Joint Committee on Communications, Climate Action and Environment debate -
Wednesday, 16 May 2018

Developments at Hinkley Point C Power Plant: Discussion

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I welcome the officials to the discussion on the development at Hinkley Point C power plant.

I draw the attention of witnesses to the fact that by virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. However, if they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and they continue to so do, they are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and they are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person, persons or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I also wish to advise witnesses that any submissions or opening statements they have forwarded to the committee will be published on the committee website after this meeting.

I welcome the witnesses to the meeting today to engage with the joint committee on developments at Hinkley Point C. I propose that the main witnesses speak for no more than five minutes. If they wish to share speaking time, they may indicate this to me at the start. The presentations will be followed by a question and answer session during which each member may ask a question not exceeding three minutes. I ask committee members to wait until the presentation has concluded before putting their questions. I apologise for the long delay. Unfortunately, due to votes and the previous item running over, we are very late. I apologise for the inconvenience, and I look forward to hearing the witnesses' presentations.

Mr. Paul McDonald

I thank the joint committee for the opportunity to appear before it today to discuss issues pertaining to the development at the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant and the UK new-build programme. I am joined by Mr. Paul Shortt from the Department and by Dr. Ciara McMahon and Dr. Micheál Lehane, from the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA.

The Irish Government has been aware since 2009 of the UK's plans to build nuclear power stations at sites judged as potentially suitable. The UK Government identified up to eight locations for the construction of new nuclear power plants by 2025, five of which are on the Irish Sea coast and the remaining three are on the east coast.

Ireland has been recognised for some time by the UK as a stakeholder in any nuclear development proposal. When the UK initially decided to embark on plans to build a new fleet of power stations, Ireland was one of the stakeholders consulted as part of that process. Following strategic level environmental assessments, the UK concluded in 2009 that there would be no likely significant transboundary effects for Ireland arising from the new build programme. The assessments showed that while in the event of a significant unintended release of radioactive emissions, for example, as a result of a major accident, there would be a possibility of transboundary effects the probability of such an event was rated as extremely low due to the robustness of the regulatory regime.

This assessment was considered by the then Department of the Environment, under the technical advice of the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, prior to its merger with the EPA, and it was determined that there was no reason to contradict the conclusion that there were not likely to be significant transboundary effects. These matters were conveyed to the Government in a memo dated 17 January 2011 and the decision arising was that the existing bilateral engagement supported by ongoing contact at regulator level was the most effective mechanism through which to raise and seek to have Irish concerns addressed. This was conveyed to the UK Government in a letter from the then Minister for the Environment, Deputy Ó Cuív, to his counterpart on 24 January 2011. This letter further states that having regard to these considerations, the Government of Ireland is of the view that the appropriate and most productive way forward would be to avail of the aforementioned mechanisms of consultation rather than to seek a formal transboundary consultation. This proposed way forward was accepted by the UK and remains the adopted position. It should be noted that under the EURATOM treaty, the UK was required to satisfy the European Commission that the development at Hinkley would not result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another member state. In this context a Commission opinion, issued in February 2012, considered that in normal operating conditions, discharges of liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents were not likely to result in exposure of the population of another member state.

The Government then asked the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, to prepare a report on the potential radiological implications for Ireland from the proposed suite of new plants. A principal finding of this report is that the routine operation of the proposed nuclear power plants will have no measurable impact on Ireland or the Irish marine environment. This report continues to inform Irish engagement on the UK new nuclear build programme. The Irish established position is that while we are not a nuclear energy producing country, we acknowledge the right of states to determine their own energy mix but we expect that where a state chooses to develop a nuclear power industry, this will be done in line with the highest international standards with respect to safety and environmental protection.

