Criminal Law (Defence and the Dwelling) Bill 2010: Report and Final Stages

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 4, to delete lines 3 to 20 and substitute the following:

"2.—(1) Notwithstanding the generality of any other enactment or rule of law and subject to subsections (2) and (3), it shall not be an offence for a person who is in his or her dwelling, or for a person who is a lawful occupant in a dwelling, to use force against another person or the property of another person where—

(a) he or she believes the other person has entered or is entering the dwelling as a trespasser for the purpose of committing a criminal act, and

(b) the force used is only such as is reasonable and proportional in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be—

(i) to protect himself or herself or another person present in the dwelling from imminent injury, assault, detention or death caused by a criminal act,

(ii) to protect his or her property or the property of another person from imminent appropriation, destruction or damage caused by a criminal act, or

(iii) was necessary to prevent the commission of a crime or to effect, or assist in effecting, a lawful arrest.".

I am sure the Minister is aware that the amendments before us are the same as those I submitted on Committee Stage. Ordinarily I would not resubmit the same amendments on Report Stage but having discussed them on Committee Stage I felt I would have to table them again. On Committee Stage I listened carefully to the Minister's arguments for not accepting the amendments and I subsequently read the transcript of the committee meeting. Having done so I felt further discussion was needed on section 2 as we still have some concerns about how the Bill is being presented.

Amendment No. 1 proposes to delete section 2(1)(a) and (b). As I stated on Committee Stage, in deciding if an individual is justified in using force, a two prong test comprising subjective and objective elements is provided. It was pointed out on Committee Stage that to satisfy the subjective test, the householder need only believe the force used is reasonable in the circumstances as he sees them. In this respect, it does not matter if the force can be justified or not if the person honestly believed it was reasonable in the circumstances. To satisfy the objective tests on whether an individual honestly believed the force used was reasonable, a jury will be asked to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds after taking into account all relevant circumstances. I said on Committee Stage that we believe the lack of reference in the Bill to proportionality, necessity and imminence meant the objective test set out in the Bill was not robust enough and did not comply with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

On Committee Stage, in response to the amendment, the Minister said:

In addition, the approach in the Bill reflects the well known judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP v. Barnes. The test of reasonableness in fact incorporates elements such as imminence, necessity and proportionality, which are referred to in the amendment.

I appreciate the purpose of the Deputy's amendment might be an attempt to tighten up the circumstances in which force can be used [but] it is likely the amendment would in fact have the effect of imposing additional tests to those already prescribed in the Bill.

The Minister went on to say:

The Bill is based on the approach of reasonableness [that] already incorporates elements such as necessity, imminence and proportionality If, for example, an action is taken that is disproportionate, it is highly unlikely [when] taking all factors into account, that it would considered reasonable.

For these reasons the Minister would not accept the amendment.

Having read that, I consider the Minister was contradictory. He stated our amendment, which adds the elements of imminence, necessity and proportionality, would have the effect of prescribing additional tests to that of reasonableness. He then went on to state that the test of reasonableness already incorporates the elements of imminence, necessity and proportionality. If that is the case and they are already incorporated, what is the problem with including them in legislation so every person is clear this is what is needed to satisfy that test? I also ask the Minister to state what additional tests he thinks the amendment will bring if this is the reason he opposes it.

Stating that an action that is disproportionate is highly unlikely to be considered reasonable is not good enough. Highly unlikely means it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a disproportionate action could be considered reasonable under this Bill. If the purpose of the Bill is to provide clarity, it will fail if our amendment is not included and will likely be of no use to the Minister.

We already dealt with this matter in some detail on Committee Stage. The Deputy says he has tabled the same amendment again. What he leaves out in his comment where he refers to the transcript of what was said on Committee Stage is a reference to the exclusion from the provision he has tabled to a very important aspect of this particular legislation, section 2(1)(a). Before someone engages in the use of force, he or she must believe the other person has entered or is entering the dwelling as a trespasser for the purpose of committing a criminal offence. It was the reference to and omission of the fact that someone was trespassing on the property of another, particularly the family home. Violation of the family home by trespass is a crucial element in the matter with regard to someone engaging to defend themselves or their home in a reasonable way. Having explained that to the Deputy, I would have believed that, in resubmitting an amendment, he would have ensured that it incorporated the matter omitted from the amendment discussed on Committee Stage. The change he seeks to make would effect a fundamental change in the purpose and intent of the legislation, that is, to ensure that people do not trespass inside the dwelling home of individuals. The very fact of trespass in the context of the judgment of Mr. Justice Hederman in the case he referred to was regarded as an aggressive violation of someone’s rights by virtue of illegal entry into the home. The Deputy has not addressed that issue.

