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JOINT COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD debate -
Thursday, 8 Jan 2009

Contamination of Meat Products: Discussion with Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

On behalf of the committee I welcome from the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Mr. Tom Moran, Secretary General, Mr. Paddy Rogan, chief veterinary officer, Mr. Jim Beecher, assistant secretary general, Mr. Martin Heraghty, assistant secretary general, Mr. Seamus Healy, assistant secretary general, and Mr. Dermot Ryan, senior inspector. At its last meeting before Christmas, the committee decided to have a series of hearings with all interested parties on foot of the recent difficulties in the pigmeat sector. I am delighted to welcome all here today to discuss the topic.

This is the first time the Secretary General has attended the committee under my tenure as Chairman and I am delighted he has come before us. Before I call on him to make his presentation, I draw his attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege but the same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Before we proceed, I take the opportunity, on behalf of the committee, to congratulate Pat Smith, the new secretary general of the IFA. He is a great Meath man and lives near Dunshaughlin. He hails from a great part of the county, north Meath. There is no better man to have the knowledge and experience of agriculture because he came from an area which is the backbone of agriculture in County Meath. I wish him well. I compliment and pay tribute to Michael Berkery, whom I worked very closely with over the last number of years. I wish him many good years of retirement.

For obvious reasons I would not know Mr. Smith as well as the Chairman but I congratulate him on his appointment as successor to Michael Berkery as general secretary of the IFA. He has a long track record, as noted by the Chairman, both within the organisation for many years as well as outside it. He comes from good farming stock and I have no doubt that although he has a hard act to follow, he will distinguish himself in the role. I wish him well.

This side of the committee would also like to be associated in wishing Mr. Pat Smith the very best in his work in the IFA in the years ahead. There are tough times ahead for farming; it has always been a tough time for farming. All we can do is keep fighting for the best for farmers, which is what we do here. I wish him the best on behalf of the Fianna Fáil organisation.

I compliment Mr. Michael Berkery and thank him for his years of service to the IFA and the farming community in general and for the work done in the number of years he has been there.

I would also like to be associated with those comments. I wish Mr. Smith well and look forward to working with him in the years ahead. As Deputy Creed said, he has a hard act to follow but I am sure he is well up to the challenge.

I call on Mr. Tom Moran to make his presentation.

Mr. Tom Moran

I thank the Chairman. It is my first time before this committee and I am delighted to be here. I thank the committee for inviting myself and my colleagues before it to update members on the events and actions surrounding the feed contamination issue and the recall of pork and bacon products. In making the presentation and addressing queries, I am joined by a number of colleagues. Mr. Paddy Rogan is the chief veterinary officer of the Department. Mr. Jim Beecher is the assistant secretary responsible for the livestock sector while Mr. Martin Heraghty is the assistant secretary responsible for food. Mr. Dermot Ryan is a senior inspector dealing with feedstuffs and assistant secretary, Mr. Seamus Healy, is responsible for animal health and welfare. That is the departmental team.

If it is okay with the committee, I propose to cover three particular areas. First, the detection and cause of the problem; second, the actions taken following the detection of the problem; and, finally, the lessons learned. Before doing so, I would like to explain the relationship that exists between the Department and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland. This is very useful in the context of the interactions that took place between both organisations during the event.

I should make it clear that, from the outset of the dioxin contamination issue, the Department worked extremely closely with the FSAI in dealing with the matter. The Department operates under a service contract with the Food Safety Authority of Ireland. The Department first entered into the service contract arrangement with the FSAI in 2000. Our current contract runs until 31 December 2009 and is subject to audit by the FSAI. The sectors included in the contract, which is wide-ranging, are meat hygiene, milk and milk products, eggs and egg products, pesticide control services, Border inspection posts, residue monitoring programmes, the zoonoses directive and food labelling.

I want to refer briefly to the legislative framework within which we operate. European legislation governing food safety, known as the hygiene package, came into effect at the beginning of January 2006. These measures brought together, updated and consolidated earlier EU food and feed legislation. They cover all food business operators throughout the food chain from farmer to retailer.

The underlying philosophy of this legislation is that all food business operators along the food chain bear full responsibility for the safety of the food they produce, process, transport or any other procedure along that food chain. This is made possible by the development of hazard analysis and critical control point, HACCP, principles and is in line with internationally accepted procedures. These principles take into account the variety of different operations, both in terms of products and scale, and provide operators with the flexibility to adapt their "own checks" control systems to the specific requirements of their operation.

Part of the hygiene package requires member states to produce a single, integrated, multi-annual control plan which covers development and performance of official controls in the following sectors: food law, feed law, animal health rules, animal welfare rules and plant health rules. The objectives of the national control plan for Ireland are in line with those established in EU hygiene legislation. The primary objectives are to ensure feed and food is safe and wholesome, and to protect consumers' interests. This is achieved through ensuring food and feed business operators fulfil their primary legal responsibility to ensure food and feed safety. It is also achieved through the organisation of official controls to monitor that the relevant legislative requirements are fulfilled by food and feed business operators at all stages of production, processing and distribution.

The approach taken in Ireland is to foster a culture of compliance through the use of risk-based controls which protect public, animal and plant health without imposing unnecessary burdens on the food and feed business operators that are subject to these controls or on the authorities that are responsible for undertaking official controls on behalf of the taxpayer. This national control plan is submitted to the Commission through the EU Food and Veterinary Office, FVO, and is used by it as a basis for audits in the sectors concerned.

On the chronology of events, the dioxin contamination originated in the detection by the Department, for the first time since the national residues programme began, of dioxins in food of animal origin, specifically pork fat. I will outline in chronological order the events which led to the detection and the identification of the source of the dioxins from 19 November when the sample of pork fat was taken, up to the interdepartmental agency meeting on Saturday, 6 December 2008. This was the date when the decision was taken, on the recommendation of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, to require the food industry to recall from the market all pork products. I will also refer to some other subsequent dates and events that were of importance.

Since the initiation of the incident, the Department, together with the FSAI and other agencies, has worked through the various priorities — protection of public health, restoration of consumer confidence, securing the future of the industry, and maintenance of markets and our national reputation as a food producer and exporter. Those priorities are quite important, as will become clear later.

On Tuesday, 19 November, an officer of the Department took routine samples, under the national residue monitoring programme, of pork fat from pigs slaughtered at a plant in Drumlish, County Longford, and submitted them for analysis at the Department's pesticides control laboratory in Backweston, County Kildare. On Friday, 28 November, the analyses/results indicated the presence of marker polychlorinated biphenyls, more commonly referred to as PCBs. In accordance with standing procedures under the DAFF/FSAI service contract arrangements, the FSAI was advised of these findings at the time. The source of the pork was immediately identified back to a farm in County Cork. While at this remove, the time lag between the taking of the samples and receipt of the analysis results may seem inordinate, it should be noted that this was a routine monitoring sample, that the time period involved seven working days and that it takes up to three days to complete the laboratory testing procedure.

On Saturday, 29 November, samples were taken of all the different types of animal feed used on that farm — ten in all, including the dry bread — and these were sent to Backweston for priority analysis. On Tuesday, 2 December, the Department's laboratory indicated that the dry bread was positive for marker PCBs. The source of the dry bread was immediately identified back to a registered surplus food recycling plant in County Carlow. Given the link between PCBs and dioxins, the samples were taken immediately by a Department official to the Central Science Laboratory in York for further analysis.

On the issue of availability of dioxin analysis facilities in Ireland, it is useful to point out that the State Laboratory has indicated that it will be in a position to carry out such tests in the early part of 2009. To be clear, the initial testing which began this process was in regard to PCBs, which are markers for dioxins. The subsequent further analysis was done in the UK.

Department personnel visited the food recycling premises in County Carlow on 2, 3 and 4 December to collect all the relevant samples and gather all the necessary information. A list of farms which received feed material from the premises was compiled and samples, both current and library going back to late July 2008, were submitted to the laboratory in Backweston for analysis for presence of PCBs. I remind the committee that feed business operators, as part of their registration obligations under the feed hygiene regulations, EU Regulation 183/2005, are obliged to retain samples of manufactured products.

On Thursday, 4 December, Department officials commenced visiting all the identified pig and cattle farms. All bread product remaining on the farms was impounded and restrictions were placed on the movement of animals from these herds. On the same Thursday, a Department press release also issued indicating that a number of herds had been restricted following the identification of marker PCBs.

On Friday, 5 December, the authorities in the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Northern Ireland, DARDNI, were informed and a list of farms was forwarded to them indicating that bread product from the premises may have been delivered to those farms. On the same day, Friday, 5 December, the Dutch authorities, following sight of the Department's press release, contacted the Department and the FSAI about an independent investigation into the presence of PCBs in pork fat samples originating in Ireland.

On Saturday, 6 December, an interdepartmental agency meeting was convened to assess the emerging situation. This meeting was attended by the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Health and Children, the Chief Medical Officer, the FSAI and officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Health and Children. In light of the assessment of the position and possible implications, the Taoiseach subsequently joined this meeting. At 3.40 p.m., the Central Science Laboratory in York confirmed to the FSAI the presence of dioxins in the pork fat samples. Following on from the meeting, the FSAI decided that it was necessary for the food industry to recall all Irish pork and bacon products from pigs slaughtered in Ireland since 1 September.

The 1 September date was chosen on the basis of the evidence available to the FSAI. In making the decision for a total product recall, account was taken of the fact that the ten pig producers affected and associated farms involving 17 separate production units nationally accounted for some 8% of the national kill, or approximately 50,000 pigs slaughtered between 1 September and 1 December 2008. Taken together, they supplied eight of the ten main abattoirs in the country, which account for about 98% of the national throughput of pork.

Running in parallel to all of this was ongoing activity to identify the cause of the contamination and to put in place arrangements for the recall of the feed material impounded on the farms. In addition, meetings were held over the weekend of 6 and 7 December last with representatives of the pig processors, producers as well as retailers. The meetings with the pig processors continued over the following days.

In the meantime, on Monday, 8 December, results of samples for non-dioxin "marker" PCBs taken from 11 of the 45 cattle herds initially restricted were received and, on the basis of those results, the FSAI on Tuesday, 9 December, concluded that there was no public health issues arising.

Results for "marker" PCBs for samples taken in the remaining cattle herds became available the following weekend. Results for dioxins in the beef samples were subsequently received on 17 December. On Thursday, 18 December, the FSAI, on concluding its assessment of the these results, published a statement which indicated, based on food consumption data, that the exposure from beef was 300 times lower than that posed by the contamination found in pork.

Additionally, it was confirmed that of the 120,000 cattle farms in Ireland, only 21 had been identified as having received the implicated animal feed. As a precautionary measure, on the recommendation of the FSAI, a decision was taken to slaughter and remove from the food chain all animals in these 21 herds.

A significant amount of the Department's time, with the assistance of the Garda and the EPA, has been devoted to identifying the cause of the contamination. Given that the issue is the subject of a Garda investigation and may be subject to litigation, I am constrained on how much can be said at this stage. However, laboratory tests have indicated that the source of the contamination was the use of contaminated or inappropriate oil to fire the burner used for generating the heat to dry the bread.

On the pigmeat recall scheme, following the events of 6 December there was intensive discussions with the pig processors to facilitate the resumption of slaughter. Financial assistance by the Government was agreed given the impact of the product recall on the industry and for the culling of pigs and cattle.

A facility of up to €180 million has been made available through the pigmeat recall scheme. The scheme is confined to processors who have suffered losses as a result of the recall and to product relating to animals slaughtered in Ireland between 1 September and 6 December 2008 which cannot be shown to be uncontaminated. Payments are being made on the basis of weight and category of product in store, which is being presented for rendering. We have made 64 payments to date, totalling some €35.4 million.

EU state aid approval for this scheme was obtained from the EU Commission on 24 December 2008. The scheme document for the pigmeat recall scheme was published by the Department on the same day. The scheme document sets out detailed terms and conditions for the payment to processors, as well as outlining the principal controls to be applied at site level.

In addition to state aid approval, EU funding of up to €20.7 million has also been obtained for some elements of the process, that is, the destruction of up to 130,000 pigs, 7,000 cattle and 9,050 tonnes of pig meat. During the days following the recall, there was intensive contact between the Department and the Commission. The Minister, Deputy Smith, spoke to Commissioner Fischer Boel to update her on our actions and to seek EU assistance. He also spoke to Commissioner Vassilou, who is the Commissioner for public health.

The very exceptional decision to co-fund part of the recall was taken on foot of the support received from the 27 Heads of Government at the European Council which expressed "its support for Ireland's effort to deal with the situation relating to pigmeat and its prompt precautionary action". The Council furthermore invited the Commission "to support farmers and slaughterhouses in Ireland by way of co-financed measures to remove relevant animals and product from the market". Clearly, we were very pleased to receive this practical demonstration of support for our actions in this matter from our European partners. I would like to take this opportunity to record our appreciation for the strong support and positive approach of the European Commission and other EU institutions throughout this episode. Up to 4 January 2009, some 50,000 pigs had been slaughtered. A further 40,000 will be slaughtered by the end of this week. All carcases and other animal by-products are being dealt with as category 1 animal by-products as defined in EU regulations. They are being disposed of as category 1 waste at an approved rendering plant with the incineration of the rendered product. Arrangements are under way for dealing with the slaughter of approximately 4,500 cattle. Material from the product recall is classified as category 1 animal by-product under Regulation 1774 of 2002. The options available for disposal are rendering at category 1 rendering plants or incineration.

In a guidance document published on 10 December 2008, the Environmental Protection Agency recommended disposal by rendering of contaminated pork goods in the commercial chain at one of the four facilities licensed by the EPA and permitted by Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to process category 1 material. The EPA also recommended that meat and bonemeal produced during the rendering of the affected meat goods should be disposed of by incineration or by combustion as part of a process that complies with the waste incineration directive. The EPA also recommended that tallow oil produced during the rendering of the affected meat should be disposed of by incineration or by combustion at a temperature of 850° Celsius for two seconds. This would allow use of the tallow as fuel within the rendering plants in question.

The Department held discussions and reached agreement in principle on 15 December 2008 with the rendering plants about their role in disposing of the recalled pork produce and culled pigs arising from the dioxin incident. The objective of the discussions was to bring a swift and effective conclusion to this aspect of the problem. It is envisaged that the disposal process through rendering plants will take a period of weeks as the material concerned is additional to the normal flow of material. In the product recall process, we are looking to all parts of the food chain, from producer to retailer, and to the financial institutions to exhibit solidarity and work with us for the long-term benefit of the industry. I emphasise the need for co-operation and solidarity across all the sectors involved in this regard.

I wish to address some of the specific questions that have been raised by the committee. I was asked about the proportionality of the State's response to this crisis. I have explained why it was necessary to recall all pork and bacon products. I contend that the approach taken to the management of the incident was correct. It demonstrated how seriously Ireland takes any questions about the safety of its food products. It is clear that the decision to recall all pork and pork products had significant financial consequences, but the damage would have been far more severe and long lasting if it had been decided to allow possibly contaminated products to remain on sale to consumers. This may have irretrievably damaged Ireland's reputation as a producer of safe and quality food. Members will recall that in 1999, a similar dioxin contamination incident in another country was handled quite differently. It led to the recall of all animal products from that country, and resulted in long-term reputational damage. The actions taken in our case allowed Irish pork to be back on the shelves within a week and confirmed the priority that Ireland attaches to consumer health.

I wish to speak about the issues of traceability and the monitoring of licensed premises. Under national and EU legislation, pig farms must be registered with the Department. Pigs leaving holdings must be identified by slap markings or eartags and movements must be accompanied by despatch documents and be notified in advance to the Department's database. Traceability of pork at slaughter and thereafter is on the basis of production batch. However, it should be pointed out that the traceability system at farm level enabled the Department to move immediately from positive samples at slaughter to a farm and feed supplier and to all the customers of the feed supplier in question. The Department is examining the potential to improve pork traceability in order that in the event of recalls arising in future, it may be possible to reduce their impact.

With regard to the monitoring of licensed premises, the Department's national feed inspection programme and national residue monitoring programme, which operate in accordance with European Union legislation, are part of an overall integrated annual control plan for Ireland. The national residue programme involves a risk based sampling regime under which upwards of 30,000 samples are taken from across the food chain and tested for more than 200 possible contaminants.

Council Directive 96/23, which is the EU framework legislation for national residue plans and animals and animal products, does not have a requirement for dioxin testing. However, following the Belgian dioxin crises in 1999, the Commission indicated that any positive PCB result should be followed up by dioxin testing on the samples concerned.

Ireland is fully compliant with EU requirements in terms of its level of testing for PCBs. In 2007, a total of 487 samples were tested across the entire range of animals and animal products, including 74 samples from pigs and 112 from bovines. While final data for 2008 are not yet available, a total of 351 samples were tested on a routine basis up to the end of November, including 100 from bovines and 57 from pigs.

Until the positive PCB finding on 28 November 2008, no positive findings had been made under the national residue plan. Of the pig herds — other than that which showed positive on 28 November — which were initially restricted on the basis of having received bread crumb from the manufacturer concerned, three samples had already been taken routinely — on 15 April, 6 August and 2 September — under the 2008 residue plan and were negative. The negative sample taken on 6 August was from the pig herd of the bread crumb manufacturer.

The national feed inspection programme involves approximately 2,400 inspections per annum throughout the feed chain. The feed inspections cover a range of areas, including imports, mills, mineral mixture plants, suppliers of surplus food for recycling and recycling plants, wholesalers and retailers of animal feed and farms. During these inspections 1,800 feed samples are taken and in excess of 7,000 individual laboratory analyses are carried out on these samples. In recent years, this programme has resulted in a number of high profile cases in which imported consignments of feed materials were impounded following the detection of bone spicules, unauthorised GM events and other undesirable substances.

