I thank the joint committee for the invitation to the Department to brief it on the proposal to recast the deposit guarantee schemes directive and the proposal on investor compensation schemes. I am principal in the EU financial services legislation section of the Department. With me today are my colleagues Mr. Frank Maughan and Mr. John Moore from the Department.
The committee recently met the Central Bank, the Investor Compensation Company Limited and the Irish Banking Federation on these directives. My intention is to set out the context and the main elements of the proposals from the perspective of the Department of Finance. It is useful to provide some context on the legislative framework of which the deposit guarantee scheme is a part. The legislative regime for financial regulation in Ireland is largely based on a comprehensive framework of directives that apply throughout the European Union, of which the deposit guarantee schemes directive is an integral part.
The original deposit guarantee scheme directive was introduced in 1994 and implemented in Ireland through SI 168 of 1995, the European Communities (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Regulations. Members of the committee will recall that these regulations set the coverage level at €20,000 with only 90% coverage of eligible deposits and subject to off-setting. This remained the situation until September 2008, when the Irish Government raised the coverage level to €100,000 per depositor per institution, eliminated setting-off arrangements, and widened the scope of the scheme to credit unions.
The proposal before us today has its origins in the financial crisis and the events of September 2008. It is a comprehensive reform of the EU deposit guarantee schemes directive and follows on from the EU emergency measures taken in 2009, through Directive 2009/14/EC, which included a provision for a review of the deposit guarantee scheme framework. That Directive raised the guarantee level to €100,000 in EU states where it did not already exist and was transposed into Irish Legislation on 30 June 2009 through the Financial Services (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Act 2009 and the European Communities (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) (Amendment) Regulations 2009.
The main elements of the proposal are: simplification and harmonisation, in particular as to the scope of coverage and the arrangements for payout; further reduction of the time limit for paying out depositors; sound funding arrangements for the deposit guarantee scheme; and cross-border co-operation between deposit guarantee schemes.
The Department, like the Central Bank welcomes the broad aims and ambitions of the proposed directive. The main benefit attached to the proposal is that depositors' protection is expected to be significantly enhanced by a higher level of coverage, faster payout and better funding arrangements of the deposit guarantee scheme. It is also expected that all relevant bodies, government, regulatory authorities, industry and consumers will benefit from the overall financial stability to which the proposed deposit guarantee scheme reform is expected to contribute.
I will now provide a short overview of each of these areas. First, I will focus on harmonisation and simplification of scope of coverage. There are currently about 40 deposit guarantee schemes in the EU. These cover different groups of depositors and deposits up to a different coverage levels. They impose different financial obligations on banks and therefore limit the benefits of the internal market for banks and depositors. By harmonising coverage, the maximum level of compensation will be set at €100,000 per customer, per credit institution and all credit institutions will now be covered by national schemes. Furthermore, all banks must join a deposit guarantee scheme. In addition, cover is being extended to all non-financial companies, whereas at present only deposits in small companies are eligible for compensation.
Under the proposal, deposits will now be more clearly defined and certain financial products with an investment character, in particular those that are not repayable at par and those whose existence can only be proven by a certificate, will be excluded from protection; It will now be easier for competent authorities and members of the deposit guarantee scheme to identify eligible deposits, and thus simplify the associated administration.
The draft directive proposed that payout times will be reduced from 20 working days to seven calendar days (one week) to be effective from the end of 2013. The proposal is underpinned by: simplified coverage scope; improved access by the deposit guarantee scheme to customer data in institutions; and requirements on credit institutions to hold depositor data in readily accessible formats such as "single customer view".
The aim of this shorter payout period is to allay any fears that customers may have about accessing their deposits. This may entail additional costs for banks and credit unions in relation to investment in IT infrastructure to move to what is know as a ‘single customer view'. These IT upgrades may happen in any event.
In relation to funding, members will be aware that under the current Irish deposit guarantee scheme, there is an element of ex-ante and ex-post funding. In Ireland all participating deposit-taking institutions make a contribution to the deposit protection account held in the Central Bank. This is recalculated annually by the Central Bank depending on the level of deposits held by the institution. In the event of the insolvency of a credit institution, claims by depositors would be met in the first instance by that account. As provided for by the Financial Services (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Act 2009, any shortfall in the account would be met from the Central Fund, which would ultimately be recouped in due course by additional contributions levied from the banking sector.
Most member states operate their schemes on an ex-post funding basis. Under the new proposal, all schemes within the EU must have an element of ex-ante funding. This entails that the Irish deposit guarantee scheme, like all other deposit guarantee schemes must be pre-funded to the tune of 1.5% of eligible deposits from 2020, that is, after a transition period of ten years. This means that all credit institution will have to increase their contributions to the deposit guarantee scheme. This will be done on a phased basis taking into account that various member states are starting from different starting points and the difficulties that some credit institutions in the EU and elsewhere are experiencing. It should be noted that the level of contribution by a credit institution will depend on the level of eligible deposits held by the institution and on its risk profile, in accordance with criteria proposed in the amended directive, so it is not possible to say at this stage what the contribution of individual credit institutions will be.
The Department's assessment is that harmonised and sound funding arrangements of a deposit guarantee scheme and the significantly accelerated timeframe for paying funds will help strengthen depositor confidence regarding the protection of their deposits across the European Union. This is clearly an important objective in the context of enhancing financial stability arrangements overall.
While the level of funding will be subject to further negotiation at EU Council level, it is important that the right balance be struck, that ensures the putting in place of a more effective deposit guarantee scheme is aligned with the continuing ability of a credit institution to contribute to the growth and economic recovery.
