JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union) debate

Role of Houses of the Oireachtas in EU Affairs: Discussion.

Chairman

I welcome everyone to the meeting. I must draw Dr. Gavin Barrett's attention to the fact that while members of the sub-committee have absolute privilege, this privilege does not apply to witnesses who appear before it. I remind members of the parliamentary practice that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I thank Dr. Barrett for his attendance at such short notice. The topic on which he will address members is the role of the Houses of the Oireachtas in European affairs, as well as his observations on how this role might be enhanced and improved. He has a great deal of expertise in this subject. He has studied, taught and practised in many of the leading European institutions and widely published in this field.

Members have agreed to focus on a submission model for these meetings, whereby witnesses will make a submission on which members subsequently will question them. However, given the short notice at which Dr. Barrett has attended, we will suspend the model for the day. We will give him 15 minutes to make a presentation on the topic and take it from there. I will interrupt him when five minutes and one minute remain to him to allow him to make the best use of his time. I again thank him on behalf of the sub-committee for his attendance.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

I thank the Chairman. As members can see from the hand-out I have prepared and brought with me today, I wish to address a number of topics. I am unsure whether it will be possible for me to so do in the time available to me, at least in the initial 15 minutes. However, in so far as I am unable to do so, I will be happy to come back to address the remaining questions after my initial contribution to these proceedings.

As the hand-out shows, what I have to say has been divided up between general observations that I want to make in this regard. I wish to examine the question of whether what Ireland is doing in the area of scrutiny can be regarded as being effective. I wish to make a couple of recommendations of my own on how I consider the role of the Houses of the Oireachtas in European affairs can be enhanced. For some reason I have written down that point twice. In addition, I wish to ask whether a mandate or a scrutiny reserve system such as is operated in other jurisdictions in the European Union would work here. In so far as I address that point, I wish to consider some constitutional considerations; in other words, were we to consider a scrutiny reserve or a mandating system, to ask whether we would need a constitutional amendment. These are the broad topics I wish to consider.

I wish to make seven general observations which I will go through as quickly as possible. First, although not everyone will agree it is a cloud, every cloud has a silver lining and the aftermath of the Lisbon treaty vote is a rare, fleeting moment of opportunity for the Oireachtas to have its relations with the Executive, that is, the Government, altered in its favour and, I hope, altered in favour of the people in general in so far as it concerns scrutiny of European Union policy-making. One did not have to be a fan of Jean Monnet to accept the truth of his statement that people generally only accept change when they are faced with necessity and only recognise necessity when a so-called crisis is upon them. If the Oireachtas has any ambition to increase, in the interests of the common good, its role in the policy-making process at EU level, it is imperative that it now use it. The opportunity may not come again in our lifetimes. The only comparable situation was the aftermath of the "No" vote in respect of the Treaty of Nice in 2001. It is important that the sub-committee be sufficiently bold in its recommendations in this field. If it needs to ask for radically increased resources in this area, even in current circumstances, it must do so. If it considers it necessary to see legislative action or even the amendment of the Constitution, it must call for this because I do not believe this opportunity necessarily will present itself again. This constitutes the first observation.

The second observation is it is important to know what we expect of the Oireachtas when it engages in scrutiny of EU affairs and that it is important for us to be realistic in our expectations. It is important that we do not expect national parliaments, or more accurately, parliamentary majorities to turn suddenly and publicly into powerful influences over policy in European Union affairs, as one writer in this area would have it.

At the same time they do not necessarily have to be the poor losers in European integration that they are often made out to be, as they can exert influence. Arguably one of the most important ways this can be done is by providing for public information and deliberation on European Union issues and by holding governments publicly to account for European Union policies. Some writers in this field use as their criterion for judging the success or otherwise of national parliaments in European Union affairs, their policy making power but that is a flawed and unrealistic task. Even at national level, the primary role of devising policy rests with the executive, and that kind of test is guaranteed to make almost every parliament look bad, including the Oireachtas.

We must have a realistic test that focuses on public deliberation and holding the Government publicly to account. If that is the impact we want European Union affairs scrutiny to have, we must devise a method for making that happen. The kind of things we are talking about are the right to demand information via monitoring and reporting requirements, and the capacity to impose sanctions if those demands are not met.

The third observation is the design or amendment of any parliamentary scrutiny system must take careful account of party political realities. It often seems to be the case that when the role of parliament and government is discussed, it is as if parliament is in one corner of a boxing ring and the government is in the other. Even the Treaty of Lisbon provisions in this regard can be criticised.

That image does not fit with reality, as we all know, as in a parliamentary system of democracy like that of Ireland, such an image is just a fiction. Instead, parliamentary systems are characterised by a different kind of duality. On the one hand there is the executive and its supportive majority and on the other there is parliamentary opposition. That is often forgotten, particularly when we are talking about scrutiny of European Union affairs.

Bearing in mind the correct duality, where does that leave us? It leaves us having to take into account that Deputies and Senators who belong to the Government majority usually have no incentive to criticise publicly the members of their own party, the Executive they have effectively put into power. To do so — for example if they say they do not share the Government's negotiating position at European Union level and that the Government should change its position — would be rather like defeating a Government Bill. It would be a public and humiliating defeat of the Government by its own majority and something which would do little good either for the Government and its stability or the political careers of the backbenchers concerned.

It is unrealistic to expect majority Deputies and Senators to do this but we can expect them to engage in what one writer terms "monitoring" scrutiny. This is to seek information on what a Minister has done at European Union level and find out what has happened in Brussels. For the most part, he or she can then leave what we call political scrutiny — the very different task of asking whether the Minister's actions in the European decision which was reached were appropriate — to the Opposition. In other words, what might be called the public parliamentary police patrol could be left to the Opposition. At any rate, a system which is not designed to take into account party political realities in this manner will not work and there is no point in setting it up in that way.

The fourth point is that we must avoid jumping to simplistic conclusions as to what the effects of introducing particular mechanisms or rules used in other countries will be. The effect of institutional arrangements and formal legal rights, such as, for example, mandate systems, is not uniform in the different national parliaments. It is affected by various factors, such as whether governments are generally majority or minority in nature, or if there is widespread consensus or scepticism about European integration in the country. Identical institutional arrangements can produce different results in different countries and as a result, we should not make the mistake of thinking that if we introduce a Danish-style approach regarding scrutiny in Ireland, it will produce the same results in Ireland as in Denmark.

I am of the view that it would produce positive results, but they will not be the same as those observed in Denmark. Other countries have even greater formal rights than the Danish Parliament. The difference, however, is that they do not use them or at least do not do so in the same manner as the Danes. The mere existence of certain parliamentary legal rights does not necessarily mean those parliaments are willing or able to use them. Therefore, we should not make the mistake of assuming that formal capabilities are equivalent to parliamentary behaviour. In other words, we must ask ourselves how the Oireachtas might use certain rights if they were afforded to it. It may do so in a different manner than the Danish Parliament.

The fifth observation is that neither the existence of qualified majority voting nor the fact that the European Council legislates behind closed doors makes scrutiny impossible. Although these restrictions certainly make scrutiny more difficult, they do not make it entirely impossible. Even if an Irish Minister is outvoted at Council level, he or she can still be made accountable for his or her behaviour at the negotiations or the Government's original position. Council law-making behind closed doors makes scrutiny more difficult but it does not prevent Ministers from being required to offer explanations to parliaments and populaces for decisions they have taken. The restrictions should not be accepted as an excuse for making scrutiny impossible.

The sixth observation is a word of caution. The performance of the Oireachtas in regard to EU scrutiny is likely to be related to the overall performance by Parliament in all its tasks. In other words, factors that negatively affect the Oireachtas in its domestic functions are equally likely to affect its performance in exercising its scrutiny role. These include the relative shortness of legislative terms, the lack of interest on the part of the media and the public in much of what goes on in the Oireachtas, particularly its committee work, and the need for politicians, if they wish to be re-elected, to prioritise constituency work. The reality is that parliaments and their majorities are unlikely to be more assertive in the EU sphere than in the domestic sphere.

A Finnish expert in this area, Mr. Tapio Raunio, has observed that variations in the level of scrutiny among member states have been primarily explained by two factors, the first of which is the role of parliament in the domestic political system. In other words, where the parliament is powerful vis-à-vis the executive in the domestic system, it tends to have a more powerful voice in scrutiny and to exercise that scrutiny more vigorously. The second factor — although I am not advocating Euroscepticism — is that a more Eurosceptical public tends to lead to more vigorous scrutiny. Such attitudes bring their own disadvantages but seem to lead in practice to tighter scrutiny.

The seventh observation is a further word of caution. Even if scrutiny in European Union matters were to function perfectly well, that would not be the end of deparliamentarisation problems. We live in an area of deparliamentarisation for a variety of reasons, including the increasing complexity of life, the need for technical regulations, membership of various international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation, the rise of social partnership, the existence of a highly professional Civil Service, and the development of a strong system of political parties. These factors tend to reduce the influence of national parliaments. Moreover, European Union membership may have led to a certain reduction in the role of parliament in so far as matters are transferred to the European level, although there are broader issues involved.

My final observation is a general one. There are limits to what we should expect of parliamentary scrutiny. These limits are similar to those which operate in regard to parliamentary control of domestic policy-making. I cannot put it better than Mr. Tapio Raunio in his observation that "members of parliament delegate rather than abdicate EU matters to governments in a very similar way to that in which they delegate policy-making authority to government in other matters". Members of parliament normally have their hands full, even without engagement in European Union issues. In choosing the issues on which to focus they tend to make a rational choice, weighing the costs and benefits of various parliamentary activities. Given that re-election and policy influence are probably the primary goals of most members of parliament, focussing on EU matters tends not to be an attractive option for them. In terms of re-election, EU policy may be important in the context of attracting regional funds to constituencies but, it is not necessarily that important to voters who base their voting choices primarily on domestic issues. It is fair to say that certain limits do apply. However, just because we cannot do everything is not an excuse for doing nothing. Reforms are possible in this area and we should have a look at them.