The Department has a specifically trained staff unit devoted to feed inspections. Risk-based inspections are carried out at establishments covering the following aspects of the feed chain: import amounting to approximately 800 bulk consignments; 80 mills; 17 mineral mixture plants; 90 premises supplying surplus food such as bread, dairy products and vegetables for animal feed and two recycling plants; 812 grain intake depots and retailers and wholesalers of animal feed; 967 transport operators; and a sample of 900 farms, including those involved in the home mixing of animal feed. The level of inspection and analysis carried out by the Department complies with and in many cases exceeds the requirements of EU legislation.

In accordance with the risk assessment, it was considered appropriate to inspect the food recycling premises on an annual basis. The premises in County Carlow was inspected in 2006 and 2007 and was scheduled for an inspection in late November or December 2008. This inspection had not yet taken place.

Following on from the incident in question, the Department has identified a number of areas requiring additional attention. These include ensuring that feed business operators fulfil their legal responsibilities to guarantee feed safety with particular reference to the diligence with which they implement, evaluate and amend their HACCP programme.

Following recent discussions with other agencies involved in this incident, a number of actions have already been taken. They include: focused communication with the Northern Ireland authorities on strengthening measures with regard to oil imports as appropriate; dialogue with the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, the Department of Communications, Energy, and Natural Resources, the National Standards Association of Ireland and the EPA on the regulation of waste oil and oil products; instructing feed business operators involved in drying grain and feed to incorporate oil specifications into their HACCP and quality controls; reviewing the risk assessment methodology of the national feed inspection programme to take cognisance of the dioxin event; and communication with other member states and the European Commission in regard to monitoring the use of oil for drying feed materials.

In addition, the Department, through the veterinary public health inspection service, is responsible for the supervision of 165 large meat processing plants, which are approved under the European Communities (Food and Feed Hygiene) Regulations. Of those plants, 56 are approved for slaughter, including 31 approved for bovine slaughter and 12 for pig slaughter. The Department's meat hygiene service involves audit, inspection, surveillance and checks on food business operators who carry out the slaughter and processing of meat products destined for the human food chain. There is a clear and important public health dimension to the work involved and the key responsibility is the need to verify the compliance of food business operators with EU and national hygiene legislation.

We must consider what the actions surrounding this incident have taught us as a Department. It should be pointed out that the initial indication of the dioxin contamination came from the laboratory result of a routine sample under the national residue testing programme. Our feed traceability systems worked efficiently with regard to the speedy identification of the source of the feed and to where it was distributed. While it has been suggested that unused surplus food of non-animal origin should not be used as feed ingredients, the events surrounding this incident do not give credence to that proposal.

In the first instance, investigations to date suggest that the cause of the dioxin contamination incident was a feed business operator using contaminated or inappropriate oil in the drying process. The feed materials being used, namely, low risk unused surplus food of non-animal origin, were not the source of the problem.

It has already been decided that the Department, along with the relevant agencies, will carry out a complete review of all aspects relevant to the dioxin contamination incident, including the risk assessment employed in the annual feed inspection programme. The review is consistent with the approach adopted after the foot and mouth outbreak in 2001 when the Department updated its contingency arrangements in the light of the experience gained.

It is worth recalling the current market base of the sector. In 2007, some 188,000 tonnes of pigmeat product were produced here of which 129,000 tonnes were exported to over 30 countries. Those exports were valued at €368 million. The UK market accounted for €271 million of that while the other principal EU outlets were Germany and France. The main non-EU markets were Russia, Japan, the US and China. The total value of the output of the sector, including value added products, exceeds €1 billion.

In the wake of the positive dioxin test results, the Department made it a priority to ensure that our customer countries were kept informed of the actions being taken to eliminate any possible health risk and to ensure the continued safety of our product. To that end, our diplomatic missions have been most active with the relevant authorities in our export markets while Bord Bia has supported their efforts and has helped to provide the necessary reassurances at trade level. In addition, the Department has been in direct contact with various countries in regard to their inquiries about different aspects of the issue. The Department, Bord Bia and the diplomatic marketing offensive will continue to be a priority over the coming months and for as long as is necessary.

It is fair to say that other countries viewed our actions as the correct ones and indicative of the priority Ireland affords to food safety. This, along with the authoritative independent opinions, such as that of the European Food Safety Authority, about the negligible health risk involved has helped to protect our markets. There are, however, some residual issues in certain non-EU markets where our exports remain suspended. Allied to addressing these, there is a need to allay any lingering consumer concerns in our main markets and ensure that the excellent reputation of Irish pork is speedily restored.

The Department, together with Bord Bia, will be actively engaged in customer reassurance and trade promotion programmes for this purpose. The Minister, Deputy Brendan Smith, has indicated his willingness to visit particular markets if that appears to be appropriate, and he has already been to France in that context. The Minister will be participating in the forthcoming trade mission led by the Taoiseach to Japan next week. This will be an opportunity to emphasise the safety and quality of Irish pork in that important export market. The Department and Bord Bia will also be visiting other markets in Asia in conjunction with this trade mission. As I have said, whatever is needed will be done for as long as it takes by the Department and the various agencies to ensure that any issues that arise affecting this valuable export trade are dealt with on the same basis as in the past when issues arose in areas of the food sector.

On the home market, Bord Bia introduced the Irish pork and bacon approved logo to reassure consumers. This logo accompanied Irish product back to the market and was effective as evidenced by the strong sales over the Christmas and new year period. Developments will be monitored over the coming months. The independent assurances as to the negligible health risks will have helped to alleviate any consumer concerns and, hopefully, there will be little effect on consumption patterns. Relevant marketing and promotional activities can be tailored accordingly should this transpire not to be the case.

In summary, the signs are that our efforts to retain markets have been successful and that customer countries have been reassured by our actions. Some problems remain in certain markets and these are being addressed. Despite all the best efforts, the industry will face challenges in the months ahead. On that account, the EU funded what is called an aid to private storage scheme, set up specially for Ireland, and this could prove to be very important. The scheme allows the temporary storage of 30,000 tonnes of product for up to six months, with a potential value of €15 million to the Irish pigmeat sector. It provides a necessary breathing space in case there are problems in the market in the coming months. This scheme was specifically sought by us as soon as the issue became apparent as a mechanism to get us over the particular period following the market disturbance.

I apologise for taking so long, but we felt that there was a good deal to be covered. In conclusion, I thank the Chairman and the members for affording me this opportunity to address the committee. I and my colleagues will deal with any questions the committee may have at this time.

I thank Mr. Moran for his very comprehensive report. We will deal with matters in different stages. First, we will discuss the withdrawal of the products and then deal with traceability, the inspection regime and compensation. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I welcome the Secretary General and his colleagues to the committee. We have certainly had a very worrying period, which is now, hopefully, behind us. A very expensive financial lesson has been learned in the context of the €180 million put up by the Exchequer to compensate rightfully those who were innocent victims of this debacle. It is appropriate that this committee forensically examines all of the detail of this contamination in terms of how the matter was dealt with so that we may ensure such incidents are not repeated and learn lessons which are not just applicable to the pork sector, but all other food sectors that are so critical to the economy.

I will confine my questions, under the Chairman's direction, to the proportionality of the response. When this controversy arose in early December, we were repeatedly reassured, by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland and by eminent people in whose comment I would place a lot of faith, and retrospectively by the European Food Safety Authority, that if we ate this contaminated pork every day from 1 September to the date of the recall, there was no quantifiable danger to our health. That raises the question for the public as to whether it was proportionate to withdraw the product.

I would like Mr. Moran and his colleagues to comment on the legal issues here. I have read commentary that suggests it is illegal to knowingly place on the market a product which is contaminated by dioxins. That must be squared with the subsequent decision on dioxins in beef, albeit that the risk was at a lower level earlier on and at a higher level during Christmas week.

Mr. Moran stated:

At 3.40 p.m., the Central Science Laboratory in York confirmed to the FSAI the presence of dioxins in the pork fat samples. Following on from the meeting, the FSAI decided that it was necessary for the food industry to recall all Irish pork and bacon products from pigs slaughtered in Ireland since 1 September.

Notwithstanding the round table discussion on Saturday, 6 December, which included the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Health and Children, the Taoiseach, the Chief Medical Officer from the Department of Health and Children and officials from the FSAI, this statement indicates that the decision to recall the products was not taken by the Department officials, the Minister or the Taoiseach, but by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland. I am not sure if that paragraph is too literal an interpretation of what happened, but that is the meaning I take from it. What was the dynamic of what was going on in the Department on 6 December? What were the various views expressed around the table? We are not dealing with Cabinet confidentiality, and we will hopefully hear from all the relevant people. Were any contrary views expressed to the position taken that the product should be withdrawn entirely?

Mr. Moran referred to contact made by the Dutch authorities with the Irish authorities on 5 December, the Friday after the issue of dioxin contamination appeared on the Department's website. The Dutch authorities were aware of the issue of contamination of pork fats in early September, but they did not consider this contamination to be of such importance as to send a circular e-mail to all member states to bring the issue to their attention and to ask them to carry out additional tests. The Dutch authorities merely sat on this information, knowing that there were contaminated dioxins in the food chain, but they did not feel it necessary to take any action between September and 5 December. On 6 December, the Irish authorities decided it was necessary. On the face of it, there appears to be a contradiction in the relative urgency which both attached to it. If we take the subsequent reassurances that emerged, particularly from the European Food Safety Authority, which stated there was no risk of contamination if one was eating the contaminated product for a long period, it begs the question that if the Department had at the early stages of its initial appraisal of the issue on 28 November convened the inter-agency meeting it had in the Department on 6 December, and had contacted its European colleagues, it might well have been able to adopt a different approach which would not have involved a 100% recall of product.

While I am not sure if the witnesses understand my line of thinking on this, at face value very significant differences of approach appear to have been taken. The Dutch authorities were aware of the PCB dioxins in pork fats as early as September but they did not seem motivated to the extent that they would carry out a forensic search for the source or contact any of the other member states on this issue. We did so, however, on the basis of the same information and in a relatively short period of time. Those are my opening comments on the proportionality of the response.

Does the Department acknowledge there was a systems failure and that the Department itself has some degree of culpability for what happened in December. We are now in a situation where an allowance of up to €180 million has been made available from taxpayers' money to assist an industry that could have been on its knees because of that same systems failure. I would like the Department to acknowledge this publicly today.

I will get straight into the specifics and ask whether the substance that was used in the Millstream plant in Bunclody was illegal. To refer specifically to——

Deputy, we will be coming to——

Let us get to the specifics straight away. If I may, I will go straight to what has been said. The Secretary General states that laboratory tests have indicated that the source of the contamination was the use of contaminated or inappropriate oil to fire the burner used for generating the heat to dry the bread. We are also told the Garda is now assisting the process. I would like to know whether an illegal process was taking place or whether it was a process that is not governed by regulation. If it was an illegal process, that is fair enough, and I am sure the full rigour of the law will apply, but if it was not governed by proper regulation in the first instance, that speaks to the fact there was a systems failure which put the whole industry practically on its knees for that period.

To be frank, I welcome the political actions taken to deal with this matter in terms of the withdrawal, which was necessary. However, serious questions arise about the failure of regulation. Why was it, in the first 24 hours of the crisis, that ordinary people and those like myself did not know who was answerable in terms of the food regulatory regime? We did not know whether it was the Food Safety Authority of Ireland or the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and there was some degree of confusion. If we are to learn anything from this debate, I suggest there must be one voice in this country speaking on the issue of food safety. Somebody should be appointed, not necessarily a new regulatory regime, but one voice who will come out definitively to speak when such issues arise. This is vital and will get rid of any confusion on such issues.

While I will leave it at that for now, the Department's officials should acknowledge whether they consider that a systems failure took place in the first instance.

On a point of order, are members taking this subject in different sections?

That is what I suggested and am trying to do. At present, members should concentrate on the withdrawal of the products.

At present, members should focus only on the proportionality of the withdrawal.

Yes, I ask members to so do.

The next speaker is Deputy Aylward and I ask him to concentrate on that subject.

I welcome the witnesses. After what happened last November and December, it is important to go through this procedure for the sake of confidence in the Irish food sector and industry. First, I compliment and congratulate everyone involved. I will not make any negative comments about the response to this crisis of the various Departments and agencies involved when it first arose last November as they did an excellent job. Had the Department, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland and the Government not taken such actions, the consequences for Ireland would have been dire. This has been seen previously after similar incidents happened in other countries and Belgium has been mentioned in this regard today. The same procedure was not carried out there some years ago and it paid the price for not so doing in the long term and suffered for years thereafter. This was important for everyone involved in Ireland, including the producers, processors, retailers and consumers, all of whom know how the pig, pork and bacon industry has been saved by such quick action. Confidence has been restored and everyone involved should receive a clap on the back, because one should remember this is all about consumer confidence. This is the reason our products were back on sale on the shelves within one or two weeks and were being consumed by people in Ireland, across Europe and in other parts of the world. Everyone must take cognisance of this fact.

We can learn from this debacle and try to ascertain whether traceability and accountability for food safety can be improved. We are being told the oil that appears to have been the contaminating substance responsible for this problem came from Northern Ireland. How did such oil come to be present? Was waste oil containing contaminants used in this product? I note the individual plant in County Wexford is closed at present. For what reason was it using this oil? Was it using the product that caused all the trouble for financial reasons or for personal gain? What is happening in this respect? I note a Garda investigation is ongoing.

Mr. Moran mentioned the waste food that is being recycled. Many rumours abounded when this problem arose about the failure to remove bread packaging from the system, the inclusion of dyes and so on. While much of this may be rumours and false allegations, does confidence exist that this is not happening in respect of waste food in particular?

Are members going to——

I have gone forward.

This is going away from what was agreed in private session.

This pertains to withdrawal. I am asking the reason for the withdrawal.

I ask the Deputy to stick to the subject of withdrawal please.

Is my question on the reason for the withdrawal not relevant?

While it is to an extent, the matter can be taken up when discussing traceability or the inspection regime.

I will wait until the discussion on traceability and will leave it at that.

I call Deputy Scanlon, on the issue of withdrawal.

I welcome the opportunity to speak on this issue and wish to raise one or two items in respect of the withdrawal of the product. The Government did not have much choice because unlike beef, lamb or chicken, withdrawal was crucial in respect of pork. On first considering the matter, one might ask whether the Government overreacted. However, in hindsight it did not because 90% of the pork production in Ireland took place in plants where pigs from the farms affected were slaughtered. While one can guarantee 100% traceability in respect of beef, lamb and chicken, I have stated previously that even were God Himself to come down from heaven, there would be no way to guarantee 100% traceability in respect of pork. Every part of the pig is used, down to the blood. No one could guarantee 100% traceability. As there was an illegal substance in a food product, the Government had no choice but to recall all the product. The Department is criticised on many issues but the right decision was taken in this case. We have a good, green food identity in this country and that had to be protected.

Like previous speakers, I cannot understand why oil was used unless it was edible oil. If it was used to create heat to dry waste food product like bread, there is no way it should have come in contact with whatever food was being dried. Someone in the business asked if it was possible that, because there is much moisture in bread and it takes great heat to dry it into crust, the wrappings or plastic on the bread may have caused the problem under the intense heat to dry the bread. Coming from a farming background, one can have free range pigs on the land that might eat plastic day in and day out and it does not do them any harm. When plastic is heated it creates a problem and can create dioxins. That is where we should be looking.

I will be brief, as the Chairman requested in private session, in referring to the proportionality of the withdrawal. The Department operates under a service contract with the FSAI. Who is working for who in that arrangement? The list of sectors included in the contract being what they are, the officials referred to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Minister for Health and Children, the Chief Medical Officer and the FSAI officers. The witnesses made the point in a straightforward manner that the FSAI made the decision. Who is working for whom? The Department or the FSAI overshot the runway regarding the proportionality of this withdrawal. It was probably because the Department was suffering from administrative indigestion.

I call on Deputy Sheehan.

I suggest it is appropriate to take groups of three speakers and get answers.

Deputy Sheehan will be the final speaker.

I will be brief. I thank the Secretary General, Tom Moran, and his colleagues Mr. Paddy Rogan, Mr. Jim Beecher, Mr. Martin Heraghty, Mr. Dermot Ryan and Mr. Seamus Healy. It is a pity the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food could not be here to hear the views of the joint committee.

He will be here in a couple of weeks.

He will have had time to digest the debate.

The Secretary General has dealt with the history of events in his comprehensive presentation today. I wish to explore the options available to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Department of Health and Children at the beginning of December. This committee has been seeking greater traceability not only of pork and bacon products, but of all food products. There are many reasons and I must go into them this morning. Had this series of events occurred 20 years ago, it would not have been detected, nor would any measures have been taken to remedy the situation. The current legislation has been driven in conjunction with our partners in the EU. We must remember this when we complain about some of the bureaucratic restrictions placed on our food producers. With that in mind, we can see this incident and our reaction to it as another major advantage of our membership of the European Union. I note the Department's comments on the support it has received from the European Union partners in dealing with this problem and I hope those involved in our farming organisations will also take note of that when considering options in a possible referendum later this year.

Was it necessary to push the so-called nuclear option or, as the Department called it, the proportionality of response? Did we have to destroy all Irish pork and bacon products that Saturday evening when most of our housewives' and restaurants' fridges would have been full? Should we not have asked them to place the products into freezers until more information was available?

Can we have a question please?

I note in the Department's presentation that it has paid 64 payments totalling €35.4 million of taxpayers' money. Is the Department telling us that a much more measured response could have been taken if we had had better labelling and traceability systems in place? The second issue is the need for a more comprehensive State laboratory and analysis system here, not just for these types of samples from food centres but also for the health sector and many other types of analysis carried out under State and European regulations. Most of the samples mentioned in the Department's presentation were tested abroad. Did the Dutch know of this problem as soon as we did or much sooner? Does the Secretary General consider it worthwhile to raise with his colleagues at Secretary General level not only a saving but a greater efficiency if the State were to establish a single State laboratory to test all these samples and those that need to be tested for all other Departments and agencies?