On the specific issue raised, it was already said that the amendment was discussed on Committee Stage when it was noted that the section and the entire Bill have been drafted on the basis of applying the test of reasonableness. This test is well known in our law and has been interpreted by the courts. The Deputy referred to the judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of DPP v. Barnes. During the debate on Committee Stage, Deputy O’Brien stated that the purpose of the amendment, which he has reiterated today, was to provide for a test of imminence and proportionality by way of express provisions. He stated on Committee Stage that this would make the section more robust. The approach the Deputy now proposes would alter the reasonableness test provided for in the Bill, which test is known to the courts.

The Deputy is trying to say that what I am saying is contradictory. The reasonableness test, through existing jurisprudence, incorporates the concepts of imminence, necessity and proportionality. It can also be broader in that something else might arise that would be of relevance to a reasonableness test of the manner in which someone responds to a burglary in his home. What the Deputy would be doing would be moving discretion from the court to determine in a global context whether someone has objectively behaved reasonably. In the circumstances, I can no more accept the Deputy's amendment on Report Stage than I could on Committee Stage.

The Minister said on Committee Stage that an action that is disproportionate would be highly unlikely to be considered reasonable. Does he not agree that it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a disproportionate action could be considered reasonable under the Bill?

The proportionality of response in this context is important in determining whether someone has behaved reasonably. There may be circumstances where there is imminence and a necessity to respond and where, due to the subjective perception of the individual and out of fear, he may conduct himself in a manner that others distanced from the event may objectively view as disproportionate. However, in the round and overall, this behaviour may be considered reasonable because of the background circumstances. This is a very complex issue which, in the context of individual cases, will require an examination of the individual circumstances. That is why the reasonableness test involves a broader concept which includes the three factors about which the Deputy is concerned, but which may include more.

There could be a suggestion that an individual has behaved somewhat disproportionately. In determining whether an individual should be convicted, the overall background circumstances, the individual's personal perception of the level of threat and the conduct of the trespasser would all be issues to be considered under the reasonableness test. If the absence of one of the three criteria meant that there could be no justifiable defence of an individual charged with behaving in a violent manner towards a burglar, it would add an artificial difficulty to the workings of the law and a huge difficulty in ensuring that the circumstances in the round were fully considered by a court. It is in that context that I cannot accept the Deputy's amendment.

I return to the fundamental flaw in the Deputy's amendment, namely, his omission of the entire subsection to deal with trespassing, which is the kernel of the legislation.

Where an action may be considered disproportionate, is the Minister saying that the amendment cannot be accepted because there may be circumstances in which only two out of the three criteria we seek to insert are met?

By and large, it is my view that the three factors — imminence, necessity and proportionality — will have to be complied with but that there may be exceptional circumstances in a particular case in respect of which, despite an individual's failure to fully meet one of the criteria, a court may hold the view that his behaviour or conduct was reasonable in the specific circumstances that rose in the context of the overall background, the individual's overall state of mind and perception of threat to himself or a family member. Reasonableness is a test that the courts have already applied and are familiar with. It is the better way of dealing with the matter. Leaving that aside, the Deputy's amendment is, unfortunately, flawed in that it omits addressing the trespass issue and, as a consequence, would have a fundamental impact on the purpose of the legislation.

Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."
The Dáil divided: Tá, 74; Níl, 31.

