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JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, EQUALITY, DEFENCE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (Sub-Committee on the Barron Report) debate -
Tuesday, 10 Feb 2004

Public Hearings on the Barron Report.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I welcome all of you to the resumed hearings in the consideration by the sub-committee on the report of the independent commission of inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings - the Barron report. This morning the sub-committee is starting module 4 of its programme of work. In module 3 last Tuesday the sub-committee heard from Mr. Justice Barron. Today the sub-committee will be hearing contributions from the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, the Chief-of-Staff of the Defence Forces and the director of the National Archives. Tomorrow the sub-committee will hold discussions with Dr. Jim Donovan, former chief State forensic scientist, and his successor, Dr. Sheila Willis. The sub-committee will also be discussing the report with a number of serving and retired Army explosives experts. Mr. Sean Murphy, author of a book on the National Archives, will also be in attendance before the sub-committee.

I welcome Mr. Noel Conroy, Commissioner of the Garda Síochána; Mr. Fachtna Murphy, deputy commissioner; Mr. Joe Egan, assistant commissioner, and Mr. Martin Callanan, detective chief superintendent. You are all very welcome. Commissioner, before you begin, I remind you that while Members of the Oireachtas enjoy parliamentary privilege, invitees before Oireachtas committees do not, as you are already aware. I now invite you to make your opening statement.

Garda Commissioner, Noel Conroy

I thank you, Chairman, and your sub-committee for inviting me and my colleagues here today to assist you with your inquiries into Mr. Justice Barron's report. Before dealing with this issue, I, as Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, express my deepest sympathy to the families of all those who lost their lives in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in 1974 and to the many others who suffered injuries and pain.

I prepared a written submission following your request to do so and hope it is of some help to you and your sub-committee. I now intend to give a brief summary of the areas requested as per your letter of 14 January 2004.

Following the announcement by Government to initiate an inquiry, the former Garda Commissioner appointed a liaison officer to ensure the fullest co-operation by the Garda Síochána with the independent commission of inquiry. All the relevant material was assembled and placed at the disposal of the commission. During the course of the commission's work further material was requested. This was made available. The liaison officer also arranged, at the request of the commission, for the interviewing of both serving and retired members of the Garda Síochána.

The three principal senior officers, detective chief superintendent, Mr. John Joy; Tony McMahon and Dan Murphy, had died before the commission had commenced its work. These members were highly skilled investigators and would have dealt with lots of serious crimes in Dublin and other parts of Ireland at that time. I am satisfied that the commission was provided with the fullest co-operation by the Garda Síochána and can assure the sub-committee of continued co-operation with your work.

The primary function of the Garda Síochána following the bombing outrage was to carry out a criminal investigation and to obtain whatever evidence it could identify to hopefully identify the culprits with a view to submitting a file to the law officers if evidence existed against any person or persons. It is a matter of regret to me as the current Commissioner of the Garda Síochána that despite the best efforts of those tasked with the investigation of those atrocities, no person has been made amenable before the courts for such crimes.

As regards the missing documents from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as referred to in the Barron report, it was normal policy at the time of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings to advise officials of the Department of Justice of the progress or otherwise of matters as serious as the bombings. I have caused an examination of records to be carried out. I confirm that it does not assist in the nature or extent of the material, reports or memoranda that might have been provided at the time in respect of those bombings. I note from Mr. Justice Barron's report that a copy of the Monaghan investigation file was available in the archives of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. It follows that it must have emanated from the Garda Síochána. I can only assume that the Dublin bombing investigation file was also forwarded.

As regards the relevant general policies in existence at the time in terms of the investigation into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, the usual structures for murder investigations were put in place. Incident rooms were set up to co-ordinate daily inquiries and tasks were assigned and recorded. Statements were taken from all relevant people in the jurisdiction and appeals were made for witnesses to come forward. The primary source for the instruction for the investigation of serious crimes, such as the bombings at that time, was outlined in the manual of criminal investigation.

As set out in Mr. Justice Barron's report, security co-operation existed at two levels at that time. There was regular ongoing liaison on operational matters between members of the Garda Síochána and the then RUC through both official channels and on a day to day co-operation basis between officers on the ground in the Border area. Secure radio communication was in place which provided a satisfactory means of communication between the two organisations. I am sure the sub-committee members appreciate that policing in the Border areas between the two jurisdictions presents its own challenges.

As regards changes which have since taken place, over the past 30 years significant developments have occurred in co-operation between the Garda and RUC - now called the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Many of these changes have origins in the agreement between the Irish and British Governments following the Baldonnel and Anglo-Irish Agreements. Working groups comprising Garda and RUC officers produce reports dealing with areas such as communications, cross-Border operations and the exchange of information. Following from the Good Friday Agreement, the Patten commission was set up. As a result, joint annual conferences are now in place. Progress on securement is at an advanced stage.

As regards some of the practical problems facing the Garda Síochána investigating the bombings then, the principal suspects for these crimes were loyalist extremists who lived outside the jurisdiction. Intelligence and information suggested that the planning and preparation of the bombs was carried out in Northern Ireland. In 1974 forensic science was in its infancy not only in Ireland, but in other countries.

Increased interaction with police services world-wide has contributed to the Garda Síochána developing best practices and enhanced methods of investigation and exploiting advances in the forensic science area, as we know today. There is a dedicated point of contact between the Garda Síochána and the Police Service of Northern Ireland and regular meetings take place. A Garda forensic team, backed up by State pathologists and expert forensic science laboratory personnel, would attend if a similar scene occurred today. We must also look at advances in DNA. Garda specialist units have been put in place and most cities are covered by CCTV. There have been many advances in the area of investigating serious crime. That is my brief introduction to my presentation.

I thank Commissioner Conroy.

I welcome the Garda Commissioner and his colleagues and I thank the Garda for its submission. Where was Commissioner Conroy based in 1974?

Commissioner Conroy

Thirty years ago I was based in Finglas Garda station. I was a detective garda in Finglas.

Was the Commissioner directly involved in the investigation that he described today?

Commissioner Conroy

No, I was not. However, I knew the officers who led that operation pretty well as I had come in contact with them during my career regarding other very serious crime.

The Commissioner's submission states: "The taking of statements at the time from all persons living and working near the bomb scenes were carried out, the appeals were made for witnesses to come forward and efforts were made to employ photographic evidence, forensic evidence, etc." Are those statements available today? Does the Commissioner have evidence that they were there and are no longer in the files or are they in existence and therefore available to Mr. Justice Barron?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. Those statements were available to Mr. Justice Barron at the time he visited us at headquarters and they are still there and available for any other inquiry which may occur or to this committee if need be. We would have had many members involved early on in the taking of those statements. As the Deputy will appreciate, information is collected fairly quickly to get a picture and the number of gardaí involved at a very early stage was very substantial.

Page 125 of the report by Mr. Justice Barron states:

The Government caused or allowed the Garda investigation to come to a premature end - either out of fear that illegal Garda collaboration with the British Army and Intelligence Services would be revealed; or in order to minimise publicity which might have led to an increase in popular support for the IRA.

I ask the Commissioner to comment on this paragraph.

Commissioner Conroy

I would be very surprised to hear a comment like that, stating that the Government would interfere with a Garda investigation. Governments do not interfere to my knowledge. I have never seen a Government tell the Garda Síochána to investigate a particular matter in a particular way or say when it should end. The job of the Garda Síochána is to investigate the offence and hopefully to bring it to a successful conclusion. There are many offences that we do not bring to a successful conclusion and it is not for the want of effort. However, in this particular case, as the Deputy will appreciate, as far as we are concerned and the intelligence indicates this, the culprits for those crimes lived in another jurisdiction. There are major problems when suspects - or culprits, let us say - live in another jurisdiction. The questioning of those people would not be carried by members of the Garda Síochána, but by having the other force in whose jurisdiction they live carry out that questioning.

I welcome and thank the Garda Commissioner, the deputy commissioner, assistant commissioner and the detective chief superintendent. This is not the first occasion they have appeared before this committee and we appreciate their willingness to do so.

In relation to your statement, in the first instance, what is the relationship between the Garda Commissioner and the Minister for Justice? Is it the traditional relationship?

Commissioner Conroy

We talk to officials in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform on a daily basis in relation to serious matters and occasionally have meetings with the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and brief him in relation to security matters. There is a cordial approach to all those matters. We actually give the facts as we know them at any particular time. I would say there is a very good relationship with officials and the Minister which to my knowledge has always been the case. I have never been in a situation where I felt the relationship was otherwise.

When there is a major ongoing investigation, the subject of public concern, is it normal for the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to emphasise the importance of that Garda investigation? To what extent does the Minister involve himself with the Garda Commissioner on the emphasis to be put on a particular investigation?

Commissioner Conroy

You can take it that we would be talking to officials in the Department of Justice on a regular basis in relation to the progress or otherwise of a particular case. While I was not around dealing with the issue now being inquired into, I know that if it happened today, officials would be kept up to date on a daily basis. It was a very serious outrage. Naturally enough, the officials would want to be kept informed because I am sure the Parliament would wish to be informed as well. I imagine the officials would be briefing the Minister so that if questions were posed to him, he would be in a position to deal with the questions put. I believe the up-to-date position would have been given to officials and hopefully from the officials to the Minister.

Would the Minister be demanding action if there was no sign of a successful solution to a particularly important investigation? Obviously, I make this reference in the context of the position in 1974.

Commissioner Conroy

As you will appreciate, if we are keeping officials up to date with how we are progressing the investigation and they, in turn, are briefing the Minister to the same level, I imagine the Minister should appreciate that we are really and truly doing our best to bring about a successful conclusion to our investigations.

Obviously, files were missing from the Department of Justice but there were missing Garda files as well. C3 files were missing - C3 being the centre of all activity in the investigation of subversive activity at the time. Later in your statement you say C3 set up a unit on 11 July 1974 to establish a new intelligence network. You have said you have conducted an investigation. Did you have a fresh look for the C3 files at the time?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. The then Commissioner, following a request from Mr. Justice Barron to try to establish where that small number of files had gone, had inquiries carried out at headquarters. Let me add that more than 800 files were shown to Mr. Justice Barron.

Did the Commissioner say 18?

Commissioner Conroy

Over 800 files were shown to him. As you can appreciate, that was quite a lot of material. All of the 800 files did not deal with the issues being inquired into by Mr. Justice Barron. We would be satisfied that some of the missing files would not in any way hinder the successful investigation of this case if we were to get evidence today, tomorrow or at some time in the future to prosecute somebody. In other words, I am not sure if the missing files related directly to the Dublin-Monaghan bombings.

There was nothing in the files relating to the Dublin-Monaghan bombings?

Commissioner Conroy

I am not saying that. There may very well be names of persons in the files. Several of the 800 files shown to Mr. Justice Barron would have information copied from one file into another. In other words, in 800 files from our security area one would see the same names popping up in approximately 10% of them. I hope the Deputy appreciates the point I am trying to make. The fact that a small number of files could not be found does not mean the information in other files does not contain the information contained in the missing files.

What procedures are in place in the Garda Síochána to ensure the security of files and how far back do they go?

Commissioner Conroy

There is a registry in the security branch and the files are looked at regularly. Some files are dead because the individuals concerned have passed on and the file is no longer active. The Deputy will appreciate that some of the files die with the death of the individual concerned. I will try to give the Deputy an idea of the number of files and what happens to them. Everything is logged and we know exactly what files we should have and what files are missing. Our liaison officer, who at the time was Detective Chief Superintendent Martin Callanan, spent many weeks going through the documentation to make sure that we facilitated Mr. Justice Barron in every sense of the word.

I would not expect otherwise. The Garda Síochána deals with very sensitive material that is held in the archives. It would seem to me that the area where most valuable documentation would be likely to be available would be in the unit specifically responsible for subversive activity and so on, such as the Special Branch and regarding C3s activities. Is there an archivist or a structure within the force that ensures sensitive material is kept under lock and key and cannot be misplaced, destroyed, stolen or, as Mr. Justice Barron commented, "go missing"?

Commissioner Conroy

I will ask the Assistant Commissioner Joe Egan to deal further with that aspect.

Assistant Commissioner Joe Egan

It is not a simple answer. One may be concentrating on files in the C3 section, but the investigation was not carried out in the C3 section but in individual incident rooms. All the material from the incident rooms would not be logged in the C3 filing section. In relation to the filing section in C3, there is a person in charge of the registry and we have an archivist in the force.

How far back does that go?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

It goes back for material we are statutorily obliged to maintain.

But it is not going back to the time we are referring to, in 1974.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

There is material going back to then, yes.

I am sure there is material but would there have been an archivist or somebody who had the equivalent functions of an archivist?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

No, they were not in place then, in 1974. That is an appointment that has been made since then.

There was no management structure of files in place at that stage.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

No, but there was a very careful management structure in C3 in relation to a filing system, a person in charge of the filing area and accountability for all files.

Can you tell us how that worked?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

When a file comes into the section - irrespective of whether it is that paper that comes in this morning - it is allocated a number. It is then filed in its section, year by year. In those days it was year by year as they came in. Each year had an individual filing number and that carried through to that file from there on. Additions to it, irrespective of when they came in, were attached to it. It was a simple enough system but it was effective and it was controlled by a carded system in those days; it was not technology driven. A small card like that one was opened on each individual file with a number, a name and an address. That was carded under A, B, C, D, E, F or G. It was pretty simplistic but at the same time, very effective. A corresponding file was then opened and archived in its own special section and most of them remain there today.

Were they in filing cabinets?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

It is a huge filing area. For operational reasons I do not want to say the number in it, but you can take it that it is up in six figures. Some of the files there go back to the 1930s. It was probably then when it started. They remain there today and are available if they are required, in the same manner, right up to today. It is now on an IT-based system.

Are they in manila folders?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes, in folders - the normal old, brown Civil Service folders.

That is just an ordinary manila folder with no envelope or cover on it.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

No.

Were they put in with a green tag, a treasury tag?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes, perforated and coming through from the back to the front, and added in.

Were they then kept in alphabetical or date order?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

The cards were stored in alphabetical order, A, B, C, and the files in order of year and number. So, a file beginning in January 2004, would be: 3C/1/04, and it would follow on from that until the end of the following December.

Would the bombing in Parnell Street have a specific file as distinct from the file for South Leinster Street and Monaghan?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

It had a file under the Dublin bombings.

The Dublin bombings of May 1974?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes. A card was opened and then a file cover.

The file number is on that card. Do you know what is the file number of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Well——

Is the card still around?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

It is available and that is the file that was given to Mr. Justice Barron.

So, Mr. Justice Barron got the whole file and there was nothing missing from that file.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

The problem arises in that some of the files may refer to the incident room, not the ones in C3.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

They may not all have been forwarded, so they can be missing from the incident room or the 3C files. As the Commissioner said earlier, the information may well be in other files that he has seen. It was probably in other files, and there are probably very few files, if any, that he has not seen in some shape or form. He might not have seen the files themselves, but the information was contained in others.

So nothing went missing in the filing and archiving system about which you are talking.

Commissioner Conroy

I might add that the liaison officer, Det. Chief Supt. Callanan, dealt with that issue.

Det. Chief Supt. Martin Callanan

I thank the Chairman and Commissioner for the opportunity to speak. As Commissioner Conroy has outlined, it was my function to liaise with the independent commission regarding the gathering of these files, and, as has been rightly said, several hundred were produced for it. There was a wide variety of files.

The figure of 700 was mentioned. Does that refer to pages?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

There were several hundred; Commissioner Conroy has indicated that there were 800.

What was the thickness of those files?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

It varied. One could have, for instance, one or two documents in an individual file, and one also regularly had the Garda investigation file within those covers. That varied in thickness depending on the extent and level of those investigations.

Was there a separate card for each of those several hundred files?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

No. The files were numbered, as Assistant Commissioner Egan has said, individually and by year. They therefore appeared in numerical sequence year by year. In those days some files, particularly the lesser numbers, for instance, Nos. 1 to, I believe, 100 were annual files. For example, Nos. 2, 7, 12, 18, 24 of 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975 might essentially deal with the same subject matter, depending on who received the various pieces of information. For instance, there have been occasions when we received information from our colleagues, as they were then, in the RUC. For example, it might have been a list of suspects or people associated with a specific type of paramilitary activity. Depending on who had received that information and the branch at the time, a file could be opened on ten individuals if there were a list of ten names. However, another individual might have chosen to treat that somewhat differently and open only one file. What we have seen——

What is the difference between one file on ten names and a single file?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Essentially there is no difference. If, for instance, we had been dealing with ten individuals, and ten separate files had been opened, they would obviously have been given an individual number in sequence.

Would they have had a separate index card for each?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Yes, the index card, as Assistant Commissioner Egan was explaining, would be a simple card recording all the numbers for the year in question. It is not true to say that there was an individual index card with the file.

Would a general description of what was in the file be put onto the index card separately and filed?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

No. Perhaps I might articulate this point. In those days, we did not have the benefit of any electronic or computer system. That did not happen until the middle of the 1980s. We were, therefore, dealing with a paper base essentially. We had to refer to the number recorded on the file and a very brief description or title, but it did not paginate or nominate the type of documentation contained within the specific files.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Perhaps I might clarify something. The Chairman asked whether there were individual cards. To take the group of ten, that could refer to two things in terms of collating. The group of ten may have belonged to a particular organisation. If we take organisation X, there may well be two cards open - a file on organisation X, which would go in toto into that file, and individual files on the separate individuals. Maybe that might make it clearer to the Chairman. If the second file was the one that was missing, the same information would be in the group files as in some of the individual ones.

Was photocopying widely used at that time?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes.

Sorry, for interrupting you, Deputy Costello.

To add to one or two things that have been elucidated, did Det. Chief Supt. Callanan, in his search for Justice Barron, come across any index cards where there were no files represented or no materials suggested on the cards?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Yes, there was a number of files in the earlier years that we could not locate.

Specifically around 1974.

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Yes and, indeed, earlier.

In 1972 and 1973.

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

I think possibility 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975. They were pre and post the bombings of 1974. They were small in number. Again, while I do not want to second-guess what those files may have contained, what we have seen with the surrounding material Mr. Barron had looked for, it was rather generic and, for operational reasons, I cannot go into the nature of the files. While they were regarded as secret files, we did not see anything in them from the surrounding material that would have advanced matters in relation to those investigations.

There were index cards that suggested there were files that were not there when Det. Chief Supt. Callanan sought them.

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Yes, there are some files that we cannot locate.

Did those files relate to material sought by Mr. Justice Barron in the context of the 1972, 1973 and 1974 bombings?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

I will explain the way we dealt with those files in the beginning. Mr. Justice Barron requested all of the material we had available and, of course, we produced all of those files, so the independent commission of inquiry was not prejudiced in any form with regard to the actual Garda investigations. It would have received all the Garda investigation files. Flowing from that, a number of people were mentioned within the Garda investigation files - suspects - and Mr. Justice Barron had asked if we had files on those particular individuals. We sought to accumulate those files for his perusal and, in the course of viewing some of them, he saw references to other numbers of files and it was in that light, that the multiplicity of files that were gathered grew. It was through that exercise that some of the material further down and further removed from the central core of the files caused us difficulty in that we could not locate them.

How many files were missing, misplaced or otherwise?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

I do not have exact numbers but it was a very small proportion in relation to the volume of files sought by the commission.

Did you come across many misplaced files in his trawl?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

No.

