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Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach debate -
Tuesday, 6 Dec 2016

Scrutiny of EU Legislative Proposals

We are dealing with No. 5, scrutiny of EU legislative proposals for the corporate tax reform package, including the common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB; COM (2016) 683; COM (2016) 685; COM (2016) 686; and COM (2016) 687. With us are Mr. Rónán Hession and Mr. Brendan Crowley from the Department of Finance and Ms Kate Levey and Ms Yvonne Quirke from the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. The committee will be briefed on the package of EU proposals for the proposed common consolidated tax base. They are significant proposal for Ireland and all other EU member states. Therefore, it is incumbent on the joint committee to engage on the proposals and come to a considered position. To assist us, the officials from the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners will outline the proposals and their implications for Ireland, as they see them. This will be followed by a briefing by Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp from the European Commission who will explain the technical aspects of the proposals.

By virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. However, if they are directed by it to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and continue to so do, they are entitled thereafter only to qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person or an entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

Mr. Rónán Hession

I am the principal officer in the business tax unit of the Department of Finance. I thank the joint committee for its invitation to attend the meeting. I am joined by my colleague, Mr. Brendan Crowley, who handles the Department’s international tax files. I am also joined by two colleagues from the Revenue Commissioners, Ms Kate Levey, principal officer in the EU branch of the international division, and Ms Yvonne Quirke, also from Revenue’s international division.

On 25 October the European Commission published a package of tax measures, containing three distinct legislative proposals. The first is an anti-tax avoidance directive to deal with hybrid mismatches. These are situations in which a particular instrument or entity goes untaxed because of differing tax treatment in different jurisdictions. The directive is at an advanced stage and was discussed at this morning's meeting of ECOFIN. Ireland supports the work on this directive which mirrors the work done at OECD level.

The second proposal seeks to improve dispute resolution mechanisms within the European Union. Ireland is supportive of this proposal which will be helpful in resolving disputes in a timely way under tax treaties. This will improve certainty within the system and be good for business and tax authorities. My Revenue colleague, Ms Levey, will say a little more about this proposal.

The third element is the proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base which I understand is the main focus of this discussion. Strictly, the Commission has made two proposals. The first is a proposal for a common tax base, TB, which is to be discussed in its own right as a “double C” TB. The Commission has made a second proposal on consolidation – a “treble C” TB – which is intended to be negotiated if and when a common base is agreed to.

A common corporate tax base would consist of agreed rules for how a company calculated its taxable profits in each member state. The member state would then apply its own tax rate to these profits. It would replace the entire existing corporate tax system for large companies with a whole new set of rules for how their taxable profits would be calculated. The proposal for a common tax base is, by necessity, very complex. Each member state currently applies different rules to what income is taxable, which deductions are allowed, which credits are given, etc. Ireland currently has a very wide tax base, while some member states have narrow bases.

The second stage of the process, consolidation, involves how profits are attributed to each country in the European Union. A common base would give countries common rules for how to calculate profits, but it would not impact on where the profits and, therefore, taxing rights would be attributed. Currently, member states use OECD transfer pricing rules in determining how profits are attributable to each country. Under the transfer pricing rules, one looks at where the real value-added activities happen and attributes a proportionate share of the profits to these activities. Consolidation would replace the transfer pricing approach within the European Union with a formula for dividing profits among member states. The formula would be based on where sales happened, where staff were located and where a company’s assets were. Under this formula each corporate group’s total EU profits would be added together and divided among countries. The country concerned would then tax the profits attributed to it at its corporate tax rate. Consolidation would not legally impact on a country's tax rate, but it would have a significant impact on how much tax was paid in each member state. The impact assessment published by the Commission states the CCCTB can lift growth in the European Union by up to 1.2%, but it is silent on the impact on growth in member states individually.

How does the new CCCTB proposal compare to the previous one? The CCCTB proposal has a long history. It dates back to 2001 when the Commission first put it forward as long-term, comprehensive measure to reform corporate tax rules within the European Union. The concept was discussed at ECOFIN and technical working group meetings from 2004 and the Commission published a detailed proposal in 2011 which would be superseded by the new proposal. With a proposal such as the CCCTB proposal which has been debated publically and at length for many years, it is perhaps tempting for us to simply reheat our old analysis and pick up where we left off. However, it is important that we consider it anew and with fresh eyes, given that the proposal includes some important differences when compared to its predecessor.

The separation of a common base from the more problematic issue of consolidation is significant. This is a separation which Ireland has supported since its Presidency. Most significantly, adhering to the CCCTB proposal would be mandatory for multinational companies with a group turnover of more than €750 million, whereas adhering to the 2011 proposal was optional for all companies. The new proposal allows smaller companies to opt in to the CCCTB rules or remain taxable under our existing corporate tax rules. This would require Ireland to operate two corporate tax systems side by side, namely, the CCCTB rules for large companies and a domestic system for smaller companies that did not opt to adhere to the CCCTB rules.

While the consolidation aspect of the proposal is broadly similar to the 2011 version, there are a number of substantial technical differences in the design of the proposed common base. For example, allowance for growth and investment is included in the new proposal which effectively allows a business to claim a tax deduction for equity investment in the business. Additionally, under the common base proposal, an enhanced research and development deduction is proposed of between 25% and 100% of qualifying research and development expenditure.

It is also important to recognise that there have been significant changes on the corporate tax landscape since the previous proposal was published in 2011. Since 2011 the OECD base erosion and profit shifting, BEPS, process has been launched and 15 comprehensive BEPS reports were published in October 2015. The implementation of the BEPS reports is under way at national and international level, including through the EU anti-tax avoidance directive. The business environment has also changed considerably since 2011. The profile of taxpayers in Ireland will naturally have changed in the past five years. This is also true of the broader international environment, in which issues such as Brexit and US tax reform are part of the backdrop to our assessment of the CCCTB proposal.

How is the CCCTB proposal different from our existing system? A focus of our work since the proposal was published has been comparing the common base proposed by the Commission to the existing Irish corporate tax base. There are some significant technical differences. In some areas the proposed common tax base is likely to be significantly narrower than the existing Irish tax base. For example, the CCCTB proposal allows much broader rules for deducting business expenses, for example, business client entertainment expenses which are not deductible in Ireland would be 50% deductible under the common base proposals. There are broad exemptions for foreign income earned by Irish companies, a new tax deduction for equity investment - the allowance for growth and investment that I mentioned - while the anti-avoidance rules are less specific across all aspects of the base.

As I said, under the Commission's proposals there is a super deduction for research and development expenditure, which would raise a question about the continuation of our best-in-the-class research and development tax credit. The Commission's proposals do not appear to distinguish between trading and non-trading profits, nor do they include separate tax treatment for capital gains. This raises a question about whether we would get to keep our 25% rate for non-trading profits or our 33% capital gains tax rate.

Neither the Minister for Finance nor the Government has taken a position on CCCTB at this point. As with any complex proposal, at this stage it is appropriate that officials would undertake a detailed analysis to understand the implications for Ireland and to inform our advice on Ireland's negotiating position. Some preliminary work is under way in the Department and the Revenue Commissioners, but we will consider commissioning a more detailed analysis if we feel it is necessary. Obviously, this is a Commission proposal that requires the unanimous approval of all 28 member states. There are months of detailed technical analysis and negotiation ahead, during which the proposal is likely to change shape. We will engage constructively with this process as things progress.

The new CCCTB represents a significant proposal that warrants careful consideration and analysis. That work is now under way and will take some time. We are happy to assist the committee with its deliberations and to answer its questions.

Ms Kate Levey

On behalf of the Revenue Commissioners, I thank the committee for the invitation to assist members in considering the corporate tax reform package published by the European Commission on 25 October 2016. I will use this short opening statement to outline Revenue's role in tax policy and to highlight briefly the elements of the Commission package that focus specifically on the administration of the tax system, which is Revenue's core business.

In addition to our administrative role, Revenue assists the Department of Finance in the formulation of tax policy by providing advice and technical tax expertise. Our experience of administering the tax system enables us to advise, in particular, on the practicalities of proposed measures, including avoidance and evasion risks in particular and how they might be mitigated. As regards our international role, Revenue participates in discussions on a broad range of tax and customs matters at fora such as the EU, the OECD and the World Customs Organisation, contributing to the formulation of broader international tax policy.

Each of the three proposals put forward by the European Commission will be discussed in detail at the relevant Council working group at the EU. Revenue participates in these discussions with our colleagues from the Department of Finance, providing the necessary support on technical and administrative implications. In the event the directives are agreed, Revenue will also have an important role in transposing tax directives into domestic legislation.

With regard to the European Commission's package, the proposal to address hybrid mismatches and the two draft directives proposing the CCCTB are predominantly policy-related and my colleague from the Department of Finance, Mr. Hession, has outlined the main features of each. I want to briefly highlight one particular administrative aspect of the consolidation proposal. Under this proposal, multinational groups would deal with a single tax administration in the EU, referred to as the principal tax authority or one stop shop. This would be based in the member state where the parent company of the group is resident for tax purposes, and if the overall parent company is outside of the EU it would be based in the member state of an alternative nominee within the group. While the consolidation element of the proposal will not be brought forward for discussion unless or until the common base is agreed, Revenue will have a particular focus on this administrative aspect.

The third element of the package, the proposed directive on double taxation dispute resolution mechanisms in the EU, aims to improve dispute resolution between tax authorities in situations of double taxation of business income. By way of background, double taxation arises when tax is imposed on the same income by two or more countries. Double tax treaties between two countries set out the taxing rights of each jurisdiction in an effort to avoid such double taxation. "Competent authority" is a term used in tax treaties. It refers to the body responsible for trying to resolve any issues or disputes that arise with the applicable treaty. In Ireland, Revenue is the competent authority. Due to an increase in the complexity of international trade, there has been an increase in the number of disputes being referred to competent authorities in recent years. While most disputes can be resolved by considering the relevant treaty directly, double taxation may still remain where two countries disagree on the interpretation or application of a treaty provision.

The OECD and the EU have focused for a number of years on improving what are referred to as the mutual agreement procedures in tax treaties, commonly referred to as MAPS, in an effort to improve dispute resolution processes. Arbitration is one of the most powerful tools for dispute resolution in circumstances where tax authorities fail to reach agreement. Mandatory binding arbitration gives taxpayers a guarantee that their case will be resolved within a set period. As a result, taxpayers and their representatives are advocating the introduction of mandatory binding arbitration. Ireland has already expressed support for the OECD BEPS initiative, which would see mandatory binding arbitration under double tax treaties introduced next year. In addition, the existing EU arbitration convention already provides for a mandatory binding arbitration mechanism in the narrower category of transfer pricing disputes between EU member states. The European Commission has now put forward this proposed directive to improve existing arbitration convention mechanisms in terms of access for taxpayers, coverage, timeliness and conclusiveness.

Revenue’s role in negotiating disputes with other countries is important to ensure the appropriate allocation of profits between Ireland and our treaty partners. In budget 2015, the Minister for Finance provided for increased resources for Revenue's competent authority function to ensure we are equipped to deal effectively with disputes with other tax authorities and we welcome any improvements to the international framework for addressing such issues, including the proposed directive.

We are happy to assist the committee in any way we can in its consideration of the corporate tax reform package presented by the Commission.

