I welcome Mr. Bobby McDonagh, head of the European section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. John Cushnahan, MEP, an alternate member of the European Parliament delegation to the Convention on the Future of Europe and member of the external relations committee of the European Parliament. Mr. McDonagh will begin followed by Mr. Cushnahan. Deputy Carey is welcome to make a contribution.
Convention on the Future of Europe: Presentation.
Mr. Bobby McDonagh
I am delighted to attend the joint committee this morning to brief members on the working group on external action of the Convention on the Future of Europe. As you are aware, the Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Roche, is unable to attend today as he is attending a conference in Warsaw on the convention and holding meetings with his Polish counterparts. However, he has asked me, as the Government's alternative representative at the convention, to represent him here and present the findings of the external working group, of which I was a member.
If members wish, I can also say some words on the defence working group later, although I was not a member. If Deputy John Bruton or Proinsias De Rossa, MEP, arrive later, I presume they will wish to speak principally on that area. I can also say some words on the legal personality working group on which there was no Irish member.
The working group on external action was set up last September to examine ways to bring greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility to the European Union's external relations, including its development co-operation programme, trade policy and the CFSP. The group, which was chaired by former Belgian Prime Minster and vice-president of the convention, Jean-Luc Dehaene, held eight meetings, including a joint session with the defence working group. It was also addressed by a number of expert speakers, including Chris Patten, Javier Solana, Pascal Lamy and Poul Neilson, the development co-operation Commissioner. I had the honour of representing the Government on the group, of which John Cushnahan, MEP, was also a member.
There was a lively and wide ranging discussion of the broad range of issues covered under the heading "external action" and more than 50 written submissions were made by members of the group, including me. The Government closely followed developments in the group and along with other members played an active role in its deliberations. The final report of the group was formally presented to the convention on 20 December when the first discussion of its finding took place in plenary. The Minister of State with responsibility for European Affairs, Deputy Roche, represented the Government at that discussion and Deputy John Bruton and Prionsias De Rossa, MEP, also spoke. As Deputy Roche said on that occasion, the report represents a positive contribution to the work of the convention in this important and sensitive area.
The report does not cover crisis management or defence issues, which were the subject of the separate working group on defence to which I referred. The EU is uniquely placed as a community of values and common interests to play a significant role for international peace, stability and progress. It has a unique range of instruments at its disposal from trade to aid and diplomatic relations across the globe through to developing conflict prevention and crisis management tools. It is generally agreed that we need to examine how we can use these tools more effectively so that the Union can deliver a clearer message in support of peace while fully respecting the values and traditions of its member states.
The report of the working group begins with a text of suggested principles and objectives for the EU's external action which groups together the objectives for CFSP with those from the community domain including development co-operation and trade policy. Members of the group felt it was desirable that the new treaty should contain a clear statement of the fundamental values, which form the basis for the Union's external relations. This would serve as a statement of these shared values to the citizens of the Union's member states and also to the wider international community.
Drawing on existing treaty provisions the text reflects clear commitments to conflict prevention, promotion of democracy and rule of law, development co-operation, sustainable development, environmental protection and respect for fundamental principles. Ireland took a lead, with others, in successfully promoting a high priority, in particular for the UN charter, human rights, development co-operation and conflict prevention in the text.
Having discussed the basis for the Union's actions on the world stage, the working group moved on to the mechanisms and policy areas that make up the EU's external action. In keeping with the aim of the convention to simplify the treaties, it was widely felt that the treaty clauses governing the Union's external relations should be located in one section for ease of reference, while keeping different arrangements for the operation of different policy areas.
One of the most important areas of discussion in the group was the question of how to make the institutional arrangements in the external relations area more effective. In doing so there was a dual concern to bring about greater coherence between the different areas of the Union and to raise the profile and influence of the Union on the world stage by enabling it to deliver a clear message wherever possible through a single spokesperson. While a number of different proposals were put forward and are set out in detail in the working group's report - which is available to the committee - there was a general consensus in favour of combining or "double-hatting" the positions of the High Representative for CFSP, currently held by Mr. Solana, and the External Relations Commissioner post, currently held by Mr. Patten. The report proposes that this new position be appointed by the European Council using a form of qualified majority voting with the approval of the Commission President and the endorsement of the European Parliament. He or she would be a full member of the Commission college for issues under community competence and would attend all Commission meetings and also be a non-voting member of the Council for common foreign and security policy matters. He or she would not act as a member of the Commission college and would not seek approval in advance for initiatives under the CFSP.
This so-called double hat wearer would have a right of initiative alongside the member states. Recognising that this would create a significant burden of responsibility for one person, Ireland has suggested a substantial increase in the resources available to the High Representative and the creation of deputy representative posts with responsibility for particular regions. These ideas, which were put forward in an Irish paper to the working group, have received widespread endorsement in the convention and elsewhere.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs has welcomed the proposal on double-hatting, which, as he made clear in his speech to the Institute for European Affairs last week, has the potential to bring greater coherence and effectiveness to the Union's external relations. This proposal has also attracted support from a number of member states and is included in the Franco-German proposals published the same day the Minister made his speech. However, the Minister has expressed reservations about suggestions contained in the working group report that the double hat wearer should chair the External Relations Council on the grounds that this would, in our view, represent too great a concentration of responsibility. We have argued that the democratic accountability of the High Representative's actions is best guaranteed by the member states continuing to chair the Council. While there was strong support in the group for the double hat wearer to chair the External Relations Council, there was also opposition from a number of partners and this is an issue which will require further consideration.
The report also recommends the separation of the General Affairs and External Relations Council into a General Affairs Council, on one hand, and an External Relations Council, on the other, while leaving it for the member states to determine how they would be represented. They may choose, for example, to be represented by the same Minister in both cases. It was also felt that there should be a separate position of secretary general of the Council to enable the High Representative, who is currently also the secretary general of the Council, to focus on the important task of representing the Union it its external actions. The intention behind these proposals is to bring greater efficiency into the way in which the Council functions.
There was also a limited discussion in the group on the question of an elected or permanent president of the European Council and the related subject of the rotating presidency, as these questions were considered part of a wider institutional debate. While a number of member states - most notably France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK - have supported the idea of an elected or permanent president of the European Council, a number of other partners, including Ireland, have expressed reservations and many group members are opposed to it. This important subject and other institutional issues are currently being discussed in the convention plenary which, as Deputy Mulcahy indicated, held its first deliberations earlier this week on the institutional questions and so the report of the working group does not express a view on these proposals.
The group also discussed the different procedures for decision-making in the external relations area. A number of group members argued that the common foreign and security policy would not be able to function coherently if the existing requirement for unanimity were retained in an enlarged Union. They proposed that the use of QMV should be extended to cover common positions and joint actions to facilitate easier decision-making in a Union of 25 or more states. It was generally recognised by those advocating such a change, however, that unanimity should continue to be the rule for matters with security or defence implications.
Under the existing treaty there, is already a limited provision for using QMV in the CFSP. Decisions can be taken using QMV for implementing measures under a common strategy which has previously been adopted by the European Council acting in unanimity. To date, only three common strategies have been adopted and QMV has never been used to implement them. There has also been little or no use of the existing provisions for constructive abstention, whereby a member state can decide not to be involved in implementing a particular CFSP decision whilst not blocking other states from going ahead.
While there was general agreement that there should be more use of these existing treaty provisions, where appropriate, a number of group members, including Ireland, questioned whether a greater use of QMV would result in a better CFSP. The CFSP derives strength and integrity from the fact that where there is a common position it represents the views of all 15 member states and this would be even more so the case when we have 25 member states. What is needed, in our view, is the political will and commitment to reach common positions and to adhere to them. The differing views on this complex issue are reflected in the report, as is the further proposal that while there should be no decision to extend QMV now, the treaty should be amended to permit the European Council at a future date to take this step if all member states were to vote in favour.
There was also a discussion of decision-making procedures in the area of commercial policy. Many members of the group called for an extension of the use of QMV to all areas of commercial policy, including services and intellectual property, and this is reflected in the report. However, the group made clear that any steps in this direction should be without prejudice to current restrictions on harmonisation in the internal policy areas. In the plenary debate this latter point was emphasised by Ireland, which joined with others in making the point that this should not create additional competences for the Union.
The group welcomes the recommendation from the working group on legal personality that the Union should be recognised as having a single legal personality. Taking this as its basis, it examined how it would affect the Union's external relations, in particular the conclusion of international agreements where the Union has exercised an internal competence. The report recognises that developments in this area should be without prejudice to the existing delimitation of competences between member states and the Union.
