I welcome Mr. John Deady, counsellor in the UN section of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Deady has been invited to brief the committee on the issues surrounding the formations of UN peacekeeping missions, once a political decision for UN intervention has been made. Today's presentation is the second part of an exercise within this committee which will lead in due course to the preparation of a report by the committee on Ireland's continuing role in peacekeeping and our future involvement in UN mandated missions. Before we commence, I remind the meeting that while members are covered by privilege, others appearing before it are not. I invite Mr. Deady to commence his presentation.
UN Peacekeeping Missions: Presentation.
Mr. John Deady
Today, I will not be dealing with the Government's approach or policy to peacekeeping but rather the nuts and bolts operation when the UN Security Council decides to establish one.
The first objective in any looming crisis is to manage it in such a way that conflict does not break out. The Security Council will call on the parties in the dispute in question to resolve their differences peacefully. Leaders of neighbouring countries, who sometimes can be part of the problem, or other leaders with influence on the parties, will be encouraged to use their good offices in the effort to maintain peace. The UN Secretary General may appoint a personal envoy to mediate between the parties. Sometimes, these efforts are successful and we do not hear much about them.
When they are not successful and conflict occurs, the Security Council and the UN Secretary General follow the situation closely. UN efforts at this stage are directed to achieving a ceasefire, and if possible, a peace agreement. It is possible that a military intervention may take place by other states, with the authorisation of the Security Council, to create conditions for a ceasefire and the conclusion of a peace agreement which is known as a peace enforcement operation.
Ceasefire agreements and peace agreements concluded at the end of a period of conflict are usually fragile as the parties often do not trust each other. Outside help is necessary to ensure compliance, including a military force, to observe the ceasefire, to deter violation, to offer protection, where possible and within their capacity, to the population and to give confidence to the parties and the population so that normal life can resume. It also ensures that any necessary humanitarian relief can be delivered. It is at this stage that the Security Council is likely to consider the establishment of a mission, encompassing a peacekeeping operation.
The UN Secretariat's Department of Peacekeeping Operations will have anticipated the possibility or likelihood of the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. It will have done what it could to gather information on the internal situation in the country in question, to form estimates of the strength of armed groups and of the resources and support that they command. It will draw up provisional plans for a peacekeeping operation as the conflict develops, and it will want to be ready, as soon as conditions permit when the parties have achieved a ceasefire or the conflict has moved into a decisive phase, to provide the Secretary General with a full report on the situation. There will also be a proposal for a peacekeeping mission, including troop numbers and resources to be provided, what civilian components it should have and the appropriate mandate. The Secretary General will then send a report to the Security Council. A resolution is drafted, typically by a Security Council member with a close interest of one kind or another in the conflict, in close consultation with interested parties. It is discussed by the members of the Security Council, amended as necessary and adopted. This provides the legal basis for a peacekeeping operation.
In the past, when establishing peacekeeping operations, the Security Council acted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which concerns the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, it now acts under Chapter VII, which concerns actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. As this chapter includes Article 42, which provides that the Security Council may take such action by land, sea and air as may be necessary to establish peace and security, it gives more flexibility and robustness to the mandate and, more importantly, is regarded as such. It tends to get the attention of the various actors in the conflict more readily.
The resolution will usually establish an upper limit for troop numbers. The mandate is for six months and must, therefore, be renewed twice yearly. These mandate renewals provide an opportunity for the Security Council to review the operation on the basis of a report from the Secretary General. Troop contributing countries are closely briefed on progress of events in the conflict country. In the wake of the Brahimi report, they are now in possession of as much information as the members of the Security Council, their concerns are heard and taken into account. The Secretary General will appoint a special representative, usually an experienced career UN Secretariat staff member, who will be in overall charge of UN operations in the country in question. He will not be in charge of the day-to-day military operations. That is the responsibility of the military force commander. The special representative will be in charge of the general UN operations and it is his responsibly to attend the UN to brief the Security Council when it considers a renewal of the mandate or as events demand.