I made my comments on the back of what Dr. Pat Wall said on "Questions and Answers" on the Monday night, that there was no threat to public health.

On that point, given the fact that all the medical and expert advice subsequently backed up by the European Food Safety Authority was that this contamination posed no threat to human health, in hindsight would it have been more prudent to have withdrawn the product from shelves and held it? It came to light on a Saturday evening and not all outlets would have been closed. This would have meant that much of the disposal and destruction would not have to have taken place. I hope I will be able to speak on other issues around traceability. The early indications on the Saturday were that it was not a serious health threat. Given that it came to light as early as the Monday, and subsequently confirmed on 10 December by the EFSA, that it was not a health risk, would this not have been more prudent?

Mr. Tom Moran

I thank committee members for the questions. I will follow the Chairman's directions and stick with the proportionality question and deal with the other issues later. We have listened very carefully to the debate and the questions, which are reasonable. Looking back at an event such as this to try to see whether the response was proportionate or disproportionate is one way of approaching it. We have done much looking back, as have many other people, and our view remains that ours was the correct course of action. I can explain why we think it was proportionate and there are a number of reasons for it.

Our food sector, not only livestock but generally, represents a huge proportion of our economy and its export dependence is very significant. Over the years we have been through events different from but broadly comparable with the dioxin issue in our livestock. The Deputies and Senators will have lived through those eras. We have been through BSE with beef and foot and mouth disease, which is not a zoonoses but is significant nevertheless. We learned an awful lot over those years and we have learned much by looking at other countries and other private brand owners' attention to dealing with an issue like this. One lesson we have learned is that the issue should be approached in a systematic way. Our primary concern is to protect consumers because there cannot be a food industry dealing in export, or any kind of modern-day sector based on food, if the protection of consumers is not taken as a sine qua non. After the protection of consumers has been ensured, one ensures there is a sector and that customers have confidence in it. Apart from the consumers, there are also retailers, importers, third countries and EU countries. They must have confidence in what we do.

When these are taken together, we could have taken a different approach. I will come back to who took the decision in a moment but the country can take a different approach depending on its perspective. A country may go down a particular route of taking a slightly more cautious approach, for example, trying to differentiate whether it is all right to withdraw food but holding on for a couple of days to see how it goes. Unless it can stand over the approach completely and utterly, seeds of doubt are being sown in the minds of consumers, customers and exporters as to the validity and acceptability of the food product. We must all be very careful about that because there is life after an event like this.

I am speaking generally now but will return to the specifics. One must have regard to all those factors. The consumer must be protected and if product is out there that is injurious to the health of the consumer, there would be legal issues involved as well as those concerning human health. We should consider our action against that background. We can see also how we can move to protect the food sector in the aftermath. Experience has shown that prevarication and vague and ill-defined approaches to issues such as this have been disastrous. One member mentioned another country, Belgium, which had a dioxin issue and handled it in a different way than we did. The evidence is there of the effect of the approach as against the way we acted.

In general, as a result of the importance of the food industry, especially the livestock sector, we have taken approaches over the years which leave no doubt in the mind. One cannot go to third country or EU markets or huge multinational retailers and indicate that we think the food being given to them is okay and may not do any harm. Retailers and those in the food industry worldwide do not need to take those kinds of risks and they will not do so. They will tell us to come back when we can give them definitive positions.

That is a general backdrop but I will return to the specifics of the dioxin issue in a moment. There was a question of who took the decision and the dynamics of the decision made on that Saturday. In my statement I outlined the role of the FSAI. The decision to withdraw is something which is taken by the FSAI. It was based on the information available and the assessment of the facts at the time. The decision was communicated in the context of a meeting between Departments and involving the various relevant Ministers on the Saturday. Ultimately, the decision to withdraw was recommended — and not dissented from by anyone present — and put by the FSAI on the basis of available facts.

I know the committee will meet the FSAI, and its representatives will be better able to outline its role than I am. The FSAI is an independent food safety authority outside the remit and completely independent of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. It was set up deliberately for that purpose and that structure has been mirrored at EU level. Ireland was among the first to have a similar arrangement. The FSAI operates under completely separate legislation and offers useful objectivity outside the Department's role. That model is replicated throughout the EU. For example, if the Department or Bord Bia, which as an agency operates to ourselves, is presenting its position to a buying country or agency, it is useful that some agency, which is answerable to the Dáil through a different line Minister, can present an independent, objective, outside view. One gets away, therefore, from the charge that the Department or those in the food sector are involved. The FSAI's independence in this process is paramount. The decision was taken by the FSAI in the context I have outlined.

I also wish to mention the proportionality of the response because there was a reference to whether we overshot the runway, so to speak. Our view is that, without question, the runway was not overshot.

The Department skidded into the soft margin, so.

Please let Mr. Moran finish. The Deputy will have an opportunity to come back in if he wants.

Mr. Tom Moran

Subsequently, within a few days after that decision was taken, it was confirmed by the EU food safety committee that it was the correct decision. It was also confirmed in the EFSA recommendation that it was the correct position. In other words, product and pigmeat slaughtered between 1 September and 6 December should have been withdrawn from the market. It was confirmed, therefore, by a separate risk assessment done at EU level both within the EFSA, which is the wider food safety authority at European level, and the EU food safety committee. They would have had a disinterested view in that sense and would have had no involvement. They said it was the correct decision.

Within the Department we know — and it is a view that has been expressed by Bord Bia as well — that had we not taken the route on pigmeat I have outlined in general terms, there are many reasons we would still be in a very difficult position. We are quite sure that pigmeat with a safe, quality-assured mark would not have been back on the market within the short period it was. In addition, competitor countries would have watched that space, by which I mean, literally, space on empty shelves. They would have been in like a shot with product, which would have been sold and marketed as being okay. It might not have been said overtly that it was not Irish, but it would have been said that it was a dioxin-free product and consumers would have been okay. It is very difficult to try to get back into a market in the modern retail world, having lost it on a negative.

As for proportionality, I can understand fully why people would ask whether it was the right thing to do, whether we went over the top, and whether the recommendation was wrong. The FSAI's recommendation was based on an analysis of the test results, exposure and amount of pigmeat. For example, roughly ten farms were involved in supplying 98% of the processors. It sounds small, but they were big farms supplying into processors that covered the vast bulk of the sector. It was not possible to differentiate. Naturally, if it could have been done without the collateral damage, it would have been but it was not possible. Apart from all that, the FSAI's advice was categorical and clear: a withdrawal of that particular product should be done. That was the basis for the decision.

I was asked about the Dutch, the testing and the sequence of events there. That is why I outlined the chronology in my statement. When the positive PCB result was found in Ireland, and we put out a statement on the Thursday of that week to the effect that we had stopped movement on a number of farms, restricted farms and so on, we were acting at that stage in line with best practice. In other words, we had information, we took action and we published that action. Not to have done that would have been remiss.

What happened prior to that is important, and it might answer Deputy Creed's question. Positive PCB results were being picked up in Europe, although not in the Netherlands but in France. There were positive results from mixed product which could not be attributed to a particular country. They were looking at these results but could not attribute them.

When the Department issued the press release on the Thursday of that week and said it had restricted farms due to a——

Will Mr. Moran clarify when the Dutch authorities became aware of dioxins from their own testing?

Mr. Tom Moran

The Dutch authorities were testing a carcase during that week but they had received information from other countries that there were positive PCB results coming from a mixed fat sample.

As far back as September?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes. Fat from a Belgian rendering plant had been tested and found positive but they were not able to attribute it to a particular country.

The Dutch were testing a clearly identified carcase from Ireland during that week. When the Irish press release went out on the Thursday, which is when we had the information, suddenly the Dutch twigged and said there was an issue. The information came together around the publication by Ireland of the positive results we had.

Is it not a fair conclusion to draw that arising from the tests being carried out by the Dutch in September, which confirmed the presence of PCB dioxins in the human food chain, that they were not as alarmed to the extent that they did not attempt to identify the country, or countries, of origin, albeit that this was an amalgam of pork fats?

One would imagine that if this issue was of such gravity to public health that an effort would have been made by the Dutch authorities to protect public health and, therefore, to make contact with member states of the European Union in which there would have been some umbrella organisation under which they could have pursued this matter.

We are being asked to believe the Dutch sat on their hands until 5 December, that all this time PCB dioxins were in the human food chain from pork fats and that they did not consider it an issue of such gravity to take some type of proactive approach until such time as something was put on the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food's website.

Has it been proved beyond doubt that the PCBs identified by the Dutch came from Ireland or could they have come from other countries?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes. The Dutch were in the process of testing an Irish carcase directly originating from one of our processors for PCBs. Subsequently, there was a positive PCB test.

Were the Dutch also testing for the Belgian plant? I am trying to establish the sequence.

Mr. Tom Moran

The Belgians had tested the fat outcome from a rendering plant but they had no way of knowing what had contributed to that. There was a view that there was some dioxin or PCB problem within the pork sector but it only became apparent when Ireland discovered it, traced it and publicised it. Then the other countries said, "Right, that is where the problem is." There was no basis on which the Dutch could have taken the kind of action.

When did the Dutch carry out their test on the Irish animal?

Mr. Tom Moran

The Dutch were testing an Irish carcase, I think during the week.

Which week, in November or September?

Mr. Tom Moran

The result was available on the Friday of that week.

That is 5 December?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes.

But the September tests of the mixed batch confirmed PCB dioxins.

Mr. Tom Moran

The Dutch authorities were informed of a French control result on pork processed in a cutting plant in the Netherlands which resulted in a positive. The Dutch were fairly sure that the carcase was Irish but they were not able to say because product from six member states was processed on the day.

When Mr. Moran speaks of six member states, this was therefore a matter within the competence of the European Union to circulate to its 27 member states, tell them they had a problem and ask them from early September to go back and redouble their efforts in terms of the testing for PCB dioxins at that stage.

Would there have been an obligation on the part of the Dutch at that stage to notify the EFSA as to the high levels of dioxins in the September testing? It seems, from what Mr. Moran stated, that it was only when the Department gave notification through the website that the information seemed to come to light.

I am not a member of the committee and I thank the Chairman for allowing my question. On the issue raised by Deputy Sherlock, when the Dutch authorities discovered that there were difficulties, were not all other member states' agriculture and food departments alerted straight away as to possible contaminants because it links in with the entire European traceability and food regime? Was each country left then to report to the European authorities or was it the other way around? For instance, what was the driving force? When the Dutch authorities were doing their testing and they discovered there were problems, I would have thought that automatically they would have alerted immediately all other member states producing that product. My information is that is how they did work.

Let Mr. Moran continue.

Mr. Tom Moran

I wish to be clear on the specifics. As I understand it, our first information on this was on 5 December last. As I stated, there were indications that a positive result had emerged from a plant, which on a particular day had slaughtered 1,000 pigs from different member states. They were not in a position, I assume, to give the kind of information which would have allowed them transmit the required information to other member states. In other words, they were aware that there was some kind of a PCB problem in the system but they did not have the specifics to carry it through into the detailed notification that is required. However, once the test was done in Ireland, then the focus centred on Ireland. Had that not happened, we know — we knew on the Friday of that week — the Dutch were testing a carcase from, as I stated, a major slaughterer here which proved PCB positive and that also would have triggered the same. In other words, there are two converging sets of information.

Is Mr. Moran stating that there was live export of Irish pigs which were being slaughtered in France? As Mr. Moran stated it was in a slaughtering plant in France. I assumed he was referring to a live export of which I was not aware.

Mr. Tom Moran

Sorry, it was a sow carcase.

The delegation will forgive my ignorance, but I seek an understanding of the process between September and December. The Secretary General stated that the information first came to his attention on 5 December and that testing took place in September which clearly indicated markers for polychlorinated biphenyls, PCBs, in the Netherlands. Even if there was no specific indication of the source of the PCBs, surely there was some notification to the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA, indicating there were PCB markers discovered within the European Union. Was the EFSA notified or not? If it was not notified, perhaps there was no obligation to do so. Perhaps the Secretary General could clarify this for the committee. Such an explanation would tally events up to 5 December.

If the Dutch authorities were not able initially to identify the source of the problem why did they decide to test a carcase originating in Ireland? Was there a particular reason, or did they test produce from each exporter into the European food market, taking one at a time and examining produce systematically to determine from whence the problem came?

My understanding is that there are two issues and that we are discussing two tests. I understand the first test took place in the Netherlands to determine whether fat product contained PCBs in September. Is that correct? The second test involved a carcase tested by the Belgian authorities on 5 December. The animal was slaughtered here and the carcase was sent to Belgium. Can the delegation clarify the difference between the two tests we are discussing, and the dates?

We will allow Mr. Moran to continue and the committee can put supplementary questions at the end. Is that agreed? Agreed.

Mr. Tom Moran

I will clarify that matter and then move on. The French and the Belgians carried out tests. The Belgian test was carried out on non-food output from a rendering plant. They discovered background PCBs and could not attribute a source to them. The Dutch——

When did this occur?

Mr. Tom Moran

It is not clear, but it was some time around September or early October. The information was transmitted back to the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, FSAI. The position is that the information from both the Belgian and French testing, attributed to output from the Netherlands, did not allow anything to become attributed directly to anyone. I am not aware that they transmitted this kind of information to the EFSA. We would not have that information. However, it appears they did not have the kind of detail which would allow them to give the normal reports back into that system. We did——

I do not understand what Mr. Moran is saying. Forgive my ignorance, but I do not understand the point the Secretary General is making. He stated that there was a background test carried out by the French which took place in September.

It was a Belgian test.

He said it was a French test.

Let Mr. Moran continue and perhaps we can——

I will continue as I am trying to understand events. The Secretary General stated that the test results came back to the FSAI. Where was the communication to the FSAI? What was communicated to it and did it relate to an Irish carcase? Did this occur in September? This is what we are trying to find out.

Mr. Tom Moran

If it is okay I will come back to that, because it warrants clarification and I wish to clarify the matter precisely. There was a communication from the Dutch to the FSAI on 5 December which encompassed information transmitted to the Dutch from the French and the Belgians. That information was back with the Dutch authorities. When the Irish authority published its information in a press release on the Thursday, the Dutch then indicated that they had the information and it was beginning to make sense. That is the summary of how this happened. If there is any further need for clarification I would be delighted to provide it.

I would like to ask Mr. Moran about the reference in his opening statement to "a Department press release" on 4 December. It seems that the Dutch authorities contacted the Food Safety Authority of Ireland on foot of a departmental press release. I am trying to close the circle. Did the Dutch authorities respond directly to the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, or to the Department, on foot of a press release that was issued by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food? The Secretary General might not have that information at his disposal at the moment. He could get back to the committee on the international dimension in this regard. Who was testing for what?

The net point I want to make, which relates to the proportionality of the decision to withdraw all produce, is that EU authorities were aware of the presence of dioxins in September but did not consider it appropriate to take action on an EU-wide basis. In this context, it does not matter whether the contamination of pork with PCB dioxins was identified in a rendering plant in Belgium, in a slaughter plant in France or by the Dutch authorities. Although EU authorities were aware of the presence of PCB dioxins as far back as September, they did not consider it appropriate to provide for a recall of product at that time. If it is the case that they could not identify the country of origin, it is clear that they did not consider the matter to be of such gravity to necessitate the protection of consumer interests by providing for an EU-wide withdrawal. In December, when the authorities in this State became aware of this country's direct involvement in the matter, they decided, on the basis of the same information that had been in circulation since September, to provide for a 100% recall. I do not suggest that the decision in question was wrong — I am merely pointing out that there is an apparent contradiction in this regard.

It seems that the action the Government took in December, when compared to the action taken by the EU in its broadest sense when this knowledge was available in September, reflects a difference of opinion between the two bodies. I am not sure whether this knowledge was available to the European Food Safety Authority, or to individual governments, agriculture departments and private companies in the various countries. Nonetheless, no decision to withdraw was taken at any level in September. We are being asked to believe that these issues were not flagged to member states until December. A big question about the proportionality of the response arises in that regard. I have yet to get a clear answer to that question. Perhaps we need more information about who was testing what, who knew what and when, and to whom that information was conveyed.

Mr. Tom Moran

The Department picked up a positive PCB test as part of its routine monitoring. It traced it back to farms and feed and had a result. It issued a statement on Thursday, 4 December. The same statement was published on the website of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland on 4 December. The Department would have picked up this information even if no issue had arisen in continental Europe. It would have done the correct thing, which was to analyse and test the information and publish its findings, on 4 December in any event. The Food Safety Authority of Ireland published the same statement on 4 December. I have a copy of the statement with me, which the members of the committee will have seen. There were ongoing investigations in Europe prior to that date. The French authorities, which were actively investigating the matter, had made contact with the Dutch authorities, which were aware that the Belgian authorities were testing fat from a rendering plant and had come up with results that pointed to the presence of PCBs. There is no suggestion that any action taken by the Dutch authorities caused Ireland to take action. When Ireland had a positive PCB test, as part of its routine testing, it traced it to specific farms and feeds and then took the appropriate action. When the Dutch authorities saw the statement that was issued by the Department and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland on 4 December, they realised that our industry might be the source of the results they had got. The Deputy asked me to explain why the Dutch authorities, or somebody else, did not decide prior to that date to withdraw Irish produce.

Perhaps they did not attach the same gravity to the matter as we did.

Mr. Tom Moran

I would not imagine that was the case. If the information available to us, which was directly attributable to a product, was available to the Dutch authorities, or to the authorities in any other country with a high concentration of food production, I would have thought they would have taken exactly the same action.

Could the reason be that the European Food Safety Authority stated that if someone was to eat the products concerned every day, it would not damage his or her health?

