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Joint Committee on Legislation debate -
Friday, 24 May 1985

SECTION 56 (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That section 56 stand part of the Bill."

There was quite an amount of discussion about this section which arose from difficulty in distinguishing between disclaimer and election. I want to say a brief word about the distinction between the doctrines of election and disclaimer and the committee's decision to abolish the former and to amend the latter. Basically, under the doctrine of election — section 271 of the 1857 Act — when the property of a bankrupt consist of leasehold, or is held under a fee farm grant, it does not vest in the assignees on the bankruptcy of the grantee or lessee unless or until they elect to take it. Until election, therefore, it remains vested in the bankrupt who is liable for the rent and other covenants. On electing the assignees become liable for payment of rent unless they subsequently disclaim. When they occupy property without electing or disclaiming they are liable to pay an occupation rent from the date of adjudication to the date of delivery of possession. If the assignees elect not to take, the bankrupt remains liable for rent due after the date of adjudication. As regards arrears, a landlord also has power to distrain on the tenant's property but this procedure, I understand, is not availed of.

The assignees can be required to make a decision whether to accept or decline such property. If they do not decide within a reasonable time of being required to do so the person entitled to the rent or the lessor may apply to the court and it may order the assignees to elect. if the assignees decline the lease or the land the court may order the bankrupt to deliver up possession or may make such order as it thinks fit. Election need not be expressed in any particular form and it may be inferred from conduct. I understand that in practice if the Official Assignee elects to take a lease and if he sells the lease, arrears of rent due up to the date of the sale would be paid. But there would be no question of the Official Assignee being liable for the rent until the property vested in him, that is, until he elected to take it.

The doctrine of election was abolished in England in 1869 and replaced by the doctrine of disclaimer because in the Act of that year provision was made for the vesting of the bankrupt's property in the trustee in bankruptcy. However, in Ireland the 1872 Act introduced disclaimer but retained election so that the dual system remains in the law today. The basic difference between the doctrines is that election applies to property which does not vest on adjudication while disclaimer is concerned with property which has vested but which the assignees wish to disown. As Members are aware, the Bankruptcy Law Committee felt that since under the Bill all the property of a bankrupt, with certain exceptions, would vest on adjudication automatically in the Official Assignee alone, there was no further need for election. The disclaimer provisions were therefore up-dated in line with company law. In principle, the Official Assignee's power to disclaim onerous property remains. However "after-acquired" property is excluded because this does not vest unless and until he claims it. The consent of the court to disclaim is made statutory and a 12 month time limit is imposed.

It might be helpful also to summarise the section. It is obvious that each subsection inter-links and one arises from the other. Section 56 is divided into nine subsections which are designed to balance the rights and liabilities of the Official Assignee, the bankrupt and his property, and persons affected by the disclaimer. Briefly, subsection (1) enables the official assignee to disclaim, indicates the kind of property comtemplated and imposes conditions as to court sanction, the form disclaimer must take, that is, it must be in writing, and the time allowed for exercising the right to disclaim. Subsection (2) qualifies subsection (1) as regards property which does not come to the Official Assignee's knowledge within a month of the adjudication. In such a case the right to disclaim may be exercised within 12 months of his becoming aware. Subsection (3) sets out the respective rights and liabilities of the bankrupt and his estate and of other persons in the disclaimed property and the position of the Official Assignee. Subsection (4) deals with pre-conditions the court may attach to the granting of leave to disclaim. Subsection (5) sets out the circumstances in which the Official Assignee may disentitle himself from disclaiming. Subsection (6) empowers the court to rescind contracts made with the bankrupt. Subsection (7) is concerned with vesting orders made by the court in favour of parties interested in disclaimed property. Subsection (8) deals with leasehold property and vesting orders. Subsection (9) continues the existing provision in favour of a person who is damaged by a disclaimer. I think that clarifies all the points that were raised at the last meeting on the issue.

Is everybody happy that the points raised at the last meeting have been clarified?

Are you happy?

It is not my function to be happy or unhappy. I am asking the Members who raised the points at our last meeting.

If you remember, we had some discussion in the intervening period about these matters and you raised some very interesting points.

Is the Minister satisfied, or would the Minister explain why he is satisfied, assuming that he is, that in subsection (1) a period longer than 12 months is allowed at the discretion of the court? A similar question arises in respect of subsection (5) which deals, as the Minister says, with an application being made in writing to him by any person interested in the property requiring him to decide whether or not he is going to disclaim and giving him a period of 28 days after the receipt of the application — this is the next section — or such further period as may be allowed by the court. I am concerned about the way the courts have been acting in general. I am not speaking about this section or this doctrine of either election or disclaimer at the moment but in general. Have they not been bending over backwards to give people in official positions, like the Official Assignee, every opportunity, often at considerable loss and inconvenience to the person who is seeking the decision? In other words, it says that within 28 days the Official Assignee has time to make up his mind unless the court says to give him longer. Similarly, it says that even if there is no notice within 12 months he must make up his mind unless the court decides to give him longer. In my experience where you have that kind of "out" for an Official Assignee or a person in a position like an Official Assignee, or the court, it is used to the detriment of the person who is waiting for a decision with regard to the property. In these circumstances would the Minister consider being more restrictive with regard to the ability of the court to extend it indefinitely?

(Limerick East) If we tie the Assignee in too tightly there may be complicated cases where he cannot elect within the 28 day period, but Senator O’Leary’s point is that because he has a more liberal regime under which to operate he will always operate under the more liberal regime. Firstly, the system now being proposed is more restrictive than what exists at present. Secondly, when the court would adjudicate, the burden of the whole section would put an obligation on the court to take into account the rights of everybody and not just the Assignee. It is not weighted in favour of the Assignee and the court would have to take the lessor’s, the lessee’s and the creditors rights into account when making a decision. I see the point Senator O’Leary is making and we will have a look at it between now and Report Stage.

Any other points on this long, difficult section?

Question put and agreed to.
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