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Joint Sub-Committee on Global Corporate Taxation debate -
Tuesday, 27 May 2014

Ireland's Corporate Tax System: Discussion

We will proceed with No. 6 on the agenda, the interaction of Ireland's corporate income tax system with the rules and regimes in operation in other countries.

I welcome Mr. Brian Keegan, director of taxation at Chartered Accountants Ireland, and Mr. Sorley McCaughey, head of policy and advocacy at Irish Christian Aid. The format of the meeting - the purpose of which is to discuss Ireland's relationship with the global corporate-multinational taxation architecture - will be that our guests will make their opening presentations and that a question-and-answer session will follow. I propose that 15-minute slots will apply in respect of the latter. I remind members, witnesses and everyone in the Gallery that all mobile phones must be switched off. This is because they interfere with microphones in their vicinity and affect the sound recording equipment.

I advise the witnesses that by virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. However, if they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence in regard to a particular matter and continue to do so, they will be entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and are asked to respect the parliamentary practice that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person, persons or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

We will take Mr. Keegan's opening statement first and then proceed to that of Mr. McCaughey.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Chartered Accountants Ireland welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the work of the sub-committee. Its examination of these important tax issues is already making a significant contribution to the public and political debate.

The use of the term "global taxation" by the sub-committee is well-informed. There is no such thing as international tax - taxes are paid by companies to the sovereign governments which hold the taxing rights. Ireland, like many other countries, charges companies to tax on the basis of their tax residence. This concept of tax residence is fundamental to the issue under consideration today, namely, the interaction of Ireland’s corporate income tax system with the rules and regimes in operation in other countries. Companies which are incorporated, managed and controlled in Ireland are tax resident here and are subject to Irish corporation tax, irrespective of where their income arises. Ireland’s claim to corporation tax on the activities of companies which are not resident in Ireland - but which are active here by virtue of a branch operation - is sometimes overlooked. Our corporation tax system is more transparent than other taxation systems which have higher headline tax rates but which also provide for significant deductions to arrive at taxable income and taxable profits.

With the focus on Ireland's 12.5% corporation tax rate, the treatment of profits from companies when after-tax profits are distributed to shareholders and other stakeholders can be overlooked in the tax debate. Ultimately, the profits of a company make their way to individuals and much of the global tax system aims at ensuring those profits are not taxed too many times along the way. A clearly defined interaction of the Irish tax system with the tax regimes of other countries is, therefore, fundamental to international trade. Ultimately, tax is a business cost for companies and it must be predicted and managed. If our tax regime were to be too closed and protectionist, Irish companies simply would not be able to trade abroad and Ireland would not be an attractive destination for companies seeking to locate operations in this part of the world. In that context, SAP Ireland and other companies made announcements about the creation of new jobs this morning.

The main defining instrument for the interaction of Ireland's tax regime with other tax regimes in the world is the double taxation agreement, DTA. The purpose of a double taxation agreement is in fact to eliminate double taxation, that is, the taxing by two sovereign governments of the same profits arising from the same activities of a company or for that matter, an individual taxpayer. Double taxation agreements may have their flaws but they are vigorously negotiated between sovereign states, depending on the needs and aspirations of those states at a particular point in time. Critics point out that such agreements can result in double non-taxation. Another criticism involves so-called treaty shopping. This is the idea that certain activities are better located in one country over another, not because of any commercial considerations but because of a more favourable treaty treatment of those activities. Nevertheless, Ireland cannot tax income or assets which are outside its sovereign charge to tax. It is no surprise, therefore, that debates concerning residence rules focus on the themes of residence in the context of the OECD base erosion and profiting shifting initiative. I understand the Department of Finance launched a public consultation process in respect of the latter earlier this afternoon, which makes the discussion in which we are engaging particularly timely.

Unfortunately our country's tax regime has become something of a target in the discussion of global tax policy. This is unfair and unfounded. We are not outliers in terms of our tax rules, they are grounded in over a century of common law practice and interpretation. In particular, double taxation agreements are bilateral instruments. In other words, they are agreements between sovereign nations. Such agreements must work for both countries involved and can be changed where they do not do so. Harmful tax practices are simply not a feature of the Irish tax landscape. Harmful tax practices, as and when highlighted either by the OECD or the EU, have been changed by successive Ministers for Finance. The Irish system has already been through the mill of good practice scrutiny. That is why concepts such as the requirement to have a substantial presence in Ireland, anti-transfer pricing rules and exchange of information between revenue authorities are features of the Irish system. We must always be mindful of our obligations under the EU treaties when contemplating any changes to our tax system. That is not to say that there is not room for improvement. Tax legislation and best practice can and must evolve, not least because many of the rules which apply predate the growth in cross-border trade and the pre-eminence of intellectual property on the balance sheets of multinational companies.

I look forward to discussing this matter further with members.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I thank the sub-committee for inviting Christian Aid to make a presentation to it. Christian Aid is an Irish development organisation which is involved in work in approximately 40 countries across the globe. We have been working on tax and development for a number of years and became the first leading NGO to make it a major campaign priority in 2008. Since then, the importance of tax justice has been recognised by the G20, the UN, the OECD, the IMF and by many large businesses. In 2010 Christian Aid was identified as one of the 21 most influential organisations in the world of tax by International Tax Review. Christian Aid is a member of the OECD informal task force on tax and development and the task force on financial integrity and economic development. It is also a member of the European Commission's Platform for Tax Good Governance which was established in 2013.

Since the 1950s, Ireland has been very successful in attracting foreign direct investment, FDI. There are now more than 1,000 multinationals with operations in Ireland. The corporation tax rate has been a central plank of this but other factors also contribute to making Ireland an attractive location, including a skilled workforce, an English-speaking population, membership of the EU and various other incentives such as tax credits for research and development carried out here. I wish to highlight how some of these factors leave Ireland vulnerable to exploitation by some MNCs and pose a threat, therefore, to the country's international reputation, as well as to the development of some of the poorest countries in the world. I will also argue that while considering Ireland’s tax regime is important in understanding how we fit in globally, without having a more complete understanding of the workings and structures of multinational corporations themselves and the secrecy on which they depend, we are only ever going to see part of the picture.

A 12.5% corporation tax rate makes Ireland an attractive destination for the legal processes of moving genuine economic activity to this country in order to avail of this rate. Where activities of this nature are part of a multinational's supply chain, transfer pricing is used to assign the value and profits to the activities in Ireland. However, research by Christian Aid and others has illustrated that an accurate application of the OECD's arm's length principle in transfer pricing is difficult to ensure. Intra-company transactions between subsidiaries allows for highly subjective discretion in determining the price at which transactions take place. This results in vast amounts of money being shifted between subsidiaries across the globe, including from those in countries of the global south. It is particularly difficult to ensure compliance with the rules in respect of transactions involving intangibles such as intellectual property or management fees, which may not have a comparable price on the open market. The latter is the basis of the arm's length principle.

Christian Aid's research shows that the least developed countries of the world lose $160 billion each year as a result of transfer mispricing and false invoicing. Further research looking at trade mispricing also showed that between 2005 and 2007, some $5.8 billion in mispriced capital flowed into Ireland. Some $268 million of this came from the least developed countries in the world. Prem Sikka, professor of accounting and director of the centre for global accountability at the University of Essex, made the point in 2010 that allowing companies to offset research and development expenditure against taxes makes it very attractive for them to have a research-and-development presence in Ireland. However, according to Professor Sikka it is often highly subjective as to what constitutes research and development expenditure.

Christian Aid acknowledges the strategic aims behind the research and development tax credit, namely, fostering innovation and research in Ireland and driving future employment and growth. We also recognise the need for Ireland to remain competitive internationally in terms of attracting and retaining sustainable foreign direct investment. However, in examining the architecture of Irish tax policy, consideration must also be given to the potential for our low corporation tax rate and our research and development credit to be used, or abused, in ways that may impact negatively both on our reputation and on the ability of developing countries to raise their own revenues.

Through locating intellectual property rights in developed countries such as Ireland, multinationals have the ability to declare these intellectual properties rights as a large share of their profits on products developed and produced in other jurisdictions, including in developing countries. Research and development tax credits, in reducing a company’s effective tax rate, have the potential to incentivise multinationals to accumulate intellectual property rights in Ireland and represent a degree of moral hazard.