At this stage, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations gets in contact with states to request components for an operation. It will have identified what elements it needs such as infantry units, mechanised units, communications units, medical facilities, mine clearing units, engineering units, transport facilities, special forces, etc. It will also put together a headquarters staff, that is, the officers who will be engaged in the direction of the peacekeeping operation as a whole. The Secretary General, on the advice of his military adviser, will make the key appointment of force commander. A deputy force commander will also be appointed. HQ staff must be in place very quickly, before the main elements begin to arrive.
In inviting states to provide elements, and in making key staff appointments, Department of Peacekeeping Operations will not have regard merely to numbers, but also to capacity. The latter, clearly, must be a primary concern, but there is also a political necessity for Department of Peacekeeping Operations to have regard to geographic balance. The United Nations being a political organisation this is inevitable and desirable. Department of Peacekeeping Operations will turn to states that have agreements with the United Nations under the UN standby arrangements system as Ireland does because such states are, obviously, predisposed to respond positively to requests for troops.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations officials also draw on a wealth of experience, and a very wide range of contacts. They will be very familiar with track records, including those of individual officers. One obvious element for some peacekeeping operations will be the troops that may already be in the country, from states who participated in the "peace enforcement" phase. In other words, it would be a question of so-called "blue-hatting" these troops. Sometimes the question arises of whether these troops are suitable for "blue-hatting" and for engaging in the peacekeeping operation as distinct from a peace enforcement operation. What is the nature of their relationship with the population and the parties and so on? Occasionally this is a matter for discussion.
The military authorities of the states providing major elements to the mission will then wish to conduct a reconnaissance, to reassure themselves regarding the conditions their troops will face. They are responsible for the conditions they will face and the danger in which they might be placed. They will want to be satisfied regarding the level of security, medical facilities, accommodation, etc. This reconnaissance is usually carried out by a small group of military officers. All the various elements must then be transported to the operational area. This is usually done by aircraft chartered by the United Nations, and sometimes by sea as appropriate. The Russian Antinov aircraft is in demand for this kind of operation given its size. The United Nations enters into a status of forces agreement with the authorities of the country in question. This provides, inter alia, for the privileges and immunities of participating personnel and is regarded by the participating military forces as essential.
At the same time the civilian elements of the mission whose efforts focus on peace building are put together. There is a core political element to work with the parties in the implementation of the peace agreement and experts on economic reconstruction, governance and administration, human rights, and humanitarian relief. Attention is paid to the involvement of women in peace building efforts as the Security Council has recognised that women and children are particularly affected by conflict, their needs must be taken into account and their involvement in the peace building process can have very positive effects. The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters are a particular focus of both military and civilian elements of the mission. Sometimes this includes the repatriation of fighters if they are from another country.
The United Nations has two budgets, the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget. The demands on the peacekeeping budget vary in accordance with events. The UN secretariat puts forward an estimate based on ongoing or already mandated operations, but the mandating of a new mission will upset the estimates and can lead to an unanticipated demand on the member states. For instance, we are likely to receive a request for additional estimates for the new UN mission in Liberia and we will have to pay that.
When a state formally decides to participate the UN negotiates a memorandum of understanding with it. This memorandum contains details of the assets that the country in question will provide to the peacekeeping operation and establish the associated terms and conditions and provides for reimbursement by the United Nations for personnel and equipment costs. Personnel are usually reimbursed on a per person per month basis. The payment of allowances or per diems to individuals for service in the peacekeeping operation is then a matter for the authorities of the sending state.
The United Nations will also contribute to the cost of any necessary once-off purchase by the sending state, for instance of military vehicles, or other transport, essential to the operation. Reimbursement of a proportion of these expenses is covered by letters of assist agreed between the UN and the authorities of the sending state. There will not be total reimbursement because this equipment is the property of the sending state and returns with its troops to the country when it ends its mission. Disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation are often funded largely through voluntary contributions made by individual member states because this often involves economic and social support.