Did you come across files that were not filed in the proper place?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

There were some.

On the question of security, who had access to these sensitive files? Are they widely accessible?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

They are not. They are available just to people within the branch. The files are stored in a secure zone within Garda headquarters.

Is it under lock and key?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Yes, there is a secure system.

What is the secure system and how secure is it? Will you give some details?

Commissioner Conroy

You can take it that the security system is in place to allow the staff who work there access to the building. Any other person trying to get into the building would have to make an announcement as to who he or she was. It is a matter for the people in the building to allow that person to come in, so it is pretty secure.

While I am dealing with the matter of the files we do not have, none of the 800 files viewed contained evidence in relation to the individuals suspected of having committed those crimes. Of all the files looked at, a very small proportion would be in relation to the identity of suspects for those crimes - I can say without doubt that it is a very small number - whereas the great majority of the files would contain names of individuals. Let us say we had perhaps opened a file on an individual before, a copy of that new information with the name would go into an existing file as it would be copied into other files.

What I am trying to say in essence is that there would be a common denominator between several files because of groups of people together and no more than that. Naturally enough - rightly so - Mr. Justice Barron did a huge trawl of any names that came up in respect of anything. At the end of the day, those names may not have anything to do with either of the two bombings under inquiry here or the inquiry in relation to the Barron report. To be honest, it was a very wide and effective trawl. I have no doubt that in looking for and trying to ascertain the best evidence, best information or best intelligence we had, he actually went down that road.

My final question relates to the reports on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The Monaghan report did find its way to the Department of Justice but there is no indication as to what happened to the Dublin report. It appears to have been a somewhat sloppy keeping of records that a matter as important as the Dublin bombing was not recorded in any fashion. It appears that it was forwarded to the Department of Justice but there is no record of it.

Commissioner Conroy

Yes, I have to accept that from the checks made by our personnel at Garda headquarters, I cannot say what went to the Department of Justice but I did add that we could not say whether the Monaghan file went to the Department of Justice either. No doubt if it was found in the archives of the Department of Justice, we are the people who would have sent that file. I also assume that we would have sent the file in relation to the Dublin investigation as well. That is all I can say.

One would have expected, given the system that was in place, that there should have been some record of it.

Commissioner Conroy

You can appreciate that with so many documents in our branches it can sometimes be very difficult to find one. When you are dealing with a paper based system and looking and looking and looking and you do not come up with the answer, what can I say? If it happened today, an IT system is in place - none was available then - which would identify straightaway where your file is.

Reference was made to a file "dying". Does that mean closed, integrated with another file or destroyed?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Various things may have happened to it. The broad, general answer is that it is just closed, not destroyed. It may well be that as reviews are carried out, as they are every few years, there will be cases where three or four files referring to the same matter may be amalgamated, but they are not destroyed.

Could that have been part of the reason that files were missing for cards that were there, because they had been integrated with other——

Assistant Commissioner Egan

It is a regular feature that there might be a file with a single page which was not linked previously and in the review they are consolidated and put together. Some of the missing material may well be in other files that do not seem to be related. It happens pretty regularly.

The Commissioner intimated that it is likely the Dublin investigation file also went to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Would you suggest that within the Garda Síochána if a file went missing, it did not go missing on purpose?

Commissioner Conroy

I have no doubt that it did not purposely go missing, if that is the Chairman's question. We have both Dublin and Monaghan files, as we stand today. I do not know where the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform would get any other files other than from ourselves with regard to what they would wish to have on file. At that time, it is clear from our research that files of serious crimes went to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. While we have no record, as I have already stated, of those files going to the Department, I must presume that if it got one, it got the two. I do not think it went missing purposely.

Is Commissioner Conroy stating that files went regularly from the Garda Síochána to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform——

Commissioner Conroy

Yes.

——and that there was no system in place to know exactly what files went and when or if they came back?

Commissioner Conroy

That is not necessarily so. We cannot locate the register for our system at that time. The register shows what went and where it went.

Does the missing register cover just 1974 or any particular years?

Commissioner Conroy

It covers a number of years.

What number of years?

Commissioner Conroy

I am told it covers the very early 1970s.

Until when?

Commissioner Conroy

Until we became computerised.

Until 1988 or so.

Commissioner Conroy

Yes.

I welcome Commissioner Conroy and his team. I welcome the forthright manner in which the Commissioner has answered the questions put to him. In his opening statement, Commissioner Conroy stated that despite the best efforts of the Garda, nobody was brought to justice regarding those bombings, yet, Mr. Justice Barron in his report is very critical of the Garda. He said there were many things that were not looked at and an analysis of the Barron report by lawyers for the Justice for the Forgotten group pointed to many leads that could possibly have been followed up. In that context, was Commissioner Conroy disappointed by the statements in the Barron report that seemed to imply that the Garda did not do a good job on that occasion?

Commissioner Conroy

If a person today is looking at an investigation that took place over 30 years ago and he or she is looking at that investigation with the standards that pertain today, then I imagine I would be as critical as Mr. Justice Barron. However, if one winds back the clock in time and looks at the procedures and what was there to investigate those matters at that time, then I would say we may not have been looked at fairly with regard to all those matters. One is dealing with intelligence - there is no evidence anywhere, but there is intelligence. We do not have any evidence. I know there is a reference to "evidence" in the file, but I can assure everybody here that there is no evidence that I know of today other than the evidence of the relatives and those who were around the scene. There is no solid evidence, to this day, to connect any of the suspects to the crimes. There are major difficulties when one is dealing with a situation in which the culprits are in another jurisdiction. The same cautioning procedures do not apply.

In recent years we have had to make certain changes, in consultation with the DPP, in order to make progress in investigations. We had part of the evidence here and the culprits were in another jurisdiction. We could not get our hands on the culprits in the other jurisdiction, but the police force in the area the people had moved to were able to do so. With the consent of the DPP, we have supplied that information to the other police services and asked them to interview the individuals. We hope the information we gave them, in terms of evidence collected in this jurisdiction, will help them to detect the crime on our behalf. That has occurred in a number of cases in recent years. One such case is currently due for trial in another jurisdiction. We did not have the evidence to seek the extradition of somebody or to put any evidence before the law officers who make the extradition decision. We just did not have it. That is as it is. I would like to be able to tell the committee something different today, but I cannot do so.

The Commissioner spoke about the difference between intelligence and evidence. His main basic training was as a young detective at the time under scrutiny. He mentioned in his statement that the fact that some of the suspects were in another jurisdiction, Northern Ireland, was a major disadvantage, because the Garda did not have an opportunity to interview them. At that time, apparently, the RUC requested, in some instances, that representatives of the Garda be present for the interrogation of some of the people in question. Does the Commissioner have any evidence in that regard? Can he explain to the sub-committee why the Garda did not sit in on the interrogations? Why was the Garda not part of those interrogations in Northern Ireland?

Commissioner Conroy

I am not totally au fait with all those matters, but I can say, based on my inquiries and my knowledge, that there was a problem in putting in place reciprocal arrangements here in respect of interviewing individuals who had been sought in Northern Ireland. That was there. If that was there, that was there for us too. Even today we request the other police force to conduct the interviews on our behalf. As the Deputy said, we make all the information available to them to help them to try to achieve the purpose that we wish to achieve.

Even today, some members of the Garda would not normally sit in on interrogations in Northern Ireland or Britain.

Commissioner Conroy

No. For example, custody regulations and the complaints Act are in place in this jurisdiction. Naturally enough, one must take great care if allegations are made against an individual. If somebody makes a complaint about an individual, the complaints board must be able to investigate it. We are very cautious about who or what should go in. The procedures in one jurisdiction are not identical to those in another jurisdiction. For example, in the United Kingdom, they operate under the PACE Act, which is totally different to what happens here. In view of the way Europe is going now, I think we will make strides in the near future. I think you have a draft Bill before you about joint investigation teams. That will change the whole face of investigations in the future. They are major advances.

Perhaps Judge Barron did not fully understand the situation at the time when he made that comment. I am sorry but I am slightly confused about the level of interaction and discussion and the passing of information between yourself, the Department and the Minister. Did you say in response to Deputy Hoctor that you would not normally discuss individual crimes with the Minister? Is that the case?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. It would be most unusual.

Is it the case that you would talk about crime generally but not normally an individual murder, robbery or seizure of drugs or cigarettes?

Commissioner Conroy

That is true because the officials are there for that purpose.

Is it the case that some of your senior people liaise with and give the necessary information to a named official in the Department? What is the rank of this official? I do not want a name.

Commissioner Conroy

They would be in the area of principal officer.

You would make the material available to them virtually on a daily basis. It is then their job to brief the Minister in whatever way they think fit.

Commissioner Conroy

Yes, that is correct.

When you have meetings with the Minister, you discuss policy decisions, resources, manpower and so on, but nothing related to individual actions or crimes.

Commissioner Conroy

We brief the Minister mainly on security issues. Sometimes he may have some particular matter to discuss with us but normally it is policy and, let us say, ensuring we are, I suppose, keeping abreast with what is happening in relation to the security of the State.

I know your experience has been short but you have been in the top echelons for a long time and know what happens. A Minister would not say, "Wind up," or "Wind down" a particular inquiry, that "We need results," or might such a direction come through a principal officer in the Department?

Commissioner Conroy

I have never in the time of my service heard of such a comment being made by the Minister or by officials.

Again, you find it strange that in the Barron report there was an indication that he felt that, perhaps, the Minister of the day did not pursue the investigation.

Commissioner Conroy

Let me answer that in a different way - winding up the investigation as indicated. When, say, a murder investigation or, in this case, an investigation into a bombing is ongoing, of course, it runs out of steam. You have everybody interviewed. You go back three or four times to the same individuals and you try to get as much information as you possibly can. Eventually, there is no more you can get from witnesses in the jurisdiction. There are appeals. As a result of those appeals, nobody comes forward, so you do not actually have people twiddling their fingers doing nothing. However, you do have a core number of people trying to push it, in this case, I imagine with our colleagues in the RUC, then in place in Northern Ireland.

The major force of people looking at any particular crime at any time may well be reduced somewhat because there is not that much for them to do. Nonetheless, there is a core of people who will continue to investigate a serious crime, I suppose in an open-ended manner.

Commissioner Conroy

That is true. For instance, if you look at what happened at the beginning of the investigations, we would have had in the region of 300 people involved in the taking of statements. That is a lot of people. They were there to try fairly quickly to get a picture and description or any information that would connect the culprits with the crime. Naturally enough, as the statements had been taken and there were no more, people went back to their stations. That would have happened in the normal course of events.

That is a regular occurrence?

Commissioner Conroy

It is, yes.

I welcome the Garda Commissioner and his colleagues.

From your submission - I think it meant this in 1974 - when we are talking about the crime scene, we are talking about the physical evidence, photography and mapping. I think this was based on a procedure you had at the time in the Manual of Criminal Investigation. My first question is: has this manual changed since 1974 and has it been updated to adapt to modern times?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. It has been changed twice. There is now a committee looking at it as well, to update it again. You have to keep updating in view of the changes in investigation procedures and the forensic science area. All of those have to take place. You have to take account of all the changes in the area of identification parades. You have to brief your force. This may very well happen at inservice schools throughout the country, or it will be part of the training of graduates at Templemore.

I know things have changed over the last 30 years but would you be satisfied that the immediate examination of the crime scene was carried out in a thorough and professional manner given the facilities and services available at the time?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes. From what I have read, I would be happy that that was the case. There would probably be a different emphasis in relation to what would happen today in the preservation of the scene. Unfortunately, the injured were removed pretty quickly from the scene. Also, the people who died were removed whereas today that would not happen.

It is stated at page 275, section 1 of the Barron report - conclusions:

The Garda investigation failed to make full use of the information it obtained. Certain lines of inquiry that could have been made pursued further in this jurisdiction were not pursued.

Those two sentences are highly critical from a professional policing point of view. We have already had submissions from families of American policemen who were also unhappy about it. How do you respond to that criticism?

Commissioner Conroy

I can see how the families would be unhappy. Of course, I sympathise, in so far as they have not seen anybody charged with these outrageous crimes, which we would all liked to have happened but let me say this. In my young days, I worked with the senior officers involved in the investigation of those particular crimes. I can tell you that they were conscientious officers who would leave no stone unturned, as far as I am concerned, in the investigation of any serious crime, never mind this outrageous crime.

I have experience of having to go back six and seven times to a witness until the witness would tell me, "In the name of God, what are you coming today for? Sure, I have told you everything that I possibly can." For instance, just to give you a snapshot of where they would be coming from, some witness - a civilian - would make a statement and say that at a particular time he had seen something. How do you know that the time that that individual gave you is correct? For instance, he may say he was looking at a programme on television at the time. I have gone through all of these things in my time. After going back and back to that witness a number of times and he was still saying that that was the time, I would end up out in RTE - the next port of call - asking, "What time did a particular segment of that programme go out?" That is the type of investigation those people would have carried out. I am talking from experience in relation to those people.

Perhaps Det. Chief Supt. Martin Callanan may respond on the question of the missing files. Did outside intelligence agencies, in this case, British intelligence agencies, have access to those files?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

No.

Did they not?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

No.

The Commissioner stated in response to Deputy Hoctor that he was a detective garda in Finglas in 1974. Was he aware, as a detective garda at that time based in a city station, of discussions or concerns in Garda circles about allegations that the bombs were assembled in the church car park in Whitehall or did that emerge later?

Commissioner Conroy

I cannot recall hearing that.

Does the Commissioner not recall that?

Commissioner Conroy

No.

What was the view of the Garda in the immediate aftermath of the atrocity? Was it immediately presumed that it was the work of loyalist paramilitaries?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes, the intelligence came in very quickly from what I have read that the loyalists were involved in these bombing outrages.

Did nobody express any concern that for loyalist paramilitaries this was a seriously well-planned and co-ordinated attack in which the timing was very precise? Some experts have told us they would have needed professional advice to carry out such an atrocity in such a manner.

Commissioner Conroy

The only response I can give is that they were involved in bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland and several bombs had gone off there in which the same suspects as those for the Dublin and Monaghan bombings were involved.

Overall, and finally, is the Commissioner satisfied that no member of the Garda Síochána acted in an improper manner during the whole investigation?

Commissioner Conroy

I would be extremely surprised if any of the members would act in any but the best interests of this country and of ensuring that the culprits would be brought to justice.

Could the Commissioner please clarify one issue connected with the Dublin bombings investigation file? I do not know whether Assistant Commissioner Egan said it is intact, apart from something that may have occurred in an incident room and was not reported. Is the file intact?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

The file is intact.

Is everything there: all the statements made, everything done in connection with the Dublin bombing, apart from things that may have been held inadvertently in incident rooms around the country, or which may have been unimportant, or for whatever reason?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

It is all intact.

Would a copy of that, not the file itself, have gone to the Department of Justice?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

A copy, yes.

Is it the position that anything that went to the Department of Justice was a copy and the Garda retained the original?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes exactly. Little notes made by individual members would not have gone to the Department.

Does the assistant commissioner have those intact and did he give them to Mr. Justice Barron?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Any that were available were given to him.

In respect of documentation missing from the Department of Justice, does the Garda have its originals back at base?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

In respect of the investigation files, yes.

Are there other files that the Garda would have sent on to the Department that the Garda would not have?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

We have other files that we did not send on. For instance, the handwritten working books in which the individuals involved in the investigation kept their statements would not have gone.

Did Mr. Justice Barron have access to all of those?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

He had access to everything.

I welcome the Commissioner, the assistant commissioner and the detective chief superintendent and thank them for coming before us today. I thank them also for what appears to have been full co-operation with Mr. Justice Barron. He said when he was in here that he received nothing but the best co-operation. He complimented the Garda on putting in place a liaison officer to help him, in contrast to other areas of his inquiry. The Chairman and Deputy Costello have referred to the files. As regards the points made by Deputy Costello about the files, some of our work has involved trying to identify what files may have been in the Department of Justice at that time and are not there now. The Commissioner has not had the benefit of the submission we received from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, which tries to analyse what files may or may not have been received from the Garda Síochána. I am not asking the Commissioner to answer any questions about that. However, it is clear from the submission we received from the Department that as regards any files, information was normally supplied by way of internal intelligence reports with covering letters and was brought to the Department of Justice by a member of the Garda Síochána. That was the system at the time.

If information, particularly intelligence information, became available, a report would have been prepared internally and a copy would have been made and dispatched to the Department of Justice. That would have arrived in the Department with a covering letter. In response to the Chairman, it was stated that the original was retained and copies were made. That seems to indicate that a copy of the covering letter was also made. Is that correct?

Commissioner Conroy

As regards sensitive intelligence, we prepare documents and we may send a brief note with the sensitive intelligence. The investigation file is different in so far as one is talking about a huge volume of paper. When a garda travels to the Department of Justice, it would be part of another dispatch to the Department, bringing other material. The Deputy can take it that a member of the Garda would not go to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform with just one envelope; he would bring a lot of material at a given time.

The Commissioner is saying that a number of different reports about different aspects of the investigation could have been put into the envelope and sent to the Department without any covering letter.

Commissioner Conroy

Exactly. However, it would be for a named person, particularly sensitive security information. Perhaps, because of the nature of that file, it would go to a named person. There are so many branches in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as there are in the Garda Síochána, that HRM would deal with certain people, while the security people would deal with a set group of people. There are many different sections, not only in the Garda Síochána, but also in the Department.

When the Commissioner said it would go to a named person, does that mean the report or a copy of the file was put in an envelope and directed to the head of the intelligence section?

Commissioner Conroy

Security section.

Was that done without a covering letter which stated that the latest report on intelligence information was enclosed for the information of the head of the security section?

Commissioner Conroy

It could have happened as the Deputy described. Unfortunately, however, I am not in a position to say yes or no in that situation. There could have been a letter or a note with it or it may have accompanied other documents of a security nature with a letter covering a list of things going over.

Mr. Justice Barron, who looked at the limited files he got in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, stated in his report that the Department was informed of all Garda operational matters relating to subversive crime and that information was normally supplied by way of internal intelligence reports with covering letters and was brought to the Department of Justice, etc. If there were covering letters for the security files and the security files are now missing, which is likely to be stated in the submission of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform later, and there were covering letters on all of the remaining files, it would seem to indicate that in Garda headquarters there should be a duplicate, probably a carbon copy, as would have been the norm then, of the covering letter of the security file. At that stage it might have been possible to determine what security files were dispatched to the Department of Justice.

I believe officials from the Department will tell us later today that it is impossible to determine what files they received, as they were not indexed. However, if the Garda could produce the copy of the covering letter, which accompanied the file, we could establish that the Department must have had a file on this matter, which is definitively lost as distinct from what I suspect the officials will say, which is they cannot determine whether they have received such a file as they have no record.

The originals are still in Garda custody. Copies of the security files and the C3 files would have gone to the Department of Justice.

Commissioner Conroy

Exactly.

Is that absolutely correct?

Commissioner Conroy

That is correct. There is no way that the Department of Justice would have got original files. That would never happen. Without a doubt, the original files will be with the Garda Síochána. If there were a court procedure afterwards we would have to have the original files.

Do you still have them?

Commissioner Conroy

Yes, we still have them. I cannot answer for what happened 30 years ago. However, today we definitely send letters with it. I am not sure where Mr. Justice Barron is coming from on that issue. He might be right and might not.

