The meeting has been called to discuss electronic voting. I welcome the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Deputy Cullen, and his officials. The joint committee will hear first from the Minister before taking questions from committee members. We will then have a demonstration of the system, followed by another question and answer session.
Electronic Voting: Ministerial Presentation.
I apologise for delaying the committee as I was at a Cabinet meeting. I thank committee members for giving me this opportunity to demonstrate the system, provide information on proposed activity in the first half of 2004, leading up to the use of the system at European and local elections, and to answer some of the questions on security in particular which have been raised in recent months.
The election management system consists of a voting machine, a ballot module, a programming unit and a personal computer, which are on view this afternoon, and related software programmes. The software used to set up an election and count the votes is called the integrated election system, IES. The new system is being introduced to modernise our electoral system, which is basically the same as it was in the 19th century.
The new system has four major benefits: ease of voting for the electorate, avoidance of inadvertently spoiled votes, the production of more accurate and earlier results and the provision of improvements in electoral administration. I stress that it is not an e-voting system, the term usually used to describe the use of the Internet, touch-type telephones, text messaging and interactive digital TV for voting. International discussions are ongoing on the security and other features of e-voting and my Department is following such deliberations at the Council of Europe.
Our approach to modernising the electoral system is evolutionary and the future use of technology such as e-voting can be considered when satisfactory solutions are found to the security and secrecy aspects of it. Despite frequent comments in the media, no decision has been made to use e-voting here.
The voting machines and PCs to be used in June 2004 will be stand-alone and will not be connected to the Internet or to an internal computer system, thus avoiding any opportunity for hacking over the Internet. Throughout the development of the system for its use, the security and integrity of the electoral system have been of paramount importance. The system incorporates security and audit features at all stages from initial set-up of a poll to the production of the count result. The system has also been benchmarked with the following five objectives - integrity, confidentiality, enfranchisement, availability and verifiability.
The objective of the integrity test is that preferences and votes should be recorded and counted as intended and that it should not be possible to add, modify or delete votes during the poll and vote counting. The voting machine software has been tested by a German independent internationally accredited testing institute, PTB, and its report has confirmed that the voting machine software complies with the above requirements and that any attempted interference with the ballot module in the voting machine will be detected. The voting machine has physical security features to prevent tampering during polling day and it will be rigorously supervised and securely maintained before polling day and throughout polling hours.
The physical components of the voting machine and programming unit have also been tested by another international testing institute, TNO Electronic Products and Services in The Netherlands, and found to be satisfactory. The software for the election set-up and vote counting has been subject to an architectural and code review by an independent Irish software company which had access to the source code. The count software has been further functionally tested by the Electoral Reform Society in the UK against itsdatabase of some 425 single transferable vote-type elections. The various reports will be shortly uploaded on to a dedicated web site for consultation by interested persons.
The confidentiality aim is that it should not be possible to associate a vote with a voter, duplicate a vote or view the results before the close of poll. There is no link between the marked register of electors and voting on the voting machine. Votes recorded on the voting machine are stored randomly in the ballot module. This was tested by PTB, which states in its report that all the votes stored in a module in the voting machine cannot be associated with particular voters. In addition, the software further randomises the votes at constituency level after all the votes are read into the system and before the counting of votes commences.
The enfranchisement objective is that each eligible voter should be able to vote once only. Access to the voting machine is strictly controlled by the polling station staff. The number accessing the voting machine can be audited at any time during the day by checking the number of voters marked off the register of electors, the number of permit tickets issued and the number of voters who have used the machine. When a voter presses the "Cast Vote" button and the vote is stored, the voting machine automatically deactivates itself until the polling staff activate it for the next voter. These procedures functioned satisfactorily when the system was used on two occasions in 2002.
The fourth aspect - availability - requires that the system must be operational throughout the voting period. The voting machines will be available for use for the polling hours appointed for the poll or polls in question. There will be a voting machine to replace every ballot box, with spare voting machines on standby on the off chance that a machine develops a fault or for use at the busy period in buildings with a large number of polling stations. Arrangements will be made to provide a battery in the event of a power failure.
Finally, the verifiability objective provides that the above matters should be able to be verified. The various test reports on the voting machine and software confirm that the voting machine and associated software are fit for the purpose intended. If an independent internationally accredited testing institute certifies that a product or software is fit for the intended purpose, it is not unreasonable that such certification be accepted. This has occurred with the system to be used in this country. My Department and returning officers will facilitate political parties and candidates with demonstrations and explanations on the security features of the system. Arrangements will also be made before the June 2004 polls for the public to use the voting machines. Activity at a polling station can be monitored by impersonation agents appointed by candidates and by the candidates themselves. Likewise, agents, candidates and political parties can monitor the count procedures at the count centre, where an information leaflet will be provided. Statistical and other information on the count will be available after each individual count is completed and at the end of the count process, so that candidates and others can follow the count.
I have appointed a company to undertake a national and local information and awareness campaign to inform the public on how to use the voting machines. This campaign will include information notices on television and on national and local radio, national and local print media, a dedicated website, cinema advertising, a lo-call telephone information line, the posting of an information leaflet to each house, a roadshow and local demonstrations in local authority offices, libraries, shopping centres and other local locations. In addition, arrangements will be made to demonstrate the system at parliamentary parties meetings, to officials of political parties and to local councillors. I will also arrange, perhaps at the meeting with the political party officials, to conduct a complete "end-to-end" election, including the printing of the individual ballot papers, to enable a manual count to be carried out. Of course, the mix of ballot papers cannot be disturbed.
I wish to deal with some of the issues that have been raised in recent months about the system. Versions of the Nedap voting machine have been used successfully in Holland and parts of Germany for many years without difficulty. As I indicated, the version for use in this country has been tested by two internationally accredited testing institutes. Many of the security issues raised by people have been tested by the institutes and their conclusions are included in their reports, which will shortly be placed on a specific web page dedicated to the system. Copies will also be sent to the Oireachtas Library. I have been waiting to get all the reports on the system completed so that the complete picture will be available, rather than publishing the reports piecemeal.
The issues raised by the Zerflow security assessment report in 2002, some of which dealt with extremely remote possibilities, were considered in the review of the system after the pilot uses. Zerflow, the security company, issued a statement last July stating that the modifications made to the voting machine meet any concerns expressed by it.
On the computers to be used, election specific PCs will be supplied with only the election specific software loaded on them. Specific security keys for use of the PCs will also be issued to returning officers so that only they, or staff authorised by them, will have access to the PCs. Responsibility for the security of the voting machines and PCs is a matter for the returning officers who have the statutory responsibility for conducting the polls. This parallels the present position where returning officers have control over the paper ballots, stamping instruments and other electoral materials. Security protocols and procedural guidelines will be furnished to returning officers early next year. In addition a security and audit paper will be issued by the Department in the new year and it will be available to the public.
In this matter I would stress that, as with the present system of paper ballots, we have trusted the returning officers and their staff to conduct the polls in a fair and safe manner. For instance, the returning officers must keep the ballot box with postal and special voter ballot papers safe and secure for some weeks before polling day, as indeed the custody of thousands of paper ballots. As similar procedures will apply to voting machines and PCs used, there is no reason now to doubt the integrity of returning officers and their staff to continue to conduct polls in a fair and equitable manner.
There is no perfect system, whether manual or electronic. We are dependent on the integrity of the staff employed, including supervisory staff, the integrity of the system and security protocols and procedures to ensure that any attempt to interfere with the process is immediately detected and the necessary corrective action taken.
Other criticisms of the system to date relate to the availability of an audit trail, the availability of the software source code, and costs. The system has an audit trail for each step from the set-up of an election to the end of the count. While the voting machine does not produce a paper receipt or copy of a ballot paper for the voter, the voter can see the number of the preference recorded opposite the candidate's photograph and the voting machine display will show details of the candidate for which the preference is recorded and will also show a message, after the cast vote button is pressed, that the vote has been stored. The operator of the control unit of the voting machine will see that number of votes has increased by one. These matters have also been tested by the German institute which has stated that they operate satisfactorily.
The count software also has an audit trail of all votes cast. It can produce a list with a line for each vote showing the preferences recorded in each vote. None of the votes will be traceable to an individual voter, as the list will be produced after the votes are mixed by the system for the whole constituency. If there is a doubt about the number of votes recorded, the matter can be traced back to the marked register of electors, the number of permit tickets issued and the printed statements from the voting machine. If the High Court or Circuit Court at a local election, at a petition hearing, orders a recount of the votes, the system will print a ballot paper for each vote cast, which will have two numbers on it - a computer number created after the votes are mixed for the whole constituency and the number of the count at which a vote was transferred, if applicable. Consequently it will be possible to manually recount the votes, if required. Like the present position, the order of the votes after they have been mixed before the first count will not be disturbed.
