JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) debate

Public Hearings on the Barron Report.

Chairman

I welcome the representatives of Justice for the Forgotten, Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, Micheál O'Connor, Mr. Nigel Wylde and Mr. Greg O'Neill. My apologies for the delay. There were some matters with which the sub-committee had to deal. It was unavoidable.

We are resuming hearings in the consideration by the sub-committee of the Barron report, the report of the independent commission of inquiry. This morning the sub-committee is starting module two of its proposed programme of work. In module one last Tuesday the sub-committee heard from the surviving victims and relatives of victims of the atrocity. Their contributions helped set in proper context the consideration by this committee of the report. The accounts given by all of the victims and family members highlighted the degree of terrible suffering encountered by them on the day of the bomb and in the 30 years since. On behalf of the sub-committee, I thank everyone who spoke to it last Tuesday. I also acknowledge the survivors and families who were not in a position to appear before the sub-committee last week.

I turn to the application made last week by Ms Miriam Reilly, BL, counsel on behalf of the O'Neill and O'Brien families and Berni Bergin. The sub-committee has carefully considered the submissions made and noted both the objection of the said group of families to its proposed scheme of hearings and the reasons for same. The sub-committee considers that it is obliged to carry out all of its terms of reference, not just the last term of reference. In so doing, it is obliged to comply with the law and, in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara case.

It is with these factors in mind that the sub-committee drew up its proposed programme. The sub-committee respectfully intends to proceed with its proposed programme and fully respects the right of the clients represented by Des Doherty and Company to object to its proposed proceedings and the decision not to participate in some or all of its hearings. All of the persons who appear before the sub-committee do so voluntarily. The sub-committee notes that the authorities and their clients intend to participate in respect of module 5, and we look forward to any such contribution. However, if at any stage the authority and company, and their clients, feel that they wish to participate in any of the other stages, including module 1, the sub-committee will welcome their submissions in respect of same, and afford them a full opportunity to participate. I would now like to welcome back the Justice for the Forgotten group. I invite Mr Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, senior counsel, to make his opening statement.

Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin

Thank you, Chairman. With regard to this module, we have been asked to come before the committee to, effectively, discuss the extent to which the Barron report addresses its terms of reference. Last Friday, we submitted a paper to the committee entitled "The Barron Report: the Extent to which it Addresses the Terms of Reference". The purpose of that submission was, first, to stop and think about what is required of a committee when it is asked to consider a report, and to try and put the consideration of the report into context. I would like to go through that submission briefly in a few minutes. I am conscious that committee members have had an opportunity to consider it.

This morning, we submitted a further, supplemental memorandum, which attempts to draw together in 15 pages the significant points, factors and facts established by the Barron inquiry. It is not an easy task to summarise such an extensive report, but we believe that the supplemental memorandum may assist the committee in focusing on the issues that we raised in our first submission. If I might proceed with regard to the first submission, the first point we made concerned our expectation of what the Barron report would achieve. In our opinion it establishes that there is substance to the allegations it was asked to examine, and in that regard it furnishes considerable detail. It is inherent in the terms of reference that it must, first, establish whether the allegations are of substance, and the report has achieved that end.

With regard to our expectation of what the Barron process - the first stage of this process - was about, I would like to refer to a number of short statements made by the Taoiseach in Dáil Éireann on 17 November 1999, when the establishment of this inquiry process was being debated. The Taoiseach indicated that the Government called for a public inquiry into Bloody Sunday after the publication of a very detailed assessment of new material on Bloody Sunday and the Widgery tribunal. In the Pat Finucane case, British Irish Rights Watch prepared a very detailed submission, but in the cases of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, and Seamus Ludlow, no such detailed assessments have been made. The Taoiseach indicated that while from the outset, the families sought a public inquiry, the case put forward by the Government, based on all the legal advice and assessments in which it had engaged with the representatives concerned, was that until there was a comprehensive assessment, it would not be in the families' best interests to proceed with a public inquiry. While much was said about the Bloody Sunday inquiry, an enormous effort first had to be made by the previous Government before it became a reality - something that was acknowledged on several occasions. Finally, the Taoiseach expressed the hope that an eminent legal representative would be able to sift through the existing facts that have been collected by the Garda, Departments or groups such as Justice for the Forgotten to ascertain whether a substantive case can be made.

Therefore, effectively, at the outset of this process, our expectation of the Barron inquiry was simply this: would Mr. Justice Barron be able to gather sufficient facts to make a substantive case for a public inquiry, or after his assessment, would the end result be that he would say - or that his report would invariably lead to the conclusion - that there was no substantive case? In our opinion, he has made that substantive case.

The second question is, having made a substantive case, is that the end of the story? In that regard, we say the Barron report significantly fails to achieve the goal of the entire process. In that regard, we say the process was established, with the Barron Commission, this committee and the question of a further stage. The aim of the entire process was to find out the truth in relation to the bombings, the truth in relation to the Garda investigation, the truth in relation to State action and the truth in relation to collusion. We say that, in a substantive sense, that has not been achieved.

Further on, on page 2 of our submission, we ask ourselves what should guide this committee in assessing whether the Barron report has achieved the overall objectives. We say you have to think about how you approach that task. It requires a serious process of assessment, requires some identification of standards against which the report is to be measured, and then the testing of the report against those standards.

We say the standard that this committee should adopt should reflect the gravity of what the report is about. In this case, the report is substantially about the murder of 34 people and the decisions made in relation to the investigation of those murders. In that regard, this committee, as opposed to considering reports from a Comptroller and Auditor General or suchlike, is asked to make a decision on a matter of fundamental human rights. In every decision that it has to make, it has to keep, effectively, to the forefront of its mind that this committee, for the purposes of this exercise, is the protector of the most fundamental of all rights, effectively, the right to life enshrined by our Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Effectively, this committee is put in a position that no other committee of these Houses has ever been put in in terms of making a critical, serious and formal assessment of a report on a very fundamental matter. In that regard, we say that, although this committee is parliamentary and therefore political, it is, effectively, entrusted with discharging a protective duty. That duty is owed in the first instance to the immediate victims of these atrocities, in the second instance to those close to these events but luckily not injured or maimed, and in the third instance to the community at large. Effectively, since that protective duty which must be discharged is so high, the balance or burden shifts in order that the case which has to be made before this committee is not why there should be a public inquiry but why there should not be. Given the duties involved and the findings of the Barron report, the onus is very heavily in favour of a public inquiry.

The purpose of the process was to find the truth as far as possible. Obviously, any process may not lead to the truth. Therefore, the words "as far as possible" are important words but they are not words that limit. In other words, this committee has in front of it an opportunity to pursue another process by way of a public inquiry of whatever model, shape or form. By advocating or recommending a further stage of inquiry, this committee is moving the process on as far as possible. Whether that further inquiry ultimately gets to the truth of every single matter and aspect of concern is another issue but at least the process of investigation and inquiry is moving on as far as possible.

I will move on just to pinpoint what Barron did uncover in a general sense. Let us take it that the Government's detailed assessment, as outlined by the Taoiseach in November 1999, was that no case for a public inquiry had been made at that stage and that it lacked a detailed assessment. The Barron report confirms that there is evidential substance and foundation to the allegations that the Garda investigation was compromised, that the RUC did not co-operate, that the Government did not assist, that there is a reasonable basis for the suspicion of collusion, and that assertions made by "Hidden Hand - the Forgotten Massacre" had substance. On "Hidden Hand - the Forgotten Massacre", the report indicates that some of the factual conclusions are wrong by reason of misinterpretation or lack of other evidence, but with regard to the significant findings of the programme, the report generally supports them in so far as it creates substance and foundation to these allegations.

On the Barron report, I want to pause there. The significance to us of the report is that it provides a factual framework in which those allegations now have substance. In our view, Mr. Justice Barron's conclusions are primarily observational. They are not conclusions reached at the end of a critical phase of assessment and testing. In some respects the report is documentary in so far as it documents a whole series of facts. In other respects, it is observational.

The committee is well aware of the gravity of the allegations that arise as a result of the Barron inquiry. It is aware of the significance, even 30 years later, of questions arising as to whether a murder investigation into 34 murders failed, and to why it failed. It is aware of the gravity of the concern as to why that inquiry and investigation did not proceed. It must also be conscious of the fact that in the 1990s, the relatives were effectively told that there was no substance to the allegations in the "Hidden Hand - the Forgotten Massacre" documentary. That was the position in 1993, 1994 and 1995. The message was delivered with the force and authority of the Department of Justice, the Garda Commissioner and of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Yet, eight years later that position, delivered with such authority, unravels during the investigations conducted by Mr. Justice Barron.

The formal response by the Department of Justice on 17 May 1995 to the Yorkshire Television programme could be summarised in one line, that no useful purpose could be gained by any further inquiry. That was the position in 1995. The question which arises before this committee is whether it will deliver a similar verdict on the Barron report and whether, effectively, it will say that no useful purpose can be gained by any further inquiry.

We are aware that the committee has indicated that various parties and Ministers in charge of Departments will come before it. In that regard, we simply reflect on the deep distrust the relatives and Justice for the Forgotten would have in respect of any Department advocating or indicating to this committee that the inquiry process is over because of the positions adopted by those institutions down the years and because of the fact that the Barron findings reflect on actions by those institutions, if not in the immediate past years then at least in the past decade and the decade before it.

Mr. Justice Barron, throughout his report, indicates the extent to which he proceeded on an informal basis, that his inquiry or investigative model was informal. That model of informality was probably adopted for good reason, first, because what was involved was an assessment, not a thorough public inquiry. Its purpose was to find out if there was substance to the concerns that had been expressed. Second, it attempted to adduce the basic factual framework in a non-confrontational way so that Mr. Justice Barron could assess the facts that were emerging and say, "Out of this, do I now move to a stage where there are serious allegations?" In relation to that, our submission is that once the gravity of the allegations begins to emerge, the process has to change. You have to change tack; you can no longer continue with the informality. We say that change occurs at this committee stage, that effectively, in considering whether this matter is being pursued as far as possible, the committee has to ask itself whether it is happy to stop the investigative process with an inquiry that has an informal model, and whether that meets the requirement of the State to pursue these matters as far as possible.

We also indicate that the committee has a difficulty in evaluating this report. The difficulties arise in relation to how a committee conducts a "due diligence" on such a report. It has only the report in front of it. The committee does not have access to the primary documentation. The committee cannot test, check and analyse. It has not seen the Garda reports from the period; they have not been published. It has not been able to dip in and out of the various statements and internal reports that are contemporaneous to 1974. It is limited entirely to the extent to which information emerges in the Barron report itself. It is not privy to the flow of correspondence between the Commission of Inquiry and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office or the Garda Síochána. That is not a criticism of Barron, of the Barron Commission of Inquiry or of the Barron report. However, it poses a difficulty for a committee that has been asked to make a judgment. How can members make that judgment if they cannot test the primary material?