In terms of current engagement and recent development, there are now twice yearly meetings of the UK-Ireland contact group on radiological matters. This forum has been existence for a number of years. The meetings are attended by representatives from central Departments of both the UK and Irish Governments and their respective colleagues from the regulatory and environmental protection agencies. As part of the process of engagement between the two Governments, officials from Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment and radiological experts from the EPA have visited numerous UK nuclear related sites in recent years, including Hinkley Point and Sellafield. What we gain through this process is access to the UK experts and an opportunity to visit the various sites. The issue of the UK new build programme is a standing agenda item at these meetings and arising from these discussions a letter was received from the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in December 2016 concerning the UN Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context - generally referred to as the Espoo Convention. In this letter, the UK reiterated its view that the development at Hinkley was not likely to cause a significant adverse impact on the environment of another state and that, therefore, the UK was not required to undertake trans-boundary consultation. It further stated that following a recommendation from the Espoo committee, the UK was seeking our opinion as to whether notification would be useful at the current stage for the development at Hinkley Point C. The Department responded by letter dated 2 March that such notification would be useful and set out the basis for this view and adding that having the opportunity to formally comment on the UK new build programme is extremely valuable in allaying public concerns in relation to the programme.

The new build programme and specifically Espoo related matters were discussed at the meeting of the UK-Ireland group on 27 April, following which, on 28 July 2017, a further letter was received from the UK by the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government - the lead department in relation to Espoo - in which the UK stated that while it maintained its position that it did not breach the Espoo Convention, it recognised the value of constructive engagement and in that spirit it was providing an opportunity to comment on the current environmental information in relation to potential transboundary impacts. The letter further stated that if likely significant adverse transboundary effects are identified on the basis of scientific evidence, it would then look at how the regulatory regime might address any identified effects. A consultation process was then initiated by the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government through the local authority network and this process was recently completed.

On emergency preparedness, in the unlikely event that there is an accidental discharge from a nuclear power plant in the UK, the Irish regulatory authorities are well primed to deal with such an eventuality. The UK and Ireland have agreed and developed an early-warning notification system to alert Irish authorities of any problems in nuclear facilities in the UK. This system is regularly tested and discussed through the UK-Ireland contact group to ensure that it remains robust and fit for purpose. Ireland has also developed a detailed national emergency plan for nuclear and radiological accidents, NEPNA, to make provision for preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological emergencies taking place both inside and outside the State. Officials from Irish Departments and agencies who will have a role in the event of such an emergency take part in international exercises to evaluate and improve our response arrangements and capabilities with regard to nuclear and radiological emergencies.

In 2017, Ireland participated in a large-scale exercise held by the International Atomic Energy Agency to test our operational arrangements of the convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. The outcomes from this Convex exercise will inform an update to NEPNA which will then be established on a statutory basis to ensure that Ireland's preparedness and responses to nuclear and radiological emergencies remains first rate.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I thank Mr. McDonald and I invite Dr. Lehane to make his opening statement.

Dr. Micheál Lehane

I thank the joint committee for the opportunity to attend this meeting to assist it with its deliberations. I am joined by Dr Ciara McMahon who was lead author of the 2013 report on the potential radiological implications for Ireland of the proposed nuclear power plants in the UK.

As the committee is aware, the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, is an independent statutory body with a wide range of responsibilities. Since 2014, it also has responsibilities in regard to radiological protection, following its merger with the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. One of these roles is to monitor scientific and technical developments abroad in regard to nuclear installations and to provide advice to the Government on the implications for Ireland. Some specific areas of work in the EPA over the past number of years include the review of the new nuclear build plans in the UK, the provision of technical support at meetings of the UK-Ireland contact group on radiological matters and the preparation of national reports and reviews to the convention of nuclear safety. The EPA also carries out an annual programme to monitor radioactivity in air, food and water.

The EPA's monitoring of the environment confirms that while the levels of artificial radioactivity in the Irish environment are detectable, they are low and do not pose a risk to the human health of the Irish population.

The EPA has several key roles under the national emergency plan for nuclear accidents, including: maintaining arrangements for early warning and operation of an on-call duty officer system; maintaining the national radiation monitoring network; maintaining a national laboratory for the measurement of levels of radioactivity in the environment and food; and providing advice to the national emergency co-ordination group and Departments on possible protective actions to minimise radiation doses to the Irish population. Undertaking hazard assessments is a key element of emergency preparedness.