In September 2012, as reported by The Irish Times, the US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations found that Microsoft used subsidiaries in Ireland and elsewhere to reduce its US tax bill for 2011 by €1.87 billion. This was done in part by using the architecture of research and development tax credits and intellectual property rights in Ireland. The subcommittee stated: "Microsoft Corporation has used aggressive transfer pricing transactions to shift its intellectual property, a mobile asset, to subsidiaries in Puerto Rico, Ireland, and Singapore, which are low or no tax jurisdictions, in part to avoid or reduce its US taxes on the profits generated by assets sold by its offshore entities."

In 2001, Microsoft established a subsidiary, Round Island One Limited, operating from the offices of a Dublin law firm. By 2004, Round Island controlled $16 billion of Microsoft's assets and gross profits of nearly $9 billion, approximately 22% of the company’s global profits. Much of Round Island’s income comes from royalties and licensing fees for copyrighted software code that originated in the US. Through another company, Flat Island Company, Round Island licenses rights to Microsoft software throughout Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Round Island has absorbed other Microsoft units, from Israel to India, moving much of that intellectual property to Ireland.

Colm Keena, writing in The Irish Times on this subject, noted: "Seen from the perspective of Africans, it must seem very rum indeed to see profits from sales in their countries being taxed in Dublin, to fund a society a million miles away from theirs in terms of development". However, arguably the most important elements of our tax policy for enticing multinational investment to Ireland are our extensive network of tax treaties and a relatively benign transfer pricing regime. In theory, multinationals could base themselves out of one of the traditional tax havens of Europe, but doing so would place them outside of the global network of treaties available in Ireland and leave them vulnerable, for example, to any potential crackdown on tax havens. Ireland’s membership of the European Union, however, and our network of over 60 tax treaties, in particular our tax agreement with the US, has encouraged numerous multinationals to use Ireland as a base to manage their operations in the Middle East and North Africa. Considering the importance of our tax treaties, it is surely in our national interest to ensure their integrity is not threatened by a perception that we are engaging in harmful tax competition. It is in our interest to ensure that elements of our tax regime are not contributing to such a perception. For example, an Action Aid report from last year highlighted how Ireland’s tax treaty with Zambia enabled a subsidiary of the giant food multinational ABF, called Illovo Sugar, with an address in the Irish Financial Services Centre but with no record of employees or activities in Ireland, to avoid paying withholding tax on loan payments from Zambia into Ireland, and likewise on management and purchasing fees booked in Ireland, an accusation that ABF rejects.

The impact of tax treaties on development is being increasingly debated internationally, by both developed and developing countries. Mongolia, for example, has recently cancelled its double tax treaty with the Netherlands. While the Netherlands is particularly in the spotlight following research suggesting its treaty network is costing developing counties more than €700 million a year, it is at least beginning to acknowledge the problem and has offered to review its treaties with developing countries. While Ireland does not have many tax treaties with developing countries, Ireland should seek to lead in this area and advocate for the need to establish principles and practices for development friendly tax treaties, both at national, EU and international levels.

In regard to our to our transfer pricing regime, allowing for retroactive challenges to inward transfer pricing as well as outward transfer pricing would bolster the integrity of our tax regime. To explain, changes made to our transfer pricing rules in the Finance Act of 2010 granted powers to the Revenue authority to challenge suspected cases of transfer mispricing that aimed to minimise the amount of profit being transferred into Ireland. Of course, instances of multinationals engaging in transfer mispricing to minimise the amount of profit recorded in a low tax jurisdiction such as Ireland would be highly unlikely and the changes in rules could be described as self-serving and designed to protect only Ireland’s tax base. Dr. Sheila Killian of the University of Limerick has made the point that it would be useful if the revenue authority were granted power to challenge retrospectively instances of suspected transfer mispricing into Ireland rather than just assume that what is being declared by the company in Ireland is the correct amount and not the result of transfer mispricing. That would be especially helpful to developing countries, where weaker capacity-----

As a ten minute time limit was set for the opening addresses, I must ask Mr. McCaughey to wrap up. We can deal with some of the other matters during the question and answer session. If he is close to concluding, I will allow him to do so.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I will skip to the concluding remarks.

Thank you.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

Much of the response in Ireland to criticism of Irish tax policy has been to note that the solution is necessarily global and cannot be fixed by Ireland unilaterally. Christian Aid certainly agrees with that assertion that taxation needs to be viewed as a global issue. The policies of one country cannot be looked at in isolation when it is clear that these policies can have negative, albeit unintentional, consequences on other countries and, in particular, on those countries with less capacity to engage with multinational companies. We also acknowledge that the international tax rules cannot be fixed by one state alone. We contend though that there are certain things that Ireland can do to ensure we are putting our best foot forward, responding to the reputational damage we are experiencing and embracing all opportunities that present themselves to demonstrate the highest commitment to transparency, even if in cases that means going beyond what is the internationally accepted standard. As we have learned from the base erosion and profit shifting, BEPS, initiative, adherence to the standards laid down by the OECD have been insufficient in some cases in curbing the problem of base erosion and profit shifting.

What is clear and is uniformly acknowledged by the OECD, the Commission, the World Bank and the IMF is that it is developing countries that suffer most as a consequence of corporate secrecy and inadequate regulation. While there is no suggestion that Ireland is deliberately setting out to deplete the resources of developing countries, which I hope has been made clear, there are gaps in the system that may result in Ireland inadvertently undermining the tax take of poor countries. There is a clear moral responsibility on Ireland to ensure it is doing all in its power to close these gaps and honour its obligations to the poorest countries of the world.

To summarise where we are at and the purpose of this discussion, it is not purposeful for committee members to give their own opinions. The witnesses are before the sub-committee and we would like to hear their expert opinions on this matter. In laying out the reason we are doing this, I would use the analogy of football. We could talk to Manchester United or Chelsea about the offside rule, or we could talk to FIFA and UEFA about it. We consider the witnesses to be the people who have the understanding of UEFA and FIFA when it comes to this matter.

I will start by putting my questions and the questions will be taken in 15 minute slots. If the witnesses could keep their answers cogent and clear, it would be better for us and for themselves in terms of moving things on. As I will be directing my questions to both witnesses, I ask them to be succinct in their responses. A debate is taking place on this issue in Ireland and we have seen that debate change in terms of the landscape. There was an announcement in the budget at Christmas by the Minister, Deputy Noonan, in regard to Ireland's positioning on this. During the Irish Presidency, statements were made with regard to trying to find a universal approach to this across the European Union. To use Mr. McCaughey's term, the architecture of this is very much what we are looking at. I will begin by seeking a defining position on this from Mr. Keegan and Mr. McCaughey in that order. Do they consider Ireland to be a tax haven?

Mr. Brian Keegan

No, Chairman, to be as succinct as I can be.

On the basis of what criteria do you make that statement?

Mr. Brian Keegan

With regard to the criteria for a tax haven, there are two wings to it. One is a low or non-existent tax rate, coupled with a lack of substance and secrecy in transactions. They are the essential components. Admittedly, we have a low corporation tax rate of 12.5%, and that is recognised. In terms of transparency, we have very clear legislation. We have very clear procedures laid down by the Revenue Commissioners.

There is an excellent range of links for an information exchange between Revenue and other revenue authorities worldwide. In terms of a key criterion - substance - it has been established by the European Court of Justice that the tests are applied by Ireland to ensure those who wish to avail of the 12.5% rate can only do so if they have a substantive presence in the country. For these reasons, I contest any suggestion that Ireland is a tax haven.

The delegates should feel free to contradict one another. That is the purpose in having them before the committee. Would Mr. McCaughey classify Ireland as a tax haven?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

To be honest, I do not think that is the question because, essentially, it brings one down a blind alley. The OECD’s definition of a tax haven is so useless that, essentially, no country is a tax haven. To get stuck into the nitty gritty of what constitutes a tax haven really is to miss the point. What we should be looking at is whether Ireland’s tax rate has a negative impact on other countries. Our particular interest is in whether it has a negative impact on developing countries. Committee members might be interested in the situation at a European level, but, ultimately, the issue at which we should be looking is whether Ireland’s engagement with tax competition is having a negative and unsustainable impact on other economies.

That brings me to my next question. There is a lot of discussion at the G20, at OECD level and Europe-wide. I will revert to discussions in the United Kingdom and the Senate on the matter because one could argue that they are coming from a single or nationalistic perspective and that their commentary does not have a global context. We will deal with that matter later. In terms of the G20 and the OECD, what does Mr. McCaughey see as the threats and the opportunities arising from the process and what is the state of play in such dialogue?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

Coming from a development perspective, we welcomed the OECD BEPS process very warmly at the start and have continued to engage in it as much as we possibly can. That said, one of our main criticisms of the process is that it has not included representation or an input from developing countries – those who are suffering the most from their inability to engage in the international tax regulations and architecture. A lot of what is possibly coming out of the OECD BEPS process is very positive, in particular in terms of country by country reporting. It would be a requirement for multinational corporations to report on their activities on a country by country basis. They would have to state how many employees they had, the assets they hdld, the sales they made, taxes paid and profits made. From what we are led to believe, that is something very positive that could emerge from the process.