Page 12 of Mr. Justice Barron's report outlines the files that are missing from Garda headquarters. The penultimate paragraph states:

Firstly, some relevant security files that should have been retained at Garda Headquarters were missing. The Inquiry was furnished with the Monaghan security file, but not with that for Dublin. In relation to loyalist paramilitary organisations, the general file started in 1966 contains no information prior to the early 1980s. While there are annual files relating to the UVF/UDA, none are available for the years 1974 and 1975.

This looks like——

We should try to get an answer to the first part of the question.

It forms part of the same question relating to C3. Effectively the C3 file was missing. While the results of the investigation might still be in the Garda files, Mr. Justice Barron has established that much important material on this matter is now missing.

Commissioner Conroy

I will ask Det. Chief Supt. Callanan to address this issue.

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

Thank you, Chairman. As I had indicated to the Chairman earlier, these particular files had a reference number - a low number - and they were annual files. These are some of the files that were missing. Obviously it would be imprudent of me to comment on the nature of what is contained within those files. However, based on the ones that are certainly available, there is nothing of the magnitude that one would expect to link individuals with these particular events. I do not want to be more specific than that, but the judge has seen some of those later files. They do not contain the specific type of information one would have hoped to have seen or information which would have been available at that time to assist the investigators in advancing their inquiries. Is that helpful?

It is not really because Mr. Justice Barron has identified a number of extremely relevant security files in the Department. He states that they are missing or the inquiry has not seen them. It is one thing to get a copy of the investigation report sent to the Department of Justice and for the Garda to have the original copy of that. However, according to Mr. Justice Barron, the details of all the contextual, background and security-relevant files of that period are not there. It seems that is a serious flaw in the missing files.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

There is probably a simple explanation to this. You will notice that in his report, Mr. Justice Barron states that the relevant files were in the special detective unit, which was in Dublin Castle at the time. The files which were in Dublin Castle came from security branch. They are the same files which are missing from the security branch. The same way as files went to the Department of Justice, the files to Dublin Castle came via C3 in the Phoenix Park.

Were they copies which were sent to the Department of Justice?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

No. These are separate files. The files to which the Deputy refers are Garda files. These files on the UDA and the UVF which he mentioned are the same files, copies of which are in the special detective unit and which Mr. Justice Barron got. The originals, which were in C branch, are the ones which cannot be found. However, the exact copies are available and have been seen by Mr. Justice Barron.

Those are the files on the UVF and the UDA. What about the other areas to which Mr. Justice Barron refers? Are the security files which should have been retained at Garda headquarters available somewhere else?

In copy form or otherwise.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

The way in which the narrative is put makes it hard to understand the actual situation vis-à-vis what is there. It mixes up the actual file on the investigation with security files and they are not the same thing. They are separate issues. The security files to which Mr. Justice Barron refers are those which were separate from and had nothing to do with the investigation.

True. However, you intimated to me that they were still in Garda Headquarters and that copes had been sent elsewhere.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Not the security files. The files on the investigation are the ones which went forward. The security files did not go forward.

Are copies of the security files available anywhere?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

They are. The security files are available, except for the two years - 1974 and 1975 - which were unavailable at Garda Headquarters. However, copies of them are available at the special detective unit and they were seen.

Did Mr. Justice Barron get those?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes.

Would they necessarily have to be retained at Garda Headquarters? Is that the system which was in place?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes. Obviously, there is some information about which one does not want to talk in detail. However, in broader terms, you can take it that there were names of groups and individuals received from other sources. They would come to Garda Headquarters which would forward them to Garda divisions and the special detective unit for the information of people on the ground.

The ones which went out are available in the special detective unit and Mr. Justice Barron saw them. The originals of those files for those two years are not available in Garda Headquarters.

They are missing.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

They are missing, yes.

Sorry, Deputy Costello, but I have an extra question. The inquiry mentions the Monaghan security file but not that for Dublin. Regarding the Dublin security file, we were saying that COP is missing as well.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

That is the Dublin bombing file.

No, it is the security file.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

I think again it is in the narrative. When he speaks about the Monaghan security file, that is in effect the investigation file. The word "security" there is misleading.

I understood that the Dublin investigation file is still in Garda Headquarters and available.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes.

Mr. Justice Barron said that the inquiry was furnished with the Monaghan security file but not with that for Dublin. Obviously the Garda Síochána would have supplied him with the investigation file, but it is the security file he is saying——

Assistant Commissioner Egan

There is no Monaghan security file. The word "security" there is misleading. It is the Monaghan investigation file.

It is the Dublin security file to which Mr. Justice Barron refers. The position is that the Dublin security file is missing from Garda Headquarters.

Assistant Commissioner Egan

The Garda Headquarters' file is missing.

And the copy of it is where?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

In the special detective unit in Dublin Castle, which was the operational arm of headquarters.

Is the assistant commissioner happy that the file is complete?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

There is no reason to think that it is not. It runs in tandem with all the other years and there does not seem to be anything missing from it.

Regarding the annual files relating to the UVF and the UDA, none was available for 1974 and 1975. Were copies made of those files? Is it correct that the original files are missing from Garda Headquarters?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes, but there are copies in the special detective unit.

There are copies in the special detective unit, which, as far as Assistant Commissioner Egan is concerned, are complete. Is that correct?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

Yes, and they emanated from Garda Headquarters.

Does Assistant Commissioner Egan have any idea of what would have happened to the original file?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

One could speculate. It could have been filed in a wrong year, but the bottom line is that the files were not available in the trawl and search. I am not sure if they were incorrectly filed in a different place among approximately one million files, but they cannot be found.

In the final two sentences, Mr. Justice Barron states that there were certain files in C3 which would not have been kept by the special detective unit that are missing. Has the assistant commissioner any idea what those files are?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

I have not and the narrative is mystifying to me. I do not understand it. There seems to be total confusion in describing the files. I can find no basis for what he is saying.

So there is a difficulty with that comment. That is fine.

I wonder would it be possible for the Garda Síochána to write a note on that because Mr. Justice Barron makes very substantial statements on page 12 of his report which give a very strong impression that he did not have access to a great deal of relevant material because it was missing? It seems to me, however, from our examination today that in the assessment of the Garda Síochána it was not quite that substantial by any means.

Apart from last items, the C3 files.

The C3 files seem to be missing, which is very serious.

Yes. Could we have a full detailed letter on that?

Assistant Commissioner Egan

We will, and perhaps we might be able to better describe what is meant by the term "a file" without going into the nuances, such as names. We will give you an understanding of what it means.

I note the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform is due before the sub-committee shortly and he has to leave early.

May I finish my questioning, Chairman?

The questions you asked, Chairman, included almost all the ones I was going to pose concerning the C3 files. It seems that files, both in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Garda Síochána, relating to the same issues, namely intelligence and security, are missing. Perhaps Assistant Commissioner Egan and Det. Chief Supt. Callanan can tell me when it was first discovered that the C3 files were missing?

Commissioner Conroy

Just to clarify something, Chairman, in relation to your comments - the files that are missing from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform are not missing from the Garda Síochána. We have those files. If, for instance, tomorrow morning we had detected any individuals for those crimes, those files that we have at Garda Headquarters would be used.

My question related to the files that are missing from the Garda Síochána, namely the original C3 files, copies of which, you say, are with the SDU. When was it discovered that those original C3 files were missing?

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

When we searched for the files on request from Mr. Justice Barron. As I said, these were not files that formed the nexus of the original search for files; these were auxiliary numbers that were seen by the commission and that it had requested.

I do not understand that.

Det. Chief Supt. Callanan

The answer to your question is that we discovered they were missing when we went looking. Second, these were files that flowed from the Garda passing over to the commission the investigation files and what flowed from inquiries resulting in a perusal of those particular files. Is that making sense to you?

A bit more, yes. I look forward to that note because Mr. Justice Barron states, "...but the files kept at security and intelligence, C3, at Garda Headquarters would have included more than just the files kept by security and intelligence". So, if you are saying that copies were with the SDU, Mr. Justice Barron is indicating that there are, in fact, more files than those with C3, which may now be missing. That is the point I am making. If we have the note we will try to get to the bottom of it.

I have seven or eight questions and I would like to get them all in. I do not know whether you wish to continue, Chairman, or if you wish to get the Minister in and adjourn.

No, go ahead.

I welcome Commissioner Conroy and his colleagues to the sub-committee. Given the security issues that were arising at the time with the Ulster Workers' Council strike, there was a state of alert, security wise, in Northern Ireland at the time. Was it similar down here? If so, how in practice would that have manifested itself on the ground? There have been suggestions, for example from submissions and otherwise, that perhaps there should have been Border checks and checks at bridges on the approach to Dublin, and places like that. Do you know what the position was at that stage?

Commissioner Conroy

In the Border area, let us say in Garda stations, the numbers of personnel would be much higher than in an equivalent place in other parts of the country. Also in the Border regions, we had patrols along the Border backed up by the Defence Forces. That was ongoing. Naturally enough, we were hoping at all times that our local people on the ground along the Border, in their day to day dealings with their counterparts in Northern Ireland, the RUC, would elicit as much information as possible regarding suspects that may be causing outrages in Northern Ireland and that may tend to come to the South. We were trying to get as much information as we could. That was the only way we had of doing that and making that information available to the general force along the Border.

There has been some suggestion regarding the approach taken by the bombers - they could have checked it out previously - that, given the general political situation and the risk involved, certain key areas should have been made more secure.

Commissioner Conroy

Members will appreciate that there are approximately 130 Border crossings between the North and the South. Many of them were cratered to try to reduce the risk - more to Northern Ireland than to the South of Ireland. Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of police and army personnel on the other side of the Border, we can all think of what happened there. It takes many people to secure the Border. It is almost an impossibility because there are land crossings too. Roads are one thing, but land crossings are another. It is an impossible situation to try to achieve a secure place. One need only look at what is happening in other parts of the world to see how people there cannot prevent bombers going into certain areas and causing loss of life.

There is some criticism of the investigation itself in the report, as the Commissioner will be aware. On 7 July, the Monaghan report was issued and on 19 July the investigation units returned to their stations, as it states on page 76 of the inquiry report. On 9 August 1974, the Dublin report was issued. It mentions that responsibility for continuing the investigation rested with Chief Superintendent Tony McMahon in co-operation with Chief Superintendent Larry Wren. Two questions arise from that. It seems a very short period for a very active investigation of what was the worst atrocity in the history of the State and during the whole troubles. Regarding Chief Superintendents McMahon and Wren, what other duties would they have been undertaking at that time? Would they have been involved exclusively in continuing the investigation, or would they have had other duties to attend to?

Commissioner Conroy

The persons the Senator named would have been involved exclusively in the investigation of those atrocities. Perhaps the former Commissioner, Larry Wren, would not have been involved exclusively, but the other named people who were involved in the investigations, for example, Chief Superintendent John Joy and the late Chief Superintendent Tony McMahon, would have been involved exclusively in the investigation of those crimes. As I already said regarding the reduction in personnel on the investigation, that would have happened as a result of there being no further lines of inquiry at the time to be pursued by the number of people then engaged.

All our investigations operate along those lines. At the beginning of a situation, we might pour in 100 people because we want to get information and intelligence in as quickly as we can so that we can get a picture of what exactly happened, descriptions and so on. If one gets that information in quickly, one can get it out to the public and the public generally responds with sightings and so on. Those sightings can then help the investigation and one can go to those members of the public who saw the individuals or whatever happened and take statements from them. Naturally enough, however, as time progresses, all those things dry up and one cannot keep people doing nothing. That may be the reason for the reduction in personnel.

How long did Chief Superintendents McMahon and Joy continue their exclusive involvement in the case?

Commissioner Conroy

I could not answer that question now in all fairness, since I was not there. However, I can assure the Senator from what I know of investigations that, once people are associated with an investigation, it continues with them, unless they are moved away from the investigation area.

Mr. Justice Barron told us that there are no records - or very few - of any aspects of the investigation after 9 August and there is certainly no further report.

Commissioner Conroy

The Senator can take it that there were little bits of intelligence coming in because I saw certain things. While they were not major bits and pieces, little bits of intelligence came in which were exploited to the best of the ability of those at the time.

On the guidance for interviewing witnesses and so on, to which the Commissioner referred in his earlier report, what did that specifically state about interviewing people outside the jurisdiction?

Commissioner Conroy

It would not deal with a situation like that because that was controlled by the Commissioner in what was referred to earlier as C3. The request would go to that Commissioner and he would deal with the issue relating to another force. That still applies today in that if we want some inquiries to be made in another jurisdiction, correspondence would come from the investigator into C3 which would, in turn, make the arrangements. For instance, Chief Superintendents John Joy and Tony McMahon travelled to Northern Ireland. The Senator can take it that was arranged by the commissioner in charge of C3. They went up to and conducted their business in Northern Ireland, but it was arranged through C3.

We have a submission from a superintendent who was assisting the investigation in Monaghan which states that the gardaí would not have travelled to the North because of the risk to which they would have been exposed. To what extent would that have been prevalent in the force and might have inhibited it? There is a second issue of policy, to which Deputy McGrath may have referred, of not going North because of the reciprocity of the RUC coming down here. Maybe it was regarded that that was not in line with policy. I would like to hear the Commissioner's comments on both those points.

Commissioner Conroy

I did not get the Senator's last point but I will answer the first one in regard to fear on the part of members of the Garda Síochána travelling to the North. I can assure everybody that as far as I was concerned, there was no fear, to my knowledge, among the Garda Síochána of travelling to the North to deal with our counterparts in Northern Ireland - there was absolutely none. I am sure most of the people with me today travelled to Northern Ireland at that time and conducted business there in so far as they could.

Interviewing individuals in Northern Ireland is a different issue in that we did not carry out any interviews in Northern Ireland. The judges rules are somewhat different in Northern Ireland to those here. In other words, one has to depend on one's local police force to deal with all those issues and to make sure whatever evidence is obtained, if it is obtained, will be admissible in law later on. If we decided to use our caution, I am not sure whether that would be applicable if we came down here.

In a situation like that, we would seek legal advice in regard to all those areas. They are not as simple as some people might think they are, that is, that somebody can sit in a car, ensure somebody is arrested in Northern Ireland, interview him or her and deal with the issue. It is a totally different world when one is faced with the situation of providing books of evidence and so on to somebody accused of a crime because he or she will have his or her lawyers and will challenge issues. From a Garda point of view in dealing with a situation outside our jurisdiction, we have to be very correct in the procedures we follow.

Would there have been any concerns within the Garda at the time with regard to allegations of collusion by security forces in Northern Ireland with the loyalist paramilitaries who would have been suspected of perpetrating this crime? As a consequence, would that policy have been reviewed in that context? I point out that two year's earlier, there were bombings in Dublin and there was widespread reports allegedly saying the loyalist did not have the capacity and the expertise to undertake those bombings without the assistance of elements within the security forces in the North. Given those allegations, on which I am sure the Commissioner could not adjudicate one way or the other, were there not some reservations about following the line he mentioned and about being proactive? In that regard, Mr. Justice Barron, on page 117 of his report, is critical of the fact that the Garda did not avail of opportunities to go North and stated that nothing would have been lost by making the effort - I think that comment was a specific reference to Mulholland. Given the magnitude of the atrocity, did it not warrant a more hands-on approach, rather than appointing the RUC as an agent?

Commissioner Conroy

The person you named, in whom we had a big interest, has unfortunately passed on. He actually was detained by our counterparts in Northern Ireland and he was interviewed in relation to various terrorist crimes and they did not reach any success.

In relation to our dealings with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, we would have dealt with a relatively high level in the RUC at the time. As with every other member of the public, I heard the word "collusion" mentioned from time to time and whether the bombers had the capacity to make up a bomb which was capable of doing what happened here in Dublin and in Monaghan. We heard that and I am not saying here that there were not some maverick individuals, let us say, who would have assisted certain individuals involved in this area of crime because we are investigators and we see from time to time people becoming involved in criminality who one would not expect to become involved. One can take it that may be true and it might be the reason for saying that.

The Garda did not see any merit and never asked the Government about the possibility of going north to conduct interviews in conjunction with the RUC. Did that not arise?

Commissioner Conroy

Naturally enough, one is dealing with senior officers in another force and one trusts them.

Specifically, was any approach made to the Government or the Department of the day?

Commissioner Conroy

I do not know that.

Not that the Commissioner is aware.

Commissioner Conroy

Those individuals were later interviewed to no avail so, in other words, if that was the information then, we were not able to disprove it.

Heavy emphasis has been placed today - I also heard it from the former Ministers who came before us - on the point that there was no evidence to give foundation to any prosecution to be pursued with regard to this matter. Mr. Justice Barron contests this on page 122 of his report, which states: "It was also incorrect to say that it was virtually impossible to prosecute successfully on visual identification alone." I will come to some weaknesses in that statement in a minute but would the Commissioner like to comment on it?

Mr. Justice Barron also commented on pages 123 and 124 that the Garda should not have ignored Wallace and Holroyd simply because they were not in a position to give concrete evidence. Basically, Mr. Justice Barron is stating that issues which could have been undertaken were not undertaken.

Commissioner Conroy

First, with regard to evidence of identification, I am sure lawyers will tell one quite clearly how strong or weak that is. The former Director of Public Prosecutions gave his views on that and there is plenty of case law in relation to photographs, identification, time spans and various issues like that. Our investigators would know quite well that identification by photograph is not sufficient and I doubt if any law agent would tell us otherwise. Even an identification parade on its own is not convincing and we have gone down the road in the courts in that area and we all know the results of a prosecution many years ago. Today, I am sure there would not even be a prosecution based on identification.

Furthermore, the timespan a witness would have to see an individual for recognition is a big factor in all those areas. We were most grateful to those witnesses who supplied information at the time, but if one examines the timespan, the opportunity they had in which to see the individual was very short indeed.

There are a number of issues regarding the Hertz van, the Four Courts Hotel suspect, Portland Row-Dublin docks, the British Army military officer, the Border lorry and the Trinity College graduates, etc. There are many leads, for example, William Scott, that have not been followed up. Commissioner Conroy stated that in essence the missing files are unlikely to contain anything material which might be helpful to the investigation. With regard to the missing file and payments and the confidential sources, would those confidential sources have been within or outside the jurisdiction or both?

Commissioner Conroy

I have to be honest and say that I could not answer that question. Naturally, if we can cultivate individuals to give information, whether they are within or outside the jurisdiction, in the interests of this country and its people, we will do it.

That could be material, presumably, if there were people there who might have been able to source information for the Garda. In that regard, the missing file would seem to be significant and I ask Commissioner Conroy to comment. The photo album is missing and that would seem a crucial piece of the investigative mechanism. How could that have gone missing given that it is a very valuable piece of the investigative process?

Commissioner Conroy

It was very valuable at the time with regard to fixing on suspects, but it must be remembered that the manner in which those photographs were taken meant that they could not be used in evidence. The Garda would need to find some other mechanism to deal with that issue if we were in a situation of producing evidence and making evidence available for presentation in the courts. Those photographs were taken by photographers without the knowledge of those in the pictures.

I understand the file on the Dublin-Monaghan bombings is still open. What does that mean? Are we in reactive or proactive mode? Is there any benefit to be gained now from a more vigorous pursuit of leads that were not followed up previously?

Commissioner Conroy

The Senator will appreciate that all leads were followed up.

With respect, that is not what Mr. Justice Barron said in his report.