I am not sure if the committee would prefer me to speak now about whether what Ireland is doing at the moment is effective or to outline some recommendations.

Chairman

It might be more helpful if Dr. Barrett were to speak to the recommendations.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Apart from the opening observations I have made, the following are some suggestions as to how I think the role of the Houses of the Oireachtas in European affairs can be enhanced at least to some degree. The first issue is that of resources. Effective parliamentary scrutiny depends not only on the receipt on time of adequate information but on the capacity of the parliament to deal with that information. In this regard, resources of various kinds are needed. It is important the Oireachtas is listened to not only because it represents the expression of the people's will but also because its opinion is a well-informed assessment of the situation which assists Ministers in representing national interests at the Council table.

Financial resources are a major consideration in this regard. I do not believe I am revealing any secrets in stating that the Oireachtas committee system generally is chronically under-resourced — we are all aware of this — compared with countries of equivalent size in the European Union. I mention in my book that the resources available to the entire committee system in 2006 and 2007 were less than expenditure in respect of catering and bar staff in the Houses and approximately half the cost of televising Oireachtas proceedings generally. I am not attempting to make a cheap point in this regard. While I recognise the importance of the other services, this shows that the committee system is trotting behind at some distance financially. Financial resources are one example worth mentioning.

On research resources, it is absolutely essential that the committee system and, in particular, the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs, has an adequately resourced research section, full-time researchers and a full-time director of research. It would be possible to use the models used by organisations such as the Law Reform Commission, the Judges' Library and the Institute of European Affairs, all of which employ bright young graduates to undertake tremendous research which is then available to assist those organisations in their work.

Co-operation with other parliaments is another area worth considering. There is no need to re-invent the wheel as regards research. The Internet is already being used to help in the exchange of information at parliamentary level. It is also important that external experts are called upon to contribute to the work of this committee. The organisation of conferences and hearings such as this are important.

The "Europeanisation" of the Oireachtas as a whole is required. Research shows that the most influential parliaments in respect of European affairs tend to be those in which committees are involved across the parliament and not in the area of European affairs alone. There is simply too much work to be done and too much expertise needed to concentrate everything on the shoulders of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs.

There is a role for the Europeanisation of the Oireachtas in other senses such as the taking of initiatives which the Oireachtas has taken in the form of European Day or European Week which provide for discussion of major themes, annual legislative programmes and other issues. The issue of resources arises in this context also. It is not only the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs that needs to be properly resourced.

Perhaps most important is the need for what I call the closing of the circle. In this regard I mean that Oireachtas committees generally remain starved of information as to the outcome of their own contribution to the European policy making process in that Ministers do not have to report back to them following Council meetings. This is both demoralising for committee Members and democratically inappropriate. The right of a parliament to demand information via monitoring and reporting requirements and the capacity to impose sanctions are identified by the writer to whom I referred earlier as the two most important ex post facto control measures needed to ensure accountability. We do not have either at Irish level. That leads directly to what I also consider to be appropriate in the Irish context, namely, the introduction of a scrutiny reserve or mandate system. This is such a major issue that I will not deal with it now. If I may, however, I will return to it later.

Another suggestion is that interventions need to be moulded to the topic under discussion. For example, confidential discussions may be required in respect of particularly sensitive matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy or justice and home affairs. Conversely, the latter areas must, in respect of non-confidential matters, be scrutinised as rigorously as possible because they are not subject to adequately rigorous control at European level.

Another point in this regard relates to the timing of intervention by the Oireachtas. Intervention must occur at as early a point as possible in the policy formulation process. It is almost too late to intervene by the time legislation has been drafted and it is certainly too late to do so when it arrives at the Council table. Many of the decisions in this regard are taken at sub-Council level by COREPER and are merely rubber-stamped at Council meetings. If the Oireachtas, as a body, wants to have any influence over what happens at European level, it must act at the earliest possible stage. Ideally, this would be before the Commission even drafts its proposals.

The Oireachtas also has an important role not only in conveying the views of the electorate to the Government but also in transmitting information from the latter to the former. In fairness, the Joint Committee on European Affairs already has a much improved Internet presence. Organising conferences would be a good idea. The role the joint committee played during the referendum campaign on the Lisbon treaty was, in principle, a good idea. I am not sure that vast crowds were attracted to its meetings but the idea was extremely positive. Even if the initial experience was not so good, people should not lose too much heart because this is a valuable initiative which needs to be continued.

There are three further points I wish to make. A serious approach must be taken to the subsidiarity early-warning mechanism. Members may question this assertion on foot of the fact that since the Lisbon treaty was rejected, such a mechanism may not be put in place. Parliamentary scrutiny tends to be the motherhood and apple pie of European integration. In other words, no matter what side one is on regarding whether the Treaty of Lisbon is necessary. Everyone believes increased parliamentary scrutiny at national level is a good thing. It is possible that what is proposed in the protocols attached by the Treaty of Lisbon to the existing treaties in this regard is — even if the treaty never comes into force — likely to be introduced on an informal basis in any event. It is likely the institutions will decide for themselves, as they are entitled to do, to accord a role to national parliaments in this regard. If that happens, it must be taken seriously because it needs to be done if there is any hope of parliaments expanding their role in the future perhaps in the context of challenging the adoption of legislation at European level. The latter is something I feel they should ultimately possess.

Openness to the need for engaging in the policy-making process through various routes other than at national level must be shown. Knowing what is happening at European level is crucial. Having an Oireachtas representative in Brussels would be extremely important in order that information could be communicated back to the Houses. Contributing to policy formulation at European level is also important.

I have a final recommendation. I am not sure how this might be achieved but something must be done to counter the effect of the different schedules and rhythms and national institutions. These pose serious questions for national parliaments. Consideration must be given to how scrutiny can be maintained during the long periods when the Oireachtas does not sit or for it to continue when elections are taking place. Perhaps more full-time employees might be of assistance in that regard but they cannot be the complete answer. Timetable problems are said to be one of the reasons most national parliaments and their committees seldom have MEPs at their meetings.

That is a list of almost random suggestions which I compiled, through nobody's fault, in the short time available to me before the meeting. I hope some of them will be of assistance to the committee.

Chairman

I thank Dr. Barrett for his presentation. He was probably expecting to have more time to comment on the various aspects of this matter. I am grateful to him for dealing with the main points in the 15 minutes available to him.

Senator Déirdre de Búrca

I thank Dr. Barrett for his interesting and wide-ranging presentation. It will obviously take time to absorb the recommendations he made. I wish to comment on some of the issues he raised.

I fully agree with Dr. Barrett that while the Irish rejection of the Lisbon treaty was disappointing for many of us, it also presents a window of opportunity. If the EU responds by abandoning the business-as-usual approach for what I would hope will be a new phase in the functioning and development of the European Union which involves democratisation and engagement with its citizens, this will be a positive outcome of the rejection of the treaty. This sub-committee is particularly privileged in this regard, having made a head start on other parliaments.

National parliaments will undoubtedly have a role to play in terms of addressing the issue of citizen engagement but, unfortunately, they are at present largely semi-detached from the European institutions. I concur with Dr. Barrett on the need for the Europeanisation of national parliaments. This will only occur if, as he has suggested, plenary debates are held on European issues. More debate on European issues is needed on the floors of the Dáil and Seanad if they are to be covered by our media or considered relevant by Irish citizens. That does not happen often enough.

I do not think Dr. Barrett addressed the issue of referrals to sectoral committees. Other scrutiny systems, such as the UK House of Commons and the Danish Parliament, appear to refer issues that may affect particular sectors to the relevant sectoral committees. In other words, the monitoring of draft European legislation is not restricted to EU scrutiny committees or European affairs committees but is also done by committees dealing with sectors on which there may be an impact. Perhaps that could happen more often in the Oireachtas.

Dr. Barrett referred to the desirability of intervention at the earliest possible point in the policy formulation process. I welcomed the provisions of the protocol attached to the Lisbon treaty pertaining to the role for national parliaments in monitoring the principle of subsidiarity. These provisions allowed a period of eight weeks within which a percentage of parliaments could indicate whether they felt the draft legislation breached the principle of subsidiarity. However, as this is a very short period of time, I wonder whether Dr. Barrett has any suggestions on how the European Commission could make its intentions clear in advance of drafting directives or fostering wider consultation at earlier stages of policy formulation. Citizens and civil society could be consulted at very early stages, as opposed to the tighter framework whereby national parliaments are allowed an eight-week period to intervene.

Does Dr. Barrett believe more attention should be given to the role of the European Ombudsman and the European Parliament's Committee on Petitions? These mechanisms are likely to be of interest to EU citizens in terms of providing them with opportunities for direct engagement with European institutions.

Although one thing my students do not like about me is the rapidity with which I speak at times, it can be of help at others. I will try to get through the questions as quickly as possible in order to have time to come back to the points Senator Doherty wishes to make.

On the reference to sectoral committees, Senator de Búrca is absolutely right. This is key to the efficient functioning of scrutiny in any member state, which tends to happen in those member states in which such reference is made. In other words, issues relating to transport and agriculture are referred to the transport and agriculture committees, respectively. A scrutiny system simply will not work if the entire burden of coping with European legislation, of which there is a flood every year, is placed on the European affairs committee. This is crucial, both to share out the work and, importantly, because to carry out scrutiny effectively the expertise of such committees is needed in their particular fields. I certainly agree with this.

Intervention at as early a point as possible is key. One example of how this can be done is by looking at the annual work or legislative programmes of the Commission. There also are multi-annual programmes in this regard. It is vitally important for the Oireachtas to seize these openings to get in early to make its views known because if one's view is not known early in the policy-making process, one will not influence it. In order to maximise its influence it must get in as early as possible.