Secrecy of the ballot is enshrined in the Constitution and nothing is permitted which would breach that right, either directly or indirectly. There are long-standing offences in electoral law to prevent bribery to vote or not to vote in a certain way, exerting undue influence on voters, inducement to voters to display marked ballot papers or any interference with voters or ballot papers. A receipt by the voting machine would create possibilities for such eventualities and no provision is therefore made for it.
The Supreme Court stated in the McMahon case in 1971 that, "any method by which the ballot can be identified and the voter exposed is unauthorised and no legislation enactment can give it the force of law". Some experts have advocated that the voting machine should print a ballot paper that would be deposited in a container in the machine for future checking on the proper functioning of the voting machine. This proposal would not be in accordance with the Supreme Court decision as there would be a direct link available between the voter and the ballot paper. In any event, if such ballot papers were counted manually, it would not give the same result as the electronic count due to the legal requirement to mix the ballot papers - I refer here to the second and subsequent counts. It has been a long-standing legal requirement that votes are not mixed more than once at a count.
Ballot papers counted manually more than once but with different mixes of votes are unlikely to get the same precise result due to the random and arbitrary features of the statutory count rules. Consideration of the discontinuance of the random and arbitrary aspects of the count will be made post June 2004. This is one of the positive aspects of counting the votes electronically and it was recognised by an article written, as far back as 1984, by staff of the then National Institute for Higher Education in Limerick.
The Labour Party, in a recent report, recommended the provision of a voter verifiable audit trail with a view to conducting a manual count to compare with the electronic count. The report acknowledges that the production of a paper ballot would not assist this exercise, as one would get a different result due to the legal requirement to mix the votes. It also recognised that new legislation would be required.
The final version of the source code will contain profiles for all the different types of elections and referendums held here. To date, different profiles have been used for the Dáil general election and referendum. At present the profiles for next year's European and local elections are being tested. When the complete software package is finished containing profiles for all elections and combinations of such elections and referendums, consideration will be given as to whether the count element of the software should be made available to political parties and others. In that consideration, it will be necessary to have regard to any potential dangers to the integrity and secrecy of the ballot. In an information paper on the system published in March 2002 before the general election, detailed count module flow charts were included for information of interested persons. In addition, the report by the independent Irish software company, who had access to the source code, for the pilot uses of the system in 2002 was available on request. The company's report on the software to be used in next June's election will also be made available in the new year.
I am considering, in conjunction with the Attorney General's office, what levels of information can be provided in lieu of the information provided by the tallyman on vote preferences from each ballot box, having regard to the secrecy of the ballot. The Supreme Court, in theMcMahon case in 1971, set very strict parameters concerning the secrecy of the ballot and I will obviously have to come back to the committee on that issue.
The purpose of the new system is to modernise the electoral system, which has generally remained unchanged for more than 100 years. While cost is an important factor, it was not the sole determinant factor for introducing the system. It is the first substantial investment in the electoral system since the State was established. While the cost may appear high, regard must be had to the fact that the initial cost of the system is related to acquiring a capital asset, which requires no regular maintenance between polls and which has an estimated useful life of 20 years. Substantial savings will arise with each poll held. For example, the number of staff required for vote counting will decrease substantially; the number of ballot papers requiring printing will reduce from approximately three million to approximately 30,000; and other efficiencies will arise from the use of the system. Opposition spokespersons have advocated the use of other systems such as the Internet, including the leader of Fine Gael, who was reported in the newspapers as advocating the use of the Internet or the use of ATM machines, which would be as costly and less secure than the system to be used.
A number of commentators have cast doubts on the system. Spokespersons for Fine Gael, the Labour Party and the Green Party have indicated during debates in the Dáil that they agree in principle with electronic voting and counting. I accept people have concerns about the system but I assure them that both the hardware and software have been thoroughly tested by independent organisations as well as by my Department and a number of returning officers. We should not be overly influenced by some poor experiences in the USA, without also considering the success of electronic voting in The Netherlands, a number of large German cities and in other countries such as India. The use of electronic methods is likely to be introduced by most countries in the future.
If no efforts were made to modernise our electoral system, we would be accused of being negligent in not making an effort. Why should we wait for others to move and then be last to modernise our electoral system? I am confident the system will prove itself to be more secure than the present arrangement and will enhance the workings of our electoral process.
While I welcome the meeting, I regret it did not take place two years ago when the Department first set out to introduce an electronic voting system. The Minister is only attending because of repeated requests by members over a long period. The transfer from our current system of voting to an electronic system should have been a joint exercise involving all the participants in the democratic process, including political parties. The most important group, the public, should also have been consulted. No consultation has take place to date.
It is offensive that the Minister, having spent €35 million on the equipment necessary for the electronic system, has entered into a contract with a public relations company, worth €4.5 million, to publicise the system and inform people how to operate it. Will the Minister confirm that a former general secretary of Fianna Fáil is involved in the company that was awarded the contract to inform the public about this system? That is disturbing. This exercise is the responsibility of the political system, not the Minister or his Department and a commission comprising interest groups should have been established to analyse the voting system, which is the most important democratic process.
I am unhappy the Minister has gone so far down the road before consulting the committee. I favour moving with the times but I would like to ensure the democratic process is tamper proof and beyond reproach. The Minister referred to the voter verifiable audit trail. However, there is not a backup paper trail for electronic voting. When a voter uses the machine, he or she should be able to verify, through a paper receipt, that the end result of the exercise he or she has undertaken expresses his or her wish. There should not be an impediment to issuing a paper receipt, which could be inspected by the voter and then placed in a sealed container adjacent to the machine.
Experts who examined the Australian system have expressed concerns. They said the only impediment to issuing a paper receipt to verify a vote has been cast is cost. What price is too high to ensure the system is true? The Minister provided more information in his contribution. However, I am not an information technology expert but interested parties should be invited to appear before the committee. Margaret McGaley and Paul Gibson are authors of a report published by NUI Maynooth on the system. I would also like to have the opportunity to invite experts who have e-mailed and written to me expressing a wish to appear before the committee. I would like to hear their opinions on the system. I would also like to examine how the system operates in other countries and explore the reservations and concerns about electronic voting there.
I hoped there would have been more substance than bluster regarding the system.
There will be a demonstration of the system and members will also be offered an opportunity to ask questions.
Members looking at the machine would be like a cow looking over a ditch. I will not be happy unless I get answers to technical questions. I would like to put similar questions to independent experts.
The committee asked to see the system in operation and the officials felt it would be more convenient for them to attend Leinster House rather than us going to the Custom House to give us a demonstration of how the system works. They are doing what we asked. If there are other requests, we can make them at a later date.
Will the Minister publish all the reports on the project commissioned by his Department? Will regular updates be provided from now on how the project is proceeding? Were there flaws in the system that was rolled out in three constituencies in the 2002 general election and the seven constituencies in the Nice referendum? Flaws were brought to the Department's attention in the Zerflow report but the Minister stated a number of the concerns raised were groundless. What is the Department's response? What is the background of the Purvote part of the consortium and how much experience has it? Why is Ireland not following Australia's lead by ensuring maximum transparency, in particular, publishing the source code? If something goes wrong, what recourse will a candidate have if he or she believes the vote counter is incorrect? What will happen if someone challenges a result in the courts without a paper trail? What are the checks and balances in the system? How can people feel as secure about a computer holding votes if there is no paper backup to ensure there is no loss of voting records or there is no tampering? I would like to know who holds the source code for Ireland's possible future electronic voting system. Are the Minister and the Department satisfied that the source code remains outside the State in private hands?
I have already dealt with the Zerflow report. Has the Minister received any reports on the system so far? Can he make any such reports available to the committee? He referred to "an independent Irish software company which had access to the source code." Can he identify the company? What does the Minister mean by the term "independent" in that context? Can he provide details of the tendering process for the €35 million contract? What were the criteria for the award of the contract? How was it decided which consultants would be employed to study and test the Nedap-Powervote system?
I will conclude by saying that this exercise is a matter of Irish democracy. It is not a ministerial pet project, similar to the Punchestown project. There should be full transparency in respect of this important issue. I hope that today's meeting will represent the start of an exercise that will satisfy us that the system planned for next June's local and European elections is transparent and safe.
The Minister is right to say that there was general agreement, in principle, when the concept of electronic voting was first mooted. I participated in the debate by saying that electronic voting would be a good thing if it could give people better opportunities to vote, widen the scope for participation in elections or increase the use of voting systems in referendums, etc. I recall that I expressed reservations about switching to an intermediate form of electronic voting, essentially, during the course of the discussions. We now have such a form, however, as the proposed system will depend heavily on people going to polling stations, etc. It seems to me that the advantages of the switch to electronic voting do not justify the adoption of this system. People will still have to go to polling stations on a set day. Rather than getting a ballot paper, they will now get a small token to use to get access to the voting machine. The only thing that will be quicker will be the count process.