I thank Mr. Hession from the Department and Ms Levey from Revenue for their opening presentations and I welcome their colleagues. Mr. Hession stated that preliminary work is under way to assess the impact of the revised CCCTB proposal. Is there an emerging view in the Department on the implications for Ireland by way of corporation tax receipts? We expect to receive approximately €7.5 billion in receipts this year. With regard to the attractiveness of Ireland as a location for inward investment, is there an emerging view on the revised proposals from the Department?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Our initial view is that the base proposed is narrower than our own base. With regard to quantifying this, we have not got as far as being able to put a figure on it. Looking at the analysis provided, which is already in the public domain, the Commission's analysis sees a reduction in corporation tax of 0.14% of GDP. This is in its impact assessment. Overall, the Commission sees it as a marginally positive result because, under its analysis, some buoyancy comes out of that but it also sees a negative impact on corporation tax receipts.

In its publication yesterday, which draws heavily on the earlier analysis carried out by Ernst & Young in 2011, the ESRI sees an impact on foreign direct investment of -4.6% and on corporation tax receipts of -5.7%. When we combine this with the impact of Brexit, it shows an effective output of -1.5%. We take these as useful inputs to our analysis. We will do our own work on it with Revenue and, if necessary, get figures done. It is a very complex proposal with many aspects and we need to go through them to fully assess how we believe it will fully affect corporation tax receipts. The analysis in the Ernst & Young report, the Commission's own analysis and the ESRI is that it would have a negative impact on corporation tax receipts for Ireland. This does not surprise us.

The overall proposals are now being split. The first element relates to the base. Mr. Hession made the point that for Ireland it would result in a narrower base.

Mr. Ronan Hession

Yes.

Despite much of the rhetoric, we have a broad base with regard to the calculation of taxable profits but we apply a relatively low rate of 12.5% to the base. Mr. Hession has given as number of examples of how the calculation of the base would differ under these proposals than under existing corporation tax law. There appears to be quite a significant difference in the base. Before we look at the attribution of the profits across countries, if the taxable base is smaller, we are already at a disadvantage.

Mr. Ronan Hession

It would seem so. There are other aspects we need to examine such as, for example, the research and development provision. The common base is different to the research and development tax credit. We think it would be less attractive for firms therefore there may not be as big a cost. The allowance for growth and investment is a new provision, which would be a tax cost. Our expectation is there would be a tax cost because this is significantly narrower.

In addition, it is difficult to forecast what will come out in the negotiations or the interplay between the different aspects of this proposal and other proposals already on the table. One of the difficulties, and the reason I said in my opening statement that we would not just reheat our previous analysis, is that we have already made many commitments at the OECD table and at EU level. For example, the anti-tax avoidance directive was agreed during the summer. The tax avoidance elements of the proposed CCCTB directive, broadly speaking, largely import the anti-tax avoidance directive. This includes the provisions on control for our company rules, on interest deductibility and on hybrids, to which I referred. There is a kind of interplay of all the different aspects so that it is difficult to make a net judgment but our expectation is that the base in the case of the CCCTB would be narrower than that in the CCTB.

When it comes to the issue of consolidation, that is, attributing the profits from the base across all the EU countries, a formula is used. Mr. Hession outlines three elements: where sales happen, where staff are located and where companies' assets are. Is there a weighting of these different elements in the formula? Regarding the first element, Ireland is such a small market that we will not make much of an impact. Regarding the second, many multinationals provide employment here. What is the assessment of how Ireland would fare when it comes to the allocation of the base, that is, the allocation of taxable profits across Europe?

Mr. Ronan Hession

The previous analysis was that Ireland would be one of the big losers overall. The weighting between the three components is one third, one third and one third in terms of labour, assets and sales. The previous EY analysis was that Ireland would be a loser in this formula. In fact, I think in some categories, such as employment, we were shown to be the biggest loser.

Approximately what percentage of our corporation tax receipts are now accounted for by multinationals? Is it 70% or 80%?

Ms Kate Levey

It is about 80%.

What are we still expected to take in this year? Is it €7 billion or €7.5 billion?

Mr. Ronan Hession

It is more than €7 billion.

When Mr. Hession says the CCCTB would be mandatory for multinationals with a group turnover of more than €750 million, approximately how many such multinationals are tax-resident in Ireland?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I think there are about 50 parents in Ireland but there are also subsidiaries of companies whose parent would also be covered by the CCCTB in other member states.

How much of our corporation tax receipts are accounted for by companies that would be captured by the mandatory provision of having turnover of more than €750 million?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Considering the concentration in Ireland among the top ten taxpayers which are multinationals, I think we are talking about a good chunk of the 80%.

Ms Kate Levey

I think the top ten account for just over 30-odd% of receipts. I am not clear whether these top ten would be among the more than 50 that would be in the mandatory category.

They almost certainly would, surely. I have a question for Ms Levey. The selection of the principal tax authorities is determined by the jurisdiction in which the parented group is tax-resident. Therefore, these proposals do not involve a change in the residency rules per se. Is that correct?

Ms Kate Levey

That is correct.

However, the relevance of this is diluted if these proposals are brought into effect because of the apportionment of the profits. If the consolidation aspect happens, the jurisdiction in which the company is resident is less significant. Is that fair to say?

Ms Kate Levey

That is fair to say. The principal tax authority is the country in which the parent of the group is resident. In addition, if the parent is ultimately outside the EU, the group members within the CCTB can nominate a group that would be the head for those purposes. Therefore, potentially more than those 50 taxpayers about which we spoke are located in a particular member state, but the Deputy is right that the formulary apportionment basically means that there are different factors now determining where tax is paid.

Mr. Ronan Hession

Finally, could Mr. Hession give us an outline of where this goes from here? As he said, it has been in the ether for the past 15 years or so, but there seems to be renewed momentum behind it now. It was published last October. Where does he expect it will go from here? What is the timeline for the Irish Government and the Department of Finance to adopt a position from an Irish perspective on these proposals?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Regarding the overall package, the priority arising from the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the European Union was the hybrid element. The Slovak Presidency has prioritised this as distinct from the CCCTB components. It will be for the next presidencies, Maltese and then Estonian, to determine their priorities. I expect there will be some focus from the Maltese Presidency on dispute resolution, but the CCCTB will go in parallel with this. Much analysis is being carried out in other member states of how it affects their bases, revisiting what position these Governments will take. For now, there is not huge visibility of where the member states will go or the appetite for this. Because of the questions surrounding subsidiarity and reasoned opinions, it is the parliaments that are probably dealing with this issue ahead of some of the governments. My expectation is that this will proceed cautiously through the next few presidencies. As I said, we are doing preliminary work with our colleagues in the Revenue Commissioners, and once we get to a certain point, we need to carry out an assessment of whether we need a more specialist piece of work, which we may have to commission from outside, to give us the kind of breakdowns we feel we need to feed into policy makers.

I thank the witnesses for their presentations. One might get the impression that it is the second C of the abbreviation, consolidation, that will cause the greatest issues in Ireland's case. However, what is being proposed under the first C of the common base is as alarming from the point of view of sovereignty. Could Mr. Hession explain what a common income tax base would look like? Would it involve a common set of tax credits and tax reliefs?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Essentially, that is correct. It would mean that companies above the threshold, that is, large companies with group turnover of more than €750 million, would operate under the common European rules regarding their tax bases, the kinds of reliefs that would be available, how losses are handled and what kind of accounting principles work. Such companies would work to that common set of rules. Companies below this threshold can opt into this if they wish, but it is optional for them. The previous proposal in 2011 was optional for everybody. The two significant differences are, first, that participation is mandatory above the threshold and, second, that the consolidation element will be considered after a base, if a base is agreed. Consolidation was considered alongside a tax base during discussions on the earlier proposal, whereas work on the two elements is now being carried out in sequence. Our initial focus is on the base, which, as I say, forms part of a European set of common rules for these larger companies.

How difficult would it be to run the two systems for the two thresholds?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Perhaps my Revenue colleague will say a little about that. It certainly is an early challenge that has been identified in the context of any kind of potential savings or efficiencies it is argued the CCCTB might bring about. Running two parallel systems has that downside.

Ms Kate Levey

I mentioned specifically in my opening statement that this would be a significant consideration for Revenue. Running two systems in parallel brings with it a particular administrative burden. Introducing new legislation, which would entirely replace our existing corporation tax system for a particular cohort of companies, would also bring with it uncertainties. We have much case law on which we rely for the interpretation of our existing legislation. This has been built up over a number of years. As that would not be there with the new legislation, there certainly would be a bedding-down period regarding the introduction of the new system and an ongoing issue in applying the two sets in parallel.

Is it a sustainable suggestion that the State could be in favour of a common but not a consolidated tax base?

Mr. Ronan Hession

That is ultimately a political call for the Government about where it sits on this issue. From Ireland's point of view, going back to our own hosting of the presidency, the preference in Ireland has always been to separate those two issues. Consolidation is by far the more problematic of the two. In terms of the base, it would make more sense to discuss that in its own right. The actual splitting of the proposals is a positive from our point of view. That is not to say the Government would necessarily buy into the argument for a common base. It will wait to hear the analysis of the impact on the base and what sort of questions that raises for Ireland's competitiveness. I do not want to come across as unduly negative. It is my Department of Finance training to be sceptical about new proposals in general. At a high level, the first of the two stated objectives of this proposal is to tackle tax avoidance. The Government is publicly on board with tackling tax avoidance. The tax avoidance elements in the directive were previously agreed earlier this year and Ireland played a very active part in that. In terms of easing the compliance burden for business, it is something that is worthy as an objective. The Revenue Commissioners rates very highly on that internationally. In terms of ease of doing business and filing returns, it is top of the league in Europe and fifth or sixth in the world. That has always been something Ireland has taken very seriously. As high level objectives, the Government has supported those and continues to support them. It is just a question of whether this is the right way to further those two objectives.

Has the Department done any figures on what might be saved in terms of companies that are currently paying zero tax rates if this were this to be fully implemented? How would it affect the tax numbers?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I am not sure I fully understand the question.

For instance, the different criteria used to assess where a company is based are cited in terms of where their assets and employees are. Are there any figures on the result if that was to be applied to some of the companies that are currently not paying the 12.5%?

Mr. Ronan Hession

What we would say is if they are operating here, they are paying 12.5% on their activities here. That is the statutory tax rate. That is what they have to pay. What tax they owe elsewhere in the world and whether it is getting paid in other jurisdictions will remain a question for those other jurisdictions. Under the common base, they can look within the European Union but obviously the tax affairs of international companies that have business activities broader than the EU fall to be considered by other jurisdictions.

Strictly speaking, the role of the committee is to look at the EU proposals to decide whether they are in line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In 2011, the Dáil decided that the proposal then from the EU and the CCCTB was not in line with those principles and adopted a reasoned opinion. It stated five detailed reasons why this was the case. Does the Department or the revenue Commissioners have a view now as to whether the new proposals make any of those arguments less valid?

Mr. Ronan Hession

The issue of subsidiarity is still under consideration within the Department. It is a very important question that we have to pose with regard to any new European proposal. In this case it is a question of whether more can be achieved by member states acting collectively than can be achieved individually.

The second question is whether the proportionality test is passed. In other words, does it go as far as the treaties require and no further. There is a balanced judgment call there. We have to do our own analysis to see where we land and what sort of advice we give to the Minister on it. What we have seen at OECD level is that we can acknowledge that these problems require lots of countries to work together. They cannot be solved by unilateral action alone. Whether that requires a directive or a common base comes back to the proportionality point. Outside the European Union, a lot of the OECD reforms have been delivered either through changes via tax treaties or sometimes just guidelines or best practice standards. There is that question.