As for the subsidiarity principle and the eight week period, I agree that eight weeks is a relatively short time, although it constitutes an increase on the previous number of weeks mentioned. However, a balance must be achieved between slowing down the legislative process entirely at European level and giving national parliaments a chance to intervene. I make the point that a danger of the subsidiarity review proposals or subsidiarity control mechanism is that it will make European affairs committees focus on legislation eight weeks before it appears before the Council. That is problematic as, in terms of influencing the shape of the legislation, it is far too late. The boat has been missed — legislation must be considered much earlier. It is imperative that national parliaments are not distracted by this mechanism in focusing all of their energy on legislation coming through. Legislation must be considered before it is even drafted, certainly far earlier than eight weeks before it is placed on the Council agenda. In practice, the eight-week period will be longer because it is eight weeks after the last version is translated. If one happens to be in the fortunate position of being able to speak English, the translated document will be available earlier — the period will then be a couple of weeks longer than eight weeks.

Having a wider process of consultation is a great idea. One way in which this could be done is for members of the Commission to come on a regular scheduled basis to European affairs committees to tell us what will happen, what they are proposing to do and what they are thinking about. There is no doubt that there are enough Commissioners to do this and it is not too much to expect them to do so. It would be one way in which matters could be helped.

The ombudsman and petitions committee play a quiet background role that is of vital importance in protecting the democratic rights of ordinary citizens. I successfully made use of the petitions committee in having a legal change effected here. I am married to a French national and found the legal rules in having her registered to vote in European Parliament elections were much tougher than they were for me. I complained about this to the petitions committee and it eventually resulted in legislative change in Ireland. It is not acknowledged anywhere and may be one of the problems of the European Union that the committee does much quiet background work for which much of the time it never receives credit. That is one example. I agree on the important role played but that is how politics works.

On finding out what happens at the Council of Ministers, that is a key role at national level. Establishing accountability in that regard is a key role for the committee structure. Every system of lawmaking has its areas in which there is what might be called legitimate confidentiality. For example, in the drafting of legislation at Irish level, one does not get to see it until the Government has decided on the draft heads. Sometimes the closed nature of Council decisions and the criticisms of it are overdone. On the other hand, lawmaking should be done in public. I note the Treaty of Lisbon envisages that legislation will be done in a public manner at European Union level. By and large, that is a positive aspect, although it may make the arrival at decisions at Council level a little more difficult. I agree, however, that finding out what happens at Council level is crucial. A large part of what we are talking about should be how we get Irish Ministers to tell us what they are agreeing to at European level as quickly as possible.

The idea of processes of scrutiny being uniform is an interesting one. They are becoming more uniform as time passes across European Union level. There is an ongoing process of learning. National parliaments were very slow to come to the blocks in involving themselves in European Union affairs and it really only happened in the 1990s. There were European Union affairs committees but they did not do much until after the Treaty of Maastricht was agreed in the 1990s. At that stage it looked as if the European Union was becoming involved in more areas — this was correct — and national parliaments woke up and decided they should involve themselves also to see what was happening and engage in some scrutiny in that regard. The processes are becoming more uniform, with an example being mentioned of sectoral committees. That is happening all across the European Union, including Ireland, although perhaps not to an adequate extent. The processes are becoming more uniform and national parliaments are learning from each other. Imposing a uniform system across the European Union would probably not be a good idea, as there tends to be great sensitivity about interference by the European Union in internal constitutional arrangements. There would be much resistance on the part of national parliaments, probably correctly so.

Uniformity should not be imposed for another reason; political systems have different ways of working. We can see that several countries in the European Union have a system of mandating Ministers. This applies in the case of Denmark and the other Nordic countries of Sweden and Finland. It is also the case in Germany and Austria. However, the effects of these mandating systems are different. There are certain areas of law, such as trade union regulation, where it is not appropriate to have European regulation. Scrutiny of European Union affairs is another area which is best left to the national level. However, as I said, we may ultimately find that many of the scrutiny mechanisms will converge almost by themselves.

Deputy Joe Costello

I thank Dr. Barrett for his valuable contribution. It vindicates our decision to avoid, as far as possible, the partisan stakeholders and to opt instead for a broader, more thoughtful approach.

I wish to explore further the present role of national parliaments. The function of the parent bodies of this sub-committee, the Joint Committee on European Affairs and the Joint Committee on European Scrutiny, is to scrutinise proposals from Europe. On the other hand, the function of the Parliament in plenary session is to implement or transpose decisions into law. However, the formal institution that is recognised by the European Union is the Council of Ministers; that is where the power lies. Therefore, the Oireachtas embodies both a watchdog and a legislative function in regard to European Union issues, but we do not have the function of influencing or directing legislation or making draft legislation.

Is there any mechanism whereby national parliaments can have a more central role in the decision-making process? Dr. Barrett observed that by the time draft legislation comes to us, it is too late as the work is already done. The outcome is already largely wrapped up. The Lisbon treaty provides for a mechanism whereby citizens can engage in the decision-making process. However, there is no mechanism for national parliaments to do likewise, although there is such a mechanism in regard to governments. We in Ireland have a strong Government and a weak Parliament in that respect.

Is it possible to do something stronger than what is proposed in the Lisbon treaty whereby we, as a Parliament, might have an opportunity to engage in subsidiarity by working together with other member state parliaments to have a role in the decision-making process and the drafting of legislation? Is there any mechanism within the standard decision-making process whereby national parliaments, either through COSAC or otherwise, can be involved in the formal process of drafting legislation and making decisions? Might something be done in this regard through the Council of Europe, for example, which is a parliamentary assembly of 47 member states? It is a policy-making body but lacks an executive. We should examine whether national parliaments themselves, as distinct from national executives, can have a role in this regard. I ask Dr. Barrett to address this point.

Have we gone backwards to some extent in terms of the manner in which we operate as a Parliament? The amount of legislation coming from Europe has increased manifold since 1973. Some 75% of all legislation now operating domestically emanates from Europe. That is a colossal proportion. There is clearly an imbalance in terms of the origin of legislation, with the majority emanating from abroad rather than from the domestic Parliament. We have not come to terms with that.

The European Communities Act 2007 took the legislative process further from the remit of the Oireachtas and handed it over to line Ministers. The vast majority of legislative proposals from the European Union never reach the Dáil and are dealt with by line Ministers by means of statutory instruments. This means in a sense that we are responding to the increasing amount of material and matter from the Union in a more bureaucratic rather than an up-front democratic fashion.

On the role of the Oireachtas, how can we ensure better engagement with the Oireachtas in making the European Union more relevant? It is relevant in practise, law and decision making but how do we make this parliament more relevant in that respect? The Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Scrutiny has made the proposal that it meet at least one day each month in plenary session — this may be minimalist and perhaps increased to a figure of one week per month — to deal with legislation. Perhaps Dr. Barrett will comment on how we might achieve a balance between committee work and work done in plenary session.

Dr. Barrett spoke about resources, of which we are short, an issue on all of our lips all of the time. Do we have a particular disability in Ireland in terms of the electoral system? Many European countries operate list systems and people have no electorate to work to. As the Chairman is aware, we have a highly demanding electorate who expect Members, when busy discussing matters of global import, to be available to them in their constituencies to deal with matters of concern to them, rightly so as it helps our political process. However, this places on us as parliamentarians demands not placed on people in many of the other countries. In this respect, to what extent can we ever have truly effective parliamentary scrutiny in Ireland? Our system makes this difficult.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

With regard to the central function of drafting legislation and giving parliaments more control, curiously this issue received a great airing in working group 4 of the Convention on the Future of Europe which drafted the constitutional treaty which in modified form was transformed into the Treaty of Lisbon. What is curious is that there did not appear to be a great demand for it on the part of national parliaments. Various proposals were made, including the establishment of a third House beyond the Council and the European Parliament made up of representatives from national parliaments. However, there was a lack of interest on the part of national governments and parliaments to take up the issue. I am not sure why that is the case. Perhaps they considered it would add to the complexity of decision making at European Union level. While the idea was aired, it was not well received for one reason or another.

Similarly, it was proposed to give COSAC a greater role. This relates to parliaments acting together and having a greater role. Again, however, there was not a great take-up of this idea. We must bear in mind that even national level parliaments do not tend to have such a role. In other words, they do not have a central policy making role. They tend to have — it may have been Deputy Costello who mentioned this — the role of legitimating decisions taken elsewhere by governments. There is a policy. If legislation is proposed at national level, it can be amended as it is going through the Houses of the Oireachtas. If the Government puts forward legislation, it is generally adopted, even if in a somewhat modified form. At national level, parliaments do not have the role to which I refer and they do not have it at European level either.

In the context of maximising influence at European Union level, if the European Parliament, which also does not have a formal role in proposing legislation, suggests that legislation is desirable in a particular area, its recommendation tends to meet with a willing ear from the Commission. In so far as national parliaments have something to say regarding the desirability of legislation and the direction which such legislation should take, the committee would be knocking at an open door at European level. Formal mechanisms may not be in place to enshrine that, but in reality the committee's views would be listened to.

The Deputy referred to the European Communities Act 2007 and the role of statutory instruments in the Irish system. I agree with him that too much recourse is had to statutory instruments. This returns to one of the general points I made, namely, that if change is desired in that regard, there is a price to be paid. If people want that which is dealt with in the form of statutory instruments at present to be adopted in the form of legislation, much longer legislative terms for the Oireachtas would be required. Is that what the Oireachtas wants? If it does, the option is there and I suppose it could be done. I would prefer to see that done because too much legislation goes through and too much leeway was granted by the relevant Supreme Court decisions in this area — I refer in particular to the Maher case — relating to the use of statutory instruments.

There is a balance to be struck between efficiency and giving the people a voice. However, I tend to agree with the Deputy that too much recourse is had to statutory instruments. That said, statutory instruments tend to be used to implement what has been decided at European Union level. If one wants to influence policy-making in general, the time to do so is prior to the adoption of European Union legislation. One can really only influence matters at the margins by the time legislation is being implemented.

On plenary engagement with the Oireachtas, the concept of European days is extremely positive. The Oireachtas has a vital role to play in forming a public space in which matters can be discussed and brought to the attention of the public in order that individuals might discover what is happening.