We are losing the sense of control, or the sense of collective knowledge, we all have about the electoral process. Political practitioners know how the process works. I refer not only to elected representatives, but also to the many voluntary members of political parties who populate count centres when votes are being counted and those who have operated the paper system we have had up to now, such as returning officers and count officials from local authorities. All political practitioners at this table know exactly how the electoral process works. They are familiar with details of voter registration, the entitlement to be placed on the supplementary register, what happens when one goes into the polling station and the grounds on which a voter is entitled to be challenged. Public representatives know how to mark a ballot paper, where it goes, how it should be stamped, what it should look like when it emerges from the ballot box and how ballot boxes are sealed. Our experience of long counts has shown us that certain people are experts on what constitutes a spoiled vote, etc.
The shift to the electronic system means that we will lose the benefit of the corpus of knowledge and experience of the electoral process of voting, or of how voting works. The knowledge we all possess in this regard will be stood down. We will be asked to trust a fairly small and select band of experts who will be given responsibility for the management, testing, supervision and quality assurance of an electronic voting system which most of the practitioners in the voting process do not understand. That it is a pretty dramatic step was reinforced by the Minister's contribution today. He made a series of assertions, which we are asked to take on trust, when he presented this measure. The assertions related, for example, to the safety of the system and the German institute's opinion of its security. We are being asked to trust experts' opinions of a change to a system we have always been able to see. We have been able to put the hand in the wound as far as the voting system has been concerned.
The essential change that is being made is that we will have to rely on the assertions of others and not on our own evidence. It may well be that the experts can be trusted and that they are right. Perhaps nothing will go wrong; that may well be the case. I do not know, however, and I do not think the Minister knows. I do not think it is advisable for the Minister to proceed with this system next June, given that the major Opposition parties are raising basic questions about the level of uncertainty and unease associated with it.
Leaving aside the issues we will get into, such as the detail of the security systems and the tests that will be done, I would like to ask the Minister if he will agree not to take the big plunge in respect of electronic voting until Opposition parties are satisfied that they know enough about the system that will be used to have full confidence in it. It is proposed that the plunge will be taken next June, when electronic voting will be used for all elections in all parts of the country, rather than having a look at it on a pilot basis in a couple of constituencies. It is possible that Opposition parties will be convinced of the merits of the system. The Government wants to proceed with the new system, but the Opposition is uneasy about it. I ask the Minister to give a political assurance, at least, that the Government will not press ahead regardless. If Opposition parties continue to have such a level of discomfort in respect of the proposed system, the Minister responsible should give a political assurance that he will not proceed with it unilaterally. The idea that the Government will proceed with a fundamental change in our voting system without general agreement across the political spectrum is bad for democracy.
I would like to ask the Minister a number of questions. When this issue was discussed on a previous occasion, I interpreted the Minister as saying that tally information would be made available at the next general election. It was not made available in the three electronic voting constituencies at last year's general election. It is generally accepted across political parties that tally information should be available. I read what the Minister has said to mean that there is a legal problem somewhere and I would like to hear what it is. The cost of purchasing the machinery and software has been publicised and I think the figure of €36 million has been quoted. I ask the Minister what the full cost is, that is, not just the purchase of the machines and software but also the costs associated with advertising promotion and the cost of the batteries.
It is noted in the Minister's submission that, "Arrangements will be made to provide a battery in the event of a power failure." Does this mean——
There could be a power failure in any election.
Does this mean we will have a battery in every polling station? How much will that cost? Will it be one battery per polling station or will there be a separate battery for every machine? I understand from what the Minister has said that separate dedicated PCs will be used at the count centre. Have they been included in the cost?
Would the Minister agree that the supervision of electronic voting should be given to an independent body like, for example, the Standards in Public Office Commission? I am not casting any reflection on the integrity of the Minister or the officers of his Department but it is not desirable that the control and management of the electronic voting system rests in a Department headed by a politician who, incidentally, will be the Fianna Fáil director of elections at the next election. It is not unreasonable that the overall supervision of the system be transferred to an independent body like the Standards in Public Office Commission which, in turn, would have responsibility for the independent auditing and preparation of reports on it.
I ask the Minister to confirm that when the Electoral Reform Society carried out its test, the randomisation function of the count was disabled. The Minister has listed the various tests that were carried out, as I understand it, on different aspects of the system. Has any full, integrated, end-to-end test been conducted? In his submission the Minister stated, "I will also arrange, perhaps at a meeting with the political party officials, to conduct a complete end-to-end election, including the printing of individual ballot papers, to enable a manual count to be carried out." I wish to hear some more about that. Does the Minister mean a kind of mock election or does he mean that an end-to-end test will be conducted on an actual election? If so, would it not be desirable that this be done on a pilot basis, not necessarily in June 2004 but before we have moved over to the entire system?
I have some detailed questions to put to the Minister later perhaps but I do not want to delay the proceedings. However, I wish to deal specifically with the voter-verifiable audit trail that the Minister is rejecting. I am a bit puzzled as to the rationale of his rejection. On the one hand he stated, on page six of his submission, that in the event of the High Court or the Circuit Court ordering a recount of votes the system is capable of retrospectively producing a printout of the actual votes cast. If the system is capable of doing that, how does the Minister stand over having a system that will then create a paper record of votes cast that will not have been seen by those who cast the vote in the first place? Surely, it does not require a great addition to the system to create the kind of voter-verifiable audit trail whereby the voter can actually see but not receive the paper record of the vote which then goes into the equivalent of a ballot box?
There has been a very recent decision on this in California. A couple of days ago the Secretary of State for California, who has some recent experience of an election, made a decision to introduce the voter-verifiable audit trail for future elections in California. In doing so he makes the point, which would probably reflect the comments being made here in relation to this system, that he was introducing it not because voting systems are inherently insecure but because people understandably feel more confident when they can verify that their votes are being recorded as intended.
My other questions have more to do with the detail of the system. Picking up on a point made by Deputy Allen, would the Minister be agreeable to having at a future meeting of this committee the experts he has relied on to test this system and allowing opposition parties to nominate members to question these people? The interesting thing about the concerns raised about electronic voting is that they are being raised mainly by people who know about computers. Most of the correspondence and comments that I have received about electronic voting have not come from people who say they are afraid of the machine or uncomfortable about going into the polling station. They are coming from computer experts.
It would be useful for this committee to have a straightforward question and answer session between the experts the Minister is relying on and computer experts who have been in contact with us and are raising questions about this. It would be healthy to have that exchange directly rather than having those of us who are, by and large, lay persons in this area trying to translate and sometimes maybe misunderstand what people are saying to us.
A number of questions have been raised in the contributions of Deputies Allen and Gilmore that the Minister might like to address.
I will certainly try to address as many of them as I can. It is very important that I start with two observations. First, this decision represented the collective will of Dáil Éireann as I understand it. This is not a Deputy Martin Cullen pet project. Second, this is not a Fianna Fáil voting machine standing behind me. I welcome any experts appearing before the committee. I would be delighted if the committee invited all my experts to appear before it. I have no difficulty with having them all questioned because I have nothing to hide in this regard. I am simply trying to implement the instructions of the Oireachtas, including all the political parties. That is all I am trying to do. I have no vested interest in any particular aspect of the voting machine, any of the institutes or experts or anybody involved. I do not know any of these people personally. I am here in good faith trying to implement the will of the Oireachtas. That is the point we have reached and it is important that we do not start off on this debate as if this has become a political issue of whether we should or should not use it. The Oireachtas made the decision and we are now working through the decision.
Equally it is important to point out that all of the assessments after the pilot phases - people are now calling for more pilot phases - showed a high rate of voter satisfaction with the machines and on a range of questions. It is important that we recognise what the public felt about the entire issue and how they rated all of these efforts. All the ratings were extremely positive.
All that information has been made available in the public domain. Both Deputies asked about reports I received. They are more than welcome to see copies of any of the reports or information I received. I have no wish to hide any information.
What about the source codes?
I will ask Mr. Peter Green to deal with that in a moment because it is a technical issue. As far as I am concerned, I have no difficulty in making available all the reports or in bringing in my experts or other experts. I have no difficult with any of this because I want to ensure, in the public interest, that we do not create unnecessary doubts in people's minds. If there are issues, let us resolve them but let us deal with this in a fair, transparent and open way. That is the background to it. That was the responsibility with which I have been charged.
I welcome the giving of views by any company. The committee can invite in my experts. If anybody else wants to invite experts, I have no difficulty with that. I have said I will publish all the reports received to date and I certainly have no difficulty with all that.
I wish to return to an issue raised by both parties as to whether there were any flaws found. I do not think there were any flaws found. There were questions on concerns raised by Zerflow that were clearly answered. There are the "what if" scenarios. I want to make clear that the "what if" scenarios can extend to wherever one wants them to go. What if, in the old system, the lorry carrying all the ballot boxes crashed, there was an explosion and they all went up in flames? The answer is: one loses the boxes and the ballot papers.