It is important to clarify matters as we proceed. I seek clarification on whether the Irish authorities — the Department and Irish Food Safety Authority — were notified that testing in Belgium and France had found contamination in a rendering plant? Leaving aside the subsequent testing carried out here, was the Department aware of the findings of testing done in France and Belgium in September which found PCBs?

On the same point, the French and Belgians had a line of communication with the Dutch dating back to September. I understand that while PCBs were found, it was not established that they emanated from Ireland until 4 December when the press release was issued. Was there an onus on the Netherlands or any other member state for that matter to notify the European Food Safety Authority of the existence of PCBs? Should all other countries not have been alerted to this fact? That is the key point on which the joint committee requires clarification.

This issue tests credibility to the extent that it has been established that the French and Belgian authorities were in correspondence or dialogue with the Dutch authorities at an early stage. Is it not extraordinary that an exporting country, Ireland, was not contacted by any of these countries for a period of almost three months, at which point action was suddenly taken? It is an extraordinary coincidence that the problem was identified as a result of a routine test by the authorities here.

I will repeat my question as it may be relevant later on. Who is working for whom? Is the Department operating under a service contract to the FSAI or vice versa?

Given that a European dimension to this issue emerged after the Department's press release was issued on 4 December and in light of the consultations and discussions which gave rise to the decision in this matter, why was the European Food Safety Authority not contacted on the relevant Saturday? Notwithstanding what protocol subsequently emerged, the issue should have been discussed in that context because it was evident at that point that the problem extended beyond Ireland.

Mr. Tom Moran

I will clarify a number of points. The information available within Europe was made available to the Food Safety Authority of Ireland on 5 December. That addresses the question on the results which were being looked at. As to whether this information was or should have been made available to the European Food Safety Authority, the Department has no way of knowing what communication took place between the Dutch and French and the EFSA. While I would not like to speculate on what could have been done with this information, I know it was not specific in the sense that what we learned on Friday, 5 December, was that in one particular case 1,000 carcases had been slaughtered in one plant. The outcome of this process, which was commingled, produced a result which could not be attributed to any location. I do not know. It may have been that there was not sufficient information on which they could either make a meaningful communication on which some kind of action could have been taken. This is very important. The clear fact is that we had specific information based on our own testing that attributed directly to a farm, to a feed producer, which led to action that needed to be taken. Any consideration about what other countries were doing is really a matter for them. We took the action in Ireland based on the FSAI decision. I will come to Deputy Sheahan's question on that. We decided that a withdrawal was the appropriate course of action. That is clear.

A question was asked about who was working for whom. The role of the FSAI is legally defined in its establishment Act. There is absolutely no question that the FSAI works for the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The reverse would not be appropriate under any circumstances. The FSAI has a service contract with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, as it does with numerous other agencies such as local authorities. The service contract is drawn up after much rigorous examination and that is monitored and audited on an ongoing basis, thus providing for objectivity and an outside view on how food safety controls operate. I understand the committee will meet the FSAI in the fullness of time but from our perspective we find that system works well as it is a rigorous control system that is subject to audit.

Mr. Moran did not say when he was made aware of the Belgian and French testing of the waste from the rendering process.

Mr. Tom Moran

It was on 5 December.

The Department did not know of the situation from September until 5 December?

Mr. Tom Moran

No.

I ask members to put their questions through the Chair rather than to direct questions at officials.

I have two questions to which the Secretary General might respond. Does he consider it a mistake by the Department not to have convened the inter-agency meeting on 28 November when the first preliminary indications of PCBs emerged, rather than waiting until 6 December? In the interim contact could have been made with the European Food Safety Authority and assurances could have been gained that may have enabled a different course of action. Did the Department delay in convening that inter-agency approach to the issue?

One of the many defences I have seen promulgated for this was that it was illegal to knowingly place dioxin-contaminated meats on the market. If that is the case how does it fit with the beef decision?

Mr. Tom Moran

Before I deal with Deputy Creed's question I wish to deal with a question I omitted to deal with previously about the weekend and the contacts made. Contact was made with the Commission at senior level throughout that weekend. It was fully aware of everything that was being dealt with and being considered.

As to whether we in the Department consider it was a mistake to call the inter-agency meeting when we did, the answer is "No, not at all". Once the information became available the Department was immediately in touch with the FSAI, which was informed on 28 November about the PCBs. All the action that was taken from that time until the following weekend was in consultation with the FSAI. Throughout that week a considerable number of other actions were taken. We were not simply waiting. Herds were immediately traced and restricted. The feed was locked. The feed operator involved was locked. The samples from the farm from which the carcase was taken were tested. There were ten feed samples on that farm at the time which had to be traced rapidly. The farms were locked up. To get back to the priorities I outlined at the beginning, the first action to be taken to ensure the protection of consumer health was to ensure the farms were locked up and no more products were getting into the system from any potential problem farm. We did not get the result until the weekend and that effectively brought the decision to a head. We were aware on 5 December, the day after we issued the press release, that the Dutch were examining this carcase as well. That would have also been coming down the tracks.

Was the carcase tested in Holland traced back?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes, it was traced back.

Was it traced back to the batch or the individual farm?

Mr. Tom Moran

It was traced back to the individual processor.

What is the situation with placing product on the market that is knowingly contaminated with PCBs?

Mr. Tom Moran

The decision by the FSAI on the withdrawal of product would have been taken on the basis of very detailed risk assessment.

Is there a legal prohibition on placing such product on the market?

Mr. Tom Moran

There are legal limits to which products must conform. In considering the action to be taken in the event of those limits being breached, regard must be had to exposure, the type of product involved, the length of time, etc. The issue of dioxins, as I understand it, has to do with the length of time and the period of exposure. All those factors would have been taken into account by the FSAI in making its recommendations, initially on pork. I have outlined some of the details regarding pork in terms of the amount of product, the spread and the nature of the material to be consumed, because the dioxin centres in on the fat. I am sure the FSAI will elaborate much more clearly than I can, but when it was deciding what should be done, it would have had regard to all that. Its decision on beef was different from that taken on pigmeat. Some 8% of the pigmeat throughput and about 98% of the pigmeat processing capacity was implicated in the pork issue. The figure for cattle was about 0.02% or 21 farms that were restricted. As I said in my statement, the cattle on those farms will be withdrawn from the market and slaughtered. The product from those farms which had reached the market in the period September to December was traced and withdrawn.

I apologise for coming in again, but there is an outstanding question to be answered, as I am sure members realise. It is extraordinary that within a few hours of the routine tests being done here which identified that there was a problem, it became apparent that the Dutch authorities had been analysing an Irish carcase at the same time. This was despite the fact that it was known to the French, Dutch and Belgians that it had been established three months previously that there was a dioxin problem somewhere. It has never been explained why no one took action centrally to inform all the European member states, especially those exporting pork and pork products, that there was a problem and to ask them to initiate tests to identify possible sources. Why did that not happen?

Mr. Tom Moran

That is a fair point. The first information that came to Ireland was on 5 December, as I understand it. No information was given to Ireland prior to that on the basis of testing carried out in other member states. The Deputy is correct. When we identified that we had a problem, people began to say that this was the source of what we were doing. It may be that they were speculating because there was insufficient information available to attribute this to any particular event, but when the event crystallised and we put something out, then they put two and two together and came up with a conclusion.

Are they on the Department's mailing list, or are we fortuitous that somebody from the relevant authorities happened to be browsing the Department's website?

Mr. Tom Moran

When we publish a press release it is circulated far and wide, as people in this room know well. I will look into this issue for the Deputy, but I could not answer offhand how people would immediately hone in on a particular press release. In our own experience, the antennae are raised for specifics for certain issues. For example, if we send out a press release that mentions PCBs, that will automatically be picked up by various linked websites throughout Europe. The press release we sent out on the Thursday was also posted on the FSAI website. The Dutch equivalent of the FSAI would also monitor traffic on its sister websites throughout Europe, so I imagine that this is how the information was picked up.

If imported product into Ireland was found to have PCBs following a random test, what procedures would the FSAI or the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food carry out?

Would it be possible that these other countries used our difficulty to sort out issues for themselves? They had problems and they did not know where these problems were coming from. Is it possible that they used our difficulty? The timing is very close. We discovered on 4 December that we had a problem, and suddenly other countries claimed that it caused their problems. Is that a possibility?

We are very lucky that it was not the Dutch who told us that we have PCBs in the meat, and that the random check made on 27 November made us aware that there was a problem. If we had waited another week, we would have been told by the Dutch authorities that we had PCBs in our meat. That would have been twice as bad for us, as exporters of pork. We only escaped by the skin of our teeth.

I apologise for my absence for the past hour. Has our testing system changed since this incident occurred? Are we satisfied that we have learned from this experience? Are the systems now in place superior to what they were when this incident occurred?

Mr. Tom Moran

The first question was on imports. If our tests discovered that an imported product was contaminated with PCBs, then we would take immediate action on its commercial details and trace it right back to its origin. We would also take it up straight away with the importing country. We would not knowingly release the product into free circulation if we were aware that it contained PCBs.

Would that information be forwarded to the EFSA if the Department found contamination? Would that be part of the procedure?

Mr. Tom Moran

We must be clear on the role of the European Food Safety Authority, which is an advisory body to the Commission. It is not the enforcing body but one that advises the Commission and the EU authorities on risk assessment, so it is not a policing agency as such. Our immediate line of action in regard to an import would as a priority have been to protect the consumer from products that might be injurious. We would then hold it and take it up again with the country from whence it came.

As in this case, where the country of origin was not known because it was mixed product, what would be the procedure if contaminants were found? One would hope it would not take three months from September to December and one would imagine the correct procedure would be to inform the EFSA. That is how one would simplify the detection of where the contaminants were coming from but it is the direct opposite of what happened in this case.

Mr. Tom Moran

In a situation where we discovered PCB in an import, we would go directly back to the Commission and let it know we had found PCB in the imported product. If, as the Deputy said, it was a composite product or a product which was not immediately traceable, this is something that would be shared with the Commission and the other member states. That is a fair point.

To deal with the point of whether we hit lucky, that depends on how one defines "lucky". Our monitoring system picked up this and we took immediate and decisive action. To make no mistake about it, we would rather not have had that problem, which was a serious issue and one we would not take lightly by any means. However, we picked it up and dealt with it appropriately for the reasons I have already outlined.

On whether the Dutch were lucky, they were testing a carcase from an identifiable Irish processor, and we were aware of this on the Friday. It is reasonable to assume that had we not taken action on the Thursday, the Dutch would have found positive PCB and put it onto the rapid alert system, and we would be running behind a problem and——

Would the Department have been in a worse situation?

Mr. Tom Moran

It is fair to say we would be in a considerably worse position even though we would have been trying to suggest we would have found it a day or two afterwards. This goes back to my earlier point that when one is dealing with the food business, particularly the international food business, one must be particularly careful with one's reputation and with the speed and decisiveness of one's action. There is no second chance or room for prevarication. When we found the information and traced the problem, we took it right back and dealt with it immediately. That is why the press release went out when it did, because that was the only time it could go out. We took the action that was required after that.

Is it agreed that we will break for lunch when we have completed this session? We have three more sessions with which to deal.

What are the three sessions?

They concern traceability, the inspection regime and compensation. Is it agreed we will break for half an hour? Agreed.

Sitting suspended at 1.20 p.m. and resumed at 2.08 p.m.

We will reconvene the meeting. We will move on to the issue of traceability and I call Deputy Creed.

Traceability has been shown to be almost entirely unworkable, or non-existent, in the pig sector from the factory gate onwards. As I understood it, the principle of traceability was sold to the farming community — in its broadest sense and not simply in the pig sector — on the basis that in the event of a food contamination scare such as that which we have experienced, one could reach out and perform a forensic recall of the contaminated product. It is self-evident that being obliged to undertake a 100% recall for a 10% contamination shows clearly that we do not have a traceability system that works. This betrays much of the commitment and investment made by farmers in bookkeeping, paper trails etc., in respect of their obligations regarding traceability. While I am speaking in a broad sense, this is equally applicable to the pig sector. All the investment in such a traceability regime is for naught if, having parted with produce, there is no capacity to perform such a forensic recall on the other side. I note Mr. Moran remarked that we were capable of and had performed such a forensic recall in the beef sector in respect of the contaminated product. The question that remains to be answered is why the Department has allowed a system to develop wherein traceability does not work for the pig regime. It poses bigger questions but I do not want to stray into the area of the compensation package.

If there is no fully traceable regime, how can one protect the taxpayer from being asked to compensate the primary processors of a product that is not of Irish origin? We have repeatedly heard calls for country of origin labelling, which we do not have at present. That ties into the debate on traceability. How can one safeguard the taxpayer in respect of the operation of the compensation package to ensure the taxpayer is not asked to compensate for product that was not of Irish origin but was caught up in this recall regime due to the bigger processors and the branded products? How can one now justify asking pig processors, in particular, to continue with the regime they are obliged to live with? The flip side of this is that it is not worth the paper it is written on in respect of the processing sector and traceability. I cannot put it any simpler. It has not worked and it does not work. Why has the Department allowed the situation to reach the position where traceability is non-existent in the pig sector?

I anticipate that the officials will say that traceability worked because they were able to identify through the feed system. In respect of the product recall, it did not work. Why are we not able to forensically recall as we are in the beef sector?

We have traceability in beef, lamb and chicken. We have traceability in pork from the farm to the processor. After that, it is extremely difficult to have 100% traceability because every part of the pig is used apart from the squeak. Everything else is used in the food chain. Blood that goes into pudding is all mixed together. Pork is a versatile food product because it is used for bacon after that, pork ribs and shoulder pork. It is broken down into so many cuts that it is impossible to have 100% traceability. I do not agree that we do not have good traceability. We have good traceability from the farm to the processor but after that it is very difficult. I do not know if it is possible.

The whole question of traceability is in question arising from this episode. Traceability is not working. I say that as a consumer. For instance, at the first indications of evidence of dioxins in a particular product, it could not be determined from where they came. There is a simple way to deal with that. They may say it is not true but that is the indication that was given. When the Dutch and various other authorities identified a problem it was not possible to identify the source of the problem simply because of the lack of worthwhile traceability. If a product is exported to five European countries and exports are drawn from 12 other countries, there must be a record of the countries from whence the product came in the first place. If there is any degree of sincerity about traceability, if that system does not exist it will not work. That is a simple layman's way of dealing with it. As a consumer, I have no confidence in the traceability that is now applied, particularly coming after foot and mouth disease and BSE. We are poor and are not getting any better in the process.

The "Irish pork and bacon approved" label to reassure consumers accompanied Irish product back onto the market. We have "produce of Ireland" and "Irish produce". Can we clarify that this applies only to pork and bacon products from Irish produced pigs, not pigs that are brought in here, because more than 30% of the pigs processed in this country are imported?

I will refer to two statements on the FSAI website. A question and answer page that came out on foot of the crisis states:

How would I know that a pork product originates from the Irish Republic?

Products of animal origin must have an identification mark and the country abbreviation for products originating in the Irish Republic is "IE". This should be located on an oval mark on the label of the product with the plant number and the abbreviation "EC" for the European Community.

Going back a while ago the FSAI website states:

Good traceability can mean that a problem can be pinpointed to one batch of product or one day's production. The alternative is that all output from the business comes under supervision necessitating recall of all products and closure of the business pending ongoing investigations to identify the explanations for the contamination incident. [This is not specifically about pork.]

At this committee's last meeting before Christmas, Deputy Edward O'Keeffe, who is in the business, said the Danes are able to have 100% traceability. I contend it is not possible to have full traceability for secondary processing, namely, anything that has a mix such as blood products, puddings and maybe even sausages. However, surely it is possible to implement it for all the primary processing product from pork and bacon. I have been told on foot of several questions to the Departments of Health and Children and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, that it can be implemented only where there is a danger to public health or unfair competition.

We have all those issues. For too long we have danced around this. If we are to address this problem with a view to ensuring it does not happen again and leave us exposed to the same level of cost for compensation we must get serious about putting in place a fully comprehensive traceability system as far as it can go. It is accepted that what was there allowed us to go back to the ten farms that were the source of the problem, but it should have been able to go the other way too, from processor to fork, in so far as possible. There is definitely potential for much more there.

The traceability issue is very important because it already costs the producers money but they have not seen the benefit of it in this instance. Levies are taken at factory level when the pigs are slaughtered and a portion of this goes towards traceability and improving the situation. I believe the system can be improved. We might never get 100% but I am convinced we can get a much improved system. Producers have seen very hard times. They have never got help from any source because they are not like the beef producers. There was no headage for pigs and even the buildings put up were not grant aided at one stage. Producers are in a serious position and anything we can do to improve their lot and ensure something like this does not happen again must be examined. With the whole industry working together, including the processors, we can get better traceability and accountability for what is happening in the industry. I want to see this happen. The system could be improved and the lever could be ready to drop very fast if something happens.

For the purposes of the HACCP legislation, would the operator at the centre of this dioxin issue have been deemed a food business operator? Going back to my initial contribution, if the source of the contamination was as a result of the use of contaminated or inappropriate oil to fire the burner used for generating the heat to dry the bread, which are Mr. Moran's own words, does the HACCP or any other legislation govern the use of a particular type of fuel for the purposes of producing feedstuffs for cattle or pigs within the Irish market? Does such legislation apply to any foodstuffs for that matter?

If that is the case, is it proposed that a regulation be brought in to ensure particular types of fuel are used or that there be a regulatory framework governing the types of fuel? My interpretation — I should be corrected if I am wrong — is that no legislation governs the type of fuel used in the production of feedstuffs. Forgive me if I am wrong but I seek clarification on the matter.