The idea of discussing annual work programmes regularly is also positive, as is that relating to dealing with matters once a month or even more frequently in plenary session. My difficulty in this regard is that there are no votes in this. I do not know how well debates on the matters to which I refer would be attended. In addition, I do not know how more people could be attracted to attend. However, this is not an excuse for not proceeding but we must be realistic in our expectations. It is appropriate that the Oireachtas, in its plenary form, be given as large a role as is feasible.

We have a super-fair electoral system, which goes down to the last couple of votes. However, we all remember the experience of Dick Spring from the Deputy's party who was a very highly regarded Minister for Foreign Affairs but who almost lost his seat by a couple of votes. He did all right in a subsequent election a number of years later. One can question whether a system in which, undoubtedly, constituency work is rewarded above legislative work is ideal and whether there is some way of dealing with that in the context of, as the Deputy suggested, introducing a system such as that under discussion. There would be a price to be paid in terms of fairness in that regard. As everyone is aware, two attempts were made to alter the electoral system in Ireland but both failed. I do not know if there is a prospect of it being changed.

In the context of retaining expertise within the House, conversion, at least partially, to a list system would probably be no bad thing. It would have a cost in that it would impinge upon the fairness to the last vote that exists under the current system. In addition, list systems come with their own difficulties. I am probably touching on issues that are more wide-ranging than those we need to discuss today. Personally, I concur that it would probably be easier to retain expertise and focus attention on committees if parliamentarians were not worried about talking themselves out of their jobs through the work they do in committee.

Chairman

I now call Deputy Byrne. If Dr. Barrett wishes to further address particular issues, he can have as much time as he needs at the end of our discussions.

Deputy Thomas Byrne

On the issue of increased scrutiny, we have spoken about setting aside days for debates and plenary sessions on scrutinising legislation. The greatest need for such scrutiny is possibly in respect of directives which allow the Government a degree of discretion in their implementation. The text of statutory instruments are often vastly different to the directives they implement because choices have to be made. The habitats directive is an example of designations which have to be decided upon. Is there potential for increased scrutiny in this area? At present, a Dáil motion is needed before we can make decisions pertaining to justice and home affairs or the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Chairman

I remind members to turn off their mobile phones because this meeting is being broadcast to the world via the Internet and I do not want our words to be lost.

Deputy Thomas Byrne

I apologise to the world.

Deputy Timmy Dooley

The Nikkei might crash on the back of that.

Deputy Thomas Byrne

Is it possible to implement a similar system in respect of directives or other regulations requiring an element of discretion? There might be practical value to holding discussions in the Oireachtas on, for example, which bog will be affected rather than it merely being a case of the Minister issuing a statutory instrument. Is there scope for increased scrutiny where a decision requiring unanimity is made at the Council of Ministers? We are able to hold Dáil discussions before a Minister uses the famous veto, which never happens, but can we also be more closely involved where unanimity is required?

We in Fianna Fáil know more than anybody about the importance of constituency work because much of our time is devoted to it.

Does that happen in practice?

Deputy Joe Costello

Statutory instruments are laid before the House for three weeks. Someone may object within that period.

Deputy Thomas Byrne

That never happens.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

It might be appropriate to note the original——

Deputy Joe Costello

They are merely left in the Oireachtas Library. It is not a highly public affair.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

It does not work well in practice. It is worth mentioning that the original European Communities Act 1972 had a system in which the Oireachtas had greater involvement. Unless they were positively approved within a particular period, they did not come into force. However, as that produced such a flood of work for the Oireachtas, this provision was amended one year later by the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1973, which has left us with the present position. Were it possible for the Oireachtas to cope with the workload involved, the Deputy's suggestion probably would be a very good idea. Speaking as an outsider however, it is not possible for me to state this would be the case. It certainly would involve a massively increased workload for Oireachtas Members in that regard.

As for how one can draw the attention of one's constituents to the various information and rights-providing agencies at European level, the Deputy is correct. While I am not the greatest expert in this regard, they are there. I refer to maximised use being made of bodies such as the European Parliament's Committee on Petitions and the European Ombudsman. This relates in particular to the Committee on Petitions, because the role of the European Ombudsman pertains to maladministration at European level, which does not really affect many people. The Committee on Petitions on the other hand, is about violations of European law and maladministration in the field of European law at national level. That can be very important, particularly because litigation is not an option at European level for many people because it is so expensive. Something like a petitions committee can in effect work as a kind of alternative disputes regulation mechanism. The more people get to know about such institutions the better for all of us.

Deputy Lucinda Creighton

I will not make many remarks, as I would prefer to hear Dr. Barrett's views. I also wish to share my time with Deputy Timmins. I agree with the point made by Deputy Byrne in respect of scrutiny. Primarily, we are focusing on input to policy-making at an early stage. Part of the argument being made by Dr. Barrett is that an eight-week framework, as set out in the Lisbon treaty, is probably not adequate. I fully agree with this.

There is a significant issue which has led to a bad taste towards the European Union project on the basis that we have been remiss in these Houses in monitoring the implementation of directives. Whereas the main issue is the feeding into original decision-making processes at a European level, there is the significant matter of us taking our eye off the ball in terms of how legislation is implemented here. We have seen that in a host of areas, particularly in agriculture but in other fields as well. We must deal with it so will the witness comment on a possible format?

With regard to statutory instruments, it might be practical to include them on the Order Paper or circulate them otherwise rather than leaving them in the Oireachtas Library. That would be logical. I was not fully aware of the procedure and newer Deputies probably would not be.

Deputy Joe Costello

The legislation was passed before the last election.

Deputy Lucinda Creighton

Okay. There is a negativity which has begun to fester in Irish society that is directed towards the EU. It is unfortunate and we have a significant duty and responsibility in the Houses of the Oireachtas to address it.

With regard to some of the general remarks, it was mentioned that with the overall approach to scrutiny, we must be realistic in our expectations. I would like some more detail from Dr. Barrett about what is realistic or feasible. We are clearly restricted and our parliamentary system does not really lend itself to any sort of robust questioning or monitoring. There is no application of any sanctions on the Government in the event that it is out of kilter with the views of a parliamentary committee.

A couple of people alluded to the figure bandied about of 70% of legislation emanating from the EU. I have tried to substantiate this with Departments such as the Department of the Taoiseach but nobody seems to have a clue. Is the witness aware of any studies that can provide some real and hard facts in that regard?

With regard to the early warning system for subsidiarity, it was mentioned that this is likely to be introduced anyway. That is clear under the Barroso initiative but there is a concern that whereas an early warning system could be put in place for breach of subsidiarity, will there really be legal consequences without the Lisbon treaty?

Dr. Barrett mentioned in his introduction the possibility of constitutional implications for us in this country. I would like to hear a little more about the type of changes to our scrutiny system that would require constitutional alterations as constitutional referenda in this country are difficult campaigns and experiences. They can be difficult to explain so this obstacle would concern me.

Deputy Billy Timmins

I thank Dr. Barrett for his contribution and I have a few brief questions. He mentioned that the successes of scrutiny or otherwise would be reflective of how parliament scrutinises the executive. Does he have any view as to how effective this Parliament, the Oireachtas, is in scrutinising the Executive on national matters? This is tied in to the comment that the circle must be closed as, with the best will in the world and irrespective of which political party the Minister belongs to, Ministers come in to us before Council meetings to give the lowdown but none walk out the door thinking they have been given a good idea which must be followed up.

With regard to scrutiny of EU directives, I am reasonably happy with the transposition of EU laws via primary legislation. It is on statutory instruments and secondary legislation that we fall down. How does Dr. Barrett rate this Parliament with regard to the scrutiny of EU directives? The freedom of information decision on the carbon emissions issue indicates that Cabinet confidentiality may be subsidiary to the requirements of EU directives. Is Dr. Barrett of the view that the Government or senior officials were aware of the potential difficulties when that directive was introduced? In the high profile case of water charges, for example, does Dr. Barrett consider the Executive to have been aware of the difficulty in advance or was it something that only emerged subsequently?

The kernel of the issue for this sub-committee, as other speakers have observed, is the lack of interest on the part of the public in European issues. Politicians are responsive to the requirements and demands of the electorate and there is certainly little electoral return in engaging seriously with European Union matters. It is a chicken and egg situation. Does Dr. Barrett see merit in the introduction of a list system for politicians who deal exclusively with European affairs? Members of this sub-committee are being honest in admitting that although they have an interest in European issues, such interest may have a negative impact on their re-election prospects.

Dr. Barrett was kind in referring to a lack of interest only on the part of the public and the media. Would he include politicians in that? In regard to the notion of transmission of information to the electorate, the main difficulty for politicians is that the electorate is not interested. Moreover, research suggests people are not even interested in receiving the information. How do we bridge that gap?

Dr. Barrett has a great knowledge of and interest in these issues. The paper he submitted on the Lisbon treaty to the National Forum on Europe was extremely helpful. Do his peers share his interest in European affairs or do they switch off when he raises the topic?

In regard to statutory instruments, would it be more useful to replace the negative requirement with a positive mechanism? The requirement that statutory instruments can be annulled within 21 days is applicable to the bank guarantee scheme, for example, which is currently being modified. Would it be more useful to have a positive vote on this proposal rather than a mechanism whereby it can be annulled? Would such an approach assist in conveying information and encouraging citizens to engage?

Chairman

I ask Dr. Barrett to ensure his response is as succinct as possible. Members who have spoken thus far were allowed ten minutes and I wish to honour that for everybody.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Deputy Creighton referred to the estimate that some 70% of domestic legislation emanates from Europe. This notion stems from a speech by Mr. Jacques Delors, as former President of the European Commission, in the context of a debate about the role of national parliaments. In the course of this speech, he made the prediction that, within several years from that date, 80% of domestic legislation relating to commercial matters would be decided at European level. His objective in making this point was to urge national parliaments to ensure their scrutiny procedures were adequate. However, his statement was pounced upon by eurosceptics throughout Europe as the basis for a claim that the EU was dictating 80% of legislation at national level.

