I will speak briefly about the process of reforming electoral systems. I will not evaluate any particular system or propose alternatives to the current system. I will speak about the process by which electoral systems are changed, in practice, and about some of the issues and considerations involved. I will mention some of the historical reasons for the changes that have been made to electoral systems.
The extension of the electoral franchise in many European systems over the last decade and a half, for example with the introduction of universal suffrage, created a demand for representation by groups that had previously been excluded. When labour groups were given the franchise, they found that the existing party structures, which were typically reinforced by electoral systems that had restricted the participation of smaller parties, were unacceptable and they demanded more open systems. That historical change led to the introduction of systems of proportional representation in most of continental Europe. Voter realignments in some systems caused similar patterns to develop. There was an absence of stability in some of the party systems of the pre-war and inter-war period, particularly the French system. That instability resulted from social and demographic changes, political changes and unstable institutions. It often caused Governments to modify their electoral systems.
When electoral competition was introduced in eastern Europe — to stay with the European case — new electoral systems were needed. Interestingly, most of the communist systems had very detailed electoral laws until 1989. The Soviet Union had a very detailed electoral law, with regular elections. The law prescribed when elections would be held, how candidates would be selected and the manner in which voting would take place. There was usually one party and one candidate. One usually had to consciously cross out the name of the candidate if one did not wish to vote for him or her. If one simply dropped a marked paper in a box, that would be seen as a vote for the candidate. It is obvious that laws like that could not stand and had to be changed. The use of a new system was required by each country that changed from a single-party or authoritarian state to a democratic state, or underwent some other major regime change as part of its process of national independence. The creation of the Irish State in 1922, along with other episodes, led to the introduction of the current system. There were several stages at which electoral systems had to be adopted.
Electoral change has taken place as a result of simple political manipulation in democracies with established systems that have not undergone major social, political or institutional regime change. Electoral systems are quite easy to manipulate, in comparative terms. Most constitutions are very difficult to change, but most electoral systems are not.
Ireland is an exception owing to the rule in place for changing its electoral system. Under the constitutional enshrinement in the 1937 Constitution, there is a specification that the PR-STV system will be used. Twice in Irish experience there were majority votes in both Houses of the Legislature to change the system in favour of a first past the post system. Both attempts were rejected by referendum in 1959 and 1969 because of the constitutional requirement. It is not the case that electoral law must be approved by the public in a referendum but that any constitutional change must be approved by the public in a referendum. Most systems do not contain this provision. In France, Italy and many other countries a simple majority vote of the Legislature is sufficient. In the Westminster system in the United Kingdom a simple majority vote of Parliament would be sufficient to change the electoral system to anything Parliament wished. As a result, political manipulations often take place in such systems. I will point to a few of these shortly.
What are some of the general political considerations involved in changing electoral systems? Many types of political institution have been devised, some of which are designed to make matters simpler and easier and provide a general public good. However, electoral systems are different. The rules for slicing a pizza among a group of hungry college students apply to some extent in that someone will get a bigger share only if someone else gets a smaller one. In a Legislature in which the number of seats is fixed, any electoral rule which benefits a larger party will harm a smaller party and vice versa. Electoral systems which are more proportional will benefit a greater number of typically smaller parties than a more restrictive, majoritarian system which, by its character, benefits fewer, larger parties.
For these reasons, debates on electoral reform typically do not have the character of wise people debating the best institutions for everyone in the general public good. The most noted feature of electoral system reform is the debate in which parties of different sizes calculate their political considerations, try to determine what will be best or worst for them and evaluate the process in these terms. While we can make whatever arguments we wish before this committee or the public about what is in the greater good, what is good for representation or what is meaningful to voters, in my research in many contexts the strongest finding to emerge is that political parties typically make decisions on electoral reform based on political considerations, which are typically partisan and office-seeking in nature.
Incumbent Legislatures and legislators usually have their interests tied to the status quo. This is evident in proposals in many systems where it would be sensible to reduce the size of the Legislature. Typically, one will not be able to reduce the size of a Legislature by having the Legislature in question take a vote on the matter. I will speak to some of the mechanisms for overcoming this problem. It is a little like playing Russian roulette where one does not know who will bite the bullet to the extent that one knows that if one shrinks the Legislature by two thirds, one third of those voting on the proposition will not be present following the subsequent election, assuming that no new parliamentarians are elected.
The legitimacy of new rules is a key consideration. For this reason, especially in transitional democracies, it is often the case that some extraordinary forum will be called to consider electoral rules. I will shortly speak to two examples which arose recently in New Zealand and British Columbia, two systems which are not dissimilar to the Irish system to the extent that they are not transitional democracies and have not recently undergone major regime change. These are examples of cases where the ability to recommend a system was placed in the hands of an extraordinary commission, either a public citizens' commission, royal commission or some external body. As a result, the Legislature or parties most affected by the rule change were not involved in making the decision.
Examples of extraordinary instruments include round table talks in countries which have just made a major regime change, typically moving from single party states to democracy, and the use of electoral commissions, usually followed by a referendum on the recommendations of the commission, as was the case in New Zealand. In British Columbia a citizens' electoral commission was appointed. This system would, I believe, be the most workable in the Irish case. There are, however, constitutional implications of these extraordinary mechanisms and it is not always possible to proceed in this manner because the constitution may specify means by which a constitutional change must be approved. In the Irish case, the matter is simple. Any change from the PR-STV system must be approved ultimately in a referendum because it would involve a constitutional amendment.