At least one could see it.
I am talking about the "what if" scenarios, which can be stretched to the nth degree until one reaches a point where it becomes ridiculous. Without pointing a finger in any direction, there is an element of that involved. In anything that the Deputies or I do, at the end of the day we trust the people and the integrity within the systems used.
A point made by Deputy Gilmore does not convince me. In fairness to him, he went out of his way to ensure that he was not casting any aspersions on my officials, or me but I am not convinced that some other group might offer something that all the experienced returning officers can offer. We trust the independence of the returning officers and we always have. They have never been questioned, to my knowledge, in elections in the history of the State. I do not know of anybody who has made any accusations against them. They are, by and large, a hugely honourable group of people and they are charged with this further responsibility in the context of the systems that will be used. We can ask questions but we must understand the integrity of the system itself.
The Deputies made a point about familiarity with the old count system and there is only one difference here. As I have been at pains to explain, in using this system next year I want to return to the original way that we would have done the counts in the past so that people can see and understand the result of each count and the end result is not given on the first utterance of the returning officer. It should be a count-by-count system like the old system and should work in the same way, and that is exactly what will happen.
The Deputy rightly questioned me about the tally figures. I strongly believe that tally figures on the first count should be made available. I am involved in an important argument, not of a political nature but of interpretation of the Constitution, on the safety of the ballot box. The following question arises: what number of votes are necessary in any single ballot box for it to be safe to tally by electronic means so that one does not get a number back? Let me put it this way, in other words, if there was a ballot box for an area where only ten people voted and it is known only ten people voted, one would get a confirmed tally figure. One must remember that previously the tallymen were only leaning in and looking, and it could never be proved what they did or did not see. If I give out the tally figures on the first count, they will be absolutely accurate. The Attorney General's office would be of the view, for instance, that a box with ten or 20 votes on an absolute measure would not be safe. The question is: at what number of votes is it safe, for instance, 200 or 300 votes? That is the position on that discussion.
I want to bring this discussion to a conclusion as quickly as possible, but I take the view that the political parties, the people who follow the political system, the media and others would like to have some tally figures. This has been my desire and I have made that clear to the Deputies, both at this committee and in the Dáil. I want to bring closure to that issue but I am not a legal person and even legal people take different views. I am sure the Deputy could bring a constitutional lawyer before this committee who would give one view and I could bring in another with a different view. At the end of the day these are matters of interpretation. What is important is that if it is done, it is done on the safest possible basis. That is the current position.
I could not agree not to take the plunge next year. As I have said from the beginning since I was given this portfolio, it has been very unfair to suggest that I have not engaged with the committee on this issue. I have engaged with this committee and with the Dáil. I have explained to the committee that we were trying to get the systems to take on board many of the issues raised by the Deputies. At the first opportunity I am appearing before the committee with the machine. I am being as open and transparent as possible and that is why I am present. My Departments officials and I are open to meeting with this committee, its members or whoever wants to question any issue or see anything working because it is important that this is not presented in the public domain as a Government versus Opposition issue. That would be detrimental to the electoral process here and misleading and wrong. Collectively, we need to be careful. I recognise that there are legitimate questions and I want them cleared and fully answered in an open and transparent way.
The cost of the system has been raised. As the committee will be aware, the budget for this was €35 million. There are about 7,000 machines involved. We must go to tender on the batteries. The members might laugh but it is worth noting that during the last election one polling station not using electronic voting closed when there was a power failure in the area. It seriously affected the ability of people to vote under the old manual system and nobody welcomed the consequences that resulted in the closing of the polling station. If the Deputies recall, it arose on the question of whether it was possible to have extensions, etc. Batteries are being procured to ensure that we are prepared for a power failure. If there is a power failure, there will a backup system. If the backup system is as simple as a battery, that is fine by me as long as it can do the job. That is what is proposed and I am satisfied that this deals with the issue.
I have dealt with the question on the independent management system for elections. The Deputy spoke about the Electoral Reform Commission. I do not hold any view but I have no reason to feel that the returning officer system is the wrong one. It has worked well here.
I will ask Mr. Greene to deal with the issue of the audit trail. I can provide an audit trail paper for the benefit of the members of the committee and anybody else who wants it. I want everybody to understand this as much as possible and I want everybody to have confidence that it will work. Mr. Greene might deal with the source code issue that seems to be the core issue.
I did not get a response to some of the questions I raised. I asked how can people be satisfied that the exercise they undertake is reflected in what the machine does. I asked why a print out could not be provided for the voter, which could then be inserted in a sealed box. I asked also about the contracts on informing and promoting the system to the public.
On the question of contracts, I had no involvement whatsoever as it is part of the public procurement process. I believeMcConnells won the contract.
What was the cost?
The budget for this massive information campaign is approximately €4.5 million to €5 million. Is there a suggestion that we do not tell the public how the system works - surely not? We either do it rightly or wrongly. I have outlined in my speech the level of public consultation and communication that is needed for the entire country. I hope nobody is suggesting that we do not do this.
I suggest that Members of the House who represent political parties and the public should have been consulted before anything took place. There was no consultation with the political parties. The Department was not proactive in engaging Members in the process and it just responded to the questions tabled in the Dáil and asked at committee meetings. The Department acted single-handedly. A commission should have been established to deal with this issue.
I want to clear up a point with the Minister. The Minister said the Oireachtas had made this decision and he was implementing it. He conveyed the impression that the entire process from beginning to end was decided by the Oireachtas and that he was merely carrying out its wishes. We need to be clear on what was decided. The Oireachtas passed an electoral Act in which there was an enabling provision for electronic voting. This provision was subject to debate - it is an exaggeration to say that there was universal enthusiasm for it. There was agreement to proceed with it, but to proceed with caution. There was general agreement to try out electronic voting in a number of constituencies, but after the last general election there was no agreement at any point that we would move from a trial in three constituencies to its universal use for every election. The Oireachtas never decided that; it was an executive decision by the Minister. The members of the Oireachtas were never asked to assent to that decision and it would be wrong to give the impression that it was a decision of the Oireachtas to proceed to universal use of electronic voting.
I do not want to end up splitting hairs but the Oireachtas passed a Bill that mandated the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government - whoever that might have been on the day - to proceed with this. They are the facts. When legislation is passed, the Minister is mandated to implement the various sections and that is what I have done. Is Deputy Allen saying that I should have consulted with him on how I consult with the public? I am not an 18 year old schoolboy. I have set out in fairly detailed terms that there is to be a massive education and awareness campaign throughout the country. The machines will be located throughout the country in local authorities, libraries and so on for the public to see them, become familiar with them and use them. I have done everything humanly possible to make this information available. Are members serious in suggesting that I consult with them? I think this is a spurious argument whatever about some of the serious questions about source codes and integrity and so on. Let us not turn the clock back and pretend there was no consultation.
I would appreciate more facts and less bluster from the Minister. The first time we heard about the purchase of equipment was in a committee room when a question was asked about the Zerflow system, We were told the Zerflow machines were now a thing of the past and there was a new generation of machines. That begged the question as to whether they were purchased and at what cost - on 30 May 2003 we heard of their purchase at €35 million of taxpayers money.
The Deputy did not have to drag the information from me.
We had to drag the information from the Minister.
I attended the committee meeting and made it public at the first opportunity I got after becoming a Minister. If the Deputy reads my script he will see that it is not a Zerflow but Nedap system.
I said there were questions about the defects in the Zerflow system and the Minister implied that those machines were a thing of the past and were replaced by a new generation that he had acquired. We then asked the Minister about the cost of the machines he acquired. That was the first time we heard of a new system and what it cost. We heard today for the first time about the €4.5 million contract for a PR company where a former general secretary of Fianna Fáil is involved.
What insinuation is the Deputy making? If the Deputy is making a specific allegation, would he make it clear to the committee in public as to what he is suggesting?
Is it the truth? I am asking whether it is the truth?
This is a pointless argument. The Deputy is not interested in electronic voting. His party leader wants us to go with e-voting and the Deputy is questioning the integrity of a system that is far more secure that what his party leader is suggesting. I suggest the Deputy and the Fine Gael Party stop playing games; that the Deputy and his party leader discuss the reason that he, Deputy Kenny, is issuing statements saying we should move immediately to e-voting and ask him to stop blackguarding a system that is secure
Mr. Greene will answer some of the questions that were raised.
The point I am making about the contract is that the Minister is appearing before an Oireachtas committee after he entered into a contract this very week to spend a further €4.5 million.