The steps outlined above may appear complex. However, given the various elements involved in mounting a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations acts remarkably quickly. The UN mission to Liberia is an example. The Security Council mandated the mission on 19 September last. Most of the HQ staff were in place in early October, and the main elements, including the Irish element, have been arriving in the country through the month of November. This is a notable achievement, by a bureaucracy that is very small; in fact, it is minuscule, by the standards of national defence establishments.
Obviously, speed is of the essence when mounting a peacekeeping operation but effectiveness is also of the essence when the operation is in place and carrying out its mandate. Both are necessary to maintain pressure on the parties to the ceasefire or the peace agreement, so that they will resist the temptation to resume hostilities; in certain cases speed is necessary to relieve the troops of states that have already intervened and may well be growing restive; to give confidence to the members of the Security Council that the measures they have mandated in support of peace and security were worth it and will be attended by success; to the international community in general, that the United Nations is carrying out the task expected of it and, above all, to reassure the people of the troubled country that they will be able to resume their lives in peace.
I join the Chairm an in welcoming Mr. Deady. I pay tribute to our Defence Forces personnel and gardaí who are serving abroad and, in particular, wish well to those very brave personnel who have set out, and are still setting out, for Liberia.
Mr. Deady refers to chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter in his contribution. He does not mention Chapter VIII that deals with regional conflicts and indicates that the charter supports regional arrangements to deal with peacekeeping and peace enforcement issues, once these are in keeping with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We have got ourselves into an extraordinary situation through our actions and have created a triple lock whereby we can send Irish Defence Forces personnel to the comparatively dangerous sphere of Liberia where the ranking is medium in terms of safety and high in terms of disease but we cannot send them to Macedonia along with 13 of the 15 member states. The other member state of the European Union not sending troops is Denmark because it is more committed to NATO. That is an appalling situation and it is not being done because of any assessment of the danger or the role of Ireland or the principles of the UN Charter. It is done because we have put in place the triple charter and have allowed ourselves to be cowered into a political situation whereby China blocked a UN Security Council resolution because Macedonia recognised Taiwan. This then means that we cannot send troops to Macedonia along with 13 other EU member states but we can send them to Liberia. I do not care what anybody said, that it is wrong. It is due to politics that this has come about. We are sending our troops to a more dangerous zone than Macedonia because of the politics of the situation. In any language that is wrong. I will not ask Mr. Deady questions on this because it should be raised with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Will Mr. Deady agree that the UN Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary General are looking to regions to deal with their own crises? Can he make a comment on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter?
Are there any debts for funding missions outstanding to Ireland from the UN? Have they been paid or will they be paid now since the US has brought its contributions up to date? Is there a write-off element in any of the costs incurred? Mention was made of the per diem rates for Defence Forces personnel serving with the UN. Do our personnel receive a greater or lesser per diem rate than that which is allowed by the UN?
I understood that reform of the UN was on our work programme. The issues raised by Deputy Mitchell should be looked at in that context. It is one of the areas that there has, historically, been a good Irish contribution. Several of the finest works on UN reform were penned by Erskine Childers III, with Brian Urquhart, including Towards A More Effective United Nations.
The issue of the abuse of the veto on the UN Security Council by permanent members is part of the discussion on its role. I also understood that Mr. Kofi Annan had made two separate statements where he expressed his concern at the slow progress in reforming the UN. Mr. Deady referred to the Brahimi report that was never discussed at this committee and there was never a submission from the Department of Foreign Affairs on it.
The same argument is advanced to explain international failure to support the 28 resolutions directed against Israel with usually one or four votes. It states that these are not Chapter VII resolutions where Israel tells the international community to get lost. Most of the statements made to the Dáil by the Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs argue that the resolutions dealing with Iraq since 1991 are Chapter VII-based. If they are, then the basis for them being so never existed. It is now clear that the basis for these resolutions is, as Mr. Deady stated, to take such action as may be necessary. Take such action as may be necessary is conditional on the UN Charter as a whole. It is clear that the phrase occurs where there is a real and imminent threat and the response is expected to be proportionate.
