I thank you, Chairman, and the committee for having me back to discuss this issue which, as you say, was deferred from a previous meeting. There have been some important and worrying developments in the meantime. While these disturbing developments have raised difficult challenges for the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the international community is working to address them. I propose to outline my views on the current position with regard to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and the United States-India deal on civil nuclear co-operation.
Support for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, NPT, is the Government's highest priority in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Ireland has a proud history and track record in this area since Frank Aiken's initiative at the United Nations in the late 1950s directly led to the creation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968.
The NPT state parties meet every five years in a review conference to examine the implementation of the provisions of the treaty and consider new measures which might help strengthen these provisions. In each of the three years leading up to such conferences a meeting of a preparatory committee is held to exchange views on all aspects of the treaty's implementation and prepare the ground for decisions at the conference. Regrettably, the seventh review conference of the NPT, held in 2005, ended in failure. This disappointing outcome was compounded by the inability of the UN world summit four months later to agree any substantive reference to nuclear issues. The lack of progress over recent years is a matter of deep concern.
The 2005 review conference was not, however, the first review conference to end without agreement between state parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Despite many setbacks, the treaty has for more than 35 years stood as the basis for the promotion of non-proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It is essential, therefore, that our commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty does not waver in the face of mounting challenges. If anything, failures in 2005 and other more recent developments have compelled us to work harder on this issue.
Last May, together with two of our partners in the new agenda coalition, Ireland co-sponsored a seminar in Geneva aimed at addressing the unfinished business from the last nuclear non-proliferation treaty review cycle. Consultations have already begun at the first committee of the UN General Assembly in New York and with like-minded countries on the best approach to the next review conference in 2010, preparations for which begin next year. We retain our firm conviction that in this crucial area, as in other areas, a strong rules-based multilateral system is the best approach in seeking to preserve and promote international peace and security.
Ireland attaches particular importance to the fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament obligations set out in Article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the only multilateral, legally binding commitment on nuclear disarmament. We regard disarmament and non-proliferation as mutually reinforcing processes requiring irreversible progress on both fronts. We have continued, with like-minded partners, to promote nuclear disarmament at the United Nations, the conference on disarmament in Geneva and other multilateral fora.
Ireland's efforts within the new agenda coalition on this front are well known. Our involvement in this cross-regional group dates back to the coalition's creation in 1998. As in previous years, at the first committee of the UN General Assembly in New York last month Ireland tabled a resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". This resolution, emphasising the centrality of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and calling upon all states to fulfil their disarmament commitments, was adopted by a large majority at the UN in New York on 27 October. Some 148 countries voted in favour, seven voted against and 12 abstained. Within the European Union, 18 states voted in favour of the resolution.
In September, the chair of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Dr. Hans Blix, was in Dublin to discuss the commission's excellent report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. As the joint committee will be aware, the report cited Ireland's constructive efforts to strengthen and improve implementation of the NPT. We are proud of our credentials in the international disarmament and non-proliferation field and remain committed to maintaining them.
As members are aware, on 9 October the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK, carried out an underground test of a nuclear explosive device. This followed the DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and its subsequent declaration of a nuclear weapon capability in 2005, all in spite of the patient efforts of its neighbours to work constructively to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis through the six-party talks process. The announcement was met with swift condemnation by members of the international community, including Ireland. On 9 October I strongly condemned this provocative act by the DPRK, which I characterised as a threat to regional security and as running counter to the objectives of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
On 14 October, in clear recognition of the gravity of the DPRK's decision, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718 which obliged the international community to enforce specific sanctions, including an arms embargo, as well as a ban on any items which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, ballistic missile or weapons of mass destruction programmes. EU member states are considering a draft Common Position concerning restrictive measures in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1718.
The DPRK's action is an extremely worrying development, not only for the security and stability of the region but also for the NPT regime as a whole, given the previous violation of its commitments under the treaty. The international community has consistently urged the DPRK to abandon its confrontational policy, completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programme and comply fully with its obligations under the NPT.
The recent NAC resolution to which I have referred also contained a specific paragraph condemning the DPRK's recent test. This development has once more underlined the urgency of the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. We continue to work for this objective.