The other issue that is positive is automatic information exchange. Information is exchanged between jurisdictions only on a request basis, although there are instances of spontaneous information exchange. We have been advocating - it has become the agreed international desirable norm - that this information be exchanged on an automatic basis multilaterally. That is generally accepted but as of yet it is not clear how developing countries would be able to feed into this.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Unlike Mr. McCaughey, I believe that when we are talking about taxation, definitions are important. Whether one is married defines the income tax one pays. Whether one is resident in this country defines how much income tax or corporation tax is paid. I do not wish to dismiss established definitions.

There are three strands to the work of the G20. There is the BEPS. There is the transparency agenda, to which Mr. McCaughey referred, and there is also the development agenda. They are three separate things. In terms of the BEPS, the threat to Ireland is from profit shifting because it also means tax shifting. Irish companies contribute €4 billion to the Exchequer every year. That represents approximately 10% to 11% of the overall tax take. The risk for Ireland-----

Is that taxation they pay as employees?

Mr. Brian Keegan

It is Irish corporation tax assessed on the profits of companies. It is about 10% to 11% of the total Exchequer take and very important to us. Some of the BEPS proposals would, undoubtedly, result in that €4 billion being reduced to €3 billion or €2 billion. I am not talking about Ireland’s foreign direct investment initiatives or offers; rather, I am talking about the amount of money Revenue can collect from us. That is the threat in the BEPS.

In terms of the transparency agenda, there are opportunities for Ireland which could lead the way on many of the transparency issues. I speak to colleagues around the world because Chartered Accountants Ireland has sister organisations in New Zealand and Australia. Revenue is well ahead of the pack in its capacity to garner information from financial institutions because of Acts of the Oireachtas and then to exchange information, as necessary. Other countries are not as well developed in this regard. We would not want Irish taxpayers to be left out on a limb with information flowing that is not properly reciprocated, but we have no difficulty with information exchange in countering tax evasion, in particular.

In terms of the development agenda, undoubtedly, there is a role for taxation. We would not be as clear on the evils of double taxation agreements simply because they are agreements between sovereign nations entered into willingly. The agreement with Zambia dates back to the early 1970s. If it does not suit the Zambians, it is up to them to change or suspend it. We would be careful about suggestions under the development agenda that are too simplistic and do not tackle the real issues.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

On leaving it up to the Zambian revenue authority to initiate a renegotiation of the tax treaty, which, incidentally, is something that has happened recently, it washes one’s hands of the responsibility. The Zambian-Ireland tax treaty has resulted in the depletion of Zambian revenue to the tune of €88 million over the course of two years. Ireland has an internationally renowned and respected aid programme that is contributing money to Irish Aid. The Government has signed up to policy coherence. It is not okay to say it is up to the Zambian authorities to initiate proceedings. We have a partnership with the Zambian authorities that needs to be respected and if there is an abuse of the tax treaty, there is an onus on the revenue authority, Irish Aid and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to initiate these proceedings. The Zambian authority has initiated renegotiation.

When we wrap up, I will allow time to the delegates to make closing remarks rather than just end with responses from the last speaker.

I will move on to remarks made in the House of Commons and the US Senate debates. I would like to hear the views and interpretations of the delegates. Mr. McCaughey and Mr. Keegan have referred to the fact that reputational damage can be due to perception or reality. National self-interest is an issue also. I am interested in hearing Mr. Keegan’s interpretation of the reports, the motivation behind them, what was legitimate in the reports and what was not so prominent in the content that did not enter into the public domain.

Mr. Brian Keegan

I sometimes think the public debate on corporation tax, in particular multinational corporation tax, is a little like having a critique of the Irish education system based on the student who gets ten A1s. It is the outlier examples that are taken all the time and sometimes the point can be missed. Sometimes the dog is given a bad name.

The Chairman made reference to the Senate hearings. I wish to make a few points in that regard simply because the sub-committee chaired by Senator McCain made a number of specific recommendations. It made five recommendations, three of which, in the context of a well known multinational with operations in Ireland, had to do with changing US domestic tax law, while the other two had to do with empowering the US inland revenue service to make more inquiries of its own taxpayers. Even though the entire focus and the publicity surrounding the Senate investigation had to do with Ireland, the prominence of a major multinational and what it was doing in Ireland, the actual recommendations made by the US Senate committee had to do with US law and practice. That is what it saw as fixing the problem and a useful point to remember.

While I do not wish to constantly harp back, I keep coming back to the point that there is no such thing as international taxation. Taxpayers pay taxes to the sovereign governments where they are resident.

However much one might look at the overall vista, declare one is not entirely happy with what is going on and would like to change it, it is very difficult to change something when it is outside one's control. I think the Senate experience probably will have highlighted that. The issue in respect of the United Kingdom hearings was equally interesting, if a bit more discursive. What struck me about it was that the Irish tax system and the residency system we use is very much based on the system in the United Kingdom for obvious historical reasons. The point that was giving people in the United Kingdom the greatest difficulty was legislation they had devised themselves to ensure that profits would be assessed where matters were managed and controlled, which was exactly the nexus of much of the debate that was taking place in the United Kingdom. I derive two points from this. First, the underlying reality does not always meet the headlines in this kind of coverage. Second, sometimes the rules we have, when they do not suit our own purposes, are open to criticism.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I agree with Mr. Keegan to a degree there. Probably, the underlying reality does not always match the headlines. However, what those hearings did highlight, albeit set against the context of national self-interest naturally-----

In Mr. McCaughey's view, there was a national self-interest there.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

That is the global context, but if it takes a crisis of this proportion to highlight what are the grave injustices that have been happening for years, that is to be welcomed. However, it highlighted the degree of secrecy and opacity multinational corporations enjoy and on which they depend and that the activities of multinational companies in each jurisdiction in which they operate are not known to investors, regulators or governments alike. It took a request from the United States Senate to Apple to get the information that came to light and which was so dramatic. We have been calling for a long time for a country-by-country reporting requirement that will provide such information on a country-by-country basis. This would go some way towards addressing the profit shifting in which multinationals engage and perhaps would have shed an early light on the kind of activities in which Apple was engaged.

I welcome Mr. Keegan and Mr. McCaughey to the meeting. I should declare an interest in that I am a member of Chartered Accountants Ireland. However, I assure the witnesses this will not colour my questioning. Members have heard two quite contrasting presentations from the two witnesses in attendance. Mr. Keegan has presented quite a black-and-white picture that companies incorporated in Ireland and which are resident here by virtue of the management and control test are subject to the 12.5% rate on their worldwide income and he defends the current regime quite strongly. Mr. McCaughey presents quite a different scenario and puts a lot of emphasis on profit shifting and transfer pricing. I wish to tease out this issue because it really forms the nub of the debate.

Everyone accepts that Ireland's system, in which the profits of companies resident here are taxed here and so forth, is all above board and is quite clear cut. The issue that has dominated the debate concerns the movement of profits, that is, the shifting of profits from one jurisdiction to another to gain the maximum tax advantage. I wish to try to go through this issue. On the second page of his presentation, Mr. McCaughey made the point that because of our corporation tax rate of 12.5%, Ireland is an attractive destination for companies legally moving their profits here through transfer pricing arrangements in order that those profits ultimately reside here and are subject to our corporation tax rate. Is there evidence for this or are there other jurisdictions in which the tax regime is even more favourable? I thought the bigger problem was that Ireland is a link in the chain and is used as a channel through the royalty payment for intellectual property to result in profits ending up in jurisdictions that are commonly known as tax havens, even if they do not meet the OECD definition. I refer to countries in which there is little or no corporation tax, whereas Ireland has a rate of 12.5%. Is the bigger problem that Ireland is a link in a chain and is used to channel profits to the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and so forth or is it that profits are brought to Ireland through transfer pricing to avail of the 12.5% rate? Are they both issues or is it clear cut as to which of them is a bigger problem from the witnesses' point of view?