It is difficult to estimate precisely how much of our legislation comes from Europe. For example, an Act containing 100 sections may include one which derives from European obligations. Is that legislation to be categorised as deriving from Europe? Perhaps I should not admit as much but I have begun work on such a project myself, which involves counting the amount of legislation that derives from the European Union. As I said, it is a difficult task. For example, European legislation may also have indirect consequences, which raises the question of whether legislation adopted to cope with those consequences should be regarded as deriving from Europe. In reality, the amount of national legislation that is adopted as a result of European law is much smaller than the figures of 70% or 80% that are bandied about and represents a minority of total legislative output.

On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that not all European legislation is implemented at domestic level. Regulations adopted at European level do not require domestic implementation and as such do not give rise to legislation which makes it even more difficult to calculate the percentage involved. In terms of legislation adopted at domestic level, the figure is less than 50% but I have not completed my research in this regard. I gave up counting to move to other matters. I believe 25%-30% was the figure I arrived at at the time. However, members should not hold me to that figure, as I have not yet finished my research.

On the legal consequences that would attach to a breach of subsidiarity, it was envisaged that if a particular number of votes distributed to national parliaments went against it, legislation might be reviewed or that if a majority of those votes were against the adoption of legislation, it could be blocked, provided one could get the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers to agree. Members may recall the Luxembourg compromise agreed during the 1960s, a political agreement which stated that if any member state pleaded an important national interest, regardless of what was stated in the treaties, no vote would be taken on a particular matter. Even though it was only a political agreement, it was almost like a legal rule in that it led to legislation being blocked. I imagine that if it was possible for member states to agree to the Luxembourg compromise as an informal political arrangement, it is possible for them to agree the content of the protocol on proportionality and subsidiarity. It is possible for member states to reach a political agreement that they will not adopt legislation if it meets the standards stipulated in the protocols. That is how it would be done.

On the other legal consequences of a violation of subsidiarity, it was mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon that it might be possible for national parliaments to instruct their governments to litigate the matter before the European Court of Justice ex post facto. What one is talking about is ex ante control in national parliaments expressing their views and ex post facto control in bringing litigation, if necessary. This could be done at national level. There is no reason the Oireachtas cannot ask the Government to litigate a question relating to subsidiarity. Although these are not formal legal rights, in practice their effect is not all that different. Legal rights are always best but where they are not provided for, an informal system might make up for it.

On constitutional changes, I referred to mandates, an issue which could lead to enormous discussion. Members may prefer me to respond to their questions.

Chairman

I would appreciate it if Dr. Barrett would wrap up his responses to this group of questions. I will then open up the discussion to the full forum. We have agreed a process which if it does not work, we can review at a future date. A member who believes his or her question was not answered will have an opportunity to repeat that question later.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

I did not reply to Deputy Timmins's questions. However, if the Chairman wishes to move on, I will respect his decision.

Chairman

We have a vast amount of work to do and will not get anything done if we are not disciplined. Deputy Timmins can put his question again during the open session. I want to ensure every member is given an opportunity to speak. Dr. Barrett can respond later to Deputy Timmins's points.

Senator Pearse Doherty

Cuirím fáilte roimh Dr. Barrett. A number of speakers spoke about the dissemination of information to the electorate and the failure of the electorate to engage with these institutions. The sub-committee has missed an opportunity by simply inviting submissions rather than engaging with the wider public. That we have adopted a more restrictive approach than the Forum on Europe is disappointing. There is no participation with citizens beyond inviting them to make submissions.

The role of the sub-committee is to examine the enhancement of the role of the Houses of the Oireachtas in European affairs. It goes far beyond links between member states of the European Union. We need also to examine the role of the Taoiseach, Ministers and the Commissioner in this regard.

One of the issues to be addressed in this module relates to the impact of the development of EU integration on the role of national parliaments. To consider the impact of EU integration and the centralisation that has been taking place for a number of years, we must examine the impact the loss of the veto has had on a number of areas. I refer here to the change from vetoes or unanimity to qualified majority voting, QMV. We must also discuss the competences that have been conferred. I wish to ask a number of particular questions in respect of this matter.

We discussed how these meetings are going to be conducted on half a dozen occasions. Everyone signed up to what was agreed. The points raised by the various members during this meeting have all fallen inside the terms of reference relating to the module and are relevant to the matters under discussion. I was happy to highlight that fact to Deputy Byrne in the point he made. Senator Doherty should feel free to raise any other points about which he is concerned.

Senator Pearse Doherty

I thank the Chairman. Has Ireland exercised its veto in the past? Have any policies agreed by the Commission conflicted with Government policy? If a dispute arose between member states and the Commission in respect of subsidiarity, how would it be resolved?

We are also discussing how we might enhance the role of national parliaments in EU affairs. Will Dr. Barrett outline his views on the proposal Sinn Féin made, following the rejection of the Lisbon treaty, to the effect that EU Commissioners should be elected by national parliaments rather than being appointed? Does our proposal merit consideration?

Chairman

Deputy Timmins posed some questions earlier and Dr. Barrett did not have adequate time in which to answer them. Will he do so when summing up?

Deputy Joe Costello

It might be of assistance if Dr. Barrett commented on the mandate system.

Chairman

In his concluding comments I ask Dr. Barrett to respond to Senator Doherty, deal with the further points he wished to raise in response to Deputy Timmins and share his observations on the mandate system. He focused in his presentation on how this system would operate but also pointed to the need for constitutional referenda before it could be implemented here.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Senator Doherty asked about the implications of integration for national parliaments. This question is fair in that it legitimately relates to national parliaments. There is no doubt that the integration process results in a transmission of decision making powers to the institutions at the centre and, necessarily, that institutions which form part of decision making processes on the periphery or at national level see a reduction in their powers. Two points should be made in this regard. Within the national structure, the Oireachtas remains a serious and vital institution which represents the interests of the people. As a number of speakers have noted, however, it is a relatively weak institution in terms of its policy-making powers, even at national level. I agree that power has shifted to the centre and that European integration tends to favour the Executive branch at the expense of national parliaments but the Executive is already overwhelmingly powerful in this country.

I will do so as quickly as I can. As for how well we are doing with regard to scrutiny in respect of national measures, the general answer is we are very weak. Rather than boring members with the details, the Institute of Public Administration has published an excellent book by Dr. Muiris MacCarthaigh in this regard. He examines various methods of scrutiny employed by the Oireachtas. In general, even at national level, we do not come out too well. There is work to be done. I do not have to tell members that even in respect of matters such as Dáil questions, a highly restrictive regime obtains. We do not do very well in this regard. As for issues that arise, Deputy Timmins mentioned the carbon directive and water charges. While I take his point regarding such issues, sometimes it is extremely difficult to foresee what will explode into a political issue subsequently.

Deputy Timmins also mentioned parliamentarians and their lack of interest, as well as the list system. I have answered the question on the list system for Deputy Costello who also mentioned the question of mandates. That was another issue with which I was asked to deal and it comes back to the question Deputy Creighton asked of me. The basic issue I wanted to mention in this regard was whether changing the existing rules and introducing either a mandate or a scrutiny reserve system would work in Ireland or be helpful. Formal rights to influence a government's negotiating powers across the various member states vary considerably between national parliaments. It is clear the powers of the Oireachtas are to be found at the bottom end of the scale. One would classify the Danish, Nordic, Austrian and German parliaments as being at the other end in this regard because they can impose a mandate on their Ministers. In other words, those parliaments can send their Ministers to the Council of Ministers and tell them what they are supposed to decide at European level or at least give them a margin for manoeuvre in this regard. Mandate systems, if used as such, can have disadvantages because one limits the room for manoeuvre of Ministers. It does not give them much flexibility to change their position as needs may dictate. The systems have their disadvantages if used with the Danish method. Context is crucial and it is important not to assume that formal capabilities in this regard equal actual parliamentary behaviour. The reality is that in most member states — Denmark being the main exception — national parliaments or, more accurately, the governing parliamentary parties generally make very little use of their formal rights to influence governance. The national parliament in the European Union with the strongest mandating rights is not actually Denmark's but that of Austria. It receives its powers under Article 23 of the Austrian constitution, the Bundesverfassengesatz, which provides that the Nationalrat has the right to issue a resolution that binds Austrian members of Government in EU level negotiations and votes. Members of the Austrian Government are only allowed to deviate from this mandate if there are compelling reasons on which they must consult MPs. In practice, party politics have effectively diminished the Nationalrat’s strong formal powers. In the first year following accession it issued 18 mandates to Ministers. This number declined over the next six years to approximately 17 in total. The German Bundestag is in a similar position. Its resolutions have no legally binding effect but must be taken into account by the Government in Council negotiations. The Bundestag either usually completely abstains from drafting resolutions or drafts them in close co-operation with the German Government. There is co-operation and negotiation rather than telling the Government what to do.

Does that mean these mandate systems do not work? The system works, not because national parliaments tell governments what they should do on a daily basis but because it provides a sanction to ensure the co-operation of Ministers. In general, Ministers will be let negotiate freely in the national interest, provided they consult and report back regularly to the national parliament — in short, provided they make themselves accountable. That is why the introduction of a mandate or scrutiny reserve system would be useful here. Effectively, if Ministers do not make themselves accountable, they can be placed on an uncomfortable leash. The idea is that Ministers are made accountable. A mandate is a more sophisticated leash — if that is the correct term — than the rather crude device of a scrutiny reserve system. Rather than forcing a Minister not to agree which may not be in the national interest, he or she can be instructed to agree or negotiate in a particular way.

Overall, it can be safely predicted that if we were to introduce a mandate system in Ireland, it would function in a manner similar to that in Austria and Germany rather than Denmark. There are three reasons for this. The conditions that apply in Denmark of minority governance, hence a duality between parliament and government, do not generally hold in Ireland. It is not the duality we have; as I mentioned, we have duality between the Government and its support and the Opposition. It is a different political circumstance. There is no Eurosceptic electorate here either. We must remember that the Government controls the composition of Oireachtas joint committees also, another means by which it can protect its position. I have mentioned the bipartisan nature of German politics; the attitude which tends to be adopted within Oireachtas joint committees, particularly the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs, is also bipartisan. As I mentioned, this is something that could be used to close the circle. If the recommendations of the sub-committee could address that problem, they would do a major service to Ireland in that regard.

