I thank the Chairman and members of the committee for inviting me to speak about the Syrian conflict. I will briefly address some key aspects of the conflict through an assessment of the possible scenario and policy options western countries are faced with in their dealings with the Syrian war. I think the dominant position among western governments has been that the solution to the conflict should be a diplomatic one, a political one and, in principle, this is an opinion I support. As I will explain, diplomacy is faced with serious limits and I do not think there are many positive prospects in that respect.
What we witnessed earlier this year was the failure of the Geneva II conference which was supposed to discuss power sharing in Syria, political transition, the establishment of the transitional body, including members of the regime and excluding Bashar al-Assad himself, including the positions that members of the transitional body should enjoy full prerogatives. This transition plan was outlined by the Geneva I communique in June 2012.
It is fair to say that the talks in Geneva II failed for a very simply reason, namely, the Syrian regime refused to speak about power sharing and political transition. Basically it wants to keep Assad in power. What the regime is preparing now is another political transition and, as the committee is aware, that is the re-election of Bashar al-Assad in a no-contest election later this year.
The failure of the Geneva talks has taught us many lessons. I will highlight two important lessons from this failure. It has shown that the core problem in Syria is a domestic one. We often hear that Syria is in a proxy war between regional powers with Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the other side.
This is part of the picture, but I think that the root cause of the problem is domestic. It is a problem of power sharing, or more exactly, a lack of power sharing. We have a ruling clan, the Assad family, their cousins and their cronies, who oppose any kind of deal that would sideline them, even if that deal keeps elements of the regime in power, as was proposed by the Geneva I communiqué. I do not think this is essentially a proxy war. It is a domestic conflict that has attracted the intervention of foreign actors because both contenders have sought the support of foreign powers. This is important because we often hear that the easiest way to solve the conflict will be to start by putting an end to the rivalry between Gulf monarchies and Iran. Although that would certainly be a positive development, I do not think it would be enough to solve the conflict, because as long as we do not address that core problem of power sharing and political transition in Syria, the conflict will remain.
Another lesson of the failure of the Geneva talks is the negative role played by the allies of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, namely, Iran and Russia. The Geneva I principles were supported by western countries, Gulf monarchies, Turkey and even Russia back in 2012. However, over the last month Russia has been de facto backtracking on its initial support for a transition and coming much closer to the position of the Syrian regime, which is to keep things as they are with some cosmetic reforms. Iran is even clearer. It rejected Geneva I from the outset and has clearly aligned itself totally with the position of the Syrian regime, which is political status quo rather than political transition.
I do not think any change can be expected in the short or even mid term from Assad and his allies, because at the moment the military situation is relatively favourable to them, although it is not favourable as common wisdom has it. The regime is confident that it can survive and it does not see why it should abandon through negotiations the power it can keep by using force. It is that simple. Even if the regime suffers significant military setbacks in the future, which I would not exclude, there is a Plan B, which would be to establish a small state on the coast, which is the historical stronghold of the Alawite community to which Bashar al-Assad belongs. Assad would remain the president of something, instead of ending up in a jail in the Netherlands, which would probably happen if he lost power. That would also be a possible solution for Iran and Russia. They have gone so far in their support for Assad, by providing his regime with unlimited diplomatic, financial and military support, that they would certainly be marginalised in the post-Assad order. It is my conviction that an elected regime in Syria would be quite inherently hostile to Iran and Russia for their role in the current conflict. The idea that Iran and Russia could be convinced of changing their minds by being offered some guarantees about the survival of their interests in post-Assad Syria is problematic in two respects. First, guaranteeing the interests of certain countries in another country is something that has its roots in a colonial context. It is normally a part of the way we do international relations today. It is also unrealistic. Who would guarantee these interests in Syria? Western countries are too little involved in the conflict to be able to offer such guarantees if they were willing to provide them. Unfortunately, both Iran and Russia would be happy with the partition of Syria if that is the condition to serve their interests, just as Russia has been encouraging the partition of Ukraine recently for exactly the same reason.
I would like to say a word about a measure that is frequently associated with a political solution, which is the idea of an arms embargo on both sides. On paper, that looks like a good idea, but we should keep two things in mind. First, if the policy adopted by western states was to pressure their regional allies into ceasing to supply rebels with weapons, we would have no guarantee that the other side would do it, and that Iran and Russia would do likewise. Second, Assad is sitting on enormous stockpiles of weapons, which he has accumulated over decades. The Syrian regime runs military factories which are still functioning, so even if an embargo was implemented by both sides, the Assad regime would retain a major advantage. It would be able to keep fighting for a long time, whereas the rebels would probably be short of weapons. That would provide the Syrian regime with the opportunity to achieve a victory over the opposition, or at least to think it could achieve such a victory. Therefore, it is likely that an arms embargo could lead to an escalation rather than de-escalation, even if that sounds counter-intuitive. The rebel groups that would suffer from such an embargo would be the most moderate groups, because the radical groups - especially those linked to al-Qaeda - do not receive state support because they are overtly hostile to regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar. They get their military supplies from shadowy, clandestine private sources which are not affected by any diplomatic measure on the part of western countries. Therefore, an arms embargo would favour radicals over moderate rebels.