Mr. Peter Greene
I will deal with the source code. We have multiple elections, covering five different types of polls. The source code must be capable of dealing with them altogether, either as an individual poll or as a combinations of elections. To date we have the Dáil profile, the referendum profile, next June we will have the local and European elections profiles. If there is a Presidential election next October, we will have the presidential profile. At that stage, we will have the source codes for all the different types of elections, and at that stage a decision will have to be made either to buy the source code or to licence it. Licensing software is the normal part of the process. In that case a copy of the source code is held in escrow. A decision to buy it will be a policy decision and what happens after that, and whether it is made available to the public or to people to verify will be a policy decision and a paper will be sent to the Minister accordingly.
The cost of the machines has been in the public domain since 2000. There are a few additional pieces of equipment that need to be bought; for example a special table for the voting machine and the reason we are opting for a special table is that it will have a tilt facility to facilitate people in wheelchairs who may not be able to reach the cast vote button. It is more secure. They are once-off purchases. We will buy trolleys to hold six voting machines, which will ease transport and storage afterwards. That, for the most part, accounts for the extra costs involved. There will no doubt be costs in terms of training the returning officer staff and the polling station staff. Once that is done there should be no more costs in the future. The tender process for the voting machines and for the publicity has been fully compliant with EU and national procurement regulations and the papers are open for everyone to see.
The randomiser was not used in the ERS study because the purpose of that study was to ensure the software implemented the count rules properly. It could not implement them if one was dealing with a new mixed vote situation. We have carried out end-to-end testing and the papers are available. As we go forward and local authority and returning officer staff are trained, they will also carry out end-to-end testing. People will dispute that such testing should include ballot papers before the votes are mixed. That could be done but the problem is one would have to be doubly sure the people enter the votes in the machine accurately. If someone wants to be mischievous, all he or she has to do is not enter a vote properly. In addition, the same results will not be achieved.
We tried this out and it will affect the last seats to be filled because of the mix. There must be certainty and the mix is a legal requirement with which we must comply. The count rules in the system implement current count rules and that has been the case since day one. The purpose of this was to avoid confusion so that the people and candidates would know the rules. As the Minister stated, after June 2004 the system will be examined to ascertain whether the Seanad electoral system in which every vote is counted, including fractions, could be introduced. That is for another day.
The audit paper has been in the news frequently. The system does not produce a ballot paper when a person casts a vote and, therefore, this does not show up in the audit trail. The reason is two fold. First, as the Maynooth report strongly recommends, when a ballot paper is inserted in a box it becomes part of a sequence and it is possible to directly link it with the voter. It probably would not happen but it is a theoretical possibility that the Supreme Court ruled in 1971 cannot be tolerated. Second, the usefulness of that procedure is doubtful. It cannot be used to measure the result of the electronic voting because of the mix. Why use it? The voter will see the preference number quite clearly beside the candidate's photograph. A line on the voting machine screen will tell him or her the name of the person for whom he or she has exercised a preference, the party to which the candidate belongs and the preference he or she has given. The machine will also inform the voter that his or her vote has been stored and it will then deactivate.
I agree belief is needed in this system but the software has been fully tested by the institute in Germany, which is an internationally recognised body. It would not issue a report under its name unless it could stand over it. The report, as the Minister stated, will be published on a website shortly and will be available for everyone to read. The reports on the general election were made public and we did not receive any query.
I welcome the opportunity to raise a number of questions on the Minister's presentation and the system he proposes. Given that the political process is under question and it is enjoying significant public confidence according to opinion polls, we must be extremely careful that we do not make matters worse by introducing an electoral system that raises questions that cannot be addressed if results are unclear or disputed. I represent Dublin North, which was one of the three constituencies involved in the electronic voting experiment at the general election and it had novelty value and people took to it in the same way they took to the euro. It is a trait of Irish people to embrace new experiences. The summary execution of the political career of former Deputy Nora Owen, however, was cruel.
The experiment is part of a learning curve. The experience in other countries of the Nedap system has not been entirely satisfactory. The Minister referred to verifiability and auditability but many people in the IT sector do not believe the verifiable and auditable aspects of the system stand up. I hope the Minister is present with a view to improving the system rather than trying to talk down or ignore the issues raised. He stated all aspects of the system would be subject to ongoing review. Perhaps this meeting is part of that process.
The Minister also stated in reply to a parliamentary question I tabled recently, "My Department is considering additional security measures, both technical and procedural, which will ensure a high level of security in the use of the system." Hopefully, progress will be made in that regard today. He mentioned the US in passing but the US presidential election in 2000 raises the need to address concerns about the use of the electronic voting system. In precinct 216, Velusia County, Florida. the system recorded that Al Gore received a negative vote amounting to 16,022. It was obvious something was wrong. A total of 412 out of a possible 585 registered voters cast their votes but the computer system recorded that George W. Bush received 2,813 while——
That system will not be used in Ireland.
The Minister needs to be clear about this because he mentioned the Nedap system.
That system will not be used.
I accept that but we must be sure there will not be a repeat of that incident in Ireland. The University of North Carolina can provide a great of deal of information on this. While this mistake was obvious, it may not be as obvious in other circumstances. However, the canvassing board was able to use a manual record for the recount. Without a manual record, there is doubt and suspicion that we want to avoid. I hope Ireland will heed the lessons that have been learned abroad. Kevin Shelley, the California Secretary of State, announced last Friday that, from 1 July 2005, countries will not be able to use a machine that does not produce a paper trail. That is what the Opposition seeks. Having taken advice from IT experts, there needs to be a paper record.
California is home to Silicon Valley and the state has years of experience of using the machines, yet officials believe the system has flaws. This is not being made up for the sake of opposing the Government's position. I am trying to learn from a state that has invested in a similar system, discovered flaws, which it needs to address, and is prepared to make changes. Is the Minister prepared to make changes or is he saying change is impossible? We must have a mature discussion based on the experience in other countries. We can hopefully develop an improved state-of-the-art e-voting system which can give rise to the creation of jobs here. The learning experience might lead to the system being better or being capable of export. We must be positive and try to avoid the mistakes made elsewhere.
I referred earlier to a Nedap system, which can produce a paper record. If it is possible to produce such a record under a Nedap system, will the Minister ensure that it will be possible to do so under our system? This will at least ensure that we can have confidence in the system in terms of its proceeding along the electronic route. We do not want to halt progress or be left behind when others move to having electronic voting systems. Regardless of the outcome of the political process, doubts over a Government's integrity, etc., we want to ensure that the electoral system will be sound and that we will not be obliged to answer questions about it. Is it possible to provide a paper record when we move down this route? If it is, we will at least have a safety net that will ensure that mistakes are not made and that doubt cannot be cast over election results.
I have in my possession a list of every vote cast. There is no mystery about it. This list was also made available after the pilot schemes. Did anybody read the information provided after the pilot phases? All of the information about which I am being asked was made available in great detail.
The Minister is missing the point.
Will the Minister answer the question?
I am trying to be helpful. I will provide this information willingly. I am not in any way trying to avoid providing it. I can supply volumes of such information, which is already available and which answers the questions being posed. I agree with the Deputy that if the system can be improved, it should be improved. I am not a technical genius; I want the system to work, from everybody's perspective. However, voluminous amounts of information have been provided. The number of hits on the website, where this information was available, was nil. A year later, Deputies are now stating that it was not made available.
Let us demonstrate how the system works and we might then be able to answer further questions. If people want to see what the new system is like, we might be able——
Is it possible to have a manual recount if the system breaks down?
Two other Deputies have indicated that they wish to ask questions. I ask them to be brief. We will then have the demonstration followed by further questions.
The ballot will look like a normal ballot paper.
Is it possible to have a manual recount?
That information was placed in the public domain some time ago.
Voters never see that.
I was asked if it can be done. The answer is yes and Members were made aware of that up to two years ago. We can do it in traditional voter form, if necessary. There will not be a receipt for each voter. The Deputy asked if the machine can produce a ballot paper that matches the totality of the votes cast.
I inquired about receipts for each voter and I could not obtain an answer.
I call on Deputy McCormack to put his question. Deputy Brady will follow him.
There appears to be a conflict with what the Minister is saying and what Mr. Greene stated. Mr. Greene stated that the allocation of the final seat could be affected by use of that system in conjunction with the existing system of proportional representation. In recent elections I did not contest the final seat but earlier in my career I did so and I would be concerned about anything that might influence such contests.
It appears that we are going to spend €50 million on this system. What will be the benefits of doing so? I am aware that counts will be completed more rapidly. However, we will remove voter satisfaction and confidence. Voters have always had the right to manually place their voting papers into the ballot boxes. However, they will no longer be able to do this. The Minister has asked us to trust the experts. In the minds of members of the public, voting is closely connected to politics and asking them to trust politicians nowadays is asking a great deal. We will be obliged to engage in a big sell in order to have them accept this system. I am not sure that using a public relations team to do so is the correct route to take. A PR team was used at the time of the sale of Eircom shares, and millions was spent.
They were nearly getting their money back at one stage.