In 2010 the RPII was asked to carry out an assessment of the potential radiological impacts of the new nuclear power plants in the UK. That was published in 2013. One of its conclusions was that the routine discharges from the proposed nuclear power plant would be of no radiological significance for people living in Ireland. The assessment also considered the potential for severe nuclear accidents and five potential accident scenarios were assessed with probabilities ranging from 1:50,000 to 1:33 million chances per year. The impact of each scenario was modelled for a reference location on the east coast of Ireland over timescales ranging from 48 hours to one year after a release. Apart from the amount of radioactivity release weather was felt to be the most significant factor. Ninety per cent of the time, during the 48 hours after a potential accident scenario, radioactivity was not transported by wind over the reference location. On those occasions when the wind was blowing the radioactivity directly towards Ireland, the predicted levels of contamination and radiation doses varied significantly. Where the chance of an accident was estimated to be 1 in 50,000, the impact on Ireland was predicted to be relatively small. The radioactivity levels would not be high enough to warrant short-term measures but food controls and-or temporary agricultural protective actions would be required for a period of days to weeks following the accident.

On the other end of the scale, for the least probable but most severe accident studied, short-term measures, such as sheltering, may be warranted in the immediate aftermath of the accident to reduce exposure of the population. Food controls and protective actions would be required for many and protective actions would be required for many years to reduce radiation doses from consumption of contaminated food. While these controls have been shown to be very effective in controlling radioactivity levels in foods for sale, they do have significant socio-economic implications and costs. This was also subject to an assessment by the Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI, in a subsequent study.

Dr. McMahon is the lead author and I can provide additional information and answer any questions on these matters, if the committee wants.

Deputy Brian Stanley

What specifically resulted from the EPA's reports on radioactivity in those parts of the Irish Sea close to Sellafield? Dr. Lehane referred to the commission and said the results showed that the population of another state was not likely to be harmed by exposure. What is the effect under normal operating conditions? An accident may not happen under normal operating conditions but under abnormal ones.

I am not a scientist but I have been to a nuclear plant and am aware of some of the issues surrounding storage of nuclear waste. There are major concerns because nuclear waste cannot be wished away and we cannot hope it will go away. It will be with us for thousands of years. With the construction of eight new plants, in addition to the ones already there, in the three foreign countries, England, Scotland and Wales, which are on an island with a fairly small land mass, there will be a huge volume of nuclear waste in Britain. Some of the plants are getting old, for example, Torness will probably be decommissioned within the next five or ten years. Perhaps the Department and the EPA could give a concise answer to each of those three questions.

Dr. Ciara McMahon

Since the early 1980s the EPA, and previously the RPII, have monitored sea water sediment, shellfish and fish, looking for artificial radioactivity mainly as a result of discharges from Sellafield. It is not a nuclear power plant. It is a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and because of the difference in those operations its discharges of radioactivity into the environment are much larger. That is partly why people have difficulty understanding that new nuclear power plants may not lead to large increases in radioactivity going into the environment. It all comes down to whether fuel is reprocessed or not. Reprocessing leads to larger discharges to the environment.

We can measure the radioactivity in the environment as a result of the Sellafield discharges. What we are measuring comes mainly from discharges in the 1970s and 1980s when they were much higher. Much of what was discharged ended up in the seabed sediments just off the coast of Sellafield and there were muddy sediments just off the coast of Louth too. It got trapped in the sediment there but now because the discharges are lower at Sellafield it is starting to come back up into the water.

We measure radioactivity that has been there since the 1970s and 1980s. Even if discharges stopped completely tomorrow we would probably continue to measure around the same levels of radioactive caesium and plutonium in the sea water, sediments and shellfish and so on. The levels are extremely low. If we add what we are exposed to from all sources of radiation in the environment, including radon, medical exposures and so on, what we are actually exposed to from Sellafield, Chernobyl, Fukushima plus nuclear weapons testing, represents less than 1% of our overall radiation dose. That is for an average member of the public. For somebody who has high levels of radon in his or her home or workplace the percentage coming from Sellafield and Chernobyl, etc., will be even smaller.

In response to the question about what normal operations means, when a nuclear power plant is operating there are discharges to the environment. They are much lower than those from a reprocessing plant but there are ongoing discharges to air and water. As five of the plants will possibly be on the Irish Sea coast we assessed the discharges and what the radiation doses would be. These are routine releases from the 60 to 70 year plant life. We worked with Met Éireann to get data on the weather patterns for the past 21 years and used that to model what would happen over the next 60 years of operation of the plants for discharges to air. We also studied average sea currents and worked with the National University of Ireland, Galway, NUIG, which has experts in sea modelling to assess the maximum discharges that could occur at nuclear power plants.