With regard to traceability, I take Deputy Scanlon's point about the nature of the beast, so to speak, with regard to traceability right down to the end use. I acknowledge that when the problem was identified, it was easy within a reasonable timeframe to identify the source of the contamination and its consequences. Is every single foodstuff regulated? Are all FBOs governed by the HACCP legislation? Was there a failure of regulation in this regard? For example, was a contaminant used which, to all intents and purposes, brought a €1 billion industry — to use the Department's own figures — to its knees as a result of such a failure? This is something consumers need to know about as well. If we do not learn from this or put in place mechanisms to ensure that all aspects of food production are covered by some degree of regulation, there is no reason this cannot happen again.

There are a couple of questions I would like to put to Mr. Moran. Before we move on I will ask a question about a State laboratory, which is now more important than ever. In his presentation, Mr. Moran stated:

While at this remove the time lag between the taking of the samples and receipt of the analysis results may seem inordinate, it should be noted that this was a routine monitoring sample, that the time period involved seven working days, and that it takes three days to complete the laboratory testing procedure.

On average it takes four days to prepare and transport the samples before testing even begins. The Secretary General stated, just before we broke for lunch, that the presence of PCBs was discovered just before the Dutch had discovered same. As the Secretary General said, reputation is everything and we would not like the timetable to have been the other way around. Would the Secretary General consider it worthwhile to raise the matter, not only in the context of savings, greater efficiencies and a quicker turnaround, of the State establishing a specific State laboratory? I would deem it more necessary now than ever before to test all these samples, along with all the samples that need to be tested on behalf of all the Departments and State agencies. It should be put, as a priority, to the Department and Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. It should be initiated immediately.

I second the request of Deputy Sherlock concerning the monitoring of the quality of oil used by milling companies. Has the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food the power to ensure only proper oil is used and will be used in future by these manufacturers? This has been a very costly mistake and I agree with Deputy Sherlock that it is important for that question to be answered immediately. What monitoring system does the Department have to detect the use of oil of inferior quality? Will the agriculture industry be put in jeopardy because of a lack of proper procedure? I seek an answer to these two questions.

We are dealing with traceability. I worked in the meat business for some time and I know about traceability of beef and lamb, but there is no percentage of traceability associated with the pork industry. In Ireland we have not only Irish pork, but pork from many other countries of origin which are being labelled and sold as Irish produce. Traceability is a very significant question.

The Secretary General stated that following from this incident the Department has already identified several areas requiring additional attention. These include ensuring feed business operators fulfil their legal responsibilities to guarantee feed safety. How could one evaluate or guarantee the purchase of used oil or other oil under the hazard analysis and critical control point, HACCP, programme? The delegation indicated that it cannot say a great deal about the matter. However, in this case the feed operator with a premises in County Carlow could be an innocent victim. I cannot see, given the ins and outs of the HACCP programme, how it could cover the purchase of used oil from across the Border. Will the delegation clarify how this fits in under the HACCP programme?

Mr. Tom Moran

I will deal with several of the questions raised, but first I refer to traceability. There is no question that there is a difference between traceability in beef and pigs. There is a difference between traceability backwards to the farm and traceability from the factory gate onwards. In theory, one could design a system of traceability to go as far as one could possibility wish. However, one is trying to strike a balance between what is practical and what meets the normal criteria of cost and effectiveness. This applies from the farm right down to the final product.

Let us consider the issue of beef and the way in which the events panned out for the beef sector. I acknowledge the point made by Deputy Creed and he is absolutely correct to say that the traceability system for beef is very advanced and based on individual animal identification, animal passports and so on. We are all aware of those details. That system goes from the farm to the factory gate into slaughter and on into product. It is traceable right down along the line and the reasons for this are well known. There was a history in that sector and a good deal of cost was involved in putting that system in place. That system has proved to work again and again as it did in this case. We are pleased enough that it has proven its worth and should do so again if necessary. The system of traceability in pigs does not rely on individual animal identification. It relies on marking or tagging pigs at the point of exit from the farm to the factory. From then on, tracing is on the basis of a batch in a factory, which could involve a number of sources in that particular day's kill. One must bear in mind that the pig sector is dramatically different from the beef sector in terms of intensity, numbers and the nature of the beast, so to speak. For example, there are roughly 500 pig producers in the country but to a large extent they are large, intensive, integrated units. They supply large quantities of pigs to large processors on the same day, so they are different systems.

The system did work in so far as it applies, but it is a different one from that involved in beef. It worked in the sense that we were able, as is being suggested, to trace backwards and do something. It did not allow for the differentiation downstream after the processing to the extent necessary to allow a differentiation in terms of a recall on products. It never set out to do that and it would not allow that to be done.

It should not be forgotten that, as I said earlier, roughly 8% of the pig population was involved in this incident, and 90% of the slaughtering capacity was involved in the process. Having had the risk assessment and the FSAI's recommendation, it was not possible to differentiate further on down the line and separate products out. In consultation with the EU, the Department is examining the possibility of extending the traceability system in the pig sector. I cannot say at this stage whether it would be practical to go the same route as, for example, cattle — replicating the same system in pigs. Ultimately, it would bring a substantial change to the sector and the way it operates in Ireland. Denmark has a more elaborate system of tracing than we have. However, the other side of all this is that it would involve a cost for producers and processors. As we know, it is a tough, low-margin sector and if one is going to impose costs on it, a serious cost-benefit analysis would need to be done to see whether it would be worth it.

Would it be a cost on the producer or the processor? Where is the impediment to carrying it further? I appreciate that the producer gets lumbered with the cost anyway, but where is the impediment to having it from the factory gate onwards?

Mr. Tom Moran

If a cost is imposed on any sector, it will find its level. It either goes up or down the chain; it depends. If it goes down the chain on to consumers, it may well raise competitive issues with regard to other suppliers to the same market. If it goes back to producers, they are understandably under ongoing pressure. When one puts cost into a sector, it finds its level up or down that chain — right back to the producer or consumer. If it goes down to the consumer, members of the committee will be well aware of the retail pressure there is, particularly in pigmeat in Ireland and in Europe. It is not a sector to which one can simply add cost and expect that consumers will take that cost because there are other suppliers of pigmeat. May I deal with one point that is related to that?

Yes, just before I bring in Deputy O'Sullivan who wishes to contribute.

Mr. Tom Moran

The point that is tied in to that is country of origin labelling. It is a very fair point that has been made and I accept it absolutely and totally. We have advocated the idea of country of origin labelling for a long time, and have taken it up at EU level. We have taken it up with successive Commissioners and Commission officials. The Minister and his predecessor have raised it in the Council of Ministers on an ongoing basis. We maintain — I do not think anybody here would dissent from that view — that consumers have the right to know the provenance of the product they are consuming, and that it should be made clear. That is a strong tenet of policy which we would advocate. We have pressed that at EU level and have sought to build alliances with other member states to bring them around to the same view. Only yesterday I saw a statement from the UK ministry setting out a number of policy lines on agriculture. We do not often agree with the UK on aspects of agriculture and food policy and we tend to be on different sides of a divide but, interestingly, the UK Minister is now calling for country of origin labelling to be advocated. We are strong advocates of that.

It follows from what was discussed this morning. If one invests in food safety controls up and down the chain and at farm level and if one imposes difficult conditions at farm and factory levels, quality controls and so on, it follows logically that one should be in a position to herald that, state the country of origin, that is, that it comes from Ireland and that we stand over it. I agree absolutely that country of origin labelling is a key element.

I would have thought country of origin labelling would have been a given at this stage.

Mr. Moran suggested individual testing of the animals. From a logical point of view, I do not believe that would be necessary. Most of our producers are fairly large and send pigs to the factory in batches of 300, 400 or whatever. It would be quite sufficient to test the batch. One would not have to deal with individual animals. I do not believe it would be rocket science to do that. The batch would come from a certain farm. That is something which should be looked at. One would not need to go through the animals individually because they would all come from the one batch. A bit of common sense should be applied here.

I would not suggest individual pigs should be examined because they would come from the same source, or batch. That would be sufficient and would greatly improve the situation.

Is it a batch of carcases or a batch of different cuts?

I raised the point about the fuels used to produce the feedstuffs and whether that is governed by a regulation. If it is, was there an onus on the food business operator in this instance to notify as per the national control plan for Ireland in terms of the hygiene package? I did not get an answer to that question. I wish to ascertain whether the fuels used in feedstuffs are governed by a regulation. There is a simple "Yes" or "No" answer to that question. That will establish whether illegal activity was going on.

If we are taking about a bailout using €180 million of taxpayers' money, then it is right that some of these questions are answered in terms of the regulatory framework. The Department officials need to answer those questions.

Mr. Moran talks about traceability, batches, etc. However, is it not the case that under the current regime which applies, the mark identifying the batch on the hide is removed within 24 or 48 hours of processing? Therefore, after at least 48 hours post mortem, there is no traceability under the current regime because the batch is no longer identifiable because the mark on the carcase is no longer available. If that is the case, we need to look at whether there is another form of international best practice. I believe Deputy O'Keeffe at previous committee meetings referred to the Danes. They have a full system of traceability from farm to fork for the pork industry. If that is the case, should we not learn from international best practice and put that in place? I again ask the question, specifically in this context because some of the large processors are involved in processing both Irish and non-Irish pigmeat, whether there is an impediment coming from that quarter to putting in place the detailed kind of traceability regime that exists in the beef industry? Is that a problem? If so, it must be overcome as well.

On current traceability, Mr. Moran referred to the fact that in the national residue monitoring we identify the PCBs and to that extent, the traceability worked backwards to the farm. In a hypothetical situation where the PCB was identified later in a meat cut, in a ham, in a packet, a pudding, a sausage or whatever, where it was not in a Department inspection of a carcase, we would be floundering here today and trying to identify the source of the contaminant if it had come to our attention in any fashion other than in the national residue monitoring system. That raises very serious issues that could emerge. It clearly identifies the need for us to learn from this debacle as soon as possible and to have better traceability so that the Department can do what it has done in the beef sector, namely, reaching out and taking the contaminated product off the shelf. If there is international best practice operating elsewhere, we should look at that seriously.

If there are only 500 or less, it should be easier to do it. To be fair to those farmers, they have complied. They have invested in traceability. They have been betrayed by what has happened to them having sold their pigs. Many of them are paying a high cost now for it.

Mr. Moran did not answer my question to him about a State laboratory that would be available and ready to test at the spur of a moment rather than losing three, four or five days to get the results from Backweston. I want to find that out.

Mr. Moran wants to clarify a point.

Mr. Tom Moran

I was going through the questions——

That is what I am trying to do.

I will give Mr. Moran time.

Mr. Tom Moran

——lest anyone think I was avoiding them.

It would be better, and I would rather, if we would let Mr. Moran answer all the questions first and then come back on supplementary questions on traceability. Is that agreed?

My question was on the oil.

We are on traceability.

The oil question speaks to the traceability question because it is an input used in producing the foodstuff.

We will let Mr. Moran continue with answering the questions that have already been asked.

Mr. Moran

Thank you, Chairman. It was just in case there would be any suggestion that I was not answering the Deputy's questions. I was on the way to getting to them.

Mr. Tom Moran

I apologise for that. I was dealing with country of origin labelling and traceability. What we are saying is that the traceability system is different in pigs than it is in beef. There are reasons for that.

Country of origin labelling is a matter for the EU. We cannot do it unilaterally. Italy tried and was taken to court over it. We want to do it. We have put a significant set of proposals to the Commission to do that, as we did on beef in restaurants, etc.

On the traceability issue, there are improvements or changes which could be brought to bear in the pig sector and we will look at those in consultation with the Commission in the light of the issues raised. As I stated, however, one is looking at a balanced approach that the system can bear. We will do it in consultation with all the players involved. I take the point that producers have a strong interest in ensuring their final product is properly traceable, etc.

I would like to return to the question of HACCP. I referred earlier to the deliberate manner in which the EU food hygiene regulations operate. EU member states apply their own sets of controls under the umbrella of the food and feed safety control programme. The idea is that those who produce food and feed should be responsible for the safety of such produce. The role of the Department, like all similar state bodies throughout Europe, is to ensure that those who run food and feed businesses apply the HACCP system. The supplier of the product is responsible for that. This is an important point. The HACCP system applies up and down the chain in the food sector. Therefore, when issues of this nature arise — I will speak about the specific oil in this case in a moment — it cannot be immediately assumed that the Government agency or Department involved is at fault for not preventing it. The important thing is that all registered food and feed businesses should have HACCP systems in place, and in operation, to prevent the entry into the market of unsafe or injurious produce. That is a fundamental point in this discussion.

I would like to respond to Deputy Sheehan's point about laboratories. We are in a position to test for PCBs, which are marker indicators of the existence of dioxins. This problem was picked up during the work that is done as part of our normal monitoring programme. I agree that Ireland should have its own dioxin testing facility. The elaborate and expensive laboratory process that is needed will be available from February 2009 at the main State laboratory in Backweston. We will be in a position to provide these services from next month. I wish to make it clear that the State's lack of dioxin-testing capacity was not a central aspect of the manner in which this matter unfolded. When the positive PCB tests were indicated, the dioxin tests were taken immediately, by hand, to the reference laboratory in the United Kingdom to be analysed. While I agree that the State should have its own dioxin testing facility, I emphasise that such a facility will come on stream in February under the auspices of the State laboratory complex in Backweston.

That is good news. We should not have to wait for a week for results. It will be quicker to send tests to Backweston than to England.

Will the State test for PCB dioxins?

I ask the Deputies to allow Mr. Moran to continue. They can ask supplementary questions later in the meeting.

Mr. Tom Moran

As I said in my opening statement, the oil that was used is a crucial aspect of the feed question.

May I ask Mr. Moran a quick question before he goes?

If I allow one question, ten questions will be asked.

No, they will not. Mr. Moran said just before lunch that we were lucky that we discovered the presence of PCBs an hour or two before the Dutch authorities discovered them. If the Dutch had discovered them, we would have been blown off the surface of Europe.

I think Mr. Moran answered that question before lunch.

Mr. Tom Moran

I would like to answer it again, if the Chairman does not mind.

Go ahead.

Mr. Tom Moran

It is obvious that I was not sufficiently clear before lunch. As soon as we were in a position to place information in the public domain, which was on Thursday, 5 December, we did so. We did this in consultation and in conjunction with the FSAI. The Dutch were also testing an Irish carcase for PCBs and I think——

It is a question of negligence. If we had a proper laboratory to perform tests here, we would have reduced the time involved by 50%.

Mr. Tom Moran

I do not accept that. I cannot accept that the absence of dioxin testing in the laboratory was an issue of negligence or that it contributed to this issue. I thought I had made clear and I will try again to make clear that the statement we issued on the Thursday was of a positive PCB test result. At 3.40 p.m. on the Saturday we got the definitive dioxin result which enabled us to take a full picture and have a full view of the situation. This led to the FSAI making a recommendation and taking the decision to issue the recall. From the time we had possible results, action was taken to restrict cattle and pig herds, restrict and trace the feed and ensure, in line with the earlier priority I outlined, that no further problem was emerging into the market.

It takes four days to prepare and transport the samples to England.

Please allow Mr. Moran to continue.

Three days were lost before——

I ask Deputy Sheehan to allow Mr. Moran to answer the questions he has been asked.

We need to have proper facilities here. We should not rely on Britain to test our samples.

Mr. Tom Moran

I will return to the question of the oil. This matter must be considered in the context of the European Union's overall approach under the food hygiene regulations, within which the focal point is the operation of the HACCP system by every food and feed business operator. The issue arose because of the use of what was described as a seriously contaminated oil product in the drying process of a feed business operator.

On a point of order, was this product an edible or diesel oil?

I am sure Mr. Moran will explain if he is allowed to continue.

I know it is a stupid question.

I did not say it was a stupid question. It is an important question.

I am confused about this issue. Is the oil in question a diesel oil or is it derived from the food chain?

I am sure Mr. Moran will come to that point.

Mr. Tom Moran

The Deputy has asked a valid question which I will try to clarify. What is at issue here is the use of oil as a heat generator to generate heat to dry product.

It is a diesel oil.

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes, an oil used to generate heat and flame to dry a product.

It is a fuel oil.

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes. The particular type of operation has been referred to. A food recycler is an operator who takes human grade food and recycles it into the animal feed sector. This process has been used for centuries. One can divert food which is no longer good for humans to animals.

Is it out-of-date food?

Mr. Tom Moran

It is either out of date, badly formed or something else. As this is the kind of stuff it would be a sin to waste, it is diverted to animal feed. This has been done for centuries in the farming sector and elsewhere. This is a much more sophisticated case where the food comes from high quality human food processors and is diverted into animal feed. The food in question is bread which may not have been properly cooked, for example. As I understand it, the bread is dried by the feed operator and turned into a suitable form for use in animal feed and the process involves heat which is generated by a fuel oil. All the indications are that there was serious PCB contamination of the oil used in that situation. Members should bear in mind that the investigation is ongoing.

Under EU food regulations, food business operators must have a HACCP system in place in which they identify critical control points in the process and those points are checked and monitored. It is not a set of regulations. No reference was made in the HACCP system to the use of oil and, accordingly, there was no requirement to test the oil. That was the first time in our experience internationally that contaminated oil became an issue in the generation of PCBs or dioxins in food. What we must remember is that we are talking about seriously contaminated oil that was in circulation. That is why I am reluctant to go further down that road because investigations are ongoing that involve not only the Garda but another member state and the environmental agencies in both jurisdictions.

On a point of information. If the HACCP legislation does not cover the use of oil, can one then infer that there is no regulation governing the use of fuels for the production of feedstuffs? If that is the case, as a result of what happened, will there be a move to set up a regulatory framework so that this State and every other state in the European Union can then ensure dioxins of this nature will never again get into the food chain in the way that happened recently?

Let us take the example of our own houses where we have oil heating. Oil comes into the house from a boiler located outside and that heats the house. The oil does not come in contact with the heat inside nor with any food or people. The oil does not affect people. In this case oil was used to generate heat to dry the raw material for the feed. In effect, bread was being turned into toast by drying it out. I do not understand how the oil came into contact with the product.