Commissioner Conroy

I am stating that there were several investigations in recent years to try to bring this to a successful conclusion. If, for example, tomorrow morning, somebody was to be of assistance to us, the people who are alive and the people we suspect, the Senator can be assured that-——

Is somebody leading that investigation or is it reactive? Is the Garda waiting for information to come in before that would be pursued?

Commissioner Conroy

We have to be reactive.

I thank the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner Joe Egan, Deputy Commissioner Fachtna Murphy and Detective Chief Superintendent Martin Callanan. The committee awaits the Garda Síochána's written note on the matter of the files.

We will now hear from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister.

It was 7 o'clock this morning when some of us last had something to eat or drink.

The Minister must leave at 12.45 p.m. and if we break now it would be noon before we resume.

I suggest a five minute break.

We will suspend for five minutes.

Sitting suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.

I welcome the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Deputy Michael McDowell; the Secretary General of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Mr. Timothy Dalton; the assistant secretary of the Department, Mr. Ken O'Leary; and the assistant principal officer of the Department, Mr. David Walker.

Before we resume our consideration of the report of the independent commission of inquiry, I would like to offer the sympathies of the sub-committee on the untimely death of Mr. Barry O'Hara, who I understand was of great assistance in the preparation of the report. I ask the Minister to accept the sympathies of the sub-committee in that regard and I invite him to make a statement.

I thank the sub-committee for this opportunity to speak about the report of the commission of inquiry.

I thank the Chairman for his kind words in respect of Mr. Barry O'Hara, the loss of whom is incalculable from the point of view of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Mr. O'Hara played a leading role in the security area in recent years. He was, in effect, the head of my Department's security section. His sudden death the other day was a terrible blow to his family and colleagues. I am very grateful to the Chairman for the kind words he has spoken.

A detailed submission has been prepared by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and furnished to the sub-committee. I think I should make a few general points at the outset. I would like to express, yet again, my most sincere and heartfelt sympathy to those - some of whom are here today - who were so terribly affected and bereaved by the bombings.

As a Member of the Dáil between 1992 and 1997, I was part of a cross-party group of Deputies who attempted to take up the cause promoted by the rightly named Justice for the Forgotten. Deputy Gregory, myself and others took the first steps to rekindle interest in this matter in the Oireachtas, following a television programme about the matter. As Attorney General, I played an active role in closely working with the Taoiseach to establish the inquiry, which was chaired by the late Mr. Justice Hamilton and which culminated in the report prepared by Mr. Justice Barron. I pay tribute to the work of Mr. Justice Barron and those who assisted him. Although his report may not have satisfied all concerned, which was inevitable, I believe he worked valiantly with his team in very difficult circumstances to provide whatever answers he could. A degree of courage was demonstrated in that regard.

It is fair to say that missing documentation is the issue involving the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform which has attracted most attention since the publication of the report. The submission furnished by my Department sets out the position in so far as the information available to it is concerned. In dealing with the inquiry, my Department had two obligations. It had to establish the amount of its documentation which was required by the inquiry and it had to make such material available. Our submission shows that this was done. It is fair to say that Mr. Justice Barron does not suggest, in any way, that the Department failed to provide him with the documentation or information in its possession. That more than 70 files of folders were made available to the inquiry is, of itself, proof of a willingness to co-operate.

Every request from the commission of inquiry was responded to by the Department to the best of its ability. I am not in a position to say definitively what documentation may or may not have been in the Department. Leaving aside the accuracy of other people's recollections 30 years on, the sad fact is that the four senior people who would have dealt with security matters in the Department at that time are now all deceased. Therefore, there is no one serving in my Department who would have been involved in these matters at the time.

On the basis of the evidence available in the Department which is outlined in the submission and from my own experience as Minister in the Department - admittedly some 30 years on and with different colleagues in the Department - I caution against any assumption that a considerable amount of relevant documentation has, so to speak, gone missing from the Department. Frankly, what is at issue are assumptions because I am not aware of any evidence that such documentation has, in fact, gone missing, with the exception of the Garda report on the incident, to which I will come back.

Files and other documents dealing with the activities of paramilitary groupings are handled and maintained within a small unit of my Department known as the security and Northern Ireland division which is headed by a principal officer. Access to material within that unit is quite restricted. In the ordinary way, the only people outside the unit who would have access to the material are the Minister, the Secretary General, Mr. Timothy Dalton, and Mr. Ken O'Leary, the assistant secretary in charge of that area of the Department's activities. Nobody else in the Department has access to the material. I am informed that this is situation which has applied for as long as anybody in my Department can remember.

I also want to explain that day-to-day operating practices within the unit and the practices generally followed in handling security matters are not the same as those applying in many other parts of the Civil Service. It is not, for example, the practice to routinely minute exchanges that take place with the Garda authorities on security matters, for the very obvious reason that material which of its nature must be kept secret is rendered less so by the process of minute-taking, recording, typing, data storage and the like. It is not, as far as I am aware, and never has been the practice either for exchanges that take place on these issues within the Department itself - for instance, between the Minister and the Secretary General on a security matter - to be minuted. The only people involved in such matters at times will be the Minister and the Secretary General or the Minister and the assistant secretary. In that situation record creation is neither practical nor would it represent a sound and sensible working arrangement.

This is not something which is unique to Ireland. For instance, at Anglo-Irish conferences it is not at all uncommon in the course of exchanges that take place during what are referred to as restricted security sessions for both sides to agree that discussions on particular matters should specifically not be the subject of any minutes. To put it colloquially, the pens go down and there is a discussion. Therefore, the fact that there may be few papers in my Department on certain issues which at one time or another may have been the subject of extensive political, media and public interest does not mean that somebody has lost a file or that somebody, so to speak, has been squirreling away documentation, nor does it imply that these matters were the subject of little interest in the Department or to my predecessors in office. The mere fact that there is no documentation does not of itself imply that the matter was not a matter of acute interest and detailed discussion. Bearing in mind what I have said, for instance, in respect of many matters of acute interest to me, I know there are no minutes in the Department in this area.

Justice Ministers, in fact, devote quite an amount of time and attention to matters bearing on State security. It will hardly come as a surprise to anybody to hear that this is the case but the time devoted to discussion on the subject is not necessarily matched by a corresponding volume of paperwork. I would just like to distinguish, say, for instance, what I can see from the outside of the Department of Foreign Affairs where it is the essence of diplomacy that they record virtually everything. Everything is recorded in writing - all scraps of intelligence and all scraps of discussion of political interest. The culture in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform is the exact opposite in relation to security. There is minimal recording of material in that area.

By far the most likely explanation for a paucity of documentation on matters of a security nature is simply that most of the exchanges that took place among the Minister, his senior officials and the Garda authorities were, for the reasons I have already mentioned, verbal rather than written. In fact, given the enormity of the outrages in question in Dublin and Monaghan, it is quite likely that they would have been subject to extensive oral communication rather than written material. That is what would happen now. If something like that were to happen now, there would be lengthy oral meetings and discussions between my officials and the Garda and me. It is quite possible - in fact, it is probable - that no record would exist of those at all.

It is important by way of background to your deliberations that the committee should know how security matters are handled and the reasons for handing them in the way I have described. Those who deal with State security issues at the front line would quite understandably be extremely concerned and, in fact, very cautious about keeping the political system informed in detail of what was happening if they thought security might be breached as a result of less than watertight practices elsewhere in the system. For instance, if I get material on subversion and it is my intention to pass it on to the Taoiseach, which frequently happens, I would never in the ordinary course write him a letter or send him a note on the issue. I would make it my business to meet him in the margin of a meeting or have a special meeting with him to discuss the matter. I would not hand over a document to him unless it was absolutely necessary for some reason.

Some, of course, obviously prefer a different explanation for the lack of records on security matters. It obviously gives rise to a suspicion that there is some concealment or conspiracy involved. However, as I fully acknowledge that such suspicions may be understandable, they do not stand up to scrutiny because the likelihood that persons engaged in such activity would keep records of discussions of that kind is simply remote.

There are two other points that might be worth mentioning. First, it is a fundamental misunderstanding to think that I, as Minister, or the Department shadow Garda criminal investigations. Certainly, that is so now. Either personally or through the Department, I will sometimes be kept informed in a general way in relation to particular investigations but clearly it is not a matter for me or the Department to second-guess the Garda - the witness to whom you have just spoken - in relation to the discharge of its duties.

Second, I understand Mr. Patrick Cooney indicated that no action on his part or on the part of the Department was requested by the Garda. Had such a request been made - I am not suggesting that I have any reason to think it should have been - it would have been the type of thing that could easily have been expected to generate documentation within the Department. What I am saying is that if somebody is asked to do something, that is the circumstance in which a file is opened. If there is a request for something to be done, if somebody has to note how they are responding to it, if there is a letter which has to be replied to, if there is a set of steps that somebody has asked to be taken, they are noted and the action taken on foot of them might be noted.

I might also mention that it is no longer the practice, nor has it been for many years, for the Department to receive, as a matter of routine, Garda investigation reports. Thinking back to the period with which we are dealing with, 1974, it was routine for police reports on serious matters to go to the Department of Justice. You are also dealing with the period when the Attorney General was the chief prosecution officer for the State. I would never see a murder file or a bombing file unless I requested it. It would not arrive on my desk as a matter of course anymore. That is a change which has taken place since the days of the late Mr. Peter Berry, Mr. Dalton's predecessor, who would have had a much closer knowledge of what and was not happening at senior levels in the Garda Síochána.

Technological developments within the security division will facilitate file maintenance. The security division has two registers - I think you have been made aware of this in the submission - and all files and material are registered.

I should mention briefly that I will be publishing the Garda Síochána Bill in the near future. I am mentioning this now because sometimes there can be confusion about the precise relationship between the Minister and the Garda Síochána which for the first time in the near future will be put on a comprehensive statutory basis.

In relation to general policies which were in existence at the time and, in particular, the amount of cross-Border co-operation, I am aware that the sub-committee has heard from both Mr. Cooney and the Garda Commissioner and I do not think I have anything useful to add at this stage of my contribution. As to changes which have taken place then and lessons to be drawn, some of the issues are dealt with in the submission. It is fair to say we are virtually living in a different world from that which existed in 1974, although obviously for the relatives and the bereaved it is not different but in terms of the Department, it is. Our criminal law has been radically overhauled and there have been huge advances in technology, in particular in relation to forensic science which, as the committee will probably have gathered, was in its infancy - that is probably a euphemism - at that time. Of special interest now are the structures which have developed in the area of British-Irish co-operation.

Before taking questions and dealing with the points committee members want to raise, there is one final point I would like to make, of which I hope none of us will lose sight. This was a monstrous crime but however monstrous the crime and however perverse the perpetrators, these bombings took place against a background of conflict on this island. We have made huge progress in bringing that conflict to an end but we have to ensure we never see such events again. The era of political violence must come to an end and paramilitarism must finish absolutely and unreservedly at this point.

Thank you very much, Minister. I know that you have time constraints and have to be at the airport by 1.15 p.m. I ask members to take this into account in their questioning. The Minister will be leaving before 12.45 p.m.

I welcome the Minister, Deputy McDowell, and his officials and thank him for his presentation. You are in the unique position of having been Attorney General and subsequently Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I do not know if anybody else has ever held both positions. In his report Mr. Justice Barron draws conclusions from the inaction of the Attorney General in 1974 and indicates that he should perhaps have done more. Does the Minister, with his knowledge of the role of the Attorney General at the time and the subsequent role of the Attorney General, think that is a fair criticism to make?

When I was Attorney General, I had a radically different role from that of the then Attorney General, Mr. Declan Costello, because I hardly had any functions in relation to criminal prosecution matters. The DPP and I had a statutory relationship of independent equals. I was never involved on a daily basis, and still am not as Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, in the prosecution decision. Sometimes everyone forgets this in the heat of battle but it is true. The Constitution confers that role on the Attorney General who at that time discharged it but it was then hived off and given to an independent Director of Public Prosecutions who, unlike the DPP in the UK, does not even operate under what they call the "general superintendence" of the Attorney General. The DPP is totally independent.

If one asks me now whether that was a fair criticism of Declan Costello as Attorney General, I cannot really offer a view because I have never discharged that function. In fairness to Declan Costello, he would have operated as I presume the present DPP operates on the basis of the material supplied to him. I would not think that if something like that were to happen today, the DPP would get into the driving seat and say, "This is of such importance that I am going to take over the prosecution." I think he would trust the Garda to prepare and give the material to him. My knowledge of this is much more limited than that of Mr. Justice Barron. I have never thought that blame attached in any way to Mr. Justice Declan Costello. That thought never occurred to me.

I thank the Minister.

We are not here to attach blame or to question the adjudication or actions of any person at that time.

That is correct. We were not doing that. As regards current investigations, the Garda Commissioner spoke earlier about the lines of communication between the Garda, the Minister and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. He said that probably someone at principal officer level in the Department is briefed on a regular basis, perhaps even on a daily basis, and that arising from that, the Minister's staff will decide what is brought to his attention. Is that correct?

That would be true, yes.

Would the Minister get involved in particular investigations or ask about certain crimes and how the investigations are progressing? Would he send directions to the Garda Commissioner telling him to do certain things? Is that part of his role?

No, the latter is not part of my role. There may have been a handful of occasions in the period I have held office where I asked the Garda to brief me fully on how an investigation was proceeding. The normal run-of-the-mill situation is that my private secretary will telephone me at weekends to say that a murder has been committed in Cork or a prisoner has been found dead in his cell. I get a fairly constant stream of simple two line statements in order that if someone doorsteps me with a microphone, I will not look like I am clueless on the subject, to put it mildly.

I never say to the Garda that a certain crime is serious and it should do A, B and C because that is not my function. The function of An Garda Síochána is to report serious crime for prosecution to the Director of Public Prosecutions and he will, on occasion, give it instructions as to how the investigation should proceed. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform nowadays never gets involved - I am not unusual in this - in telling gardaí how to do their day to day operational investigative work.

Would that have been the case in the past, to the Minister's knowledge?

Things have probably changed over the lifetime of the State. There was a time when Ministers for Justice and the Department had a closer relationship with the Garda Síochána.

Is that in recent years or in the distant past?

It is in the past.

Is it 50, 60 or 80 years ago?

I am talking about the early 1970s. I do not believe it would have been usual for someone in Patrick Cooney's time to tell the gardaí how to investigate this incident. He would not have attempted to do it.

If it was in the 1970s, it was immediately prior to that.

We are not getting into the question. This is personal. We must move on to the next issue.

It depended on who was Secretary General of the Department. There were different styles. However, what I said has been the norm in recent decades.

As regards intergovernmental conferences and meetings, would it be normal to discuss individual incidents, for example, the Omagh bombing or the seizure of cigarettes or drugs along the Border, at such gatherings?

Individual incidents have been discussed by me at those meetings. We do not sit down and take out a list of incidents and go through them one by one. On occasion there would be individual incidents which would be discussed in some depth.

Would that involve the Minister being told about the suspects and being asked to pass the list of suspects back to the Garda?

Normally when these matters arise, I am with the Garda Commissioner, the deputy commissioner or the assistant commissioner.

Those kinds of conferences would specifically relate to security issues and the Minister would be accompanied by senior members of the Garda.

If we were to have a meeting at which security issues would arise it would be normal for the police forces from both parts of this island and the security section of my Department to be represented. While occasionally at such meetings individual incidents are discussed, generally we do not carry out a mutual debriefing of all that has transpired since the previous meeting.

Would these be specific meetings about security not involving the Prime Minister and Taoiseach? Would they only involve the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform meeting his counterparts?

It depends on the format and who is attending the meeting. Sometimes they would be attended by the Taoiseach and me or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Cowen, and me. Sometimes I would attend on my own.

I thank the Minister and his officials for attending to assist us. I extend my sympathy over the loss of a very senior colleague. The Minister's submission contains many references to file numbers, which are prefaced by "S". I presume that refers——

However, do these refer to documents that emanated from the security division?

Mr. O'Leary advises that the security file has "S" put on it.

The Minister's submission states that it was dangerous to make assumptions that the documents referred to in Mr. Justice Barron's report were missing. He stated that these suspicions that the documents were missing do not stand up to scrutiny. However, Mr. Justice Barron's report takes a contrary position. His report stated: "Government Departments have provided all of the relevant files in their possession and have answered all requests for follow-up information, with one exception: the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform has found that files are missing from its archives."

They are slightly different. I accept that given that the report on the Monaghan bombing came to the Department it is highly likely that the Garda Síochána report on the Dublin bombing came to the Department also. If one came I cannot imagine why the other would not have come. There seems to be an assumption that if such a report came to the Department it would have been placed in a buff file and thereafter material would accumulate against it or that minutes of discussions about it would appear on that file. That is the dangerous assumption to which I refer. If the Department received a Garda Síochána report on an incident, it is not to be immediately assumed that a file would be opened on that report and that material would be generated.

Earlier, the Garda Commissioner gave a clear submission on that point. He stated that regularly and specifically on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, individual files and reports on intelligence and security issues were dispatched to the Department. Where they related to sensitive security information, they were addressed specifically for the security division. The appendices to the submission from the Department contain many references to security files such as S9/76 and S23/78. There are constant references to security files. The Minister said it would be dangerous to speculate or make assumptions. Do you not think it is an entirely reasonable assumption that, if a file comes over from the Garda Síochána marked specifically for the attention of the security division, a file would be opened up in relation to it?

At the time, a register was kept of files that were opened. On the assumption that somebody was not taking extraordinary decisions at that time, with the benefit of foresight and hindsight, for some ulterior motive, it must be asked why, if such a file was created, it would not appear on the register. My own view is that the fact that a report came over in respect of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings addressed to the security section of the Department does not mean that, as a matter of inevitable or even massive probability, a file was opened for that document. The real issue is, if it were, why would the existence of that file not have been put into the register at the time.

According to the submissions made to us, a huge volume of almost daily reports at one stage were coming over in relation to intelligence and security matters, yet Mr. Justice Barron's report concludes that the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform has found that files are missing from its archives. He specifically states that they related to the security section. We are raising this because our terms of reference obliges us to see if Mr. Justice Barron carried out a thorough examination and addressed the issues which were set out in his terms of reference, one of which was to see whether the response of the Government of the day was adequate. If files of a security and intelligence nature came over, we want to see those files and the Government's response to them. In other words, if a file came in, following which a memo was prepared by an official in the security section which stated that it regarded the response as inadequate and unsatisfactory and that the Garda response and investigation was also unsatisfactory, we wanted to see the Government's response to that. That is why the files are critical.

I follow your point, Deputy, but I wonder if you followed my point at the beginning. The division, which was asked by Mr. Justice Barron to look at this, at no point found any reference to a file that it had at some stage and which no longer existed on its records. I want to make that clear. The implication in all of this is that there is a Government response to the bombing of Dublin which was the subject matter of an opened file. Whereas some people may think that should have been done, that there should have been some file or minutes of a Government response, I am saying that it should not necessarily be assumed that such a file was ever opened.

On that assumption, you say that should never be assumed. However, on page 14 of his report, referring to the Garda file, Mr. Justice Barron states:

The files contain in the main individual internal reports of various bombing incidents, forwarded by the Gardaí to the Department with a covering letter. In some cases, it contains a full Garda investigation report with accompanying statements. It does not contain any Garda reports relating to the bombings on 1 December 1972, or 20 January 1973, nor of the bombings in Dublin on 17 May 1974.