  • Breen, Pat.
  • Broughan, Thomas P.
  • Butler, Ray.
  • Buttimer, Jerry.
  • Byrne, Catherine.
  • Carey, Joe.
  • Coffey, Paudie.
  • Conaghan, Michael.
  • Conlan, Seán.
  • Connaughton, Paul J.
  • Conway, Ciara.
  • Coonan, Noel.
  • Corcoran Kennedy, Marcella.
  • Costello, Joe.
  • Creed, Michael.
  • Deasy, John.
  • Deering, Pat.
  • Doherty, Regina.
  • Donohoe, Paschal.
  • Dowds, Robert.
  • Durkan, Bernard J.
  • English, Damien.
  • Farrell, Alan.
  • Feighan, Frank.
  • Ferris, Anne.
  • Fitzpatrick, Peter.
  • Flanagan, Terence.
  • Griffin, Brendan.
  • Hannigan, Dominic.
  • Harrington, Noel.
  • Harris, Simon.
  • Hayes, Tom.
  • Heydon, Martin.
  • Keating, Derek.
  • Keaveney, Colm.
  • Kehoe, Paul.
  • Kenny, Seán.
  • Kyne, Seán.
  • Lawlor, Anthony.
  • Lynch, Ciarán.
  • Lynch, Kathleen.
  • Lyons, John.
  • McCarthy, Michael.
  • McFadden, Nicky.
  • McGinley, Dinny.
  • McHugh, Joe.
  • McLoughlin, Tony.
  • McNamara, Michael.
  • Maloney, Eamonn.
  • Mathews, Peter.
  • Mitchell, Olivia.
  • Mulherin, Michelle.
  • Murphy, Eoghan.
  • Nash, Gerald.
  • Naughten, Denis.
  • Neville, Dan.
  • Nolan, Derek.
  • Nulty, Patrick.
  • Ó Ríordáin, Aodhán.
  • O’Donovan, Patrick.
  • Phelan, Ann.
  • Ryan, Brendan.
  • Shatter, Alan.
  • Sherlock, Sean.
  • Shortall, Róisín.
  • Spring, Arthur.
  • Stanton, David.
  • Timmins, Billy.
  • Tuffy, Joanna.
  • Twomey, Liam.
  • Varadkar, Leo.
  • Wall, Jack.
  • Walsh, Brian.
  • White, Alex.

Níl

  • Collins, Joan.
  • Colreavy, Michael.
  • Cowen, Barry.
  • Daly, Clare.
  • Doherty, Pearse.
  • Dooley, Timmy.
  • Ferris, Martin.
  • Flanagan, Luke ‘Ming’.
  • Fleming, Sean.
  • Fleming, Tom.
  • Healy, Seamus.
  • Healy-Rae, Michael.
  • Kirk, Seamus.
  • Mac Lochlainn, Pádraig.
  • McConalogue, Charlie.
  • McDonald, Mary Lou.
  • McGrath, Finian.
  • McGrath, Mattie.
  • McGuinness, John.
  • McLellan, Sandra.
  • Murphy, Catherine.
  • Ó Caoláin, Caoimhghín.
  • Ó Cuív, Éamon.
  • Ó Fearghaíl, Seán.
  • Ó Snodaigh, Aengus.
  • O’Brien, Jonathan.
  • Pringle, Thomas.
  • Ross, Shane.
  • Smith, Brendan.
  • Tóibín, Peadar.
  • Wallace, Mick.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies John Lyons and Paul Kehoe; Níl, Deputies Aengus Ó Snodaigh and Seán Ó Fearghaíl.
Question declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.

I move amendment No. 2:

In page 5, to delete lines 10 and 11 and substitute the following:

"(7) Notwithstanding the provisions set out in Section 2, the use of force shall exclude the use of force causing death except in circumstances where it is absolutely necessary.

(8) Notwithstanding the provisions set out in Section 2, the defence of private property shall not be a legitimate reason for the use of fatal force.”.

We discussed this amendment on Committee Stage and I have retabled it because we mis-worded it on Committee Stage. Section 2(7) states: "The use of force shall not exclude the use of force causing death". On Committee Stage the Minister said:

I will focus briefly on the aspect of the amendment which would introduce a new subsection (3). It appears the intention of this is to exclude private property from the use of force causing death. This aspect of the amendment alone would defeat the entire purpose of the Bill. Subsection (11) states, "For the avoidance of doubt, a reference in this section to property includes, unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to a dwelling". Hence, a dwelling obviously is an individual's property. The Bill, as it stands, does not allow for the use of lethal force in defence of private property per se. The purpose of this Bill is to recognise the special position of the dwelling in law as recognised by the common law and as explained in some detail by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Barnes case and, not least, as embedded in the Constitution, which guarantees in Article 40.5 that “The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law”.