The broader issue of tackling tax avoidance is acknowledged in the previous directive that was agreed in June, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. Member states can come together and make a meaningful difference through a directive. To a large extent that issue was dealt with in that directive. It has been carried over to this one but we do not see a huge amount of additional anti-tax avoidance content here in this published proposal beyond what was agreed previously in June. The Commission would argue that by having a common base and common rules it makes the system more transparent and more difficult to arbitrage. We would have to see whether that is the case. It is somewhat hypothetical, given we do not have a live common based example we can compare it to.

Does Mr. Hession think a common approach across Europe would make it more difficult to avoid paying tax?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I am not sure is the short answer. I would be surprised if adopting a common base in itself was to defeat tax avoidance entirely. What we have had over the last number of years is a recognition at OECD level and beyond, to a much broader cohort of about 100 countries, that the rules as they are currently formulated leave tax planning opportunities and that it needs to be tightened up. That is really what the BEPS reports were about. Ireland has always been very positive about that process and very sensitive about the fact we have a very new international consensus on this and the importance of implementing that in order to address the problem of tax planning. We have to always be sensitive that at EU level we do not risk undermining that consensus or put in place a rival regime that would somehow frustrate the reforms we have already got. There is a balance there and I am sure when we come to discuss this among member states in more detail there will be an attempt to try to strike that right balance.

Does Mr. Hession agree that having a common tax base would not in any way affect our 12.5% corporation tax, or whatever it might be and that they are two completely separate issues?

Mr. Ronan Hession

They are indeed. The proposal does not affect the 12.5% rate and the Government has a firm position on it. The question that was posed previously in the analysis by Ernst & Young was that if this affects the base, does it not put the Government in the situation where it has to increase the rate to compensate. What the Ernst & Young analysis found was that in Ireland's case, because of the sensitivity of our rate, it would not be an effective solution. Its analysis said even if the Government was to compensate with a rate, the impact on investment and FDI, etc., would be negative and therefore it was not an answer that a country like Ireland could turn to. The Government has been absolutely clear that the 12.5% rate will not be affected by this. We have a genuine question about that because we have other rates in Ireland. In Ireland we make a distinction between trading profits, which are taxed at 12.5%, and non-trading profits of passive income, interest, royalties, dividends, etc., which are taxed at 25%. It is not clear to us where our 25% rate sits in all this or indeed out 33% capital gains rate. It could just be a clarification point from the Commission.

I wanted to pick up on the core role of this committee. It is great to have the detail in terms of what is proposed and what the Department is thinking on this. We have a question to answer on the issue of subsidiarity and proportionality. We answered that question as a parliament in 2011. My colleague asked Mr. Hession a question in that context. He mentioned that the easy thing to do would be to look at what was done in 2011. While there have been changes to the CCCTB, its premise is still the same. Has Mr. Hession reviewed the reasoned opinion by the Dáil on the five reasons?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I do not have them to hand. I apologise.

Was the reasoned opinion something that was supported by the Department?

Mr. Ronan Hession

In preparation for today I reviewed the debates.

My recollection is that the Department was sceptical on the issue.

Mr. Brendan Crowley

One of the big differences last time was the optional element. The Department's position in 2011 was that because it was optional, we were not sure that there was a subsidiarity issue and that was a key factor in the decision.

Obviously, the line Minister supported this initiative and the Government signed off on this recent opinion at the time it was issued by the Dáil. I am asking about this in order to go through some of the issues. It is stated that it is not established by the Commission's proposals or impact assessment that 27 different national corporate tax systems inherently impede the proper functioning of the internal market . In effect, the proposal would introduce a second parallel system for operation within each member state that would not improve the simplicity and efficiency of the corporate tax systems in the EU. Is that something Mr. Hession would subscribe?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I think, as Ms Levey said, from a Revenue point of view that is a bit of a headache in terms of how to run two parallel systems. We are also mindful of the fact that we are not just talking about international tax planning within Europe. There are still multifarious international tax systems that will remain in place and a lot of the tax planning that goes on is not necessarily within Europe, it takes place in other jurisdictions. Therefore, one has to live with a certain degree of complexity.

I understand the motive behind the Commission's proposal for a common base. It perhaps makes it more transparent and with consistent rules there is less scope for arbitrage. That may be the case but, if it were to come into being, I would be surprised if it was impenetrable to tax planning. As regards the administrative side or compliance cost, the Ernst & Young analysis felt those savings were overstated.

Mr. Ronan Hession

I should add something. The Deputy said that the proposal has many similarities to a previous proposal. The question for us is whether we have confidence in the multilateral nature of the agreement at that level. That was not by way of agreeing a single legal instrument. It involves a mix whereby countries need to implement some of it through legislation or country-by-country reporting, for example. Others do so by best practice which in Europe we have taken to another step through legislation on the control of foreign company rules. Others are just guidelines, which in our case we will import into our domestic law. However, not every country will do that.

Our experience of that process, both in the negotiations that went on behind it and what has happened since, is that it has gained real traction. Every time I attend OECD meetings there are more countries involved. Those countries have heard warnings from the OECD which, put simply, mean, "If you're not at the table, you're on the menu." They would realise, therefore, that there are risks to not participating. That shows that, yes, one needs countries to work together to get these solutions, but does that necessarily mean having a common base? Obviously, a common base is not part of the OECD view. Their view is that one could get the results without going quite that far. Some of that reflects the nature of compromise negotiations .

Yes. The reason I asked that question is because it would be fair to say that the Commission's argument at the time was that it was too complex across 27 member states and it needed to be simplified. However, the argument from the recent opinion is, "We don't agree with you in relation to that." The thrust of it now for those who are trying to put forward this new version of CCCTB is that it is to deal with tax avoidance, tax evasion and the issue of the Apple case and other such cases. It is to make it difficult for multinationals to avoid paying tax. In my view, it is about trying to make the narrative suit the agenda, which has been there for a long time.

The fourth reason set out in the reasoned opinion stated, "Yet the proposal would legislate to effectively redistribute the EU corporate tax base among member states based on new allocation factors." The main weakness not addressed in the proposal or impact assessment is why would the 27 member states legislative for such an unequal policy outcome? Does Mr. Hession believe that still stands today from the analysis done within the Department?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Yes. When one looks at the analysis and the number of countries where the graph is below the x-axis compared with those where it is above, it is difficult to see where the momentum will come for an agreement. Essentially, members states will be surrendering significant portions of their base in service of an abstract principle unless they feel that there is some greater motive at stake - in this case, if they feel it is necessary to weed out tax avoidance and this was the only way to do it. What compromises that argument is that the anti-tax avoidance elements of this directive have already been agreed. Therefore, having agreed to the anti-tax avoidance directive, we could not argue that those elements bring subsidiarity because we have already gone as far as signing up to that. Carrying them in here bolsters the characterisation of this directive as being an anti-tax avoidance one. However, in terms of additional added value it is difficult to see it based on those components, aside from what I have already said about a common base making it more transparent. Having common rules flushes out what would otherwise be tax avoidance schemes and arbitrage between differences.

The final point in that 2011 reasoned opinion was made in the context of the financial impact of the directive to national policies. It stated, "No EU legislation should be proposed that indirectly impacts on national sovereignty as a means of remedying any negative financial impact that flows therefrom." Whether we agree or disagree with it, this is an issue of national sovereignty, as Senator Conway-Walsh said. If we were to deal with this from an income tax point of view, we would be saying to the European Commission that it can set the bands or tax credits available to workers across the State. That is basically giving it away. We would always be allowed to apply the 20% and 40% rates, but it gives them the authority to change all the rules that affect us, which are really important. If the bands or reliefs are changed we will end up paying more or less tax. Is this not a sovereignty issue at its core? We will be handing power to the Commission - not for the first time because of VAT and other areas - for authority over the country's corporate tax system.

Mr. Ronan Hession

That is heavy stuff for a technocrat like myself. I guess they would say, "Do you want to pool your sovereignty with the other countries?" This is not going to happen unless Ireland signs up to it, and changing the directive later would require Ireland's agreement on unanimity. Not to put words in the Commission's mouth, they would probably say that this is a proposition. They certainly have the right of initiative. It would be true that in future Finance Bills - and I had the pleasure of being here with the Minister for the recent Finance Bill - that a lot of the tax issues around these larger companies would not be discussed in this room on Committee State. They would be dealt with at European level, so in that sense the role of the Dáil and Seanad - where we have Committee Stage tomorrow - would be much reduced for those companies above the threshold or the smaller ones that opt in - they would no longer be dealt with under the domestic rules. The point made to Ireland would be, "That only happens if you decide to pool your sovereignty with the other countries, and decide that you are going to agree unanimously for that to happen." The Deputy began his contribution by referring back to the nub of the discussion here which is around reasoned opinion. On the proportionality point, does it go as far as the treaty requires and no further, or is it a step beyond that? That is the question that needs to be answered on proportionality. Unquestionably, however, the net result of this is that we are agreed that a significant amount of tax policy will be decided at European level, albeit with Ireland at the table exercising its vote in the context of unanimity.

Will there always be the policy of unanimity after one's sovereignty is given away and these matters are pooled?

When changes are being made to the base, will Ireland retain a unanimous vote in this regard even though sovereignty has been pooled? Perhaps that is above Mr. Hession's-----

Mr. Rónán Hession

I am using my peripheral vision to read the body language. The first thing I would say is that unanimity will be required in future directives. Provision is being made for the Commission to issue technical standards where some of the detail is spelled out. The committee may be familiar with such standards in the financial services area. There is always a delicacy in areas like tax about what is technical and what is policy. During a discussion on a recent Finance Bill, it was largely impossible to distinguish where a policy issue became a technical issue and where a technical issue became a policy issue. Such details are important in terms of the feasibility, workability or effect of a proposal. The Commission has a role in this area that it did not have in respect of tax files before now. I think my colleague, Mr. Crowley, wants to add something.

Mr. Brendan Crowley

I just want to mention that this proposal makes provision for "delegated acts", to adopt the terminology that is used. This is a different process that does not require unanimity. It is limited to technical points, as Mr. Hession said.

My final question relates to table 39, which deals with the impact of this proposal on tax revenues by tax type. I assume Mr. Hession is familiar with this table as part of the analysis.

Mr. Rónán Hession

Yes, I have it here.