In the light of recent and past failures to persuade the DPRK to change its intended course through diplomacy and negotiation, Security Council Resolution 1718 is a necessary measure. However, it is still possible to achieve a diplomatic solution to the current crisis through the six-party talks process. Recent reports that the DPRK has pledged to return to the talks shortly without preconditions are a welcome development. I particularly congratulate China for its efforts in this regard. I urge the DPRK to commit to a diplomatic solution and work sincerely towards the implementation of the joint statement of September 2005 and the peaceful and acceptable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula it envisages.
The current lack of confidence in Iran's nuclear programme has been apparent since its previously undeclared programme came to the attention of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, in 2002. Since that time the international community has been engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve those issues still considered to be outstanding. Enrichment and reprocessing activities are regarded as the most proliferation-sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Given the clandestine nature of its programme and remaining doubts over its past disclosures to the IAEA, Iran's pursuit of such a capability, in circumstances where it has no operating nuclear reactor, gives rise to concerns that it may be seeking to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. While the activities in this area are so far relatively modest, Iran, through research, development and testing, is acquiring the technical knowledge needed to develop a nuclear weapon. It is imperative, therefore, that it should commit to a suspension of these sensitive activities until such time as confidence in its intentions has been restored.
Last June Foreign Ministers of the EU Three and their counterparts in the United States, Russia and China, agreed to a package of incentives for Iran containing a framework for a wider agreement through which a peaceful and acceptable resolution to the issue of its nuclear programme could be found. For substantive negotiations to commence on the package, however, Iran would have to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In return, further action in the Security Council would also be suspended.
Following the presentation of the package to Iran, two unsuccessful meetings were held in early July between High Representative Javier Solana, on behalf of the EU Three, and lead Iranian negotiator Ali Larijani which were aimed at clarifying the contents of the package. In the light of this development and mindful of the confirmation in June from the IAEA that Iran was accelerating its enrichment programme, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 on 31 July. This resolution made suspension of Iran's enrichment activities mandatory and set a deadline of 31 August.
The Security Council also stated its intention to adopt a further resolution imposing additional measures, including sanctions, should Iran not be in compliance by this date. Iran delivered its response to the June package on 22 August but did not respect the Security Council's 31 August deadline on suspension. Determined, however, to exhaust all avenues before returning to the Security Council, High Representative Solana met Mr. Larijani several times in September to discuss Iran's response. Regrettably, an acceptable formula for commencing negotiations could not be agreed. The EU side has been obliged, reluctantly, to conclude that Iran is not at this stage seriously interested in responding to the generous offer made in June.
The Security Council is currently discussing a second resolution that would impose additional measures in the form of sanctions on Iran. It is uncertain what exact form these may take but it is understood that the measures are likely to be designed to constrain Iran's ability to develop its ballistic missile programme and to increase pressure to comply with the Security Council's suspension demand.
Meanwhile, media reports in Iran indicate that a second uranium enrichment cascade has been installed and has begun operating in the controversial pilot fuel enrichment plant in Natanz. While this does not significantly increase Iran's enrichment capabilities, it represents a further act of defiance by Iran.
We have always stressed our strong support for a peaceful resolution of this issue and for the efforts of the EU Three and Javier Solana. It is particularly disappointing that Iran has not taken advantage of the recent opportunities afforded it to enable negotiations to get under way. It is also highly regrettable that Iran continues to defy Security Council Resolution 1696. However, I underline the fact that current discussions of Security Council action should not be interpreted as abandonment of the diplomatic track or of the possibility of agreement on the June package of incentives. We remain hopeful for such a solution.
Moving to the US-India agreement, last year President Bush of the United States and Prime Minister Singh of India agreed to establish a new strategic partnership between their two countries. A key and controversial element of that partnership was a proposed agreement on civil nuclear co-operation. During a visit to India by President Bush on 2 March 2006, the two leaders announced that agreement had been reached.
Before the US can implement the agreement, however, it will have to amend its Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to exempt India from the requirements of the Act, which, as it currently stands, prohibits the transfer of nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear weapon states that do not have full scope safeguards in place. The US is also bound by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, guidelines for the transfer of nuclear goods or technology to other states. Ireland is one of 45 members of the NSG, which Brazil currently chairs.
In July, two Bills amending the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits nuclear commerce with India, passed through the Committee Stages of the US House of Representatives and Senate. On 27 July the full US House of Representatives adopted the United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. A vote has still to be taken on the Senate Bill, although it is not clear at this stage whether this will be possible before the end of the current Congress, which is now in recess pending today's elections. In the event that the Senate Bill is not considered during what is termed the "lame duck" post-election session, both House and Senate Bills will have to be re-introduced in 2007. If both texts are then approved, they must then be consolidated into a single text representing Congress's final position on the matter.