Members will also know from the Barron report that there have been difficulties in terms of his conducting his assessment. We know he has been impeded by the non-production of State papers. We know his modus operandi was invitational. We know the disclosure from the RUC was limited and selective. We know the information received from the British Government was limited. We know from the Barron report itself that he refers to undisclosed sources that are not named in the report. Above all else, members are aware that the process by which he assessed evidence and information was not interrogative. The interested parties were not aware of the material received by the judge, did not have sight of it, did not comment on it and did not have an opportunity to contradict or corroborate it by testimony, challenge or argument.

That is not a lawyer's argument for a lawyer's tribunal. What it reflects on is this: if one goes back to Roman times and traces the concept of the investigation and the process of debate around issues, there are certain key aspects to any debate - the exchange that occurs between interested parties. That intellectual exchange, which effectively is part of the process of assessment, has not occurred within the Barron Commission of Inquiry. We are all aware - I am sure the committee members are aware - that they often come to an issue in this chamber with a very fixed mind as to the facts, how they are to be interpreted and what the conclusion should be. In the course of very rudimentary and primary political debate, their views change, their understanding of the facts change, their understanding of the emphasis on the facts change and their understanding of what is material changes. As experts become involved, reports are submitted and others with expertise engage, the matter widens out and views change. That occurs simply in respect of matters of policy that at times are non-controversial.

When one gets involved in an investigation of matters fundamental to the murder of 34 people, what happened to the criminal investigation and what political action surrounded it, that interrogation and involvement by other parties is fundamental to any fair analysis and assessment of the issues and facts. So the criticism is not of Mr. Justice Barron or of the way he has assessed it. It is a fundamental criticism of a commission of inquiry as a final process of inquiry. It cannot discharge that because it leaves gaping holes. No one individual sitting in a room, assessing material, meeting people in comfortable surroundings and engaging in one to one discussions with them can effectively conduct the process that would lead to an adequate assessment of an issue of this significance.

In summary, therefore, we concluded our first submission by simply saying the committee has a protective duty. If this committee was to go to any other country, be it a Caribbean country, a Third World country, and look at an investigation into a similar incident and be presented with a model of inquiry that finished where Barron finished, it would not be satisfied that that investigation met the international standards for investigations into human rights abuses. It would not meet the criteria set down by various United Nations protocols.

We say the gravity of the evidence uncovered by Barron moves this process - compelling - from an informal inquiry towards a formal inquiry. We indicate that Barron himself has not been able to establish the truth in relation to a wide range of matters. That is acknowledged by him. We say this committee is impeded in its ability to bring Barron from an unfinished stage to a finished stage. You cannot do that yourselves. You have to be conscious of the fact that in 1995 the State, in a very, very strong statement, sought to indicate that there was no purpose in any further inquiry.

We, effectively, come to a conclusion that many lines of inquiry are not exhausted, and emphasise the concept that the obligation of the State is to reasonably exhaust every resource it has. We say there are resources which this State has not yet exhausted. All the relatives can ask is that the State exhaust its resources in pursuing the issue. Whether that ultimately leads to finality or closure, that is all that can be asked of the State.

That, effectively, summarises what we tried to set out in our first submission. The second submission deals, in effect, with and tries to highlight and put a factual framework on what arises from Barron. I do not know, Chairman, if you want me to move onto that at this stage——

Chairman

Just before you do, I wish to say something that I forgot to say earlier in relation to privilege. While members of the committee enjoy parliamentary privilege, that same privilege does not apply to invitees. I have to say this. Would you take us briefly through it and then Mr. Wylde's document? We will then have questions.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

What we have tried to do is take the Barron report and in some way gather the information throughout, restructure it to get some overall impression of our current criticisms in relation to the investigations that took place and the other issues that arise. We start, first, with the Monaghan investigation. To understand the significance of the issues arising out of the Barron report it is important to take a look at where the Monaghan investigation was on 17 July 1974 when, effectively, the Monaghan investigation closed. We know that in the immediate aftermath of the bombings the Garda was aware that the bomb car had been stolen from Portadown that afternoon, and it was clear that Portadown would feature largely in the investigation. We also know that the importance of Portadown would be further enhanced when the Dublin investigation team identified David Alexander Mulholland as a suspect. From both ends, early on - although we do not know exactly when David Alexander Mulholland was identified - Portadown was central to the Monaghan investigation and the Dublin investigation.

We know that a list of suspects developed quickly; we do not know in what sequence or what exact order. It is not clear when they emerged but the following information was available by the end of June-beginning of July. At the outset, the Garda was aware from early in 1974 that a Stewart Young and Nelson Young were active loyalists and active around the Portadown area. We know that as the investigation started Stewart Young had been seen on the afternoon of 17 May 1974 in a car park from which the bomb vehicle had been stolen. We know that he and a Charles Gilmore and a Ronald Michael Nikko Jackson had also been seen there, and we know that an RUC intelligence source had heard a conversation between Young and a Fulton in which Young was said to have admitted that he and Jackson had stolen the car. On top of that, we know that Stewart Young was arrested on 4 July in relation to the hijacking of a oil-tank near Moira in County Down. We also know that a Dublin associate or associate of Stewart Young was known to have stayed in the Four Courts Hotel up to 16 May 1974 and was being sought by the Garda. Again, we know of another link to the Dublin investigation, that there is a link through the Mulholland connection, and we know there is another link to Portadown through Stewart Young.

We know that Nelson Young was identified as resembling a person seen leaving the gents' toilets in Church Square, Monaghan, 20 minutes before the bombing. We know that Samuel Whitten was identified as resembling a man seen driving around Monaghan town the previous evening. We know that a detailed description was given of a passenger with him, although it is not clear who that was. We know that Samuel Whitten was also identified as resembling a passenger in a bomb car seen around 5 p.m. near Middletown, travelling from Armagh in the Monaghan direction.

We know that the getaway car registration number resembled a car owned by William Fulton, and we know that William Fulton was arrested in Scotland in June 1974 in possession of explosives. We know that a Customs officer identified the driver of the getaway car as resembling a known loyalist, and we know that a confidential source alleged that this person was the driver of the getaway car. We know that the RUC had intelligence on a conversation between Ronald Michael Jackson and William Fulton that confirmed that Ronald Michael Jackson and Stewart Young had stolen the car. We know in three respects that Fulton was connected: by discussions, by a connection with a car registration number and by his activism in Scotland in June 1974 in terms of obtaining explosives.

We know that the Garda paid a confidential source for information and that that source provided a name for a driver of a getaway car, a name of a public house in Middletown at which the bombers are alleged to have stopped, a name of a farmer in whose shed the explosives had been stored and the name of a person who, it is alleged, took the Dublin bombs from Middletown to Newtownhamilton. It appears that a further source supplied information about explosives moving between three farms, that the Dublin bombs had been moved to Newtownhamiltion by a named farmer and three other named persons, that the bomb-maker was named, that it was recorded that he drove the bomb car to Monaghan and that the driver of the getaway car was named.

We are aware that the Garda was aware of the oil lorry hijacking involving Stewart Young. Therefore, three others involved with him in that incident could have been considered as suspects for involvement in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings by reason of that connection; if they were involved with Stewart Young in the oil lorry hijacking in July, then they were obviously part of the Stewart Young gang. The importance of that is that that linked back to Belfast because two of them were from Belfast. We are also aware that the Garda was aware that there was a connection between the bombings and two other bombs on 24 May 1974 at the Chalet Bar in Portadown and at the railway line at Knockbridge, Portadown, and that there was also a possible connection to a bomb factory found in Portadown controlled by the UDA.

We are aware that the Garda was aware that William Fulton had been arrested in Scotland and that, therefore, those arrested with him in that incident could have been considered as suspects for involvement in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. That was the state of play as of the end of June-beginning of July 1974. There was substantial intelligence and substantial information available about a range of people, the list of whom could have been added to.

We then go to what happened after July 1974. We know that a farmer was eventually arrested some time after November 1974 and provided additional information. We do not know what the words "eventually arrested" mean. Does it mean it was in 1975, 1976 or 1977? It is not clear what, if any, new names, emerged and there is no evidence of any development. We know the Garda in 1975 showed an interest in the arrest of Robert Bridges and that this interest continued through to his trial in May 1976. There were no developments and he was never ever interviewed.

In August 1975 a Garda memo referred to a man from Newtownhamilton. It is not clear from the report whether this was a new suspect but, again, no developments follow.

There is reference to a letter from the RUC to C3 in the Garda intelligence section, dated 16 January 1976. It contains information regarding an Ivor Dean Knox Young. There is no indication from where he emerged, why the letter arose or in what context information was being sought in relation to Ivor Dean Knox Young but it is interesting to look at the information being provided by the RUC in January 1976. In 1976 they told the Garda that this man had been in custody from 26 April 1973 to 23 November 1974. What they did not tell the Garda was that he had been on compassionate leave the week before the bombings. That would have been material. If there was a reason to inquire as to where Ivor Dean Knox Young had been during that period, the fact that he had been on compassionate leave the week before the bombings would have been relevant. It begs the question as to how the information about his period of detention could have been furnished without the party delivering that information also being aware from his record as to when he had been released on compassionate leave.

We know that in May 1976 information was received regarding a named man from Keady. Again, there is no indication of his name and he appears never to have been questioned. In January 1979 two detectives from Dundalk were told by CID officers in Portadown that they had received information about Joseph Stewart Young and two other individuals. The other two individuals are new suspects. They were not interviewed in 1979; they were never interviewed. They were never interviewed following the Yorkshire Television programme, though they were not referred to in that programme, and were never interviewed following the Weir allegations.

In 1987 we know that Holroyd made allegations in respect of five Portadown loyalists. He named the Youngs, Ronald Michael Jackson and another named UVF person. In July 1987 the Garda said the RUC had no such information on the Young brothers. That is an extraordinary statement because not alone did the Garda have information about the Young brothers but so also did the RUC. Both the Garda and the RUC knew that the Youngs were suspects but, in some respect, Holroyd's statement in 1987 to the Garda was devalued, and devalued without regard to information that the Garda itself had.

From 1993 to 1998, the Garda conducted inquiries into the Yorkshire Television programme. In the first phase - there were two phases to those investigations - David Mulholland, Samuel Whitten, Robin "The Jackal" Jackson and Ronald Michael "Nicko" Jackson were interviewed. Effectively, four people were interviewed. In 1993, when I think Máire Geoghegan-Quinn was Minister, questions were raised and there was a second phase of investigation in which Billy Hanna and Samuel Whitten are connected. The interviews following the second phase were with Charles George Gilmore, Joseph Stewart Young, Fred Holroyd and Colin Wallace. With regard to the inquiries following the Yorkshire Television documentary, it is not clear to what extent the gardaí tried to establish a wider field of suspects, such as were established in the later Garda inquiry into the Weir allegations.