Constitutional considerations were mentioned. It was said, in particular, that the last thing we needed was a constitutional referendum. If it is proposed at some stage — I do not know if it will be — that the Lisbon treaty be put to the people again in another referendum, might it not be a good idea to propose a constitutional amendment to go along with it, if necessary, to increase the level of democratic control over European Union matters agreed by Ministers? This is something the electorate could and should welcome and which would carry relatively little risk in terms of how it would be used in the national interest. It could represent a very serious contribution. If members wish, I will discuss the constitutional aspects in more detail. There is no difficulty in that regard but I am unsure how much time remains to me.

Chairman

Dr. Barrett might take the time in the coming weeks to make a submission on the issues we have discussed. We will ask all witnesses to do the same. Within his submission Dr. Barrett might deal with the constitutional implications. That document will come before the full committee and, in due course, we may ask him to attend another meeting or answer questions. Is everybody satisfied with that approach?

Deputy Billy Timmins

I suggest the sub-committee request Dr. Barrett to provide a more detailed analysis of the various scrutiny systems in place within member states and bring forward suggestions for our deliberation, taking account of the constitutional element to which he referred, as to how we might improve our scrutiny system.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Certainly. I understand the sub-committee will shortly meet representatives of the Danish Parliament and the United Kingdom Parliament. The latter, particularly the House of Lords, operates a scrutiny reserve system. It would be wise to take the opportunity to ask the representatives how it works.

Deputy Billy Timmins

That is our intention. I ask Dr. Barrett to provide suggestions based on his analysis of how we may best proceed.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

I will do so.

Chairman

I thank Dr. Barrett for his participation. I had the sub-committee's work programme before me throughout the meeting and many of his contributions will be helpful to us in reaching our conclusions. I am grateful to him for giving of his time at short notice. I also thank members for their contributions.

Sitting suspended at 1.35 p.m. and resumed at 2.35 p.m.

Chairman

I welcome Mr. Rune Lund who, at extremely short notice, agreed to meet with the sub-committee to discuss the role of national parliaments from a Danish perspective.

I draw Mr. Lund's attention to the fact that members of the sub-committee have absolute privilege but that this privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before it. Members are reminded of the parliamentary practise that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Before inviting Mr. Lund to speak to the sub-committee, I will reiterate the manner in which we have organised our business, namely, Mr. Lund will have 15 minutes to make a presentation following which we will have four, ten-minute modules during which members will put questions to him.

The topic of discussion today is the role of national parliaments in the European Union, how their effectiveness can be increased and Mr. Lund's observations in this regard. I will interrupt him when five minutes and one minute remain to him to allow him to make the best use of his time.

Mr. Rune Lund

I thank the sub-committee for the invitation to this meeting. I believe my plane ticket was purchased yesterday at 6.30 p.m.

I was curious to learn what type of meeting I was attending. While we have had discussions and referendums on EU matters, we never discussed EU matters in committee with experts or politicians. This is a new experience for me.

My name is Rune Lund. I was a member of the Danish Parliament for three years and a member of the European affairs committee. I also dealt on behalf of my party, the Red-Green Alliance, with international relations. The Irish equivalent of this party is Sinn Féin. I will give a left-wing perspective but members can ask me about the procedures relating to the work of the European affairs committee in the Danish Parliament. I will be glad to answer any questions posed. I understand members are due to meet their counterparts from the Danish European affairs committee on Tuesday next.

This sub-committee was established as a result of Ireland voting "No" to the treaty. Some people were quite glad of that outcome. We served free Guinness outside the Irish Embassy in Copenhagen and it was quite a popular event. There is no such thing as free Guinness in Denmark. My party tried to start a broader discussion about the future of Europe and the European Union. We distinguish between the European Union and Europe because the former only forms a part of the latter. If we were to decide, we would opt for more intergovernmental, convention-based international co-operation. However, we are not going to decide everything. Perhaps it would be a good idea to consider larger reforms in the context of how the European Union works today.

My party has proposed some reforms which could improve the existing treaty. One of the proposals we have relates to a social protocol and states that employees stationed and working in different countries abroad should be employed and work according to the wage and working conditions of the host country. Ireland has a splendid opportunity to introduce such a social protocol and it should use it. The Danish and other Scandinavian trade unions would be happy if this happened because they are particularly concerned with regard to some of the verdicts — such as the Laval judgment — that have been handed down. There is major frustration among trade unionists in Scandinavia and many other parts of Europe so this is an extremely important point.

We emphasise that EU legislation should be constructed to the highest possible minimum standards. Every day, week or month we face a difficulty in that we cannot implement the highest possible standards in respect of the environment and food security as a result of the rules of the Single Market. Following the French, Dutch and Irish "No" votes, we have a splendid opportunity to engage in a debate on this matter. Many Danish citizens cannot understand why EU regulations are not based on the highest possible minimum standards. When a debate or a discussion takes place, every ordinary citizen is of the view that it should be done this way. Unfortunately, however, that does not prove to be the case.

These are two important points we would emphasise. If there was a treaty which dealt only with these two points, namely, a social protocol and the introduction of minimum standards, everyone would vote "Yes" to it. The current institutions we have in respect of international co-operation in Europe are extremely unpopular. Matters could be different if the institutions were altered. Institutions are made by human beings and can be changed by them. That is how we, as a red-green, left-wing party, see the position.

I understand members are also interested in the way the committee in the Danish Parliament functions. One of the matters being considered by the Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union is how to enhance public engagement with the EU. For many Danish people, the EU is an entity that is far away and difficult to understand. As a former member of the Danish Parliament's European affairs committee, I have also found it difficult to understand what was going on or who took certain decisions. There is not always sufficient transparency in EU matters. Problems arise where decisions are made far away from the public sphere. This is also a daily problem for us as politicians. As far as I am aware, I was the first politician in Europe to ask questions about CIA flights. When we received answers on this, we shared them with other parties and movements in Europe. The debate started on the national rather than the EU level. The basic problem, however, is that the EU is far away from its citizens.

In regard to the daily work of our European affairs committee, I am not sure I agree with everything Dr. Barrett has said. The Danish Government shares its opinion with the committee on a proposal and members can state whether they agree. If the chairman of the committee sees that a majority does not oppose the proposal, the Government is given a mandate to negotiate at EU level. A majority must oppose the Government's proposal to stop it.

The sectoral committees are heard but they cannot give a mandate. In regard to mandates, usually only a small number of members engage with these committees because the substantive business is conducted in the European affairs committee. This should, and probably will, change in the future. When I left Parliament last November, discussions were ongoing over whether it would be a good idea to move discussions from the European affairs committee to the sectoral committees because the latter would be more qualified to pronounce on technical details. However, the former is also important in terms of providing a transparent overview.

One of the most important achievements of our European affairs committee is transparency. The amount of information we receive is sometimes considerable but our briefing papers make it easy to learn our mandate and the agenda for discussions. This transparency in terms of how information is provided is good for all Danish Parliamentarians.

As well as allowing for discussions on European issues, the committee provides a means for tabling proposals for plenary sessions of the Parliament. I made a proposal regarding the Danish attitude towards lobbyists in the European Union and a majority voted in favour of mandatory registration and ethical guidelines.

Moreover, such ethical guidelines and the registration of the lobbyist should be public. This was possible because when I was a member of the European affairs committee, four parties, namely, my party, the Socialist People's Party, another socialist party to the left of the Social Democrats, the Social Democrats and the right-wing EU-sceptical party, the Danish People's Party, together had a majority of a single Member of Parliament. We have a minority government which is how we could exert pressure in this case. That is the reason it got through because at first the government was very much against the proposal and did not want mandatory registration. When it found out there was a majority in this regard, it stated it also was in favour and, ultimately, everyone voted for it. The position in Denmark is special because of its tradition of minority governments which provides other possibilities. Without specific knowledge of how matters operate in Ireland, it gives us some tools in our toolbox that members here may not have.

I will stop at this point and members can ask questions. I shall try to answer as best I can.

Chairman

I thank Mr. Lund for his presentation. I invite Deputy Timmins to begin, followed by Deputies Costello and Byrne and Senator Doherty.

Deputy Billy Timmins

I thank Mr. Lund for his attendance at such short notice. I have a few questions for him. At the start of his presentation he mentioned that he had heard the end of Dr. Barrett's contribution and that he had disagreed with some of it. He should outline the parts with which he disagreed. As for the Danish European affairs committee, has a situation arisen in which it has opposed the negotiating position of the Danish Government? It appears from the submission provided for members that it always supports the Danish Government's position. Mr. Lund stated he had celebrated outside the Irish Embassy after the Lisbon treaty referendum result. What were the main issues in the Lisbon treaty to which he was opposed?

Mr. Rune Lund

While I only heard the very last part of Dr. Gavin Barrett remarks, he gave the impression that there was much discussion and debate at the European affairs committee. That is not always the case because the Government always arranges everything before meetings. That is the way it works with the current Liberal-Conservative Government and was the way it worked under the previous Social Democrat-Social Liberal Government before 2001. Before 2001, my party nearly always was consulted before meetings of the European affairs committee and now other parties are being consulted. My party does not have a very good relationship wit the Liberal-Conservative Government. However, in the case of a Social Democrat or Social Democrat-Social Liberal Government, it would consult us before meetings of the European affairs committee because we are closer to them. This does not mean we do not have discussion; sometimes the committee opposes a position taken by the Danish Government. However, this is extremely rare. The general pattern is that everything is arranged beforehand.

Regarding our opposition to the Lisbon treaty, we stated it was a step in the wrong direction. It gave us less democracy and more centralisation. It gave us more rearmament and militarisation of the European Union. Moreover, strengthening these institutions also would mean a more neo-liberal agenda for the European Union and Europe. These were the reasons we opposed it. The verdict in the Laval case served as an example to us of the direction the European Union was taking. We think it would be a bad idea to strengthen that institution when it has that neo-liberal agenda. That is the reason we were against it.