Many small investors lost a great deal of money in that instance. Eircom was oversold. I would be sceptical of a PR team being used to convince people that this is the correct system.
It would be easier to interfere with or make changes to this system - these would be more difficult to detect - than is the case with the current system. How will the PR team answer people's questions in this regard? I have absolute trust in the presiding officers, the staff, Mr. Greene and everyone else involved. However, would it be possible to interfere with or rig the machines before they come into the possession of the presiding officers? I do not know enough about computers to know whether this is possible and people are expressing concerns it may be possible to tamper with the machines. Members of the public are so distrustful of politicians; they will believe that it will be possible to engage in tampering.
What assurance can be provided that the machines have been tested? The Minister stated that they have been successfully tested in the Netherlands and parts of Germany. How can I assure people in west Galway that the machines here will operate in a satisfactory manner?
My final question relates to the tally. I was concerned by the Minister's statement that some people have stated that a safe figure might be 100 or 200. In west Galway, there were always a number of small polling stations and, at one of them, only six people voted. It was easy to tally because everyone marked their ballot paper with a purple pencil and, with the exception of one occasion, they always voted for the same candidate.
They were not given a second chance.
There was no doubt at all. Ballots will be no more secret, if a tally is put in place under the new system, than they were under the old system. As of the people to whom I refer only voted for one candidate, it was easy to tally the votes. I will not name the island where this took place.
The legal point is that the tally was unofficial. Once the tally figures are provided in a document, it becomes an official document.
I know a great deal more about tallies than the Minister having been through 16 elections. I tallied the box in question myself, therefore, there was no mistake about the result.
Were candidates from the other parties happy that it was open and transparent?
Yes, we all agreed on it. We knew before it was opened. I have raised the issues that people are seeking reassurance about. The question of politicians trusting the new system is not as important as the question of the people trusting it. Given that many people are very distrustful of anything to do with politics, it is likely that some people will not trust the new system. I would like the Minister to provide some clarification in respect of the suggestion that there could be a difference between the result of the final count under the existing system, which has a paper trail, and the new electronic system. If this is true, it will have serious repercussions.
It is very serious.
Many of the doubts and concerns that have been outlined to the Minister today were expressed before the electronic voting system was used in my constituency of Meath at last year's general election. It was anticipated that elderly people, or those entitled to vote for the first time, would choose not to vote. The reality was different, however, because the amount of elderly people who voted increased by 5% or6%. Many young people voted. I did not hear any worries from the constituents of Meath after the election. The public information campaign in my constituency in 2002 was second to none. I am sure Deputy Sargent will confirm that there was a fine campaign in his constituency of Dublin North. The public roadshow, which visited towns and large villages, was the most important and interesting aspect of the campaign. The people thought the roadshow, which took place outside supermarkets or churches, was very attractive. Many people tried out the new system. The campaign should be continued next year because it was very successful.
It is natural that there will be some concerns. Those of us who have participated in local or parliamentary elections over a long period are aware that the tally information provided as part of the existing system is very important. One is given the information one wants about various boxes. I would appreciate it if something could be done to retain this aspect of the old system. Many people are concerned about the method of announcing the results of the various counts. Many of us may recall the cruel occasions when we lost an election. It was sad when it was suddenly announced that the former Deputy, John Farrelly, who is from my area, had lost his seat. It would be a great help if such results could be given individually.
I do not think people should have any concerns about the new system. I was very pleased with the operation of the electronic voting system last year.
The Deputy was elected.
It is natural that I was satisfied. We had been concerned that elderly people and first-time voters would not vote, but many of them voted. It was a great result.
I agree that I do not want a repeat of the manner in which the former Deputy, Nora Owen, was informed that she had lost her seat. All of us at this meeting understand the value of common sense and we do not want people to be treated in such a way. Since I took office it has been made clear to me in the Dáil, in response to written questions and at committee meetings that a count-by-count system is favoured. Candidates want to see how many votes they have acquired on the first count, who has been eliminated and where transfers are going. They want the traditional features of an election count to be made available in a clear manner. I confirm that that will happen. I am being absolutely clear about that.
Deputy Brady raised the issue of tally figures. I share the strong view of members of the committee, particularly Opposition Front Bench spokespersons, on this matter. I agree that tally figures should be made available. I have to abide by the legal advice that I am given, however. There is an argument about the safe figure. I would probably take the politician's approach of favouring a much lower figure than that suggested by legal officials. What can we safely get, constitutionally? We would all like this issue to be resolved in a way that provides accurate tally figures. Like Deputy McCormack, I have attended counts where just five votes in a box were tallied. Such tallying is unofficial, however, as it is not related to the count. It is a matter of one's opinion. The legal position is that the production of tally figures in an official format would represent an official confirmation in documentary form of the contents of a ballot box. I understand what Deputy McCormack means and I accept that he knows how the system works. I have outlined the legal position.
I was glad to hear Deputy Brady's comments about public satisfaction with electronic voting. His comments have confirmed my understanding of the matter. Deputies Sargent and McCormack also raised this issue. We know what the public's view of this matter is. We have undertaken serious work to establish the public's opinion. The new system has been tested at a general election and at a referendum. Many people were asked about their satisfaction with, and confidence in, the new system. They were asked if they believed in the new system. We are confident they do because those who experienced the pilot stages of this project registered high levels of satisfaction with it. I do not claim that it is not legitimate for people to ask questions about the new system. People have said, based on their experience, that the public information process that was embarked upon was a central aspect of the development of confidence in the system. It was an advantage to have seen and tested the new machines in a local supermarket or library, which is a large element of what we are doing.
I remind Deputy Allen and others that the extension of the electronic system to the entire country is a pretty big undertaking. A large amount of human resources and effort is needed. Every person in every constituency is entitled to the same level of information. It would be wrong to make a greater effort in some areas than in others. An identical level of public information should be made available in every constituency.
Many questions have been asked about security. Members who would like to know how the machine works can consult Mr. Peter Greene and Mr. Dave Walsh, who are present. They can ask them any questions they wish.
Can voting machines be interfered with beforehand?
No. Mr. Greene and Mr. Walsh can give us a demonstration.
May I quote from the NUI Maynooth report, written by Ms Margaret McGaley and Mr. Paul Gibson? The report states:
The source code for the system is not publicly available. In fact, even the Government does not have a copy. If someone were interested in affecting the outcome of Irish elections, they might compromise one of the programmers within Nedap, or manage to have someone employed there. Skilled programmers could insert changes which could affect the outcome of an election, whilst being very difficult to detect.
I can answer that assertion.
I am worried about the source code.
I will address the matter of security breaches.
Mr. Greene said that the publication of the source code was a policy matter. This means that it is a matter for the Minister. Will the Minister publish the source codes?
I will have no difficulty with publishing the source codes when they are available.
They are available for the Dáil elections and the referendum that have been conducted by electronic means.
I will try to get legal clearance. I understood that there were legal issues. If it is simply a policy matter and they can be published, I will do so. It makes no difference - it does not bother me in the slightest.
We shall proceed with the demonstration.
I have asked the Minister a question.
We will start the demonstration now.
May we resume the debate later?
Yes.
Mr. Greene
Mr. Walsh will run through the preparation of a ballot paper and the programming of a ballot module. We will then demonstrate the operation of the voting machine, before having a quick demonstration of the count process.
Mr. Dave Walsh
There will be two different polls next year. The local authorities will be the returning officers for both the local and European elections. Local authorities will have to take nominations and create ballot papers, which will be printed and placed on the voting machine. When the votes are collated and distributed to the various count centres, depending on the type of election, the count can begin.
I will go through the process from the creation of a ballot paper to the count after Mr. Greene displays the machine. We have an already programmed mock election for Kells Town Council for 2004. The four main stages for the IES system are, preparation of the election, inputting of the votes, the count and the final results, papers and statistics. In the preparation stage the poll data shows the date of the poll and what the election is for. In this case the system recognises it in shortened code as a town borough election, 2004 and it confirms that the information for setting up the election is correct.
The next level in the system confirms the number of seats to be filled and, for the purposes of this mock election, in Kells we have nine seats. Obviously, there would be more than nine candidates. The process is straightforward. Once the local authority receives nominations, it can input candidates. I have already entered some candidates names but I will show the committee the type of information that is produced, such as how the ballot paper is created. The information that is inserted on the ballot paper is displayed. The candidate's political party can be selected from the logos and information already pre-loaded onto the system. There is no way this can be changed by anybody voting.
Kells town supports Fianna Fáil.
Mr. Walsh
The Department is impartial. The candidates surname, title, forename, gender, and address are then entered and appear as they would on the ballot paper. Occupation and a photograph can also be entered and I have loaded a photograph for the purposes of the demonstration. It is a straightforward process to scan photographs, either from a disk or a CD. If we want to add a new candidate we click on "plus" and get the clear space to add another candidate. The process is straightforward for the local authority once it has all the candidates names and details. Once it has entered the information the system will automatically alphabetise them and set them up, as they will appear on the ballot paper.