We had to make assumptions because these plants have not been built yet but we had information on what the UK regulators were considering as the maximum amount that could be discharged to air and water. We also had information on what similar, older plants would currently release into the environment in Europe and the world. We used all that data to examine the radiation doses that would occur over 60 to 70 years. The radiation dose we get currently is approximately 4,000 microsieverts per year, this would increase by less than one additional microsievert. We would not be able to measure that above what we get at the moment. That led to the conclusion that for the routine releases, excluding any emergency occurring, the radiological impact would be insignificant.

Mr. Paul McDonald

In response to the question of storage, there has been some discussion about geological disposal facilities, GDFs, and how the UK would manage the waste coming from the nuclear industry. Consultations have commenced within the UK to enable stakeholders and members of the public to submit comments on the GDF programme. At this stage they are of a very general nature, and are appropriate to an internal UK audience.

At present there are no proposals to site one of these geological disposal facilities on the island of Ireland. Following a number of unsuccessful attempts to identify a long-term facility, the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills launched a consultation paper on how better to engage and represent communities across England and Northern Ireland in any future process to consider siting a geological disposal facility. The consultation paper notes that the process to identify and select a site for one of these facilities requires detailed technical work that would be estimated to take somewhere between 15 years to 20 years. That is the sort of timescale we are looking at.

Even if a community proposal won public support in Northern Ireland, we are talking about a long-term game here. The final decision on whether there would be a geological disposal facility for radioactive waste would be a decision for the Northern Ireland Executive as a whole, taking into account the various planning and environmental considerations. I assure the committee that the question of the management of waste, particularly the GDF programme, is a standing agenda item at the UK-Ireland contact group I mentioned previously, which comprises officials from the various Departments and the regulators and which meets twice-yearly. This is something we keep our eye on and we get regular updates from central government. I emphasise that we are at the very early stages of the process, which could take somewhere between 15 years and 20 years.

Deputy Brian Stanley

Which central government?

Mr. Paul McDonald

The UK Government and ourselves.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Thank you, Mr. McDonald. Unfortunately, a vote has been called in the Dáil, so I am going to have to suspend the meeting. If it is not too inconvenient, I hope you will be able to come back straight after the vote. I have some quick questions I want to ask. I am sorry for the inconvenience and the long delay. We will suspend briefly for the Dáil vote.

Sitting suspended at 6.22 p.m. and resumed at 6.34 p.m.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

We are back in public session. I apologise to the officials, we have had a difficult day with votes in the Dáil and an overrun on an earlier session.

I want to ask short, concise questions one at a time. In Mr. McDonald's presentation, on the second page he said that back in 2009 the UK's assessment considered that there was no significant transboundary effects for Ireland on their new nuclear programme. This assessment was considered by the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government at the time and under the technical advice of the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, it was determined that there was no reason to contradict the conclusion that there would likely not be significant transboundary effects. Can you forward that written assessment to the committee?

Mr. Paul McDonald

I can look at the documentation. I know there was a memo for Government which would have had a lot of the background to that so I can forward that to the committee in the coming days.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Could he also send us that? That memo to Government was on 17 January 2011.

Mr. Paul McDonald

Yes.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

However, there would have been as assessment carried out in 2009 or 2010.

Mr. Paul McDonald

It was over that period. I do not have the precise date but I can find the supporting documentation and get it to the committee.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Perhaps Mr. McDonald could send it all, including the memo. I was a member of that Cabinet and I cannot say that I remember much from 17 January 2011 other than that we were in something of a crisis at the time.

Mr. Paul McDonald

The Acting Chairman had other things on his mind.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I would appreciate it if Mr. McDonald could send all the background documentation to the committee.

Mr. Paul McDonald

Certainly.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Subsequent to that meeting on 17 January 2011, a letter went from the then Minister, Deputy Ó Cuív, to his counterpart on 24 January. Deputy Ó Cuív had only been in office a day. He was holding down three portfolios at the time, which was quite a feat. The letter stated that, having regard to the relevant considerations, the Government was of the view that the appropriate and most productive way forward would have been to avail of the mechanisms of consulting mentioned rather than a formal transboundary consultation. Was it not the case that that letter went on to say that in cases that we did expect formal transboundary consultations on the environmental assessments relating to each proposed power plant?

