Billy Timmins
Question:89 Mr. Timmins asked the Minister for Defence the situation with respect to Irish troops participating in the EU battle groups; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [1766/05]
Priority Questions.
Overseas Missions.
John Gormley
Question:91 Mr. Gormley asked the Minister for Defence if he plans to abandon the triple lock, amend the Defence Acts or seek amendment of the Constitution to facilitate Ireland’s participation in the EU battle groups or other military arrangements; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [1763/05]
Joe Sherlock
Question:93 Mr. Sherlock asked the Minister for Defence if he wants Irish soldiers to join the European Union’s proposed rapid reaction battle groups; if he is still committed to the policy of not joining any military force not mandated by the United Nations; if he intends taking proposals to the Cabinet on this issue; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [1765/05]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 89, 91 and 93 together.
I refer Deputies to my reply to the House on this subject on 17 November 2004. The position remains as I outlined at that time. The background to the rapid response elements concept, commonly referred to as battle groups, is that at the European Council in Helsinki in 1999, member states set themselves a headline goal that "by the year 2003, cooperating together and voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty". In short, they are humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management operations, including peacemaking. This included, inter alia, a capability to provide “rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness”. The ambition of the EU to be able to respond rapidly to emerging crises has and continues to be a key objective of the development of the European security and defence policy.
The EU has learned from historical experience in the Balkans and Africa and wants to be able to react more quickly when crises develop. This was effectively illustrated last year by the EU's first autonomous military operation, which was conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The operation, undertaken at the request of the United Nations Secretary General and which deployed in rapid circumstances, was successful in contributing to the stabilisation of the security environment and the improvement of humanitarian conditions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Deputies will recall that during his visit to Dublin in October 2004, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stressed the importance of battle groups and requested Ireland's support for them.
As I indicated in my reply to the House on 17 November, at the Cabinet meeting of 16 November, the Government agreed that I should advise my EU counterparts of Ireland's preparedness to enter into consultations with partners with a view to potential participation in rapid response elements. A military capabilities commitment conference was held on 22 November 2004 at which member states committed up to 13 battle group formations which will be available to deploy to crisis situations within a five to ten day period from 2005 onwards. The five to ten day period begins from the date of a decision by the European Council to launch an operation. However, it is to be expected that a crisis would normally have a longer gestation period during which the UN Security Council would have sufficient opportunity to decide on a UN mandate.
To fully assess the implications associated with such participation, I have established an interdepartmental group which includes representatives of my Department, the Defence Forces, the Taoiseach's Department, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General's office. This group met in December and has established three subgroups to address the policy, legislative and operational issues arising. The work of these subgroups will span some months because the rapid response elements concept is still evolving and a complete picture of all other member states' proposed involvement is not yet available. Following completion of the necessary analysis I intend returning to Government with proposals regarding the level of any proposed participation by Ireland.
The House must bear in mind the Defence Forces are in Liberia in a UN operation, in Kosovo in a NATO-led operation and in Bosnia in a EU-led operation, and that rapid response elements are but one aspect of EU capabilities to assist in crisis management. The rapid response concept raises many issues, not alone for Ireland but also for other EU member states. I again stress that the question of Ireland's participation in rapid response elements will remain subject to the usual requirements of a Government decision, Dáil approval and UN authorisation and I have no plans to change this.
On behalf of myself and our party leader, Deputy Kenny, I thank the Minister for facilitating us to visit Irish troops in KFOR over the Christmas period. I am a little confused by the Minister's answer. My understanding following the last time Defence questions were answered was that the Cabinet had given permission in principle for an examination of the concept of joining the battle groups. The Minister has now stated that he would recommend to Cabinet the level of any assistance which Ireland might give. Will he confirm to the House that Ireland has not decided in principle to join these battle groups? Fine Gael believes that Ireland should join them.
He referred to the military capabilities commitment conference held on 22 November in Brussels where approximately 13 different formations were drawn up by 20 countries. Cyprus is hardly a wet week as a member of the EU and it is a small nation, yet it has given a commitment to a niche involvement. Is this not a cause of embarrassment for the Minister for Defence at meetings of the Council of Ministers or for the Taoiseach when he attends the Heads of State meetings? Ireland is a member of a club whose benefits it has enjoyed for almost 30 years, yet it is not willing to give something in return.