Effectively, all that happened in the 1993 to 1995 assessment is that what appear to be new suspects were questioned; but there was no reconsideration of the suspects from 1974 who appeared during the 1970s. There was no question as to whether those suspects should have been investigated. It simply focused on the new suspects; it did not focus on the totality of suspects. It is clear that the exercise of that time did not reflect an incisive review of the original Garda investigation. It simply did not happen. If it had happened in 1993 to 1995, far more people would have been interviewed.

We know that from 1999 to 2004 the RUC conducted inquiries into John Weir's allegations. Similarly, we know that the Garda commenced investigations. We know that five more individuals were interviewed at the request of the Garda: James Mitchell, Laurence McClure and three others. We know that in 2001 two other interviews were conducted.

From the commencement in 1974, there has been an issue about the mode of interviewing suspects and about whether gardaí should have attended interviews. In so far as it emerges from the Barron report, gardaí were not present at the interviews of any of the seven individuals who were interviewed following the Weir statement in January 1999, in the most recent phase of the Garda investigation. That requires an answer. Why, even at this stage, is there a reluctance to allow gardaí to be present at interviews or a reluctance to request that facility? What happened in those interviews in the last three to four years? We do not know. What we do know from the Barron report is that the Garda received transcripts of the interviews. We do not know whether they are complete, full or thorough. There are even questions about the investigations that the Garda have been able to conduct in recent years.

It is clear that the Northern security forces had extensive information on Monaghan suspects in 1974. We know that no action was taken on their own initiative on foot of that intelligence. Criminal actions took place in Northern Ireland in 1974, apart from the explosions themselves. There were car hijackings, kidnappings and the theft of vehicles -- all primary offences in Northern Ireland. However, the murders that occurred in this jurisdiction were criminal offences under the law in Northern Ireland and could have been prosecuted as such in Northern Ireland because they involved the common law offence of murder. We see that although the RUC was providing photographs and intelligence, there was no murder investigation and no pursuit by the RUC of what would have been standard criminal investigation steps on its part.

The suspicion remains that the persons named by Wallace should have been identified as suspects in 1974. The suspects who emerge in late 1979, 1990-93 and 1999 are referred to by Wallace in documents from 1974 and 1975. The question which arises is, why were these names not circulated to the Garda or the Government as suspects in 1974? In particular, Wallace, in 1974 and 1975, refers to the Youngs, Jackson, Mulholland, of whom the Garda was aware, Hanna, Kerr and a Robert McConnell. While Wallace plays down the interpretation of what he calls an "excluded list", a list that existed in the summer of 1974 ring-fencing certain names from military and intelligence observation, the fact is that those people on those lists are subsequently shown to be involved in various episodes and to have a notoriety. The Wallace letters explicitly refer to a connection between those people and a special duties team.

The Barron report does not contain the full text of the Wallace letters and they are not appended to it. I will read two short extracts. In August 1975 Wallace writes to his former military superior: "There was intense hatred of Rees and Orme within intelligence and special branch and there is good evidence that the Dublin bombings in May last year were a reprisal for the Irish government's role in bringing about the executive."

He refers to "one of Craig's people". Craig, effectively, was involved on the intelligence side. He was the MI6-MI5 security co-ordinator and in so far as being the security co-ordinator he was, effectively, in charge of the co-ordination of intelligence and would have been the primary communicant of intelligence to the MI5 office with which Irish Army military intelligence was meeting on a regular basis. In so far as Irish Army intelligence was gathering evidence or information, it was, effectively, from Craig's people. He refers to it: "According to one of Craig's people, some of those involved, the Youngs, the Jacksons, Mulholland, Hanna, Kerr and McConnell were working closely with SB and Int at that time."

Chairman

Do we have those documents?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

I can furnish these letters to the committee.

Chairman

Thank you.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

In a subsequent letter in September 1975 he goes on:

I have been told recently that most of the Loyalist sectarian killings which took place in Tyrone and Armagh this year, including the Irish showband murders about two months ago, were carried out by the PTF. There are also rumours that the group is linked to the Special Duties team at Lisburn. The whole business is really chilling... Billy Hanna is a PTF member (Lurgan UVF & UDR).

Effectively, when one looks at the Wallace letters with the benefit of the entire Barron report, there are very serious questions in relation to the stewardship and control of the co-operation that was coming from the RUC. The Wallace letters refer to two people, whose names appear consistently over the years——

Chairman

Sorry for interrupting but to come back to module two and whether the relevant issues were addressed, what is the relevance of what you are saying?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

The relevance of this is that when you gather it all together, you have to come to a conclusion. You cannot consider whether something is addressed without first of all saying, "What is the information?" This is the information emerging from Barron. The next question is, "Does that information address the primary terms of reference?" I cannot answer the question of whether or the degree to which it addresses them without listing the information contained in the Barron report and trying to gather it together into some order so that the submission has some connection to a factual content. The report states that in 1992 and 1993 Dr. Reid confirmed intelligence reports that Robin Jackson and Billy Hanna had been involved but there was no indication whether that intelligence was furnished in 1993 when the Garda commenced its review of the Yorkshire Television programme.

We will now consider Mr. Fred Holroyd. What he tries to portray, and the information he gives, is substantially verified by what he has said. There are elements about his allegations over the years that do not hold up, but the substance of his allegations does. The principal concern arising from Mr. Wallace and Mr. Holroyd is that the British security forces had knowledge of the bombings before they happened and knew the identity of the likely planners and participants. The Barron report does not reach a conclusion on that, but the basis for that allegation by Mr. Wallace is supported by Dr. Reid's intelligence, the facts that emerge and the various connections in Portadown.

The Garda and the RUC had sufficient information by 7 July 1974 to enable a detailed investigation to proceed into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The Barron report does not tell us why the Monaghan investigation stopped on 17 July 1974. There is no adequate explanation. When all the facts and the information arising from the bombing were looked at, what was left to do? There were numerous people who could have been lifted for questioning; people in custody could have been questioned; properties could have been raided and searched; there were sufficient pressure points for interrogation and there were leads to follow and connections to be made or discounted from other crimes. There was effectively, in relation to Monaghan alone, a significant tree to shake, and this tree connected to David Alexander Mulholland and into Dublin. It connected to Dublin in relation to allegations of the making and transporting the Dublin bombs. The Monaghan investigation was a critical component of the Dublin investigation. They could not be separated.

We know that as of July 1974, none of the original 15 Monaghan suspects were interviewed, no details of movements of the suspects were obtained, there was no evidence of secondary inquiries and there was no evidence that information from five other incidents were collected and correlated. There would have been forensics and detailed information from other incidents between Fulton and Scotland, between the oil lorry and Moira, between the bombing in the Chalet Bar, between the bombing on the railway track at Portadown and the reference to a search of a bomb factory in a UDA area of Portadown. Other investigative material could have been pulled together. There is no evidence of any detailed request from the Monaghan investigation team.

The fourth paragraph on page 91 of the report states:

In relation to the Monaghan investigation in particular, there was clearly more Garda/RUC cooperation than is apparent from the documentation available. Former Detective Inspector Colin Browne said that he was in contact with the RUC once a week for two months. Former Chief Superintendent Tom Curran has told the Inquiry that names were supplied by the RUC not many days after the bombing. It would seem that these names are the names of those whose photographs were provided. He has also said that he went to Armagh RUC station a number of times to check names which were coming up on Garda enquiries. On one occasion in July 1974, he was instructed to go to Portadown to obtain photographs of all known UVF members in the area. However, he agrees with former D/Inspr Browne that the decision, if any, to ask the RUC to bring any such persons in for questioning was a matter for the senior officers conducting the Dublin investigation.

With regard to Monaghan alone, we represent seven families of seven deceased. Effectively, that paragraph is as far as Barron has got in establishing why the Monaghan investigation stopped. We have no information from this stage of the inquiry, from the Barron process, as to what requests, if any, to conduct any of the matters we have suggested should have been asked for were made. The only impression one gets is that the sole function of visiting the RUC was to collect a name but that there was no other purpose in gathering in that name. We are to believe the Monaghan report was then finalised on 7 July and that none of the officers involved in the Monaghan stage asked for directions or looked for instructions in relation to any further step; that in all these meetings over and back across the Border once a week for two months there was no request to bring in a suspect, to question a suspect, to lift suspects. If we take one area barely ten miles from Monaghan in which there was a cluster of suspects, it was a classic case for a lift and of suspects involved in the fringe of these events in some circumstances.

There is nothing there that indicates in any adequate way or gives any adequate explanation as to why an investigation, which appears to us from the Barron report to have had material to work on, stopped. It confounds us to understand how a report can simply be put into an envelope, delivered through internal Garda mail or posted or brought to Dublin, and that we are left in a situation that the decision, if any, to ask the RUC to bring any such persons in for questioning was a matter for the senior officers.

We know that the Monaghan report, as furnished to the central investigation in Dublin, contains an apology for why we have not got further but within that apology are the very seeds of what should have, been asked to be done. There is no indication at the Monaghan end that they were asked to be done or at the Dublin end that anyone said, "Well, I have read that paragraph, what should we do?" That simply is not a satisfactory explanation five, ten or 30 years later as to why that investigation stopped because, effectively, with the stopping of the Monaghan investigation, the Dublin investigation was over because the leads were significantly there. For that reason, the detail of the Monaghan investigation is important to understanding why we say Barron has not got to the truth of what happened to that investigation.

Let us go on to look at what happened to the 15 suspects who we say were not interviewed. Five were ultimately questioned between 19 and 20 years later - after the broadcasting of the Yorkshire Television documentary. David Alexander Mulholland was interviewed in 1993. We know that the interview went on for two days, and we are told that a garda sat in for one interview session. At this stage, we are asking ourselves what went on. It is a fair question. Was the previous day spent briefing or debriefing David Alexander Mulholland? Was he being interrogated at all? In 1993, when a garda attended the interview of David Alexander Mulholland, we are entitled to know why a garda sat in on only one interview session, and why that was felt to be acceptable by the Garda authorities at the time.

We know in relation to Joseph Stewart Young that Barron raises questions about the method by which he was interviewed - the fact that there was no caution, and that he was told that he was not a suspect - when we can see from the detail of the Mullan investigation that from day one it was not that he was a suspect based on one line of inquiry; it was not that he was a suspect based on one particular piece of intelligence or evidence: he was a suspect because there were numerous connecting factors - numerous leads leading in his direction - and he was told in 1994 that he was not a suspect.

At the interview of Charles Gilmore no garda was present. We know that Robin Jackson, The Jackal, was questioned in 1993. He was the only surviving suspect of the four additional persons named by Yorkshire Television. Billy Hanna, Harris Boyle and Robert McConnell were dead. In relation to what I have called "the cluster of suspects" living not more than ten miles from Monaghan, we know that they were never interviewed. We do not know whether they were alive in 1993 to be interviewed but we know that there was no review as to which suspects were still available.