At some stage he states that files were opened. This is, I think, in your submission that we received this morning. There were files opened in relation to the 1972 and 1973 bombings. Why were there no files open in relation to the 1974 bombings? Mr. Justice Barron is only speculating.

He is doing what he was asked to do at the time, which is inquire into and attempt to draw conclusions from the absence of documentation. Absent files and missing files are two fundamentally different concepts. If there was not a file at all, one can draw conclusions, if one wants, from that fact, but it does not mean that the absence of a file means a file has gone missing. That is all I am saying.

I see the Minister's point. I am sorry to labour this point, Chairman, but I misquoted a paragraph of Mr. Justice Barron's report. Two paragraphs further down it states:

The investigation reports and accompanying documents relating to the bombings in Dublin on 1 December 1972 and 20 January 1973, received in 1973, have been supplied to the Inquiry in their original folders. There is no contemporary record which shows that the Dublin and Monaghan investigation reports were sent to the Department; but it is inconceivable that they were not.

I would agree with that. It is inconceivable that they were not sent. I would find it highly unlikely that they were not sent.

Therefore, if files were opened in the security section for the 1972 and 1973 bombings which, relative to the 1974 bombings, were relatively small, it is inconceivable that files were not opened.

I do not accept that second proposition. If a file was opened at that point it would have been registered - Deputy Power's guess is as good as mine - but if one were to ask me now, I believe in all probability that the Garda files on the two incidents were sent to the Department of Justice and that no file was opened. On the balance of probability, I believe there was no file because the alternative view is that somebody at the time said, "I am opening a file but I am departing from normal procedure in this case and am not going to register the existence of that file." I cannot image circumstances at the point when the file was supposed to be opened - if there was a file - where somebody would decide not to register the file or make any note of its existence. I cannot imagine the motive of somebody at that time for making such a decision.

Are all the registration details available now for that period? We have evidence from the Garda Síochána that the registration details were missing from the early 1970s to 1988 but in the Department they are——

The security division's register was available to Mr. Justice Barron.

I am sorry to be taking up my colleague's time but the logical follow on from what the Minister is saying is that in relation to the biggest murder atrocity in this country, no file was opened in the Department of Justice.

That, I think, is a more probable explanation rather than that a file was opened and, for some reason, it was decided not to register it and it subsequently disappeared.

Does the Minister not think that is quite extraordinary?

I do not want to use language now which is unfair to individuals at the time. I am saying that if the investigation report from the Garda Síochána came over and nothing was done with it, in the sense that no steps were taken with it, other than to look at it. It is quite conceivable that it was in the Department, which I believe it was, and that no file was created in relation to it, that somebody read it and it sat there on a desk.

That is why Mr. Justice Barron concluded as he states in his report that "The Department of Justice has found that files are missing from its archive." It is a logical follow on.

He is assuming - this is the point I am making - that there was a file that no longer exists, ergo it has gone missing. What I and the Department officials say is the other view that there was no file; that explains why no entry was made in the register and the report simply sat on a desk or a shelf in the Department of Justice, was read but no steps were taken on it by anybody which would require a file to be opened.

One final question, Chairman. In the Minister's submission——

May I stress that I am not a protagonist for one view or the other because one or the other is correct? I am in no better position than the chairman or any member of the committee to speculate backwards.

I think the Minister would agree when he says one or the other, that there are other possibilities regarding what might have happened. The Minister would agree with that.

I accept I have used some other members' time but I have one final question. In his submission, at Appendix 4, the Minister included a very helpful reference to the extradition issue. I wonder why that was included since the Minister was not asked to deal particularly with that issue, although it is important.

It was not my decision to put in that. I just want to make that clear. To be helpful to the committee, at the time of the Sunningdale Agreement, the British Government was pressing the Irish Government for extradition. Both Governments agreed to set up a law commission to investigate that issue. Its report was inconclusive in that the Irish participants, the most senior of whom were two Supreme Court judges, seemed to take the view that it would be unconstitutional for Ireland to allow terrorist-type, politically motivated people to be extradited. The British took a different view of the Irish law and their own law.

As a result of that impasse, the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act 1976 was passed whereby both States assumed, in the Irish context, the power to prosecute for extra-territorial offences. That table shows an interesting point in that, in Northern Ireland, the British were willing to send people south, and did so, whereas the Irish State, for the reasons the Irish lawyers set out in that commission's report, was unwilling to send people north. Therefore, it may be the case that some people would consider that difference of approach to extradition as a relevant issue concerning the attitudes of both Governments to how criminal investigations might proceed.

The suggestion is there, although Mr. Cooney did not agree with it, that it would be academic to seek the extradition anyway because even if we had a volume of evidence against the perpetrators, they would have been able to defeat any application for extradition.

It shows that there was a difference of approach between both states to the issue of extradition and what might have been academic south of the Border might not have been academic north of the Border.

I welcome the Minister and his staff from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. In his introductory remarks, the Minister mentioned his involvement with and support for Justice for the Forgotten as a newly elected Opposition Deputy, along with Deputy Gregory. What prompted him to support that group at the time?

I am a bit vague on all of this because I do not keep diaries. Therefore, I am not able to put everything in its exact sequence. However, there was a television programme which rekindled the public controversy about the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. In the wake of that, Justice for the Forgotten began to lobby Deputies, drawing to their attention all the issues with which we are now dealing. At that time, I had grave misgivings in my own mind about the whole episode - what had happened and who was involved in it. Deputy Gregory and I - I cannot remember who the Fine Gael people were, but there were people from a number of parties - were interested in this subject. We agreed one day here in this House, in a place that one cannot mention, to set up an informal group among ourselves to be supportive of the group.

Did the word "collusion" come up at that stage? What is his view now on collusion? This has come up in many submissions from different people. As Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, what is his up to date view on that word "collusion"?

Mr. Justice Barron came to his views on collusion——

I am asking for the Minister's views.

——having studied it much more carefully than me. However, I believe one has to be careful to be precise about what one means when one uses the word "collusion". If one means that people in Downing Street or very senior people in the apparatus of the United Kingdom were making decisions, that is one thing. I do not think there is any evidence of that. If one is talking about some members of the security forces in Northern Ireland - as they then were, a security force under siege, as it saw itself, in its own construct - actually colluding with people to take on its enemies, I think that collusion did exist and there may well have been collusion of that kind regarding these events.

If there was a major atrocity tomorrow morning and a bomb went off, killing 33 people and injuring many more, is the Minister telling the sub-committee that under no circumstances, in the light of earlier comments, would politicians interfere with the Garda and vice versa? Are you telling me that you would not pick up the telephone tomorrow morning and ring the Commissioner to demand an update or, in the days after the atrocity, make regular contact and perhaps demand a meeting with him? Is that what you are telling the sub-committee today?

No, I am not saying that at all. On the contrary, if such an event took place, the Garda would not wait for me to contact it. It would be in touch with me very quickly and brief the security division in the Department to tell me what was going on. In the immediate aftermath——

You would be proactive.

The Deputy should be very careful with the word "proactive". If there was an equivalent atrocity, I would not set up some kind of emergency room in the Department and begin to issue instructions to the Garda on how they were to investigate.

But you would contact the Commissioner or seek a meeting with him.

I would expect him to be in contact with me within the hour, and that we would have a meeting on the matter within hours. I would know that I would have to go to the Dáil and before cameras and microphones to deal with all of those things. I would not simply try to wing it.

Yet that did not happen in 1974. The title of the victims' group is Justice for the Forgotten. They very much feel they have been forgotten by successive Governments and parties. I accept that I am crossing the line.

I will not ask the Minister to answer that question. We do not want to impugn anyone.

He has answered my question about being more proactive.

I do not know that it did not happen in 1974.

I also welcome the Minister, Mr. Dalton, Mr. O'Leary and Mr. Walker. I sympathise with them on the loss of their colleague. The Minister will remember that other people were also involved at that time——

Were you in the House at the time?

——and the "Hidden Hands" programme when a presentation was made in Buswell's Hotel which a lot of Deputies attended.

I am not suggesting that that was an exhaustive list. I remember Deputy Gregory - doubtless you were involved.

There is no doubt that he is a memorable Deputy. I have two brief questions.

Was the Deputy in the House?

I was in the House.

You were in the House. I am sure you were involved.

I came here in 1993. Regarding what I would call the "paper trail", in his presentation the Minister indicated that, in his experience in the late 1980s, there was minimal recording and very little documentation when discussing matters of a serious criminal or subversive nature. Judge Barron gives the opposite impression, stating categorically on page 273 that all intelligence information received by the Garda Síochána was, as a matter of routine, copied to the Secretary General of the Department. That is not the only occasion, since he has done the same on page 13: "Information was normally supplied by way of internal intelligence reports with covering letters and was brought to the Department by a member of An Garda Síochána". How does this tally with the absence of material in the Department?

The phrase that you have just quoted is open to misunderstanding. I have no doubt that there has never been a time in the Irish State when all intelligence coming into the hands of the Garda Síochána has routinely gone to the Department of Justice. I have no doubt that it has never been the position that every piece of information coming into the Garda - I assume that the Deputy means on subversive groups - would come over to the Department of Justice. That has most certainly never happened, as the records in the Department clearly indicate. If that was happening, we would have a vast archive of intelligence, including such matters as what people in Kerry were saying to the local superintendent about who was responsible for this, that and the other. That never came to the Department. One should not read too much into a general statement of that kind by Mr. Justice Barron and the public should not think that there was ever a time when all intelligence came to the Department of Justice - there never was such a time.

Mr. Justice Barron said that while not all intelligence was submitted, routine intelligence was submitted. A record of this was kept, it was copied to the Secretary and there were covering letters. If all was not sent to the Department of Justice, surely a vast quantity would still have a paper trail indicating its origin from the Garda Síochána.

In his submission, the Minister stated that 70 files or folders were made available to the Barron commission. The Garda Commissioner said earlier that the Garda Síochána made 800 files available to the Barron commission. That means the Department of Justice would have had knowledge of less than 10% of the quantity it revealed. It boggles the mind that there should not be a greater quantity of information in the Department.

That proves my point and the point that this statement is not correct. If it was literally true, that is, that all intelligence information received by the Garda Síochána was, as a matter of routine, copied to the Secretary of the Department, it would mean that all files that existed in the Garda Síochána in this matter would be mirrored by a similar file in the Department of Justice. That is simply not so, and has never been the case. The next sentence in Mr. Justice Barron's report state: "As there is now no record of this in the Department nor in the security files of the Garda Síochána, it can no longer be ascertained exactly what information passed between them." That proves the point I am making, that one could not possibly believe that all intelligence going to the Garda came as a matter of routine to the Secretary of the Department of Justice. That is simply not so.

Can we excuse the Minister? Mr. Dalton, Mr. O'Leary and Mr. Walker will remain with us.

I can stay until 1 p.m. To answer Deputy Costello's question correctly, a generalisation of that kind, if misunderstood, could give a completely misleading view of what is happening. The ratio of files Deputy Costello just mentioned of 800 to whatever, demonstrates that the converse is true, that is, that the majority of intelligence information is kept by the Garda and is not the subject of any communication to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

I refer the Minister to the third last paragraph on page 127 of the Barron report on the termination of the Garda inquiry. It states:

Although Garda investigations of this type are operational matters for them alone, the Department of Justice would have been kept fully informed of the course of the investigation. Having regard to the Northern Ireland element, this would have been very full. An examination of the Garda security files shows that all matters of importance were reported to the Secretary of the Department in writing.

This does not seem to tally with the available material in the Department. It almost seems an inevitable conclusion that there were missing files.

As I said to Deputy Peter Power, that is one conclusion that is open. If there were missing files in the security section of the Department, it would appear - there was no suggestion that there was a later alteration of the register - that someone made the decision not to register those files at the time they opened them. These files are not registered years after the event, but at the time they are opened and are given a number. The question you have to ask yourself is, why, with an appalling atrocity, would somebody in the Department of Justice say, "There is going to be no file on this as far as posterity is concerned. We are not going to register; we are going to keep an informal file which will be away from scrutiny." I cannot imagine any possible motive for somebody deciding to do that at the time because it would have been very strange given that the security division in the Department of Justice was composed of Dubliners or whatever. They could not possibly have seen some motive in the immediate aftermath of this event to say, "We won't keep a file on this one," especially since they kept and registered files on other ones. I do not see why they would come to such a conclusion and do that.

There is an obvious discrepancy in that respect. However, to lead on from your conclusion, surely if there was not a formal file in the Department, there must have been some informal file which might have been put on a shelf, rather than put into one of the folders and registered normally because files had to be registered and then put in a particular location.

It has to be stressed again and again that the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform gave Mr. Justice Barron everything it had. By the way, it seems that in the 1990s in the aftermath of the television programme that we mentioned, people then went looking for more material and they could not find it then either. They went to see if there was Department of Justice material on this and it could not be found then, if it existed.

My judgment on this is not hugely better informed that anybody else's - I have to say that for starters - and therefore I will not say Mr. Justice Barron was wrong. However, I am saying that it is strange indeed that if a file were opened on this, somebody, apparently at the same time, decided not to register that fact. The alternative view could have been as prosaic as this: perhaps somebody did go through the file that came over from the Garda; perhaps somebody did write comments on it; perhaps that has disappeared at some stage between 1972 and 1992, in that 20 year period; and perhaps the original report, with a lot of notes of whoever went through it and comments and criticisms and perhaps even notes of verbal discussions with the Garda were on the file as sent over. Maybe that is an explanation for what happened. All we know is that the Garda report does not exist in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and did not exist in 1993. I think we can conclude that it is probable that it would have been sent over. However, the question is whether there was an accompanying file which detailed the response of Government, which is the phrase Deputy Power has used. Maybe there was not.

I have one brief follow up question on security. Is it possible that instead of these files simply being missing or misplaced, they were deliberately taken from the Department of Justice? What level of security is in place and who has access to this type of sensitive Garda files which would have been sent by the Garda Síochána?

I will start with that question. If that happened - by the way I do not believe it did happen - it would involve the very lucky coincidence that nobody had registered the existence of the file in the first place because nobody looking at the register kept by the Department can see a deletion or an abolition of this file. On the conspiracy that you are advancing, that somebody decided that they would take that material away from the Department of Justice or whatever material was in the Department, I cannot advance any strong views one way or the other, except to say that whoever did it was hugely assisted by what would have to have been a coincidence, that is, that a Department of Justice official failed ever to note the existence of the file, to register its existence, and there was no alternative documentation which showed that such a file existed.

Any file usually has documents which are sent to and from people and so there are usually two versions of every document that exists or, alternatively, there is some kind of external evidence that a file existed, such as a memo by somebody stating, "I sent a letter to the Department of Justice in relation to the Dublin-Monaghan bombings the day before yesterday," and that is recorded in some other Department by the sender. There is none of that smoking-gun evidence for the existence of a file whose existence has now been suppressed.

I cannot speak for the people who were there 30 years ago or 20 years ago but I can say something about the departmental officials who are there now. I have spoken to them about this process and I am absolutely satisfied that nothing is being held back on security grounds now. It is not a question that somebody decided that Mr. Justice Barron has no statutory powers and therefore would not be given certain documents. I am absolutely satisfied that in good faith every effort has been made to give him everything the Department has, that he has received everything that we know we have and that there is not something being deliberately concealed.

I can understand the Minister's difficulty. His hypothesis is that if a file was opened, it is hard to concede that it would not be registered there. There is another hypothesis and I refer to page 128 of the report which states, "Unfortunately departmental files are of no assistance on this issue since they are missing in their entirety".

If they are absent in their entirety, it would have been a happier position.

There is a general file on bombings but apparently no specific file opened in respect of individual cases. Notwithstanding this, the Department has provided a number of files relating to other bombings within the State, but has failed to produce any files relating to the Dublin bombings in May 1974. There is no explanation for their absence nor is it possible to indicate when they went missing. The hypothesis that the Department would not have opened a file on the biggest atrocity in the history of the State would seem even more strange than not registering it, I suggest.

I see the force of the point made by the Senator. If this was a file which consisted of transactional documents with items going out and coming back, where is the other copy of all those documents and where is the incoming material originating? How is it that those copies have also all disappeared? I can see that some people will say that it must have been hoovered up very carefully, but it would also involve somebody making a decision at that time to keep it off the register. I cannot see why somebody would have done that at the time.

I reiterate the point that the use of the word "missing" is like the dog that does not bark. The use of the word "missing" rather than "absent" causes every sentence to have a different meaning. The "missing" files are such and such is one thing, but it is different language if one says, "The files that were never opened and are therefore completely absent, which gives rise to the following conclusions..." The real question is that one or other of those hypotheses is true; either there was never anything or there was something and somebody has taken it away.

In answer to questions on this matter the Taoiseach said in the Dáil last week that the Minister's predecessor, Deputy O'Donoghue, would have conducted a fairly thorough investigation as to these missing files——

The Senator is using the phrase "missing" again.

——and that he had some information to offer or some possible explanation. Is the Minister familiar with that investigation?

I am not acquainted with that, but I know that the Taoiseach inadvertently suggested there had been a Garda inquiry which there was not in fact.

In paragraph 5 of section 2 of the Minister's submission to the sub-committee, there is mention of the background information and a list of names of individuals, many of whom are deceased. The submission states that a number of more junior staff were involved. I am not asking the Minister to give a name at this stage, but can he say if anybody working in the Department today would have been involved in, or had knowledge of, the files and this whole area?

Not that I am aware of.

Is Mr. Dalton aware of anything further in this regard? I imagine that if there is somebody there, Mr. Dalton would be aware of it. This matter arose in the context of the inquiry, so some investigation in this regard would have been done by the Department. Would anybody working in the Department today have been there at that time? Would any such person have had knowledge of the whole bombing area at the time?

Mr. Timothy Dalton

There is no such person, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Dalton

There is nobody. I knew the four people who were——

Has it been checked? Has Mr. Dalton checked that? He has said that no such person is in his Department, to the best of his knowledge. Has that knowledge been given to the sub-committee following a fairly thorough investigation within the Department to ascertain whether such a person exists?

Mr. Dalton

I am pretty certain that there is nobody there.

No, that is not the question. Did you carry out an investigation to determine whether there is somebody within the Department at present who has knowledge of the events of that time?

Mr. Dalton

I do not know. I know the relevant people who handled the information at the time. I do not know whether there was a junior official there at the time.

Are you saying that you do not know whether you carried out an inquiry? I am not asking Mr. Dalton to identify somebody, but to state whether an examination has been done, under his instruction or that of anybody else in the Department, to ascertain whether people in the Department today have knowledge of the events of that era.

Mr. Dalton

I am certain that there is nobody in the Department.

With respect, you are not answering the question. I ask for a specific answer to the question.

I ask Senator Walsh to allow Mr. Dalton to complete his reply before he makes any judgment on whether Mr. Dalton has answered the question.

Mr. Dalton

I am certain that there is nobody in the Department who worked there at the time. I do not know if those who worked there at the time, but have since retired, are still alive. I will have to check it out. I will come back to the sub-committee.

I accept that. Am I right in assuming that an examination has not been carried out to date to identify——

Mr. Dalton

That is correct.

That is fine.

Can I add that the Department co-operated with Mr. Justice Barron in every possible way? I would like to draw to the attention of the sub-committee that Mr. Justice Barron was free to interview whoever he sought in the Department.

Can I ask that such an investigation be undertaken?