The next step, before the ballot paper is produced for the voting machine, is to confirm that the information on the ballot paper is correct. It is necessary to confirm that the election is taking place, the number of seats to be filled, and we can also decide whether to have single or double spacing on the ballot paper. We have examples on the system that Mr. Greene will demonstrate later. The system also shows the candidates' names and parties and where they will appear on the ballot paper. The information in the system can be confirmed by the local authority, and on start-up of the machine by the presiding officer. A printout is made to ensure that this information matches what is on the ballot paper and on the ballot module. A visible representation of what the ballot paper would look like can also be produced and printed for a record to compare against the final ballot paper. It is possible to see what a ballot paper will look like and the names as they appear. This can be printed off and kept on file for comparison purposes.
The final testing task is to examine how the ballot paper will appear on the full system. The columns show the information on the candidates we entered. This is another check system. This too can be printed out for filing and to show to people afterwards. Once all of this is done all that is left is to create a results file. This means creating a framework within which the votes can be inserted and counted. I have votes entered already so I will create a new results file. Once the information is ready all the local authority has to do is to prepare a PDF file of the ballot paper, as it entered it, for the printer so it can print full ballot papers. The authority will also export data to the Dáil returning officer who will manage both the European and local elections. When the information has been exported to the Dáil returning officer he can put it together and load the ballot modules on to the voting machines for the election. I will now pass over to Mr. Greene who will demonstrate the actual voting machine.
Mr. Greene
First, there is the programme ballot module where the ballot paper will be entered. The system records a paper record in that system which will be there as part of the election documentation. It provides every scrap of information in the system, where the candidates are and who they are etc. That is part of the paper trail.
The ballot module is loaded into the back of the machine and is locked and sealed into it. Some reports cast aspersions on the machine and said people could lift out the module. The back of the module is a sealed unit and only a technician can access it. The sealed module is a feature of the Irish system and is not present in the German or Dutch machines. They do not have backup modules because they trust the system. However, because of the doubts, we have included it as an added security feature. It would only be required in extreme circumstances. In 15 years of use in Holland a ballot module has never been lost.
The machine contains a printer for printing off statements. After the presiding officer prints off a statement he closes down the back of the system. The back of the machine is in view of the polling staff all day during the poll but the public has no access to the back of the system.
What does the presiding officer do? He opens the machine and plugs it in. The first thing he must do then is to print off the data in the ballot module. This provides all the details. He will check that the listed candidates are in the same order as on the ballot paper on the screen and have the printout witnessed and signed. He can then test any particular button on the system. For example, if I vote for Breen and want to check the system is recording the vote for Breen and not Browne I can do that. I can demonstrate that afterwards to any member who wants to check it. The printout also shows that there are no votes yet in the system before the poll commences.
The presiding officer and poll clerk now check that the machine is ready for any member of the public to come and vote. On the control panel there are four buttons for the four different categories of electors. For example, next June we will have both European and local elections. Voters will get a permit ticket with an E or an L on it. When they go to the machine the poll clerk will press the E button and the machine will be ready for the voter to cast a vote in the European election. The voter simply goes to the machine and looks at the ballot sheet and selects his preference. If he wants to change his preference he hits the button a second time and it is deleted and he can make another selection. When the voter is happy with his selection he presses the "Cast Vote" button. The system then tells the voter the vote is stored and thanks him and it deactivates itself.
On this particular unit I am using, the poll clerk will know when a vote has been cast because the light will flicker and the message appears that the vote has been stored and the number of people who have used the machine will increase by one. If at any time during the day there is any doubt about the number of people who have used the machine, this can be checked against the number of people marked off the register or the number of people who had permit tickets to see if and why there is any difference.
The presiding officer must confirm in writing that the seal on the ballot module is intact before voting starts. He must also confirm that the seal on the side of the machine is intact before voting commences. In some cases, there will probably be a third seal around the voting machine like at the airport when a security seal is put around luggage. There could be three seals on the machine. If anyone tries to break the seal, that machine would not be used. The returning office would be informed and he or she would investigate and report it. The printout will show there are no votes in the system.
At the end of polling, the presiding officer will create another statement which will give details on how many votes are in the system and on the number of people who did not use the machine. If, for instance, I decide I do not want to vote for anybody or if I get stage fright and I do not press the "Cast Vote" button, the person at the control unit will know that. Reminding people not to forget to press the "Cast Vote" button is part of the information campaign. We cannot be certain in all circumstances that people will press it. It is not compulsory to press it. If someone walks away from the machine without pressing the "Cast Vote" button and despite all the advice, instructions and reminders from the poll clerk, the poll clerk, without going near the machine, will deactivate it by turning the key in a particular direction which will mean the machine will record that someone came to it but did not vote. That is recorded in the system for election statistics and for any questions that might arise.
When polling is over, a statement will be created which is part of the election process. The presiding officer must again confirm in writing that the seal has not been tampered with on the ballot module. The system automatically copies the information on to the backup module in case of emergencies. The presiding officer will send the ballot module, two statements and a reconciliation statement, either in a special envelope or in whatever way the local returning officer arranges, to the count centre. Depending on what the returning officer wants to do, the machine will be taken back to the count centre. After the election, it will be opened up and the ballot papers will be removed. It will be cleaned and someone will make sure the wires are okay. The material on the backup module will be deleted. The machine will be stored until the next election. Mr. Walsh will go through the procedure at a count.
Mr. Walsh
Once the information has been read back into the system, either through a CD or a disc, it is tallied and one can go into the server. There is an account menu. First, the votes will be mixed and numbered. Once this is done, it cannot be redone. As the Minister said, every time one re-mixes them, one gets a different order. The data base is then secured to make sure that if anything happens to the PC, such as a power failure, one could always get it back after the mix and numbering. One can also get a list, as has been distributed, of all the mixed votes. They will all have been given randomised numbers. This shows the various candidates, the number of votes and the preferences. One can check and query each one.
A number of pages of information can be provided. The first page shows what the poll is for, the constituency, the date of the poll and the number of seats. It calculates the number of votes which have been cast and the quota. It shows the turnout and the number of candidates. It also shows the candidates in alphabetical order, their party and the total number of votes. It shows their status, that is, whether they have been elected or excluded. It shows any surpluses and also calculates the requirement to reach the quota. At the bottom of the page, there is a graph showing what happened. Every candidate who reaches the quota and is elected is in the yellow box.
The next page also shows the candidates who will be ranked in order of who has received the most votes. It is the same information but shows it in a different format. The third page is a statement which can be the basis of what the returning officer reads out at the count. It shows the poll data and what the quota is. It shows if there are any surpluses available and it indicates what the next step is. It also shows the number of votes which will be distributed in the next count to elect a continuing candidate.
It is likely that these three pages will be distributed as soon as the first count is announced to people at the count centre so that they can dissect and understand the information and consider what will happen at subsequent counts. There will probably be a brief period of maybe five or ten minutes to digest that information before the next count. This information can be printed or exported, as required.
The person will perform the next count. The count result will show what has happened. The candidates will be ranked in order of who has received the most votes. Candidates who have reached the quota will be elected while other candidates may be excluded. The statement will show what happened during the count and whether there is a surplus available for distribution. The same process applies to each count. If the number of continuing candidates is equal to the number of unfilled seats, the continuing candidates will be deemed elected without reaching the quota.
The last count will show that all the seats have been filled. The results sheet will show how people's votes increased or decreased. When the count is completed, the returning officer will produce final reports which will formally announce the result.
The volume of information the machines will create at each stage of the process will be significant and it will be accurate. It will take much of the guess work out of what goes on at the count centres. Detailed information will be available at each count which would not have been available before. As Mr. Murphy took us through the system, we could see that the type of information generated at each count was not previously available at count centres in an official format.
We will be as brief as we can as it is possible that we will have a vote in the House in the next few minutes.
What is the objection to the proposal to provide the voter with a printout of the votes he or she casts? The voter could then satisfy himself or herself that the printout accords with the procedure he or she followed when voting. The printout would then be placed in a sealed container to be destroyed rather than kept for subsequent re-examination in the event of a dispute. The printout would serve purely to satisfy the voter that the procedure has been carried out in accordance with his or her wishes.
Earlier, I quoted a report by Ms Margaret McGaley and Mr. Paul Gibson which was published by NUI Maynooth. The report states that the source code for the system is not publicly available and that even the Government does not have a copy. It adds that if someone were interested in affecting the outcomes of Irish elections, they might compromise one of the programmers within Nedap or manage to have somebody employed at the company. According to the report skilled programmers could insert changes to affect the outcome of an election which would be very difficult to detect. Does the Minister have a reaction to this assertion by the authors of the NUI Maynooth report?