As a first step, it was felt that the different treaty clauses containing the procedures for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements should be grouped together. The group requested clarification of the procedures used when negotiating mixed competency agreements in which the subject matters cover more than one pillar - for example, a trade matter and a CFSP matter. In such cases, the report recommends that, where possible, there should be a single agreement. The Council would determine the procedure for the negotiations on the basis of the main subject area for the agreement and its legal base.
The Council would also decide who would conduct negotiations on behalf of the Union. While recognising the value of having a single body responsible for negotiations, we suggested that the report leave open who this might be as there may be times when it is appropriate when someone other than the commissioner or the High Representative should be involved, for example, in the justice and home affairs area.
The mandate of the working group also included development co-operation issues. Ireland's approach at the convention has been that development co-operation should be defined as an EU policy area with its own specific objectives, which would be set out in the treaties. Development co-operation should also be endowed with a standing in the treaties similar to other areas of EU external policy, including CFSP. Ireland's interventions on this topic in the working group have been based on these principles. In particular, we have been to the fore in arguing that a basic principle of the Union's external action should be poverty reduction in low-income countries. Our efforts, combined with those of others, have helped to secure agreement on this aim in the external action report. We will continue to work on the basis of these principles in the negotiations ahead.
The group also discussed the external representation of the Union with the objective of enhancing visibility of the Union's efforts on the world stage. One way in which the report suggests this might be achieved is through allowing the Union to seek a formal status, including the possibility of full membership, in international organisations. Of course, the EU already plays a role in many organisations, while full membership in some international organisations, including the UN, is reserved for states. There were a number of other suggestions in this area, including a proposal for a single representation of euro zone members in the international financial institutions. A number of members, including Ireland, felt there was scope for greater co-ordination of member states' positions within international organisations without necessarily requiring new arrangements in all cases. These proposals will need to be carefully examined to see how they would function in practice before a view can be expressed on their value.
The report of the external action working group has been formally submitted to the convention. Like the report from other working groups, it is not a definitive statement of views or positions among the different members of the convention, but rather an attempt to capture the spectrum of opinion on individual topics and, where possible to identify potential areas for agreement.
It is clear from the discussions both in the group and in plenary, that many of these issues will require further reflection before agreement can be reached. The findings of this report represent a sound basis for taking this discussion forward. Some areas of the report have implications for the wider debate on the institutional framework of the Union and the rotating six-month presidency and will need to be considered in the context of the overall convention debate.
The next stage of the convention process will see the praesidium bring forward proposals for possible treaty clauses in various areas and discussion of institutional issues has just begun. Over the coming months, plenary will consider further the issues and proposals contained in the external action report. I am sure these issues will also form the basis for continuing domestic debate in the Oireachtas, the forum and among the public. The work of this committee today is an important contribution to that debate.
The Government remains committed to playing an active role in the work of the convention along with the other Irish members with whom we are working closely on these and other aspects of its work to ensure that we get the best outcome, not only for Ireland, but one which will enable the Union to continue to develop in the interests of all its citizens. I noted what Deputy Mulcahy said about the importance of keeping this committee informed. We are delighted to do that in any way we can. If the representatives on the defence working group are not here, I would be happy to speak about that and the legal personality group.
Deputies John Bruton and Gormley were members of the defence working group. It was asked to consider the Union's role in the fields of security and defence and in particular, whether there is support for developing this role beyond the arrangements agreed at Amsterdam. The group's deliberations have taken place against the background of substantial changes in global security. The report has sought to bridge the gap between the diverse positions of the member states, and clearly states that the aim should not be to transform the Union into a military alliance. Overall, the Government's approach is to be positive towards many of the recommendations while carefully delineating those aspects that are more problematic for Ireland, most notably the issue of mutual defence.
The report sets out various recommendations under a number of headings. Under the heading of crisis management, improvements are proposed through modernisation of the Petersberg Tasks. The inclusion of such areas as conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations and post-conflict stabilisation is fully consistent with Ireland's approach to European security and defence policy. The Government also intends to look positively at the report's suggestion for better coherence and effectiveness in implementing crisis management operations.
Another set of recommendations set out suggestions for three distinct types of solidarity clause. As reflected in Minister Cowen's speech to the Institute of European Affairs last week, the idea of a solidarity clause that would assist in the EU's response to emergencies and new threats against civilian populations is in line with our approach. In principle, Austria, Finland and Sweden also support a solidarity clause along these lines.
Suggestions for collective security arrangements, including the idea of a solidarity and common security clause, as proposed by France and Germany, are more problematic. This could extend beyond emergencies and be a step towards a mutual defence clause, a further option presented by the working group. Ireland's constitutional position is clear regarding such a clause; Ireland cannot join in common defence without a further referendum to amend the Constitution. The Government will therefore seek to ensure a clear distinction is maintained between emergency arrangements arising from natural or man-made disasters, and more mutual defence-type issues.
France and Germany are also pressing for the application of enhanced co-operation in security and defence matters. This was specifically excluded under Amsterdam and Nice. However, in reality there may be considerable pressure from a number of member states to introduce enhanced co-operation arrangements in this area. We will have to reflect on the implications of such proposals before adopting a definitive position.
The issue of closer armaments co-operation is also covered. This arises in the context of ensuring that member states' respective military forces are properly equipped to carry out crisis management operations. While this may include the establishment of a European armaments agency, a key aspect from Ireland's perspective is the proposals today to recognise the need for flexible arrangements to accommodate the individual positions of member states. It is the Government's intention that Ireland should engage fully in the debate on all of these issues which lie ahead in the convention, and therefore in the subsequent intergovernmental conference.
I now come the legal personality working group report. This was a particularly technical but important issue. Its task was to look at the consequences of explicit recognition of the Union's legal personality, the consequences of a merger of the Union's legal personality with that of the communities, and the impact of such a merger on the simplification of the treaties. It reported in early October and its report was debated by the convention plenary later that month.
There was unanimous support in the group for the conferral of legal personality on the Union, with broad consensus in favour of a single legal personality. The group expressed a preference for a single new treaty to replace the Treaty on European Union and the treaties establishing the European Communities. It also recommended that the new treaty should have a single structure as it felt the current pillar arrangements would be anachronistic in a merged, simplified treaty. The group also suggested that cohesion of the Union's position internationally would be strengthened if it were represented by a single voice in international negotiations. This area was further considered in the external actions working group.
When the plenary of the convention discussed the report there was a general consensus in favour of the group's recommendations. These are now likely to be reflected as the convention's work is taken forward and the draft treaty fleshed out. The consequences of the legal personality issue are significant and become clear when one looks at the new treaty structure proposed by the convention's praesidium. Creating a single legal personality paves the way for a considerably simplified and more legible structure. Even people working closely on European matters sometimes find the distinction between the Union and the communities difficult to fathom and it is a point of the greatest obscurity to the public. Now it is intended there will be a single treaty with a first constitutional part and a second part dealing with work in the different policy areas. This is a much more accessible arrangement.
Although the group recommended the abolition of the pillar structure, this does not in itself alter the special procedures that apply in the different policy areas, for example CFSP, necessary distinctions will be retained. Neither does the group's recommendations alter the distribution of competence as between member states and the Union. For example, they do not impinge on the ability of any member state to enter into an international agreement in an area within its competence.
There is an onus on the convention to bring forward proposals that will make the Union and its treaties more accessible to the public. The Government therefore welcomes the creation of a single legal personality as paving the way for simplification of the treaties and a single treaty seems a sensible way forward.
I thank the MEPs who met us for the very useful exchange we had in Brussels earlier in the week.
Mr. John Cushnahan, MEP
It is a pleasure to be here and I echo the Chairman's sentiments about our meeting in Brussels. It was a very useful opportunity to meet the committee and I found the discussions to be very worthwhile.
I was a member of the external action working group. In that context, I submitted a number of documents. I have circulated one of them to the committee and a further two included detailed amendments to the ongoing working group recommendation. It was a very interesting exercise.
Members may be aware that I am a member of the foreign affairs committee and it is very frustrating for us to see the way in which the EU has been unable to achieve its potential on the geo-political stage. The EU has double the number of diplomats the United States has and five times as many embassies. The EU provides over 50% of all development assistance throughout the world. It has concluded many political and trade agreements with countries and regions around the world. Yet despite the tremendous opportunity for influence offered by all of these, our failure to have a single voice on foreign policy coupled with our decision-making process has undermined our global potential. Our decision-making process is too slow. Agreement by unanimity is a weak and hesitant policy and, even with that, member states regrettably speak with different voices. As Mr. McDonagh pointed out, the working group for external action examined these issues in great detail. The bottom line is whether it provided the right answers to resolve the matter. I welcome a number of the proposals which emerged from the group but it did not go far enough in a number of other key areas.