Resolution 1441 is fatally flawed with regard to the history of the use of Chapter VII in the proceedings of the UN. The Chapter VII invocation by the Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is singularly flawed. How does Mr. Deady see our position on Iraq? The motions on Iraq are Chapter VII-based. Through the hard work of the Secretary General and Ireland in the early days of the UN, the phrase occurs in these resolutions that the "Security Council resolves to stay ceased of the situation". This means that the Security Council managed to pass each and every resolution on the sole condition that it would be the judge of the action to be taken or in the evaluation of any breach of the resolutions as previously carried. There is absolutely no connection between the actions that took place outside of the Security Council. There is a real problem now with Chapter VII-based resolutions.
The description that Mr. Deady gave us of the procedures invoked for peacekeeping missions was interesting. However, it is not accidental that the UN has moved from Chapter VI-based resolutions to Chapter VII-based ones. There is a huge difference between interpreting the role of the UN and the function of the Security Council and seeking the implementation of a Council decision. Can we now say that we signed the UN Charter in good faith but we are now proposing to give a set of functions in the charter to a regional body? I do not think it can be done in international law.
It is inevitable that a UN Security Council takes a resolution that needs implementation at regional level. There is nothing in the UN Charter that impedes it using a regional body with the appropriate resolution. However, there could be a resolution taken by the General Assembly, for example through the process of Uniting for Peace where there is no obstacle there if it expresses a particular opinion in seeking assistance or possibilities in a regional body.
I agree with the conclusion. I wish the troops a safe return from Liberia. However, we did not discuss Part A of this exercise when we heard from the representatives of the Defence Forces. I am unconvinced by their presentation on the interoperability of the resources they are seeking. Their statement was that the schedule for military exercises in Europe was entirely exchangeable for the materials and equipment they needed for peacekeeping missions, over which I have a huge question mark. I had hoped that when we had discussed this in the Dáil the Minister for Defence, Deputy Smith, would have responded to it positively and practically.
I thank Mr. Deady for a very good brief, and I acknowledge the role played by the Garda and the Army in peacekeeping missions abroad over the years. The reputations of both forces, but in particular the Army, which has had a longer tradition of such missions, and with greater numbers, are acknowledged not only at home, but anywhere one goes where these matters are discussed, the professionalism of the Irish Army and its members' excellence as peacekeepers are acknowledged.
My questions cover issues already raised but come at them from a slightly different perspective. Without going into too much detail, could Mr. Deady explain the legal basis for peacekeeping and for peace enforcement? He might then comment on the third issue, namely that, as is now being argued from a policy point of view, the most effective interventions would be by neighbouring well-meaning states in the region of the conflict, frequently led by the regional power. What is the legal basis for that? What would have to be done here if we were to participate in such interventions, or could we, under mandate from the General Assembly, as Deputy Michael D. Higgins has suggested, become involved in regional interventions rather than interventions mandated by the Security Council?
The second area of questions is even simpler. In his briefing, Mr. Deady talked about the various elements that must then be transported to the operational area. This is usually carried out by aircraft chartered by the UN and, occasionally, by sea. In a different context, I read somewhere regarding the jumbo jet aircraft that carry troops and equipment that while the United States have many of these, and Russia has some, there are very few in Europe. I understand there are three in the UK, one in France and one on order by Germany. In this as in other matters, when it comes to the crunch, a European Union member state, with the exception of the United Kingdom, cannot even deliver its troops to the point of conflict.
Mr. Deady might tell us what arrangements are made commercially. Does the UN contract member states to deliver the troops? Is there a way of doing this commercially, or is there usually a fairly long lead-in time to UN interventions, so that troops can be sent out in smaller consignments and do not need these very large airforce troop carriers, of which there are very few in Europe outside the United Kingdom?
Unfortunately I missed Mr. Deady's presentation because the Seanad was about to begin its business at that time. On peacekeeping and peace enforcement, is there any realistic prospect of a serious diminution in the world arms trade? The one common denominator among a huge number of the localised but very bloody conflicts in the world is the international arms trade, because every time there is a risk of conflict there is obviously a limitless supply available of what I presume are mostly second-hand weapons. We talk about peace enforcement by the very best institutions of the world while at the same time turning our backs on the competition between Europe, Russia, China and the United States lining up to sell arms to anyone with a cloak of respectability in which no one believes any longer. I know we are active in this area and it is entirely related to the risks involved in peacekeeping. If we could reduce the world arms trade, or eliminate it, probably a dreamy idea, that could have a huge effect.