Mr. Paul McDonald

Yes. I was trying to give an indication of the policy that we currently operate of dealing with these issues through the engagement with the UK-Ireland contact group and that was the background to it. Moving on through the various stages that we have had and the more recent engagement around Espoo and so on, the UK has agreed that there would be full consultation in respect of future nuclear power plants or any change to the current planning permission around Hinkley.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

The impression that was created in Mr. McDonald's presentation was that we would not be seeking a formal transboundary consultation. However, the letter to which I refer said that we would be doing so in respect of specific projects.

Mr. Paul McDonald

We were trying to talk specifically about the Hinckley project so that is why I was extracting that statement from the letter. At that stage, we were talking about the Hinckley project. The idea would be to deal with it through consultation rather than the transboundary consultation.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

On page 3 of his presentation, Mr. McDonald cites the fact that the UK Government again wrote a letter in December 2016. The Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy reiterated its view that Hinckley was not likely to cause a significantly adverse impact and that it was not required to undertake transboundary consultation under the Espoo Convention. Mr. McDonald also says that the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment responded by letter on 2 March. Was that 2 March 2017?

Mr. Paul McDonald

Yes.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I refer to the Espoo Convention. There was a complaint by an Irish non-governmental organisation, NGO, to the convention implementation committee about the lack of consultation with the Irish public on Hinkley. Ireland received a letter from the committee on 14 October 2013 asking if we thought the proposed nuclear plant was likely to cause significant transboundary effect.

The UN committee asked specifically whether the Government considered "that the proposed development at Hinkley Point C is likely to cause significant adverse transboundary impact on the territory of Ireland". The response we provided on 22 November 2013 did not answer that question. When the Norwegian Government received a similar letter a year later, it responded by saying that it could not confirm that it was not likely that the proposed NPP at Hinkley Point C, in the case of a major accident or incident, could cause significant adverse transboundary environmental impact on the territory of Norway. Why did we not answer the question that was asked by the UN committee?

Mr. Paul McDonald

I would surmise that, at the time, we were still relying on the report from the RPII, which stated that until the normal operation of these power plants commenced, there was no significant threat to the Irish environment. There was no change in the position. The scientific evidence had not changed. There would not have been any change in the policy positions. The position was maintained.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

There may be confusion about the various letters to which I am referring. Surely the letter concerning the Espoo Convention that was sent by the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in December 2016 resulted from the Espoo Convention implementation committee's finding that the UK was in breach of the convention. Was that not what gave rise to the letter being issued?

Mr. Paul McDonald

The UK determined early in the process that the development at Hinkley Point was not going to lead to a significant transboundary impact. The UK is maintaining that position to this day. The letter referred to by the Acting Chairman and subsequent letters sent by the UK refer to the "spirit" of what had transpired. One of the later letters, which was sent on 28 July 2017, stated:

As you are aware, the United Kingdom maintains that it did not breach the Espoo Convention in respect of the initial planning process for Hinkley Point C, but recognise the value of constructive engagement and it is in this spirit we are sending this letter.

In the July letter and in a letter sent the previous December, the UK was maintaining its position that it did not consider that it was in breach of the Espoo Convention.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

The Espoo Convention implementation committee has found that the risk of an accidental or unplanned release of radioactive material from Hinkley Point is covered by the convention, regardless of however small the UK assesses that risk to be. Does the Department agree with that finding?

Mr. Paul McDonald

The Department's unchanged position is that these matters are to be dealt with through the mechanism of the UK-Ireland contact group. As the subject of this new-build plant is a standing agenda item, we are updated on it every six months. There has been no scientific evidence since the RPII report to alter that thinking or that position.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Therefore, the Government formally disagrees with the Espoo Convention implementation committee's assessment that the risk, as small as it may be, of leakage or release of radioactive material from Hinkley Point is covered under the Espoo Convention.

Mr. Paul Shortt

That is a draft finding and is still under discussion. It is not the final position of the committee.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

What would be the position of the Government in any submission with regard to the draft finding? Would we agree or disagree with it?