Regarding the single voice - Mr. McDonagh will agree with this - there was a clear majority for the merger of the two roles of High Representative and External Relations Commissioner. There was recognition that the Council might not agree to that so the working group's recommendation was for the "double-hatted" approach which has been outlined by Mr. McDonagh and which is the second best system. It would be more acceptable that this person be supported by the establishment of a single service based on DG relics of the Council secretariat on secondment from the national diplomatic services as well as enhanced parliamentary control. It is also important that person is appointed on the recommendation of the Council by QMV, is a member of the Commission - probably the Vice-President - and subject to the approval of the European Parliament. At least it represents a step forward. Even if we have that single voice and we have effective policy, the working group's recommendation do not go far enough to avoid the fear of paralysis in an enlarged Europe. Qualified majority voting should be the norm, the only exception being in this area of defence matters.
I regret that proposals did not emerge to prevent a reoccurrence of the solo runs that have taken place by individual heads of member state governments which have severely undermined EU influence on the world stage at critical moments. Developments since the events of 11 September 2001 particularly underline that. I accept that the transatlantic relationship is important and necessary but, historically, it has also been unequal. Because of our dependence on the US, our role as the EU has been one of junior partner in which we have been reluctant to act independently as necessary or offer criticism when appropriate. Following those tragic events, we were presented with a real opportunity to achieve a new equilibrium in that relationship.
The US needed the EU and we were correct to offer unequivocal support to a global anti-terrorist coalition, however, our participation should have been on the basis of equal partners sharing the policy and subsequent actions. That opportunity was lost particularly because of the role played by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Instead of the EU presenting a united front, Mr. Blair broke ranks and went on a solo run. Conscious of the fact that they were facing domestic elections and did not want to be left out of the picture, his actions were followed by those of President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder and way down the line came the EU voices of Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten. The consequence of that was that we became a junior partner with little opportunity to influence the subsequent direction of the global anti-terrorist strategy which became a vehicle for US foreign policy. At that point, the US retreated into its unilateral approach. Part of that was the example of Chancellor Kohl's premature recognition of Croatia which contributed to accelerating the blood-bath in the region. In the last 24 hours we have seen another example of the solo run as President Chirac extended an invitation to President Mugabe to join a conference in Paris in February on African and French heads of state. In my view, that is against the spirit of EU sanctions policies. It sends the wrong message and undermines common security and foreign policy of the EU and it would be better to have been left to the external relations committee council which was due to discuss the matter on Monday. Those type of actions have undermined our approach on the global stage.
I would have liked to have seen the adoption of an approach by myself for the use of sanctions against any member state that takes unilateral action in defiance of an agreed EU foreign policy. It is not a unique concept because it applies in other areas of the EU's work. I would also have liked to see coming out of that document a more radical approach in using our instruments in the policy areas of trade, development and justice and home affairs to support clear political objectives at the heart of our foreign policy. We should use trade and aid agreements to promote EU policy in the fields of good governance, human rights and non-proliferation and I believe a proposal like this would reward the countries that work with us in the promotion of these values and punish those who do not.
As regards suggestions as to how we can ensure individual member states act in support of EU decisions which apply to human rights, democracy clauses and trade and aid agreements, I find it unacceptable that at times there is a clear breaking of ranks on the issue. Unfortunately what often happens is that the EU, whether collectively or at an individual member state level, takes a strong stance in defence of human rights in small countries but when it applies to countries such as Pakistan or China with which they have strategic trade or geo-political associations, they will prostitute their position. The EU will not be able to speak with authority on the question of human rights unless it is consistent in its approach. That approach applies as much to the larger more powerful nations as it does to the smaller ones.
I note what Mr. McDonagh said regarding the working group's recommendation on the reduction of poverty as a primary objective but I would have preferred human rights to have been a primary objective because if we strengthen human rights and democracy, it is the best way of guaranteeing there will be a reduction in poverty. When one looks at the problems affecting developing countries, one of the keys to poverty is that they lack fundamental human rights and good governance. One cannot be separated from the other. The part of the report which I find most disappointing is its failure to enhance European Parliament control of the common foreign and security policy and international agreements. As has already been said, we as a parliamentary delegation will continue to fight for parliamentary consultation in all common and security policy instruments including not only common positions and joint action but also common strategies and main guidelines. We will also seek a procedure whereby our assent is required for any international agreement concluded by the EU as well as a commitment - if we want to act cohesively - to integrate European Parliament members into EU delegations to international conferences. Those are my views on this working group's report. It was a worthwhile exercise. Some positive proposals emerged, more work needs to be done and I look forward to the opportunity of having further debate on this at the convention. I know Mr. McDonagh mentioned issues of defence but at this stage, I would like to conclude on the issue of external action but I hope I will have an opportunity, when the debate turns to defence, to address the issue.
We will hear from Deputy Bruton and Deputy Carey, if he wishes to make a contribution, and then will take questions. Deputy John Bruton is a member of the working group on defence.
I am afraid I am not a member nor have I been a member of any of these working groups.
I am wrongly advised.
I must appear here as an amateur rather than a professional. I will not take much of the committee's time unlike on previous occasions, as members may be glad to hear. I will highlight a number of points I believe to be important in the reports.
In paragraph 42 of the defence report, as I am sure Mr. McDonagh has highlighted, there is a suggestion of a treaty article that would enable all the instruments of the EU to be mobilised, including military resources, in order to avert a terrorist threat or to protect the civilian population and democratic institutions. This provision is related to the new threat which became evident after 11 September 2001. The conventional military threat is not the principal one to lives in Europe from those with ill intent. Rather, it is non-state actors, terrorist organisations, which represent the biggest threat. It is an important recognition in the EU treaty that it should respond. I welcome the fact that the Government has adopted a positive attitude towards this provision.
I refer to the external action report. While the proposals in regard to the double-hatting of the high representative are good, there will be problems in regard to whether this person, who is both a Commissioner and an officer of the Council, will be collectively responsible when he or she is acting as a collectively responsible member of the Commission. How can that collective responsibility be reconciled with his or her position on the Council if there is a conflict between the Council and the Commission? He or she will almost have to create Chinese walls inside his or her mind. It is not impossible but we must recognise that we have been very lucky in having Javier Solana and Chris Patten in those two positions. They work very well together. If one individual tries to do both jobs, it will be quite difficult.
There will also be problems of accountability. The Commission is accountable to the Parliament in a very different way from that in which a Council official is accountable to the Parliament. The latter is ultimately accountable to the Council which, in turn, is responsible to national parliaments, whereas a Commission official is, I understand, accountable to the European Parliament, not national parliaments. This is a distinction that will have to be worked out. I do not have the answer, although I am sure Mr. McDonagh does. He has the answers to both questions, I have found. I just wanted to throw that one at him.
The excellent summary of the report draws attention to the fact that the question of a supposedly elected president of the European Council was mentioned but that a majority did not support it. It is interesting that this proposal has now emerged with the support of the Governments of France and Germany. It is a thoroughly bad proposal; Ireland should oppose it, as should all of us, because it will downgrade the Commission. It is proposed, for example, that this full-time President should have the responsibility of following up on Council decisions. Under the existing arrangements, the Council, which does not exist in the treaty but has come into existence thanks to an initiative of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, when he was President of France, gives general instructions to the EU institutions representing the political will of Europe such as the decisions taken at Tampere in regard to justice, the Lisbon process of economic reform and so on. It gives general directives on what it wants done. It is then the responsibility of the Commission, and other institutions, to act on these. If the Franco-German proposal was to go ahead in its current form, this President would have the responsibility of ensuring all the institutions, including the Commission, did what they were supposed to do after a decision of the European Council. In fact, the President of the Commission would become subordinate to this person because he or she would have to report to the President of the Council on how well he or she was fulfilling the European Council's decisions. A reporting relationship like that, as anybody can tell one about any employment, creates a form of subordination that is entirely unacceptable. From speaking to both the French and German Government representatives at the convention, I know they realise they have made a mistake in going this far with the proposal, and I expect that part of it to be dropped.
The legal personality report is quite hard to understand if one is not fully familiar with the way the European Union works but, in fact, it is crucial. Unless the European Union has a legal personality, it will not be able to act on the international stage in regard to justice and home affairs issues and so on. The creation of a legal personality goes together with the unification of all the treaties into one. As the excellent summary points out, however, this raises a problem in regard to the EURATOM treaty. Will we have to re-endorse the treaty which we accepted in 1973 as part of the package? There would be difficulties in putting it to the people again because they are more sceptical now than they were in 1973 about nuclear power. Although, in effect, nothing new would be achieved, I am well aware of how in a referendum campaign constructions less than charitable can be put on clauses in a treaty. I can foresee many problems with re-endorsing the treaty. One could spend a long time trying to explain that it meant nothing to which I do not particularly look forward.