This relates to the evolution of peacekeeping. The Brahimi report outlined how the UN no longer has the wherewithal to carry out these operations and that they would need to be contracted out to regional organisations. Where better to go than to the EU and who better to participate than the Irish? Is it the Minister's view that Ireland should participate in these battle groups? If so, what legislative change will be necessary? Is the Government committed to bringing forward this required change in the legislation to allow training on foreign soil or to permit other armies to come here? In 2001, the Minister's predecessor stated that if a change in the legislation were required, it would be done. Is this still the Government's view? Fine Gael firmly believes that Ireland should participate.
On a final point, much confusion was caused over Christmas by the Taoiseach's office and the Minister's office as to whether a UN mandate was required. Does the Minister agree that while the triple lock may be an emotive issue, we in this country treat the UN in the same way as a dysfunctional family uses a comfort blanket and the time has come to make decisions for ourselves on a case by case basis?
As I informed the House previously and as I repeated today, the Cabinet decided on 16 November that at the meeting in Brussels, I should advise my EU counterparts of Ireland's preparedness to enter into consultations with our EU partners with a view to potential participation in rapid response elements. That was the decision taken. There was no decision taken to join the rapid response elements but the decision was taken to consult our EU partners to see whether Ireland could participate in such a concept and to determine what obstacles lay in the way.
Deputy Timmins refers to other countries such as Cyprus. With all due respects to Cyprus and any other countries that have signed up as part of the battle group concept, if one looks at the size of their populations and economies, I doubt if they have put as much as Ireland into peacekeeping over the past 50 years. As I stated, Irish forces are deployed in Liberia, Kosovo and Bosnia. The contribution made by Irish forces to United Nations peacekeeping missions over the past 50 years has been second to none and, regardless of whether we participate in the rapid reaction force, that will not change. Participation in rapid reaction units is only one way in which we can contribute to world peacekeeping. That is the position.
The position in the Department is that there are a number of obstacles. Deputy Timmins asked me directly if I was prepared to abandon the triple lock mechanism. I read his party's interesting paper on neutrality. I do not agree with his statement that the triple lock is a political or other type of straitjacket. If we had to abandon the triple lock to enter into the rapid reaction arrangement, I would not be prepared to make that sacrifice.
The Department, in conjunction with other Departments, is seeking to determine if we can participate meaningfully within the parameters of the triple lock mechanism. This will depend on a number of factors, not primarily the Defence Act. It will depend, for example, on how the United Nations reforms its procedures, a process which is under way. The primary issue will be whether a Security Council decision can be obtained more quickly than at present. This is the main obstacle from the point of view of the triple lock. Something will have to happen on those lines before we would even contemplate looking at our legislation.
Does the Minister agree that the United Nations is not so much a comfort blanket as the basis of international law? On what legal basis is the triple lock founded? Does the Minister agree that section 2(1) of the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1960 does not state that service outside the State by Defence Forces contingents can only be with a United Nations force but stipulates instead that service with a United Nations force can only be pursuant to a resolution of the Dáil? Will the Minister be clear on this? While I support the triple lock, I want to know its legal basis and the legal advice available to the Minister on it.
With regard to the implications of the new EU constitution, Article 40.2 is clear. It states:
The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.
That is one aspect. The crucial point, however, is the clear statement in Article 40.7 that: "Until such time as the European Council has acted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, closer cooperation shall be established, in the Union framework, as regards mutual defence." Is it not clear that involvement in closer co-operation as regards mutual defence is not compatible with the triple lock the Minister claims he does not want to abandon?
I agree with the Deputy's sentiments regarding the United Nations. With regard to the legal basis of the triple lock, my advice from the Attorney General is that this is contained in the corpus of defence legislation, namely, the relevant Defence Acts. I do not have the detailed legal advice to hand but I undertake to the Deputy to obtain it and forward it to him.
As the campaign on the draft EU constitution has not yet started, Deputy Gormley has started his early.
I am simply asking a question.
There is no doubt the advice I have received will be debated in various fora throughout the country. A Cabinet sub-committee on European affairs is examining the terms of the draft EU constitution. The advice we have is that the triple lock is perfectly consistent with signing up to the section of the draft EU constitution containing the concept of common or mutual defence. Deputy Gormley probably does not accept it but that will be a subject for debate during the campaign on the EU constitution.
If the Minister for Defence wants Irish soldiers to join the EU's proposed rapid reaction battle groups and if he is still committed to the policy of not joining any military force not mandated by the United Nations, he must clarify recent comments that he intends to bring proposals to Cabinet. What proposals will he bring to Cabinet? What are the precise legal and constitutional issues he has identified? How will these changes affect the triple lock procedure?