Through the fumes.

But the fumes should not be able to get near the product. I do not understand how that could happen.

There is an anomaly as far as the testing of the oil is concerned.

Is it the case that the source of the contamination comes from a PCB oil that has been banned since the late 1970s and that is primarily associated with the use of transformers? Is it likely that in this case someone blended such material into an identifiable fuel oil to avoid the appropriate method of dealing with a dangerous oil substance?

I also wish to ask about a previous point that was not addressed. I appreciate we are probably jumping the gun a bit. I made the point that PCBs were identified in the national residue programme from sampling. If PCBs were identified elsewhere in the food chain, for example, in a joint of pork or bacon or in rashers, because of our current inadequate traceability regime we would not have been able to trace back, as we were fortuitously able to do in this case because a carcase was identified in our own routine testing. Accordingly, we would now be in a situation where the entire industry would be labelled as contaminated but we would find it much more difficult, if not impossible, to address because of the failure to introduce a proper traceability regime to identify the source of the contamination. Does this not urgently suggest that we need farm to fork traceability for the pig sector?

On foot of the response as regards the testing of oil, and going back to the issue of testing facilities in this country, thankfully, the food hygiene regulations obliged manufacturers to retain samples. Is it the case that the cost of testing in England was preventive? To take a simple example, when a milk lorry takes milk from ten different farmers it takes a sample of each, which is tested that day in the milk processor's laboratory. Had a protocol been in place whereby these samples were being tested for dioxins or PCBs once a month as a matter or course, even without the oil being tested, this would have narrowed things down much sooner. It would have flagged that there was a problem with a product coming out of a particular plant.

Is it true that Backweston's dioxin facilities are in readiness for industrial action only? I am not saying that this is the case, but that is what has been suggested to me. I was told that it was ready and operational apart from some industrial relations issues that had not been resolved. If that is the case, how long has this been going on?

Would Mr. Moran recognise PCB contaminated oil from any other oil, just by looking at it? How should one expect a feed business operator to know contaminated oil from non-contaminated oil? I asked him initially how one might incorporate oil products into a HACCP, because I, for the life of me, cannot see it. I believe I am reading this as an admission that the Department did not have the procedures or the protocol in place. It has had five different levels of discussion with other agencies since this contamination and they were all about oil products. Therefore there was nothing in HACCP to indicate to the producer that the oil he or she was using was safe.

Five different points have been made since as regards the number of actions taken since the contamination happened, so how does the Department now hope to implement under HACCP a mechanism whereby the person using oils may identify whether they are PCB-contaminated?

On the same question, will the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources have to be brought into this? It probably will, as it is responsible for the fuel coming into the country. If a farmer is caught with red diesel in his car, he is fined, perhaps €1,000 or maybe €2,000 or €3,000, whereas there is no protection at all against imported oil that is contaminated.

Nobody would do that, would they?

That is where the whole issue is falling down. We have no check on oil products coming in for heating or industrial fuel.

I have a particular interest in this aspect of the discussion because the State laboratories are in my constituency. I just want to ask a couple of questions.

When the Minister was answering questions on the day of the statements in the House, I and other Members asked about the testing facilities that were available here. The Minister said that from January of this year, not February, the full extent of facilities would be available. I notice Mr. Moran has mentioned February, and I should like some clarification in that regard.

When the Minister was answering the question that day, he deferred to the Minister for Finance. He looked in the direction of the Minister for Finance when he confirmed that the full range of facilities would become available in January this year. Which Department is responsible? I asked a parliamentary question on 18 December, and was told:

The pesticides division of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food carries out laboratory tests for PCBs, but not for dioxins. Due to the need for special laboratory facilities, safety concerns and so on, it was decided that when the laboratories were moved to their new site in Backweston in 2005, the State laboratory of the Department of Finance would be developed to test for dioxin. [So the decision was made then]. This would include testing samples from the environment, food, feed and so on.

Mr. Moran spoke about the degree to which tests were carried out on animal feeds. How often are such tests carried out? Some reference has been made to annual tests. Are annual tests sufficient to detect any possibility of contaminants at any stage? How safe does that make the whole traceability sector and the integrity of the food chain?

Food recycling comes under the changes that were made in 1986 or 1987, when animal offal was banned from pig feed. I recall some aspects of this, but I would like some clarification. I presume that the quality of the product going into recycling in the first instance is taken into account. In other words, if one has half a tonne of mildewed recyclable product, that is one aspect. If it is partially baked or improperly baked, that is a different aspect.

Mr. Tom Moran

I will try to take the questions in order. I was asked whether I would know an oil product with PCBs, and the answer is that I would not. How oil is reflected in the hazard analysis system that applies at a food or a feed plant is a fair question. It is up to the operators at a food or feed plant to identify the hazards and the points at which risk might arise along a process. That is what the HACCP system is about. How they would identify that oil might or might not be a problem is an issue to which we have given a good deal of thought. I am sure that the industry is giving a good deal of thought to it as well, because this applies along the chain of the food industry in Ireland and across Europe. We took this up the first day with the Commission. Other member states are looking at the same situation.

There are a number of ways in which the HACCP system could deal with the quality and safety of the oil. For example, any food business operator might be asked to get certification from the supplier of the oil to state that it is free of PCBs. Any reputable supplier of oil could consider this. In the meantime, we have taken interim measures to make sure they are aware that they must pay attention to this in their HACCP programmes. Those programmes are applied by food business operators for their own purpose of identifying hazards. We have pointed them towards oil as being an issue which needs to be considered in the HACCP programme. We have given them some pointers on how they should do that and it is something we will consider with our colleagues in the EU. We have taken this up and identified its cause at various meetings in Brussels, even at the time of the crisis.

Let Mr. Moran finish——

Mr. Moran has finished on that point, which was well answered. All of this was put in place subsequent to the contamination. No direction or indication was given by the Department or the FSAI regarding the use of oils in the production of animal feed prior to this contamination. Is that correct?

Mr. Tom Moran

The situation with regard to the use of oil was not an issue. To the best of our knowledge, the vast majority of countries within the EU are in the same position with regard to oil. Contaminated oil as a generator of heat in the drying process has never been a problem in the feed business in the EU, let alone here. It was asked how many tests we have carried out. We conducted 75 to 80 dioxin tests in feed throughout the last year and found no problems. We have not had dioxin problems in Ireland prior to this. In the context of the HACCP programme, oil has not been an issue. This is one of the reasons we raised it with the Commission and we asked that it be taken into account. I would make the point——

Deputy Sherlock has a point of order.

It is important that we get to the nub of this. On the one hand, we are being told the food business operators have a duty of care, if one likes, to ensure against any potential hazards, which is the whole purpose of the legislation. However, if I understand correctly what Mr. Moran is saying, there is no overarching governing regulation at EU level in regard to the use of oils for the production of feedstuffs. Is there, therefore, an onus on the person who is producing the feedstuffs or is this just a failure of regulation and, therefore, anybody can use any kind of oil as fuel for the production of feedstuffs?

It seems the HACCP legislation does not actually govern the production of feedstuffs. Perhaps now, as a result of this crisis, there is a necessity for some sort of regulation relating to the use of particular types of fuels. This is a view on which this committee needs to get some sort of a steer, whether it is a political or an apolitical issue.

I missed some of the meeting so I hope I am not repeating a question that was asked already. Was the oil used in the plant in Wexford waste oil? My understanding is that it was not oil that was used for the first time and the rumour is that it was waste oil that had already been used in highly contaminated areas, which is why it contained dioxins. Was it through fumes, steam or vapour that the oil got into this food that was being recycled? Should it be possible that such oil could get into foodstuffs that are being recycled and then fed to animals?

That question was asked earlier.

I am sorry if I am repeating a question. I was late because I was held up. I have to look after a constituency as well, as the Chairman knows.

If the Deputy has no other questions, I call Senator Bradford.

I wish to continue with the question of the source of fuel oil. During the crisis period, the media and perhaps all of us referred to a banned or an illegal fuel source. It is clear that under HACCP, no regulations governed the sourcing of fuel. How can one use such phraseology to the effect it was an illegal oil or an illegal fuel source? While I appreciate it is not the function of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to decide what constitutes a legal or illegal fuel source, where does such a definition come from? The suggestion that the problem stemmed from the use of an illegal fuel source has entered the lexicon of this debate. As the word "illegality" does not come under HACCP, from where does it stem?

Mr. Moran should complete his response to the questions raised.

Mr. Tom Moran

I do not mind and am willing to take whatever questions in whatever form they come.

I know that.

Mr. Tom Moran

I wish to follow them logically, if possible, and to be consistent, I will follow up on the oil question. There is legislation to govern what is called hazardous waste and oil containing PCBs would be within this context. I cannot go too far in getting into the legalities or otherwise in this specific instance because it still is the subject of investigations by the Garda and environmental agencies in this jurisdiction and elsewhere. However, another point worth mentioning is that HACCP is not the regulatory mechanism. HACCP is a system that is applied by food business operators, large and small, up and down the chain, in which they are obliged to identify and set out the hazard points within their own processes. Oil has not been one of those areas.

Is Mr. Moran referring to waste oil? This is central.

Mr. Moran should be allowed to finish, after which I will allow a few supplementary questions. Members cannot intervene continually and Mr. Moran should continue.

Mr. Tom Moran

Some questions were asked in respect of the laboratories, dates of readiness and ownership of the laboratories. My information in respect of dioxin testing is that February is the date. While I may be wrong, as in many things, my information is that February is the date. As for the Backweston complex, it includes both the laboratories of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the State Laboratory. The latter is answerable to the Department of Finance while our departmental laboratories obviously are answerable to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Dioxin testing is within the context of the State Laboratory, hence the reference to the Minister for Finance. The question was how often dioxin tests were conducted on feed. Such dioxin tests have been required by the Commission since the Belgian dioxin crisis and we do whatever is required in this regard. My information is that approximately 75 to 80 tests were carried out last year.

I refer to the question of food recycling. It is a somewhat unfortunate term because it brings to mind all sorts of other forms of recycling and so on. However, it pertains more to redirecting food from the human food chain into the animal food chain. Deputy Durkan referred to the issues which had arisen in the context of the BSE crisis, mainly in respect of swill and whether the input to the swill was of animal or vegetable origin. I believe that was the point being made. I do not believe it is relevant here.

I also referred to the treatment of swill before it was fed to the animals.

Mr. Tom Moran

In the wake of the foot and mouth disease outbreak, adjustments were made to the requirements for swill to prevent any possible contamination. After the foot and mouth disease ban, adjustments were made to ensure the heat process in respect of swill was sufficient to kill off any——

Members did not get an answer in respect of the waste oil and whether highly contaminated waste oil was used illegally. That is the kind of answer members wish to hear. It was supposed to have come from Northern Ireland.

Mr. Moran noted that a Garda investigation was taking place. He cannot answer that question.

What kind of oil was it? Was it waste oil?

Will Mr. Moran answer that question? I know he is prohibited——

Mr. Tom Moran

I regret that I cannot, and the members will understand that. The analysis of the oil in question showed a high level of PCB, which should not be found in oil in normal circulation. The investigations are proceeding on that basis to see what the situation is.

This oil was used to create the heat. How did it come in contact with the feed?

Mr. Tom Moran

The process involved direct heat. One creates flame with the oil and blows it through the process to dry the feed.

On the point about the 75 tests annually, and returning to my analogy about the milk testing regime, surely the simplest way of protecting the feed is to have a protocol in place whereby the feed is tested much more regularly or systematically than it is. I have seen Mr. Rogan nodding his head and I would like to know why that is not the case, why the feed cannot be tested as a matter of course. It could be done quarterly or monthly. Feed ingredient producers make up a blend of feed from different sources. There must be some way to ensure batches of ingredients do not remain too long into the system before a problem is identified.

Had the problem with the oil been identified at that point, the system could have checked which product and which plant it came from. This was done, but it could have been done much more quickly if the samples had been tested earlier. To conduct 75 annual tests nationally is nowhere near sufficient when one considers the level of traceability checks and balances put into the farm to processor system. There are 120,000 beef farmers in Ireland but a farmer can go into a factory with two cattle, and each of those animals can be tested and traced. There are only 500 pig farmers but when they go in with a day's killing we say the same cannot be done. I cannot see how that is more difficult or costly than in the case of the beef traceability.

Members would like to be assured by the Secretary General that within a defined timeframe we will have for the pig industry a traceability regime similar to that which operates in the beef sector. For all our talk here, we have received no assurance that this is the Department's objective and that this can be achieved within, for example, a 12-month period. We could be back here in 12 months' time talking about the same issue. This is a necessity because if the PCB dioxins had been identified further down the food chain, in a ham or any other meat cut, we would not have been able to trace back to the source of the contamination. We were fortunate in the manner in which this contamination was identified because the traceability worked from that point backwards. Had it been identified further down the food chain we would be floundering to identify the source of the contamination and the industry would be in far greater difficulty.

That is why this committee needs the assurance that within a defined timeframe it is the Department's objective to pursue a traceability regime similar to that which applies in the beef industry. Nothing I have heard on this issue has assured me that this is the Department's objective. We can have all the commitment in principle to country of origin labelling, etc. We have had that for a decade but have made little or no progress on it. The most recent EU paper on country of origin makes it more difficult. We had the Minister of State, Deputy Sargent, before this committee not long ago clearly identifying the difficulties we face at EU level, notwithstanding the fact that the British are now coming on-side. There are very significant obstacles.

We can act ourselves to protect our industry. We can put in place for the pig industry what is already in place and works properly for the beef sector. I want to hear that this is an objective of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and this weakness has been identified in the debacle we currently face. I want to hear that within a defined timeframe we will deliver a traceability regime that works.

We are straying from traceability to the testing regime so I will ask a question on the testing regime. Notwithstanding the fact that there were no tests in 2008 in Carlow, is it not the case that if people were in every day testing, the contaminant identified — PCB dioxins — would not have been routinely tested for anyway? All this commitment to traceability and inspection regimes, etc., is avoiding the point that under the current testing regime applying to the facility, Millstream Recycling in Carlow, we would not have been running the appropriate test for PCB dioxins anyway. We were not there at any stage in 2008 up to the first week of December.

Given that the feed chain was identified in the Belgian PCB dioxin scandal back in the 1990s as the source of contamination, how is it that during the course of all that was printed and spoken during this controversy, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food could consider the feed chain to be "low risk", according to Department statements. If we learned anything from the Belgian example and the foot and mouth disease crisis, it is that the feed chain is critical to consumer safety and the survival of the food industry in Ireland. How the Department could conclude that the feed chain was low risk defies the logic of international experience in Belgium and our experience with the foot and mouth disease crisis.

Does anybody else wish to comment on the inspection regime?

Is it intended that these places will be checked more often? Would it happen twice or three times a year? Is that the plan following on from what has happened in past experience?

I want to return to something that was said in reply by Mr. Moran with regard to laboratories and tests. In reply to Parliamentary Question No. 343 of 18 December, the Minister indicated:

The State Laboratory (Dept of Finance) moved to new laboratory facilities in Backweston in May 2005 and the laboratory has been fully operational since then.

That includes testing for dioxins. The question is if it is operational, is there some reason that we had to send the samples abroad for testing? This is what the Minister stated in reply to the question.

Deputy Creed mentioned the following matter a few moments ago. With regard to regulations appertaining to the treatment of offal, there was specific reference made in the 1980s to the treatment of any such recycled material from the domestic food chain going into the feed chain. It related to the degree and temperature to which the product was heated. In some cases the degree to which the heating would have had to take place would perhaps have rendered product unusable. Is that correct?

I wish to have a specific reply to the earlier question, which I put down as a result of the reply given by the Minister himself. As it relates to my own constituency, I am anxious to find out precisely what is taking place. Is the full range of facilities originally planned for Backweston now in operation? If it is not, why is this?

This committee is not worried about constituencies it is worried about a report. I call Deputy Aylward.

I am worried about the food chain as is the Chairman.

My last question concerns traceability. Will the Department introduce new regulations to ensure this cannot happen again? More frequent testing has been sought already, especially when human food is being recycled into animal feed. That is very important because of the risk of contamination of human food when it becomes stale and for other reasons.

I refer to the oil used at rendering plants and other plants involved in food or meat processing. Its use should be regulated, certain criteria should be set down and standards should be enforced. This would ensure such an incident could not happen again and that waste oil or any kind of contaminated oil containing dioxins will not be used.

There is regulation in the pig processing business, involving visits to farms, to processors and to breeders. Would it not be more important to regulate these groups and concentrate on contaminated feed? This idea has already been mentioned by a colleague of mine. Self-regulation does not work. It works to a certain degree and those involved must take samples, but more should be done. Department officials must visit the relevant businesses on a monthly or three-monthly basis and ensure that compulsory samples are taken.

Mr. Tom Moran

Several points were made and I will try to address all of them. No one can dispute the fact that feed is central and significantly important to the whole food, feed and agriculture sector. I refer to the number of tests. I spelt out in the statement and it is worth re-stating that in one year, for example, we would take 1,800 samples from the range of compound feed materials. These samples undergo 7,200 analyses in accordance with the animal feed inspection plan. Our approach to animal feed testing is in line with the overall control programme submitted to the European Commission. We do what is required and, in some cases, we exceed what is required.

Many people have touched on the issue of risk assessment, upon which all of this is based. The idea of policing or controlling the food sector, regardless of whether it is carried out by State companies, private companies or co-operatives is based on the assessment and management of risk and drawing up programmes to reflect that risk. It is a dynamic process and it is not something that is done once, left static and is not touched anymore. Following our experience with the BSE crisis we constantly reviewed and reassessed our handling of risk and where it existed. In the 1970s no one knew what specified risk material, SRM, was or no one knew about the different temperatures used in dealing with meat and bonemeal. No one knew how to render to prevent the BSE prion reinstating itself in the system. After the outbreak of foot and mouth disease a great deal was learned about the movement of animals and so on. One constantly reassesses the risk assessment approach, it is a dynamic process.