Who wishes to respond first?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I would be interested to hear what Mr. Keegan has to say in response to the first part of that question because the answer is - this is the part to which I seek Mr. Keegan's reaction - it is well known that Ireland is an attractive location for its low corporation tax rate, which attracts the booking of profits in the State. However, in specific answer to the Deputy's question, I think it is both. Ireland now has a reputation as a conduit country through which profits are routed and end up in some of these small island sunny states around the world in which no corporation tax at all is levied. However, Ireland now is listed, along with the Netherlands and Luxembourg to a degree, as being a conduit country. That is exactly as the Deputy described it, which is that the profits are routing through Ireland and ending up in Bermuda. We know about the Dutch sandwich, in which profits are routed through the Netherlands in order that no withholding tax is paid on profits that ultimately will be booked in Bermuda, for example. Consequently, it is both issues and the double Irish about which we have heard, as well as the Dutch sandwich, illustrate how this is happening.

Mr. Brian Keegan

I thank the Deputy and while I do not know about black and white, I do know that one cannot be a little bit taxable. One either is taxable or one is not. If the Deputy bears with me for a moment, while we consider the overall structure, what happens is that a company pays tax at 12.5% but those after-tax profits must go somewhere. In the case of a multinational, they typically will go back to a holding company and ultimately out to the shareholders. When they go back to a holding company, they are taxed again and the holding company gets a credit for the Irish tax. Consequently, for a lot of the structures that are under investigation, we actually are looking at a deferral of that final charge in the holding company. The reason the so-called double Irish structure is used is not to not pay tax but to defer the payment of tax, admittedly sometimes indefinitely. I would be giving very different answers to the Deputy if I thought for one minute that these structures were extinguishing a tax liability altogether. They are not but are allowing multinational companies to leave profits offshore in order that those profits can be reinvested to further their European business. We rightly think of tax incentives in terms of bringing business into this country. In some states, the capital exporters, they think of using tax incentives to encourage their indigenous companies to go out into the broader marketplace. This is what we are looking at in a lot of the instances of the double Irish. I am merely reporting it as I see it. I am not defending it but this is how I see it.

The transfer pricing issue is a totally different kettle of fish. Transfer pricing means a company is not paying an associated company a fair market price for its profits or services and, as a consequence of that, is leaving more profits in a low-tax jurisdiction, thereby reducing the overall tax bill on a permanent basis. Therefore, there is a permanent loss. This is a problem for governments everywhere. It is not a huge problem for the Irish Government, as Mr. McCaughey pointed out, simply because our rate tends to be lower than that of everyone else. However, this is not something that can be condoned. Again, without wishing to be too black and white, because the issues are so difficult, there is an international standard for it. Ireland has adopted that international standard and does not deserve to be kicked on the transfer pricing issue simply because it does not apply to us a lot of the time.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I already have referred to the issue in respect of transfer pricing. The international standard has proven to be inadequate in tackling base erosion profit shifting, BEPS. One of our suggestions and a criticism we make of the Government is that it is adhering to a standard that is fundamentally-----

The Irish Government?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

Yes. It is adhering to a standard that is fundamentally weak and unworkable. To state constantly that Ireland is adhering to the standards of the OECD is not really adhering to the standards to which we need to adhere. I already referred to transfer pricing and to people transferring profits into Ireland. To grant the revenue authority powers to challenge where they might be minimising this absolves both the revenue authority and us of detecting instances where this might have been generated by transfer mispricing somewhere else in the world. We have been recommending that the Irish revenue authority should take responsibility for and be granted powers to address this when it suspects instances of transfer pricing that come into the country.

Would Mr. Keegan accept the international standard on transfer pricing is not up to standard and is inadequate?

Mr. Brian Keegan

One would be foolish to suggest otherwise if for no other reason than when a dispute arises, it can drag on and on. The down side of it is that, unfortunately, it is the best we have at present. One has to work with what one has. Because transfer pricing issues tend to be cross-border by definition, one cannot make up one's own transfer pricing rules and go over to the neighbouring revenue authority and state, "By the way, we are tackling it this way this year", because they will merely laugh one out of court.

If we make a mistake, it would be not to engage in ways of improving the transfer pricing regime. That is an ongoing process and, as far as I can see, there is reasonable involvement by the Irish authorities.

I have no fundamental issues with what Mr. McCaughey is saying but, unfortunately, sometimes one has to play with the hand one is dealt, irrespective of how satisfactory or unsatisfactory that might be.

In practice, is the biggest problem not that the intellectual property is held offshore in jurisdictions where there is little or no corporation tax and then they are charging the other companies within the group and the profits are shifting and ending up in those destinations? In practice, is that not what is happening?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

Yes.

If the other point is valid, Mr. McCaughey's point that Ireland is very attractive at 12.5% and the rules are being used legally to transfer profits into Ireland, then surely we would have a bonanza of corporation tax given the presence of multinationals here, and we simply do not have that? We get approximately €4 billion which, as Mr. Keegan stated, is 10% of our total tax take. That, as I understand it, would be out of line with other countries where corporation tax would form a higher percentage of their total tax take. We are getting the bad reputation but we are not really getting the benefits in terms of corporation tax. We are getting jobs through multinationals but it seems that the offshore destinations are a far bigger problem.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

Deputy Michael McGrath has hit the nail on the head or made an important point. The only ones who are really benefiting from this are multinational corporations, their tax advisers and, one could argue, small island sunny states around the world. Certainly, Ireland is not benefiting from it, not to the degree that the Deputy described here.

Who is the policeman of the transfer pricing rules? Is it the individual tax authorities in individual states? One of Mr. McCaughey's suggestions is that Revenue should be allowed assess the transfer pricing rules in both directions, whether it is resulting in the minimisation of profits coming into Ireland or maximising profits coming into Ireland. What would be wrong with that? Why do they only have the powers on one side of the equation?

Mr. Brian Keegan

Revenue authorities are fairly circumscribed in what they do. They have almost absolute authority within their own jurisdiction. Everything else has to be done by way of negotiation under international treaties.

Incidentally, I do not accept that the transfer pricing issue is something that is confined to multinationals. One could have a firm in Newry and a firm in Drogheda engaging in cross-Border trade which could conceivably benefit from transfer pricing abuses. I also do not think that we are quite as bad at it as is portrayed.

The last point I would make is that one of the big issues with transfer pricing - Mr. McCaughey referred to it early in his presentation - is the difficulty of assessing what the correct position should be. To be fair, we have seen a lot of unprecedented stuff in the past ten to 15 years simply by virtue of the fact that the reliance by multinationals on their intellectual property has grown and the ability of a company to fairly and honestly state that X amount of the value of that product relates to the research it has done on it and Y amount relates to the materials and physical manufacture are challenges, not only for the Revenue authorities but also for the companies themselves, and we are working through a process.

I ask about the change in the Finance Act concerning stateless companies, that no company incorporated in Ireland can be deemed to be stateless from a residency point of view. Will that make any difference in practice?

Mr. Brian Keegan

As Deputy Michael McGrath will know better than I, the Department of Finance provides an estimate of what a change will result in. At the time the change was made, they did not give a figure for it. As to whether it is going to make a difference, it is not. It is very much a reputational move. It is copper-fastening a notion that we do not tolerate egregious planning practices. It is worth making the point that the existing residence rules that were brought in in 1998-99 were designed to ensure that one could not benefit from our 12.5% rate unless one had a proper presence. This is a further development of that. Arguably, this is a refinement, had it been thought of, that could have been brought in in 1998-99.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I would concur with some of that. There are more fundamental changes that are required rather than merely what was at the time a degree of not playing to the gallery but addressing a reputational issue. What this has highlighted is the lack of transparency and opacity that multinational corporations depend on to operate cross border. That is a fundamental issue that, unfortunately, lies outside of the terms of reference of this committee but is at the heart of how multinational corporations manage to engage in this kind of activity.

We do not have a full picture of what activities multinationals are engaged in. We only have a very small part of the picture in Ireland. We do not know what their activities are in jurisdictions elsewhere. How do we know that the amount of money that is coming into Ireland is the correct amount if we do not know what they are doing in country X, Y or Z. Country X, Y or Z may include a tax haven, and then the trail goes cold and one does not have any information about that company to take an informed position on whether or not the activities of that corporation are legitimate.

Before I bring in Deputy Boyd Barrett, I will round off something that was said. Believe it or not, I lived in Bermuda a long time ago, by the way, not as an accountant. I remember all the brass plates and noted that many of the accountants out there were Irish. Many senior staff in our own banking system have been trained out there.