Deputy Joe Costello

I thank Mr. Lund for coming at short notice and making a good presentation on how the process in his country works. Much of what was mentioned is peripheral to what we are discussing, including the social protocol, CIA flights, transparency and the registration of lobbyists, although we all agree with the comments made on which there would not be too much debate.

With regard to the social protocol, there was a social agenda in the Lisbon treaty which provided that all legislation after the treaty was passed would be socially proofed in terms of its impact on society, unemployment, the community and so on. Does that in any way link with Mr. Lund's presentation on the social protocol?

Does the Danish Parliament operate a list system? What is the mechanism for election of Members of Parliament? On the mandating process, the line Minister is held responsible prior going to the Council of Ministers and is also held responsible afterwards. Will Mr. Lund clarify how this is managed and if it works effectively? What timescale is required to do this?

With regard to a European affairs or scrutiny committee, is there just one committee in the Danish Parliament? We have two. How does the Parliament manage with regard to plenary sessions? Does it become involved with matters and does the committee have any formal links in getting material onto the floor of the Parliament in order that there might be a wider audience for deliberations? Does the committee have any mechanism for communicating what is being done to the public? Are its proceedings covered by the media? I presume it has a website with materials and webcasts but will Mr. Lund give us an idea of how it operates in terms of coverage by the media, communications and public awareness?

Mr. Rune Lund

There were many questions asked. With regard to the social protocol, we are talking about the right to strike and for trade unions to negotiate. The problem with the Laval verdict is that the Swedish trade union movement was not allowed to use a strike in order to achieve the normal wage for Latvian workers in a municipality just outside Stockholm. This is really important. If a person comes from another country to work in Denmark or Ireland, for example, that person should be made welcome. They must be allowed to earn the same amount of money and work under the same conditions as native workers. This principle cannot obtain with the current verdicts from the European Union; therefore, we must write a provision in the treaty providing for a guarantee. That is what we really want. It must be included in the treaty or else we cannot use it for anything.

Will Deputy Costello repeat his question on how members of the European affairs committee are elected?

Deputy Joe Costello

I asked how Members of Parliament are elected and, after that, how members of the committee are appointed.

Mr. Rune Lund

We have a proportional system and a threshold of 2%. When the elections are over, the various parties form into separate groups. For example, my party is in a group which also comprises the Socialist People's Party, the Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party. The other group, the Government group, consists of the Liberal Party, the Conservative People's Party and the Danish People's Party. The two groups then enter into negotiations on how many from each group should be appointed to each sectoral committee and, in each case, who should be appointed to the chair. The chairmen of the various committees include Opposition representatives. For example, the chairman of the European affairs committee, Svend Auken, is a member of the Social Democrats, which is an Opposition party. I expect members of the sub-committee will meet him next Tuesday.

Each group, therefore, has a certain number of members on the different sectoral committees and, within each group, there is further negotiation. For example, if it is particularly important for my party to have two members on the traffic and transport sector committee, that request will most likely be granted. However, we will then be obliged to give up a seat on another committee to one of the other Opposition parties in our group.

The European affairs committee operates under an early mandate system which was introduced only two years ago. Before that, the Minister would come to a meeting of the committee on the Friday before a meeting of the Council of Ministers and merely set out what the Government proposed to do. This meant the committee functioned simply as a rubber stamp for the Government's plans. However, we realised that between the three left-wing parties, including my own, and the eurosceptic right-wing party, the Danish People's Party, we had a majority of one vote. This allowed us to make a deal with the Government whereby the Minister is obliged to come to the committee before the Government decides on the Danish position on European Union matters. This means we can control the process from the beginning. After the Council of Ministers meeting, the Minister must return to the committee to outline his or her actions during the negotiations and be subject to critical questioning.

Therefore, the European affairs committee is much stronger than it was. When members of the committee meet with the sub-committee next Tuesday, they will probably say that all parties agreed on this deal. However, the reality of the dynamic was that a majority outside the Government, consisting of my party, the Socialist People's Party and the Social Democratic Party, along with the right-wing Danish People's Party, enforced it. That is the true story of how we strengthened the European affairs committee.

Deputy Joe Costello

That happened two years ago. What was the situation before that?

Mr. Rune Lund

Deputy Thomas Byrne

I am merely interested in Mr. Lund's views.

Chairman

I will allow the Deputy's question. However, we discussed our terms of reference and the need to ensure particular matters are relevant.

One of the issues we are considering relates to the decentralisation of the European Union and whether this has affected Ireland in a positive or negative way. In examining this matter we must consider the transfer of powers and the competences transferred from Ireland to the European Union. The negotiations on the Laeken Declaration dealt with proposals for returning to member states powers that had been transferred to the EU. Has this issue been addressed in the Danish Parliament?

At what level does the Danish media engage with EU affairs? Is there much interaction and are the public engaged with discussions?

Mr. Lund outlined his concerns with the EU project, as well as his party's vision for a different type of Europe. I ask him to expand his comments on accountability and set out how European Union institutions could become more accountable to citizens.

What are the background to and consequences of the opt-outs secured by Denmark subsequent to the initial defeat of the Maastricht treaty?

Dr. Barrett was of the opinion that the Danish model is not the best example for Ireland to follow because he argued that it ties the hands of Ministers and restricts their flexibility in negotiations at the Council of Ministers. He indicated, however, that a system is in place whereby MPs can be contacted when issues arise.

In regard to the estimate that 80% of Denmark's legislation stems from the European Union, he argues that the figure in Ireland is approximately 25%. How was the Danish figure derived?

Mr. Rune Lund

The "Yes" side sometimes claims that 60% of Danish legislation originates from the EU, whereas the "No" side has for many years put the figure at 80%. The general consensus now puts the figure at somewhere between 60% and 80%.

The Danish model does not necessarily tie the hands of Ministers. Much depends on the position of the Government and the demands of the committee, which can give broad as well as specific mandates for negotiations. When early mandates are given, Ministers obviously need space for negotiations. I believe every member of the committee would concur with me in this regard but the sub-committee can seek their opinion next Tuesday.

Commissioners are an issue in Denmark. In general, people would prefer to elect a commissioner but the "No" side is sceptical about this because we may thereby further strengthen an EU institution which already has too much power. It is odd that the only institution of the EU which can put forward proposals does not hold elections for its officials. The Commission should comprise an ordinary secretariat and the European Parliament or member states should make proposals directly to the EU. They should not have to depend on the Commission.

The issue of the centralisation of power is very important and we should have had a referendum in Denmark about the constitution. We will not get a referendum on the Lisbon treaty because our Government claims it is a completely different treaty. Each time we have a referendum, people always discuss issues they consider to be really important, such as decentralisation, the loss of democracy and the transfer of power. Unfortunately, what also happens is that people who are opposed to such measures often ask what they can do because politicians do not want to listen. That is a general attitude and people are not very satisfied with the way it works. It is also a major reason for the growth of the Danish People's Party, as it is critical in respect of EU matters. There definitely is major frustration among ordinary citizens.

As for the role of national parliaments, there should be more political activity because one can challenge the EU systems within the logic of the EU system itself. For example, my party has made many proposals in which we sought to introduce better standards than those existing in the European Union, such as those regarding the transportation of animals. This is a huge issue in Denmark. In the European Union, one is allowed to transport animals for 24 hours, whereas internally in Denmark one only can do so for eight hours. However, we cannot make legislation that prevents one from exporting animals to Denmark if they have been transported more than eight hours, because that would be breaking the rules of the Single Market.

We should have the possibility to move ahead and introduce and implement better standards than those that obtain elsewhere in the EU. My party has made many proposals in respect of better standards of food security, working conditions for people coming from eastern Europe and so on. One should do so to challenge the system. Such political activism within parliament is required because otherwise the European Union will not wake up. There is a great need to do this and many politicians would perceive this to be a positive development.

Very well. I welcome Mr. Lund and wish to ask a few questions. His comments frequently refer to the "Yes" and "No" sides. Does he refer specifically to the Lisbon treaty or to the general debate on Europe? He should outline his perspective on European membership, whether he supports it as a basic principle and whether he has supported the treaties to date.

Although Mr. Lund is quite young like many of the members present, I am sure he has a position on treaties of Maastricht, Nice, etc. It would be helpful if he were to provide members with some background to enable them to understand his attitudes in respect of Europe.

One of Deputy Costello's questions that may remain outstanding pertains to the issue of scrutiny. Mr. Lund should outline whether the Danish Parliament has a separate scrutiny committee. To what extent is the responsibility for scrutinising legislation devolved to the sectoral committees? Is it done by a separate scrutiny committee or the European affairs committee within the Parliament?

Will Mr. Lund give an idea of how the transposition of EU law in the Danish Parliament works and comment on the principle of subsidiarity? Has this been a problem and did the European affairs committee consider there were issues that should have been dealt with at national level instead of being imposed by the European Union? Does Mr. Lund believe this principle was not being adhered to properly?

Mr. Lund has made clear his position on the Lisbon treaty. Will he outline his vision of where he would like to see the European Union go from here? Specifically, how would he change the treaty which was put to the people in June to make it acceptable to him? What specific changes would address his concerns and those of the wider public?

Senator Déirdre de Búrca

Mr. Lund's presentation was very interesting and I have one or two questions. Others have raised the question of Mr. Lund's vision. He spoke at the beginning of his presentation about having a more intergovernmental arrangement led by an international convention. Will he comment on this idea?

One of the reasons most people believe the European Union has been so successful is that it seems to have changed the pattern where individual nation states within Europe were at war with each other. In the previous century there had been many wars on the European continent; therefore, the pooling of sovereignty by some of those member states appears to have allowed for much more peaceful relations. Does Mr. Lund consider the intergovernmental arrangement about which he is talking would have the same effect, where national interests would not be the sole consideration of the individual countries operating within it? Does he see any advantage in the pooling of national sovereignty in order to bind countries closer together and make their interests more collective and shared?