In relation to those interviews, we do not know the level of preparation, the lines of questioning, or whether transcripts or notes were kept. There is insufficient information relating to those interviews for us to form a view as to whether it was a genuine exercise.

In relation to the allegations made by John Weir in 1999, the Barron report deals with them in detail. I do not want to revisit them - the committee has the report - but there is one final line in the Barron report where Barron states: "The inquiry agrees with the view of An Garda Síochána that Weir's allegations regarding the Dublin and Monaghan bombings must be treated with the utmost seriousness".

That is an invitation to a further process of investigation. It is not an invitation to say our investigation of Weir's revelations or statements is at a conclusion. The only process that we are aware of at this stage by which that can be furthered is by a public process of investigation.

Let us turn to the Dublin investigation. We focused significantly on the Monaghan one today because over the last many years the focus has primarily been on the Dublin investigation as if the seeds of what did or did not happen, in terms of the criminal investigation, arose in Dublin but it is very clear that there are huge questions about the Monaghan investigation.

The evidence available to the Garda in Dublin by the morning of 18 May was that the three bomb vehicles in Dublin had been stolen from Belfast on the morning of 17 May, and that the Monaghan car had been stolen from Portadown that afternoon. By Monday, 20 May, the structure of the Garda investigation was in place, and some key tasks had been completed. I do not think there is anyone who would engage in criticism about the Garda actions on 17, 18 or 19 May. With the enormity of the events that had occurred, no one was going to approach a Garda force responding to a range of explosions happening within the capital city, with suspect vehicles in various other locations, and a bomb exploding in Monaghan and subject the steps taken at that stage to a very intensive analysis or criticism.

However, what is of interest is what occurs in the weeks following, when there should be time for reflection and for someone to take charge of the direction and guidance of the investigation. Our concerns relate to the direction and guidance of the investigation. We know that the investigation knew where the cars had come from, that by the Monday morning forensic collection had taken place, and that the Army had carried out assessments on the bomb sites. We also know that no one had been detained by the Monday morning, so the prospects of detaining anyone within the State must have been remote at that stage. We know that several eye witnesses had come forward. There is no record of any formal request to have the owners of those stolen vehicles interviewed in the presence of the Garda or to have them interrogated by the RUC. It is clear that, in the case of the Parnell Street and South Leinster Street bombs, the car owners would have had information that might have identified the persons who stole the vehicles. What happened in Belfast was the starting point of the investigation. It is clear from the details of the statements made by the owners of those vehicles that there are significant gaps that should have been revisited and scrutinised. There is no record of any formal request for a detailed investigation into their backgrounds or known associates.

As the investigation progresses, we know that, regarding the Parnell Street car bomb, a witness came forward claiming to have seen the vehicle in Ballybrittas on 15 May. There is no sense, and no evidence emerges, that the Garda revisited the RUC regarding the owner of that car and asked where the person and their vehicle had been on 15 May. It appears that some inquiries were conducted regarding the owner of that car, since there is a statement from an insurance agent who visited. However, it does not appear that discrepancies arising from that statement were acted on. It appears that it took six months for the RUC to communicate the statement itself from the insurance agent to the Garda.

We know from the Barron report that by August 1974 the Garda had a list of five names from Belfast of suspects in the bombing. All of those were intelligence-based. We do not know when during the investigation those five names emerged. We do not know whether it was in the first, second or third week. However, we know that the chief superintendent of the special detective unit received information on people referred to as suspects A, B and C. The source is not identified, and we know that Inspector William Kelly received information from the RUC regarding William Marchant and suspect D, who was referred to as a reputed explosives expert. We know that, by 1 June 1974, Army intelligence was aware that unnamed Belfast suspects had been held under temporary detention since 26 May. It was also told that the gang had stayed overnight in Dublin and returned north the next day. We know that G2 sought more information, but no reply is recorded.

Colin Wallace claims that, from early on, Marchant's name was being circulated. In June, on a date that we are not given, the Garda asked the RUC to make inquiries about Marchant. By 15 July, we know that the Garda had all five Belfast names together, with some limited information on them. That is apparent from a letter of the RUC of 15 July. A reply came from RUC special branch on 23 July with specific information on Marchant that he had been a guest of the special branch and CID with negative results and referred to another suspect, saying that he had an alibi. The Garda report on the bombings is dated 8 August 1974. A detailed reply is not recieved until December 1974.

We start off with five suspects in Belfast, all intelligence-based. Suspect A is not traced, but someone with a similar surname who has an alibi is interviewed. Suspect B is not traced. Suspect C, a known loyalist of that name, was interviewed. Suspect D, when interviewed, said that he had not been involved. We do not know who carried out the interviews or where, and we have no evidence of what was put to the suspects. We do not know the value of the alibi given by suspect A, and we do not know if the proper identity of suspect A was clarified. We do not know what further efforts were made to trace suspect B. We do not know if the connections between the Belfast suspects, or indeed the Portadown suspects, and the car owners were explored.

In terms of the overall investigation, the Dublin investigation had most interest in pursuing the Belfast suspects, yet nowhere, in August 1974, was there any sense that there was a focus on these five individuals in terms of trying to identify any further information about them other than that they existed as five names. After December 1974 no further effort was ever made to trace or interview any of these five Belfast suspects and no new intelligence was ever gathered on them. It also appears that no one reconsidered whether there was any basis to the Belfast lists at all, whether this list of five was an entire fiction. We simply know that, in relation to the bombings in Talbot Street, Parnell Street and South Leinster Street, we are left with five suspects and no detail, no investigation, no reinterviewing, no request to interview and no sense of any intensive focus on that aspect of the investigation.

We do not know from Barron. Knowing that information, knowing the criticisms inherent in Barron, we have no idea from the Barron report as to why no thought was applied to the purpose and objective of interviewing suspects or informants or why there was no preparation for interviews. We do not know what arrangements were made, or tried to be made, for attending interviews or requesting notes of interviews. Simply no structure emerges. No explanation for that emerges from the Barron report, except a superficial one in so far as Barron says, "Well, it wasn't done" but that is not a finding, that is not an assessment. That is a self-evident truism - if something is not done, it is not done. What we are interested in, and what the relatives want to find out, is: why was it not done? Who decided not to do it and for what reason did they so decide? If they did decide to do it, were their intentions countermanded or were they instructed not to?

In respect of the investigations into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, it appears to us - again, we are dependent on the Barron report for this - that the RUC response was co-ordinated and controlled by RUC Special Branch. If that is the case, that raises huge concerns in relation to the entire management of this investigation if RUC Special Branch was at the centre of this investigation.

We see references in the Barron report to correspondence to the senior constable, who is head of RUC Special Branch, on the central co-ordinating committee in terms of intelligence. We know that the head of RUC Special Branch sat on that committee. We know what is referred to as "Craig's people" sat on that committee, so if Craig and Irish Army intelligence had information on primary suspects, the head of RUC Special Branch had that information and did not pass it on to Dublin.

In so far as the RUC co-operated with the Dublin investigation, or through Dublin headquarters, we are left with the clear impression that there was a puppet on a string. That names were being fed in but, effectively, names were being kept back. The genuineness of those five Belfast names must be seriously in doubt. Those names were never ever pursued. At any other stage when the matter arose, no one said, "Where are those five people now? Can we locate them? Can we find them?"

As we look back at the Monaghan report we find that at least within the Monaghan division of the Garda when intelligence arose from contacts back and forth across the Border the information about a farmer in Keady in 1976 and 1979 entered the system but there is no sense in relation to Dublin that Dublin was pro-active from 1974 in pursuing any line of inquiry in terms of monitoring and continuing. We are not clear in relation to information received from the RUC and to other events whether that was managed through the RUC Special Branch. Members will appreciate the shorthand; from reading the report, they will know that the incidents refer to the lorry at Carrickannan, the Hertz van, the Anglia and such matters. It is not apparent whether any inquires were made to the RUC regarding the man at the Four Courts Hotel. What emerges in the initial Garda investigation is a matter of considerable concern in relation to leads, for which again there is no response. The Barron report highlights the fact that the senior gardaí are no longer alive. However, that does not prevent the jigsaw being put together and for that reason we say that these matters are still amenable to investigation.

In relation to trying to put together a jigsaw, obviously there are people who are not able to assist any further inquiry, but there were people who would have played a part in events in that inquiry who are still alive and who may have very useful information or insights that need to be tested. However, in terms of the leads, including the Hertz van, a garda being able to establish the day beforehand, with certainty, the vehicle and its make and accurately record its registration number, and counter-information from the RUC, the matter parked. There were two conflicting sets of facts and the issue was parked, with the Four Courts Hotel suspect simply disappearing to re-emerge suddenly, out of the fog, as a witness in the Catherine Nevin trial. This was someone to whom gardaí really wanted to talk. They may have been able to deal with the lead. It may have had no basis whatsoever, but where had this witness been lost for all those years that he could not be located?

We have the extraordinary Portland Row-Dublin docks-British military officer story about a van that gave rise to a suspicion. A public servant rang gardaí during 17 May on two occasions to say that there was a suspicious van outside the Department of Posts and Telegraphs in Portland Row. It evoked no great sense of urgency, but ultimately that night it led to a further call and to that witness being brought down to the docks to identify the van, which had English number plates and which at some time, then or later, emerged to be false plates. So there was a van with false plates down at the Dublin docks, in the back of which was a British military officer's uniform. We are then told that a British military officer was taken off the boat and that weapons were found on his person, but that is it. There it ends. There is no other detail; there is no information.

The Barron report states that there is no information about it at all on the Garda file. It exists on the files of military intelligence, but there is nothing in the Garda files about it. However, the Garda were involved in all of that at the Dublin docks - on the day of the bombing, on the night of the bombing, after the bombings and after the alerts had gone up. There are so many questions about that incident in itself that have yet to be answered and explored.

There are other incidents that we have listed that have simply not been brought to a close. Someone was given the task of pursuing some of those questions, and we have no doubt that those who were tasked did that and came back with a reply. However, the question is, having come back with information, what were they not then asked to do? It does not emerge at all.

In regard to the Dublin investigation, the Barron report confirms a collapse in that investigation, including the management of forensics, the use of photographs, the failure to record who identified what photographs and who appeared in a particular photograph and photo-fits. There is a reference to the Monaghan number plate finger print but to this date we do not know whether that finger print still exists or if the original finger print is still in Garda possession. The strategy of interviewing suspects, the recording and storing of evidence, the investigation of leads, the tracing and location of suspects and the long-term preservation of a case file that is still supposedly open - all of this leads us to feel that there are huge questions still to be asked about how such an investigation collapsed. The Barron report presents a picture of a collapse, and, if I may offer an analogy, if this was a collapsed building we would want to know whether the architect, the engineers, the builders or the suppliers of the materials were responsible. All that the Barron report does - it is done very well - is to bring us to the collapse but it does not present an investigation as to how, why and who caused it. The committee cannot walk away from that.

Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Wylde is present and we might take his document up shortly in such way as the committee might wish. He deals very significantly with a critical issue - the forensics of the day and what can be made of the explosives that were used. Regarding the political response, our initial reaction to the question as to whether the Barron report addresses the political response is that it does not do so. There is nothing in the report about the political response. It is the shortest part of the report. It is as if nothing exists to report on. That is the impression one obtains from the report.

There is the question of information passed on to the Government at various meetings and there is a huge issue about files within the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform gone missing and the counterparts of those files not being in Garda records. Let me indicate the way in which that simply cannot be so. The issue did arise in public fora. It arose on two occasions in 1975 in the Dáil when questions were put and information was given. I am sure that committee members, as parliamentarians, will know that a ministerial reply to a Dáil question invariably gives rise to a ministerial briefing paper. On two occasions in 1975 this issue was raised in circumstances that we believe would have caused the preparation of a ministerial reply.

If I might indicate the replies that were given in 1975 by way of political answers to the Dáil. It appears that Deputy Davern asked questions and that Mr. Fitzpatrick - I am not sure whether he was Parliamentary Secretary in the Department of Justice - gave the answers on behalf of the Minister for Justice. He stated: "I am informed by the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána that Garda investigations of these outrages continue." Was that a fair statement in May 1975 given the content of the Barron report?

Chairman

Where are you getting the information on this, Mr. Ó Dúlacháin?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

It is from the Oireachtas website. I can furnish copies of two very short questions that were replied to. They were adverted to in correspondence with the committee. Deputy Davern asked: "Is the Minister not aware that it is a well known fact that three people have been arrested, interned in Northern Ireland and released who, it is well known, were responsible for the outrage?" The reply stated: "I have no more information of a specific nature about that than has the Deputy. As far as the Garda Síochána are concerned they have not received evidence from the RUC that particular persons perpetrated these outrages." Is that a fair statement to make in May 1975?

They have no positive information or evidence that would identify the culprits. Is that a fair statement to make in 1975?

Chairman

I ask Mr. Ó Dúlacháin to try to stay away from any individual culpability or responsibility and stick to the issues in general.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

It is central to the political issue. What information was given to the Dáil? I have no idea what information was given to the Deputy or the Minister. We are saying that the information must have come up through the system. We are not at this stage making any allegation that anyone deliberately gave information to the House that was intended to mislead. However, information was given to the House. When one looks at the Barron report there must be huge questions about from whom this briefing came. Did it come from the Garda Commissioner or from officials in the Department of Justice? It was stated that they had no positive information with which to identify the people who committed these outrages.

Further on, on a matter of law, it was stated:

Even if these people were the people who were guilty, the offence was committed here and, unless the reciprocal legislation which is now being sponsored here and in Britain were available, it would not be possible to bring these people to justice in Northern Ireland for crimes committed here.

That was wrong as a matter of law. The debate continued: "The Minister gave an indication that he did not even know who committed those crimes," while Mr. T. J. Fitzpatrick (Cavan) said: “Neither do I.”

The following November further questions arose, which we again say in November 1975 should have given rise to inquiries between the Garda Síochána and the Department of Justice, of which no records have been found by Mr. Justice Barron. Mr. Lemass asked the Minister for Justice if any arrests had been made as a result of the bombing tragedies in Dublin and other parts of the State, and if he would make a statement. The Minister referred the Deputy to the reply on 21 May and stated:

So far nobody has been made amenable for these outrages and I could not, in this or any other case, give any indication as to the lines of inquiry pursued since, quite clearly, the only persons who would benefit by such a disclosure would be the perpetrators.

Unfortunately, the photocopy does not come out very well. Could you circulate the original?

Mr. Wylde

You can see that the gentleman who is severely distressed is surrounded by a considerable amount of debris; what appear to be fragments of glass and bits of loose explosive that have been scattered around. You cannot draw a definitive conclusion from it; it is a very poor-quality photograph. But the second photograph, which was taken only a few minutes later, shows the scene just in front of where the Garda officer was standing, and it shows that the area has been substantially cleared. It has been substantially cleared because the fire brigade has hosed down the area; it has removed pieces of human remains and blood. I would have done exactly the same in those horrific circumstances. That is what has happened. The evidence has been removed from the scene before the experts arrived.

So, for Mr. Justice Barron to conclude in his report, as he does, that you cannot draw inference from these pictures is not correct. I say that for a number of reasons. First, the quality of the photographs is exceedingly good. Second, you can get what is called a stereo image. If you have been watching the recent pictures from Mars you will have heard talk about a stereo image; it is produced in a different way, but, effectively, it is the same. In 1974 we had black and white photography; today we are using different types of colour photography. So if you use glasses with a green and a red lens you can get a three-D image in exactly the same way. It produces a three-dimensional image so that you can identify what is on the ground. The photographs of some of the scenes, particularly South Leinster Street, are quite clear and distinct.

Again, in my report it may be indistinct but good quality photographs do exist. You can see in the South Leinster Street picture that the fire brigade is present at the scene and it is about to use the hose further down the street. In the picture the bomb was behind the little MG sports car, which was set on fire by the explosion. The fire brigade put out that fire; then it cleared away the casualties. After that, it continued to hose down. You can see it hosing down the area in newsreel pictures. The evidence had been removed from Parnell Street and South Leinster Street before the people arrived. The Barron report goes on to state:

EOD and ballistics officers who had encountered ANFO residues on other occasions conducted a rigorous search of each site. To suggest that they failed to find the clumps of ANFO deposits which were large enough to be visible on television camera or footage seems unlikely.

The evidence shows that the clumps of ANFO had been dissolved and been removed from the scene before they arrived.

Second, the Barron report does not make it clear that these were the first ANFO explosions to occur in the Republic of Ireland. So the chances of the individuals recognising what was on the ground were very, very remote indeed, even if it had been there in the first place. We have to look at whether this was a true statement of the facts. My evidence, as a photographic interpreter, which Mr. Justice Barron did not go into - I have been trained as a photographic interpreter - is that they are. What I would suggest that is required is a proper investigation of all the photographic material, and I certainly have not seen it all, so that this can be put before some form of investigation to confirm or contradict what I am saying and that other people can then test that evidence and test it properly.

I admit that when you are looking at these photographs in a report like this, you cannot get the true picture of what this evidence is like for real. Mr. Justice Barron has not actually seen my original photographs. He has only seen the considerably reduced sized photographs that I have put in my report.

I think also that the points that I have tried to put in a table in the report are quite valid. There was considerable confusion in Dublin on the night of 17 May and the EOD teams were dealing quite properly with other suspected vehicles at that time, as one would have expected, so they did not arrive on the scene in time. I cannot understand, and there is no reason given, why the technical bureau staff did not arrive earlier. I would have expected them to do so, particularly if they were in the Dublin area. There was a major delay at all scenes of getting to them anybody who was qualified to investigate. Again, that needs to be looked at and some conclusions drawn as to why that would happen.

The third point I would like to make is that there was considerable skill involved in making this three bomb attack happen as and when it did. I have referred in my reports to what was possibly viewed as the retaliation by the Provisional IRA on 25 July in Belfast when it attempted to get six car bombs into Belfast for simultaneous explosion. It hijacked six cars in the Belfast area and then drove five of them in to the city. The sixth was held up by the traffic jam it had caused in the whole of this process, so it arrived a couple of hours later.

To undertake the operations required considerable skills. The UVF did not have those skills in 1974 at all, nor has it displayed them on any other occasion. This point was made not only by me but by in the film for Yorkshire Television by Lieutenant Colonel George Style who at that time was probably the most experienced bomb disposal officer in the world and had just written his book on the subject, Bombs Have No Mercy. He had just attended a conference along with his superior, Brigadier Peter Dutton. We, in Belfast, had dealt with more bombs in the course of that conference than had been dealt with by the rest of the world in the same period of the previous 12 months. The expertise that Barron dismisses of myself, Colonel Styles and three army officers from the Irish Army, is cavalier in the way it has been done and it needs to be severely addressed because no form of cross-examination or questioning has taken place on that aspect.

Chairman

Will you withdraw the word "cavalier"? It has a connotation which I do not think is appropriate in this particular circumstance.

Mr. Wylde

Fine, Mr. Chairman, I understand that.

Chairman

Thank you very much. We are very much amateurs when it comes to bombs and your presentation told us a lot about the whole aspect of what is in bombs and what are the effects. We will have questions until 1 p.m. when we will break and resume at 2 p.m.

Deputy P. Power

I thank Mr. Ó Dúlacháin, the legal team and members of the Justice for the Forgotten for coming back to assist us in our task. I have several questions for Mr. Ó Dúlacháin on his submission that we received on Friday, and questions on the supplementary submission we received this morning. My questions should not be misinterpreted. Mr. Ó Dúlacháin made the point that it is by a rigorous examination of the points already made that progress may be achieved. I hope that nobody in Justice for the Forgotten might think that we have a preordained position arising out of any of these questions as we do not; they are to help us in our deliberations.

The submission received last Friday states on page one that "the process of analysing the report involved (a) the identification of standards against which the report can be measured, and (b) the testing of the report against those standards". That may be Mr. Ó Dúlacháin's definition of what the process should be, but where does that process come from, how did it come about, who defined and produced it? Is it in conformity with some international standard of which we are unaware?

Surely the first step in the process of analysing the report would be, as we all agreed, to look at our terms of reference and try to analyse the issues in the report, and then look to see whether they have been addressed or not addressed, as the case may be.

Can Mr. Ó Dúlacháin elaborate on where this standard came from?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

There are two different aspects to the standard. First, in terms of a procedural standard and a process of investigation, standards exist. There is, for example, the Minnesota protocol, and we can furnish the committee with technical documents on various protocols on human rights standards. In addition, the question of how one approaches the assessment of complicated matters such as collusion have been addressed by other forums. They have been addressed by the Inter-American Human Rights Court, a tribunal that is rarely heard of on this side of the Atlantic, but is an equivalent to the European Court of Human Rights, and we can similarly furnish some material to the committee on that.

The assertion that one should adapt some type of standard is an exercise more in logic in the sense that one is asked to assess material, what satisfies one when one assesses it and what one is trying to satisfy? One must ask oneself how far along the path of truth a standard takes one. If one is given a fact or facts, one must ask what questions those facts or circumstances bring to one's mind and whether those questions have been answered in the report. The Barron report is rich with material, but that richness should not be confused with being a final product. Those facts must be examined and decisions made on what is revealed. One must then ask what questions that reasonably gives rise to. One must ask "If I were conducting this assessment or investigation, what further questions would I want on this particular aspect or would I want any?" I suppose in the end you have to adopt some type of scoring mechanism. Whether you reduce it to numbers or a mental exercise, you do have to look at each aspect of the report and say, "Have I got all the information that is relevant to this aspect? Am I working on partial information? Am I working on information that is second-hand? Am I working on information that Barron was able to test himself? Am I working on hearsay delivered second-hand to Barron? Am I working on assessments of documents by the RUC, the assessment of which was given to Barron but not the document?" All of these different facts just arrive in Barron's report without being separated out as to which are the most reliable facts from those which are least reliable and, therefore, you must ask how the assessment is structured.