The issue, to which both Mr. Keegan and Mr. McCaughey referred, is who is the beneficiary of this process - Mr. McCaughey indicated was the company - and the deferred payment, that the matter goes into an elongated process that may have tax paid at the end of it. I remember watching the UK hearings. Putting aside the morality of all of this argument that these are merely the rules, if I was a shareholder in one of these companies, I would have been infuriated that the company is making a lot of profit and it is ending up in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Dutch West Indies or wherever, it is banked there and the bank account is getting bigger and bigger. The sums out there are astronomical. If I was a shareholder, I would be asking why the company is banking all of this money out there where I would much rather it pay tax at some rate internationally so that I would get even 1 cent on the dollar because at present I would get no cent on the dollar. I would be interested to hear their thoughts on this. Ultimately, will it be, not the OECD or the G20, but the shareholders of these companies who might force them into paying some level of tax in some jurisdiction?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I will make one or two brief observations. First, it is well on the public record that shareholders in a number of publicly-quoted companies in the United States have expressed exactly that level of concern and frustration. Second, it seems that a big benefit to shareholders is the increase in the value of their shareholding be virtue of the fact that these moneys are there offshore. Third,-----

That is separate from a dividend. That is merely the share value.

Mr. Brian Keegan

It is different from a dividend. I suppose my point is that it is not as if they are not getting any benefit entirely from the accumulation.

That is true.

Mr. Brian Keegan

The third point is that a number of years ago the US authorities temporarily suspended or lifted the gates on the taxation of the moneys being paid back from offshore subsidiaries into the United States and that resulted in a significant flow of capital back to the United States. I suppose it is always a possibility that something like that might occur again but that does not address the underlying structures which give rise to the issue in the first place.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

The issue of shareholder power in a situation like that is interesting. I would not overestimate it. The amount of money that is being held offshore is, as the Chairman stated, astronomical. In the main, multinational corporations are waiting for some kind of amnesty, as happened previously. I will leave it at that.

I thank both contributors for their comments to the committee.

It is worth asking both of them, putting this debate in context, whatever about all the nuts and bolts and the questions of who and why, if they agree that aggressive tax avoidance by multinational corporations is a major contributor to the spectacular growth in the gap between the rich and poor.

Each year report after report from various international agencies points out that most of the 250 richest individuals are the CEOs of multinationals and that their personal wealth is the equivalent of that of the 46 poorest countries in the world. This level of extraordinary, unprecedented inequality is accelerating year on year. Does Mr. Keegan agree with the assertion that aggressive tax avoidance, be it through deferral, transfer pricing or the abuse of research and development clauses in tax codes, etc., is a major factor, if not the major one, that explains what any fair person would say is the morally unacceptable gap between the rich and poor?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I simply do not know. I do not want to give the Deputy a flippant answer. It is an economic question and outside my ability to comment on it in any way coherently. That is all I can really say on the matter. It strikes me that historically there have always been a number of dominant corporations at different times in different countries. Perhaps the phenomenon is not necessarily new. Other than saying this, I cannot give the Deputy a sensible observation.

That is an amazing response, to be honest. Could any reasonable person believe the correlation is coincidental given the spectacular wealth of certain individuals, whose current concentration has never been seen before? Circumstances are such that one individual could be worth tens, if not hundreds, of billions of euro. They are the CEOs of the companies in question and we are discussing the means through which the companies avoid, defer or get around taxation. Surely any reasonable person would say there is a strong, if not direct, connection between the phenomena I describe.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Clearly, I would be concerned if the Deputy were not happy with my answer, but I believe I am here as a witness on tax issues. The question the Deputy has asked is very much an economic one that goes beyond mere tax legislation, policy and practice. Really, I am in no better position to comment on the Deputy's question than any other contributor. With regard to the tax issues, I will certainly do my utmost to respond. However, I cannot competently comment on something that is not in my area of expertise.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I am interested in Mr. Keegan's response. It highlights of the problems we have, namely, people's ability to divorce morality from taxation as an issue. This seems almost impossible to do, but, apparently, it is within some people's gift.

To answer Deputy Richard Boyd Barrett's question, what he described is a major contributor to growing inequality between the rich and poor. I am aware of the discussions on Mr. Piketty’s-----

We will not get into naming individuals, as stipulated in Standing Orders. The delegates may speak in a general context.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

The author of a new book-----

I thought Mr. McCaughey was going to name an individual CEO.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

The author of a recently published book that discusses inequality references the amount of wealth held offshore as being important in assessing figures for inequality. The figures he has produced highlighting the massive gap between the rich and poor are only a small part of the picture if one factors in the huge amount of wealth being held offshore.

Therefore, the gap is even greater.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

It is even greater than suggested in the book. However, because we do not know exactly how much wealth is held offshore and because of the secrecy of small island semi-states and corporate secrecy we cannot put an accurate figure on it.

A recommendation made in an OECD paper of 1998 was on harmful tax practices. It suggested countries obtain a better understanding of the tax avoidance schemes in which the multinationals operating in their jurisdictions were involved and require multinationals to advise the authorities as to what they were engaged in. Interestingly, this point is made in the BEPS action plan. It is point No. 12. If many of the multinationals that claim to be resident in Ireland and are operational in Africa and the Middle East are really operational in these areas, they will have a good understanding of the tax avoidance schemes — tax avoidance is legal – but they need an understanding of what the schemes are. Therefore, Ireland should be in a strong position to ask them about the tax avoidance schemes in which they are involved and, by extension, share knowledge of them with developing countries.

Mr. Brian Keegan

I wish to make an observation. It seems that all of a sudden morality and economics have been conflated in this discussion. I answered what I understood from Deputy Richard Boyd Barrett to be a question that, to my mind, centred mainly on economics, on which I am not really in a position to comment. However, the suggestion now is that I am somehow divorcing morality from taxation. Let me be absolutely clear: neither my organisation nor I in any way condone any form of tax evasion. In fact, the contrary is the reality. We teach our students the ethics and morality of proper compliance and ensure they are properly equipped to deal with compliance issues. I totally reject any flippant suggestion to the contrary. In different circumstances I would ask for them to be withdrawn. It is utterly unfair.

This is not about directing remarks at Mr. Keegan personally. I was surprised that he would not accept that there was a connection between tax avoidance and the widening gap between the rich and poor. He states he teaches compliance with the law. As I do not know a lot about what he teaches, I am not personalising the issue at all. There is the question of compliance with the law and that of getting around the law legally. We are trying to determine whether there is a connection between tax avoidance by multinationals that make such extraordinary profits and the CEOs of which are spectacularly rich and among the richest in the world and the fact that there is a huge gap between the rich and poor.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Okay.

That is the point. I am not saying Mr. Keegan's organisation is encouraging tax avoidance, but to my mind it is extraordinary that somebody would not acknowledge that there was a connection between the two phenomena.

Mr. Brian Keegan

It was not that I did not acknowledge it; I said I did not know. It is entirely possible that there could be a connection. I simply do not know.

Mr. Brian Keegan

On a point of information on tax avoidance, Mr. McCaughey quoted an OECD recommendation dating from 1998. For several years we in Ireland have had a mandatory scheme for the disclosure of tax avoidance schemes to the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. It is based on the UK scheme introduced approximately ten years ago.

It has to be segregated from tax evasion.

Mr. Brian Keegan

We are now talking specifically about tax avoidance. The recommendation has been adopted by this jurisdiction and a number of others, including the United Kingdom. That is one particular box in terms of recommendations.

It is hard to quantify the extent of transfer mispricing, which seems to be one feature of tax avoidance, because corporations operate on an international basis and we do not have country by country reporting, as pointed out by Mr. McCaughey. I would like to hear a little more about whether we could on our own start a process of reporting. It seems that we could and should and not just wait for the OECD to demand it.

We want to know details of multinationals' operations, what is being made here and where these profits are being generated, as against stuff that is coming in. I would therefore like to hear a comment on that.

In so far as we could possibly get a handle on transfer mispricing, that is not just tax avoidance; is it not tax evasion? If they are abusing the rules, that is tax evasion.

Is that a question?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I think there is no issue there. I have already made the point that in transfer pricing, tax is permanently gone. It differs from deferral. The transfer pricing difficulties are myriad, not least because they involve large amounts of money and also involve industries which are often poorly understood by the Revenue authorities. Let us call a spade a spade here. There are certain areas where Revenue can, in actual fact, bring in expertise from outside to help tackle these issues.

Can I just stop Mr. Keegan there because time will run out?

Mr. Brian Keegan

Yes.

I have seen figures - I do not have them in front of me - which show that, for example, the productivity of workers in Irish multinationals and the profits generated per worker are off the Richter scale compared to other countries.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Yes.

I have great time for Irish workers and I have no doubt how educated and capable they are, but there is such a spectacular gap between the profits being generated per worker in Irish multinationals and those in other countries, that two and two would strongly seem to suggest four. I am suggesting there is something going on. Would Mr. Keegan agree with that?