Mr. Paul McDonald

I reiterate the point that no scientific evidence has been produced that would require us to alter our position that nothing in the normal routine operation of these plants would be a significant threat to the Irish environment.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

The report of the Espoo Convention implementation committee was considered at the triennial meeting of the parties to the convention last June. The Minister was not present. No Irish delegation or official was present. Why was that?

Mr. Paul McDonald

I would have to refer the Acting Chairman to the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government. That Department, not the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, has responsibility for matters relating to the Espoo Convention.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

This is not an inconsequential bilateral issue between the two nations involved. Indeed, a number of other countries, including Austria, Germany and Norway, are involved. This is not a small issue on a European political or diplomatic basis. Given that this draft report seems to be contested from the point of view of the Department or the Government, why did we not attend the meeting at which it was discussed?

Mr. Paul McDonald

I repeat that the Espoo Convention focal point is within the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government. I am virtually certain that the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment did not receive an invitation. We would not have had the vires to attend that meeting.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I take the point. I will avail of the opportunity to put this question directly to the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government. A complaint made by the Friends of the Irish Environment, an NGO that has consistently been raising this issue, was accepted by the international organisation that is in place to oversee matters relating to the Espoo Convention. Why has that organisation not received a response to the letters it sent to the Minister in this regard? They have gone unanswered.

Mr. Paul McDonald

Did those letters relate to the Espoo Convention?

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Yes.

Mr. Paul McDonald

I am not sure what letters have come to the Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment. We have engaged with some of the NGOs on this matter. I have met representatives of the organisations to explain our position with regard to the Espoo Convention and the whole issue of the new plant and the UK's new programme. There has been engagement. I cannot provide a definitive answer on letters that have arrived and not been answered. We have certainly engaged with the NGOs.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I would like to put a final question to Mr. McDonald before I put one or two questions to the officials from the EPA. As I understand it, the ESRI study he mentioned estimates that costs of €4 billion, or indeed more, could arise as a consequence of an accident - please God it will not ever happen - at Hinkley Point. Does the Department agree with the assessment in the ESRI study?

Mr. Paul McDonald

The Department commissioned the assessment. The probabilistic risk assessment that was referred to earlier, which looked at the issue from the point of view of what the damage to the environment might be, recommended that we look at the socioeconomic cost of such an accident. We drew up the terms of reference and we engaged with the ESRI. That was done for a number of reasons. The information we were looking to get would inform decisions on whether it would be in Ireland's interests to be a signatory to certain international treaties and conventions concerning nuclear emergencies. The analysis would help to inform our position on policy and legislative developments in Europe and internationally. An assessment of the vulnerabilities would help to inform emergency management. The Department engaged with this process and of course accepts the findings of the ESRI report.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

However, not to the extent where we want to have the right to engage in transboundary assessment of projects.

Mr. Paul McDonald

We are satisfied with the level of engagement we are getting, the interaction we have with the UK on these issues and the openness of our ability to visit these sites and monitor the developments at them. We do not see any reason to divert from that strategy, which we have had for a number of years.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I am conscious of time so I will finish up after I have put a final question to Dr. Lehane and Dr. McMahon. It is unfortunate that we are so limited. It is probably unlikely that Hinkley Point will ever get built because it is so uneconomic. If it is built and there is an accident, what sorts of timelines will apply? How much notice would we have to react to an unplanned release from Hinkley Point? As I understand it, the main recommendation is to shelter behind closed doors from immediate weather or atmospheric conditions such as rain or wind. What are the timelines that are likely to apply in these circumstances? Even though we had a week's notice of recent weather events such as Hurricane Ophelia and Storm Emma, we saw how significantly difficult it was to organise ourselves. We would not have any notice of this. What are the timelines for getting shelter?

Dr. Ciara McMahon

I will take that question. We have looked at a range of accidents. Sheltering was not required in the case of most of the accidents we have looked at, including some very severe accidents.