I have two brief questions. I am conscious that other colleagues wish to contribute. First, the software for the ballot module can be designed to operate normally when it is tested on the morning of an election but to bias one candidate or party once a certain trigger has been activated. If a certain sequence of votes were cast, the machine could be used to relay a different record to the one which voters input. How will the Minister convince me that cannot be done?
Second, Deputy Johnny Brady described Kells as a Fianna Fáil town. How would the Minister explain if the Communist Party of Ireland received 11% of the vote there and the Socialist Workers Party 12%? How would the Minister convince Deputy Johnny Brady or anyone else that the machine had not got it wrong?
I apologise for missing part of the discussion. I heard the main viewpoints which were communicated by the lead speakers and I can appreciate their concerns. I am in favour of electronic voting. I made radio statements after the last election in which I had been involved in one of the closest contests in the country. After the experience, I became more supportive of electronic voting. Deputy Gilmore spoke about the count and the tallymen. I have been through many counts and it is an enjoyable day out. However, I hope no other committee member has to experience a long recount and the emotional trauma which can accompany it over a long weekend. People's families and dependants should not be put through that. The count should be completed quickly and the result made known to allow people to go home on the day of the count happy that a decision has been made. Of course, there is a personal dimension to this. A situation like the one involving Nora Owen should not happen. The Minister responded to the statement on that earlier.
During a recount, it is infuriating to find that presiding officers are not franking the ballot papers as happened in my case. No form of redress is available if one loses one's seat. The ballot papers cannot be tracked back to polling booths. The same presiding officer will probably be in place the next time and the same mistake will be made. When I saw that, it increased my support for electronic voting. I saw examples of the same thing during local elections. I was frustrated to see that in this day and age a person would not stamp the ballot paper. The electronic system is more foolproof in that respect. There is a greater risk of human error in the existing system and there is no redress when it happens.
I am glad to see that electronic voting is to be introduced. I was very supportive of the measure following my experience in the last election. I welcome the reassurance the Minister has given the committee today. I am not a member of the committee, but I am very interested in the subject which is why I have attended the meeting.
How long does a count take under the electronic system? I understand it can be quick and, where there is a second and third count, breaks may be factored in. It often cushions the shock for a person if they know the tally on the first count at least.
I apologise for missing part of the meeting. I concur with Senator Finucane's comments. Can the Minister answer in more detail Deputy Allen's question about the printout of the ballot? I am aware of the Minister's explanation from reading his script, but the voter would be more satisfied if he or she could see a piece of paper.
We complained about what happened in America. People's analyses of what happened there took on all sorts of legs depending on the result they wished to see. We must concede that while it took some weeks, people were physically able to go through ballot papers which were marked to some degree by the voter. There was physical evidence of the ballot. One of the weaknesses here is that once the button is pressed, the result is set be it good, bad or indifferent. Even at this late stage, the Minister could do something about allowing the printing off of ballot papers.
The 1971 Supreme Court judgment was invoked to indicate that there was a fear sequencing in ballot papers could be used to identify voters. If voters saw that Johnny Murphy, for example, had entered the booth first, he could be identified with ballot paper No. 1. That is not an insurmountable problem. If the printout were simply deposited by the voter in a ballot box, that would not apply.
Can the Minister provide the committee with more detail of what he termed "randomisation"? As politicians, we all understand the present electoral system. In circumstances like those in which Senator Finucane found himself, randomisation might provide a different result to the present count system.
In the new system, will there be a full distribution of surpluses based on the full number of ballots or will it be based on a random sampling? Will distribution be based on the present system or the Seanad system?
I tried to answer that important question earlier, but I misunderstood it slightly. The system we have presented today will work in the next election on the same basis as it would have under the manual system. The system has the capacity to do as the Senator suggests after the 2004 election. It can redistribute all ballot papers, which is something we might all like to see. It would be the ultimate and true reflection of the voting patterns.
Why can we not do that in 2004?
We did not say we would do it; legislation is necessary. We have a tried and tested system in place. New legislation will be a matter for all political parties in the Houses. On the basis of the legislation as it stands, the 2004 election will be the same as previous elections. If, beyond that election, the Oireachtas takes the view that every vote should be distributed, that can be done. I favour this approach.
Hopefully, that will happen even though the present system is probably 99% accurate.
The electronic system is much truer.
I would have thought the Minister would have considered bringing forward legislation before next year's election. We could then say the result we get on the day is 100% accurate. That is perhaps a debate for another day.
I raised the issue of the public information campaign in the Seanad today as I was unaware the Minister would be attending the committee. The campaign is vital. I concur that the turnout in constituencies in which there was electronic voting last year was as good as the national trend. There was a novelty value to the voting in those constituencies.
Every night we heard on the news that electronic voting would be introduced in certain constituencies, such as Dublin North, for the first time. With all constituencies voting electronically on this occasion, no one constituency will get the same degree of attention. Although there was no evidence of a negative impact in the three constituencies where electronic voting was initially installed, or in those constituencies where it was installed for the referendum on the Nice treaty, I am concerned about elderly people, in particular, who could be put off by electronic voting. These people may not use ATM cards or be familiar with computers.
A public information campaign needs to begin at the earliest possible date. A number of months ago, we were told it would be up and running by now - perhaps not by the Minister, but we were informed to that effect in the Seanad. It is important to have a strong public information campaign. We know the result of voting trends down the years, that fewer people are voting and, if we are to stem the tide we must ensure the advent of electronic voting is used to enthuse people once again. It is too late to begin a publicity campaign next March or April; it needs to start immediately. Perhaps the Minister will inform us as to the start-up date and the level of information.
I welcome electronic voting and accept that it requires a leap of faith. The Opposition is obliged to question this. In opposition, paranoia can always set in. Perhaps if I were more paranoid in my constituency I would not have lost my seat. This is a step forward. I am keen that voters would be able to print off their voting slip for deposit in a secure box to provide for double-checking afterwards. It would reassure the public if we could say that a full check would be done with a paper system in at least one electoral area. That would satisfy everybody.
The next motion after the Order of Business in the Dáil concerns the Minister and some Front Bench Members.
There may be a private notice question which may delay matters.
We will proceed for the time being and keep an eye on the Dáil monitor.
I have not yet received the necessary assurance that the programme cannot be tampered with before it goes to the polling booth. I seek assurance on that point.
I would also like to hear more information on the potential for different results arising from a paper system compared with electronic voting. This would be significant in terms of the last seat in a tight contest. Why are we changing the system when it was working well? If it is not broken, why are we trying to fix it at a cost of some €50 million?
I apologise for having to leave for votes. I thank the Minister and his officials for a comprehensive presentation. Is there leeway in the system to provide for a polling station staying open longer if something goes wrong? Returning officers seem to have a great deal of responsibility for the new system. Will on-site IT advice be available in all polling stations for the duration of the poll?
There is a vote in the Dáil. Does the Minister wish to respond briefly?
If there is a catastrophe, it is possible to extend the time. This was the case during the referendum when a power failure occurred.
We targeted all the different age profiles after the referendum. We did not expect old people to be very familiar with modern technology. However, the results were phenomenal and the response to the machines was positive.
Receipts are not issued under the old system and will not be used under the new system for the same reason - to protect the privacy of the voter. Allowing a voter to leave a polling booth with a receipt jeopardises voter security and the anonymity of the ballot paper is affected.
Nobody suggested that voters would leave the polling booth with the slip of paper. I said it should be deposited in a box.
The Deputy should allow me finish. We could have people leaving the building with what they think are ballot papers. We either have one system or we do not. We have demonstrated the back-ups in the electronic system. If one has a separate paper system in operation, which one will take precedence, the paper or electronic system?
The central question of members concerns the source code. I have no doubt that if I make the source code available the members will ask me the opposite question. This requires a judgment call as to what is the safest approach. Legal issues are involved. In fairness to Deputy Allen, he did say that nobody, including members of Government, has the source code. This gives rise to certain issues but I have an open mind on the matter. If I make the source code available then experts will tell me I have made a complete mess, as the source code will be available to any hacker. No more than my colleagues across from me, I am not an expert but I have an open mind in dealing with the matter. I want to do what is best.
What is the Minister's reaction to the Maynooth document?
We will invite them in to discuss the issue.
We should adjourn to another day and return to this matter.
It would be impossible for me to find another day between now and Christmas. I am occupied with EU Presidency matters at present and life has become impossible.
Until we are satisfied with the system——
I will come back.
——the Minister should stall his plans to introduce the system next June.
To be fair to the Minister, we are quite satisfied with the system. If the presentation had been given at the start of the meeting, half the security concerns expressed would not have been raised. The Minister has been more than generous with his time.
We are running out of time. I thank the Minister and his officials for attending and making the presentation.
The joint committee adjourned at 4.57 p.m. until 4 p.m. on Wednesday, 26 November 2003.