Mr. Dalton

Yes.

It will mean that we will get a report on that. Can I also ask, as a follow-on to a question asked by Deputy Costello, whether any security checks on departmental officials were carried out, as a matter of routine, during the 1970s?

Mr. Dalton

People working in that area would normally be the subject of security assessment by the Garda.

That would have been the case at that stage.

Mr. Dalton

I think it would have been the case. I am not certain of the arrangements at that stage, but I think it probably would have been the case.

Can I ask that it be checked as well, in order that we can ascertain whether it was the case?

Mr. Dalton

Yes, if it is possible. Certainly, nowadays, we check people taking up such positions.

We have had discussions with the Minister for Justice of the time, Mr. Patrick Cooney. A special sub-committee on Cabinet security was established at that time. Can I ask which Department was the lead Department in the security sub-committee? Would it have been the Department of Justice?

Mr. Dalton

It would have been the Department of Justice.

Would officials have been involved?

Mr. Dalton

Yes.

Does Mr. Dalton know if such officials are still in the Department?

Mr. Dalton

No, the official who would have been involved would have been one of the four officials who were mentioned earlier.

I understand that an interdepartmental committee on security was also established at the time. I presume that the committee would have consisted exclusively of officials.

Mr. Dalton

Yes.

Would the Department of Justice have been the lead Department in that regard?

Mr. Dalton

I think so, but I will have to check.

Mr. Justice Barron said in his report that minutes are not available from any of the meetings. This means that we do not have an indication of whether issues relating to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, such as the investigation's progress or lack of it, were ever discussed. Is that a fair remark? Is information available which suggests that the issues were discussed?

Mr. Dalton

We have given Mr. Justice Barron everything we have. If we had minutes of that kind, we would have given them to him.

Mr. Justice Barron came to the conclusion that there was no such reference.

I do not think that is correct.

Obviously, the well-being and security of society was part of the remit of the security committee. An atrocity of this magnitude was an example of what we had hoped would not happen. Would it not have been important to consider fully all aspects of the incident with a view to ensuring steps were taken to prevent a recurrence?

Mr. Dalton

I cannot say what those committees did as I had nothing to do with them. Certainly, I would have access to nothing in that area - in fact, that area is kept locked. In terms of finding out what is going on in that area, one might as well be working in another Department. I was in the Department during that period and knew the people involved but as far as their business was concerned, I was a completely excluded party, as was everybody else in the Department apart from the five people involved.

Mr. Peter Berry, Secretary General of the Department at the time, is described as being meticulous. It is also stated by Mr. Justice Barron that he received evidence that Mr. Berry would have been getting daily reports from the Garda at the time and that this continued subsequent to his retirement. As part of the provision of information for Mr. Justice Barron, were any attempts made to acquire papers, diaries or other notes that might have been made by Mr. Berry at the time?

Mr. Dalton

We relied on Mr. Justice Barron to tell us what he wanted. We do not have any diaries or anything of that kind belonging to Mr. Berry. We would not have gone searching for diaries from his family or anything like that. If Mr. Justice Barron thought it necessary to have anything belonging to Mr. Berry, he did not ask us for it. I do not know what practices Mr. Berry followed in his time in dealing with security-related material and so on. Even though I was there, I was, as I said, an excluded party, as was everybody else.

I have just one very brief question which requires a brief answer. Mr. Paddy Cooney explained to us that in September 1974, following the atrocities, he had attempted and succeeded in setting up the first forensic testing laboratory. How well equipped are we today for taking and assessing DNA samples? To achieve the results we need, can we do all of this within the facilities available to the investigating teams or do we still rely on foreign expertise to provide information for us?

There is now a very sophisticated State forensic science service which is well funded and has up-to-date equipment. I am told it is capable of doing DNA analysis but some is still done on an international basis as well. Things have changed dramatically since. As I said, the State forensic science service was practically non-existent; it is now hugely developed and very different.

We will be talking to the director of the forensic laboratory tomorrow.

That is fine.

We shall excuse the Minister. Members still have some short questions for Mr. Dalton.

Thank you, Chairman. In case anybody thinks - particulary as I see relatives here - I am being defensive about this, I am not. I am just asking people to bear in mind that there are a number of different explanations for things we cannot know. By definition, in going 30 years into the past and looking at remarkable events and omissions, there are different explanations for them. All I am asking people to do is keep an open mind on those different explanations. I am not offering any strong view that I have an insight into all of these things that is preferable to that of anybody else. I do not want in any sense to be seen as clashing with Mr. Justice Barron. He was asked to do this. He spent a long time doing it and has drawn some conclusions. When I say that other views are possible, it is purely to allow people to keep an open mind on some of these issues, not a wish to close anyone's mind to any issue.

My question comes back to page 219 of the report which was discussed by the sub-committee with the then Minister, Mr. Patrick Cooney. Reports the Department received on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings were for information purposes only. This is qualified by the statement that the Department would have no role in the criminal investigation, which everybody would fully accept. However, when the Department stated these were for information purposes only, was it to keep the file right or extrapolate information from it which would be useful to the security committees?

Mr. Dalton

The Garda provide information for officials at the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform for one reason only, namely, that officials at the Department - sometimes a Secretary General is the only person who gets the information - can keep the Minister informed. That is a necessary function of the democratic system. Information is not just supplied to officials for their personal use so that they will be better informed. It is supplied in order that the political system and the Government can be properly informed of what is happening on the security front.

In the past and now, that information was and is highly relevant. For example, in the context of dealings in Northern Ireland, it is important to know what is stirring on the ground. If there are political developments, one needs to know if they are being matched by other developments. It is primarily and only for the purpose of keeping the Minister, and through him, the Government properly informed of what is happening.

Would Mr. Dalton accept that in this instance there may have been a couple of areas where the information should have proved valuable? For example, once the Garda investigation ground to a halt within a couple of months of the atrocity, would political and departmental concerns to see how the matter could be assisted or kick-started have been considered at all? On the ongoing preservation of security in the State, the failure to conclude or advance the investigations into the bombings was creating unknown risks for the security of individuals. There was a double reason to show some initiative in assisting the investigation. Would Mr. Dalton classify that as interference in the investigation?

Mr. Dalton

I know that interference, or allegations of political interference, with prosecutions has been a constant theme for as long as I have been in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. That is the underlying reason an independent prosecution system was established in 1974. I am not saying anyone consciously said there was interference and it needed to be corrected. However, there were allegations of excessive closeness between the political system and the investigation system and, so, they were separated.

For as long as I have been in the Department, that line is very rigid. It would not have been the function of anyone in the Department to kick-start an investigation. We would rely on the Garda to pick up every available piece of information and to act on it. That is the normal situation. The failure to prove that X, Y, or Z committed a particular crime does not mean that the lessons of a particular crime, like the Dublin-Monaghan bombings, have not been learned. The basics would be known - somebody came down and got through the system. I am sure that appropriate security measures, even though it is a matter for the Garda, would have been taken to counteract repetition.

The failure to identify that A or B committed a crime is a different matter. The standards of proof are extremely high. The Garda would have a fair idea of the lists of suspects who might have been involved. By definition, if those people were serious suspects they would have been under some kind of observation. Lessons were learned but trying to prove, to the standard that would be approved by a court that one of these people committed the crime is a different matter. It would be the same now, for example. Many people in this jurisdiction are the subject of suspicion, not just for subversive crime, but for other forms of crime and in some cases the suspicions of sexual offences or other crimes are extremely strong. The Garda would have intelligence, many items of information that point to possible or even probable guilt. Therefore, those people are kept under observation and the information is not wasted or forgotten. Trying to prove that someone was a paedophile, a bomber, or whatever, to the standards necessary for a court is a different matter altogether.

In his submission the Minister writes that the due to its sensitive work the security division maintained its own file registry system and storage areas, separate and distinct from those of the Department and that remains the position today. Does that mean there is a separate section in the Department to which nobody else has access, apart from a very limited number of people?

Mr. Dalton

That is correct. There are seven people to be precise.

Does Mr. Dalton have any idea whether it was a similar number of people in 1974?

Mr. Dalton

It was four people.

It was four, the four about whom we spoke. Were they the only four who had access to it?

Mr. Dalton

There were two clerical staff. Therefore, the total might have been five or six. I will reply later to Senator Walsh about who exactly were the staff at the lower levels, the clerical officers.

Is there any way anybody can take a file out of that section to bring home or read? For example, would the Minister check out a file, or would the Secretary General if he wanted maybe take home a voluminous file to read?

Mr. Dalton

I never as a matter of practice go near files in that division unless I have to and then I do not take them home in my bag.

Is there a mechanism for anybody to take them such as a library system whereby one might check out a particular file to take away from the Department?

Mr. Dalton

It would be contrary to what we regard as acceptable practice because anybody can be burgled or lose a briefcase. Anybody taking a file like that out of the Department would be running an extremely high risk. I could not say that nobody ever did.

If someone were to check out a file such as that who would be responsible for giving it to him or her?

Mr. Dalton

It could be the person handling the files. In other words, they might not have been given by somebody, they might be taken by the person who was working on the file or putting papers on it. It would not necessarily be the case that somebody must give out a file on a particular day. I do not know if there is a marking system for the files. Mr. Walker might be better able to tell the Deputy what happens when a file leaves the division.

Mr. David Walker

It is not usual practice for any official in the division to take out files and bring them home because it is considered an unacceptable security risk. There is no library system for ticketing a file going out, simply because it does not happen. The files remain within the division as a matter of course. I could not put my hand on my heart and say it has never happened in the entire history of the security division that a particular official wanted to work on a file at night to get the work done for the following day but it is certainly not recommended and as a result there is no ticketing system there.

Perhaps, Chairman, we could establish whether that was the situation in 1974 or whether there was a system in place.

Mr. Dalton

I would be surprised if it were otherwise because I recall on one occasion trying to write a report on murders in another division and when it came to an S file I was told that the project was over. I was not going to get the file and that was it. It is quite rigid. We do not allow files out from that area to any other parts of the Department except to the assistant secretary, sometimes to me or to the Minister if there is a need.

Mr. Dalton might check back on the practice in 1974 as Deputy Costello has requested.

Mr. Dalton

I will do that.

The last point on that is that these were security files. Presumably most of the information coming into them files came from C3 and we have a difficulty with the C3 files as well. Mr. Justice Barron did not manage to get access to them. Do we take it that the Garda Síochána does not have a proper record of the majority of subversive material on the bombing and its source, namely, C3 and that there is no file in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform?

Would it be normal for all the information the Garda has in C3 on such subversive crime to be given to the Department?

Mr. Dalton

Not nowadays. By and large, the Department and the Minister need, for the purpose of discharging their responsibilities, an assessment of what is happening on security matters. If, for example, progress is being made on Northern Ireland - I am familiar with this - and if it is necessary in the context of political discussions which might take place about the settlement of the Northern question to know about the security assessment and what is happening, the Secretary, the Minister or the officials of the Department must have an assessment as to whether it is sensible to proceed along certain lines politically in view of the state of developments on the security front. Equally, the police need to know whether what is happening politically could constitute explanations for things they might observe on the security front. General assessment is required.

There is no way I or anyone else would need to know who was the informant of a particular Garda detective. It is probable that the Commissioner does not need to know that either. If someone has an informant, the need to protect that information is absolutely crucial because people's lives are at risk. The people dealing with gardaí who provide information need to know they are safe. That type of information is, by definition, tight. I do not need to know that information nor would I ask for it. I just need to know that generally something is happening and that a particular organisation is taking a particular course of action and that it appears to be accepting the Good Friday Agreement, for example. That is all we need to know. However, sometimes we need to know a little more. If a robbery occurred today, it could be of significant interest to establish whether one organisation, as distinct from another, was involved in it. That could be significant in terms of advancing political discussions.

I do not know if Mr. Dalton has answered Deputy Costello's question. Perhaps Deputy Costello could repeat it because it is complicated.

It seems the material which is most important is in the security division.

Mr. Dalton

Yes.

Most of that information emanated from C3, which had responsibility for security and subversive matters. It is a huge coincidence that both sets of files in the Garda Síochána and the Department of Justice were not available to the Barron inquiry. We will never know what material should have been there. It seems incredible that there is no file for or information on the biggest crime in the history of the State, which had a subversive context. Such information should have been kept and carefully filed by the security division and C3, particularly given the level of security required to ensure it was kept confidential and that only a limited number of people had access to it.

Mr. Dalton

It is probably worth explaining something because there is confusion about these files. If the Department of Justice got an investigation file at that time or subsequently - we do not get them now as a matter of routine - it did not necessarily mean that having received the investigation file the Department of Justice then proceeded to open another file of its own. It would only open a file of its own if it had some work to do on it, if there were inquiries, parliamentary questions or issues arising which were of relevance to the Minister or the Department. Otherwise, what would happen is that the file would come in, but it would not necessarily be registered because the Department would not be opening a file. As I understand it, a file dealing with the Monaghan inquiry was available. The Dublin file is not available. It does not necessarily mean there is anything in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform that is not in Garda records. Even if the Dublin file came in - I cannot say whether it did and, as the Minister said, it seems surprising that it did not given that the Monaghan file came in - it does not necessarily mean there is anything on it that was not available to Mr. Justice Barron from the Garda file he got.

We got the Dublin file in 1993. Back in 1993 we looked for this file and could not find it either. We got it in 1993 in connection with a television programme. The problem of the non-presence of that file in the Department existed prior to 1993.

I thank Mr. Dalton, Mr. O'Leary and Mr. Walker for attending. We will break for lunch and resume in public session at 2 o'clock. The Chief-of-Staff of the Defence Forces, Lieutenant General Mangan, is scheduled to appear before us. Other items will arise in the Dáil with which we will also have to deal.

Sitting suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 2. p.m.

I welcome to this hearing the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, Lieutenant General Colm Mangan, together with Lieutenant Colonel Dermot Igoe. We also have with us Mr. Michael O'Donoghue, who is Assistant Secretary General in the Department of Defence. Lieutenant General Mangan joins us here today on one of his last days serving as Chief of Staff, prior to his retirement after a long and very distinguished career in the Army. You were commissioned into the infantry corps in 1961 and in your period in office, from your appointment as Chief of Staff in December 2000, almost four years ago, you have seen a lot of changes in the Defence Forces that have been very successfully steered through by you and the Department of Defence. I take the opportunity this afternoon to thank you for the service you have given to the Army and the country and to wish you the very best in your retirement. I now invite you to make a brief opening statement.

Lieutenant General Colm Mangan

Thank you very much for you very kind opening remarks which I certainly appreciate very much. You have received a written copy of my opening statement. I do not propose to waste your time by reading it out again; I do not see any amendments that I would make to it. I would stand by what I have said in that opening statement. I wish to emphasise that at all times we have co-operated and done our level best to provide as much information as we possibly can for the inquiry in respect of those awful events of 1974. I express our sincere sympathy to all members of the families of those who were lost at that time because there is no doubt about it that it was a tragedy for them, it was a tragedy for the country. If we can help in any way to reconcile this, we would be very happy to do so.

Thank you very much. To give some context to this afternoon's events, I wonder if Lieutenant General Mangan could go through the outline of some of the answers to the three specific questions that we posed in order to fill in the background, in terms of the position since the foundation of the State, where the Garda and the Army stand and how you work together.

Lieutenant General Mangan

We operate on a principle of the primacy of the police in respect of the policing of this State but are very conscious of the fact that most of our gardaí are unarmed and that consequently there is a need for protection of that police force. Usually when we are acting in aid of the civil power, it is for the protection of the police. That is why you would have armed trooped deployed to protect the Garda Síochána in any internal security operations. That is a principle that we observed all through that period. It is a very important one for us that we do not see ourselves as being involved in the policing of the country - that is very properly a subject matter for the Garda Síochána.

On the interaction between Army intelligence and British army intelligence, what was the relationship at the time?

Lieutenant General Mangan

We very rightly and properly will attend to all matters for the security of the State. One of those, very obviously, is to consult with all agencies or sources of information that would help us to provide for the security of the State. That is what our intelligence was charged with. Consequently, one of the agencies that they would have been sourcing for information would have been the British intelligence services. That type of contact predated 1969 back to the period of the Emergency during the Second World War. We hope that contact was all embracing in respect of matters pertaining to the security of this State.

I, too, join in welcoming Lieutenant General Mangan and I concur with the compliments paid to him on his career. I notice that on page three of his report, he makes a distinction between the role of the Garda Síochána and the military. He does make the point however that he continued his work in the area of military intelligence, gathering information relating to national security. I understand from the report that military intelligence in some meetings in London at the time would have received some information from British intelligence regarding the suspects.

Lieutenant General Mangan

Yes, the contacts would have been with British intelligence in London. That is correct.

Would information on that specific matter, and also as a matter of routine, be passed on to the Garda Síochána?

Lieutenant General Mangan

We have ongoing and very cordial relationships with the Garda Síochána. Any matters that would pertain to the investigations or to operational security would be passed on immediately to the Garda Síochána. That is correct.

Would you then, as a matter of course, have had any follow up? I mean, if you gave the names of suspects to the Garda Síochána would you have inquired subsequently - or would that have been the remit of the Army - to see what progress was made concerning the information given?

Lieutenant General Mangan

In a structured way, it would not properly fall to us to do that, obviously, because it would not involve the greater concept of State security. Logically, however, I think there would be some form of follow up. In respect of the specific instance you are talking about - that is the arrest on 26 May - that information would have been conveyed, and was conveyed, but with regard to the follow up thereof, there is not a record of a specific follow-up mechanism that was put in place. I am not totally surprised by that because operationally that is very much a hands-on, follow-up investigation, which, as I said, is not really our remit.

It would be the role of the Garda Síochána.

Lieutenant General Mangan

I would imagine, at the time, the operative that was dealing with it, even out of curiosity, would have asked questions about it.

What information might have been available to military intelligence at the time with regard to allegations, which we subsequently heard from Fred Holroyd and Colonel Styles, who was based in the North at the time, regarding the sophistication of the timing devices and the possibility of collusion by British military forces in it?

Lieutenant General Mangan

I am not sure. Are you referring to the specific details in respect of the bombs?

Yes, the bombing specifically, and generally.

Lieutenant General Mangan

Generally, there would have been what they call technical meetings between our explosive demolition experts and the British explosive demolition experts. That would have been a matter of ongoing exchange between them and information would have been exchanged in the matter of their expertise with regard to explosives. With regard to the particular instance, I am not aware of any specific, hard information available. If I could just refresh my mind from the report - no, that is not the case. Two very experienced explosives ordnance disposal officers will be appearing here tomorrow and questions of a technical nature would be more appropriately put to them. I am not a technical officer.

I had other questions on that issue as well but, as you said, they would be better directed tomorrow to the people with expertise in that specific area. Would Army intelligence have been aware at the time of the covert operation at Castledillon, which is referred to in the Barron inquiry report? That is the four fields survey group, which was led by a Captain Ball and Captain Robert Nairac. It was acknowledged by the Secretary of State at the time, as well, that he had an awareness that this covert operation was based at Castledillon. Would Army intelligence have been aware of that?

Lieutenant General Mangan

No. We had no specific evidence of any covert operations within our State by the forces in Northern Ireland.

Would it have been any part of the brief of Army intelligence to be aware of something of that nature?