He has already responded to a question asked by Deputy Michael McGrath about the ESRI economic outlook that was published yesterday. As the ESRI publication draws on the 2011 proposal, we are not comparing the same things. We will stick with table 39, if Mr. Hession does not mind, because it is based on the Commission's assessment of the current proposal. It suggests that if this proposal goes through, Ireland's corporate tax receipts will decrease by 0.14% of GDP but there will be increases in receipts from labour taxes, consumption taxes and taxes on bonds, dividends and capital gains. It states that our overall tax revenue, which is really what we are interested in, would increase marginally by 0.02% of GDP. The Commission's view, therefore, is that the effect of this proposal on our tax receipts would basically be neutral. It would lead to marginal reduction of the overall tax revenues of states across Europe. Does the Department agree with the figures that have been presented by the Commission? Does it agree that this proposal, as identified by the European Commission's joint research centre, would broadly be tax-neutral if it were to be introduced in this State because there would be a reduction of 0.14% of GDP in corporate tax receipts but that would be offset by other taxes?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I would not take it at face value. We generally like to get under the bonnet of such figures to have a look at them. It strikes us that one of the differences between 2011 and now is that we now have fiscal rules. If we proposed to reduce taxes while claiming that the buoyancy in the economy meant that such a reduction would pay for itself, ordinarily we would not be allowed to do that under fiscal rules. I reiterate that we have not had a technical engagement with the Commission. We will need to do that to understand the analysis. Perhaps it is not what it appears from our reading of it. If we were to come back to the Commission with our figures, tell it that we were reducing our base for some other reason and argue that it would be cost-neutral overall because it would lead to a bounce in the economy, I am not sure we would be given the discretion to do that. It is an interesting piece of analysis. The part of it dealing with the reduction in the base is certainly consistent with what other commentators like the ESRI and Ernst & Young have said. I am not sure about the buoyancy of results element of it. In the run-up to budgets, my job involves hearing from many people who ask us to make a tax change that they say will pay for itself. When we hear that in the Department, we know it is a common argument that is often made. We like to look at the tax element on its own. Under the fiscal rules, there is a discipline around us having to do that. I think we will have to engage. I am not going to dispute it or dismiss it. In fairness to the Commission, it has done the analysis and we should try to understand its perspective in the first instance.

What is the 0.14% reduction in corporation tax as a percentage of GDP in round figures? What is the actual reduction?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I would say it is a reduction of approximately €250 million in 2014 figures.

I thank Mr. Hession.

I welcome the delegation. Do I understand correctly that there will be a one-stop shop in every country?

Mr. Ronan Hession

There will be a one-stop shop for the large companies.

It will just be for the large companies.

Mr. Ronan Hession

A company needs to have €750 million in its group turnover in order to qualify. It is a case of "as you were" for companies below that level.

Who is going to police this all over Europe? A company that is paying PAYE and PRSI in a country with low wages might bring its sales team to a country with a low corporation tax rate. How will it all be policed?

Ms Kate Levey

Provision is made for this in the directive. If the one-stop shop is to operate in respect of a company, that company's group must be paying corporation tax or filing its tax returns in one member state. There is provision within the directive for member states to work together. The competent authorities in each member state will have to work together if an audit of a company is required, for example. If there is a dispute in respect of the amount of tax paid in another member state, the competent authority in that member state will be able to request an amended tax assessment from the principal tax authority. The bottom line is that there will have to be a great deal of co-ordination and co-operation between the various member states in order for the one-stop shop concept to operate effectively.

I assume the various regional governments in countries like Germany and Belgium have differing taxation systems. How would this proposal operate in such countries? Would there be a one-stop shop in each region or would there be a one-stop shop for the whole country?

Ms Kate Levey

The idea is that companies which have opted into the CCCTB will be taxed under the common European rules and will then be entitled to file a tax return in just one member state. Each member state would need to have a one-stop shop for the companies in its jurisdiction that are paying tax under the common EU rules. The various one-stop shops would need to be able to talk to one another across borders in the event of disputes about the amounts of money being reported to the one-stop shop in Ireland or Belgium, for example, in respect of profits being made in Germany, for example. It would be a brand-new system. It would require a great deal of co-operation between the tax authorities in the various member states. The directive makes provision for how audits should operate and for the role of member state courts in the event of disputes.

I presume Revenue carries out audits on small companies on a percentage basis. How often are audits carried out on large corporations?

Ms Kate Levey

The Revenue audit system is based on risk. Our large cases division deals with the largest taxpayers in the State. This incorporates many of the multinationals and many companies that are automatically subject to this directive. They are basically audited on a risk-based profile. Audits on companies of this kind are performed by the transfer of pricing teams within our large cases division.

Details are often published of small companies that have been fined on foot of audits that were carried out, but larger corporations never seem to be subjected to audits and fines. I am sure it happens. Does it?

Ms Kate Levey

Our large cases division was set up specifically so that manpower could be directed at the companies that pay the largest proportions of tax receipts. There are detailed reviews of how those companies are complying with tax law. In practice, the largest companies have armies of accountants and lawyers who prepare those companies' tax returns in accordance with the law. We often look at how they use the law, the extent to which they might avail of loopholes in the law and where legislative amendments might be required. The short version of what I am trying to say is that Revenue's risk-based approach to audit deals with large companies in exactly the same way as smaller companies.

Under the proposed system who would authorise an audit to be carried out on a large corporation or a small corporation under €750 million?

Ms Kate Levey

The member state, where the one-stop-shop is, could decide to undertake an audit, but also a tax authority in one of the other member states where that company operates could request the principal tax authority to undertake an audit.

Is it the case there are two competent authorities to say that an audit should be carried out on a particular company?

Ms Kate Levey

The country carrying out the audit would be the country of the principal tax authority but one would respond to a request from other member states to examine the taxes paid by the companies that are also operating there.

All right. Will Ms Levey give examples of existing double taxation in the European Union?

Ms Kate Levey

The idea of double taxation is to deal with a company that operates in two different jurisdictions. It can sometimes be taxed in both jurisdictions in respect of the same income. Let me give an example of a company that manufactures violins in Ireland but sells them into the German market through a shop in Germany. Germany might be taxing the sales receipts in respect of those violins as would Ireland. Ireland has a tax treaty with other countries and on the basis of the tax treaty, one shares the taxing rights between the two countries to make sure that the same income is not taxed twice.

Under this system would there be no case of double taxation in the EU?

Ms Kate Levey

Is Senator Burke referring to CCCTB or the other directive?

Ms Kate Levey

Formal apportionment would decide where the profits are allocated in the different jurisdictions. By its nature, that may eliminate double taxation of business income. I am not 100% sure.

If the implementation were to run smoothly what is the timeframe for the implementation of CCCBT across Europe?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I think it will take some time for this to progress. Previously the proposal was painfully slow. This year tax files have moved extraordinary quickly, but they tend to be the tax files that had some basis in the OECD process. The essential principles have been agreed so I do not expect that pace will carry through to the CCCTB. To a large extent it will depend on the next two presidencies; Malta will take over the Presidency in the new year and then Estonia follows and they have the job of prioritising files, deciding on the pacing of discussions. It depends on the extent to which they push it or prioritise other files. Our expectation is that the Maltese may look to have some unfinished business from the day's ECOFIN. There is an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, ATAD, which has to do with hybrid mismatches and that will carry on to their Presidency. They will have to finish that. I know they have an interest in the dispute resolution mechanism but they will indicate their priorities in a pacing ahead of their Presidency or early in their Presidency. Given the complexity, this would be a profound change for any member state that member states will want to carefully consider each aspect to it before agreeing anything. I think it will be handled cautiously. I do not expect it to go at the same pace as other files that were dealt with this year.

Has there been an urgency about in the past year? Has it gathered pace?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I think urgency is probably overstating it. When the package was announced, which after all was only five weeks ago, it is still reasonably fresh, the immediate priority was to deal with the hybrid mismatches. There is a sense from those who are favourably disposed towards the directive to see things move quickly and not get bogged down. I think the intention from the Commission's point of view is to separate the base out on consolidation to make sure it does not get bogged down in more difficult issues that there can be some progress on the base first of all. It is really very hard to tell. To some extent this is not a policy work stream, it is a very political process. There is a negotiation that has to happen. It depends on the extent to which member states are starting on the same page. Initial indications are some member states are quite negative about it, so we will see how that feeds into the pace.

If a country wants to change its corporation tax - I am sure there are areas in a country that might want to have a different corporation tax in a disadvantaged area - how difficult will it be for them to do that under this new system?

Senator Gerry Horkan took the Chair.

Mr. Ronan Hession

If one is talking about large companies, that is companies above €750 million, they will be dealt with under this directive, so any change for those type of companies will have to come through agreement at European level. If one is talking about targeted tax measures for disadvantaged areas, generally speaking that is not allowed under State aid rules, unless it is below certain thresholds. I would expect that if there was a very targeted measure, companies below that threshold would not be targeted, that is types of companies called pre-CCCTB. I think we would have initiatives in the finance Bill to do with the farming, marine sectors and so on, which are below the necessary thresholds for State aid purpose and generally would not be targeted at the large companies that are caught here.

It is hard to answer the question in the abstract, but I would not expect CCCTB and regional development to have a bigger rap

Would there be an advantage for a company to be below threshold as well? When they are getting close to €750 million, could there be an advantage in that company staying below the threshold of €750 million? They could close down production to stay below the €750 million for that year.

Mr. Ronan Hession

If that were to be a material concern, when we do our domestic legislation, we are always designing it so that there are no monkey puzzles either side of the threshold, that people are not artificially trying to keep below a threshold. I expect if that vulnerability is in the directive and if the directive were to progress to agreement, that type of manipulation of business to get around the threshold would be addressed. We have similar rules about anti-fragmentation to ensure that groups do not separate themselves and keep themselves below the threshold. That is a reasonably common feature of tax codes that one would make sure that where a threshold bites at a particular point, that there is no way of laying around with the threshold artificially.

Ms Kate Levey

May I respond to Senator Burke's question, as I have had a moment to think it out? It was a good question, it would resolve double taxation completely between member states.

I am sorry for missing the presentation but I have it in front of me. Obviously Mr. Hession stated neither the Minister for Finance nor the Government had taken a position on a CCCTB at this point. That might be formally true, but one does not get a sense of enthusiasm for the CCCTB from the witnesses or the Government. Is that a fair comment?

Mr. Ronan Hession

What I said earlier is that we are professionally sceptical on tax proposals. I think the onus is on a proposer to make a persuasive case. What I said in my opening statement is that we are not going to jump to a conclusion on it, we will do our analysis. We will look through the figures. We will digest it and we will come back.

As we begin to digest it, we can see what a big departure it is from what we have and I do not think that any Irish official or politician would see the previous analysis on this what it mean for base, for our CT receipts, for FDI and so on would jump to a very quick positive result. It is often the case in policy, that one must defer taking a rigid opinion because it compromises one's analysis. We have to maintain professional scepticism which is not a negativity. We always have to put ourselves in a position and ask whether we are fully persuaded of the merits of something.

Is that because essentially Ireland is a corporate tax haven because the Government and the Department of Finance are well aware that corporations book profits in Ireland that are not made in Ireland because of CCCTB would cut across some of that activity?

Mr. Ronan Hession

We reject completely the characterisation as a tax haven.

We do not meet any international definition of a tax haven. As far as we are concerned we have a transparent statute-based tax system. We do not agree with that characterisation of our system. We have already agreed the anti-avoidance measures in this proposal in the anti-tax avoidance directive. That is not consistent with being an apologist for tax avoidance.

Analysis of the previous proposal and the Commission's initial figures, which we have yet to discuss in full with the Commission, indicate that it will eat into our tax base. If that turns out to be true, our understanding of the fiscal rules is that will have to be paid for some other way by a cutback in services or taxes raised elsewhere. The analysis in 2011 was that increasing the rate would not deliver that. We have to be mindful that we are going into this with an open mind but not an empty mind. We are aware where the pinch points are but our analytical scepticism is a prudent point of view not to defend any particular-----

It was mentioned at the beginning of the meeting that this is a technical briefing rather than a political debate. I would like members to be aware of that.