I am sorry but I must ask the Deputy to be succinct in his questions, and witnesses should be succinct in their answers as well. A question?

That is the question.

Mr. Brian Keegan

It does occur to me that where one has high-value processes carried out by highly-skilled and highly-educated individuals, there is going to be a substantial difference between the productivity of Irish and other workers, if measured in terms of sales. There will also be a substantial difference if a big part of the value of those sales is derived from intellectual property wherever relevant. I accept the Deputy's point that he does not have any figures in front of him, but beyond those two general observations I do not know if I can comment sensibly any further.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I wish to make two quick points. First, we have not talked enough about the brass-plate companies that are operational in Ireland. They are the ones that are, in part, skewing the figures. They are damaging our reputation and giving us a false impression of how productive Irish workers are.

My second point is about country-by-country reporting. We could go ahead and do that in the morning. Other countries, including France, Norway and Finland, have all made varying degrees of commitment to introduce country-by-country reporting. We could do it as part of the OECD's working party No. 6, which is looking at a template for country by country reporting. At the moment there is nothing to suggest a need for confidentiality in that template, so that when Ireland looks to enact legislation as a result of the BEPS process, they can introduce a requirement for that information to be public. There is absolutely nothing stopping us. We can do it as part of the OECD's BEPS process or we can introduce legislation to make it a requirement unilaterally.

I have two other quick questions and the answers will have to be brief because I do not have much time. I am back-tracking a little bit. Tax deferral, as opposed to tax evasion, might be legal but Mr. Keegan made a good point which is worth underlining. Perhaps he can confirm this point. If one can defer tax there is a huge amount at stake, is there not? To take the comparison with an individual, if we did not have to pay our property tax and water charges for ten, 15 or 20 years, but had to pay them way down the line, that would be a pretty significant benefit. Ordinary individuals do not get the opportunity to do that.

One can actually do it with the property tax. One can defer it.

One can do it for five years.

A pensioner can defer it.

If one is on a low income, one can do it.

Simple interest, not compound.

Yes, but one pays interest on it. As regards share values, however, because they do not have to pay tax on it the value of their shares can appreciate - sometimes enormously - and they can then sell those shares and make vast fortunes. Generally speaking, it is not a mechanism that is available to ordinary citizens but by doing this, shareholders in those companies can become very rich. Is that not true?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I entirely concur that tax deferral is a valuable advantage. It is also an advantage that is conferred even in domestic situations where, for example, an additional tax allowance is given for energy efficient equipment. Effectively, one is getting the benefit of one's investment up front and therefore deferring an ultimate tax bill. I agree entirely that tax deferral is not an option which is available to the vast majority of citizens. I suppose that if everybody were ultimately to defer their tax the Exchequer would encounter significant difficulty. I agree with the Deputy that tax deferral is a very valuable benefit.

I have one last point. There were references to the €4 billion we get in profits. Mr. Keegan said that was a big figure. Perhaps he could comment on the point I have made several times, namely, that compared to the €70 billion in pre-tax profits it is very small.

I am giving Deputy Boyd Barrett a bit of latitude.

It is 6.8% of the pre-tax profits. The European Commission's effective figure would confirm that, whereas effective rates elsewhere - according to a paper we received recently from the Oireachtas Library service - showed that similar implicit rates across Europe are very much higher. Putting that together with the point about research and development, there are other ways in which taxable income is reduced. I would like to ask both Mr. Keegan and Mr. McCaughey about that. How is it that our implicit rate is so much lower? Is it to do with abuse of research and development tax breaks or other tax breaks that allow companies to write down the amount of their taxable profits?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I have a quick observation to make. Implicit tax rates are fraught with difficulty. We have a top income tax rate of 41%, but I do not think anybody pays an implicit tax rate of 41% as an income earner. It is somewhere close to 33%. It is almost like the question of how long is a piece of string, as to how it is measured. The Department of Finance did a very good paper some time ago comparing the different ways in which effective rates can be measured against the stated 12.5% rate and the 25% rate. Let us not forget that there is a 25% corporation tax rate for investment income.

I have one other observation on the Deputy's point, if I might.

I have just one question, while Mr. Keegan thinks about his answer. Why is our implicit rate so much lower than everybody else's in Europe?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I am not clear that it is.

According to the figures we were given in the research document, it is. The implicit rate is much higher than in other countries in Europe.

Mr. Brian Keegan

As I mentioned in my answer, it depends on how these things are measured. I am not privy to those particular figures, but I would be glad to take a look at them and revert to the Deputy on that point.

Mr. Brian Keegan

I have a last observation. The Deputy mentioned a possible abuse of research and development. Research and development claims are made under the self-assessment system and are routinely audited by the Revenue Commissioners. Revenue has the power to bring in outside experts specifically to look at research and development claims if it is unhappy with them. In case there is any misapprehension that there would be widespread abuse, I suspect that is one area where it is fairly tightly policed.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

To reduce the effect of the tax rate that is paid is to take advantage of the research and development credits that are offered. It is clearly outlined in this report, which spells out simply how research and development credits are, and can be, abused to reduce the effective tax rate to 6% or lower.

Not only are individuals not able to benefit from deferring tax, but small and medium enterprises also do not have the same advantage that multinational corporations have. This kind of tax avoidance really puts small and medium enterprises at a distinct disadvantage.

In recent years, I have attended meetings of the OECD in Paris on global taxation issues. One can see a lot of finger-pointing over there and we are often at the receiving end. However, the leadership of the OECD makes it quite clear that we are very transparent in regard to how we deal with our taxation matters. Other countries have often been picked by the OECD chairmen when they are pointing the finger at countries like Ireland or the Netherlands.

Their countries are not exactly perfect either. If one looks at some of the stuff that has transpired from these meetings, we are more transparent than even the United Kingdom in some of our taxation matters. Luxembourg is quite hostile regarding how taxation is dealt with. Many of the taxation havens about which we talk - the ones in the Caribbean - are under the protection of the United Kingdom or the USA.

What transpires from all of this is that it will be very difficult to find a unilateral solution from any one country. Unless all countries jump together, it is unlikely that anything significant will happen. That is what seems to be coming out of the BEPS. Unless the G20 and all OECD countries decide to work together, it is unlikely that anything significant will come out of it. On the back of this, what has happened to the McCain recommendations? I gather that the Revenue Commissioners have changed nothing in the couple of years since the recommendations were published. Certainly, Congress has not published any legislation to change it. In fact, some of the difficulties about which we are talking are the result of legislation which Congress passed in the mid-1990s. I refer to the tick-the-box legislation of which Senator McCain was one of the advocates at the time.

When we talk about this issue, there is nothing Ireland can do on its own. I will ask the delegates for their opinions on this, although they may not be able to answer. They are here to discuss taxation issues. The worst accusation that can be made against Ireland is that it is a conduit for money which moves in and out. This has become an international issue as we are really talking about the value of intellectual property. Is that not how much of this has come to a head? Intellectual property is given a value by a holding company in one of the tax havens, which generates the issue. Many countries are recognising these huge amounts of money which are being held in offshore accounts. There was a very deliberate policy by countries. Companies using the retained profits could not only push their own agenda but, in some respects, push that of a nation. This seems to have become an issue only in recent years. Is this due to the huge amounts of money about which we talk in terms of retained profits and because it is so easy to put a value on intellectual property rights that one can make up oneself?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

The Deputy is right that this is not something Ireland can do unilaterally. It will not solve the problem on its own. However, bearing in mind that Ireland's reputation has taken a severe hammering-----

That is because it is easy to give its reputation a severe battering.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

For whatever reason, it is the reality of how Ireland is perceived by many very well respected commentators in organisations and institutions such as The Wall Street Journal and among others.

The Wall Street Journal would have its own agenda also.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

The perception is that Ireland's reputation has taken a hammering, rightly or wrongly, and that there are things we can do to address this. We cannot solve the problem unilaterally, but we can go some way towards improving our reputation. There are a number of things Ireland has not yet managed to do to address that reputation, some of which I have highlighted in the presentation which I hope has been circulated to members.

It is also interesting to note that much of this could be solved by the USA. I am sure Mr. Keegan will agree. With the stroke of a pen, the tax regulations governing things like how US companies operate in Ireland could be addressed. This is slightly outside my area of expertise, but I understand it could be done simply. It is not being done, which probably reflects the degree of corporate lobbying to which the President's office is subject.

Deputy Liam Twomey referred to Ireland as a conduit country. That is the accusation correctly levelled at us, but from our point of view, the question is from where the money is coming. Is it coming from countries in the global south? Is it coming from revenue authorities which lack the capacity to police and monitor whether this is legitimate profit shifting out of the country? That this is a conduit country is, in fact, a strong accusation to make, as we do not know from where the money is coming. It could be coming from some of the poorest countries in the world.