I also wonder what our Government position is. On the one hand, we are, correctly, trying to ensure Iran is not up to anything suspicious. Meanwhile the Senate of the US, the most powerful country in the world, decides to resume nuclear investigations and nuclear testing. There is hardly consistency in that. If there is to be an international order of peacekeeping, one of the roles this country must have is to be a pointer for consistency about arms, and in particular nuclear weapons.
I will add one or two points before Mr. Deady replies. On the Brahimi report, at one of our earlier meetings in October, I suggested that the report, which was published following a review, also deserves our attention as it sets out the UN's recent thinking on how future peacekeeping missions should be run. I take the point made by Deputy Higgins and we will include that in our study. Since Mr. Deady is an expert in this area he might come back to us at a later date, when we can discuss that report as an individual item.
I also wondered what contact the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Department of Defence maintains once the troops have gone out. What kind of continuous feedback is there of any risks, dangers or needs? Is that monitored at home on a very regular daily basis? People at home would clearly be concerned that such monitoring should happen.
On the question of interoperability, I know there was training before the troops went out. What sort of a review of that is there when the troops are out there? The Minister in his Dáil contribution told us that interoperability was part of the fairly extensive training now given before troops go out.
Mr. Deady
Some of the issues raised involve Government policy, on which I cannot comment.
On Chapter VIII, I did not deal with this in my presentation because what I dealt with was specifically a UN-mounted peacekeeping operation as distinct from a UN-authorised peacekeeping operation. Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that "the Security Council shall where appropriate utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority". It specifies however that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council, with the exception of any actions taken in self-defence. That is the legal basis for authorising regional organisations to take action.
Could Mr. Deady repeat the words?
Mr. Deady
The charter states that the Security Council "shall where appropriate utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority", with the word "such" referring to regional organisations referred to in a previous article. The charter notes that no enforcement action can be taken without the authorisation of the Security Council. The regional organisations may undertake enforcement action provided the Security Council adopts a resolution authorising such action.
Does the same apply to peacekeeping as well as to peace enforcement?
Mr. Deady
This is very similar to peace enforcement. It is similar to Article 42, which states that the Security Council shall "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". If it adopts a resolution in those terms, member states are authorised to take such action. Similarly, a regional organisation may take such action under the authorisation of the Security Council. This is different from the peacekeeping operation, in which the Security Council itself establishes an operation. In the former case, a peace enforcement mission in which regional organisations take action, the countries themselves provide the military assets for a joint operation to enforce peace. In the case of a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations secretariat organises the operation, contacting member states to put together the elements of the mission under the authority of a force commander appointed by and reporting to the Secretary General, who is, in turn, responsible to the Security Council.
I must interject with one point I did not mention in my opening comments. I did not use the term "triple lock". The difficulty we have is our own triple lock - Dáil approval, Government approval and UN resolution. I think a UN-raised force is mentioned, although I cannot remember the actual words. Thirteen of the 15 member states, some of which are members of the Security Council, were able to participate in the regional peace enforcement effort which took place on our doorstep in Macedonia, while, because of our own legislation, we were not.
Mr. Deady
That is a matter for the Government; I cannot comment on that.
A question was asked about funding and particularly the overseas allowances paid to the members of the Defence Forces. I was asked whether the troops taking part receive the amounts paid by the UN. I do not know the answer to this, as it is a matter for the Minister for Defence. It is a complex issue and I would not like to address it. There are different allowances for different ranks and then there is an overseas-armed peace support allowance that is the same for all ranks. It is not a calculation I couldmake.
Could Mr. Deady arrange for the committee members to be given a note on this?
Mr. Deady
I will contact my colleagues in the Department of Defence and ask them to arrange that.
I also asked whether there were any debts outstanding. Is there a write-off element?