If Ireland is not a tax haven how is it that the top ten companies in Ireland between 2008 and 2012 paid 24% of corporation tax, presumably generating 24% of corporation profits and are responsible for less than 1% of employment? The Revenue Commissioners have provided a table showing that each worker of that 1% is associated with €7.7 million worth of corporation tax which if they were paying 12.5% - being generous to them – means that they are generating €62 million in profits. How is that explained except by the fact that profits are being booked in Ireland that are not made here?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I am not sure I fully understand the question except that the Deputy's characterisation of tax haven is that we do not tax companies. Is the Deputy saying we do tax companies excessively or that more tax is booked here than belongs here?

That is the point I am making here, which relates to the common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB. Profits are being booked in Ireland and tax is being paid on them at a relatively low level that is unlikely to have been made here. Are workers at the top ten companies in Ireland really making €62 million in profit a year for their companies or, and this is precisely what in my understanding the CCCTB aims to address, are profits being booked in Ireland that are not made here?

Ms Kate Levey

I think the Deputy is referring to a Revenue publication and I have another one here before me about corporation tax receipts. It is important to know that corporation tax receipts in Ireland are 8.3% of total tax revenue, equivalent to 2.5% of gross domestic product, GDP. Both of those are within half a percentage point of the average for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, countries. We collect the same proportion of corporation tax when compared with total tax revenue and GDP as do other jurisdictions.

In respect of the CCCTB, formulary apportionment and how it operates, there are two competing philosophies about how to allocate profits between different countries. On the one hand, there is the OECD and the "arm's length principle", which seeks to identify where value add is generated. It is often generated by relatively low numbers of people where, for example, it is focused on research and development or high value-add types of activity. On the other hand, there is the formulary apportionment, which is divided by staff assets and sales. The difference between consolidation and the current international OECD rules for allocating profits between jurisdictions is that under consolidation, the biggest markets, the jurisdictions where the most sales are made, will capture a proportionally higher amount of the revenue regardless of where the value-added activity took place.

There is a real debate to be had about how to apportion it absolutely and the balance between labour assets and sales, that is a fair point. It is also, however, clear that companies are able to take advantage of the fact that there is no common way of assessing corporation tax. I get the impression that Revenue and the Department of Finance have not made any assessment of the impact this would have on tax revenue. If the top 20 corporations paid 43% of corporation tax, presumably they all would be over the €750 million threshold. Presuming they were, have we an estimate of what that would cost the Exchequer?

Mr. Ronan Hession

As I explained, this proposal was published five weeks ago. We are doing a preliminary analysis. We may need to commission more detailed work on that. The Commission's published view is that the impact on corporation tax receipts would be a reduction of 0.14% which, based on 2014 figures, was approximately €250 million. It foresees a buoyancy effect from the CCCTB and sees the overall proposal as being tax neutral. The publication by the Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI, yesterday draws quite heavily on the analysis by Ernst & Young in 2011 which stated that foreign direct investment, FDI, would be reduced by 4.6% and corporation tax receipts by 5.7%. There were further impacts outlined in the new Ernst & Young analysis that GDP would be negatively affected by 1.4% and employment by 1.3%. The effect would be greatest on Ireland. The analysis that has come out so far, whether from the Commission, the ESRI or Ernst & Young, points to a negative effect on corporation tax receipts. The Commission argues that it expects a buoyancy effect that would neutralise that. I am not an expert on the fiscal rules but my understanding is that ordinarily, if we were to introduce a new tax expenditure we would not be allowed to pay for it by buoyancy measures. We would have to find the money upfront.

I do not know which report referred to the potential FDI loss of 4.6%.

Mr. Ronan Hession

That is coming from the ESRI report published on Monday but it refers back to the Ernst & Young work in 2011. Even though it was published as a new document the analysis was familiar to us from that time. Even though the earlier CCCTB was optional for everybody, Ernst & Young modelled what a mandatory CCCTB would do.

Was that on everything or just the €750 million plus?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Yes on everything. That is a good question.

That is not the witnesses' analysis so they can take it or not. How does the argument that Ireland is not a tax haven tally with the idea that if we come up with a common consolidated corporate tax base, FDI will drop by almost 5%? If corporations are not here to avoid paying taxes why, if we have a different way of allocating taxes across Europe and where they are paid, would FDI drop?

Mr. Ronan Hession

In a rational commercial decision they will consider what will be the net effect on their book if they are to pay more tax in Ireland compared with another jurisdiction.

It will be the same anywhere in the EU. That is the point. They will be the same sort of activities, no matter where they set themselves up, or they will pay on the same base.

Mr. Ronan Hession

Well our base is very broad. This is a narrowing of our base. Strictly speaking, this could be seen in a perverse sort of way as a tax cut.

Why then would FDI fall?

Mr. Ronan Hession

The overall effect on how the tax bill would be shared out between the different jurisdictions would make Ireland comparatively less attractive. They would move to where the people are.

Ms Kate Levey

I do not have anything particular to add to that other than the fact that companies are attracted to invest in a jurisdiction because its rate is lower than others does not make it a tax haven.

It has nothing to do with the rate.

Ms Kate Levey

If profits are generated in Ireland, the company has the benefit of the 12.5% rate. If it is part of a multinational group that operates throughout the EU and will now be subject to the CCCTB, the Deputy is correct, its profits will be allocated on a different basis throughout the whole of the EU, including that sales factor that has a particular impact on us.

Therefore, more of the profits will be allocated outside Ireland and less profit will benefit from the 12.5% rate. This would make Ireland comparatively less attractive.

Incentives such as the research and development tax credit are designed to increase the amount of research and development. Incentives like that will disappear. The ability to differentiate by way of particular tax incentives will disappear under the CCCTB. This is another reason why there might be an impact on foreign direct investment.

Mr. Ronan Hession

I would draw a distinction between having tax competition and having a tax haven. The OECD has been very clear that it does not have a difficulty with tax competition but that it does have a difficulty with harmful tax competition. The harmful measures identified in the OECD's work are subject to scrutiny at international level. Countries have a sovereign right to choose their own tax rate and the OECD recognises that. In fairness to the Commission, it also recognises that in its proposal. It is very clear that it is not providing for harmonisation of rates. We need to be fair to it on that point.

Even Brazil believes Ireland is a tax haven but that is a debate we can have. Tax competition is harmful for public services and for tax revenue across the world. The only winners from the ideology of tax competition are the corporations that get away with not paying tax.

If there were CCCTB, with a threshold of €750 million plus or an arrangement right across the board, would it have a negative impact on accountancy firms and corporate tax lawyers, of whom there are quite a few in Ireland? Would it diminish their ability to advise companies on getting the best possible tax deals within the European Union? Obviously, it would not affect matters outside the European Union.

Mr. Ronan Hession

I do not see how that would be the case. It may be that there would be more competition between the European offices of the big four firms. I refer to a common knowledge pool. When the OECD published the BEPS report, it issued its own questions and answers and addressed formulary apportionment, which is the mechanism used on the CCCTB. It made the point that we do not know what the tax planning opportunities would be under that. Certainly, it is possible to criticise the existing system because there is no tax planning around it. It is untested. I said earlier that I would be surprised if a common base were impenetrable in respect of tax planning.

It is worth bearing in mind that the issue of advisers, etc., is the subject of a separate initiative at EU level in terms of mandatory disclosure of tax planning regimes. Ireland is one of the few countries that has that already domestically. We have already been supported in principle in that. Separate to the way companies pay tax or the way governments behave in a tax base, the role of advisers is up for discussion. That derives from action 13 of the BEPS report. There is more to be said there in terms of how they behave. I do not believe it is necessarily a point that the Commission has identified in favour of the CCCTB. One could infer from its belief that it reduces compliance costs that it envisages a lesser role for tax advisers, but I am putting words in its mouth somewhat in that regard.

I have a couple of issues to raise. Many of the points have been covered. We are referring to a corporate tax base and there were references to income tax. It has nothing to do with income tax at all.

May I make a point that follows on from that of Deputy Paul Murphy? What is proposed will not necessarily eliminate or reduce tax avoidance, which is also known by some people as tax planning opportunities. That will still occur as much or as little as before. Is there no reason why CCCTB itself would change that?

Mr. Ronan Hession

There is a significant portion of the directive that deals with tackling tax avoidance. The point I was making earlier, which is not a criticism of the proposal, is that many of the measures were already in the anti-tax avoidance directive. Their implementation is not contingent on this proposal. The Commission can speak for itself but I guess it would say that agreeing a common base with common rules brings greater simplicity and transparency and, therefore, less opportunity for arbitrage.

An open question from the Department's point of view concerns the fact that international tax co-operation on this goes far beyond EU borders. The OECD inclusive framework now includes approximately 100 countries so we are dealing with everywhere, including North America, South America, Africa and the Far East. We are reminded of how small Europe is when we go to the meetings. Much of the tax planning that has become notorious is not purely within EU borders. The OECD reports were trying, in a very meticulous and surgical way, to identify the various weaknesses that existed and to find very targeted measures to shut them down. There was an amazing amount of international consensus on that. We would always have a concern if doing something different or new at EU level were in some way to slow down the momentum of those reforms. That is something of which we would be mindful.

Mr. Hession and Deputy Michael McGrath stated the base we have is relatively wide by international or EU standards. It is almost a mathematical equation in that if the base is narrowed and the rate is not changed – we do not want to change the rate – we will effectively be collecting less, even if the other rules were left before going near the sales location, or the location of assets or the payroll. If one narrows the base at 12.5%, one will be taxing less than one was taxing before. Is that a fair point?

Mr. Ronan Hession

It is really a question of the mathematics. The Ernst & Young analysis carried out about five years ago suggested that even if Ireland were to increase the rate to compensate, it would not work. Our foreign direct investment and investment environment is too sensitive to the rate. It would be self-defeating. We have to do our own analysis of what we think the effect would be. At present, we have older analyses that we can certainly talk about for now until we get our figures together. We have the Commission's own analysis, into which we have yet to dig with it. One factor that is different now is that we have the fiscal rules. There is external disciplining of how we run a balanced budget in that if it were to eat into the base, it would have to be paid for. That would mean either raising other taxes or scaling back the ambition in public expenditure.

The Department is relying on older analysis and doing its own analysis. When is the latter likely to be published or available?

Mr. Ronan Hession

It is probably too early in the process to say. This proposal emerged about five weeks ago. We are doing what we can internally. Despite how far we have got, it is becoming clear to us that we will need a deeper piece of work. In the new year, we will probably consider commissioning work. We will have to try to time that so it will have an input into the policy discussion.

With regard to the new CCCTB assessment, transfer pricing is effectively gone.

Mr. Ronan Hession

Within the European Union. It is still relevant for transactions outside the European Union but, as Ms Kate Levey said earlier, there are essentially two philosophies now emerging, the first being the OECD arm's-length principle, which until now has been the epitome of the OECD's tax philosophy and the international standard for how transactions between groups should be taxed, and the second being formulary apportionment, which is under CCCTB. That is obviously a big step. All EU member states but one are at the OECD table and signed up to the arm's-length principle. This is an extremely technical area. Introducing formulary apportionment would not be a complete replacement because the other arrangement would still operate for third countries. That additional technical complexity could be an issue in itself.

Does the €750 million refer to global turnover as opposed to just EU turnover or turnover out of a unit that operates out of Ireland?