Mr. Brian Keegan

There are many points and I might mention some of them briefly. Deputy Liam Twomey mentioned his visits to the OECD and the consequences there. The fact is that because we have had a 12.5% rate for so long, we have been under fierce scrutiny by the OECD and European Union institutions. As such, we have had to be whiter than white. The 12.5% rate only applies as a consequence of EU scrutiny as the European Union stated, "You cannot have a 10% rate for manufacturing entities and a 40% rate for everything else." That is the genesis and we have been subject to a great deal of public scrutiny.

The Deputy made reference to the US Senate committee hearings, the report on which was published approximately one year ago. My understanding is that nothing has happened there.

On the observation that our reputation has taken a severe hammering, I note that it does not seem to have damaged our capacity to attract foreign direct investment. I see new announcements almost every day by IDA Ireland of new investments.

Can I interject, because this is a point of contention? We have major global operators here from the western hemisphere, but we have no global operators from the eastern hemisphere. It is the same taxation system. I will not name the companies as it is obvious who they are, but I note that they are not in the Irish market. They are neither here as brass plate companies in the IFSC or with 4,000 or 5,000 employees behind the gates of a company.

Mr. Brian Keegan

I accept that point. Ericsson and SAP made announcements only this morning. Ericsson is Scandanavian, while SAP is German. It is not necessarily all flowing from east to west, but I take the overall point.

Much of the reputational damage has been caused by the media coverage and, to a lesser extent, certain opportunist commentary by people looking after the national interests of their own countries. That is entirely legitimate and acceptable.

On the Deputy's observation about so-called "fixing" the double Irish, these five US Senate sub-committee recommendations, were they to be implemented by the US authorities, would address many of the double Irish structures. As I say, however, one year has passed and nothing has happened.

On the international scene, much of the debate appears to focus on what happens in Ireland and Holland, but perhaps I am wrong. Why is there not as great a desire to rein in the tax havens? There are trillions of euro on account in what are described as "tax havens". They are called "tax havens" as our taxation commissioners and the revenue services of other countries cannot gain access to accounts in these countries. Why has no attempt been made to rein them in? Why does the debate fail to focus on Bermuda or Barbados? The United Kingdom and the USA have more jurisdiction over these countries than they have over Ireland.

Mr. Brian Keegan

The Deputy makes a very good point. It seems to be accepted, no matter what the forum, that the striking of the tax rate is a sovereign matter, whether the rate is 12.5%, 20%, 35% or even 0%. It seems that there has been a considerable effort on the international front to establish a network of what are called "tax information exchange agreements". These fall short of full double taxation agreements and constitute arrangements with very low tax countries to provide information on request for other nations. Ireland is certainly involved in that network. There have, therefore, been some developments in that regard.

That is a development everyone would like to see.

That does not apply to territories like the Cayman Islands or Barbados. Do they have that same agreement with most other countries?

Mr. Brian Keegan

Off the top of my head, because I do not have the list in front of me, I cannot tell the Deputy categorically whether we have a tax information exchange agreement with either of those two islands. We do have agreements with comparable ones.

Some countries like the United Kingdom and the United States were critical of our position. They would almost have jurisdiction over some of these islands. Did they seek the same information about which we are talking?

Mr. Brian Keegan

Unfortunately, criticism of the Irish position does not necessarily translate into action. For example, several countries which might be among our most strident critics in this regard have introduced the patent box, a special low rate of corporation tax for the kind of high-tech intellectual property related activities. These are very similar to the same systems which we are so often accused of using to abuse the multinational tax system. Unfortunately, there is no direct correlation between the rhetoric and what other individual territories do with their own tax systems.

I presume Mr. Keegan is referring to the UK in that instance.

Mr. Brian Keegan

The UK is one of several countries.

Did the UK parliamentary committee hearings on taxation make any significant recommendations?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I certainly think they made a number of findings but I am not clear if it had the formal status of granting committee recommendation as had occurred in the US.

If we took a unilateral approach to taxation policy, would that damage our ability to attract foreign direct investment?

Mr. Brian Keegan

Yes, there is no question of that.

Would it have a significant effect on the Irish Financial Services Centre, IFSC, if we decided to go offside on how international accounting rules are operated?

Mr. Brian Keegan

We are down to the two strand issue, namely that is a combination of Ireland maintaining its 12.5% corporation tax rate but also interacting through its double taxation agreements and through EU treaties with other sovereign nations. If we make drastic unilateral changes, we will damage the existing network and create, perhaps, an atmosphere of uncertainty because foreign direct investment decisions tend to be taken over five to ten year spans. Companies proposing to invest here like to see a certain reliability and continuity. Accordingly, there would be a reputational as well as the practical issue.

I would be slightly concerned as to the consequences of those kind of changes were we to act unilaterally. If we act in concert with everyone else, it might be a good development for the country. What could happen is that more profits would come into the charge of tax at 12.5% as compared with higher rates in the US, UK or anywhere else. I would not have particular concern with everyone moving together on several initiatives. However, to act unilaterally might be damaging to Ireland’s interests.

On the brass plate issue and the IFSC, is it correct that the same operations occur in Luxembourg and London on a much larger scale?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I do not wish to dispute Deputy Twomey on this but the point I would make about the IFSC is that the status of those companies in question was put under the lens by the Europe Court of Justice in the Cadbury Schweppes case and we were not found to be wanting. I would be reasonably happy, based on that authority, that what were are doing at the IFSC is sustainable.

Is it exactly the same that happens in the UK and Luxembourg?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I am not in a position to comment on Luxembourg.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

Deputy Twomey may not have been here for my earlier reference to a subsidiary of the food company, ABF, which operates out of Zambia. It used a brass plate operation in the IFSC essentially to deprive the Zambian tax authority of €88 million over the course of two years through the tax agreement between Zambia and Ireland. That is the result of two years of research by the organisation in question. Are there other brass plate companies engaged in that kind of operation? Knowing what we know what came out of the US Senate hearings and from what happened in the UK, we could make a very informed guess to say "Yes" and that there are many other operations that are just brass plate and have not come under the scrutiny that perhaps they should have.

I call Deputy Mathews.

How much time do I have?

Very little. I will give Deputy Mathews ten minutes maximum as I want to finish this meeting at 5.50 p.m.

I want to contribute.

Yes, I am allowing the Deputy to contribute. He is on the clock now.

Going back to when taxation was first talked about in principle, philosophically - equity, certainty, collectability - I believe we have moved into the realm of what happened in the stock exchanges. This was well elucidated by Michael Lewis in his recent book, Flash Boys, which dealt with the great danger and fear among investment banks that with the fragmentation of markets, risks were becoming uncontrollable and unknown. That is why the IEX was created. Similarly, deferred taxation has become a massive fund of back-loaded money that provides working capital and resources to businesses and enhances their embedded valuations. As a result, tax arbitrage is not unlike the fragmentation of the stock exchanges.

Ireland, which the delegation said, has received a bad reputation but is now being rehabilitated. The balance sheets of the banks and building societies between 2001 to 2008 - something the Chairman will see in his banking committee - will tell us about the financial meltdown in Ireland. There was the manufacturing of a credit bubble which was the precondition for the asset price bubble and collapse. Accordingly, the directors were responsible. Forget about regulators, greedy builders and developers. The atmosphere-----

A question, please, Deputy Mathews.

This is the parallel argument.

Will you put a question, please?

It is difficult to have a conversation when-----

It is but we are not having a conversation. There are witnesses here to whom we should put questions. I would like the Deputy to put some questions.

Deputy Boyd Barrett asked why there is only a 6.8% effective rate of taxation on €70 billion of corporate profits, mainly multinational corporation profits. Many of the chief executive officers of these companies are my age contemporaries and I was in schools and college with them. When I have asked them how they would feel if a three year national recovery levy of 3% were imposed on their companies’ reported profits, they have said they would neither up stumps and close down nor be afraid to make further investments in Ireland. Such a levy on their surged profits since 2008 is very sustainable. It is a great pity the Department of Finance and the Government has not asked them for this. It is the same way there has not been a persuasive request for debt write-down in the euro system for the banks’ collapse and socialisation of their losses.

Three percent of €70 billion is €2.2 billion, or an awful lot of medical cards and repairs to the water system before water is metered and charged. It is disgraceful that our Government-----

We have had four minutes already. Is the Deputy’s question whether the baseline corporation tax should be increased by 3%?