Risk assessment in the whole area of dioxins not only involves the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, but others as well. It is something which is being re-examined and this is done at EU level also in light of recent events. It was done following the Belgian crisis and it will be done in light of the Irish situation.

Reference was made by Deputy Creed to the Belgian crisis and the fact that the problem there originated in the feed. I understand he was referring to the addition of oil to feed. That was referred to earlier by both Deputies on my left. The issue in that case arose with the addition of oil into feed. That is how the feed was contaminated and hence the dioxins in the product and so forth. In Ireland the issue was the use of a particular oil. I will not go down the road of commenting further on that because I have gone as far as I can go, but it was the use of that to generate heat to dry feed for use in animal feed, so they are somewhat different. Obviously lessons were learned from the Belgian crisis and lessons will be learned from this crisis, not just by ourselves but by all.

The questions arose of country of origin labelling, traceability and what can be done. There is always room for improvement in any traceability system. That goes without saying. Every adjustment has cost implications as well as implications for the operations at farm and factory level. As I said, traceability in pigs can definitely be looked at — there is no question about that — in conjunction with the EU. I cannot restate enough our view on the country of origin, but that is an EU issue. It is a competitive issue on which the EU has taken a fairly strong line. Whether that will change over time, I do not know, but we pursued country of origin in beef. Country of origin in beef did not arise in catering establishments. That was a lacuna in that area and we went after it and were quite successful. We have tried to push country of origin not just on pigmeat but on lamb and all other meat products to ensure that consumers get the information to which we believe they have a right.

For various reasons the Commission has been opposed to that. The Minister made it clear, however, that we are not giving up the ghost on that. We are gaining a bit of traction on it and will continue to do so.

Deputy Durkan had a question on whether the laboratories are fully operational. As I said, there are two labs but I can only answer for the Department's lab. The dioxin testing will be done in the State laboratory. That is my information but if I have different information I will be glad to inform the committee. That applies to any of the other information I have transmitted here. If I can give clarification later, either directly or indirectly, I will do so. I will check the date of the dioxin testing — my information is that it is in February — and I will let the committee know.

If Mr. Moran informs the clerk of the committee, she will be able to inform all members who are here today.

Mr. Tom Moran

I would be delighted to do so. There is no problem.

I am extremely disappointed that the Secretary General could state that traceability in pigs is an issue that the Department can look at. If there is a single lesson we must learn from this matter it is that traceability, which will enable us to do forensic recall as in the case of beef, is a top priority. It has to be achieved within a set timetable. It is something that gives us a competitive advantage. There may well be costs but they are costs that have been met already in the beef sector where it works to our advantage. I hope that objective will loom large in our deliberations and findings. A traceability system that works must be delivered. Otherwise, if there is another scare, and we have to have a 100% recall for the sins of a few visited on all, it will be entirely unacceptable. It has been an expensive lesson at €180 million. To say that it is something that can be looked at worryingly relegates its significance. I would certainly not be happy if that was the Department's official line on the matter.

Did Deputy Aylward indicate that he wanted to come in? No. Does Mr. Moran wish to contribute again?

Mr. Tom Moran

Thank you, Chairman. I want to revert to one point. I thought I said in my speech that we will be looking at traceability in pigs. It is something we are looking at and will continue to do so. We will discuss it with the stakeholders involved who all have an input into it. As I said, there are many implications.

What about the objective of the Department to achieve a system which mirrors what is in existence for beef?

Mr. Tom Moran

What was put in place for beef, which I know quite well, may well be — I am speculating on this——

It sounds like Mr. Moran is hedging and not speculating.

Mr. Tom Moran

I am not a hedger. Traceability in the beef system is very sophisticated. It is based on individual animal tagging, passports and computerised movement, CMMS, which was extremely costly and is an extremely useful system. The two sectors are not similar, as the Deputy knows even better than I do. To say we will replicate the beef system in the pig system would not do justice to a process. One would want to have a good look at the pig system.

What would one hope to achieve with a forensic recall?

Mr. Tom Moran

I take the point the Deputy made about where one would go if a dioxin positive, or a PCB positive, was found in a rasher or a piece of meat. That is a worrying issue which would have to be addressed to guarantee all the checks and balances were in place further back to ensure it would not happen.

From a farmer's point of view, it would be needed further forward, not further back.

If one wants to be financially viable——

(Interruptions).

In the days when there was a plethora of abattoirs in the country, one could trace one's pork product in the same way as one could trace one's beef or lamb products. Some supermarket chains and smaller outlets have circumvented the labelling laws by putting a picture or the name of the producer of a rasher or half a dozen sausages on the product at a cost to themselves.

I go back to what the FSAI's website said, that with good traceability, a problem can be pinpointed to one batch of product or one day's production. Taking literally the comments about replicating the beef system is to be a little disingenuous because that system allows traceability.

I made the point that two cattle can be traced, as can a lorry or two lorries of pigs coming from a farm because there are only 500 pigs. If one sends 200 pigs a day, they can be batched off and labelled. CMMS forms are not needed. That can be done and something can be isolated. One cannot isolate something to an animal in the case of pigs but one can isolate something to one day's production or a single event.

(Interruptions).

I am talking about primary cuts. One can complicate it. If that regime was in place, the level of exposure to the taxpayer would have been a fraction of what it is now.

I accept it would be impossible to have the same system as in the beef sector. It would not be viable financially because pigs come in such numbers and batches. We could probably do a little bit more to isolate it to the day of the product being slaughtered. There is no way one could trace sausages and puddings because it is a mixture.

Mr. Tom Moran

On the point about traceability of pigs, in light of any event, we will see where improvements can be made in regard to traceability. I take the point the Deputy made that, for example, it may well be on primary cuts and so on. We will see if improvements are feasible in the context of the points made by the Deputy. We will see where the traceability system can be improved to perhaps facilitate a different response in the event of something occurring.

No matter what the traceability system is like, it goes back to the earlier justification for the total recall. We must examine that in a wider context as well. If it was a question of putting at risk the re-emergence of a healthy sector, it would not necessarily be worth the candle at that stage. We will have a look and see how we can improve the traceability.

Does Deputy Creed want to ask a question on the premises in Carlow?

I deliberately tried to compartmentalise the issues. I have a question on the operation of the Department's inspection regime. One such question I have asked to which I have not got an answer is in respect of the contaminant that has been identified. If the Department was in the Carlow plant testing every day of 2008, it would not have conducted the appropriate tests to identify the contaminant concerned. That is tied in to the observation which I made in respect of the feed chain and the Belgian experience. With hindsight, is that something on which we were remiss in terms of not testing for these contaminants on a more regular basis?

The second point relates to the inspection regime generally as it applies to such plants — there is more than one such plant in the country. In 2008 there was no inspection whatsoever of that plant.

My experience would be not with such plants but with the farming community generally. The farming community is regularly policed, and rightly so, in respect of all its obligations for traceability etc. It finds it incredible that a plant as critical in the feed chain as this was not the subject of an investigation or testing regime in 2008. How is that the case?

It is not just a failure at that plant. That plant supplies a number of people who blend their own feeds and at that level the contaminants were not picked up until we worked our way backwards from the national residue testing regime. Is that not a layered failure, at that plant and among the number of people to whom it supplied feed, that we did not pick up the contaminant on the basis that we were carrying out the wrong tests?

After our experience of what happened in November and December last, and learning from the contaminations, which would be the most viable or the easiest to test? Would it be the meat or the feed? Where would be most beneficial from the Department's point of view? If it was to start with a new regime of foolproof testing, how would it proceed? Would it be better to test the food that is fed to the animals across the board, including beef and poultry, or would we be better off testing the carcase? At this stage, given what we went through, which would provide the best result for the money we spend on traceability and accountability?

Mr. Tom Moran

There are two questions. On the question of the plant, it was indicated that the recycler, to call it that, is at the lower level of risk in terms of what is inspected. That is why it was deemed to come within our overall food control programme and it was deemed to get such inspection. On the number of inspections, for example, mills received 80, intake points received 20, premises received 90 and wholesale and retail of animal feed received 692. The level of checks varied according to the assessed risk at the time.

The reason the plant was at the lower level of risk related to the nature of the operation in which it was involved. It converted human-grade food into animal feed. This was the first time ever in our experience and throughout Europe that contaminated oil in the drying process had contaminated feed. That is why it was at the lower level of risk.

In line with what I stated, in the event of an incident of any sort within one's overall risk assessment programme, obviously one reassesses and sees where the focus might be. The focus here, arising out of this, will centre on reflection within the HACCP system on the oil used. Food business operators must make sure they address that hazard in their HACCP programmes. That has been and is continuing to be pursued. The dioxin testing of feed was taking place anyway. It was deemed appropriate in this case. This programme was submitted to the Commission. It was deemed appropriate to visit recycling facilities once a year. Between 70 and 80 dioxin tests are done on feeds over the course of a year. All the tests were negative throughout the year. I was asked whether testing should focus on meat or feed.

Where were the dioxin tests to which Mr. Moran referred conducted? Were they conducted in similar plants to the Carlow plant, but not that plant itself, or were they conducted in other feed processing plants?

Mr. Tom Moran

They were conducted throughout the feed sector — in mills etc.

Were the tests aimed at finding dioxins?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes.

Was dioxin testing included in the array of routine tests which were conducted in Carlow in 2006 and 2007? What tests were included in that array?

Mr. Tom Moran

I understand that on-site visits were carried out. The main focus of those checks was on hygiene, the state of the place and the way in which the integrity of the feed intake was addressed.

Were samples of the feed taken?

Mr. Tom Moran

The visit to the plant would not have involved taking samples specifically for PCB testing etc. The laboratory analysis——

Were samples taken for any form of testing?

Mr. Tom Moran

The laboratory analysis involves testing the composition of feed material. The feed is checked for its protein levels, the absence of undesirable substances, the presence of heavy metals, microtoxins or dioxins and the absence of meat and bonemeal. That is the kind of thing that is examined as part of the wider 7,200 laboratory tests that are undertaken in the feed sector. The plant was visited on the basis of its classification in the lower-risk category. There was a focus on the way the facility was operated.

Nothing was tested. It was just a visual inspection.

Mr. Tom Moran

It was a kind of a——

The finished product was not tested during the two visits in 2006. No samples of the feed being produced were taken away and tested in a laboratory to ascertain whether they might be contaminated. There was merely a visual inspection of the hygiene standards at the plant and the behaviour of the staff of the plant — the way they kept the systems clean etc. No samples of the actual produce were taken to determine whether it was contaminated.

Mr. Tom Moran

As I understand it, the residue testing programme would have covered produce across the board. Some of the produce from that feed plant would have been examined in different places as part of the overall monitoring programme. The inspections in question involved an examination of the facilities and procedures in the plant.

At what point is the finished product, which is given to animals as feed, examined within the testing system? If it is contaminated, as in this instance, which of the 7,000 tests will pick it up?

Mr. Tom Moran

One picks up the feed at farm level when samples are taken of the feed that is used in the various farms.

The dioxin in this instance was not picked up by the routine testing regime until December.

Mr. Tom Moran

The dioxin was picked up in a slaughtered pig before being traced back.

It was not picked up in the feed.

Mr. Tom Moran

It was not picked up in the feed until we tested a sample from one of the farms in question. The sample in question was found to have PCBs.

Is it the case that the samples that are routinely taken in mills and farms that blend their own feeds are not normally tested for PCB dioxins?

Mr. Tom Moran

As I understand it, we would do a certain amount of PCB testing across the board.

It never showed up in feedstuffs.

Mr. Tom Moran

It never showed up. We never had a positive test.

Can Mr. Moran answer the question I asked about the most viable means of testing? Is better value for money available from testing carcases or from testing feedstuffs? Are we learning from this? What type of regulation regime is envisaged for the future?

Mr. Tom Moran

I do not see this as an either-or situation but more as a combination of the two. One focuses one's testing and analysis up and down the scale. As I stated, feed is clearly important. While one will always need to do tests and analysis at the feed level, we also do tests further down the chain. This is not, therefore, an either-or question.

Is it agreed to move on to the issue of compensation? Agreed.

Will the Secretary General comment on the progress made regarding the compensation package for the primary producers affected by the recall, specifically, whether the Department has reached a decision on the desirability or otherwise of proceeding with the slaughter of the breeding sows in the contaminated units? Will Mr. Moran outline the scientific basis for any decision on slaughter? I understand an issue arises as to whether this matter will be dealt with.

With the exception of the breeding sow population, have all other animals in the affected herds and units been slaughtered? In the absence of country of origin labelling, how does the Department propose, for the purposes of compensation, to distinguish between pork produced by Irish pig producers and pork produced by processors involved in processing Irish and non-Irish pig carcases? It would be entirely unacceptable if, by virtue of the failure to have a proper regime for distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish pig carcases, taxpayers were asked to pick up the tab for pork which was not contaminated or of Irish origin. In the absence of an appropriate regime to identify the country of origin of products, how can one be assured that this will not be the case?

Secondary producers are concerned to ensure they receive a fair share of the compensation relative to their losses. I am not sure the sum of €180 million will adequately compensate all those who lost out as a result of the recall. We must ensure everyone is compensated in a manner that is proportionate to the losses incurred. Those with most muscle who, by virtue of their position, may have been sitting around the table must not be allowed to lock out others who also lost out in this debacle through no fault of their own. I ask Mr. Moran to provide an overview of the compensation regime and to indicate whether he believes the figure of €180 million will be adequate.

Since the Taoiseach referred to the term "contingent liability" at some point after 6 December, I have been at pains to find a definition of the phrase as it pertains to this case. I expect the €180 million package arises from the fact that a recall was issued at the Government's behest. As a result, those innocent producers, if I may use that phraseology, who, through no fault of their own, used a certain type of product lost production and suffered a loss in profit. They are, therefore, entitled to some compensation. What is the Department's view of the compensation scheme and the €180 million fund in terms of liability? I would like to have a better understanding of this issue as it goes to the heart of the scheme.

I also wish to ask about the statement made by the Secretary General that the scheme is confined to processors who have suffered losses as a result of the recall, and to product relating to animals slaughtered in Ireland between 1 September and 6 December 2008 which cannot be shown to be uncontaminated. Is it the case that only those people who used the contaminated product will be liable for the compensation package? I seek clarification on that point. To date, a payment of €35.4 million has been made and there are 64 payments. Is that 64 payments to 64 individuals or have some individuals received more than one payment?

I am concerned also about the workers who sustained a loss of income as a result of the crisis. When the processors closed down, many farm workers and others within the processing industry lost income. The question can be asked whether they should be entitled to some form of compensation package for loss of earnings through no fault of their own. Will Mr. Moran provide some clarification on that?

Hundreds of pig farmers are sustaining a serious loss of income through no fault of their own, who were not directly affected by or who had never used the contaminated product. The question can be asked also as to whether they should be eligible for some form of compensation. I seek clarification on the nature of the scheme, how it is proposed to make the payments and whether there will be a full disclosure on how the payments are made and to whom.

According to my notes, to date 50,000 pigs have been slaughtered and 40,000 more will be slaughtered within a week. Is 90,000 the total number of pigs that will be slaughtered as a result of the contamination? The question has been asked already about whether the €180 million that has been set aside will be sufficient to provide adequate compensation? To date €35.5 million has been expended. Has that sum been paid to the processors or the producers? The groups affected are interconnected.

I know of one company that used the situation to let go many workers. The same company has not sold Irish pork or bacon for six years; it imported all its produce and repackaged it to sell to the Irish consumer. I did not know about that situation until the crisis developed. Will that company be entitled to compensation? I do not think it should be as it was not even selling Irish product, yet it used the crisis to let people go. I do not know whether those people have been re-employed. I hope that company does not receive compensation.

I would like a breakdown of the compensation paid to producers and processors to date. In the beginning processors used the crisis while many pig farmers had to carry the can for up to three weeks during which they received no payment for their pigs. I refer to people who were sending hundreds of pigs to processors every week on a continual basis, yet they had to wait for payment at a time when the processors got compensation. I do not say they were not entitled to it. However, the compensation package must be an equal one across the board.

The previous speaker referred to workers who were let go for a period of one or two weeks. Will there be any compensation for them from the processors given their loss of two weeks earnings?

This is about the compensation package and unfortunately it is an area that comes back to bite us. Traceability will cost the Department millions because it will not be able to determine which is Irish produce and which is not. While I am not a mathematician or an economist, based on rough figures I believe the Department is short €45 million in this package.

Mr. Tom Moran

The financial package introduced relates to the third priority we talked about, in terms of sequencing. The health of the consumer must be protected and confidence restored to the market. The industry had to withdraw product as a basis for allowing it to start processing again, and that is the origin of the scheme. It is not a compensation scheme, but rather a financial contribution to offset the cost suffered by the sector because of the withdrawal. This was the basis of the State aid approval given by the Commission on 24 December, Christmas Eve. Members will be aware of the serious constrictions that apply to State aid.

The contribution of the Commission to the overall fund, leaving aside the private storage aspect I mentioned, to help the sector to get up and running, was to co-fund the slaughter of the animals as well as some of the recall product close to the primary processor — the stock on hand within the control of the primary processor. That is the area which the Commission agreed to co-fund. Matters are somewhat complicated in that sense.

We published the terms of the scheme and it follows on from the heads of the agreement worked out with the sector in the Department that night. It relates only to Irish product, pigs slaughtered between 1 September and 6 December. There is a provision for products which, for some reason, became unsaleable as a result of that. That provides a certain amount of flexibility in the operation of the scheme, given the constraints. There were some 64 individual payments across the board, amounting to €34.5 million. It breaks down roughly as €10 million for primary processors and the balance for secondary processors. Some payment has already been made to the farms on an interim basis. We have reached agreement with the pig farms in relation to everything apart from sows and gilts. Some 90,000 of the pigs will be destroyed or taken out of the system this week and we are still in discussion with farmers on how to deal with the outstanding pig population, mainly the sows.