I had not been appointed to the convention when these working groups were set up. Therefore, if Deputy Bruton was the amateur, I was the guy carrying the Lucozade bottles and the spare jerseys. We have addressed most of the working group reports. Rather than getting bogged down in huge detail, we should deal with themes coming up, a couple of which Deputy Bruton addressed. The question of institutions was dealt with at the plenary session on Monday and Tuesday. The proposed method of election of the President, the system of rotation and so on need to be discussed frankly. How will they affect us? The Irish representatives spoke against the Franco-German proposal on Monday and Tuesday. I do not think it is in Ireland's interests to support it, nor is it in the interests of any of the small or medium-sized states.
On the other hand, the issue of double-hatting of the high representative and the external affairs Commissioner has a lot of merit. It would enhance the role of the European Union in external matters. I do not pretend this is something which is easily understood; we will have difficulties in trying to explain it. I mentioned in Brussels on Monday that if we were to engage in this kind of gobbledegook, we would be sunk. The area of legal personality is for the lawyers and I suspect the Devil is in the detail. I do not pretend to have any insights into it, other than that I can see, in principle, the advantages in the European Union having a single legal personality in certain matters. The Chairman is always talking about the Kaliningrad settlement and whether some kind of settlement could be developed for our own common travel area.
I raised it yesterday, referring to Mr. Tony Blair.
He will be blamed for everything.
The Deputy should not encourage him.
The European Union's role in development co-operation and aid is something Ireland would strongly support, as is the area of the Petersberg Tasks. The working parties' reports on defence and external action are inextricably linked. There are areas in both reports which we need to address. Proinsias De Rossa and Deputy Gormley made submissions to the defence working group indicating strong reservations about the thrust of the proposals. It is now time to identify themes that ought to be debated at future committee meetings. We are now discussing tranches of articles and the reports of working groups will inform the discussions. It is clear the presidium has a view on the outcome of this process and we need informed and articulate debate of the issues.
My knowledge of the area is limited - I am on a learning curve. This is too detailed for me. When a person is on a learning curve it is terrible to arrive in the middle of the process. Deputy Bruton stated that there is a great deal of detail. My role is to do the best I can to interpret what is going on and to tell the public about it. We should concentrate on the double hatting concept. In the light of 11 September we should incorporate into treaties means to protect ourselves from a terrorist threat in the future. That is a real issue and I want to play my part. If I have to use "euro speak" I will but I want to understand the concept first. Unfortunately, I do not understand "euro speak" when I use it. At future meetings we should discuss this.
I will ask the committee secretariat to examine the format.
I thank everyone who contributed this morning. It was an interesting and useful summary of the common foreign security and defence policy.
Returning to double hatting, there are the issues of "Who?" and "What?". Deputy Bruton dealt with the fundamental difficulty about who reports where and the Chinese walls that exist. It is a serious problem. It was evident when we visited Brussels during the week that there is a burgeoning administration in the Council. It is almost a parallel administration to the Commission.
Asking "What?" brings the point made by John Cushnahan to the fore. This week, France and Germany made statements on intervention in Iraq, with which I agree. How would the structure fit in with that? Would the capacity of the member state be reduced or abolished in making a response that puts forward the national view with regard to such an issue? There is a wide divergence between Britain and Germany and France and reconciling it will be difficult.
Solidarity in common defence was mentioned. There is no problem with an overall European response to natural disasters. We cannot, however, stand back in the face of armed aggression either by terrorists or in the event of an incursion by ground forces at the eastern frontier. We stood back for far too long. That was proved by the impotence of the Union over what happened in the Balkans. The Americans had to come in to clean up the mess because we were unable to do it.
Ms Patricia McKenna, MEP
Deputy Bruton, because he is on the presidium, would have the inside story of the outcome of the convention. Can he tell us anything about the legal personality and the impact that will have here?
I have some problems with John Cushnahan's idea of sanctioning member states that do not adhere to EU foreign policy when decisions are made through qualified majority voting. Mr. McDonagh believes that consensus is the way forward. In a situation where member states strongly disagree with a qualified majority vote, Mr. Cushnahan is saying that we should then sanction those countries that do not comply. The majority of member states could decide to maintain sanctions against Iraq while some member states would not support that on humanitarian grounds and break those sanctions. In such a case, could sanctions be imposed on that EU member state because it decides for moral reasons that EU policy is wrong but because it was decided by QMV it could not be stopped? I am glad to hear the Government has accepted that consensus is the way forward. I have a problem with the idea that would we be forced to accept a policy because it has been adopted by qualified majority voting when it may be far removed from what the people and Government of Ireland want.
Development and the amount of aid we donate in comparison with the US was mentioned in relation to 11 September and the EU's role on the global stage. We must also look at our policies. There is an enormous contradiction between what the EU says it does for developing countries and its other policies that totally conflict with that. Fisheries agreements with developing countries are highly exploitative. The money that goes to the developing countries is a pittance when compared to what the EU gets through its access to resources of those countries. We would be better off if we had a real development policy where our interests did not come first. That is the situation currently.
That is why I raise this in relation to 11 September - it did not happen in a vacuum and the international community made a major mistake by not looking at the root causes of terrorism. The developed world has a duty to look at the policies it supports and their impact on developing countries.
Like Senator Ormonde, I agree with what Deputy Carey said. It is now time to shift our focus from these working groups and to reorient ourselves to a few specific themes, perhaps mirroring the timescale of the convention itself. If we follow the convention closely and see that specific things are being proposed, we will have the chance to mirror that debate here and have our own input, helped by the receipt of feedback from the convention delegates.
I wish to comment on the legal personality and external relations issues. It is obviously important that the EU be given a legal personality. If there is one thing we learnt from our visit to Brussels it is that the European Union does not actually exist, believe it or not. I thought it did exist but we were assured by the finest legal experts in the universe that there is no such thing as a European Union, so we may as well bring it into existence.
There is a European Community in existence.
I thought the first paragraph of Maastricht had established the European Union but I was obviously mistaken. In agreeing that the EU needs a legal personality - I am not sure we are going to discuss this today - the question arises as to what form it should take. We know that Romano Prodi, in a solo run, offered his own definition, and the document on constitutional structure presented by the presidium proposes an à la carte selection of models, including European Union, United States of Europe and United Europe. I think, from talking to some delegates, that they are going to settle for a European Union, and I certainly hope they do. The fact that they are even canvassing ideas like the United States of Europe or United Europe is indicative of some of the thinking that we then find mirrored in the external relations debate.
What is obvious is that this is happening, to an extent, in a political vacuum. As the Chairman pointed out, if these countries are very serious about having a common voice on the international stage then France and Britain must be prepared to give up their permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. When they are serious about a common foreign policy they will cede the right to the European Union to sit on the UN Security Council alongside China, Russia, the US and so on. There is a bit of political doublespeak going on. I absolutely agree with Deputy Bruton - I am glad we are opposed to it - that the idea of a permanent president of the European Council would only be to the detriment of the smaller countries. It would be another way for the larger countries to rest more power to themselves.
The idea of having one voice in foreign policy or one person of contact - the two hats idea - is good. The over-riding impression I had before I visited Brussels was that there is a struggle to be that voice. I think the President of the European Parliament sees himself as a voice. I think the President of the European Commission sees himself as that voice. Then we have the Franco-German proposal that the President of the Council would be that voice. If anything it is getting worse. The Franco-German proposal would mean that there would be three big voices instead of one proper voice. It is about time we got serious and said who is going to represent the Union, which goes back to the issue of legal personality. I hope it remains Irish policy that we want a legal personality of a Union of independent and sovereign states which pool part of their sovereignty in common causes upon which we all agree. After that, though, I urge those in favour of a super state to get real and to bear in mind the Irish Constitution. We have a constitutional right to conduct our own foreign policy and anybody who comes back to the people of Ireland asking them to cede that will not get very far.
Regarding the trip to Brussels, I heard good reports about it and am sorry I missed it. I hope, Chairman, that you will follow through with the proposal to arrange something for those of us who were unable to attend the first time.
The more I hear about the issue of the convention the more it worries me. I am not persuaded by the idea that the treaties of the European Union could be simplified. I wonder if simplification is a red herring. Do members of the public read the treaties? Will they read the treaties once this simplification process has been completed? My understanding was that the whole convention was to be a period of consolidation, but the more I hear and the more of these papers I read, the more I see that developments are taking place which are clearly moving more towards a single federal structure. The abandonment of the separate legal personalities, for example, is clearly a move away from an intergovernmental type of structure to a single federal structure. A single legal personality clearly is the thin end of that wedge.