Mr. Ronan Hession

I stand open to correction in saying that threshold comes from the directive on country-by-country reporting. It kicks in at that level. Companies have to report on their group-wide activities to particular revenue authorities, which then share it among themselves.

That is the threshold that operates at that level. It has been carried over as an identified threshold for a big company.

Can you identify at this stage how many companies based in Ireland and paying corporation tax in Ireland meet the €750 million threshold? Are they all multinational companies? Are there any indigenous companies that meet that figure?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Approximately 50 of these companies have a parent in Ireland. Those we do not have sight of are those with a subsidiary in Ireland but a parent elsewhere in the EU. They are covered by the threshold through another gate. I am unsure whether Ms Levey wants to add anything with regard to the multinational component.

Ms Kate Levey

I am afraid we do not have detail on the number of indigenous versus multinational companies. By way of general information, there is a relatively small number of large indigenous multinationals.

You have said it is a work in progress. Since this has been going on for 15 years, I imagine it will take a while longer. It requires unanimity. Do we have an idea of the position of other countries? Obviously, some countries stand to benefit from it more than others. Several countries will be subject to a negative rather than a positive impact. Do we have an idea as to which countries are less in favour of the proposals or which have stated they are more in favour of it?

Mr. Ronan Hession

Because of the process the Houses of the Oireachtas are going through now in respect of the reasoned opinion, the parliaments are probably ahead of the governments in some jurisdictions because they are facing an eight-week deadline. At political level, the next two EU Council presidencies will push this file. Ministers will only really begin to engage at that stage.

The Dutch Parliament has issued a reasoned opinion in terms of the consolidation aspect but not the common base aspect. The Estonian Parliament has decided not to issue a reasoned opinion. There is a peloton of other parliaments examining the issue. I imagine the picture will become clearer in the new year.

Some maintain this would decimate our revenue in respect of the corporation tax take of €7 billion or €7.5 billion. If one considers the sales element for the aforementioned 50 companies, it is obvious that most of the sales are not being made in Ireland. Significantly, the multinational companies are in Ireland to be part of the EU. In some cases they are selling outside the EU as well. The staff, including labour and payroll, could be or may not be a major part of it. Let us consider the location of the assets. Many assets of companies nowadays include brand names, intangible assets, intellectual property and so on. Could companies relocate assets in or out of countries relatively easily? It is not all plant, equipment and vehicles and so on.

Mr. Ronan Hession

The Commission has foreseen that possibility. It has excluded certain assets, such as intangible assets, precisely because of the point you have made. In other words, their mobile nature would mean-----

Sorry to cut across you but those assets are not part of the definition of assets. Only fixed assets are in question. Is that correct?

Mr. Ronan Hession

It related to immovable assets.

It includes property, plant, equipment, vehicles and so on. That would be a small component of the balance sheets of many large companies, presumably.

Mr. Ronan Hession

I imagine that is probably what is coming through in the analysis. Let us consider the previous analysis and what we are seeing now. I have yet to see analysis suggesting that it is positive in terms of revenue, especially in terms of corporation tax. It is one of those files. We have had several EU files in the past year, as well as international tax proposals. We have discussed them in terms of tax principles and the correct design. To some extent, in this case it comes down to the money. What would the impact be on the base of a country like Ireland? Could Ireland afford it?

Having said that, we are having this conversation using data from other people. I am not suggesting that we have the right answer compared with others. However, we believe the onus is on those of us in the Department, along with our colleagues in Revenue, to undertake the analysis and put forward our figures. It goes different ways. Ms Levey made the point about how the treatment of research and development under the common base is in some ways less generous than it is now in Ireland. There is a net figure but there will be pluses and minuses within that. There will be negotiations and naturally, every country will arrive at the table seeking to push the elements favourable to it and to exclude other elements. What we have now is a starting point. What we have learned from experience is that there will be a process of negotiation. Obviously, we will have to box clever in that negotiation in terms of how we put across the Irish case.

No other members have indicated they wish to contribute. I thank all of our witnesses, Mr. Ronan Hession, Ms Kate Levey, Ms Yvonne Quirke and Mr. Brendan Crowley for their attendance and for the opening statements.

Sitting suspended at 5.45 p.m. and resumed at 5.50 p.m.

We will continue to scrutinise the following EU proposals on a corporate tax reform package, including the common consolidated corporate tax base: COM (2016) 683; COM (2016) 685; COM (2016) 686; and COM (2016) 687.

The witnesses from the European Commission are Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp, head of company taxation initiatives unit; Mr. Uwe Ihli, taxation and customs unit; and Mr. Tim Hayes. I remind members and witnesses that we need to conclude by 4.45 p.m. I welcome all of our witnesses to this section of the meeting.

Before we begin, I will make a note on privilege. I wish to advise witnesses that by virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, they are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. If they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence relating to a particular matter and they continue to do so, they are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of the proceedings is to be given and they are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise nor make charges against any person, persons or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

I invite Mr. Zuijdendorp to make his brief opening remarks.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

I thank the committee. It is a pleasure to be here today. On 25 October 2016, the Commission proposed a package of legislative proposals which included two proposals for a relaunched common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB, that is, a proposal on the common tax base and a proposal on consolidation, alongside a dispute resolution mechanism for double taxation and an amendment to the anti-tax avoidance directive, to address hybrid mismatches. Today, I will focus mainly on the CCCTB proposals, which are the centrepiece of the package.

For the European Commission, the CCCTB is the epitome of what we perceive as a corporate tax system for the future. The relaunched CCCTB initiative reflects an effort to bring together the policy priorities for business facilitation and the need for fairer taxation in a globally integrated economy that operates within open markets. The Commission first proposed the CCCTB in 2011 with a view to enhancing the Internal Market for businesses. However, the magnitude of the project led Council negotiations to stall. In the meantime, the idea of a CCCTB continued receiving support from the European Parliament, businesses and stakeholders around Europe. In its 2015 action plan on corporate taxation, the Commission announced its intention to relaunch the CCCTB. The relaunch of the CCCTB initiative is structured as a staged approach which will consist of two steps. Member states will first need to build and capitalise on the extensive technical work that has already been accomplished on the rules for the tax base and, only when this framework is secured, touch upon the more complex aspect of consolidation. It is important to bear in mind that for the European Commission, the CCCTB project remains a single one and that the two steps are inextricably linked. I should also clarify from the outset that the CCCTB stays away from the issue of tax rates. The context of the proposal does not reach further than the calculation of the tax base. The common rules do not interfere with the determination of the tax liability and national budgetary priorities of member states.

The most notable change in the re-launched CCCTB is that it will be mandatory for all EU companies in financial accounting groups with consolidated group revenues of more than €750 million. Non-qualifying companies - those below €750 million - may still opt for the rules of the common base or CCCTB, as the case may be, subject to certain conditions. They will have to meet the conditions to be within the scope of the directives. The mandatory scope primarily serves the objective of fairer taxation. It aligns the CCCTB with the policy priority for clamping down on the opportunities for tax avoidance but only targets those who possess the resources to engage in such practices. This is why it is limited to larger multinational groups with a consolidated revenue exceeding €750 million. As already mentioned by our colleagues just now, these are the same companies which are subject to the country-by-country reporting between tax administrations, a proposal which was agreed by the Council earlier this year.

I will not go into too much detail on the CCCTB. I would, however, like to give an overview of how this system works, especially for those who are not familiar with it. I will then briefly present some of the specific new elements introduced by the relaunch. The first step in applying the CCCTB is the calculation of the individual tax bases. For the companies that form part of the CCCTB group, tax bases will be calculated according to a common set of rules, which will be provided for in the directives. The next step is that all results are added up by the principal tax authority to create a consolidated tax base for the group in the EU. This means that loss-making results of one company of one member state are automatically set off against the taxable profits of others in the same group. The tax return will be filed in one member state. This is the so-called one-stop shop. The advantage of a common base is there will be no transfer pricing formalities within the group. The principal authority will apply the apportionment formula to distribute the consolidated tax base across the group. Taxable revenues are allocated to each company of the group based on the weight of the three factors. They are assets, labour and sales by destination, which each account for one third of the formula. As already mentioned, member states are and remain free to set tax rates on their taxable shares individually.

There are a number of important new elements in the proposals. One concerns research and development. The treatment of research and development has always been rather generous under the CCCTB. The proposal of 2011 provided for full deductibility of research and development costs in the year in which they were incurred. There is therefore no capitalisation and depreciation of research and development over a number of years. This basic regime has been retained under the relaunched proposals with the exception of immovable property. We included it in the initial 2011 proposal but one of the results of the discussions with member states was that it was better to leave this element of the immediate deduction out of the treatment of research and development. In addition, the relaunched rules on the common tax base provide for a so-called super-deduction whereby research and development costs up to the first €20 million receive an extra deduction of 50%. In total, there will be a deduction of 150% of the costs. For amounts above €20 million, the extra deduction is 25%. In that case, the deduction will be 125% in total.

Innovative startups are entitled to an enhanced super-deduction which allows them to deduct up to 200% of their research and development costs for amounts up to €20 million. We went for a rule that supports innovation and the actual research and development activity itself. This is contrary to intellectual property, IP, boxes, where one looks at the income coming from an already developed asset. Our rule promotes the employment and the fact that research is being undertaken. Given that most of research and development costs involve payroll, our rule should be expected to bring forth considerable benefits in terms of jobs and growth. By giving larger-scale deductions for costs up to €20 million, the research and development incentive will give a boost to smaller companies with limited research and development budgets to allow them to grow. It will therefore encourage the creation and expansion of young, innovative enterprises.

The second new element in the CCCTB proposals is the allowance for growth and investment, AGI. This is an adjustment mechanism for neutralising the debt bias in current tax systems. It will put debt financing and equity financing on an equal footing. The rule is entirely in line with the objectives of the capital markets union and is aimed to discourage excessive indebtedness and so bring greater stability to companies and therefore also to the union. The AGI will reward companies that strengthen their financing structures by boosting their equity base. In particular, small and medium-sized enterprises that often struggle to secure loans should be expected to reap the benefits from this rule. The AGI framework is designed in such a way as to prevent cascading effects in the deductibility of what is commonly referred to as notional interest.

We have taken measures to ensure the system cannot be abused, for example, by excluding participations. Where there is a parent company with a subsidiary, we have made sure the parent company cannot claim the notional interest deduction for the capital of the subsidiary because that is capital from which a deduction should be claimed at the level of the subsidiary.

A final element is a temporary cross-border loss relief with recapture mechanisms. This is a cash flow facility to make up for the absence of cross-border consolidation at the first stage. The repercussions of this facility are, however, contained by a series of anti-tax abuse measures. For example, there will be automatic recapture of relief after five years if the subsidiary has not returned to profit in the meantime.

The CCCTB, common consolidated corporate tax base, can offer many benefits to Irish businesses, particularly in terms of tax certainty and simplicity for Irish-based multinationals which operate in other member states. These benefits, combined with Ireland's 12.5% rate, would enhance Ireland's competitiveness, not reduce it. Foreign investors and cross-border businesses are keen to have the CCCTB in place. They are among our strongest supporters. Ireland's primary concern is with consolidation. The two-step approach means that once the common base is secured, we can give full focus to finding an approach to consolidation that all member states can accept. In any case, with unanimity, Ireland can feel secure that its views will be taken on board before the final CCCTB is agreed. It would send an important signal in the EU and internationally if Ireland were to constructively engage on this file.