Having carefully studied and considered what the Minister said, I believe his analysis is incorrect when he says the Bill does not permit the use of lethal force per se in the defence of private property. Section 2(1)(b)(ii) on the justifiable use of force states it is legal to use force “to protect his or her property or the property of another person from appropriation, destruction or damage caused by a criminal act”. Section 2(7) states, “The use of force shall not exclude the use of force causing death.” From my reading it is clear that the Bill allows for the use of lethal force in the defence of private property without the accompanying threat to persons within that property. If it is the Minister’s intention to only allow the use of lethal force in defence of private property where the defence of that property forms part of a defence of persons within it, the Bill should state this clearly. On Committee Stage the Minister said:

It is worth recalling that in the Barnes case, Mr. Justice Hardiman referred to a burglary, entering someone else's house, as essentially an act of aggression. To be precise, he stated:

Every burglary in a dwellinghouse is an act of aggression. The circumstances may make this element of aggression more or less patent but the violation of a citizen's dwellinghouse is just that, a violation and an act of aggression no matter what the other circumstances.

Lethal force would, of course, only be reasonable to use in exceptional circumstances and only where it was proportionate to the threat with which someone was confronted. For example, if an attacker was attempting to firebomb a family home, it would be reasonable to use very strong force to prevent that attack so as to protect the lives of those in the home. The Deputy's proposed amendment would prevent the householder from using such force as his or her protection of the home would constitute the defence of private property.

We do not dispute the constitutional inviolability of the dwelling. However, we dispute the ability of a person to be able to take the life of another in defence of that dwelling. The Bill clearly permits the use of lethal force in cases in which there is a threat to private property. We do not believe it is correct to place the same value on a life as on bricks and mortar. On Committee Stage the Minister used the example of someone attempting to firebomb a house and a person using lethal force to defend the lives of those within it, which is a completely different scenario because the threat is different — it is to the life of somebody within the home. However, if the home is empty, the threat is just to the bricks and mortar.

Amendment No. 2 would not prevent somebody from taking reasonable and necessary action to defend himself, herself or other persons. It is to prevent someone from using lethal force where the risk is simply to the bricks and mortar. For example, if a person is standing in his or her garden and another person attempts to set fire to the home which is empty, that does not pose the same threat as somebody attempting to firebomb a home when the family is inside it and different rules should apply. We do not claim a person cannot use lethal force, but when it is used, there must be a threat to the life of the person or his or her family within the private property, not just a threat to the private property.

In dealing the Deputy's previous amendment, I misread a note on the trespass issue. Of course, that amendment did incorporate the trespass matter which had been the subject of exchanges on Committee Stage. That would not have made the Deputy's amendment any more acceptable for the reasons I gave with regard to the application of the test of reasonableness.

As for the amendment before us, again a similar amendment was considered on Committee Stage. I must oppose this amendment once again because it fails to take proper account of the wider provisions of the Bill. Section 2(7) does not stand in isolation. Section 2(1)(b) is clear when it states “the force used is only such as is reasonable”. That is an objective test. A jury or a court ultimately will determine whether force used is reasonable, should the matter arise. Where lethal force is used unnecessarily, it will be unreasonable. As has been noted previously, the concept of reasonable force is well known to Irish jurisprudence and embodies the concepts of necessity and proportionality. The aspect of the amendment which would introduce a new subsection (8) would defeat the entire purpose of the Bill. Section 2(11) states “For the avoidance of doubt, a reference in this section to property includes, unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to a dwelling.” As it stands, the Bill does not allow for the use of lethal force in defence of private property per se. The purpose of the Bill is to recognise the special position of the dwelling in law, as recognised by the common law, confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Barnes case and not least, as embodied in the Constitution, which in Article 40.5 guarantees “The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and should not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law”. Lethal force would only be reasonable to use in exceptional circumstances and only where it was proportionate to the threat faced. In light of this, I cannot accept the Deputy’s amendment.