Mr. McDonagh referred to QMV in foreign policy and defence. I understood that part of the Nice treaty was that this was not to be part of enhanced co-operation. The abandonment of the pillar structure is another of a whole range of concerns I have. Simplification is a red herring and is a way of persuading people that what we are really doing is trying to make it easy for them to understand the treaties, as though members of the public were actually getting involved at this level. Perhaps those concerns might be addressed.
I wish to make a few points myself, firstly a general comment on the role of Valery Giscard d'Estaing and his alleged comment in relation to the permanent President of the European Council that the important people were not present. A visit to Ireland by Mr. Giscardd'Estaing is pending and he has been invited to address this joint committee and the Forum on Peace and Reconciliation. If he does come here, I do not believe he should be invited to address the Dáil or the Seanad. He should be invited to address somewhere where he can be asked questions, not where he grandstands, makes his speech and walks out to an ovation. This is important because we will have to put the outcome of these deliberations to referendum and we want people to see that there has been due process.
This is an exchange of views, but I do hope that the concerns and suggestions of committee members will be taken into account by Oireachtas representatives. We have the Minister for Foreign Affairs here before every General Affairs Council. We speak to him in advance and scrutinise legislation, proposed directives and regulations in advance. We are here on behalf of the people and we do not want to be taken for granted either. When we raise issues, we ask our parliamentary representatives to take them up.
I have a very strong view about the continued use of passports. It is not the occasion to raise it here, but when I do raise it I expect someone to take note and say it should be given an airing.
Is this really a constitutional treaty for 50 years, or even ten years? I do not think it is. I jotted down a few points this morning when I had a chance to read the briefs. The common travel area and Schengen is to continue. Deputy Mulcahy mentioned the UN Security Council and the fact that Britain and France will continue to have permanent seats. No common defence is proposed. We will still have a division of activities between Brussels and Strasbourg, from what I can make out. There will be no single currency across the Union as Britain remains outside. National ambassadors will remain in other countries. There seems to be internal powerhouses, with the Franco-German vehicle being one of them.
This is not a treaty for 50 years or even 30 years. We will have to revisit these issues sooner. These are just considerations that I can think of now, and I am sure there are others. We must be vigilant and pro-active. We do not want to burden the members of the convention but there is a case to be made for us continuing to meet every fortnight and to get reports on what has happened in the intervening period and some advice on what is happening in the plenary session coming up. We can then have an input into that plenary session.
I have a general question that I want to raise because Mr. McDonagh may wish to address it. When and how will the protocols and declarations attached to previous treaties be addressed? Is legal personality relevant to any of these protocols and declarations? Clearly there are some serious and sensitive issues for certain member states.
Here is a specific question which arose in Brussels the other day. For 30 years the European Union had no competence regarding environmental issues, yet significant strides were made. We asked why this was so and they said it was because there were events such as Chernobyl. On the other hand, and Mr. McDonagh touched on this in his contribution, the treaties have given powers. For example, existing treaties allow for qualified majority voting when implementing measures regarding a common strategy under CFSP. A common strategy must first be agreed by the European Council by unanimity and, to date, as Mr. McDonagh has said, only three have been agreed involving Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean, and QMV was never used to implement them. We have made major progress on one hand without treaty provisions and on the other hand there are treaty provisions which have not been used. Are we investing too much capital in the whole idea of getting the treaty right and, therefore, the European Union will be well governed and all will be well?
On the single legal personality, what are the implications of the EU being able to conclude international agreements, as touched on by Deputy Mulcahy and others? Has the Government any concerns about the European Union obtaining formal status in international organisations? I note from the brief from the Department of Foreign Affairs that some would conflict with the rights of member states and may not enhance the functioning of the organisation or the influence of the Union. Perhaps we could have some comment on that.
I want to refer to some of the issues at the centre of the whole question of sovereignty. In the plenary session of the Convention on the Future of Europe on 20 December, the defence working group report was considered. We received a note about this, point 4 of which states:
The second subject of recommendations is entitled "The response to the new threat - more solidarity" and proposes three alternative ? [in other words, are they three alternatives] types of solidarity clause. The first of these relates to protection of civilian populations and democratic institutions from (terrorist) attack by non-State entities, another to a solidarity and common security arrangement, and the third to a collective defence type arrangement. The latter would see enhanced co-operation apply again to allow for incorporation of Western European Union treaty commitments by EU member states who wished to do so.
I read the report of the group and I do not think that is quite what it says. Point 42 of the report of the working group states——
What is date of that summary from which the Chairman is quoting?
It is from the Department of Foreign Affairs. It refers to 20 December and the report is dated 18 December.
The report itself is——
The Deputy will get an opportunity when I have finished. I am proceeding to the report dated 21 November. Is that the document?
Mr. McDonagh
That is the problem. That is not the final one. The committee has the briefing note for the session on 20 December but the other document is not the final version of the report of the defence working group which is dated 16 December.
Perhaps Mr. McDonagh would comment on that in his reply. Can Mr. McDonagh say if the following has been included because this is the kernel of what I want to mention here. I do not know why I do not have the up-to-date draft. I was given the draft in front of me only yesterday and read it last night and early this morning. Point 42 states:
In application of the principle of solidarity between member states which might be embodied in one of the initial articles of the constitutional treaty, a new clause could be inserted into the treaty enabling all the instruments available to the Union to be mobilised, including the military resources and the structures originally set up for the Petersberg missions, in order to avert the terrorist threat, protect the civilian population and democratic institutions and to assist a member state within its territory in dealing with the consequences of a possible attack.
Chairman——
The Deputy will get an opportunity to reply in a moment. I am asking questions here.
The Chairman is being sensitive.
I have good cause to be, Deputy Bruton. The report goes on to state:
Such a clause would not be a clause on the defence of territorial integrity but would apply to threats from non-State entities. Moreover, assistance in managing the consequences of an attack would be provided only at the request of the civilian authorities of the country concerned.
Is that still included in that format? I hope I am quoting from the actual form. I am sorry for going on at some length about this matter but this is one of the most important issues before the convention.
Proinsias De Rossa, MEP, has circulated a document on security issues and, perhaps, all parties would do likewise. We as a State are probably the most vulnerable in the whole of Europe. We feel as cosy about our defence arrangements as the United States public did about internal flights prior to 11 September. We are no longer neutral but we are non-aligned. Should one of the debates be whether Ireland should now become aligned? For example, could Ireland propose - this is my own personal view - a common defence in given circumstances with the Western European Union Article 5, not a binding provision for those who do not want to sign up to it, but allowing others to do so; in other words having it as a protocol to a future treaty? Is this not an issue which we should raise? Who is providing for our defence? We are not providing for it ourselves. We have not equipped the Defence Forces. I had an e-mail the other day giving all the details. As a public representative I am very worried about this. What worries me most is that we cannot debate it. We never get to debate it. If one raises the issue of defence one is put down as a militarist. I am concerned about the safety and security of the State. If we are not to join some European entity, why not? If we want to be part of the security architecture should we not be designing it? Should we leave it to others to design, just like EMU where those who join later will do so under the rules made by others. This is an issue. If this is supposed to be a treaty for 50 years or 30 years why are we not raising this issue? Why are our members on the convention not raising this issue? I know there will be people who will think it controversial but it is an issue of interest to the State.
I was quite taken by the wording, and I am surprised nobody mentioned it, in relation to capabilities and armaments. I would like to know what is meant in points 49 and 50 which refer to the capabilities and armaments towards a European agency. To develop the ESDC, it is necessary to strengthen the military capabilities available to the Union. Point 50 states that development of capabilities is linked to development of armaments. This is going into the treaty and we are beating around the bush at the other end talking about dealing with only terrorism. Where stands that language? What view does Ireland take of that language about the armaments industry? We are not here for a cosy discussion, we are here to raise issues. These are important issues which touch on the sovereignty of the State.
My last question relates to the EURATOM Treaty. Why is it being excluded from the merged treaties? I think we all know the answer but I would like to put the question on the record.
On a point of information, I have the preliminary draft report of the working group on defence and my colleague has the final report. They differ substantially. Can somebody tell me how that could happen? Has something happened in the meantime? Has another meeting of the working group been held? Who updates it and who determines the interpretation included in the document? I regard this as a briefing from members of the group who are attending on our behalf. While I find it very informative, educational and enlightening, I am now concerned because I cannot understand the reason the documents can differ so substantially in a very short period. The sands are shifting far quicker than even I had anticipated when we started these discussions. Therefore, if somebody can explain it to me, I would appreciate it.
I have just quoted from the wrong report in regard to one of the items for the very reason that——
You did——
We heard your question. Can you hear the answer?
All right.
I quoted from it because that was the copy I was given in my brief yesterday which I read last night and this morning. In fact, it is a preliminary draft report whereas the report on external action is a revised final draft. Clearly, there are different drafts of the reports. The one from which I should have quoted was the final draft but that was not the one I was given.