I thank our guests for their presentation.

From my observations on the CCCTB proposals, I do not see them going anywhere. I cannot see how these proposals are not encroaching on member state competence over taxation. The Commission is essentially seeking to rewrite our entire corporation tax code. It tells us the rate is a matter for Ireland but the rate will apply to something determined by these common rules. Once the base is agreed, the allocation of profits will again be determined by EU-wide rules, if these proposals were introduced. How is this not an encroachment on the core competence of member states over the issue of taxation?

There is a long-standing argument, based on analysis, that overall this is a big negative for Ireland in terms of our corporation tax receipts and our attractiveness as a country for inward investment. Will the delegation address this? When it comes to the consolidation and allocation of profits across the EU, the three factors will be one third, one third, one third. One of them is sales by destination. Ireland will rank close to a statistical zero on that one third, given the scale of the Irish market in the EU. This is the basis on which profits will be allocated across different member states.

How does the delegation deal with the issue of competence and the argument, backed up by analysis, that this is a negative for Ireland? It seems to me that it is a matter of time before the Irish Government will repeat its previous position that it is not in favour of this.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

We believe this proposal is not encroaching on member states' competence. Otherwise, we would not have proposed it. We believe our proposals are entirely in line with, and in the spirit of, subsidiarity and proportionality. It is important to keep in mind that what we do is make proposals. It is for member states to either adopt or reject these proposals. In the tax area, they do so in unanimity. There are checks and balances to ensure that anything that is agreed at EU level carries the support of all member states, including Ireland. On that score, I do not believe we would have any concerns that anything we propose would encroach on member states' sovereignty.

On the perceived negative effects for Ireland, I would be a bit cautious not to draw the conclusion too rapidly. We will carefully need to listen to what the effects on individual member states will be. When we present proposals, we look at their impact on the 28 member states. What we did not do in this case was drill down to the level of the individual member states because our modelling does not allow that in any great detail. This is also a matter in which member states will need to be engaged. To drill down to the level of member states, one needs the kind of information that only member states can provide, such as tax files. Member states are best placed to provide that information. We are happy to do that analysis with them.

On the figures presented in the impact assessment, it is important to note the system is designed to be tax neutral. Broadly, this is the case. There may be minor pluses or minuses but when one looks at the grand total, they are designed to be neutral. We saw the figures mentioned in the newspapers and they were used as the basis for the ESRI report referred to in the previous discussions. There are probably a few caveats to be made. The figures used here were used in the study carried out by the Irish Government and Ernst & Young in the context of the first CCCTB proposal in 2011. This was based on figures from 2008 and it may be slightly outdated by now. This an area in which we might want to compare notes to see how the figures compare to those used in our impact assessment. Moreover, the effects measured on the CCCTB are from the 2011 proposal. There are some fundamental changes in the relaunched proposal with method, the two-step approach and scope. The new proposal also means the CCCTB will be mandatory for certain groups of taxpayers, which was not the case in the 2011 proposal. The new proposal has new features such as research and development incentives and allowance for growth and investment, while it has been strengthened with the integration of all the elements of the anti-tax avoidance directive. All these changes were not factored into the study carried out before. We need to be cautious in using the figures related to the previous proposal to assess the impact of the current proposal on any member state.

We were very happy to compare notes with member states in carrying out these analyses of what the new proposals mean for them.

On the allocation and as mentioned already, there are three factors. If one looks at member states, one will see that certain factors will be more relevant for some than for others. It is clear, for example, that for member states with large domestic markets, the factor of sales by destination would be more important than for smaller member states. In the case of Ireland, the other two factors, namely, capital and payroll, would be considerable. I would not speculate on the outcome because this is something that we will still need to discuss with the member states. I certainly would not jump to the conclusion that because Ireland has a relatively small domestic market, the formula will always work to the disadvantage of Ireland and other member states in a similar position. If this was the case and if that was the outcome of the discussions with member states, then I am sure that there will be further discussions on whether this is the right formula and the right weighting for each of the different factors. Of course, we are very open to having that discussion with the member states.

I should add that the formula is not something we have invented in the Commission. It is a formula that has already been used for over 100 years in the United States of America because it has a system of formulary apportionment. There are similar formulary apportionment systems applied in other countries around the world, including Canada and Switzerland. In that sense, what we are proposing is not a complete novelty. It is a system that is already in force in several places today.

I thank Mr. Zuijdendorp for his presentation. The Commission issued a fact sheet entitled Questions and Answers on the package of corporate tax reforms on 25 October 2016. That document argues that a common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB, will "reduce harmful tax competition". Does Mr. Zuijdendorp regard Ireland as one of the EU states that is engaged in harmful tax competition?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

I do not think that is a question on the technical content of CCCTB proposals.

First, I would like to echo what our colleagues from the Department of Finance said earlier, namely, that the Commission also distinguishes between harmful tax competition and tax competition per se. As regards harmful tax competition, the EU has a long track record of discussions about and efforts to remove harmful tax practices in the EU. I refer in particular to the work of the code of conduct group which started in the late 1990s. That group has, over the years, rolled back harmful features of member states' preferential regimes in more than 100 cases, some of which involved Ireland. Virtually all member states have their share of harmful preferential regimes that were rolled back.

On the question of whether we consider Ireland, in the current context, as a country involved in harmful tax questions, I do not think the answer is "Yes". No, this is not the case. Have we had issues with certain preferential regimes in the past? Yes, we have but in this respect Ireland is certainly not unique. We have looked at all member states and have found fault in most. All we can say is that in this respect we are in a much better place now than we were ten or 15 years ago.

Regarding the limiting of the proposals to company groups with turnover in excess of €750 million, what percentage of total profits in the EU does that capture and what is the rationale for it? If the rationale is transactional costs and so forth for smaller companies that cannot avail of this kind of tax avoidance in any event, why would some opt to engage in it?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

The rationale for limiting the mandatory aspect of the CCCTB to larger multinational enterprises is that we believe - this is also borne out by the evidence - that such enterprises have a greater capacity to engage in aggressive tax planning to reduce their tax burden. We know from studies that on average their tax burden is substantially lower than that of small and medium sized enterprises. The focus on multinationals above €750 million is a pragmatic one. It catches the most relevant population of companies in terms of those that are most likely to engage in aggressive tax planning. According to our figures, worldwide there are some 6,000 multinational enterprises which would fall under the scope of the proposal, that is, which have a turnover of more than €750 million, out of which some 3,500 are EU based. We are looking at a manageable population but still a very relevant one. I will ask my colleague to provide information on the share of total profits in the EU.

Mr. Uwe Ihli

In the impact assessment on page 108 there is a table showing at EU level the consolidated turnover for different groups, for example, those below €50 million, above €50 million, above €500 million and above €750 million. It shows the corresponding share of unconsolidated turnover in the EU. It shows the relevance of the groups for cross-border activities. The €750 million group, in terms of purely domestic turnover and purely domestic activities, has the lowest percentage from the group turnover.

What has been the engagement with the Irish authorities on this so far? The witnesses said that it would send a very important signal if Ireland were to constructively engage on this file. Is there a suggestion there that Ireland has not constructively engaged on the file thus far?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

No, quite the opposite in fact. Ireland has been a very constructive partner in our discussions, even on the 2011 proposal. I should stress that those discussions were at the technical level, however. They never reached the level of political decision-making. It has always been made clear, not just by Ireland but by other member states as well, that engagement and active participation in technical discussions was without prejudice to the political appreciation of these proposals. In that context, it is early days. We have just issued our proposal and have had a first presentation by Commissioner Moscovici to the ECOFIN Council, where first reactions were broadly positive or at least there were no member states standing up and saying that they would never accept this. It is still early days and we know, of course, that when we start discussing the details of these proposals, that concerns will be raised and positions will be expressed by the different member states. We are very much looking forward to those discussions.

The ECOFIN Council has already adopted some first conclusions on the package, that is, on the CCCTB as well as on the anti-tax avoidance, ATA, ll and dispute resolution proposals. At least in regard to the CCCTB proposals it has asked the incoming presidencies to continue to work on them. There has been an invitation to the Maltese and Estonian presidencies to work on these files during their terms. It is very important that these proposals do not just land on the nearest shelf but that there is actually an active debate on them at the Council.

I want to ask about the proposal for the common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB. Has it distinguished between trading profits and non-trading profits?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

No it does not. It is important to note that we are designing a system that should meet the needs of 28 member states. We know there are different traditions-----

So there will only be profits?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes.

In Mr. Zuijdendorp's statement he said, "I should also clarify from the outset that the CCCTB stays away from the issue of tax rates". That is simply not true because the witness is saying that if this measure goes through one of Ireland's tax rates is gone; it is either the 25% non-trading income or the 12.5%. One of them is gone because two rates cannot exist. Is that correct?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

It is correct to the extent that companies would be covered by the CCCTB, either on a managed or optional basis. They would only have one set of taxable profits so only one rate to apply to those profits.

Can I ask Mr. Zuijdendorp why does he come before the committee - and I am sorry if I sound a bit hostile - and make a statement such as this, which is a blatant attempt to pull the wool over politicians' eyes by saying, "We are not going to touch your rates", knowing well that one of the rates has to go if this proposal comes in to effect. It is not right and it treats this committee and the people who attend the committee with disrespect. Mr. Zuijdendorp should have come to the committee to say that he wanted to make it clear that if the CCCTB is accepted by all the member states then one of the existing rates for corporations in this State will no longer apply. Is that the accurate version of what he attempted to say earlier?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

I would have to contradict the Deputy on this point. Deputy Doherty is assuming that the CCCTB will replace the existing Irish corporate tax regime, which is not an assumption that is in our proposals. It is entirely left up to member states to decide whether they will have two parallel tax systems in place. The proposal provides that member states have to introduce the CCCTB and that it will be mandatory for certain groups of companies. The proposals do not say that member states should do away with their existing national corporate tax systems.

The companies, however, for which this measure is mandatory, will have to do away with their existing tax rates.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

They will have to have a single rate-----

Yes. Exactly. With respect, Mr. Zuijdendorp is trying it again. We know there is going to be a parallel system. There will be the existing system for companies that have the threshold of below €750 million and there will be the CCCTB, which means that one of the rates under the existing tax law will have to go. A bit of honesty is required in this debate. It is important. If the State decides to go down this direction, or not, then it needs to do so with its eyes wide open. Many of the issues people have with the European Union and where it is going is going are around this type of nonsense. We are big people. The Commission should sit down and explain this is what will apply, this is how it will work, this is what it will mean, instead of unelected Commission officials coming here and telling us not to worry, the rates are fine. The rates are not fine. If a State agrees to CCCTB - for the companies that are included either mandatorily or by opting in, only one rate will be allowed to apply. This is a fundamental change. One can argue whether or not one wants that, but it is a fundamental difference in how we tax corporations in the State. How will the Commission treat capital gains? Will it be one rate also?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes.

So Ireland will actually lose two of our tax rates. It is likely that the 33% and the 25% rates would go and we will have one rate for these multinational companies with turnover of above €750 million, which is the 12.5% rate.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

The common base does not distinguish between different types of profits, or indeed capital gains. It is one set of profits and they will be taxed.

For the 50 companies in the State to which the mandatory inclusion would apply there are currently three different tax rates apply to their profits. Does Mr. Zuijdendorp accept that point so far?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes.