This goes back to one reason for tabling the first amendment, which was to include the tests of imminence, necessity and proportionality the Minister has decided not to include. However, were the Bill to pass as it stands, my reading of it is that in effect, Members will have placed the same level of importance on the life of a person as on private property. If this is the case, it completely contravenes Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister stated on Committee Stage that he received guidance from the Attorney General to the effect that this Bill is in line with Article 2 of the aforementioned convention. However, Article 2 states that the State is obliged to take appropriate measures to safeguard human life. This places a positive obligation on the State to provide a legal regime that effectively protects the lives of all persons present on the territory of Ireland. Moreover, the State must prohibit unlawful killing and punish it by criminal sanctions. Again, on Committee Stage, speakers referred to the stress placed by the Law Reform Commission on the importance of maintaining a proportionality component on the right to use force in the defence of a home, as well as reasonable limits in respect of that right. Sinn Féin agrees completely with this analysis but I believe this Bill to be flawed, in that it does not comply with Article 2. The Minister should reconsider this point because while I do not suggest one cannot use lethal force, I make the point that one cannot place the same level of importance on someone's life as one does on bricks and mortar. Any democracy that does that is on a slippery slope.

The Deputy essentially is revisiting the issues dealt with on Committee Stage. For the reasons I gave, I cannot accept the Deputy's amendment. The Deputy has raised issues about the European Court of Human Rights and was correct to cite me as having stated that the legislation has been proofed in that context by the Attorney General and that I have been advised the legislation is in order. In the context of case law from the European Court of Human Rights, I also am satisfied that the legislation is in order.

I revert to the issue. It arises specifically under section 2(1) and the wording thereof, which states:

Notwithstanding the generality of any other enactment or rule of law and subject to subsections (2) and (3), [the key point is] it shall not be an offence for a person who is in his or her dwelling, or for a person who is a lawful occupant in a dwelling, to use force against another person or the property of another person.

It goes on in section 2(1)(a) to specify where “he or she believes the other person has entered or is entering the dwelling as a trespasser for the purpose of committing a criminal [offence]” and in section 2(1)(b):

the force used is only such as is reasonable in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be—

(i) to protect himself or herself or another person present in the dwelling from injury, assault, detention or death caused by a criminal act,

(ii) to protect his or her property or the property of another person from appropriation, destruction or damage caused by a criminal act, or

(iii) to prevent the commission of a [criminal act].

One has then brought in the objective test of reasonableness to this issue. Essentially, lethal force can only be used, in the way the courts may well see it, in circumstances where it is reasonable and that will be in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, it must be used in the context of an individual being the occupant of a dwelling or being in his or her dwelling. Consequently, where I occupy a dwelling or am in my dwelling and there is a trespass, in the vast majority of instances, lethal force would not be appropriate. However, the test of reasonableness will apply, as will its other subtexts of imminence, proportionality and necessity, and the law as it is now being proposed to be enacted in the Bill will be on all fours with the approach taken in case law dealing with the reasonableness test. For these reasons I cannot accept the Deputy's amendment, which effectively would undermine the principles behind the Bill, namely, to ensure that individuals can regard their homes as their castles and can use reasonable force in circumstances in which there has been a trespass.

That said, I repeat a point I made on Committee Stage, because I think it is important. The Bill is not an invitation to individuals to put themselves in harm's way. People who have a burglar in their home may well, under the Bill following its enactment, for reasons of protecting themselves or their family lawfully defend themselves using reasonable force. However, there will be many instances in which people's homes are burglarised or in which there is an intruder in the home, where there may be a disproportionate age gap between the intruder and the occupant of the home. The intruder may be an individual of violent disposition or may be an individual who is high on drugs and who has no capacity to assess a situation and make any judgments that could be relied on. For many people who discover an intruder in the home, leaving the home, telephoning the Garda Síochána and seeking assistance may be a better and preferred option to that of engaging with the intruder.

However, the Bill does something that is important. It gives a statutory framework to the constitutional recognition of the inviolability of an individual's dwelling house. In that context, it will ensure that where someone's dwelling house is violated, where someone's home is being burglarised, where people feel themselves or their families to be under threat, they can address this threat, if they have the capacity to so do, in a manner that is reasonable and proportionate to deal with a threat that is imminent and poses a serious risk to their safety or where there is a risk of loss of property or, as I mentioned on Committee Stage, where there may be a risk of their homes being burned down.

There is a whole range of circumstances to which this will apply. However, the nature of the response of the person residing in the home, and the extent to which it is reasonable, will be determined by an objective test. That provides the protection necessary. It recognises the right of individuals to live peacefully in their homes without unlawful intrusion while ensuring, if there is such unlawful intrusion, that they respond reasonably to it.