Mr. Deady
There are certainly amounts outstanding. This was covered at the last committee meeting we attended in the presentation by my colleagues from the Department of Defence. There is no write-off at this stage, but these issues are constantly under discussion with the UN in an effort to resolve them. We try to put as much pressure on the UN as possible.
What about the question of debt?
Mr. Deady
There are still amounts outstanding.
Do we have any hope of obtaining those amounts?
Mr. Deady
Yes. We have obtained some and we hope to obtain more. We are not at the write-off stage yet by any means.
How much remains due to us?
Mr. Deady
I cannot say as I do not have the figure with me, but I could obtain that information.
Is it €100 million, €50 million or €20 million?
Mr. Deady
No, it is a few million. It is in single figures in terms of millions.
Does it vary from time to time?
Mr. Deady
Yes, sometimes we obtain more of it back than we do at other times.
Would Mr. Deady like to proceed with the other questions that were raised?
Mr. Deady
The matter of Iraq and the Middle East should be the responsibility of other colleagues. I will only comment that the original Chapter VII resolution in respect of Iraq was adopted in response to an attack by Iraq on a neighbouring country that was followed by its takeover. That was where the problems originated. That was certainly a Chapter VII resolution.
It was I who raised that point and I must clarify it. There are two resolutions. The original resolution is the one that deals with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The other resolution established the terms of the ceasefire when the invasion of Kuwait was over. As Mr. Deady knows, one range of problems with the Chapter VII usage is the position argued by the UK and the USA but not by others, and rejected by a group of eminent international lawyers at Oxford and Cambridge, which is that one can invoke that resolution as a Chapter VII justification for later actions, including the no-fly zone. It was in that sense I mentioned this matter. I was responding to Mr. Deady's suggestion that when establishing peacekeeping operations the Security Council acted under Chapter VI, but nowadays it generally acts under Chapter VII. Mr. Deady helpfully quoted Article 42, which is the basis of taking such steps as may be necessary. All these things suggest something that is essential to the integrity of the Security Council. They are all on the rider. The council decides to stay seized of the situation. That is its Chapter VII connection.
Mr. Deady
The Deputy is referring to Resolution 687, which imposed all the obligations on Iraq subsequent to the first Gulf War. Whether this justifies all subsequent actions is a matter of interpretation. There are arguments on both sides. The approach we took was that even though it could be argued there was not a legal necessity for a further resolution, there was a political one. This was the position taken at the time.
On the matter of Resolution 1441, the question the Security Council had to address was whether Iraq had fulfilled the obligations imposed on it, in particular the obligation to present a full and verifiable account of its programme of weapons of mass destruction. We participated in the negotiation of Resolution 1441 and voted in favour of it because manifestly, at that time, Iraq had not done this.
I will finish the point because it is not fair of me to ask Mr. Deady to conclude it. We were advised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Taoiseach that it was a resolution for peace. Resolution 1441 gave a mandate to the weapons inspectors. Technically, the inspectors are still entitled to be in Iraq.
Mr. Deady
One could make that argument.
Deputy Noonan asked, among other things, about the legal basis of the peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Mr. Deady
I have covered that to some extent. Peace enforcement refers to military action, or action such as the imposition of sanctions, in response to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Chapter VI deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. In former times - up to the beginning of the 1990s - the traditional UN blue-hatted peacekeeping operation was undertaken under Chapter VI. It was regarded as part of the pacific settlement of disputes. Nowadays, however, mandates are generally provided under Chapter VII. A UN blue-hatted peacekeeping operation may use force not simply to protect its own members, but also to further the aims of the mission and in particular to protect the civilian population and to deal with breaches of the ceasefire. This is necessary especially when special forces are involved. There has to be a stronger mandate for action.
I presume the change of policy occurred as a result of the ending of the Cold War.
Mr. Deady
The ending of the Cold War, and the various situations that have arisen since where UN peacekeeping operations were manifestly seen not to have the capacity to deal with situations they were involved in, brought about the change.
From the Korean War until 1990 there was never a situation where if one side in the Cold War did not veto Chapter VII intervention, the other side did.