Deputy P. Power

On the gravity of the allegations dealt with on page 5 of your submission, I have a difficulty with a number of aspects of your submission which were reinforced this morning. There are a lot of assertions in your presentation which you claim are in the Barron report but which, from my reading of it, are not there. One of them - you mentioned it on at least 20 occasions this morning; it is a cornerstone of your submission - is that the cumulative effect is that the allegations have now been shown by Mr. Justice Barron to have a foundation, or to have substance, to use your words. I am not certain whether the report goes as far as that. I refer you to his conclusions on page 287, paragraph 7, where he says: "The possibility that the involvement of such army or police officers was covered-up at a higher level cannot be ruled out; but it is unlikely that any such decision would ever have been committed to writing." Paragraph 8 reads:

There is no evidence that any branch of the security forces knew in advance that the bombings were about to take place ... If they did know, it is unlikely that there would be any official records. Such knowledge would not have been written down.

Paragraph 10 which relates to the conclusions issue reads:

But any such conclusion would require very cogent evidence. No such evidence is in the possession of the inquiry. There remains a deep suspicion ... but it cannot be put further than that.

The next paragraph relates to the assistance by the security forces:

Ultimately, a finding that there was collusion between the perpetrators and the authorities in Northern Ireland is a matter of inference. On some occasions an inference is irresistible or can be drawn as a matter of probability. Here, it is the view of the inquiry that the inference is not sufficiently strong. It does not follow even as a matter of probability. Unless further information comes to hand, such involvement must remain a suspicion. It is not proven.

Yet in your submission which you reinforced on at least a dozen occasions today you say these allegation are now shown by Mr. Justice Barron to have a foundation. Will you clarify or elaborate on this? I suggest to you that the report does not go that far. Your whole submission hangs, or is based, on this cornerstone that there is a foundation to these allegations.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

First, the body of the report has to be regarded in its totality. What we are not really concerned with is whether Barron's conclusions of the material he has discovered are right or wrong in that sense. What we are concerned with is looking at what Barron has uncovered and advancing our case that it creates an allegation that has substance.

No. First, let the member put himself in the situation of representing the relatives as we do. No matter what standing or integrity any individual, judicial or non-judicial, has, in a case involving so many murders, one would absolutely insist, as a party representing someone affected by those bombings, to have access to the primary material. One would simply not be happy that one is discharging one's duty to one's client to walk away at the end of an inquiry process without, at the very minimum, having been able to access the primary material which that process itself had available to it. One could not and would not fly blind. A public process would, first of all, meet the first criterion, since one would have the material before one.

The second issue is the non-production of papers. In so far as papers do not appear, at least every effort would be made, and those who had custody of those papers could be questioned in public and a trail followed. The modus operandi would be different. It would be confrontational, testing and teasing. The extent to which one gets disclosure or assistance from other agencies can affect any process of inquiry, but it does not rule it out. One would not be happy to rely on a report that refers to undisclosed sources. One would want the final assessment to be based on sources who are willing to disclose who they were and what they were saying, and one would want to participate in item G.

Deputy P. Power

Let us turn to Mr. Ó Dúlacháin's submission today, which we have not had a great chance to assess. In the first paragraph on page 9, you state:

In relation to the allegations made by John Weir in 1999 the Barron Report at page 162 states "The Inquiry agrees with the view of An Garda Síochána that Weir's allegations regarding the Dublin & Monaghan Bombings must be treated with the utmost seriou"ness".

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin went on to say that if there was ever a case for a further judicial inquiry, it is that.

I have given great latitude in regard to module 5 but I ask all the members, as far as possible, to stick to module 2, which is the issues in the report and whether the report addresses them all.

Chairman

Thank you very much. We will break until just before 2 p.m.

Sitting suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 2 p.m.

Chairman

Before we recommence questioning, for the public record, I invite Mr. Nigel Wylde to let us know his professional qualifications, his current job and how he fits into the role of expert in these matters.

Mr. Nigel Wylde

I am a former army officer. I was commissioned from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in 1968 and retired from the British army in 1991. In 1970, I was trained as an ammunition technical officer specialising in guided weapons, but part of the role of the ammunition technical officer is terrorist bomb disposal and explosive ordnance disposal of ordinary conventional munitions. From 1974 onwards I spent the summer from June through to October as the officer in command of No. 1 section of 321EOD unit in Belfast where I was responsible for all terrorist bomb disposals in that particular area. Stemming from that, I have given evidence in well over a dozen cases involving murder to straightforward conspiracy to create an explosion at the lower end of the terrorist scale. I have also given expert evidence in a number of cases in London, dealing with bombing attacks on the Israeli Embassy and various other Jewish premises at varying times over recent years.

As to professional qualifications, I am a graduate of the Army Staff College and I have a postgraduate diploma in law.

Chairman

Thank you very much, Mr. Wylde. I invite Deputy Costello to ask some questions.

Deputy Costello

I, too, welcome Mr. Wylde and most of the people before us.

I agree with your final statement. I am glad that you are here to assist us, not in any confrontational sense. We would certainly like to try to explore this as much as possible in as reasonable a fashion as possible. First, I put it to you directly that your reading of Judge Barron's report is coloured by a prior decision that only a public inquiry would resolve these matters to your satisfaction and that when you are considering all of the issues, you are considering them only in that context?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

I think you are correct to say our view has been coloured for many years as to how the truth would be ascertained. We have always held the view from January 1996, when Mr. O'Neill and I were asked to assess matters, that the only effective vehicle for establishing the truth is a public tribunal of inquiry. We have always held that view, so it is not that we have approached Barron with any colouring other than a firm belief in what is the effective means and mechanism for establishing the truth. That is formulated not on any love or affection for public inquiries but on our understanding of what they can do practically and how they go about their work and from the experience in this State from the 1970s of the Stardust and many other tribunals that they are a public mechanism for investigating grave matters.

Deputy Costello

Truth is very difficult to define, as we know from the Bible. What is truth? Perhaps we could look at the terms of reference in appendix D of the Barron report to refresh our memories? There are four sets of terms of reference: the facts, the circumstances, the causes and the perpetrators of the bombings. In other words, what happened? Why did it happen? Who did it? How well has Judge Barron addressed these questions? The terms of reference cover the nature, extent and adequacy of the Garda investigation, including co-operation with the Northern Ireland authorities and the forensic evidence about which I would like to ask Mr. Wylde later. We must ask the reason there were no prosecutions and about the "Hidden Hand" documentary.

Which of these areas, do you think, has Judge Barron not addressed?

Mr. O Dúlacháin

I think he has examined them in the sense that he has gathered material relevant to them. In terms of a thorough examination, a thorough examination requires in the first instance that you have all the material before you, or all the material that can be reasonably ascertained. An assessment involves a process of analysing, comparing and questioning that material that comes before you. In our opinion, you cannot say that his report addresses the matter in a substantive sense because if you take that first matter, the facts, circumstances, causes and perpetrators, there are very significant gaps in the facts. There are considerable questions as to the perpetrators. In terms of perpetrators who may have had a hand or a hidden hand in it, the collusion theme runs through each of those terms of reference in one way or another. You cannot say he has addressed who the perpetrators are. What he has established is the limit of how far he could get through his investigative process.

Deputy Costello

I put it to you that he has identified perpetrators at various stages. What we have is a totality that appears to include all of the perpetrators but may not cover the immediate ones who did it. Is there anything to be gathered beyond the issue of identifying the individual perpetrators, the organisation that carried it out and the motive? The question of collusion is dealt with at a certain stage.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

First, in relation to Monaghan you can say that perpetrators or individuals may be identified and some of them may be linked to particular actions. In terms of Dublin, other than David Alexander Mulholland, there is nothing ascribed to any one of those identified. There is no role allocated, there is no particular part played in the events of the days ascribed to any person in relation to Dublin, other than David Alexander Mulholland.

To address something satisfactorily you must do everything within your power to get the relevant evidence and information into the public domain and you must test it. The Barron process has not done that. He has not been able to gather everything that is relevant. Once it is gathered the matter moves into a realm whereby the only proper and appropriate assessment is an assessment in public where the parties can test it.

We deliberately used the phrase "substantive". Has the matter been substantively addressed? No. Has Barron done a significant job in gathering together information? Yes, he has. However, there is a lot of information out there that has not been revealed or disclosed about the individuals who have been identified and those who have not.

Deputy Costello

Deputy Costello

I want to ask one question of Mr. Nigel Wylde, whose presentation was very important. With regard to the ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, on page 3, he says that such a bomb was never used before in the Republic. He disagrees with Judge Barron's findings, and is still of the opinion, as he states in the second paragraph, that the bombs were made with ANFO. However, on page 70 of the report, Judge Barron appears to agree with him on that. He states that the main loyalist improvised explosives are A, B, C and D, D being a mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, which is ANFO. He states that of the second two mixtures, by far the most common is the mixture of ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate and sugar, which is usually packed in a beer barrel. Presumably, it is likely to be the same situation with regard to the ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, because residue and beer-keg fragments were found.

Mr. Wylde

Those are actually my words. They are taken from a report that I prepared for Judge Barron, and in certain cases they are a reflection of the words of a forensic scientist from Northern Ireland. The explosive mixtures A to C listed there are what are classed as "low explosives". That means that if they are in the open, they will probably burn but they will not detonate. They have to be confined in an airtight, solid container, such as a gas cylinder. I have a photograph here that I can circulate which shows what I am actually talking about. The initiation of that device is through a detonator, usually attached to a piece of safety fuse - the detonator being what is called "igniferous" or "plain" - that is, it burns and is set off by burning. That is a very crude and very simple device, and it was the method that was employed after 1972 when, both in Dublin and in London, orders were laid by the respective Parliaments relating to the common 1875 Explosives Act, and various other Acts that were common as well, to restrict the amount of ammonium nitrate in fertilizer, so that if it was mixed with fuel oil, it would not lead to a detonation.

That comes to ammonium nitrate and fuel oil. Ammonium nitrate fuel oil is a "high explosive". It detonates, depending on the quality of the mixture, at over 4,000 metres a second and can detonate at over 6,000 metres a second if it is commercially produced. It does not require confinement. What it does require, however, because they were operating with mixtures that were not pure ammonium nitrate, is a booster explosive. A booster explosive could be some form of chlorate mixed with nitrobenzene, which was quite common up until the 1972 regulations were introduced, both here and in Westminster, restricting the use of nitrobenzene. Therefore, that had virtually died by the end of 1973, and in 1974 we did not encounter any such explosives. It was unique, in any case, to the IRA. What was used, therefore, to ignitiate ANFO bombs was commercial explosive.