The Minister referred to section 2(1)(b). We are not disputing that there may be cases where lethal force has to be used to protect oneself, one’s family or individuals within the home. However, it is not correct to say the Bill would not exclude the use of lethal force just to protect private property — bricks and mortar. Section 2(1)(b)(ii) states: “to protect his or her property or the property of another person from appropriation, destruction or damage caused by a criminal act”. That is the subsection we have an issue with. We do not believe it is robust enough and it does not comply with Article 2. For that reason, we will seek a vote on the amendment.

Amendment put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 71; Níl, 32.

  • Breen, Pat.
  • Broughan, Thomas P.
  • Butler, Ray.
  • Buttimer, Jerry.
  • Byrne, Catherine.
  • Carey, Joe.
  • Coffey, Paudie.
  • Collins, Áine.
  • Conaghan, Michael.
  • Conlan, Seán.
  • Connaughton, Paul J.
  • Conway, Ciara.
  • Coonan, Noel.
  • Corcoran Kennedy, Marcella.
  • Creed, Michael.
  • Deasy, John.
  • Deering, Pat.
  • Doherty, Regina.
  • Donohoe, Paschal.
  • Dowds, Robert.
  • Durkan, Bernard J.
  • English, Damien.
  • Farrell, Alan.
  • Feighan, Frank.
  • Ferris, Anne.
  • Fitzpatrick, Peter.
  • Griffin, Brendan.
  • Hannigan, Dominic.
  • Harrington, Noel.
  • Harris, Simon.
  • Hayes, Tom.
  • Heydon, Martin.
  • Keating, Derek.
  • Keaveney, Colm.
  • Kehoe, Paul.
  • Kenny, Seán.
  • Kyne, Seán.
  • Lawlor, Anthony.
  • Lynch, Ciarán.
  • Lynch, Kathleen.
  • Lyons, John.
  • McCarthy, Michael.
  • McFadden, Nicky.
  • McGinley, Dinny.
  • McHugh, Joe.
  • McLoughlin, Tony.
  • McNamara, Michael.
  • Maloney, Eamonn.
  • Mathews, Peter.
  • Mitchell, Olivia.
  • Mulherin, Michelle.
  • Murphy, Eoghan.
  • Nash, Gerald.
  • Neville, Dan.
  • Nolan, Derek.
  • Nulty, Patrick.
  • Ó Ríordáin, Aodhán.
  • O’Donnell, Kieran.
  • O’Donovan, Patrick.
  • Phelan, Ann.
  • Ryan, Brendan.
  • Shatter, Alan.
  • Sherlock, Sean.
  • Shortall, Róisín.
  • Spring, Arthur.
  • Stanton, David.
  • Timmins, Billy.
  • Tuffy, Joanna.
  • Twomey, Liam.
  • Walsh, Brian.
  • White, Alex.

Níl

  • Collins, Joan.
  • Colreavy, Michael.
  • Cowen, Barry.
  • Daly, Clare.
  • Doherty, Pearse.
  • Dooley, Timmy.
  • Ferris, Martin.
  • Flanagan, Luke ‘Ming’.
  • Fleming, Tom.
  • Healy, Seamus.
  • Higgins, Joe.
  • Kirk, Seamus.
  • Mac Lochlainn, Pádraig.
  • McConalogue, Charlie.
  • McDonald, Mary Lou.
  • McGrath, Finian.
  • McGrath, Mattie.
  • McGuinness, John.
  • McLellan, Sandra.
  • Martin, Micheál.
  • Murphy, Catherine.
  • Ó Caoláin, Caoimhghín.
  • Ó Cuív, Éamon.
  • Ó Fearghaíl, Seán.
  • Ó Snodaigh, Aengus.
  • O’Brien, Jonathan.
  • Pringle, Thomas.
  • Ross, Shane.
  • Smith, Brendan.
  • Stanley, Brian.
  • Troy, Robert.
  • Wallace, Mick.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies John Lyons and Paul Kehoe; Níl, Deputies Aengus Ó Snodaigh and Seán Ó Fearghaíl.
Question declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.
Bill reported without amendment, received for final consideration and passed.