I am committed to the triple lock as it stands. On the proposals I will bring to Cabinet, as I said, we have set up a group which is divided into three subgroups to consider all the issues on participation in rapid reaction units. I will take the conclusions of those groups to Cabinet where we will discuss them. That is the position. People have asked if we should make a decision on this immediately. At the conference in Brussels, some countries talked about committing by 2010. That did not indicate a great urgency. The only agreements at present are for battle groups set up by framework countries where a battle group would come from one country.
On multi-operational measures, where a number of countries are involved, I am advised that they will not get off the ground until approximately 2007 at the earliest. There is no great compelling urgency about this. We are performing our functions of peacekeeping and peacemaking on behalf of the United Nations in missions established or authorised by it as we have always done. This is another way in which we can help if we can. However, I am not prepared to abandon the triple lock to enable us to do so.
Does the Minister agree that we, as a nation, should be able to devise our own foreign policy? By adhering to the triple lock, we are, in a strange way, making ourselves subservient to American, Chinese, Russian, French and British foreign policy. That is a weakness in this whole system. After the tsunami disaster, people clamoured to get Irish troops to go to south-east Asia. I do not know what the Minister's legal advice was and whether we needed a UN mandate to send troops. I do not believe we needed such a mandate but if we did, is it not ironic that we are subservient to so many other countries in respect of our foreign policy?
When will the subgroups considering the possibility of Irish troops joining EU battle groups report? I am concerned that people will become confused and will use the concept of joining EU battle groups, which is completely separate from the EU constitution and common defence policy. It is important the Minister brings forward proposals, whether positive or negative, long before the campaign on the EU constitution begins because these are two separate and very different issues and I would not like one to be used to blur the other.
In the event of us joining the battle groups, which I hope we will, I realise that our commitments overseas are a drain on resources and numbers. There are 10,500 members in the Defence Forces and this would take its toll. Will the Minister consider the concept of developing military-cum-civilian cells whereby, in many of the contingents operating at present, perhaps 40% of the unit could be made up of reserve Defence Forces members who have expertise in certain areas, whether fitters, drivers or medical personnel? That happens in almost all other European countries and it would make up for the shortfall in Irish personnel.
We are firmly in control of foreign policy. We devise our own foreign policy and do not look to China, America, Indonesia or elsewhere. My advice was that we did not need a UN mandate to deploy people on a voluntary basis overseas, as has always been done. For example, it was done in Mozambique and Honduras. I imagine the subgroups will report by the summer. The overall group met in December. I understand that each of the three subgroups will meet within the next week.
I agree with Deputy Timmins's last remark about deploying some reservists overseas. As the Deputy is aware, a programme was put in place last year, which will be implemented over a six-year period, to upgrade the reserve Defence Forces. Part of the recommendations on which the associated committee is working is that members of the reserve Defence Forces, particularly specialists, could be deployed overseas on a voluntary basis. A number of issues must be dealt with in this regard, such as adequate advance training, security of employment and so on. However, nothing like that will happen without full consultation with PDFORRA and RACO, the relevant representative groups within the Army. It is a matter under consideration that Defence Forces reservists may be deployed overseas on a voluntary basis after all these issues have been dealt with and the matter has been discussed fully with the relevant representative organisations.
The Minister must agree that the days when we made our own foreign policy are long gone, given that we have long since been part of a common foreign and security policy. That is fact. The Minister made an interesting distinction between mutual defence and common defence in his reply. If we are part of a mutual defence arrangement under Article 40.7, the Minister must agree that it would be strange for us to say to an EU partner which is the victim of armed aggression that we cannot go to its assistance, although we are part of a mutual defence pact, because we do not have a UN mandate as required by procedure in our country. Although I support the triple-lock mechanism, does the Minister agree that it seems to be incompatible with that provision in the long term?
I understand that but I do not agree. This is a debate we will have over a long period. Second, I reject Deputy Gormley's assertion that there is something lacking in the independence of Ireland's foreign policy. We are part of the EU and have certain responsibilities and obligations in this regard. However, by and large, Ireland controls its own foreign policy.
Is the Minister committed to the policy of not joining any military force not mandated by the UN? Depending on his answer, what assurances can he give that the triple-lock procedure will be maintained?
The answer to the first of Deputy Sherlock's questions is "yes". I am committed to the principle of not involving Irish troops in any military operation unless mandated by the UN. Regarding the triple-lock procedure, the present position will be maintained. I can only give the Deputy my word. I speak on behalf of the Government in assuring the Deputy that it is Government policy that the triple-lock mechanism in its current form will be maintained.