In relation to mutual borrowing facility and cross-border co-operation, the draft directive includes proposals to improve the level of co-operation between deposit guarantee schemes in cross-border situations. Where a bank has a branch in another member state, the draft directive foresees the host scheme acting as a single point of contact for consumers in the host member state. The responsibilities of the host scheme include communications and pay-out on behalf of the home scheme. It is also envisaged that the deposit will be paid in the currency of that host state.
The draft directive also proposed an obligation to establish a mutual borrowing facility between deposit guarantee schemes. The purpose of such a facility is that, in the event of the deposit guarantee scheme fund being unable to meet its liabilities, it may borrow from all other deposit guarantee scheme funds in the European Union. The other deposit guarantee funds will be required, if needed to lend to the deposit guarantee scheme a maximum of 0.5% of its eligible deposits on short notice, proportionate to the amount of eligible deposits in each country. The loan must be repaid by the borrowing deposit guarantee scheme within five years and new contributions to the deposit guarantee scheme must be raised to reimburse the loan. This aspect of the proposal merits further examination and is subject to ongoing negotiations at Council level.
The Department shares the Central Bank assessment that the general obligation on deposit guarantee schemes to lend may not be appropriate in all circumstances, for example where a deposit guarantee scheme fund has already been diminished due to payouts or could be required in the short-term to meet its obligations to its own deposits. However, we will approach discussion on this issue - as with all elements of the directive as a whole - with an open mind and in a constructive and positive way.
It is important to note that proposed amendments within the directive are aimed at improving depositor confidence and through this, overall financial stability. These requirements include clearer information for depositors, through the provision of a standard consumer information sheet on coverage, which depositors must countersign before making a deposit. Advertising by institutions of deposit based products can only reference factual information on coverage, to avoid guarantees being used as a marketing tool.
The draft directive is expected to impact at a number of levels. For credit institutions there will be increased costs associated with complying with the new requirements but the directive will help strengthen deposit confidence by allowing deposit holders access to funds more efficiently and in a faster timeframe. The provision of transition periods for faster payout and the provision of ex-ante contributions should allow credit institutions to make the necessary adjustments in an orderly timeframe and ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme is credible in terms of meeting any requirements placed upon it, which will ultimately protect the interests of taxpayers in any possible activation of the deposit guarantee scheme. This is a key objective. There will also be benefits to having increased EU-wide harmonisation. It is important to keep in mind that this is a draft directive and certain aspects may be clarified and changed as it works its way through the EU legislative process.
The second directive to be considered deals with amending the provisions on investor compensation schemes. The 1997 investor compensation directive has been an important investor protection tool. In Ireland the Investor Compensation Company Limited was established under the Investor Compensation Act 1998, to administer the Irish investor compensation scheme. I understand the committee recently heard from the chief operating officer of the Investor Compensation Company about how the company has performed its tasks and how it has handled matters which arose from failures of three investment firms. The Department of Finance has welcomed the proposal to revise the ICD, investor compensation directive and believes it is a timely initiative to enhance investor protection.
The most significant issue in the draft directive is probably the increase of the compensation limit from €20,000 to €50,000. The limit of €20,000 has been in place for a long period and on that basis, it needs to be reassessed. The Department, while being mindful that estimates indicate that approximately 95% of investors would be covered by the existing €20,000 limit, recognises the need to increase this amount to reflect the effects of inflation during the intervening period and in light of increases, for example, in depositor protection under the deposit guarantee scheme, DGS. It should be noted that the compensation limit used in most member states is also €20,000. However, in some states, the figure is higher than the €50,000 set out in the proposal.
The proposed inclusion of harmonised funds within the scope of the investor compensation scheme is an issue of particular relevance to Ireland. These harmonised funds which are authorised throughout the EU under the provisions in the undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities, or UCITS directives, form a major part of the Irish funds industry. It should be noted that UCITS benefit from a number of significant investor protection mechanisms which enable such funds, once authorised in one member state, to be marketed in all other members states, via a UCITS passport. All UCITS are required to appoint independent depositories or custodians to ensure that client assets are held securely. Depositories are typically very large international financial institutions. The proposed inclusion of UCITS and their depositories, coupled with the proposal to within ten years to create a reserve of 0.5% of the total value of financial instruments or funds held by relevant institutions would entail a significant increase in the level of reserves required to be held by the Investor Compensation Company Limited. The ICCL's annual report for 2009 shows that it currently holds a total of approximately €30 million in the two compensation funds it manages. At present, the value of Irish authorised UCITS amounts to approximately €700 billion which means that within ten years the reserves held in the Irish compensation fund scheme would rise from €30 million to €3.5 billion.
The Department does not believe such a proposal is proportionate to the risks to which investors in UCITS are subject. Most other member states have expressed concerns about including UCITS which already have robust investor protection regimes. In view of the high costs associated with this proposed measure, many member states, including Ireland, have called for the Commission to reconsider the inclusion of UCITS at this stage. The Department would welcome the 0.5% funding requirement if UCITS and depositories were excluded from the scope of the proposal.
The proposal also provides for a speedier payment in case of investor claims. These proposals are welcome but it must be borne in mind that an administrator appointed by the Investor Compensation Company Limited, ICCL, might encounter difficulties in identifying the ownership of assets, particularly in the event of fraud. Such difficulties were encountered in a compensation case where client assets were fraudulently used. The Department supports efforts to speed up compensation payments but it is mindful that operational problems may arise for the ICCL. The Department is in close contact with the ICCL on the discussions as they evolve on all these matters.
I thank the committee for the opportunity to make this presentation on these matters and I welcome the views of members of the committee. I am available to take questions or to clarify any points.