Lieutenant General Mangan

Very much so. The fact that they do not discover everything that may be going on would not detract from their brief. It would be right and proper that information of that nature, should it become available to them, would be a matter for reports, since it was of course very relevant. The relevant authorities would have been made aware of it had it been known to our intelligence.

Would it have been known to Army intelligence at the time - this is something disclosed in the "Hidden Hands - the Forgotten Massacre" programme - that British Army headquarters at Lisburn believed that some of the explosives used in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings had been provided by the security forces? Was Army intelligence aware of that at the time?

Lieutenant General Mangan

No, that was not known to us, and——

The Chairman might rule me out of order on this question, and the lieutenant general may prefer not to answer it. Did Army intelligence undertake any covert intelligence operations outside the jurisdiction during that period?

Lieutenant General Mangan

I do not think that that is appropriate to the inquiry.

Was Army intelligence aware that the use of nylon was desirable when gathering forensic evidence and also that bomb material gathered close to an explosion needed to be analysed very quickly? Were military personnel involved in that area aware at that stage of the need to expedite the analysis and the desirability of using nylon bags?

Lieutenant General Mangan

As contained in the report, and as members will hear tomorrow in more detail, the principle involved for our explosive ordnance people at the scene of an explosion is, first, to declare the area safe for any subsequent investigation. That is their overriding principle. They are not trained forensic scientists or investigators, though they are, of course, very experienced, and would have some expertise in the area. Their primary concern is to declare the area safe for others to come in and carry out the follow-up investigation.

What precautions did the Army put in place at that time to prevent any of its members being sounded out for information by British forces? I refer as an example, but not exclusively, to the report that deals with Commandant Trears and the attempt made to get him to co-operate and pass information to the British security forces. What was the policy at the time to protect matters?

Lieutenant General Mangan

People would very much have been aware of their oath of loyalty to this State. All members of the Defence Forces take that oath and would be very aware that they should not breach it. Consequently, in the instance that the Senator mentions, Commandant Trears very rightly and properly reported to his superiors that such a request had been made to him, and nothing more came of it. A general principle of that time goes back to the primacy of the police, and there was no cross-Border contact between the Army and the British Army. There was absolutely no contact at that time, or at any time throughout the Border conflict. People were briefed extremely carefully about that, since to do such a thing would have been to have breached the primacy of the police in the Border areas. Consequently, I can remember occasions when our people were deployed to the Border, and British soldiers at a very low level tried to engage them in conversation, but it was not done. It was probably resented at the time; we were seen as unfriendly.

However, that principle was employed very strictly. I cannot say whether it was employed 100%, but I know that it was put into operation very strictly. I would certainly think that it was 95% enforced. There were not even any cases of friendliness or casual exchanges across the Border. They should not have taken place, though perhaps they did on some occasions. However, they would have been confined to that. Regarding seeking information or contact with our people, I suggest that it was not in any way brought to our attention.

What were the reporting arrangements with the Department of Defence at the time? To what extent, and how frequently, would it have been kept informed of security information which had come to the attention of the Army intelligence unit? Apart from passing it to the Garda, would it also have been passed to the Department of Defence as a matter of routine? Who were the conduits in respect of that interaction?

Lieutenant General Mangan

There were regular reports and briefings conducted by the director of intelligence with the Minister for Defence. On the frequency, as material became available, it could have been twice a month or once every two months, depending on the sensitivity or importance of the information available.

According to Mr. Justice Barron's report, the Army came out with a clean bill of health. I think he said the Irish Army was meticulous in its co-operation. That must be a matter of some satisfaction to you as you approach your retirement.

I wish to ask Mr. O'Donoghue about information received within the Department. How was it documented and filed? What action would have been taken on foot of sensitive intelligence which would have implied some risk in some areas of the State?

As the Chief of Staff has outlined, the practice was that the director of intelligence briefed the Minister, as required, on a regular basis. No files were maintained. Such written reports as were given to the Minister were, I understand, returned to the director of intelligence. There are no files within the civil side of the Department. After some extensive trawling, no such files were discovered.

I welcome Lieutenant General Mangan to the sub-committee. Like Senator Walsh, I commend his efforts because the full co-operation of the Army with the inquiry is specifically mentioned in the report at pages 11 and 13. I thank him for this as it is appreciated.

My first question relates to the relationship between the Garda and the Army. You talked about the traditional backup position of the armed forces in aid to the civil power. You said the Army had communicated with the Garda which had communicated with the RUC but that the Army had not communicated with the British army, even though there was some desire on the part of the British. What exactly do you mean by this? Will you expand?

Lieutenant General Mangan

Thank you for your remarks. I would not like to over-emphasise it when I say there was a desire on their part. There were many times at Border crossings when, inevitably, patrols would have been there at the same time and efforts may have been made to engage them in conversation. Our patrols would have reported this but they were operating on the basis - they were briefed beforehand - that there was to be no contact with forces on the other side. As I said, it was left to the Garda Síochána to conduct liaison through the RUC. I am quite sure that for the people on the patrols - I was never personally involved - it was probably difficult if soldiers were calling across "What do you think of your weapons?" or "What do you think of ours?" or even asking about Manchester United. That is the level it was at, so I would not like to over-emphasise the type of contact that may have been attempted.

It was not a strong effort to gather more intelligence——

Lieutenant General Mangan

No.

——on military matters or matters along the Border. It was more of low key personal contact.

Lieutenant General Mangan

Yes.

On Army intelligence generally and the armed forces, how would you describe the intelligence services in the Army in 1974 compared to, say, 2004 in terms of staffing, resources and professionalism? Is there a major difference, particularly in terms of staffing, manpower and resources?

Lieutenant General Mangan

I would not see that there is a major difference between them. It has been kept constant. The increase in the Army intelligence establishment would have taken place five years before with the advent of the Northern Ireland Troubles. It has remained fairly constant since.

Did any members of the Army, the intelligence group or the Defence Forces generally ever come across the names of Major Maynard and Captain Nairac with regard to operations both inside and outside the State? Many people have concerns that some of these operatives were operating within the State. What was the Army's role in preventing or dealing with these kinds of situations? Have I crossed the line, Chairman?

One of those individuals is still alive. As we cannot discuss individuals in that regard, I ask the Deputy to rephrase the question.

I will ask a general question. From the Lieutenant General's experience and years of service in the Defence Forces, his international experience and his dealings with his staff and the intelligence services, is there any serious evidence available that operatives from other states were operating in this State, particularly around 1974?

Lieutenant General Mangan

With respect to hard evidence of other operatives, there were occasions when British forces strayed across the Border. One of the most spectacular would have been in the late 1970s or early 1980s - I do not have the exact date - when an SAS patrol, followed by another SAS patrol, strayed across the Border in the area of Dundalk. They were apprehended and tried here in Dublin at that particular time. That would have been one of the more spectacular Border crossings. That was due to an error in map reading, I believe.

DoesLieutenant General Mangan take that explanation seriously because many people at the time did not?

Lieutenant General Mangan

It was before the courts at that time.

I know that. The Lieutenant General seems to place strong emphasis on the principles of the independence and integrity of the Army and he obviously regarded them as important, particularly when dealing with Border situations. Did he ever receive any kind of political direction or guidance from Ministers for Defence over the years? In particular, did any Minister for Defence ever infringe on the day to day business of the Army?

Lieutenant General Mangan

No.

The Lieutenant General never had any experience of that.

Lieutenant General Mangan

Never.

Ministers for Defence always kept a distance between operational matters and political matters.

Lieutenant General Mangan

The Deputy is asking me for my experience and I can only answer for that and the answer is "No", absolutely not.

The Army emerges from the report in a most flattering light from Mr. Justice Barron's point of view as a very efficient and disciplined organisation and nothing I have heard so far changes that position. With regard to the material that came before the Army, it seems that with regular meetings taking place with British intelligence - MI5, etc. - and Northern Ireland army intelligence being represented there, that the Army was in the best position of all to know what happened with regard to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Would that be the Lieutenant General's assessment of it?

Lieutenant General Mangan

As I said, we would have a strategic view of incidents and events that were going on at that particular time, but the level of detail necessary to identify who was responsible and who carried out the bombings in question would not have been either the subject matter or our remit. That would have been the result of the Garda investigation. Consequently, what one would call the tactical follow up of that would not have been within our province at all. Whereas we would have been relatively well informed on the strategic level as to the events on the island, as to what was happening with regard to the tactical follow up of them, our business was not the collection and production of evidence for subsequent prosecution; that was not our remit.

No, but the Army collected information and passed it on to the Garda. Is that correct?

Lieutenant General Mangan

Yes.

Through the contacts that were taking place at the highest level of British intelligence every week or two weeks, a considerable body of information must have been assembled and passed on to the Garda. Is that a fair deduction?

Lieutenant General Mangan

The size of that body of information, I could not say, but there was——

It states in Mr. Justice Barron's report that these meetings were taking place every three to four weeks between 1973 and 1976. It says elsewhere in the report and the Lieutenant General indicated that it might have been every week or two weeks.

Lieutenant General Mangan

The information given to us by those with whom we were dealing in Britain, was passed on to the Garda Síochána in all instances. We were not in the business of holding anything back from them. We sent anything that was relevant to investigation or operational intelligence.

Mr. Justice Barron states in page 13 of his report that the inquiry was given access to a wide range of confidential material including intelligence reports. Will Lieutenant General Mangan give the sub-committee an idea of the scale of this material to which Mr. Justice Barron had access? We heard from the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, that the Justice was given access to 70 files and the Garda Síochána passed on 800 files. What is the extent of the original information given to Mr. Justice Barron from the Army files?

If it is more appropriate for Lieutenant Colonel Igoe to answer, he may do so.

Lieutenant Colonel Dermot Igoe

Mr. Justice Barron looked at approximately 100 files but I could not state the exact figure. Some of them were very large files and some were quite small, just one page in a file.

Were these files from the period 1973 to 1976 which were particularly focused on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

Yes.

How much of that information, if any, was passed on to the Department of Defence?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

The normal procedure was that the director of intelligence would brief the Minister for Defence. In some cases that was a verbal briefing and in some cases he would hand over a file, particularly with regard to contacts with British intelligence services, which were normally fully documented and given to the Minister.

Will Mr. O'Donoghue say approximately how many files existed?

I must rely on what Lieutenant Colonel Igoe says because as I indicated earlier, the Minister returned the papers which were given to him directly. There are no files in the Department of Defence.

Is there a security file relating to that time?

Not dealing with that period. There has been a very extensive trawl and there has been no file discovered regarding that period.

Is Mr. O'Donoghue certain they were returned to the Army?

We were not in the loop in that sense. There was a direct contact between the director of intelligence and the Minister for Defence of the day. As Lieutenant Colonel Igoe mentioned, some briefings were oral, others were written and the practice was to return those either immediately once the Minister had perused them or else they were only retained for a very short period and returned directly to the director of intelligence.

On the basis of the procedures that were in place at that time and on the basis of the files that are there now, would it have been appropriate that there would have been a file on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in the Department of Defence?

Mr. O’ Donoghue

It would not have been the practice in vogue at that time.

There is no file on the Dublin-Monaghan bombings in the Department of Defence and there was no file found in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

What records were kept of the material transmitted by the Army to the Garda? Was there a filing or routine registration system? Is that part and parcel of the 100 files to which Mr. Justice Barron had access?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

It is, Deputy. We could say that in some cases we are very happy to report that we have a full paper trail. We can see the information coming to us and being passed to our colleagues in the security branch, as it was at that time. Ultimately, there might be an acknowledgement or a follow-up from the security branch to Army intelligence on the issue, but that did not happen in all cases. We have examples of episodes in respect of which we cannot prove that the information was passed on. We are quite content that it would have been, given the close nature of the close contacts that existed at the time.

Is the Army satisfied there are no missing files in its dossiers?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

No, there are no——

There was never a suggestion that files were missing.

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

No.

Has the Army checked the number of files for which there are receipts? I refer to files that were sent to the Garda to see whether the Garda still had them on file. Has the Garda checked with the Army to see if it has the original version of documents that were sent to the Garda?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

It has happened in individual cases that we have some information that we believe was passed on. In such circumstances, we have checked with our Garda colleagues to see if they received it. Fortunately, in some cases, they have the record and we do not. We know of a number of such cases. In other cases, we have examples of the Army having sent a communication but the Garda not having a record of having received it.

The Army has done a trawl. Were the findings of the trawl sent to Mr. Justice Barron so that he knew about the correspondence between the Army and the Garda?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

Yes.

I see. As it did the trawl, did the Army notice any substantial gaps? Is it correct to say Lieutenant Colonel Igoe was the liaison officer?

Lieutenant Colonel Igoe

That is right. The most substantial gap, which has been already referred to by the Chief of Staff, is that we have no written record of information being transmitted in respect of the meeting that took place on 30 and 31 May.

How does the scope of detail, information and military intelligence that resulted from the bombings of 1974 compare to that which resulted from any prior or subsequent event in the history of the State? I refer to the Army's files. Does Lieutenant General Mangan have any idea?

Lieutenant General Mangan

A number of events would have produced a comparable amount of information. The initial events in Northern Ireland in 1969 and 1970 produced a great deal of intelligence effort on our part, as did subsequent events. All of this intelligence effort related to some of the major events in Northern Ireland, particularly in the early stages of the conflict there.

I would like to ask a final question. The file on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings was completed by the Garda in July and August. The Army continued to collect as much information as it could. Did it seem strange that something as enormous as this should be terminated at such an early stage, especially given that such an enormous quantity of information was coming through?

Lieutenant General Mangan

We would not have been aware at that time that the investigation had been terminated. We continued to supply to the Garda Síochána whatever information we considered relevant. We do not know when many investigations are suspended or closed.

Does Deputy Hoctor wish to ask a question?

I thank the Lieutenant General for being with us today. Was the role of the Army on the Border at the time strictly the protection of gardaí? If it was there to assist the Garda, did it also assist in the searching of vehicles crossing the Border? What was the profile of Army officers on the Border at the time? What was the nature of their work?

Lieutenant General Mangan

It was very varied. People on checkpoint duty had the responsibility of protecting the gardaí at a checkpoint while the gardaí searched cars. In a wider context, however, searching for arms is manpower intensive. The soldiers who were there would lend their eyes to the area they were moving through and would be actively engaged in the search. They had tactics and procedures for this. If they were called to carry out an operation such as this they would do it, but they would not deploy without a Garda presence. The Garda presence legitimised their presence, because they were there in a capacity of assistance to the gardaí. There was no independent military action.

I welcome Lieutenant General Mangan and his colleagues. Can he give us a rough idea of the number of intelligence officers the Army had operating in 1974? Were many personnel deployed in that task?

Lieutenant General Mangan

Intelligence branch is at Defence Forces headquarters, but each of our formations has intelligence personnel and each unit subordinate to those formations has an intelligence cell. It is a hierarchical organisation. I do not have a figure, but each unit on the Border, for example, had an intelligence cell. That is part of Army organisation. In the eastern area they were reporting to the intelligence cell of Eastern Command headquarters, which reported to the intelligence section of Defence Forces headquarters. The same happened on the western side of the Border. That is the way in which they operate.

I understand. It is difficult to come up with an exact number.

The term "military precision" is often used in the context of organising events and so on. The three bombs that went off on that day in 1974 went off within minutes of each other. Would the Lieutenant General describe that as military precision? Is it possible that an ad hoc organisation might be able to organise such a precise hit, or would military precision be required?

Lieutenant General Mangan

The term "military precision" is a complimentary one, and we accept it as such. However, one need not be a soldier to be able to achieve precision. I would not like to say we had a monopoly on precision. If someone is starting a 100-metre race he fires a pistol and ten runners will start at the same time. That is precision. The bombing was an example of military precision, but that is not the exclusive preserve of the military. That type of timing can be achieved by anybody with planning and good, logical foresight.

Does the Lieutenant General think that an ad hoc organisation would be in a position to organise something so precisely?

Lieutenant General Mangan

An ad hoc organisation with a certain type of logical approach to events would be capable of doing that. Over the past 30 years one can find other examples of ad hoc organisations achieving fairly precise timing of events.

All my questions have been asked. I compliment Lieutenant General Mangan on the level of co-operation he gave to Mr. Justice Barron, who was highly complimentary of the Lieutenant General before the committee and in his report.

Lieutenant General Mangan

It is reassuring to hear that. I thank the Deputy.

I thank Lieutenant General Mangan and again extend very best wishes on his retirement. A number of delegations of the joint committee have visited areas under your command, both at home and abroad, and have always been greeted with the greatest hospitality and unfailing courtesy. We are very grateful to you for this. I also very much thank Lieutenant Colonel Dermot Igoe and Mr. Michael O'Donoghue for coming today.

Lieutenant General Mangan

I sincerely thank you, Chairman, and the members of the committee for your reception of me here today and your courtesy on the manner in which I was received.

I am delighted that we have with us today Dr. David Craig, director of the National Archives. I very much thank you at such short notice for putting together a briefing note on the National Archives. I understand you have some comments to make on files and the absence of files from various Departments referred to in the Barron report. I now invite you to make an opening statement.

Dr. David Craig

Thank you, Chairman, for inviting me to speak to you today. I will do my best to give you the relevant information that maybe I am in the best position to give. It is relevant to say I have not had time to prepare in any great detail, so people may well throw questions at me that I will simply not be able to answer. With regard to the observations I am going to make about the specifics in the Barron report, I will do that at the end of what I have to say. I am not going to be saying anything very surprising out of what is in the Barron report. Given my experience of record-keeping in the public service generally, there are probably some points that may stand out more clearly to me than to the ordinary reader of the report. I will not be drawing on any special knowledge——

Before we continue, I must point out that members of the committee have parliamentary privilege. As an invitee to the sub-committee, you do not have such privilege. You may have privilege but you would need to get your own advice.

Dr. Craig

I am going to be making limited observations about organisations; I do not think I am going to be saying anything about any identifiable individuals. I do not think there is going to be a problem in that regard.

Could you also, please, state your title, what you do and what your expertise is?

Dr. Craig

The document that has been circulated to the committee in advance covers the major part of what the Chairman has just said. As a preface, my title is director of the National Archives. This is a post within the Civil Service, answering to the Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism. The National Archives is an agency within the Civil Service. For financial and some personnel type purposes, it is part of the Department. Operationally, in regard to archives and records, it is separate from the Department. I will elaborate a little more but that is the essential background.

My apologies for interrupting you.

Dr. Craig

I have done this note for you very quickly only making up my mind as I went along as to what kind of information I thought you really needed to from me as background information, so please excuse me if I have gone into some details that are not entirely relevant. I was doing my best not to assume knowledge but, at the same time, not give too much basic information.

The National Archives was established on 1 June 1988 but was an amalgamation of two much older offices. Some of what I will be saying will go much further back in time than 1988. The Acts and regulations that govern the National Archives and its dealings with the records of, primarily, the Civil Service and, to a lesser extent, the public service are the National Archives Act 1986 and the regulations made under that Act. Most of that Act, including anything of any relevance to the proceedings of this sub-committee, came into operation on 1 June 1988. That is why I have devised my paper to give first the background since 1988 when I came in as Director of the National Archives and then to state the position with regard to the legal provisions concerning records and the institutional provisions before that date. In the National Archives Act, "Departmental records" is a fundamental term which needs to be explained. It could be expected to mean the records of Government Departments, but it means a great deal more because it also includes the records of the courts, committees, commissions and tribunals of inquiry and the bodies listed in the Schedule to the Act. This is difficult to define so perhaps the simplest way to put it is to say that it covers the rest of the Civil Service, minus the Houses of the Oireachtas but including the Defence Forces and the Garda Síochána.