At that stage, the IRA's stocks of commercial explosives came from thefts that had occurred from the Irish Industrial Explosives factories in the Republic. The most notable explosive used was Frangex, which started being manufactured, if I remember correctly, in about 1972. The IRA managed to obtain large quantities of it. The loyalist terrorists, on the other hand, did not have that access. They had a little from quarries, as the IRA did. Again, with the tightening of the regulations, that access was denied to them. Even the quantities that they could obtain from Great Britain were virtually zero. The tightening up on commercial explosives was such that they simply did not have access to it. We had no finds at all of commercial explosives in the hands of loyalist terrorists during the summer of 1974.

The loyalists had to rely on stocks - primarily wartime stocks - of old military explosives, notably gun cotton or nitrocellulose, which came in blocks, as well as gun cotton primers. They could be set off and used as charges. By 1973, that had gone, and they were left with boosters, with extremely limited supplies of commercial explosives, which were used only sparingly and only under certain conditions. In the summer of 1974 in Belfast we encountered one bomb that could possibly be attributed to commercial explosives used by loyalist terrorists.

Chairman

Does that answer the member's question?

Deputy Costello

Yes.

Mr. Wylde

Perhaps I might add that the method of making the ammonium nitrate that had to be employed after the restrictions were imposed was developed by the Provisional IRA. Its development started in the middle of 1973. I cannot be any more precise than that. It could have been March or August, but it was in the middle of that year. It involved recrystallising it. The process was obnoxious because of the fumes rather than the danger.

The loyalist terrorists did not have the knowledge of how to make that and probably did not gain it until late in 1976, 1977 or perhaps 1978. Therefore, if ammonium nitrate fuel oil was used in the explosions in Dublin, it would have to have come from one of five possible sources. The first was old stocks of fertiliser, but everyone was agreed that those had been taken away and probably did not exist in the quantities used. The second was pure ammonium nitrate, but they did not have access to that for the same reasons. It may also have come through a variety of ways. They may have hijacked it or stolen it from the Provisional IRA. I am not sure that either side would admit to that if that happened. It may also have come from confiscated stocks or because someone who knew how to make it had helped them. They did not have the knowledge of how to make it themselves.

Deputy Costello

Mr. Wylde is disagreeing with Mr. Justice Barron on that issue.

Mr. Wylde

Very much, and the evidence that I can put forward in support is not just my own.

Chairman

We will not go into that any further.

Mr. Wylde

Yes, but it is supported by written documents from others.

Deputy Hoctor

I thank those who are with us today. Perhaps I might begin with Cormac Ó Dúlacháin and take him up on the analogy he used before the committee today when he compared Mr. Justice Barron's situation to a collapsed building where the architects have not fully identified or brought to light. I will continue that analogy using the evidence presented today by Mr. Nigel Wylde. When Mr. Justice Barron appeared at the collapse situation, the crucial evidence needed had already eluded him.

How much time did the group spend with Mr. Justice Barron? Can it be calculated in hours or days?

You gave us what I would see as a certain type of conflicting information today when you referred to the parliamentary question dealt with by Deputy Davern which was in conflict with what you say Mr. Justice Barron said. I am interested in knowing if Mr. Justice Barron was made aware of that particular piece of information or was it information you came upon since your negotiations and discussions with him? In addition, is there other information and evidence that you have come upon since your discussions with him?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

First, I should explain that we had a limited number of meetings with Mr. Justice Barron over the course of three years. Effectively, our involvement with him ended last June or July. Over the previous three years we were involved with the commission from time to time on the basis of identifying tasks that we felt would assist the commission of inquiry, agreeing with the commission that they would be done and producing the result thereof. In its course we submitted in excess of 49 separate submissions on a whole range of issues and areas but having submitted them to Mr. Justice Barron we would not have had the benefit of whatever other information he had. Effectively, our role was to feed in information, to suggest lines of inquiry, to establish contact with witnesses such as Mr. Wallace, Mr. Holroyd and Mr. Weir, to obtain Mr. Weir's agreement to come back from Africa to meet Mr. Justice Barron in Paris and make arrangements in that regard, to conduct certain inquiries in Northern Ireland, to go North, to try to meet people, and source and locate experts such as Mr. Wylde and other ballistics experts. In that way we have participated in terms of feeding in but we have not been involved in an engagement with the information that has come to light here.

There is information that we would have had which would not have appeared relevant. We would have had in a database every question raised in the Dáil and Seanad in relation to these bombings or other bombings but the relevance of the questions raised and the answers given in 1975 would not have been obvious until the report emerged to us. That is an example. Another example is Mr. Wylde's own submission which indicates how a view taken by a commission as to what is important such as photographic interpretation unless put, tested or discussed with other parties can leave an inquiry to go off on a tangent which others subsequently disagree with.

In all, we have been working from the dark inwards - obtaining a little information, building on it and feeding in into the inquiry. There have been incidents where we have been able to locate information and feed it into the inquiry. The Fulton case is such an example in relation to the trial in Scotland. That arose from a detailed analysis by us of Mr. Holroyd's notebooks. Obtaining Mr. Holroyd's notebooks required us to go back to Yorkshire Television, to Duncan Campbell who had authored a book and documents. It involved establishing communications with the local library in Fife. It involved that local librarian doing research for us, digging out trial reports and putting information together but all of that information and all of that further investigation requires a database of facts with which to start. We were presented with more information, through the Barron report, which we believe enables us to pursue lines of inquiry that were not open to us. Our experience of unravelling the footprints of issues such as collusion is that it is found in the most indirect and obscure place. You would not expect to find, in a trial in Kirkcaldy in Scotland in September 1974, someone who is a known prime suspect in two jurisdictions in relation to bombings receiving references from Members of Parliament and indications that he has no criminal or paramilitary connections.

The process of investigating this type of atrocity is a huge exercise; it is not one that can be done like other exercises. In terms of a public inquiry, it is really the investigative enterprise that is important. It is the investigative enterprise that takes you there, and our sense of Barron is that he has brought it as far as he can. However, we believe that in the coming months other material will arrive. We have no doubt about that. We have had communication from people since the launch of the Barron report, since the focus on it, who, while not perhaps directly relevant to May 1974, are giving information about things happening in Dublin in 1973. All of that re-opens a sense of confidence in people coming forward. Mr. Wylde comes forward today; that encourages someone else to come forward tomorrow. There is a process of that public engagement that creates confidence in people to engage and disclose information. Once people see what someone else has said, it leads on and it builds gradually.

Deputy Hoctor

My two other brief questions are in direct relation to Mr. Ó Dúlacháin's summary of his submission on Module 2. It states: "An examination of the report establishes that many lines of inquiry have not been exhausted." Will Mr. Ó Dúlacháin elaborate as to which lines of inquiry he believes have not been exhausted?

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

In terms of the lines of inquiry that have not been exhausted: first, with regard to the Garda investigations in Dublin and Monaghan, we have no comprehensive sense that we will understand what happened. We feel that we have a lot of facts but a superficial understanding of what was going on in terms of the direction and control of these investigations and of the interaction of that with the body politic.

With regard to the collusive elements, we now know that there are conflicting positions on information that was given in 1974 and information that has emerged subsequent to that. We know that on the question of collusion, Stevens took 12 years to get from a position to which there was no basis to a position that there was a basis. In that regard, we now have an emerging body of information about individuals, which is in itself incomplete. There is no full account of what is known about these individuals in terms of their involvement from 1974 onwards with other events and circumstances. It is only when the full picture emerges can one then go back and ask, "Why were they involved in 1974? Who helped them? Who covered it up? Who participated?" Our sense is of an incomplete picture in which there are certain individuals on whom there is a substantive amount of information, but many individuals on which it is extremely sketchy, and this in circumstances where we know that information exists. By way of example, we know, from the structure of the security forces in Northern Ireland, that there was a central registry, there was a Protestant desk and a Catholic desk, that on a week-by-week basis information was recorded on everyone who came to their attention. That is the system and that system has not brought forward the information, which would indicate an awful lot about the participants.

Deputy Hoctor

On page nine of the submission, and Mr. Ó Dúlacháin mentioned this in his opening statement, it is noted that the process of inquiry to date does not satisfy international standards for investigations into human rights abuses. I know he spoke about the right to life but I would like to hear more from him about that particular statement.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

The international standards are very simple. There should be an independent investigation that is adequately resourced. It should, as far as possible, do its business in public. There can be circumstances in which, for countervailing reasons, elements of it cannot be done in public, but it should be done in public. Finally, those who are affected and who have a real and immediate interest in what occurred should be full participants in the process. The standards become more elaborate as one goes on but the fundamentals are very much "independent, in public and participation". The obligations then fall on states to co-operate.

Deputy F. McGrath

I welcome and commend the legal team for Justice for the Forgotten. Its earlier submissions were powerful and very professional. I hope they will agree with me that there is substance in the Barron report. I was also interested to hear Mr. Ó Dúlacháin mention the Stardust tribunal because I was involved in that also. They were constituents of mine also in Dublin North-Central. I also thank the families for last Tuesday's submissions. It was a very difficult day and we understood their trauma. I commend and thank them.

My first question is in regard to page 2 of the submission, which says that this committee "has got to come to a decision on a matter of fundamental rights". It then talks about Article 40 of the Constitution on the right to life and Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Is Mr. Ó Dúlacháin stating clearly to the committee that the families and the legal team representing them believe that the people involved in this atrocity and those who failed to act or respond are guilty of breaches of these human rights articles and conventions?

Chairman

As a lawyer, and with the time as it is, I would ask Mr. Ó Dúlacháin to be as succinct as possible. I know that Deputy Finian McGrath has a number of questions. I do not mean any disrespect.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

If I might summarise, the European Convention on Human Rights talks primarily about the responsibilities of governments. It is governments or states that are to vindicate human rights.

Deputy F. McGrath

So they are in breach of it.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

No, what I am saying is that states, in the first instance, should not take life unless they are lawfully permitted to do so. If any state was involved, by its servants, agents or proxies, then there was culpability on its part. A special UN rapporteur was established under a UN motion with specific responsibility for looking at the whole issue of killings by state agents.

Chairman

That can be answered in a more detailed way in module 5. I ask Mr. Ó Dúlacháin to make just a brief reply.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

In summary, one is starting from a base on which a considerable amount of work has been done. In certain respects Barron has identified people who can be examined on issues. You are not starting in a greenfield site.

The question of how public tribunals operate is a matter that is taxing everybody's minds. It is certainly referred to in the Cory report, which recommended a public inquiry into the murder of Chief Superintendents Breen and Buchanan.

