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Joint Committee on Legislation debate -
Wednesday, 13 Feb 1985

SECTION 7.

Question proposed: " That section 7 stand part of the Bill ".

In section 7 an act of bankruptcy is an act of default, voluntary or involuntary, committed by a debtor which is either evidence of an intent to deprive creditors of their rights through fraudulent assignment or is an implication of insolvency. This is the definition in the Report, at page 55. It is the foundation of the jurisdiction to entertain a bankruptcy petition. This is referred to in section 127 of the 1857 Act. The Committee recommended that the concept should be retained. Section 7 therefore retains the acts of bankruptcy set out in section 21 of the 1872 Act subject to the following changes: (a) certain acts of bankruptcy which can be committed by traders only will in future be capable of being committed by all debtors; (b) the following acts of bankruptcy are abolished: (i) that a debtor allowed himself to be outlawed — this is obsolete — and (2) that a debtor filed a petition for arrangements under the control of the court and it was dismissed. Under section 105 of the Bill such dismissal will result in adjudication of the debtor. It would be obsolete once section 105 becomes part of the corpus of the law.

As well as the two acts of bankruptcy that are being abolished there are two acts of bankruptcy created. One is where the debtor gives a fraudulent preference, and two, the present act of bankruptcy which occurs when execution has in the case of a trader been levied by seizure and sale of his goods for payment of not less than £20. It is replaced by one which arises from the levying of execution by the seizure of a debtor's goods or a return of no goods by the sheriff or county registrar.

Could I ask the Minister if subsection (1)(d) is a new concept in bankruptcy or is it a new dimension? I presume we are talking about recent events, and perhaps you would comment on whether this is a totally new idea in the whole concept of bankruptcy. What exactly does "or begins to keep house" mean?

It is a modern version of the existing provision. It comprises all those acts of bankruptcy committed by a debtor where with intent to defeat or delay his creditors he absconds or disappears. Some of these acts can only be committed by a trader at present. This distinction is being omitted.

On your question of "keeping house" it was used as a term to cover all cases where a debtor was hiding from his creditors. It was considered by the committee that it would be a useful kind of catch-all phrase for that purpose and the advice was to retain it and we are retaining it.

In effect what you are saying is that, if a person decides to defeat his creditors and leaves the State and lives elsewhere and does not come back, he is deemed to be a bankrupt? Is that the position?

No. He is deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy.

Will there by any definition in relation to time? It says "being out of State remains out of State". If a person remained out of the state for a long weekend does that constitute committing an act of bankruptcy?

It would not be so much a question of the time spent out of the State. It would be a question of the intention to stay away from one's creditors. It would be a question of establishing the intent.

May I make a couple of comments? Subsection (1)(d) "and begins to keep house"— I understand the historical derivative of that. The only point I would make without being unduly pernickety about it is that, since we are now tackling a piece of legislation that has been left sitting around for so many years, I can think of a better way of phrasing what is intended by that. There has been no formal amendment tabled today to deal with this but I would ask the Minister to consider on Report Stage a different form of phraseology. That term is a sort of term of art within bankruptcy law but it is largely a meaningless concept in modern language. We might have another look at that.

To come back to subsection (1)(b), which is a newer portion, could the Minister expand on what exactly is meant by "a fraudulent conveyance, gift delivery or transfer of his property". For example, if a person transferred property, if it went from one spouse to another, could that amount to a fraudulent transfer to defeat creditors within the meaning of this? Presumably it could. Could the Minister expand on that aspect?

On the Deputy's second point it would cover any fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Acts or under the old Statute of Charles. I will look at the Deputy's first point again. The term "keeping house " has a long pedigree in bankruptcy law and has a clearly defined meaning. The Committee recommended that we retain it. If it were possible to modernise the language and retain the concept I would not have any objection to that and we will have a look at that between now and Report Stage.

Coming back to section 7(1)(b), could you tease out for me what "fraudulent" means in that case? If an individual transfers any part of this property is it the intent that has to be established again?

The intent — that is what would have to be tested. Fraudulent conveyancing and transfer of property would cover conveyances fraudulent under the Conveyancing (Ireland) Act, 1634, because they are made with the intent of delaying, hindering or defrauding creditors and they are transactions which can be challenged at any time and Conveyances void under the bankruptcy laws, the principle of which is the distribution of a person's property among the creditors in proportion to their debts — a transaction which had the effect of making this impossible is void. The courts regard such transactions fraudulent as evidencing an intent to delay creditors. It is immaterial that the grantee has not notice of the fraud. It is what would be defined as fraudulent in law under the 1634 Statute of Charles, fraudulent under the bankruptcy laws; but it is the question of intent which would be at the centre of any decision on whether it was fraudulent or not.