Therefore, it is the case that all the records of interest to the sub-committee are now, if they exist at all, either archived in the National Archives or in Departments or the Garda Síochána. That would not be so in all jurisdictions. Commonly the police force would not be subject to the National Archives Act or the equivalent. Our Act is weaker than others in some areas but it is strong in this area. The National Archives Act applies to the records of the Garda Síochána but, as of now, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply. That is an important distinction.

Under the National Archives Act, ministerial responsibility for the National Archives was originally assigned to the Taoiseach as the Minister who piloted the legislation through the Dáil in the first instance. In 1993 the National Archives was transferred to the new Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht. Without going into detail about some of the changes since then, it is now part of the Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism. Consequently, most functions conferred on the Taoiseach in the National Archives Act are now performed by the Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism, but the Taoiseach continues to perform certain functions with regard to the retention by Departments of records which are more than 30 years old and the withholding of such records from public inspection.

The Minister for Finance potentially also has serious power in this area, although it has not been used to date. Under the National Archives Act and the Freedom of Information Act, although stated in slightly different terms but with much the same meaning, the Minister for Finance has power to make regulations concerning the proper management and preservation of records. In each case that power relates to the bodies covered by the Act in question, so for the National Archives Act it covers Government Departments, the other bodies I mentioned earlier and the Garda Síochána. The Freedom of Information Act covers a much wider range of bodies, but does not include the Garda. That is all I can say about that because the Minister for Finance has not made any such regulations and I am not aware of any attempt to make such regulations.

In the absence of such regulations, we are talking about the provisions of the National Archives Act rather than anything else. The principal provisions that matter are all in section 7 of the Act, which regulates the retention and disposal of departmental records. In essence, it provides that departmental records must be preserved unless their disposal is authorised in writing by the Director of the National Archives or another officer of the National Archives designated by the director for the purpose. Before authorising disposal the director or designated officer must be satisfied that the records do not warrant preservation by the National Archives. The latter is a very important provision because it makes us truly independent in this particular function. We might be directed to do something if we did not have to form an opinion first, but we cannot, in my view, be directed to form an opinion. In other words, the director, or an officer designated by me, has sole deciding power in this area.

By its very nature we cannot be absolutely sure what happened in Government Departments since that Act came into operation. There probably have been some individual instances of disposal of records about which we simply do not know and which we may discover long afterwards, or never discover if we did not know the record should have existed in the first place. That said, the Act has worked well in this area, although probably not quite so well at the beginning because there would have been a period for a few years after it came into operation in 1988 when there were still significant numbers of civil servants in decision-making positions within their own Departments who were not really aware of it.

We and some individuals in certain Departments made great efforts to ensure that was not the case. However, there must have been some people who did not hear about it and who destroyed records in the way they had been used to doing previously. We are not aware of any large scale unauthorised disposal having taken place over the past 15 years. Without pretending that the letter of the Act has been obeyed in every single case over the years, it has made a huge difference and the culture now is to retain records until they seek our permission, which was not the case previously.

The position before 1988 was different. There was the Public Records (Ireland) Act 1867 which established the Public Records Office of Ireland and provided for the transfer mainly of the records of the courts as well as of other bodies to that office. That Act was repealed in 1988 by the National Archives Act. Prior to the amalgamation to form the National Archives, there were two State archives. I will not go into the details, but there were two offices, the Public Records Office and the State Paper Office. However, by the 1970s and 1980s, they were effectively administered as one organisation. That legal distinction between them is not of any importance to the committee.

What is important to the committee is that prior to 1988 there was no statutory provision for the preservation of the records of Departments in general or of An Garda Síochána in particular. Equally, there was no statutory authorisation or procedure for the disposal of such records. That means the practice varies hugely from one Department to another. My impression is that the Department of Finance, for example, destroyed scarcely anything at least up until the 1970s, whereas other Departments had already destroyed considerable amounts of their older records by the early 1970s. It is a dangerous area in which to try to generalise. There were different record keeping and record creating practices. The records were centralised in some Departments - the Department of Finance was a good example - while in other Departments, such as the old Department of Industry and Commerce, the records were decentralised. One could have one division which kept records well, while another division kept them less well. Given all the variations between and in Departments, it is perhaps dangerous to think there was a single common picture.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a Department of Finance circular in force which instructed Departments to consult with the Public Records Office and the State Paper Office before they disposed of records. Although that existed, it had little practical effect. Probably more important were other developments which took place in the 1970s, such as doubling the staff of the old Public Records Office and State Paper Office and inter-departmental reports on archives in the middle years of the 1970s, which led eventually to the drafting of the Public Records Bill, which became the National Archives Act a number of years later. Apart from the legal change in the National Archives Act, there was a growing consciousness of the importance of older records throughout that period. Unfortunately, that ran parallel with growing shortages of space in Civil Service offices, particularly in the late 1970s when the Civil Service was at its peak. Records probably disappeared in largest quantity either side of 1980. I cannot give the committee concrete figures on that, but it is a strong impression I have from being around at the time.

We at the National Archives are aware that substantial quantities of records were destroyed by a number of Departments and other public bodies without any consultation with the Public Records Office and State Paper Office during the 1970s and 1980s. There would not be any point trying to get any details of that because it would be anecdotal. It would also unfairly single out Departments about which we have knowledge because there could be other Departments where something worse happened, but we did not know about it. It may be possible in future years and decades for a researcher to do a close analysis of what eventually survived and to determine where destruction took place. However, we are not yet at that stage.

As regards my observations of the Barron report, I will answer more questions when I am asked, but it seems the committee is broadly dealing with a general failure of record keeping in the sense of physically preserving records, of records management in a more general sense and of administering records properly over a long period of time. Taking the three organisations involved, the Department of Justice and the State Laboratory are I think fairly simple in that you are talking about one particular division of the Department of Justice and a very small group within the already fairly small State Laboratory. The Garda Síochána is obviously very different in that the Barron commission sought information from the Garda at several levels and got very different kinds of answers. It sticks in my mind that the Cavan-Monaghan division, in particular, has very good records, whereas I think the Louth-Meath division has especially bad records in terms of what the report says.

Without dwelling too much on those distinctions between different elements of the Garda Síochána, which I imagine are probably fairly accidental, the main point I want to make is that it seems to me that in the case of the Garda Síochána and probably also in the case of the State Laboratory we are talking about simply inadequate record-keeping. In other words, the record-keeping may have been quite good in parts but as a system across the whole organisation, it was inadequate. Certainly, in particular places records were destroyed that should not have been.

It looks as if where the records of interest to the Barron commission of inquiry were not available, they were simply not available as part of a larger series of records that were not available. Without having done any research of my own and just having read the terms of the report carefully, I do not get any impression of anybody either deliberately or accidentally having in some way singled out the records relating to the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan, whereas, when I read what the report says about the Department of Justice, it seems to be the opposite, that in some sense those records were singled out. By that I do not mean there was some conspiracy to destroy the records. That is, of course, possible but I see no reason to assume that and I suspect rather different things.

In the case of the Department of Justice - this is not based on any knowledge whatsoever and not based on even talking to the Department of Justice; it is just my feeling of what happens to organisations in this type of situation - I suspect that what might have happened initially was those records may actually have been kept very specially because of their very sensitive nature and perhaps their great importance at the particular time. That probably segregated them from where they really belonged in the records as a whole. At some point further down the road they may simply have gone missing.

Despite the fact that I know the Department has looked very hard for the records, nevertheless it is quite possible they are still there somewhere. They might have been inadvertently destroyed as being just some old records lying in a filing cabinet that somebody decided to clear out when there was shortage of space or something of the sort without any sense of what they were destroying. They might have been hidden by somebody - that is another possibility. They might have been hidden either because they were sensitive in a way that the person who hid them did not want them to be seen by other people. Alternatively, they could have been hidden - I have known of cases where this has happened - precisely to save them from destruction, or they could have been deliberately destroyed.

I am not saying which one of those many possibilities - there are probably more that do not even occur to me - could be right. I do not think anybody sitting in this room could do that either but it is necessary to be aware of that range of possibilities from simple physical loss of the records at some point all the way through to some kind of deliberate destruction. One needs to distinguish between what happened to those particular records where it seems very odd that they are not there.

I know there are references in the Barron report to perhaps record-keeping in the Department of Justice having been especially problematic in the 1980s - those are my words, not the report's words. It is not my sense that the Department of Justice would have been one of the Departments that has ever had a really serious problem in its own internal record-keeping. If it is or has been the case, I would be surprised at that being the case. In other words, I am personally surprised that these particular records are not there. This leads me to think they are not there because at some time they were segregated from where they belonged in the system, so although the system may have continued to operate, the system was no longer looking after those particular records. Some individual has taken some kind of responsibility for them and I do not mean anything improper in saying that. It could quite easily be that a senior officer thought he should keep these files in his own personal filing cabinet - nothing more than that but unfortunately when he moved on, retired or moved to some other responsibility, somebody else made a mistake in what they did with the filing cabinet.

I thank Dr. Craig for attending. While the last five minutes of your presentation were very interesting and helpful, the whole presentation was enlightening.

Before the enactment of the 1988 Act, what was your position in the public or Civil Service?

Dr. Craig

We were primarily in the Department of Justice up to 1984, I think. The old Public Records Office of Ireland had been headed before 1922 by the Master of the Rolls. That was an office which did not have any exact successor post-1922, so the non-judicial functions of the Master of the Rolls office went to the Minister for Justice. Therefore, from 1922, the Public Records Office answered to the Department of Justice and that continued until 1984.

The position with regard to the State Paper Office, although it was administered with the Public Records Office, is a little more complicated.

Just sticking with the Department of Justice, how long were you working in the Department of Justice? Were you working within the physical confines of the Department?

Dr. Craig

Never.

Sorry, working under——

Dr. Craig

Working under the aegis of——

——and direction. Where physically were you located?

Dr. Craig

At the Four Courts, in the old Public Records Office.

You would have been familiar, as you say, with the system of——

Dr. Craig

No. I would not like to say that. I would have been familiar with the Civil Service generally, but the Department of Justice is naturally a fairly secretive Department and as individual officers in the Public Records Office, we would rarely have had cause to go to the Department of Justice. When person to person contact was necessary, it was more likely that they came to us than that we went to them. I am not saying that I would have any significant personal experience of being in the building of the Department of Justice.

From your wide experience throughout the public and Civil Service, you would be considered an expert in these types of matters.

Dr. Craig

In so far as there are experts in the kinds of things we are talking about. It is perhaps hard to say that one can have a true expert about record-keeping practices when they vary enormously from one place to another. If there was a very centralised system for the entire Civil Service, then there could be a true expert on it. However, in this situation that is not the case and no one person can really have a total expertise.

That is what I was trying to get at. Were you in a position to make an assessment of the adequacy of archiving and filing in one Department vis-à-vis other Departments?

Dr. Craig

The experience I am talking about - in the 1970s into the early 1980s - in terms of my personal career history in actually physically going into Departments, as opposed to sending other people into them, would have been confined to the older records. At any one time it is unlikely that I would have been seeing records that were substantially less than 20 years old. That means if I was looking at records through the 1970s and into the early 1980s, very roughly I am saying I would only have been seeing records up to the middle 1960s at the latest. I would not have had any direct knowledge of the physical record keeping post-1965, nor could anybody else doing my job have had that knowledge.

In regard to the indexing of files throughout the Civil Service, what is your assessment of the level of cross-referencing or tabbing? I am not sure of the expression.

Dr. Craig

I know the kind of point you mean and what you are talking about. There is no single word for it. Different people used different systems at different dates. In the old style, when records were kept really well back in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, one is talking about thorough registration, where every document coming into an office was registered and assigned to a file that already had a file number so there was a control of the records both at document and file level. However, that was rare by the middle 1960s and by 1970 anyway.

From my personal knowledge or understanding, the Department of Foreign Affairs had a reputation of having the best filing system? You will probably contradict me on that.

Dr. Craig

I certainly would. I do not know about the Department's current filing system at all.

Did the Department of Justice have a certain notoriety for having a good or bad system? Are you in a position to make-——

Dr. Craig

I can only talk in any useful way and with any precision about what I said earlier about the Department's filing system into the early 1960s. I do not know about the filing system in the kind of way you are asking. However, I would say that up to the early 1960s it had an excellent system.

I thank Dr. Craig for his interesting contribution. I have a number of questions. When did the 30 year rule in relation to State papers come in and does it apply across all the Departments?

Dr. Craig

It came in as a total rule as a result of the 1986 Act. A two year period was provided for in the Act. The legislation was not brought into operation until 1988 and the two year period only started then. It was actually at the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 that the 30 year rule really bit properly. Although not all Departments obeyed it fully, a huge change took place in a very short time. Within a five year period the holdings of the National Archives doubled and most Departments cleared the backlog of records up to at least 1960 and that included the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice, in particular, put in a very big effort on transferring records to us in the 1991-2 period. That included records from - I do not remember the exact title of the division at the particular time - the crime and security division.

The 30 year rule itself was older but the earlier background is not relevant to the sub-committee. It only applied to the records of the Department of the Taoiseach, where a 30 year rule was introduced in a number of stages from 1976 through to the early 1980s.

Would the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform currently be preparing material for 1974 for the National Archives that could be released and available for inspection in January of next year?

Dr. Craig

What is actually required of the Department is that it obeys the law to the letter - it is up to it to decide when it does the detailed preparation. The law requires that by September it has to give us a schedule of the records it is transferring. I have to say that is the piece of the National Archives Act that operates the least perfectly, even in the Departments that have transferred all the records they should have year after year, such as the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of the Taoiseach will achieve that only by our direct assistance and the Department of Foreign Affairs has generally produced the list, but done so rather later than it is actually meant to, although that has not mattered very much. In truth, the purpose of stating a deadline as early as September was mainly to keep the pressure on Departments rather than anything else.

I would expect that people in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform are fully aware of the interest there will be in this particular year not only in the context of what we are talking about today, but other issues in that year too. I am sure they will be working on the files, but I would not necessarily expect that they would have started yet.

To get a clear picture of what happens, do the original files go the National Archives from the Departments of the Taoiseach, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, Equality and Law Reform and so on? Do they keep any copies of those files once the files have been deposited after 30 years with the National Archives?

Dr. Craig

No, they are perfectly entitled to keep copies if they wish to do so but, in practice, with very rare exceptions, it is only very occasionally that one would have calls from an official to look at a 30 year old file unless the file is being withheld under the provisions of the Act itself. However, that is a separate question. If the file is agreed by the Department itself to be appropriate for transfer in accordance with the Act, it simply transfers the file physically. If the Department finds six months, a year or three years later that it needs the file, there is a provision in the Act to allow it to recall it temporarily, but it is only a temporary recall.

The National Archives becomes the custodian of the files.

Dr. Craig

Yes.

In that context, is Dr. Craig entitled to go into the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and do a trawl of its files so that he can be assured that it is fully meeting the 30 year rule——

Dr. Craig

No.

——and that he is getting all the relevant documentation?

Dr. Craig

I have considerable powers but they do not go that far.

Can he do so?

Dr. Craig

There are two contexts in which I can go into a Department. One is if it wishes to destroy records and do so by law - not quietly destroying something and breaking the law - and properly. If the Department states that it wishes to destroy records, it must allow me or somebody nominated by me to examine the files. In other words, we will never agree to the destruction of files that we have not seen. That is a provision of the law itself; it is not simply my decision.

The other, which is probably more relevant to what you are saying, is that we have power to examine the arrangements for the preservation of records in the Department. That still has more to do with whether we have a feeling that, because the records are very badly housed and may be decaying because of bad housing, we have a right to go in, examine those arrangements and make recommendations about changes and so on. However, we do not have power to go around a Department from office to office requesting the opening of filing cabinets and cupboards.

You mentioned that the State Laboratory and the Garda Síochána were poor record keepers.

Dr. Craig

I am not saying that they were necessarily very poor by general comparison. I do not want that to be taken as what I said. I do know that, in the case of the State Laboratory in particular, very little now survives, but I am not sure of the detailed history of the State Laboratory. It has moved at least once - a radical move - so I am not sure when records went missing. In the case of the State Laboratory, I cannot say, in any precise sense, to what extent the records never existed or to what extent they were not preserved when they should have been. It is certainly true, though, that in terms of what now survives, the record-keeping seems either to have been always very poor or to have become very poor.

In the case of the Garda Síochána, I certainly would not be generalising to say that, across the board, record-keeping was very poor. Simply in terms of what we are discovering from the Barron report, however, it is obvious that in some areas the record-keeping was, substantially, not as good as it should have been. What I mean by that is that it seems obvious to me - and I would imagine that it seems obvious to the Garda Síochána management - that if a case is in any way live then one would expect that all papers relating to that case will be preserved.

Considering what you said about sensitive records that might be segregated, put into the wrong folder or put away, even for security reasons - and for that very reason might not be immediately to hand - this is most likely to have happened in the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I do not know if you were listening to the discussions we had earlier about missing files. Is there any mechanism whereby you can take extra steps to ensure that you get the full 30-year rule implemented? Can you get it double checked, even if you cannot come in yourself physically to do it?

Dr. Craig

No.

Is there anybody from your office who can liaise with a Department and ensure that all the files, or sensitive files, do not go missing?

Dr. Craig

No. There is no provision of that kind or even any loose ends in the National Archives Act whereby it could somehow be used for the end you are suggesting. It is relevant to say, though, and I did touch on it, that under the provisions of the National Archives Act, records can be withheld on grounds of public interest, which is a catch all category, or otherwise that they are records that were obtained in confidence, or that the release of which might be seriously damaging to or endanger the life of an individual.

The administration of those provisions for withholding records are controlled by the Department of the Taoiseach. All I can say is that I feel the Department of the Taoiseach has performed that function fairly seriously over the years. Therefore, if I became aware, or if, for that matter, it themselves became aware that there was a strong reason to think that a Department was withholding files improperly - not simply not transferring them in the first place but purporting to transfer files yet not doing so and, therefore, not putting files through the withholding system that should be put through that system - the Department of the Taoiseach is probably better placed than I am to deal with that seriously. I know people might not always believe that, because the Department is at the centre of the Government system and they might be suspicious of it but I think that is unfair, at least on its track record. The Department has administered that power well.

It is not simply a case of records not being transferred. That has been the case in various Departments at different times for various reasons, and in some instances whole blocks of records have not been transferred. However, I am talking here more about an area where a Department transferred the files of a particular division in a particular year, and it appeared to be all the records that should be transferred, yet it was failing to transfer some of the files, not admitting to that and not getting the certificates in place that are provided for in the Act. If the suspicion arose that some Department was doing that, I think the Department of the Taoiseach would take the matter very seriously and do something about it. By that, I do not mean there is any very direct means to do anything about it. However, if one has the power of the Taoiseach behind one, one can obviously get things done, and that might not otherwise be the case.

I thank Dr. Craig whose contribution was very pertinent. As members are aware, a significant element in the report concerns the missing, absent or lost files - whatever terminology people use. Dr. Craig has helped us in that regard.

We will now adjourn until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning, when we will meet Dr. Jim Donovan, the former chief State forensic scientist.

The sub-committee went into private session at 3.35 p.m. and adjourned until 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 11 February 2004.

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