Mr. Deady
It was difficult to get Chapter VII intervention because of Cold War politics in the Security Council.
I asked Mr. Deady about the possibility of early regional interventions and he indicated in reply to an earlier question the legal basis of this. Even if that legal basis was there and the Security Council endorsed the regional intervention, would that free us to participate or do we need to change our legal basis here also?
Mr. Deady
That would depend on our relationship to the regional organisation, which is another level of legality and policy.
I know we would not be participating in a NATO intervention, but with the establishment now of at least the unit of a European army, could we participate in that?
Mr. Deady
Yes and we have. We have participated, for instance, in the action under the European Security and Defence Policy, Operation Artemis, in north-east Congo, earlier this year. Members of the Defence Forces participated in that operation. It was largely composed of French troops, but there were military forces from other countries also.
Using this as an example, will Mr. Deady track the legal basis of that operation?
Mr. Deady
The United Nations authorised states to take action. I do not have the number or date of the resolution to hand.
Just in general terms.
Mr. Deady
The European Union, under the ESDP decided to establish an operation with France as the framework nation to contribute to peacekeeping in that particular part of northeast Congo. The basis lay in a Security Council resolution and our relationship to the ESDP subsequent to that.
There was the question I asked Mr. Deady about the logistics involved in transporting troops.
Mr. Deady
The most efficient means of transporting troops is to use the largest transport vehicles, aircraft whatever. On moving our own troops to Liberia, some of the equipment and officers participating in the HQ staff, went to Monrovia on board one of our naval vessels. The bulk of the elements have been transported in aircraft chartered specifically for that purpose by the United Nations. As speed is of the essence, the development, policy and planning office, DPPO, will look for the fastest and most efficient means available, taking cost into account.
We will use examples. I find this more useful. Take the Liberian intervention. Some of our people went down on one of our naval vessels, but most of them were routed through Moscow. Was a private sector carrier commissioned or were Russian troop carriers used?
Mr. Deady
These are private sector organisations that, as far as I know, own these carriers. I cannot be absolutely certain whether or not they are owned by the military. They are certainly leased by the military. It is a commercial operation. If they are in military ownership, they are not provided free of charge. They are provided at a cost. It is a commercial charter.
There are not private sector commercial companies outside the military organisations Mr. Deady has mentioned that transport troops. When it comes down to the military the choices are the United States and, in some circumstances, Russia, occasionally the UK and France probably carrying its own troops. I think that is the position. The point is, regardless of the support for the mandate, when it comes to the logistics, one is dependent on the superpower or the former superpower.
Mr. Deady
One is depending on the states with the assets, no question about it.
The US is investing fairly heavily in more equipment of that kind. It might be chartering more. Has Mr. Deady concluded?
Mr. Deady
I think the Chairman asked whether we monitored the danger levels as the operation proceeded. Yes, the Department of the Defence in particular and the military authorities follow the progress of the mission closely and monitor the dangers to which Irish personnel are exposed from security and medical viewpoints as the mission unfolds. No doubt action is taken accordingly.
I was thinking in particular of the civilian side of the Department of Defence, on the Civil Service side and the arrangements they would have for following developments.
Mr. Deady
I cannot speak for it, but in any ongoing operation the UN secretariat provides the Security Council and the troop contributing countries with information on the mission as it unfolds. Our permanent mission in New York reports these back. As all reports are transmitted to the Department of Defence, it would be fully up to speed.
I just want to clarify something. I am not thinking of founding my own military air company or anything like that. I want to draw attention to the weakness of the European Union. Even if it is putting the elements of a European army together it does not have the assets to take its troops to the point of conflict. With the United Kingdom tied in strongly with the United States in terms of alliance, that is one element taken out. France is not fully in NATO. Effectively France is the carrier, with the Germans having plans for what? The position is weak.
On behalf of the committee, I thank Mr. Deady for making the presentation today, for the information he has given and for answering the questions. I hope it will be possible to meet him again on the Brahimi report. We will communicate with him later.
Sitting suspended at 3.09 p.m. and resumed at 3.12 p.m.