For now.
Army Intelligence Operations.
Joe Sherlock
Question:90 Mr. Sherlock asked the Minister for Defence if Army intelligence continues to keep files on politicians and political activists similar to those revealed in the State papers recently released under the 30-year rule; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [1764/05]
Aengus Ó Snodaigh
Question:1276 Aengus Ó Snodaigh asked the Minister for Defence the number of persons currently monitored by Army intelligence. [1645/05]
I propose to take Questions Nos. 90 and 1276 together.
Both the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces perform complementary roles in the protection of the security of the State. There is ongoing and close liaison between the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces regarding internal security matters, including in the intelligence field. Both agencies gather and share information and assessments on perceived and emerging security threats. In addition, mutual assistance and co-operation is maintained between the Irish security services and those of other like-minded countries to ensure the effective flow of relevant intelligence.
The Garda Síochána has the primary responsibility for law and order, including the protection of the internal security of the State. In the intelligence field, the Defence Forces act in a complementary role, primarily in the gathering and analysis of intelligence on paramilitary activities, while also providing intelligence on external threats, in particular, threat assessments in respect of locations where the Defence Forces are deployed on overseas peace support missions. Military intelligence is also responsible for ensuring the security of the Defence Forces against internal threats.
I am advised that military intelligence does not maintain files on politicians or political activists per se. It would only be in cases where a person, or a group to which he or she belonged, was considered to pose a potential threat to the security interests of the State that it might be considered appropriate to monitor such activities.
The director of intelligence provides briefings to me, to the Chief of Staff and to the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations on such threats. In addition, the Chief of Staff, who is a member of the national security committee, apprises that committee on the nature of such threats. Obviously, of their nature, the content of those briefings must be kept confidential. As such, I am not at liberty, nor would it be appropriate for me to indicate the nature and extent of any activities, which the Defence Forces might undertake in this regard, or to disclose any information I received on such issues.
What possible justification exists for any army intelligence service to maintain files on political activists? While I know the answer the Minister has just given, I want to pursue the matter. Simply because their views might not have been mainstream, is it appropriate that people of political integrity such as Kadar Asmal, Anthony Coughlan and others were monitored in this way? Somebody who saw files gave those names as people being pursued under this system.
There is no justification for maintaining surveillance on people just because they happen to be political activists whose views do not coincide with the mainstream political opinions of the day. Military intelligence reports to me and I assure the House that nobody is under surveillance from military intelligence anyway simply because they happen to be involved in politics or democratic political activity. Only people whose activities are judged to be a threat to the security of the State are the subject of military intelligence. I cannot comment on the cases to which the Deputy refers and I am sure he understands why. They were certainly before my time and I am not aware of them. I am advised the criteria are as I have outlined.
A control system exists in that military intelligence reports on a regular basis to the Minister for Defence, who is a political figure and happens to be me at the moment. It reports to the Army Chief of Staff and to the Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of operations. I am the only political figure in that troika. I must take responsibility for those whom military intelligence keeps under surveillance. I accept this because it reports to me on a regular basis and I am satisfied that what it is doing, as I understand it on the basis of what I see, is quite in order.
Is the Minister aware that the newly released State papers reveal that this body monitored political activities by campaigners against joining the EEC and other activities? What assurances can the Minister give the House that this practice is not continuing? Was the Minister aware that those names were included in the State papers that were recently released after 30 years?
I am aware of the State papers to which the Deputy refers. However, I will not make any comment or second-guess the judgment of the people who decided to put anybody under surveillance at any time. That was done by people in military intelligence and was sanctioned by or at least known to those who were Ministers at the time. I answer for military intelligence now and take full responsibility for what it does now. It reports to me on a regular basis and I am satisfied that what it does now is the minimum necessary and no more than is necessary.
Overseas Missions.
Billy Timmins
Question:92 Mr. Timmins asked the Minister for Defence the number of Irish military personnel who will be involved in the relief effort in Asia following the recent disaster there; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [1767/05]
The Government is strongly committed to providing whatever support it can within available resources and capabilities, including the provision of Defence Forces personnel, to the humanitarian relief operation in south-east Asia following the recent tsunami disaster. As soon as the scale of the disaster became clear, the Department of Foreign Affairs deployed a high level technical assessment team, which included a member of the Defence Forces, to examine the situation on the ground and identify what assistance Ireland should offer to the affected region. Arising from its initial assessment, the team advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of an immediate requirement for two logistics planning experts and two engineers to be attached to the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre.