If the 1954 Atomic Energy Act is successfully amended, the US will then have to obtain a consensus decision in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, to exempt India from its export guidelines. The NSG is a group of 45 participating countries, with agreed guidelines governing the export of items that are specially designed or prepared for nuclear use and for nuclear related dual-use goods.
Since the announcement of 2 March, the NSG has had three discussions on the proposed agreement. In the margins of the most recent NSG meeting in October, representatives of the Indian Government were in attendance to brief NSG participants. This was a welcome engagement by India and we took the opportunity to raise a number of our concerns directly with them.
The committee will be aware of those elements of the proposed agreement that give rise to concern. There is the fundamental issue of the NPT and whether nuclear co-operation with India could undermine its core principles and obligations. This is our most important consideration and we are carefully analysing the potential impact of the agreement on the NPT.
However, this is not a simple process and it is made more difficult by the fact that all the elements of the proposal are not yet in place. For instance, the extent of full civil nuclear co-operation under the US-India bilateral agreement remains uncertain, as does the nature of the safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency which is still to be negotiated. Currently, of the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, some very significant players, including France, Russia and the UK, have already voiced their support for this agreement. No country has yet come out in clear opposition.
The debate so far has been complex and wide-ranging with many difficult technical and legal issues, but there are also many political factors. From the point of view of non-proliferation, the case against the deal is obvious. Facilitating nuclear co-operation with a non-signatory of the non-proliferation treaty is, in principle, deeply disturbing. Moreover, even on its own terms, the deal has obvious deficiencies. The failure of the US to persuade India to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for military purposes, is disappointing. Ireland, with a number of other countries, has stressed these points.
However, at the same time, there are many NSG members, including some who traditionally take a strong line on nuclear non-proliferation, including some of our partners in the New Agenda Coalition who appear, fully or in part, to be persuaded by wider political, economic and strategic considerations, including the importance they attach to bilateral relations with India and the US. This trend is quite strong and there is no doubt that India increasingly sees attitudes to the agreement as a litmus test of countries' relations with it.
Others point to India's enormous future energy needs, arguing that a stronger nuclear programme is vital, not least in the context of climate change. We do not agree with this from a national viewpoint but it is a legitimate perspective. Others make the point that India, while a non-signatory of the NPT, has never been accused or suspected of nuclear proliferation outside its borders. They say that as there is little or no practical prospect that it will ever join the NPT the damage to the treaty is more notional than real.
It is worth noting that the director general of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, has already declared his support for the agreement and I am aware that committee members have received a copy of Dr. El Baradei's views. As an authoritative figure on the workings of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Dr. El Baradei makes some valid points with regard to the safety implications for the Indian civil nuclear programme as well as India's strong credentials on international peace and security.
Another prominent figure to comment on the agreement, without declaring a position, is Hans Blix. In his report Dr. Blix finds that the agreement's compatibility with the NPT is a matter of judgment and expresses the opinion that concerns raised about the agreement would disappear if both parties demonstrated support for non-proliferation and disarmament. While there are many experts on disarmament and non-proliferation who would take a decisively negative view, the fact that Dr. El Baradei and Dr. Blix have a different approach underscores the complexity of the question and the room for alternative points of view.
We continue to ask questions and seek clarifications to improve our understanding. Last month I received the Prime Minister of India's special envoy on civil nuclear co-operation, Mr. Shyam Saran and I know he also met the committee. He clearly set out the Indian Government's argument that the deal would, in practice, strengthen the non-proliferation regime. He also emphasised India's significant energy needs and the benefits the deal could bring to its economy and people.
While the disarmament and non-proliferation aspect of the agreement is our primary focus, this is an important consideration which Ireland recognises, as I conveyed to Mr Saran. However, I also conveyed to him Ireland's deep-rooted commitment to the NPT and reiterated our disappointment that India remained outside it, as well as our concerns for the potential impact on the NPT regime. More detailed technical discussions were held at official level, which were very useful for our continuing analysis.
At this stage, it seems that the earliest point at which the NSG might be called upon to make a decision is its meeting next April, but it could be even later. Ultimately, our final view will depend on our assessment of the potential impact of the deal on the global non-proliferation regime, and also on the approach taken by normally like-minded countries and the overall balance of views within the NSG. I now look forward to the committee's questions and comments.