Will Mr. Moran say how many?

Mr. Tom Moran

The overall figure is around 130,000 pigs. Some pigs in the overall number may not be subject to these arrangements if the Department is completely satisfied they were never involved in the contaminated feed issue. Obviously it is difficult for the farmers involved and we are being as helpful, sympathetic and understanding as we can. It is a traumatic issue for them. We have helped the pig sector through various difficulties in the past. It is a sector valued by the State and the pig producers are its backbone. There is a small number of those producers and they are involved in large, intensive production. It is heavy going and there is much work involved. The margins are not always brilliant and the producers suffer cyclical ups and downs. This latest issue is very unfortunate.

Nobody is suggesting that a scheme like this will be the full answer to everybody's ills. That is why I made the point earlier that not everything will be put right by this for all of those involved in the sector, including those involved in retail. This is a facility that was made available under strict terms to try to assist the sector to get back on its feet, restart slaughtering and get the show on the road again. However, the taxpayer cannot be asked to correct every single wrong. I made that point about the retail trade as well. Nobody will end up with everything corrected. The amount of money involved is huge and is very significant in the current climate. Nobody is more conscious of that than us.

We got the maximum amount available from the EU to supplement the amount the Government provided. The terms of the agreement are carefully written in such a way to make sure that it allows for the best use of that amount of money. We have very comprehensive terms in place for the scheme at the moment. We are confident that this will protect taxpayers' money to the full and that it will not provide compensation for products that are not eligible. We have strict controls in place to make sure that is the case, from the stores right out to the rendering plants. We would be delighted to brief the Chairman and the committee on the final outcome of the scheme in the fullness of time.

We are very grateful to the whole sector for working with us in those days before Christmas to get the scheme up and running so that we could make the payments and get the sector back to work. The sector suffered and the aim of the Government was to get it back up and running.

I asked about compensation of workers and whether there is a proposal in the scheme for them. I also asked about contingent liability. Can I get a viewpoint on those matters?

I want to ask about rendering and incineration. Following the rendering process, I believe the processor is left with meat and bonemeal. If this meat and bonemeal is from contaminated pigs, is the processor obliged to incinerate it? Is it an option just to incinerate the affected product and carcasses, rather than incur a double cost?

Do I take that the only possible exemption from the slaughter out of the gilts and breeding sows would be for animals that may not have been in contact with contaminated feed? Is the Department considering leaving breeding stock that was fed by contaminated feed in the system? If it is doing this, what is the basis for it? Is there something to suggest that the contamination is not passed on from sow to banbh?

Is Mr. Moran satisfied the €180 million is an adequate package?

As a follow-up to Deputy Sheahan's point, Mr. Moran referred to some further tweaking of the scheme in the sense that he indicated the Department might be in a position at some future stage to present us with some further details of the final worked-out document. I take that as meaning the scheme, while it is up and running, for which we are thankful, is not yet finalised. What room for manoeuvre does Mr. Moran feel he might have and what financial provision will he set aside for this?

To follow on from a question asked by Deputy Sherlock, Mr. Moran spoke about persons eligible for payments and the clear definition of those who would be eligible to come within the scheme. Deputy Sherlock raised, as I do, the point about other people within the industry who were directly affected by the December crisis. Are such people entirely excluded from assistance? Are the limited number of producers whose herds are being slaughtered and whose animals were affected the only eligible producers? People outside that limited number of pig producers have also been financially affected in many cases. Will any of those clearly affected people come within the list of those eligible for compensation?

I welcome the compensation package. Mr. Moran stated: "This Department, Bord Bia and the diplomatic marketing offensive will continue to be a priority over the coming months". I would be grateful if Mr. Moran would also remember the beef sector. Beef prices are falling at present and some producers are using the problem with pigs as an issue, particularly the bull beef producers, which affects exports to Italy. I understand no bull beef cattle are getting into Italy at present because it is using the pig problem against Irish farmers. When the Department is carrying out its diplomatic marketing, I ask that it also remembers this market.

On rendering, there is one rendering plant in my constituency at Ferrybank. I spoke to the general manager there before Christmas and he told me the place was chock-a-block given the amount of rendering of pigmeat to make meat and bonemeal. My understanding is that two products come from this process, the meat and bonemeal and some kind of oil residue that can be reused and recycled for fire burners and so on, and that these can be sold on. Does the Department get anything from the sale of these products and would this be used towards the €180 million compensation package?

I understand that every shed and store in the south east and as far south as Cork has been reserved for this meat and bonemeal until it is sent abroad to Germany. Do we get any payback per tonne from that meat and bonemeal or must we pay Germany to take it for incineration? This brings me to the issue of incineration and whether we should have our own incinerator because the real——

We are trying to get one.

The real problem is that if we produce the oil, we should be able to handle it without sending it abroad. It is an issue for another day and would include the question of associated jobs.

My understanding is that the German Government is able to make money from the meat and bonemeal we send to Germany and that we have to pay for this. Is this correct? I would like the facts.

Mr. Moran can also deal with incineration, if he wishes.

Mr. Tom Moran

I would be delighted to. I will take the questions as they have arisen. When the scheme was drawn up in the midst of this crisis, the top priority was to get the industry up and running immediately. In that context, obviously the workers were very high on the list of those to benefit from this, because they had been laid off at that stage and no processing was taking place in the run-up to Christmas. Part of the aim was to get the scheme up and running and to get slaughtering started. This took a great deal of effort because many complications arose and the aim was to have the workers out for as little time as possible. If memory serves, while the deal was more or less finalised in the middle of the night between Wednesday night and Thursday morning, slaughtering recommenced on Thursday afternoon in many of the larger facilities. The aim was to get workers back to work within the shortest amount of time. I will return to the issue of contingent liability.

Many questions have been raised in respect of meat and bonemeal. Two products come out of rendering, namely, meat and bonemeal and tallow. Tallow is an oily substance and while we have come back to oil again, this is an entirely different category of oil. The meat and bonemeal to emerge is category one meat and bonemeal. In other words, it must be destroyed and cannot go anywhere else. The methods of destruction are co-incineration or incineration. It is possible in Ireland to use this product in the manufacture of cement. That is something we have worked out with the EPA and constitutes gaining value from that product.

Mr. Moran should explain co-incineration as opposed to incineration. What does it mean?

Mr. Tom Moran

Co-incineration is where one uses the product for some purpose other than simply burning it to get rid of it. For example, one might generate some heat, electricity or manufacturing process from it.

That still constitutes incineration.

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes, but a by-product or something else comes from it. The meat and bonemeal coming out of this must go down that route. If it cannot be used here in cement manufacture and so on, it must be exported for incineration in Germany, which was the case with much category one meat and bonemeal from the old BSE days.

Will this be done at a cost or will we get paid for it?

Mr. Tom Moran

We were able to negotiate with the EPA, which was very helpful in this regard, and the ability to use the tallow to generate oil for heat in the rendering plants, which is a kind of green approach to the process, limited the cost. Therefore the taxpayer and the scheme benefit because we are funding the rendering. In other words, the more use one can make of the tallow and the meat and bonemeal, the less of a cost because one is extracting value from it. Hopefully, much of it——

The Department must pay for the storage of meat and bonemeal until such time as it is used or exported.

Mr. Tom Moran

The Department will pay to have the product rendered and destroyed, as it is counted into the renderers. Thereafter, it is for the renderer to destroy it in line with our conditions.

The renderer will pay for storage and for exporting it.

Mr. Tom Moran

Exactly. Whether the €180 million will be sufficient——

Is it not an option to incinerate directly, rather than to render and incinerate subsequently?

Mr. Tom Moran

We do not have the requisite kind of incineration facility here. Does the Deputy mean that one would take the animals?

I refer to incinerating the carcase or the product.

I expect there would be massive objections to that. I do not think one could do that.

Mr. Tom Moran

We have not gone down the road of taking the carcases and simply incinerating them before. We do not have the kind of incinerating——

One would be obliged to render them first.

Mr. Tom Moran

If one renders the animals, one ends up with the powdery meat and bonemeal and the tallow. Consequently, one has an inert substance that can be stored, transported, dealt with and so on. If one is dealing with truckloads of dead carcases, one is entering a different area, which would entail serious costs.

If one had an incinerator, this would be an option. In the United Kingdom, they directly incinerated carcases during the foot and mouth outbreak.

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes, it would.

It would be more cost-efficient.

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes.

At present, there is a twin process, whereby one must render and then incinerate and export or store.

Mr. Tom Moran

That is right. This also was an issue throughout the BSE crisis, whenever we were obliged to do that.

Can one take it that these animals, or at least the cattle, will not be skinned? Will the hides be removed from the cattle?

Mr. Tom Moran

No. While I cannot remember the precise number of cattle involved——

Mr. Tom Moran

The cattle will be slaughtered and rendered but nothing more will be done to them.

I would be surprised if they are worth €200,000.

Mr. Tom Moran

One cannot take the hides from category one products. On the question whether the €180 million would be adequate, it is not for me to remind the committee of the constraints on any figure. The €180 million is not a fund but a facility. The heads of agreement that are written provide for the possibility of a levy in the event of the fund not being adequate but that has not been worked out.

There is a 1% income levy across the board.

Mr. Tom Moran

The idea of this kind of approach emerged in the EU health check where the EU food industry examined the possibility of building up a fund to contribute to funding such events down the road. Built into the heads of this agreement is the possibility of a levy in the event of the funds not being adequate.

Is that an agreement between the Department and the processors?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes.

I do not know if Mr. Moran can speculate on this but if, down the line, it is deemed that an illegal activity has taken place, is it his opinion that a liability or penalty might befall whoever might be convicted?

Mr. Tom Moran

That is an area I could not explore for obvious reasons but the scheme documentation, which has been published, provides that any payment is net of any insurance that would be drawn by any operator participating in the scheme. It is carefully written.

We have spoken about lots of different types of oils today but the heads of this strike me as very watery. Nothing is set in stone. I do not know how the Department came up with the figure of €180 million with what Mr. Moran has just said. God only knows where it will finish.

Mr. Tom Moran

The heads of the agreement were tightly written. They were only the heads of the agreement. There is a detailed scheme document published on the Department's website and I will make it available to the Chairman if he wishes. It is a very tight scheme. The figure was negotiated based on the assessment of the amount of product the industry felt was in jeopardy at the time; it was not just pulled out of the sky. The terms of the agreement were quite detailed.

Deputy Bradford asked whether there was tweaking. I said we would make available to the committee the outcome of the scheme as it is progressing if it is of interest to the committee, in other words, the uptake building on the 64 payments and the €35 million. We are not suggesting the scheme is still being tweaked or renegotiated. The scheme has been published and is on the website.

Deputy Scanlon raised the very important question of the market, which is the fourth on the list. We are very conscious of the need to restore confidence in all our markets. A huge effort is going on as we speak. The Deputy put his finger on it; beef in Italy is of concern to us. Arrangements are being made to send a high-level delegation to Italy. The Minister is going to Japan. A veterinary team is going from Japan to Korea, Singapore and China to further follow up on the matter. We have used this model in the past. Whenever this is an issue we descend on the market and bring the up-to-the-minute technical information to solve any difficulties. That is being done with Italy as we speak.

We have already flooded many of these markets at a technical level with detailed background information and our embassy personnel have been in and out to the key people. We are keeping a very close watch on it.

On a technical note, when were the heads of agreement finalised?

Mr. Tom Moran

On the night of the day in question.

It was Wednesday, 17 December. On 18 December, we were asked to approve an Estimate in the Oireachtas of €180 million without any sight or information on a deal, which I found extraordinary. There was no detail and the Minister came before the House with the excuse that given the time constraints, there was no information available. I accept there were difficult time issues involved. Is it standard operating procedure to seek approval of an Estimate by the Houses of the Oireachtas before approval is reached in the EU for state aid?

If we did not get it, there would have been no slaughtering the day after.

The Dáil can always be convened. There is not a problem in principle but the Oireachtas was asked to — if the committee will pardon the pun — approve a pig in a poke without seeing the detail of the scheme. We did so in good faith. Equally, it transpires that we were asked to do it not just without the heads of agreement — the Minister came before the House and did not provide the heads of agreement because he had no information on them — but without EU approval for a state aid. That is extraordinary.

I was wondering when the pig in the poke line would be used in the debate. Deputy Creed got in there. I asked about contingent liability but I am not satisfied with the answer I received on workers' compensation. If I am interpreting what the witness said correctly, it was necessary to get the scheme up and running so that workers could get back into the plant but there are still workers who have suffered loss of earnings in the period. Could I get a clarification, a clear succinct answer, on whether there will be funds available to workers suffering a loss in wages for that period? Is that envisaged within the scheme?

With regard to restoration of the markets, I have a view that there is a degree of political expediency going on from the Russian point of view. Is it the case that the Russians think we still have a problem or is there a certain degree of political expediency going on from other competitors within the market who would probably have their purposes served by talking down the Irish product? How far down the line is the Department in terms of restoring some degree of confidence in the product? Is the issue confidence or market considerations and economics?

On the €180 million compensation package, there was an onus on all of us across parties to approve it on the second last day before the Christmas recess, be it in Estimate form or whatever. It was not full compensation but rather a financial contribution, as has been said here on several occasions, for the industry.

Producers with pigs were waiting for their money. Every politician knew about this in his or her own constituency, as people were ringing them. I know of cases where people had 300 or 400 pigs waiting because of the rotation system in the slaughtering process. They had to move them. If we had not done what we did on that Wednesday, the pigs would have had to be killed anyway just to get rid of them. There was a chain reaction. We had to approve that money so producers could function and processors could resume work. That happened by lunchtime the following day and the pigs were moved. The retailers had that meat back on the shelves for Christmas. I make no apologies for doing this.

When in 2009 do we expect the slaughtering and rendering part of the process to be finished? At what stage in 2009 does the Department expect to have the whole operation finalised? We have lessons to learn and we must examine other procedures later, but when will the slaughtering of contaminated herds and the rendering be finished this year? What is the relevant month and date?

Mr. Tom Moran

Regarding the workers, I will try to be clearer than I was before. As I stated, we tried to re-commence slaughtering as quickly as possible. There is no provision in the agreement to compensate workers for the loss.

I refer to the debate on the supplementary Estimate. I realise what was said in the Dáil at the time and we were grateful that the House saw fit to acknowledge the difficulties. That was appreciated by everyone. On numerous occasions the Minister referred to the agreement and the scheme that was being drafted at the time. I recall the debate on the supplementary Estimate took place on the Thursday.

It was 17 December.

Mr. Tom Moran

The terms of the agreement were only being finalised at the time. However, reference was made to it and I understand the points being made.

We will get to read about it in 30 years' time.

Mr. Tom Moran

The point made about the markets is interesting. The experience of the Department, shared by those in the industry and Bord Bia, is that every market with which one deals is different. That is the same within the EU and outside. That is why Italy needs to be treated in a particular way. Russia is a particular market and it takes a particular type of product, but it is not only in that aspect that each market is unique. For example, at present some of our produce is banned in Japan. Japan is always a difficult market when an issue arises. It is a difficult market to enter, but when one gains access it is a good market to supply. However, for some reason when either it or us has a problem it takes some time to resolve. That is why we are hopeful the Minister's visit to Japan with the Taoiseach will be very important. We are going to take it market by market and deal with each one, depending on the different issues involved in each case.

Will the Secretary General indicate when the slaughtering and rendering will finish?

Mr. Tom Moran

There are two questions. I missed the question concerning contingent liability. Contingent liability is something about which we must be careful. I would be reluctant to go down the road of what contingent liabilities arise in this situation. The scheme agreed, promulgated and funded is a contribution to the recall scheme. The industry as a whole suffered a dramatic financial shock to the system because of the withdrawal of the products, but it had to continue to function. The fund serves to assist that process to take place. The scheme sets out what it will do. It is funding the recall for primary and secondary processors. There is a clause in the heads of agreement which provides a very small sum for certain other liabilities which might arise, and that is at the sole discretion of the Minister, but it is quite a small element of the overall amount.

I refer to the timing of the slaughter and I would like to be able to provide a definitive answer and an exact date. We would be hopeful of the slaughter out of the animals shortly. We are still in discussion about the remaining animals which must be slaughtered, including sows and gilts. We hope to have the bulk of the other pigs slaughtered out by the end of this week. Unfortunately, the cattle slaughter is something that we have done before. We have a system in place which can handle that. I do not believe it will take too long and we are still in the throes of dealing with the scheme itself. We are only one week back in work following the Christmas break, and the matter was only just put to bed before Christmas. We will brief the Chairman on how that is progressing.

Deputy Creed asked a question about breeding sows.

Mr. Tom Moran

We have had an expert team examining the possibility of excluding breeding sows. The advice to the Department from the expert group was that we would not be able to allow sows to stand and continue to breed if they had been contaminated with the feed.

Is it the case that only those sows that have not come into contact with the contaminated feed will be exempted?

Mr. Tom Moran

Yes.

Some 4,000 cattle were taken out on the farms. Were they of all ages, from calves upwards, that were fed the meal, or were they nearly finished cattle?

Mr. Tom Moran

We have taken out herds.

Mr. Tom Moran

Total herds and we included all the animals in those herds.

On behalf of the committee, I thank Mr. Moran and his colleagues for coming here today. I thank them for the comprehensive presentation and for answering the questions raised by members. I compliment them, and the other agencies involved, on their rapid response when this crisis developed.

The committee will now adjourn until 1.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 14 January 2009, when we will have with us representatives of the European Food Safety Authority and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.40 p.m. until 1.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 14 January 2009.
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