Following consultation with my colleagues, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Finance, I agreed to the secondment of four officers of the Permanent Defence Force on a volunteer basis to the UNJLC in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The role of the logistics officers will be to evaluate, on behalf of the UNJLC, the current and future transport requirements in the affected areas for the delivery of humanitarian aid and to recommend solutions to overcome any identified shortfalls. The engineers will examine the road infrastructure in the affected areas, specify the rehabilitation and repair requirements and establish repair priorities to restore a functioning transport network in the area. These officers will have completed their work in six to eight weeks.
It is not possible at this stage to state if further troops will be deployed to the region. The assessment team has advised that a request for a further small number of logistics planners may be pending. However, at this time, I have received no further formal requests for Defence Forces assistance. This is an evolving situation and, as such, I am not in a position to say what requests may arise over the coming weeks and months.
The Government is positively disposed towards supporting the relief effort in the affected areas to the greatest possible extent. In the event that the Defence Forces have the capacity and resources to offer further required assistance in the region in specified roles, they will be examined on a case-by-case basis having regard to the requirements and the situation on the ground.
I thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply that covers most of the supplementary questions I had prepared. Does he agree we have limited capability to deal with a disaster, natural or otherwise? He has issued some statements since entering office about the emergency planning cell but in this case, while we were willing to help, there was little we could do other than supply a few experts — there was no requirement for manpower, with many of these regions having adequate numbers.
We can, however, learn lessons from this. If we experienced a major national disaster, we would be unable to deal with it but we have never taken the idea seriously. The Minister should now provide additional funding for the emergency planning cell and co-ordinate with the other bodies to plan for and deal with such an event.
Irish people have a tremendous desire to assist in such a situation — that may stem from our past missionary zeal. Many people in State jobs would have liked to down tools and go out to the area for a couple of months. In conjunction with the Ministers for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and Justice, Equality and Law Reform, will the Minister examine the establishment of a model where people can go out to assist in such circumstances? Forensic assistance was needed, as was medical and logistical expertise. People from outside the Defence Forces could enter such a network and could return to their jobs after two or three months without facing any penalty. We could look at this to plan for disasters closer to home also.
I sincerely hope we do not see anything even remotely resembling this incident again in the near future. Deputy Timmins's idea is a good one and I will take it up with my colleagues. The Department of Defence will examine this when considering the deployment of members of the Defence Forces Reserve abroad. Many of the same considerations will apply, such as security of employment and adequate training. The monitoring group will look at this and that will assist us in our deliberations.
Deputy Timmins also mentioned a disaster at home. We must make a clear distinction between a disaster at home and a disaster overseas. I respectfully submit to the House that we are extremely well-prepared for any disaster that might occur here. Another question has been submitted about this matter, but I do not know whether we will reach it.
Deputy Timmins is aware that an emergency planning committee was established in this country in the wake of the incidents in the United States on 11 September 2001. I chair the committee, which has met quite often since it was established. It meets on a monthly basis — its first meeting of the new year will take place next Tuesday, as far as I know. The committee comprises representatives of various Departments, such as the Departments of Health and Children and the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, and members of certain organisations, such as the Garda Síochána and the Army, all of whom have a role to play in the event of an emergency. I have asked the various organisations to outline their plans, to state what would happen in the event of certain occurrences and to give the up-to-date position about certain matters. We are keeping it really up to date. The Deputy will agree, if we get to discuss this matter later, that we are staying on top of it.
The first point made by Deputy Timmins related to Ireland's capacity to respond to overseas disasters. Ireland does not have the front-line emergency response capability needed to transport large volumes of emergency supplies thousands of miles and to deliver them to those who are affected by natural disasters. We do not have that capacity, which was needed in the immediate wake of the recent tsunami. Ireland can perform best by offering support in key niche areas in which it can deliver real and tangible results. Nobody foresaw the scale of the disaster in south-east Asia. Its ultimate size was not apparent in the first couple of days after it happened. We sent a technical assistance assessment team to the affected region as soon as was practicable. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Dermot Ahern, demonstrated his typical hands-on approach by travelling to the area with a group of officials, who reported back and outlined the level of need there. The team included a military official. We have sent a number of Army officers to the region, following a request for us to do so. If we receive a further request, we will look on it favourably. We are awaiting the assessment of the technical team, which should be available shortly, before we decide what other contribution we will make. I assure everybody that Ireland will play its part in that regard to the best of its ability.