Mr. Cushnahan, MEP
I will respond to some of the points raised by members of the joint committee. On the last question, the documents were evolving throughout the discussions and substantially altered through the process. On each occasion the secretariat provided a report on what it thought was the direction in which the committee was going, members would submit amendments and it would be revised again. The documents are more like minutes than actual policy documents because they were written in such a way that they would indicate that there was a majority in favour of a position but that some members believed this or that should be done. The documents were merely an attempt to give an indication of the areas where there was a majority view. They would also indicate an ultimate view but as in all the committees in which I was involved they were evolving documents relating to the discussion which took place.
To respond to Deputy John Bruton's point about the likely confusion and problems arising from this double-hatted role, I stress that some of us wanted a very clean cut person - the merger of the two functions. In terms of how the external relations representative would function, if it was to be agreed, he or she would deal with the relevant institutions in relation to that particular part of his or her portfolio. For example, in relation to Common Foreign and Security Policy, the external relations representative would get his or her mandate from the Council and be accountable to it. Where it was a Commission matter, it would come before the Commission and where the Parliament was involved, it would come before the Parliament.
With regard to the point made by Senator Dardis and the subsequent discussion about defence, I wonder if "defence" was the appropriate name for the committee because essentially it was concerned with improving and streamlining crisis management and in that context to extend the Petersberg Tasks, as Mr. McDonagh pointed out, to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation and support for third countries in combating terrorism. When it talked about a solidarity clause, it was not one on collective defence. The terminology which the Chairman read was what finished up in the final text. It talked about threats from non-state entities in that sense. Therefore, it is certainly far removed from what people would consider to be a mutual collective defence clause.
One of the criticisms of the whole area of crisis management is the way in which our procedures are cumbersome and slow. One of the issues we debated in the external representation area was that this double-hatted person should take the lead in crisis management, have the facilities to do the job and be able to act quickly. My own view at the time we discussed the matter - I believe it was in the joint committee - was that the double-hatted person - whoever it may be - could operate in the same way as the United Nations Secretary General, that he or she would have a certain degree of flexibility and initiative but that there would be accountability and so on.
As regards Ms McKenna's point on consensus, the problem about decision making in the area of CSDP is that consensus is a structure which concentrates on the brake rather than the engine room of the policy. If a member state has a particular view - many member states have a colonial past - it can actually obstruct and thwart a policy. The problem is that the policy becomes the lowest common denominator, it takes too long to reach it and by the time the common policy is reached, it is ineffectual.
To clarify exactly what I said, I referred to the use of sanctions against any member state which took unilateral action in defiance of agreed EU foreign policy. There is provision within the structures for those who may have conscience clauses and so on but no member state should be allowed to obstruct and act in defiance of an agreed policy. If there was such a concept - members will be aware that sanctions apply where a member state acts in defiance of other areas of EU policy - it would be an important deterrent to anybody breaching a common foreign and security policy.
I totally agree with the point that it is important to understand the root causes of terrorism. While I was appalled by what happened on 11 September 2001 and believe we were right as a Union to support America, America should realise its inconsistency and hypocrisy in its foreign policy created the circumstances for the events of that day. I do not forget who created Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden but it suited US foreign policy. The United States was prepared to support terrorist dictatorships and overthrow democratic regimes. That is the reason, to some extent, the stock of the United States in the geopolitical world is devalued because it is not consistent in these approaches. When it uses terms such as democracy and human rights in regard to terrorism, people do not forget how it has operated. It is a well known and accepted fact that abuses of democracy and human rights and poverty feed terrorism. That is the reason I lay so much emphasis on these areas in my wording in the foreign policy committee document.
Deputy Mulcahy talked about Britain and France and the Security Council. I hope we will get to a position where this double-hatted person will speak to the European Union but if that does not happen and if Britain and France remain members of the Security Council, they will at least speak with one voice. If that happened, it would be progress.
The Chairman raised the question of whether the treaty would last for 50 years. Who knows? If we had sat here 12 years ago, would we have foreseen what happened in central and eastern Europe? Would we have thought we would be sitting here talking about a convention which is addressing problems created by the welcome fact that the former countries of central and eastern Europe are about to join the European family? We do not know what will happen but one hopes the consequence of what we are doing now will prevent too speedy a return to treaty revision, although circumstances may dictate otherwise.
I agree about the point on the need to have an honest debate about defence. When the word "neutrality" is raised in the political debate, too many politicians run for cover. It scares the life out of them. There is a knee-jerk reaction. I believe voters are willing to be persuaded of the merits of Irish participation in an EU common defence policy but they would prefer the political leadership to take them in that direction. I remember an opinion poll survey which came to two contrasting conclusions. Over two thirds of those surveyed said they wanted to retain Irish neutrality but a similar number in the same opinion poll said they wanted Ireland to play its part in a common defence policy. That is because they are confused about the issue. We are not a neutral country. We are a militarily non-aligned country. Thankfully, we are not politically neutral. We have always had the courage to take positions on political matters whether individually or collectively with our European partners. One could say we are not militarily neutral because to some extent our involvement in the United Nations in the past and I hope in the future through the Petersberg Tasks brings us into a grey area. The issue of Irish participation in a common defence policy has been supported by successive Taoisigh from the time of Seán Lemass to the present day. If Europe is worth building, it is worth defending. I would prefer us to participate in that debate. It is a totally different world since the collapse of communism. Our dependence on the United States inhibits us in many ways but if we were involved in a common EU defence policy, we could also have an important influence in the stances adopted by the United States in a geopolitical world.
Mr. McDonagh
I wish to make a few preliminary comments. I found the contributions and questions extremely interesting and they will be helpful to the Government in formulating its ongoing position. I apologise for saying that Deputy Bruton was a member of the defence working group. I probably made that mistake because he is everywhere at the convention. Mr. De Rossa, MEP, and Deputy Gormley are members of that working group. I will try to reply to the various questions put, but if I continue at excessive length, members should tell me. The questions were many and interesting and I will try to respond to them.
The comments made by Mr. Cushnahan, MEP, were constructive, as were his comments in the working group. He is right that there were many different options as regards how to construct a single voice for the European Union. I agree with him that no solution is perfect, one cannot find perfect solutions in a complex Union. Other options examined were moving responsibility for foreign policy of the Union into the Commission, but that would not be attainable in that there would not be agreement to that. Alternatively, some of the Commission's responsibilities could be moved out of the Commission, but that would not be acceptable. "Double-hatting" has arisen principally because of the need to find some way forward, some way of making progress, while recognising the realities.
I do not want to disappoint Deputy Bruton by not having an answer to his question. My answer to his question about how accountability will work is that I do not know. The issues are highly complex. It is an important issue, but since the idea of "double-hatting" has only solidified as a likely way forward in the December plenary, these issues still need to be thrashed out. We need to find a way to operate this that ensures accountability is fully respected.
I also understand the frustrations expressed by Mr. Cushnahan, MEP, about the way the Common Foreign and Security Policy works, which Senator Dardis echoed, as did others. This is because the Common Foreign and Security Policy must combine two elements. It must combine the importance of the member states working together and moving towards appropriate common positions in order that the whole is stronger than the individual elements while preserving the essence of the nation state and respecting the sensitivity of foreign policy issues, which are closely related to sovereignty in all member states, large and small. That is essentially the challenge we face.
As regards poverty reduction, on which Mr. Cushnahan, MEP, and others touched, Mr. Cushnahan, MEP, was the first to suggest human rights should be the main priority. The protection of human rights is already an important element of the EU's approach to development assistance and to the Irish approach, but this is not undermined by the primary objective being the relief of suffering and poverty, which is the main priority of the Irish approach to development co-operation. These issues are connected. Bringing greater coherence across the Union's external relations will advance all these objectives.
Deputies Carey and Bruton referred to their objections to electing a long-term, full-time President of the European Council. The Government, like most members of the convention, indicated in plenary that it was unconvinced by this proposal. There are many good elements in the Franco-German proposals and they are a constructive contribution to the debate, but that does not mean that anyone will sign up to them in full.
Senator Ormonde made the point that there is too much detail and that it is difficult to contribute. That, in itself, is an important contribution and an important reminder to me and to all of us to try to avoid jargon. It is something I try to do, but I will have to redouble my efforts. Senator Ormonde said she found it difficult to come to grips with everything and to pick up the key concepts. She went on to say she liked the idea of "double-hatting" and the idea of co-operating in the fight against terrorism. It is clear that she identified some of the key concepts that are emerging and I am glad she welcomes them.
Senator Dardis asked a question about the burgeoning administration on the Council's secretariat and the fear that this might be a parallel administration to the Commission. The Council secretariat has two functions. One is to support the Presidency and the management of the ongoing business of Union. That is a separate function from that of the Commission and it is not one the Commission believes it should carry out. That arrangement works effectively. In our Presidency next year, we look forward to working closely with the professional secretariat, as we always have done.
