee on the Administration of Justice regarding the experience of people in the Six Counties at the receiving end of these weapons? Will he talk to those who have been injured and the relatives of those who have been killed? What human rights training and protocols for the use of these weapons is the Minister considering? The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has so far refused to publish the guidelines for their use. I hope the Minister for Defence will take the bold step to publish the guidelines if he makes the decision to purchase these.
I would have thought that this was a step in the direction of protecting human rights rather than the opposite. We are taking our lead from the emergency response unit of the Garda Síochána. Only lethal weapons such as guns and ammunition are currently available to the emergency response unit. We are trying to provide non-lethal weapons to replace those.
They are lethal weapons.
I will take my chances of being hit by one of those things rather than by live ammunition. Maybe the Deputy has more experience in these matters than I have. That is my information.
I doubt it. The Minister plays with guns every week.
When the Defence Forces are acting in aid of the Garda in maintaining order, we need a graduated response. At one level, we can give them batons and at the other level we can give them guns and live ammunition. There is a huge gap between the two methods of maintaining order. We are trying to find something in the middle. We are in the process of evaluating some of this material at the moment. To what extent it has the capacity to kill or seriously injure people will be considered. In any case, the Defence Forces will not go down this road unless the Garda lead, because the Defence Forces will only use these weapons in aid of the civil power, which is the Garda Síochána.
If a range of new weaponry is introduced for people who are sent out to maintain order, they have to be trained properly in the use of those weapons. They will be properly trained. I am not aware of the dialogue on publishing guidelines between the Deputy and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I will talk to my people in the Department of Defence on publishing the guidelines. Unless there is something of which I am not aware, I do not have any objection to publishing guidelines in these matters. People are being trained to use certain weapons that I hope are non-lethal, in aid of the civil power. How we train them is certainly a matter of public interest and I readily concede that.
Will the Minister publish the list of weapons the Defence Forces are investigating and the findings on whether they are acceptable or not? Other jurisdictions have done so.
I will do that.
58 Mr. Timmins asked the Minister for Defence the amount of funding his Department receives from the banks for providing defence security for cash in transit; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [29187/04]
614 Mr. Durkan asked the Minister for Defence the number of cash transport escorts provided by the Defence Forces in the past 12 months; the costs involved and the degree to which the Exchequer was reimbursed by the financial institutions; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [29273/04]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 58 and 61 together.
To aid the civil power is among the roles assigned to the Defence Forces. This means to assist when requested, the Garda Síochána, which has the primary responsibility for law and order, including the protection of the internal security of the State. In this regard, the Defence Forces assist the Garda as required in duties which include escorting cash deliveries to banks, post offices and other institutions. An annual contribution of €2.86 million is paid by the banks for army escorts. This figure was set by the Department of Finance in the 1995 budget and has not been altered since. The contribution from the banks was designed to partially cover the total costs to the State of providing cash escorts. At that time, the contribution covered approximately 72% of the total cost arising to the Defence Forces, which includes pay and allowances. Based on annual costing by my Department, the relative level of the contribution has fallen in real terms over the years to the situation where it now only covers 43% of the total costs. My Department is currently in communication with the Irish Bankers Federation with a view to increasing the contribution.
The total cost of the provision by the Defence Forces of assistance to the Garda Síochána in protecting movements of cash for the years 2000-03 including pay, allowances, transport and aerial surveillance, was as follows. It was €5.7 million in 2000, €6.58 million in 2001, €6.87 million in 2002, €6.64 million in 2003. These costs related to the following numbers of requested escorts. There were 2,285 in 2,000, 2,488 in 2001, 2,516 in 2002 and 2,335 in 2003. For the first nine months of 2004, approximately 1,825 escorts took place. In any given month, approximately 1,592 army man-days are expended on these escorts.
Is there evidence showing a significant threat to the movements of cash and to the security of our prisons, proving that it is still necessary to have these operations of aid to the civil power? These were set up following the difficulties we had in Northern Ireland. Has the threat been re-assessed? Does the Minister believe we should look at the concept of withdrawing the military support for these operations?
I know it is not the populist line to take and that most people believe the banks should pay for everything, but part of the Department's mission statement is to protect the security of the State. In a democratic society, there is an onus on the democratic authority to provide a secure environment so that economic activity can take place. This will go contrary to the populist view that the banks should pay because they are not the most popular at the moment. However, I have concerns that as we originally went down this road we will not know where to stop. What happens if the equivalent of a Don Tidey operation occurs again, where someone is kidnapped and the security forces have to carry out checks? Should the company then have to pay for that kind of operation? Could we be faced with a situation where if people can pay for it they can have it, but if they cannot then they will not?
I see the point the Deputy is making. The security forces came into this back in 1978 following a significant robbery in Limerick. It was felt necessary to involve the security forces because of the fear of large sums of cash falling into the hands of paramilitary groups and terrorists. I agree with Deputy Timmins that the threat has receded somewhat. There are mixed views on whether the protection scheme is still necessary. Some people argue that dangers still exist and difficulties will recur if the banks have to rely on their own resources.
I understand Deputy Timmins's argument that the banks should be expected to contribute. They never agreed in principle that they should contribute, but the 1995 budget more or less forced them to make a contribution, which has never been increased. I appreciate that the State has a vested interest in this regard, as it does not want large cash sums to fall into the hands of undesirables, particularly paramilitaries. If the State did not provide this protection the banks would have to pay for it, which could be extremely costly. The banks are direct beneficiaries. Their initial contribution was 72% of the total cost to the State, but it has fallen to 43% because the relevant sum has not increased since 1995.
The Deputy is aware that the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform also provides protection. The annual contribution given to the Department was set at approximately €950,000 in 1995, but that figure was recently increased to €3 million, or over 90% of the total cost, when an agreement was reached by the banks and the Department. It was felt, not unreasonably, that the banks should be asked to increase their contributions because they benefit substantially from the protection scheme. They receive 80% of the benefit and the post offices receive 20% of it. I will have preliminary discussions with the banks on the issue this evening. I hope the matter can be finalised in the next week.