What is the answer from a fiscal and taxation point of view, bearing in mind the philosophical, equity, certainty and collectability to those questions that were very fairly put, and would show leadership in the country in order that the other heavy lifting among the hard-pressed middle, lower middle classes and homeless people could be borne?

We are in it together. What is the fiscal response to that? I do not think there is any.

There is so much labyrinthine complexity to the way tax is assessed that it has become a mystery in order to create the arbitrage, which is hugely profitable to the professionals who live off it - lawyers, tax lawyers and tax accountants. I am one of them. I put my hand up.

Do Mr. Keegan or Mr. McCaughey wish to speak?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

I must be careful not to step outside our mandate. We would hold that corporations pay a fair amount of tax in the country in which they operate reflective of the substantive activity they have in that jurisdiction. We would be concerned that this is not happening at the moment. The question of whether an additional 3% emergency levy would be an appropriate response to that is more of a domestic issue.

Is Mr. McCaughey telling me they would not blink?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

If corporations were actually paying the fair and accurate amount they are supposed to be paying, and we know this is not the case, perhaps we would not be in the situation we are in at the moment.

That is a separate argument. The credit bubble involved boards of directors of banks abandoning fractional reserving, pumping up their balance sheets with issues of bonds and-----

We need contributions that are-----

Bank of Ireland had €61 billion in bond funding at the end of the year.

Will Deputy Mathews respect the Chair? I need questions that are germane to this afternoon's proceedings. We are not in a banking inquiry. We do not have any banking officials across the table. This discussion relates to global taxation and the architecture of it. Has Mr. McCaughey concluded his response? I will hear from Mr. Keegan. This is a serious matter, Deputy Mathews.

I am very serious - so serious that I am trying to smile to counterbalance my frustration.

Mr. Keegan, without interruption.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Perhaps the area about which I can make the most useful comment is Deputy Mathews's observation of how labyrinthine the system has become. I agree with him that it has become labyrinthine. It is worth making the point that tax legislation is essentially driven by three factors. It is driven by Government policies and as a response to and in anticipation of business developments. As global business becomes more complex, the system is becoming more complex. Equally, there is no doubt that the joining up of activity between the various revenue authorities is absolutely unprecedented. There is the Forum on Tax Administration comprising the revenue authorities of OECD member countries and a number of others. It is chaired by the Irish, which should be a matter of some pride to us. It is a genuine attempt to co-ordinate that kind of labyrinthine legislation and make it navigable.

In terms of who benefits from labyrinthine legislation, my suggestion is that nobody benefits. The vast majority of my profession are employed in business. They are the people who operate the PAYE and VAT systems and collect fiduciary taxes in respect of the Government tax take. These are ongoing problems. One concern I would have is that coming out of BEPS could make a very difficult international environment even more complicated because it is very difficult to make changes that will keep everybody happy while at the same time keeping such changes simple.

Fairness is what we are aiming for.

Mr. Brian Keegan

Indeed.

I will round off today's proceedings, finish with two questions and leave the witnesses open to make additional comments. My first question relates to the Irish context. Should we limit the abilities of companies to use or avail of tax provisions in other countries and with other treaties? Should companies pay tax in the location of their assets or workers, as is now the case, or in the location of their customers? I would be interested in hearing Mr. McCaughey's response to the next question because there is a social commentary dimension to the work of his organisation. The question might be relevant to Mr. Keegan as well in terms of what is the best solution. Are they looking for a universal code of practice on the global architecture of taxation, which is a one-size-fits-all approach? Alternatively, are they suggesting that there need to be some agreed baselines across the global structure and that nations can decide their own corporation tax rates inside that global structure?

Mr. Brian Keegan

The first two questions are particularly interesting. I will answer the second question first because it is germane to the answer to the first question. The question of whether companies should pay tax in the location of their assets is a fundamental ongoing debate. What it really boils down to is the question of whether a company pays tax where it does the work or where the market is. There have been several attempts over the years to achieve one or the other. The EU had a project running for several years that was called the common consolidated corporate tax base. One of the ideas behind it was that companies would pay a proportion of their tax where their market was located as distinct from where the product was manufactured. It is an issue that is very much to the fore in the BEPS discussions at the moment where there is a suggestion that there should be more tax attributable to the location of the market, particularly in the context of digital goods and services. The difficulty for a country like Ireland which has a big manufacturing base and a relatively small market is that this will erode our tax take. How would it be achieved? It would primarily be achieved through the modification of provisions in the tax treaties, primarily the concept of permanent establishment and where companies are located.

My last observation on this, which may be germane to the third point, is that there seems to be a strong move internationally towards the prevalence of consumption taxes, what we called value added tax, which in a sense addresses that point because it renders a level of taxation in the country where the market typically is.

From the get go?

Mr. Brian Keegan

Yes. To draw the Chairman's three questions together, we need to be very careful not to have too big a shift towards the market and over-modify our tax treaties as a consequence. We need to look at and encourage the notion of consumption taxes, particularly in the context of developing countries, to reflect market realities for them.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

The Chairman's second question is a difficult one to answer definitively. What we have said is that companies ultimately should pay the correct amount of tax reflective of where their substantive activity is. Reflecting that most of the purchases may be done globally makes it more complicated but we are still formulating a position around that. That said, we need to see a system introduced that is reflective of the particular concerns of developing countries and which enables them to factor in and be a part of that system. Unfortunately, the OECD BEPS process is not doing that. I am unable to give the Chairman a definitive position on that, which is a complex and difficult question, as Mr. Keegan noted. Whatever is agreed needs to be reflective of the particular needs of developing countries.

With regard to the flexibilities of nation states, even in the European context, every state can set its own tax code at the moment. With regard to the global architecture, is Mr. McCaughey of the view that there should be a baseline position that is established that is universally agreed regardless of whether it is through the OECD, the G20 or the EU and that there would be a degree of flexibility for states such as Ireland in respect of getting the product to market regardless of whether tax is paid in the manufacturing area? Getting products made in Ireland to Berlin in the morning has a cost compared with making the product in Berlin and selling it there, so there are variations. Is Mr. McCaughey of the view that corporation tax should be the same rate across the EU or does he understand that countries need a variable rate because of the different approximation of the market?

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

We are of the view that there is a recognition that there can and should be variables across the EU. However, we would like to see corporations adhere to that rate, whatever it may be. We have never had any problem with Ireland's 12.5% corporation tax rate. We would be keen to see corporations paying that rate and are using it to deplete the revenue take of developing countries. It is not so much about the tax rate per se as it is about its abuse and the impact on developing countries.

Does Mr. Keegan wish to add anything before I return to Mr. McCaughey?

Mr. Brian Keegan

I have a few general remarks. I thank the Chairman and the sub-committee for the opportunity to offer some comments.

It has often been observed that the worst person to decide what is the correct amount of tax to be paid is the taxpayer. That is something that comes to bear on much of the debate on these issues, whether it is to do with offshoring, avoidance or any of the matters that were raised this afternoon. Countries have their own sovereign interests and it is entirely defensible for any country to defend those interests. As a country, we need to stop beating ourselves up about our tax system. In fact, we have a system that is well administered and compliant with international norms. It is a system that secures the appropriate amount of tax from the companies which are within the charged tax remit and is reasonably consistent in its administration. Of course, there is always room for improvement. From speaking with people in other representative organisations across the globe, it is clear that this type of public and political debate is genuinely necessary if we are to achieve real improvements where such are needed. I thank the sub-committee for the opportunity to engage in this debate.

I invite Mr. McCaughey to make his concluding remarks.

Mr. Sorley McCaughey

It is important to emphasise that we have a commitment to ensure there is policy coherence across Government, such that the tax objectives and tax policy of the Department of Finance do not undermine the development objectives of Irish Aid. I outlined in my presentation that there are certain gaps in the way in which Ireland presents its foreign direct investment incentives, which can and may well be utilised by multinational corporations to deplete the revenue take of developing countries. We are falling a little short in addressing those gaps. We could do a great deal more to rectify that situation and thereby honour our commitment to the developing countries of the world.

I thank Mr. Keegan and Mr. McCaughey for assisting the sub-committee in its work this afternoon. I appreciate their efforts to make their contributions understandable and accessible to any observer of these proceedings. We intend to deal with a number of modules in the course of our deliberations on this issue in the coming period, after which we will issue a final report. In drawing up that report, we certainly will note and draw upon the contributions, expertise and broad range of experience that Mr. Keegan and Mr. McCaughey bring to this issue.

The joint committee adjourned at 5.55 p.m. until 2 p.m. on Wednesday, 28 May 2014.
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