To sum up, in my view the prospects of a diplomatic solution are dim for all of these reasons. I would like to address an alternative solution which has been evoked in western circles over the past month, which is simply to repair ties with Assad. It is not really public policy, but we know that some European intelligence services have been resuming visits to Damascus. The idea was that some rapprochement with Assad could help restore stability in the region and fight Islamic radicalism. My opinion is that this policy is immoral, unrealistic and counter-productive. It is immoral because it basically rewards one of the most brutal campaigns of mass murder in the post-Cold War era. Whatever crimes are perpetrated by members of the opposition, and these are crimes are a reality, there is no equivalence with the crimes of the regime in terms of scale and responsibility. I would like to refer the committee to the words of Navi Pillay, who is the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who said recently that the regime was responsible for most human rights violations in Syria. This involved chemical attacks, summary execution on an industrial scale, deliberate starvation of certain neighbourhoods, and barrel bombs over Aleppo over the last five months, killing several dozen people almost every day. It is unrealistic because it is unrealistic to believe that Assad could win in the sense that he could retake the entire Syrian territory, stabilise and police it. It is based on an inaccurate reading of military developments. At the moment Assad is consolidating his hold over his strongholds in the centre of the country, but at the same time he is suffering setbacks in the north, east and south of Syria. I do not think he will be able to reconquer the whole country for the simple reason that he is lacking loyal manpower.
This has important consequences. It means that when he wants to reconquer a region - this is what he wants to do - it is usually by starving the people and bombing them for a long time. Usually this generates a massive flux of refugees and this is why we have a vast refugee crisis in the region at the moment. He rarely retakes a region without first forcing the inhabitants to go. Given his lack of manpower he is heavily reliant on Shia Islamist foreign fighters. These are pro-Iranian militia men recruited in Lebanon and Iraq. They play a key role. Every strategic victory won by Assad in the past month was won thanks to the support of these people. This is a concerning development for the future because it means that regime victories, far from bringing stability, actually lead to a form of foreign occupation by people who have a different religion from the majority of Syrians. This is a recipe for long-term instability.
I will comment briefly on the issue of counter-terrorism because this is what drives intelligence operatives in the West to resume ties and co-operation with the Assad regime. Believing that Assad is an ally in the fight against Islamic extremism is like believing one can fight fire with the help of a pyromaniac. Assad has a terrible record. He has encouraged and co-operated with jihadi networks in Iraq in 2003 and in Lebanon after 2006. After the uprising started in 2011 he deliberately encouraged the emergence of jihadi groups by releasing dozens of radical Islamic activists from jail. This has been widely documented. We have dozens of profiles of radical insurgent leaders who were in jail in Syria until the spring of 2011 and who were then released.
Assad needs these people to survive. He needs them to be seen not for what he is, a mass murderer, but as a potential partner in the fight against terrorism. He knows that the most extreme rebel groups do not receive State support for the reasons I have explained and because, basically, they excommunicate, for instance, Gulf monarchs. These people do not receive the sophisticated weapons that could defeat the regime. We know their mere presence among the ranks of the rebels discourages many western states from supporting the opposition. The most extreme elements among the opposition, like the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shm, actually devote more energy to fighting other rebels than fighting the regime itself.
It is time for me to stop now but since I am among policymakers I will outline what I believe European Union countries, including Ireland, should do. I believe diplomatic efforts should not cease but we must be aware of their limits and we must be aware of the fact that thus far they have failed to improve the situation, they have failed to protect civilians and this is likely to continue. This is why we should explore other solutions. Humanitarian aid is important but healing the injured and burying the dead while the massacre goes on is slightly hypocritical. At least there should be some way to enforce an end to aerial bombing, especially so-called barrel bombings, which occur on a daily basis and wipe out whole blocks in cities such as Aleppo. These are unacceptable. I realise there is strong reluctance in the west towards ideas like a no-fly zone. I am in favour of it but I recognise this is not a widely accepted idea. At the least Syrian rebels should be allowed to arm themselves to protect the regions they control from such attacks. European countries, even if they have no wish to participate in efforts to arm the rebels, should not oppose such initiatives from countries willing to do so, like France, for instance. Of course it is not at all about arming the most extreme elements in the opposition. On the contrary, I believe that by allowing moderate rebels to arm themselves we will create the bulwark against the most extreme elements in the insurgency. I thank the committee members for their attention.