Under this proposal, which the Commission says stays away from rates, Ireland would only be allowed to apply one rate to those profits?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

One rate for Ireland to decide.

Yes, we can decide what the rate is, but only one rate.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes.

Can I ask how the Commission arrived at the point, as illustrated in the model, where this measure would result in a reduction of around €250 million of corporation tax, which has been 0.14% of GDP.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

First, I should say, as I already pointed out, that these figures should be read with some caution. We used a general equilibrium model that is quite good at assessing the effects of tax reform on the group of 28 member states, but it is less accurate when it comes to pinpointing the exact consequences for each individual member state. This is simply because the model does not allow for that kind of differentiation. These figures, and the CCCTB's intentions, are to be budgetary neutral. That there may be a small plus or minus is more an effect of the model than an actual reflection of what might happen in practice. It is also important to note that there are certain things that are not captured by a model. These are quite significant elements. For example, it does not capture the effect of the new measures that we are introducing, the effect of the research and development deduction or the effect of the allowance for growth and investment. It also does not capture the effect that the application of anti-tax avoidance measures may have on the taxable revenues. We can assume that it should have a positive effect but we cannot model for it and therefore have not included it.

We have had a discussion with the Revenue and the Department and I questioned them as to whether they stood over the data set the Commission used in this model and they did not dispute the figures because they have not dealt with them in detail. I am finding it difficult to hear some of the previous exchanges we had with Revenue, but I believe it talked about 50 companies in Ireland would fall under the CCCTB proposal as mandatory. Of those 50 companies has the Commission received from Revenue a detailed list of their taxable profits and how they are applied? What type of data set is the Commission putting in to its model? Whatever the model is, what figures are we talking about? We have had reports in the past that talked about effective tax rates and in particular a company that produced widgets, which is similar to no company in Ireland. It all depends on what figures are being put in to the model. Can Mr. Zuijdendorp explain to the committee where the Commission got the data and is it real data from some of a sample of the 50 companies?

I will have to stop the Deputy after this response because I want to allow the other members in and we are very pushed for time. I ask the witness to be as brief as possible in his response. I will then invite Senator Burke in.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes. The data we used came from the so-called core tax model. They are real business data but we do not have the individual data on individual member states. We do not know which of the 50 companies, or whatever number, of Irish multinationals would be covered by these data. It is not something we have and this is where we need to work with member states to model the impacts that these proposals may have on their domestic situation.

Is the business data being used by the Commission the data of all the businesses instead of the businesses that would be captured?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes. It is the information of all the businesses in the EU.

It is, therefore, completely-----

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

A sample of that data.

It is a bit mad if Mr. Zuijdendorp does not mind me saying so. There are only 50 companies that are going to be captured under this model but there are thousands of businesses operating in the State. The Commission has used the data from the thousands of businesses as opposed to the 50 that will be captured within it but the data would be diluted with all the other information.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

It is important to note - I am taking the word of Irish colleagues - that there are around 50 businesses. Those are then the ones that would be mandatorily applying the CCCTB.

It does not count those that would opt into it, which may be a larger population.

Senator Paddy Burke is next. I remind all members to stick to five minutes.

I will be brief. I welcome the delegation. It has been stated that multinational groups will deal with a single tax administration within the EU, a principal tax authority that will be a one-stop-shop. However, the common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB, will have the ability to drive every parent company out of the EU. If the parent company is outside the EU, it can then go to whichever member state in which it decides to have a business. It can go to a country with a low tax system or the most favourable taxation system. Parent companies will leave the EU wholesale because they will be able to decide in which country they will be taxed favourably through the one-stop-shop.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Moving a parent out of the EU will not get a company out of the CCCTB and its mandatory application. In terms of the allocation of profits, it does not matter under the CCCTB where a company files its tax returns. That it may file in a member state with a low tax rate is of no consequence, given that the member state may only get a small share of the allocated profits. Having the main taxpayer in that member state does not mean that profits will be taxed at its favourable rate. The effect of applying the formula is that it does not matter where a company files its tax returns, as the allocation of profits is not decided on that basis, but on the basis of where its assets, payroll and-----

There would be no advantage or incentive to a parent company relocating to any EU state.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Not for the reason of reducing the tax burden on its profits. If it wished to reduce that burden, it would have to move its assets or staff - moving customers would be more difficult - to a particular member state. If a company invested in research and development in Ireland, that would increase the payroll factor and Ireland would get a larger share, which would be taxed at 12.5% or whatever rate Ireland chose to apply.

I thank the witnesses for attending. Based on an initial review, this would be an unmitigated disaster for Ireland. There can be legitimate arguments about how much tax companies pay and where they pay it, but we must be clear on who sets the rules. The member state has that sovereign right.

Time is against us, so I will ask a few brief questions. In terms of domestic courts' jurisdiction over tax matters, how could a High Court decision be sustained if it affected German yields?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

If there is a dispute over how the common tax base is to be interpreted, that is an issue of EU law. The European Court of Justice would be the final arbiter.

This would water down the jurisdiction of Irish courts over tax matters. Would that not be a fair point to make?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

It is for the Deputy to draw that conclusion. All that I can say is-----

It is simply-----

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

-----that the consequence of-----

An Irish High Court decision that affected Germany's yield under the CCCTB would not be sustainable.

It has been mentioned that corporation tax would be ring-fenced. Many companies depend on offsets against VAT and other taxes as a point of cashflow. However, that would not be sustainable under this model because corporation tax would be ring-fenced. Is that correct?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

If it concerns the payment of taxes, it is a matter for the member state's competence and will remain so.

Mr. Zuijdendorp stated that, under the CCCTB, corporation tax would be ring-fenced. If so, it would not be available for offsets against other taxes in a sovereign nation.

Mr. Uwe Ihli

The CCCTB ends at the moment when, under permanent apportionment, the share of the company's profits earned in the EU is assigned to a member state. From the point at which Ireland or any other member state gets X in taxation, it applies its national rules.

But the apportionment is the primary focus for the member state.

Mr. Uwe Ihli

Yes.

That answers my question.

Mr. Uwe Ihli

That is the share of the member state, for which the member state's tax legislation and administration enter into play.

We are setting up a pan-European revenue authority to deal with this. To whom will it be accountable? The authority will collect and allocate this tax, ensure it is fairly done and adjudicate over matters of dispute.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

We are not setting up an EU tax administration with the CCCTB. This work will still be carried out by the tax administrations of the member states. However, they will co-operate. Sometimes, that will involve joint audits and relying on the tax administration of the principal taxpayer.

If there is a problem or dispute, someone must adjudicate on it. Who does that?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

The ultimate arbiter is the European Court of Justice.

On a simple tax matter that gets into difficulty, the witnesses are saying that a company would have to go to the European Court of Justice. That is incredible. We are overcomplicating this. Essentially, we are creating 27 tax bases and increasing bureaucracy and the costs on business. A consolidated accounting profit in consolidated accounts is different from a CCCTB. We are creating an extra layer of problems for a business. There is no flexibility to deal with local and national issues. Primary tax policy has to respond to those. That is one of its main objectives with a view to delivering for the people in a state. As such, the CCCTB would cause Ireland serious trouble. We are sensitive to foreign direct investment and we want fair tax rules, but what I have heard today concerns me in that regard.

Would Mr. Zuijdendorp like to respond?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

There was not really a question in the last statement.

That is why I am offering Mr. Zuijdendorp the chance to respond.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

No, thanks.

There was a question. There will be no flexibility to deal with national and local problems. Obviously, Mr. Zuijdendorp agrees with that statement because he said that there was no question on that point to answer.

I have listened. I cannot pronounce the witness' surname, so I will just call him Bert. Would it be a fair observation to say that the CCCTB is a Trojan horse for the EU to get control over individual member states' corporation tax rates?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

The short answer is "No". It is not our intention. We have made that abundantly clear.

We would also be underestimating the intelligence of members states if we thought that by putting forward a proposal on the tax base, we would get them, by way of the backdoor, to harmonise their tax rates. This is not our intention and we also do not believe that member states would accept this.

Is there not an intended or unintended consequence to this proposal? The Commission's proposal is based on one third of the assets, one third of the labour and one the third of the sales of a company. The effective tax take of a smaller member state with a small domestic market that has a major level of exports will be down compared to that of a large member state with a large domestic market. I am referring specifically to Ireland, which has a small open economy. We survive on exports. We have a population of approximately 5 million people. We have a large multinational presence here exporting to European Union member states' markets. Will small member states with their small-scale exports and small domestic markets not be disenfranchised compared to the large member states with large domestic markets?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

We do not think that should necessarily be the case.

Why not? With respect, the figures do not lie. Mr. Zuijdendorp is saying that, effectively, one third of this common consolidated corporate tax base will be based around sales. Let us consider the case of a company based in Ireland that makes 90% of its sales in Germany and only 2% in this country. At present, the Irish Exchequer is collecting 100% off the profits of that company at 12.5%. What will happen under the common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

We usually call it the triple CTB just to wind people up.

I remind everybody that we are short of time.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

The objective of the CCCTB is-----

No. I asked Mr. Zuijdendorp a specific question. What would happen in that case?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

I am answering the Deputy's question but I have to explain the objective of the CCCTB is to ensure that profits are taxed where they are generated. We believe that a formula is a better measure of ensuring that profits are taxed where they are generated than the current practices based on transfer pricing, which allow for a far greater degree of shifting profits to where they may be taxed at a lower rate rather than where they have been generated.

Surely the measures introduced recently to address BEPS and to eliminate the double-Irish arrangement are assisting in overcoming any issues that arise.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

That is certainly contributing and it is reducing the scope for profit shifting but we believe the CCCTB addresses the problems at the root. The base erosion and profit shifting measures are extremely important and that is why we support them and why we have proposals to introduce them in the EU but they address the consequences of base erosion and profit-shifting. The CCCTB addresses the problem at the root, so we believe it is more effective.

It seems that Commission is using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. This has been around since the year dot. It is like an old model of a car that the manufacturer keeps bringing out year after year. It will never sell. How will a multinational based in Ireland that makes a large proportion of its sales in the UK be taxed under the CCCTB if Brexit - as proposed and signposted - happens and Britain is outside the EU? That is a major question in an Irish context.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes. I will not speculate on Brexit but if we take the case of a random third country - and whether the UK will become a random third country-----

Outside the EU-----

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

Yes, outside the EU, but that remains to be decided.

Having previously been in the EU.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

In relations between the EU and third countries, the current transfer pricing practices will continue to apply. This is where the borders of the CCCTB are located. In terms of attributing profits between the EU tax base and third countries, we will still be relying on transfer pricing. If we are talking about relations with a third country, then that still continues to apply.

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

If 50% of the sales of an Irish company were in mainland Europe and 50% were in the UK, is Mr. Zuidendorp saying that 50% of profits that are earned in the UK will be taxed in Ireland at 12.5%?

Mr. Bert Zuijdendorp

They would be subject to the normal rules on the attribution of profits as they currently apply.

I do not have time to quiz Mr. Zuijdendorp but I concur with almost all the speakers who all have expressed serious reservations, from an Irish perspective, about the proposals in their current form. As they require unanimity, they will require a great deal of change but I am not sure if that is possible. I can see many people in this room at least being willing to sign up to them. I thank the witnesses for being here this afternoon.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.45 p.m. until 2 p.m. on Wednesday, 7 December 2016.
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