Thirdly, the Bloody Sunday inquiry and the way it has evolved is a question that might be addressed in due course with British Irish Rights Watch, because it certainly has views as to who has stretched it out, why it has become so large and why it has become so costly. We cannot answer the question of how it should be constructed, operated or what it should cost. What we are concerned with is whether this is the only practical model or structure for moving forward an issue that we say has to be moved into a public forum.

Deputy F. McGrath

Mr. Ó Dúalacháin said he was not happy with the political response. Two of his sentences were very strong. There is no beating around the bush.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

They are very strong but they are statements, and statements based on the lack of information as to what was happening in Government circles rather than the detail of what was happening.

Senator J. Walsh

Today's meeting is concerned with whether the independent commission addressed all of the issues in its terms of reference. There has been a lot of discussion on module 5 and I would like to avoid that in any of the answers, as I hope to avoid it in the questions.

I heard what Mr. Ó Dúlacháin said about the terms of reference of the Barron inquiry in so far as they apply to the facts, circumstances, causes and perpetrators of the bombings. I will return to this later.

With regard to the other aspects - the Garda investigation, the reasons there were no prosecutions and the issues raised by the "Hidden Hand - the Forgotten Massacre" programme, Mr. Ó Dúlacháin acknowledges that Mr. Justice Barron addressed those as comprehensively as he could within the constraints of available evidence.

Mr. Ó Dúlacháin

Mr. Justice Barron has revealed the information that is available about the Garda investigation but he certainly has not assessed it. There is no assessment as to why the seven leads we referred to were not pursued. There is no indication of whose responsibility it was to pursue it and there is no indication of what inquiries Mr. Justice Barron himself made to see what more can be said. If you simply take the docklands incident, that one alone, there are questions there that cry out for an answer, even as they come to Mr. Justice Barron. He does not address that, he just presents the cameos.

Senator J. Walsh

I refer you to Colin Wallace's submission. I do not know if you have seen Lieutenant Colonel John Morgan's submission but they would both have been along the same lines as you. From what you are saying, I think you are going to agree that your view of the overall operation was that it required a professionalism and a military training which was not available within the ranks of the UVF. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. Wylde

Mr. Wylde

It comes from a variety of sources. First, from formal documents that have come in to the public domain - by that I mean British military documents.

Second, it comes from my own personal experience in south Armagh, north Armagh and Belfast of what loyalist terrorists were capable of throughout the mid-1970s and, third, I think it comes from discussions with colleagues when I was working in eastern Germany having done what was euphemistically referred to this morning as a special duties course which is a pseudonym for intelligence. We were collecting intelligence on the Soviet forces but the people who were involved had been working in an intelligence role in Northern Ireland and those people have exactly that same view that the loyalist terrorists did not have this capability.

Chairman

Thank you very much. I thank all of the representatives of Justice for the Forgotten, Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin, in particular, for the number of hours he has spent here with the able assistance of Mr. Greg O'Neill for which I thank him very much. I also thank Mr. Micheál O'Connor and Mr. Nigel Wylde for elucidating on the whole explosives issue which we found very interesting and informative. You are all excused.

I very much welcome former Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald. The sub-committee and I are very grateful to you for sending a submission and making an oral presentation to it. All the members of the sub-committee have read your submission. Perhaps, therefore, you might give us a synopsis of the position. I am sure you are fully aware that members of the sub-committee enjoy parliamentary privilege but, not being a member, you do not have that same privilege.

It certainly occupied a lot of my time. There is no doubt about that. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, there were a lot of issues with the British. There were the preparations for Sunningdale of course, cross-Border activity by the British Army on occasion and matters of that kind, and, of course, our concern at the negative effect of British security measures in Northern Ireland vis-à-vis the Nationalist population which seemed to us to be increasing tolerance for the IRA among the minority in a manner that was contrary to our best interest and that of the British Government. That was a persistent concern from the beginning, trying to get the British security measures to be modified so as to not have that effect. That remained a concern throughout until after the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. It took a long time for our arguments in that respect to come home sufficiently for the British Government to modify its policies there.

Yes, one way or the other Northern Ireland took a lot of time. Of course because of reasons related to my own family background, I have always a deep interest in Northern Ireland and had before I was involved in politics at all, and therefore spent a fair amount of time on it. Indeed, I know that when I was Taoiseach some of my colleagues were inclined to think I spent too much time on it because of my particular preoccupation. So it did take time for me.

As to the Government itself, matters arose such as Sunningdale - the preparations for it and what stance we would take - and there were some significant other issues to take up with the British which were mainly matters at one level for the Department of Justice and the Garda Síochána, but other matters at the diplomatic level that I dealt with did take quite a bit of time.

Deputy P. McGrath

That leads me to the question of policy on Northern Ireland. Is Dr. FitzGerald aware if there was a policy at that time that the Garda would not get involved in interrogations or investigations that were happening north of the Border? There is a reference to it in Mr. Justice Barron's report, that the gardaí did not sit in on investigations or where people were being questioned. Is Dr. FitzGerald aware of any policy that existed at that time or of any discussion on policy about that?

Dr. FitzGerald

No, I am not. I do not recall that. Had it been raised in Government, it would have been a matter for debate because there were pros and cons to that. Had it been raised, I would probably remember because I would have had a view of some kind on it. But I was not aware of any Government policy.

However, I recognise the Garda may have a view, either because it had come from the previous Government or because it thought the Government might not want to have the RUC interviewing people down here. They might have been reluctant to interview suspects in the North under RUC auspices lest this provoke a request for reciprocal treatment. If that had come to the Government, it would have had to be discussed. I do not think it ever was because I would have had a view of my own and I would have expressed it at the time.

Deputy P. McGrath

You think you would have remembered it.

Dr. FitzGerald

I think I would have but recollection after 30 years is very difficult.

Deputy P. McGrath

There were a lot of references to Garda activity and how it had carried out its investigation and the way in which it went about its work. At that time, would you say the Garda was under pressure? Perhaps you would comment on the resources available to it? Were constant requests being made to the Cabinet, particularly at budget time, for additional resources and manpower?

Dr. FitzGerald

I do not recall that at that time. I can see that it might have happened. I do not remember pressure in regard to Garda resources but do not take that as meaning that there was not. I just may not remember that. It would not necessarily have stuck in my mind but I do not recall that. If you inquire from other people, you may find that there was. I just do not remember it; I did not know about it.

Deputy F. McGrath

I welcome Dr. Garret FitzGerald to our committee. My first question is connected to you as a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is stated at page 276 of the Barron report, in conclusion 7:

The Government of the day showed little interest in the bombings. When information was given to them suggesting that the British authorities had intelligence naming the bombers, this was not followed up. Any follow-up was limited to complaints by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that those involved had been released from internment.

Surely that is a severe criticism of the Government in which you were involved.

Chairman

We are not here to impugn Dr. FitzGerald's responsibilities in any shape or form. The words "severe criticism" in themselves impute culpability.

Deputy F. McGrath

May I deal with the matter in another way? What was the mood in the Government at the time of the 1974 bombings, particularly in relation to loyalist, British state and republican violence?

Dr. FitzGerald

Sombre, to say the least. There was horror at the bombings and a really deep concern about the whole situation. We faced the threat of loyalist bombings; we had had them in 1972 and again in 1974, with horrifying effects, especially on the second occasion. We faced the IRA, both here and in Northern Ireland, which early on in our period of Government had murdered one of our Senators, Billy Fox, in atrocious circumstances, shooting him down in the corner of a field when he was visiting his fiancee. A dozen of them arrived to take arms from a Protestant family and threw the Bible in the fire, showing the sectarian nature of their activities. They then tried to blame the UDA for it but they did not get away with it. We had bank robberies, murders of policemen here, apart from the appalling events in Northern Ireland.

We also had a concern, from the time the Labour Government came in, uncertainty about their policy, and concern lest they might reconsider their involvement in Northern Ireland which, of course, could have opened up an appalling situation for the whole island, had they thought of withdrawing and leaving a vacuum there. That was a concern, one which I raised a lot, right through from the workers' strike to the end of 1975. Through much of 1975 it was not possible to have any communication with the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who refused to see me. We knew of their talks with Sinn Féin, about which they gave us accounts which turned out, on several occasions, to be inadequate, to put it mildly. We had a triple problem: the loyalist bombings; the IRA down here and the appalling problem with the IRA in the North; and great uncertainty about British policy. In that respect the period from roughly the spring of 1974 to the end of 1975 was a very difficult period indeed, in which certainly I was deeply preoccupied about all these aspects of the problem throughout that whole period.

That was something we had to concern ourselves with, although to my recollection it did not come up in regard to this particular matter. Yes, these were concerns but they were part of a very complex range of concerns involving the IRA, which was a major threat to us, and the British Government, whose policy was a very great worry for us.

Deputy Costello

I welcome Dr. FitzGerald and thank him very much for that clarification of his statement. I ask him about the two meetings that took place between the British and Irish Governments. Are they the only two meetings at which, to his knowledge, there was any mention of the Dublin-Monaghan bombings?

Dr. FitzGerald

As I had not remembered it was mentioned at a meeting I attended, from recollection I cannot help the Deputy. Mr. Justice Barron has been through the files. He probably had access to them anyway but I gave him access to all my files, which include a complete file of all meetings between the two Governments or representatives at political level in the entire period. I have them in the UCD archive, and I gave him my index to the files there so that he could find any document he might want over that period. I take it he went through them thoroughly, and the only two occasions he has mentioned are these two meetings.

There was another meeting in between - on 1 November perhaps - between the Taoiseach and Mr. Wilson at which I think there was no reference to this. It was on those two occasions that Mr. Wilson chose to tease us, one might almost say, by raising this issue because he wanted to put us on the spot on the internment issue and get us to agree. The record of the meeting of 5 November, not the meeting I was at, refers to him as saying that we would of course welcome the fact that these people had been locked up. This was a snide reference to our opposition to internment. I do not think it arose on any other occasion. If it had I am sure Mr. Justice Barron would have found it in the files.

Deputy Costello

I shall refer to the two references in the two meetings, first of all in the context of the June meeting, item No. 5. I quote from page 4:

The Prime Minister said that in recent months some very nasty men had been lifted on the Unionist side. On the Friday and Saturday of the UWC strike, 25 interim custody orders had been signed and the perpetrators of the Dublin bomb outrages had been picked up and were now detained but it was impossible to get the evidence to try them in ordinary courts.

What kind of relationships were there between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice? After all, this was a reasonable proposal, it would seem, yet you did not succeed in it.

Dr. FitzGerald

The sub-committee adjourned at 4.10 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 28 January 2004.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) debate - Tuesday, 27 Jan 2004

Public Hearings on the Barron Report.

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) debate -
Tuesday, 27 Jan 2004