The other aspect of the secretariat is its growing role in relation to the external dimension and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is because those issues, to a large extent, are intergovernmental. It is precisely because of that all of us at the convention are trying to find a way to bring greater coherence to that dimension of the work of the Council's secretariat and to what the Commission is doing in that area.
Ms McKenna, MEP, and Deputy Mulcahy referred to the question of legal personality, with which I have already dealt. On the question of qualified majority voting, which Ms McKenna raised and she welcomed what I said about it, the Union must combine a sensitivity to national positions while - this is equally important - trying to ensure that the Common Foreign and Security Policy is more effective precisely because we can be more effective together and it offers us an appropriate vehicle to address Irish values. The Government wants a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy and, where possible, to reach common positions on key issues. A number of people commented that we already have qualified majority voting as a possibility under the CFSP but that it has not been used. Some would say that is because the provisions are not adequate, others would say - we would tend to this view - that the absence of full qualified majority voting is not really the problem. What we have to do together - the convention is a collaborative exercise - is to examine the mechanisms. We are not convinced that, as a starting point, qualified majority voting is the problem. We believe the Union has more authority when it speaks with consensus and with one voice, but there will be issues where this is not possible and member states will continue to put forward their national positions. In our view, what is needed principally is political will and a commitmentto carrying through that will. Rather than sanctions which could be divisive, that is the way forward.
Senator Mulcahy raised a number of issues of common concern, including the importance of political will, on which I agree with him. He also raised a good point on the proposed permanent head of the European Council. At a time when the Union is trying to construct a single voice on foreign policy and to develop the concept of a "double-hatted" person, those advocating a President of the European Council will have to answer in regard to that proposal as well as other questions. If we are creating another voice at a time when we are trying to create one voice, that illustrates one of the complexities of that proposal.
Deputy Andrews expressed some scepticism about the importance of simplification. The widespread view of the convention, which the Government shares, is that simplification can play an important role. I refer not only to simplification of the treaties, although that is important, but to simplification of procedures and abolition of the pillars while preserving the necessary distinctions. Our view is that simplification on its own is not enough to set the Union on the right path, although it is desirable and important. Deputy Andrews said he had hoped we would now be in a period of consolidation, and there is a good case for that, but the hope of ourselves and many other participants in the convention is that the treaty which will emerge from this process will allow a period of consolidation at that stage.
With regard to a number of other issues, quite a number of which Deputy Andrews referred to in quick succession, I hope when these are talked through and refined at the convention some of his concerns will be addressed. For example, he referred to qualified majority voting in the defence area. I do not believe such a measure will run and it is not being strongly pushed by anybody.
The Chairman asked a number of questions and said he hoped the concerns and suggestions made here would be taken into account by the Oireachtas representatives. They are also helpful to the Government's position and will be taken on board by us.
As regards having a constitutional treaty for ten years or 50 years, a period of stability, nobody knows the length of a period of stability to which we can look forward. It is our hope and expectation that we will not be into the process of another intergovernmental conference within a matter of a few years. Some of the issues the Chairman pointed out will come up in the relative short-term. I refer to arrangements that are likely to remain in place permanently such as the share of institutions between Strasbourg and Brussels or changes that can be made without a further treaty change, for example, if the UK decides it wants to join the common currency. The Chairman was right in saying that there are many issues that face the Union in the period ahead.
The Chairman's question about how to handle protocols in previous treaties has not been addressed. The principal focus so far has been the so-called constitutional part of the treaty, which would be a relatively short, but important new, addition to the treaty. The work on how to simplify and restructure the existing treaties, which would bring into question the issue of the protocols, has not been addressed yet. We are waiting for the presidium to bring forward some general ideas on that. It has commissioned legal expertise from the different legal services of the institutions.
Not yet.
Mr. McDonagh
I accept that. The Chairman also asked if we investing too much capital in the treaties. I agree with him that the treaties are not a magical solution. He rightly points out that we have had the possibility of the use of qualified majority voting on some aspects of foreign policy, but it has not been used. The treaties are important for two reasons. One is because they outline the limits of action, that is, the Union cannot act outside the treaties, and also because they provide a basis for action. In some cases, however, the possibilities for action are not effectively used. They are not the be all and end all, but they are an essential element in the process.
With regard to the role of the EU in international organisations, the Commission is already in some international organisations and it could be in others. On the other hand, it is not a member of some organisations, for example, the UN General Assembly where it is not likely to be considered appropriate. The Community has observer status at the UN and represents the member states in the World Trade Organisation. Many organisations only admit states to full membership and we must recognise that fact. States also have rights and responsibilities as members. A single vote may not necessarily equate to greater influence. What is more important is a single message and a joint position.
Are there implications, for example, for sovereignty, of the EU being able to conclude international agreements?
Mr. McDonagh
There are many implications that still need to be teased through as to precisely who will negotiate and what procedures will be used. However, in terms of the reports of the relevant working groups on external relations and legal personality, there is nothing that follows necessarily and logically from that to suggest that there is a change in balance of the responsibilities of the member states on the one hand and the Community on the other. Indeed, the external relations report explicitly says that its ideas are without prejudice to the balance of competencies between the Union and the member states. Obviously, it is an issue that will require more work.
On the issue of the three solidarity clauses and the rogue question mark, I can only speculate as to why it is there. It is possibly because the first type of solidarity clause, the one the Government supports, which is the possibility of responding to emergency situations and new threats against civilian populations, is a distinct idea, whereas in the second and third, the idea of a mutual defence clause and a so-called solidarity and common security clause, it is not clear what the common security and solidarity clause would be. Perhaps that is why the question mark is there, it has not been defined. However, it is the first type of solidarity clause. I am not sure if the precise wording of the document quoted from November is carried through into the final document but it is more or less the same——
It was faxed on 22 January from the Intergovernmental Conference section. That is what is stated on the top.
In the newer document, No. 57, a majority of 0.42 is included in it. It is just extended further, in that there is further explanation of the one on 16 December.
Mr. McDonagh
It is more or less the same thing that was read out. All the documents in the Oireachtas and in the Department are available almost instantaneously but if we faxed the wrong one to the committee, I apologise.
The question of whether there should be a defence protocol in a future treaty should be addressed to Deputy Bruton. The position as far as we are concerned is that constitutionally we could not sign up to any such protocol. That is a factor in how we approach this question.
The whole idea is that treaty amendments will be put to the people in a referendum. This is the time for writing the treaty that will go to the people. The only way it can be changed is by referendum. However, I have done my duty and raised the point.
Mr. McDonagh
The armaments and military equipment aspects of European security and defence policy have arisen in the context of ensuring that members' respective military forces are properly equipped to carry out crisis management operations, not least from the perspective of protecting the forces themselves as well as the people they might be trying to help. The current EU and EC treaties already provide for a degree of armaments co-operation between member states but on the proviso that this should occur as member states consider appropriate. Ireland would approach proposals in this area in that context.
We are aware that the Greek Presidency is putting forward ideas in this area, possibly extending to defence research projects. We will emphasise that an appropriate balance should be maintained between the constituent elements of the SDP. It may not be realistic for Ireland to seek to prevent other member states from co-operating more closely in an area which they perceive as an issue of national importance. As was noted in a recent report by the National Forum on Europe, conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and peace making involve military as well as non-military means, and we cannot ignore the reality that armaments are part of the equation in so far as the military is concerned. From an Irish perspective it would be key to ensure that we can continue to take our own decisions on these matters in so far as they affect Ireland.
I will respond first to Patricia McKenna's question as to whether a single legal personality is likely to be endorsed by the convention. My view is that it will be. The implications of this were raised by the Chairman and Deputy Andrews. They are set out most effectively in paragraph 19 of the report.
Conferring explicit legal personality will give the European Union its own status in international law enabling it, for instance, to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights. At present, the European Union, because it does not have a legal personality, cannot enter into a convention of that nature. It is important that there should be a consistent human rights jurisdiction and jurisprudence in Europe. While the Union should have its own charter of fundamental rights, it should be interpreted in sympathy and consistently with the European Convention on Human Rights which is the overriding human rights jurisdiction and jurisprudence in Europe. That is not fully achieved unless and until the European Union adheres to the convention. I believe that should be done.