A second issue concerns how the European affairs committee in Denmark works. Mr. Lund has mentioned that it has the power to give a mandate to a Minister but I wonder if meetings of the committee are held prior to the Minister attending the Council of Ministers. Are they held in private session or is the negotiating mandate debated between the Minister and members of the committee in public session? It has been mentioned that it is only where a majority of members are opposed to the position the Minister intends to take at the Council of Ministers that the committee can ask the Minister to change. It only occurs when the chairperson senses a majority of members are opposed to the position taken. Does this happen often and what happens in that instance? Does the Minister change his or her position? How successful is the feedback mechanism? Mr. Lund has mentioned that after a meeting of the Council of Minister feedback is provided by the Minister on what happened at the meeting. Does the Minister often report back that despite the mandate given by the committee, it had to change or circumstances led to the taking of a different decision?

Another issue relates to the Commission and the European Parliament. I noted Mr. Lund's comment that it would be a better idea if member states elected Commissioners but perhaps I am confusing this with remarks made by the Sinn Féin member.

Mr. Lund mentioned that the European Parliament should have the right of legislative initiative and that the Commission should not be in a position to promote legislation. Is there a difficulty for smaller states such as Ireland and even Denmark in the case where legislation is solely initiated by a body where proportional representation applies? For example, larger countries with greater populations would clearly be in a much stronger position to promote the legislation they support, as opposed to smaller states, which would have much more limited opportunities.

Deputy Lucinda Creighton

Almost everything I wanted to ask has been raised. What system operates within the Danish Parliament to monitor the transposition of European Union legislation? This is a topical issue in this state in the context of sometimes harsh interpretations of European Union directives via our national legislation, whereby we have over-regulated beyond what is required by these directives. Has there been a similar experience in Denmark?

I see from Mr. Lund's biography that he was involved in a non-governmental organisation called the Initiative for Another Europe which was involved in arranging political activities across borders and so on. Did he develop links with any Irish organisations or political parties through that body? What were its objectives? Did it seek to promote "another Europe" within the context of existing European Union structures or something completely different?

Deputy Joe Costello

What is the relationship between the Danish European affairs committee and the Danish Parliament? Is there a mechanism whereby the committee can bring forward issues or material for debate on the floor of the parliamentary Chamber? Is there a balance between the Parliament and the committee in handling European issues? I am trying to visualise the respective roles and powers of each body.

Does the European affairs committee receive any coverage in the media? How does it manage in regard to public awareness? Is there public appreciation of all the hard work it is doing? What mechanisms are in place to communicate its activities to the media?

Mr. Rune Lund

I will begin by answering Deputy Costello's question on the respective roles of the committee and the Parliament. As a Member of Parliament, I can raise any issue I consider to be of sufficient importance on the floor of the Chamber. For example, I raised the matter of the fishing agreement the European Union has made with Morocco, which includes the occupied territories of Western Sahara, in this manner.

In regard to media coverage, the proceedings of Parliament are broadcast live on television and viewed by many. However, the meetings of the European affairs committee are broadcast on the Internet and seen by fewer people.

Deputy Joe Costello

How does the committee, as distinct from individual members, bring material to the floor of the Chamber? Are there any formal mechanisms whereby it can initiate particular debates, for example, or bring forward reports for discussion?

Mr. Rune Lund

No. The committee functions as a small parliament comprising representatives of the different parties. For example, my party has six MPs out of a total of 179 in the Danish Parliament. During meetings of the European affairs committee I represent those six MPs and my vote counts as six. Likewise, the spokesperson for the Social Democrats represents the 47 members of that party and has a voting power of 47. That is how we ascertain whether there is majority support for the government's position.

Meetings of the European affairs committee take place on a Friday, usually at 11 a.m. They often end at 2 p.m. or 3 p.m. when the media has left. Very often when the committee is negotiating or discussing important issues only one journalist is present. The media only attends when it is interested in hearing what a specific Minister has to say on a particular matter in, for example, Afghanistan or in relation to the death of a particular person. They are not interested in what is being discussed by the committee. The decision to hold meetings on a Friday was a bad one. We will need to change this if we want more media coverage of what is going on.

On European membership, the Red-Green Alliance is not in favour of Danish membership of the European Union though we accept it as fact. There are many things we would like to change. For example, we would like to get rid of the influence the royal family has on Danish politics. However, the majority of parties support the current position and it is not possible to change this. As far as I am aware, approximately 10% to 15% of the Danish population is against EU membership. While we maintain our position we accept the reality. If the opportunity arose, we would vote in favour of leaving the European Union and to agreeing another form of co-operation with it.

Deputy Michael McGrath

What is the percentage of support for the Red-Green Alliance in elections?

Mr. Rune Lund

It is 2.5%. We are the only party which favours Denmark leaving the European Union. While the Danish People's Party favours such a move sometimes, other times it does not support it, which is a bit of a blur. We have only one committee which deals with European affairs unlike Ireland which has two committees including the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs and the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Scrutiny.

Reference was made to the principle of subsidiarity. While we have been working on this, it has been difficult. In essence, it is a political concept. For example, discussion as regards where decisions should be taken is a political discussion. The Red-Green Alliance Party believes more decisions should be taken in the Danish Parliament. That is our way of defining the principle of subsidiarity. Other parties believe there should be more transfer of power to EU institutions and believe this is totally in line with the principle of subsidiarity. As in all other parliaments in the European Union, we have had discussions on the issue. It is a difficult discussion to handle.

If we were to decide everything, which is not going to happen given we have only 2.5% of the votes, we would prefer to have an international co-operation agreement inspired by the manner in which the Council of Europe works with its 47 member states. The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights are convention-based and intergovernmental, but their agreements are binding. We must adhere to the verdicts handed down by the European Court of Human Rights. We believe this type of intergovernmental convention-based co-operation could be broadened into other areas such as corporate tax. We would like laws or conventions in this regard to apply throughout Europe and not just to the European Union. There is also the question of environmental issues, which must be dealt with not only by the European Union but also by countries in the rest of Europe and elsewhere.

The reason we use this as an example of how matters work at the Council of Europe is because it is a method of international co-operation that could be supported by the majority of the populations throughout Europe and in the EU. We have already seen that it works in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. That is an example to be followed and there is a great deal of inspiration to be gleaned from it. We accept that it is not going in this direction at present. However, if we were to decide what would happen, we are of the view that it could be a good way to proceed.

We could make major reforms within the European Union in respect of implementing better minimum standards at national level. The Lisbon treaty states that countries are obliged to improve their military capabilities. If we could be obliged to do the opposite to rearmament, that would be a step in the right direction. Large reforms of this nature would be a good idea.

Chairman

I am hoping to conclude this section of the meeting in a couple of minutes. If Mr. Lund wishes to make any further points, he may do so now. I will then allow members to pose final questions to him.

Mr. Rune Lund

Deputy Creighton inquired about the Initiative for Another Europe, which was mainly involved in the counter-summits that were held when official EU summits took place. That specific platform no longer exists. At present, I work as an activist inside our party — since I am no longer a Member of Parliament — and I write strategies and different proposals for Parliament. I am also a member of the centre-left think tank, which deals with EU and European matters.

Chairman

I have two questions for Mr. Lund. What kind of support was available to him in performing his role as a member of the European affairs committee of the Danish Parliament? He alluded to the quantity of paper documents he received. What level of support did he enjoy in interpreting and making good political use of that documentation? To what degree is the power of the Danish European affairs committee dependent on the fact that minority governments are the norm in Denmark? If a majority government were to emerge, would the scope and influence of that committee diminish?

Deputy Joe Costello

I referred earlier to the accountability process. The Danish European affairs committee meets on Fridays and the relevant Minister appears before it. I presume the members of the committee meet before each Friday session and that the Minister it wishes to question is given prior warning to attend. I also presume that a further meeting takes place in order to check whether that Minister did what he or she was supposed to do.

Does the committee have time to do anything else, such as scrutinising legislation? There is only one committee of this nature in the Danish Parliament so what is the position as regards discussing the various directives and regulations that emanate from Europe? Does the committee spend most of its time dealing with line Ministers and questioning them on their business in Europe? Is there a balance to the committee's work?

Mr. Rune Lund

On the Chairman's question relating to support, I had one secretary when I worked with the European affairs committee. What the committee does depends on what the other committees are doing. The committee has become a mini-parliament since coming to depend on the sectoral committees. All the MPs in one's political party, or their secretaries, have to be consulted in order to co-ordinate a position. My party had six members in Parliament and employed 20 people. I worked with my European affairs secretary on committee issues. We were able to manage our workload because we are big nerds but this was only possible because our briefing papers clearly outlined the Government's position and set out the relevant information in a concise format.

Everything would have been settled in advance of committee meetings if there had been a majority Government. The committee has an influence because it deals with a minority Government.

I ask Deputy Costello to repeat his question because I did not fully understand it.

Deputy Joe Costello

I asked about the length of time of and the process for engagement.

Mr. Rune Lund

That depends on a range of matters. We held extensive discussions before introducing new rules on whether Ministers should approach us before the Government's position was fixed because the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, with whom the committee negotiated, wanted a strict timetable whereas we preferred a more dynamic schedule which would require the Government to consult us before deciding a position. We argued this could only be done on a case-by-case basis because of the complex nature of the system. As a committee, we could not decide the right time and would have to rely on the Minister's opinion on when we should be involved. The Government ultimately accepted this because a majority in the committee, and thus a majority in Parliament, took this view. All parties voted for the new rules requiring the Minister to come before the committee in advance of deciding a position.

Deputy Joe Costello

Does the initiative come from the committee?

Mr. Rune Lund

No, it comes from the Minister, who has to come before the committee to outline the relevant EU legislation when the time comes to decide the Government's position in negotiations. The Government proposes a certain position and can proceed if not opposed by a majority.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union) debate - Wednesday, 15 Oct 2008

Role of Houses of the Oireachtas in EU Affairs: Discussion.

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Dr. Gavin Barrett

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

Mr. Rune Lund

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union) debate -
Wednesday, 15 Oct 2008