I would like to pursue the Minister slightly on this question of fraudulent preference. I understand what he means by fraudulent preference and I do not think we should think of the expression in the context of its being fraud in the sense that it is normally used, even though it includes that. I suppose, really, conveyance without due process could also be included in it. What is at issue here is not so much whether these things can be set aside in bankruptcy — in other words, that on being declared bankrupt the court can say "The property you transferred six weeks ago to your great grand-aunt is still legally yours because you transferred it for the purpose of defrauding creditors." That has always been the case and it remained the case. What is at issue here is that this is being extended, that the act of the transfer itself becomes an act of bankruptcy. In other words, where a person has committed no other act of bankruptcy the process can commence on the transfer of property to his great grand-aunt. It strikes me as a little bit circuitous. I do not know how anybody at that time would be in a position to say that a person is bankrupt or what is the practical effect of this. The transfer of property accompanies, if it was by no other act of bankruptcy might be an indication that the person is not a bankrupt at all. What mechanism exists whereby any transfer of property can be deemed to be fraudulent and can form the basis of a petition of bankruptcy? I would like to ask the Minister that.

I do not think it is a question of somebody being a bankrupt rather than somebody committing an act of bankruptcy. Sections 57, 58 and 59 of this Bill deal with fraudulent and voluntary conveyances. Section 57 is the avoidance of fraudulent preferences and section 58 the avoidance of certain transactions. Section 59 is avoidance of certain settlements. We will have an opportunity to deal with that in detail when we come to those sections. If the sub-committee is willing I suggest we would leave that until then. In general I think the Deputy is right when he spoke about getting into difficulty only in the case of a transfer which must necessarily result in delaying creditors. I think that is correct.

I understand that property which is fraudulently conveyanced will have to be brought into the State for the purpose of bankruptcy. I understand that and I agree with it. We will be dealing with that particular point when we come to section 57 and a few following sections. What we are talking about here is whether a conveyance itself should become the act of bankruptcy and should give rise to the commencement of this process.

There have to be creditors in the first instance and it would be an act of bankruptcy if it was calculated to defeat or delay creditors. It is not a question of somebody who is in a position of solvency suddenly having bankruptcy law coming aniar aduaidh air in a particular transaction. It would have to have the intent of defeating or delaying creditors.

Could you take the hypothetical question of somebody with an overdraft, and they make a conveyance or a gift or a transfer of portion of their property? If the bank decide to foreclose on that, is the person not being put in the position of having — to use the words of the section — committed an act of bankruptcy? I agree that that might be a very out of the way case the way things are at the moment with the ordinary overdraft. It suddenly is found that the bank want to foreclose and the person has transferred portion of his property to any member of the family. It would seem under this section that he could be held to have committed an act of bankruptcy.

Yes, but that would be the most extreme solution. There are other methods of execution if there is a debt. There are other avenues open to creditors apart from putting somebody into bankruptcy.

I have always felt that this act of bankruptcy procedure is a very antiquated one. It is highlighted by the fact that we are talking about many of these having been brought in under the Act of 1872. Indeed, we are even harking back to an earlier Act of 1634 in this context of acts of bankruptcy. I believe the thing is antiquated and should be very seriously and substantially rationalised. Many of these here are things going back for 100 years or more. To be perfectly honest the application of them in practice is something that, if anything, is extremely difficult to prove, and they could not be used that much. To take one example, this question of intent to defeat or delay creditors. How on earth does anybody prove that a person left the state with intent to defeat creditors? How could you prove that? Are you trying to prove what is the state of a man's mind, in effect?- The question of conveyancing all or substantailly all of his property to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors generally — I do not know what substantially all might mean. Does it mean half, three-quarters or is it intended to mean any part of his property?

Again, the definition of what is a fraudulent preference to satisfy a court. I do not know what evidence would be required to show that. Again, you are in the realm of trying to prove what was the state of a man's mind, and how you would do that I do not know. When you come to subsection (1)(f) then again it seems unnecessarily complex.

Deputy Taylor, could I come in at this stage? We agreed to finish at 5 o'clock even though we started late. Perhaps as there seems to be some difficulties with this section, rather than put in this section now we could start of the next day at that point, if that is agreed.

The last point, of course, is the question of amendments. If we are going to meet every week I would suggest that perhaps amendments could be in by the Monday if we are meeting on Wednesday. Would that cause any difficulties?

If we meet each week for an hour and we get so much done and we go through it that would not be too burdensome otherwise. Hopefully we could get through it fairly quickly.

That would be the intention.

Are we meeting next Wednesday?

Next Wednesday at 3 o'clock and the amendments by next Monday. We will resume on section 7. If we could have the amendments as soon as possible, by noon on Monday.

I understand.

Thank you very much.

The Committee adjourned at 5.10 p.m.

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