The Chairman asked if this would have implications for our sovereignty. It would not. The European Union could only adhere to or be bound by any international agreement to the extent of the competencies already conferred on the European Union by the Irish people in a referendum. The European Union cannot act in regard to any matter on behalf of Ireland and bind Ireland outside the areas of conferred authority contained in the treaties which have already been approved. That is absolutely clear and it answers one of the questions raised by Deputy Mulcahy. He spoke of the European Union being explicitly described as a union of independent and sovereign states. I do not consider this necessary because it is already implicit in the principle of conferral, which is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union. The Union may only act to the extent that we as sovereign states have conferred certain powers on it. That principle establishes the primacy of the authority of member states over the authority of the Union as the source of the legal authority.
However, we have agreed since we joined the European Union that where there is a conflict between European law and domestic law in an area where the State has freely conferred competence on the Union, our law is inferior to EU law. That is a principle we have accepted since 1973. It has always been the case that EU law is superior to ours in the areas where we have conferred competence on the EU. To that extent, the European Union is not and never has been a purely intergovernmental arrangement. Purely intergovernmental arrangements are ones where no authority is conferred on the international entity.
I accept that. My point is that it is drifting away from that characteristic towards the federalist type.
My answer is that it already had acquired a federal character by virtue of the requirement agreed at the beginning, that EU law in the area of conferred authority was superior to domestic law. To that extent, the European Union has always been supranational. However, there is no question of it ever becoming a superpower, for two good reasons. The European Union cannot borrow and cannot tax. An entity which can neither borrow nor tax does not have any capacity to exercise overwhelming power over anyone. There is no proposal in the convention to change that. Those in this debate who claim to be worried about a super state in Europe should reflect on the fact that the EU cannot raise or borrow a penny in tax.
The Chairman made a number of points. He asked that Oireachtas Members who represent the Oireachtas on the convention should take the views of the committee seriously. It is not necessary to ask that. The presence of Deputy Carey and myself clearly indicates our intention to take this matter seriously. I cannot speak for the Oireachtas Members who are unable to be here today, but I have endeavoured to be here. Furthermore, at the last meeting the Chairman suggested that a particular facility might be given to a representative or representatives of national parliaments to have a right of audience in the European Parliament. I indicated that, with his agreement, Deputy Carey and I would table your proposal. That is a clear indication of our willingness to act promptly and literally to give effect to views expressed at this committee.
The Chairman may have been referring to a discussion at another place when he mentioned an exchange about whether it would be possible to alter the requirement that Irish people must produce passports when they go Schengen countries. My understanding of that matter, which informed my answer at the time, is that the difficulty, politically speaking, is that Britain insists on maintaining passport controls at its borders for all EU countries, other than Ireland. We, in Ireland - my understanding is that this was the case in the negotiations whenever the issue was raised - have always indicated a willingness to dispense with that requirement in favour of the Schengen type arrangements. My understanding is that the British have vigorously maintained that position and that Britain alone is not willing to dispense with the passport requirement. My suggestion that it was a matter for Tony Blair rather than for the convention was informed by that point of view. However, I may be mistaken. It may be possible to find a way around it. However, it seems that if we, for example, dispensed with passports between Schengen and non-Schengen EU members, it would still require Britain's consent because it is free to insist on maintaining its existing position. We would then be back to the British problem.
This is not a matter for the convention, but for the EU institutions in their normal functioning. There is no requirement for a change in the EU constitution to give account to the Chairman's suggestions. I would like to see agreement on what he is suggesting, but it is not a matter for the convention. Given that this is an important issue about which the Chairman is concerned and which I have raised on several occasions, I suggest that the committee should appoint a rapporteur to examine it independently. The committee, in its previous existence, appointed a rapporteur to consider the convention. I was honoured to be the rapporteur on that occasion and I produced a report which was well received. Given that this is an important issue for you, Chairman, and other members of the committee, I suggest that the committee might consider appointing a rapporteur at the next meeting to investigate this matter and to confirm whether my understanding is correct that Britain is the only problem or to identify a way around it. Rather than leave the matter unresolved, the committee should investigate it. I agree with the Chairman that this is a serious issue.
Both you and I concluded the Amsterdam treaty so we both know the contents on Schengen. We negotiated the opt in clause. You and I both understand Schengen and the common travel issue. We are talking about the fact that we are supposed to be writing a constitution for Europe which will last for the next 30 or 50 years. Recently Switzerland and Norway negotiated an agreement whereby they would have easier access to the 23 Schengen members than Irish citizens. Could some provision be made, either by amending the Schengen agreement or the Amsterdam treaty, to allow travel from the common travel area on a lesser document than a passport? The new driving licence, for example, could be adopted for that purpose. It is as easy to forge a driving licence as a passport. It is a matter for the convention because this problem is treaty based.
It is a matter primarily for Britain to resolve because unless it changes its policy of requiring passports, any other lesser document will not be acceptable to it. The treaty must be endorsed by Britain. The fundamental question is what is the British problem. If the committee appoints a rapporteur, as I suggest - I will be happy to make that proposal at the next meeting - he or she should go to Britain on behalf of the committee and find out its problem. That is one way to get action and the committee will show it can get action. The convention is not the best route for resolving this problem. Bilateral contact with Britain is the best route. Whether it is legally appropriate or not to bring this matter up in the convention, it is not the best route. I am anxious to help the committee in every way possible in relation to any of these matters.
The Chairman also raised a point about protocols. We should call a spade a spade. I expect we are talking about the protocol on abortion. It is important that protocol is carried forward into the new treaty. I raised this issue with the convention secretariat following discussions with you, Chairman, in another context. I am confident that it will be carried forward into the new treaty. I will insist on it in the presidium because you are right that these protocols must be carried forward. Some protocols may be redundant, but the protection of the lives of the unborn is not and never will be a redundant concern as far as this and many other countries are concerned.
As regards the issues you, Chairman, raised about defence, there has been confusion about the documents. We have two documents, one of which is dated 21 November and which consists of approximately 53 paragraphs. The other document of 16 December consists of approximately 73 paragraphs. The latter document is the one we should consider.
I presume Article 42, which I read out, is correct.
Mr. McDonagh
It may not be the same word for word, but it is almost exactly the same.
It is not.
The conclusion of the defence working group is that some countries are not in favour of a collective defence agreement of a territorial defence character. Under these circumstances, the members of the group who were in favour of it thought it would be sensible to allow those members wishing to intensify their co-operation and, in particular, to take over the commitments of the Western European Union treaty to do so within the framework of the Union rather than outside it. The new treaty could therefore establish a closer type of co-operation in defence which would be open to all member states wishing to enter into such a commitment and fulfilling the requirements for such a commitment to be credible. This is particularly the case in terms of command and control capabilities, force preparedness, interoperability and deployment capabilities. Decisions would only be taken by the participating member states. The methods of operation and decision-making procedures for such co-operation would be specified in the text establishing such co-operation.
That poses a significant challenge to this country. Would we want to opt into or stay out of such an enhanced arrangement? That is the first challenge. The second challenge is, are we prepared to accept such an arrangement wherein this would be done within an EU structure, even though we would not perhaps participate in it? My answer to that question is "yes". It would be far better that this be done within an EU structure even if we do not participate because at least, indirectly, in regard to other Councils and discussions we would have some influence, even though we would not make the decisions since we would not be part of it. It would be much better that we have some say because as you pointed out, Chairman, we will be affected by the outcomes of these decisions anyway.
The question as to whether Ireland should opt in to and become a member of this would be quite divisive at this and other committees. I would go with Seán Lemass who said that when we join the European Union, we must be willing and able to participate in all its aspects, including its common defence. That was the position taken by Seán Lemass in the 1960s. He was a far-seeing man in that he understood there was no point talking about creating a political union but then being unwilling to defend what has been created.
Unfortunately, not everybody who quotes Seán Lemass in other contexts in support of their beliefs would necessarily go along with what he had the courage to say on that occasion. Seán Lemass's approach, which is not to far from your own, Chairman - you represent the same part of Dublin - is one I share. I hope some of my colleagues to my left will re-read Seán Lemass's speeches. I will supply them with copies because they are a source of inspiration. He was a man ahead of his time and he is still ahead of us in many respects.
On that hopeful note I conclude the meeting by saying I note, as a former compiler of quiz books on politics, that Seán Lemass did not become Taoiseach until he was 65 years of age, so there is a lot of hope ahead in terms of comparisons. I do not want to go over my concerns. I tried to put them as best I could. I still have them but I will not raise the question again.
As regards future meetings in this format, we reached a preliminary agreement on the meeting to deal with reports on freedom, security and justice, fundamental rights, simplification and economic governance for Monday, 10 February. Does that date still stand? We leave it at that date.
That is a good time. It is the beginning of the week.
Are we happy to continue with the format of meetings thereafter? We will get reports on what has happened and then have an exchange on the three million advance. I know it puts a lot of pressure of people but it is important in the context of the democratic deficit. Is that agreed? Agreed.
The joint committee adjourned at 12.45 p.m. until Thursday, 30 January 2003.