The important things would be food controls and agriculture protection actions in order to prevent long-term health risks like cancers. We wanted to look at cases such as Fukushima, where there was a release to the environment combined with unfavourable weather, with winds coming quickly from the east with a lot of rain as the plume arrived. It is best practice to measure the maximal impact when developing nuclear plans. We worked with Met Éireann to identify weather patterns over a 21-year period and we found about six days in that 21-year period when such unfavourable weather conditions existed. At those times, it might be appropriate to advise people to stay indoors. Even if they did not stay indoors, however, they would not get a radiation dose that would be of immediate concern. It would be above safe levels during the passage of the plume and we would advise people to stay indoors for maybe 24 or 48 hours. Even if people were camping outdoors, however, the predicted radiation dose would be roughly 14 mSv, which is higher than the annual recommended dose but, as a once-off, is not an immediate health concern. Radiation workers can receive up to 20 mSv per year for every year of their working lives so we are not talking about a dangerous level of radiation.

The timelines all depend on what is initiated but with Fukushima there was a tsunami and power was very quickly lost. For 48 hours there were significant releases to the environment. The journey of any radioactivity across the Irish Sea would take a few days. Once the release started, it would be a number of hours before any action would be expected in respect of the public. The action would be to recommend people who wanted to minimise the radiation dose to stay indoors. If nothing was done and we continued with our lives completely as normal, 90% of the effects would be on food from people's gardens or food which was 100% locally produced. That does not have to happen. We have worked with the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine and the Food Safety Authority to make sure that there are plans in place to ensure all food on sale after a nuclear accident would be safe to eat. That would reduce the radiation people get to much lower levels and we would not expect an increase in cancers provided the necessary actions were taken. We have worked with stakeholder groups, including representatives from the Irish Farmers Association, with retailer groups and with food and feed bodies to make them aware of what we are doing and they have given us feedback. We know what is technically feasible but they want to know what would work in the Irish situation.

The Irish national emergency plan for nuclear accidents was subject to an international peer review at the end of 2015. It was found to be a good plan and well integrated into overall planning in the State. We learned from events such as Storm Emma, Storm Ophelia and the dioxins crisis. Thankfully, nuclear accidents are rare but we have a feedback mechanism so that we learn from such events and our practice was identified as something other countries should emulate.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

The hit could be taken by the food industry.

Dr. Ciara McMahon

That is where the costs come in. Ireland is an exporter of food and we have a lot of tourism so reputational damage could be significant. The Department commissioned the ESRI report to look at these types of impacts.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

There were consequences for some farmers as a result of Chernobyl and that was for an extended period.

Dr. Ciara McMahon

Yes.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

Senator Grace O'Sullivan asked the head of Irish Water, Mr. Jerry Grant, about the risk of radioactive contamination to our water supply. He said that if a nuclear accident happened outside Ireland, we might get some warning but that there would be no way to stop systems from being contaminated. Is there an issue in that regard?

Dr. Ciara McMahon

The closest nuclear facility is over 100 km away from our coast so drinking water is not as big an issue as it would otherwise be. Radioactive particles are suspended in the air. Some would fall in the form of dust and settle on open reservoirs. If there was rainfall, it would wash more of it into the reservoirs but it would be diluted in a large volume of water. Water treatment also removes a certain percentage of radioactivity and there have been European studies onthis. Drinking water would not be an issue but food would. If the worst accident happened and was accompanied by the worst weather and no action was taken, there would be an increase in cancers. Those concerns do not exist for drinking water but we test our plans so that we can confirm what our models show us is happening on the ground. In our laboratory, we test water samples for radioactivity all the time. All drinking water has radioactivity in it naturally and this would increase in the event of an accident but it would not be high enough to be a health concern.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

In light of the ESRI report on the potential risks relating to food and in the context of the small possibility of an accident happening, the question as to whether the Government should consider that the proposed plant would be likely to cause significant adverse transboundary impacts on the territory of Ireland should be answered in the affirmative rather than the negative.

Dr. Ciara McMahon

If an accident were to occur and the wind was coming towards us, then, yes, there would certainly be transboundary effects.

Mr. Paul McDonald

There is a high risk but a low probability. These plants are well run and we try to take all these factors into account.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I hope I have not abused my position as Acting Chairman. It is my first time as Acting Chairman and it will probably be my last. I ask Mr. McDonald to forward the correspondence to which we referred to the committee.

Mr. Paul McDonald

I will do that by the end of the week.

Acting Chairman (Deputy Eamon Ryan)

I thank the witnesses for attending in order to take part in this worthwhile engagement. I propose that the committee publish the opening statements and submissions on its website. Is that agreed? Agreed.

The joint committee adjourned at 7 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 12 June 2018.