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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 30 Jan 1924

Vol. 2 No. 15

SEANAD IN COMMITTEE.

Debate resumed on amendment No. 5:—
Section 22, line 63. To delete the words "including liability as to costs" (Senator Brown).

I stated when I moved this amendment the other day what were my reasons for doing so, but as some members of the Seanad who are here to-day may not have been present when I did so, I think it is better that I should state very shortly the reasons again. It is an amendment to Section 22 of the Bill which deals with the jurisdiction which is to be exercised by Rules of Court. It has nothing to do with the rule-making authority, but merely the jurisdiction which the rule-making authority is to have in making rules.

Amongst the things which Section 22 gives the rule-making authority jurisdiction to do, is to make rules which would affect legal practice and procedure generally, including liability to costs. The amendment I move is to strike out the words "including liability as to costs." It is to take away from the rule-making authority any power to deal with the liability to costs, as distinguished from the amount of costs. I think it ought to be left to the rule-making committee, if necessary, to provide by Rules of Court a scale of costs, perhaps; but the words which I propose should be struck out of this Section would give them jurisdiction to determine liability. That is, it would practically give them legislative authority to deal with this question.

That might result in some hard and fast rule being made by the rule-making authority as to liability to costs, and it is far better, as we lawyers know from experience, to have a statutory provision declaring some general rule as to liability for costs, with power to the judge who tries the case to exercise his discretion, if necessary, in any particular case. As a general rule, as I said the other day, the cost of an action ought to follow the result. If a man wins, he ought not to have to pay for his victory. If he has been in the right, and his right has been recognised, he ought to get the costs of the necessary proceeding to vindicate his right. There are cases in which that general rule works hardly and unjustly, and our judges have, up to the present, practically in all cases, except jury cases, had a discretion as to costs. I very much object, and I ask the Seanad to take the same view, to a rule-making authority, even consisting of judges and lawyers without any interference on the part of any Executive Ministry, having the power to legislate in this matter. Is it intended that they should by some rule interfere with the discretion which a judge should be entitled to exercise in a particular case? Is it intended that they should have power to repeal numerous statutory provisions that already exist as to the liability to costs? If it is, I respectfully suggest that it is a power which ought not to be given to a body of this kind. What I seek to do by the amendment is to prevent them legislating on this very important subject, and I ask the Seanad to support me in my opinion.

May I take this opportunity of thanking you, sir, and through you, the Seanad for the courtesy of audience which has been extended to me.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

May I say, both on personal and public grounds, we all welcome you.

I am very much obliged to you. Under the Judicature Act the rule making authority was given power under Section 61, Sub-Section 3, to make rules regulating the costs of proceedings. That had not been done under the English Judicature Act, and difficulties having arisen, when they came to pass the Irish Judicature Act the express power was given to the rule making authority. The inspiration of that amendment is obviously this: that the variety of cases, and consequently the variety of rules as to costs, is very considerable and could not be very well covered entirely by statute. Of course the Rules of Court are in the nature of legislation. The rules that will be made by this rule making authority will be laid on the Table of the Seanad, as well as on the Table of the Dáil, and each House will have complete authority over them. They become in the nature of what one may call administrative legislation. I have had a number of interviews with representatives of the Bar Council on this, amongst other matters, and one amendment has been inserted in the Bill in the Dáil to give effect to the principal request that was made—and the only definite request that was made to me on the matter. It was that in connection with jury trials the discretion of the judge should be taken away, and that without special cause stated, as to which there should be an appeal, the costs should follow the event. Senator Brown has an amendment, No. 44, that I take it should be read concurrently with this one, in which he proposes to make the rule as to the costs following the event apply to every case. We do not think that is practicable.

May I explain that I did not intend to interfere with the proviso in the other Section.

I understand that. A general rule of that character, while it is a general rule on the common law side of the Court, is we think, not practicable when one considers the other side of the Court. For instance, suits in which trustees are involved, perhaps as formal defendants against whom certain declarations and rights are asked, are forms of action in which the event could not determine the issue of costs. What we propose is that, as formerly, the rule making authority, consisting as it does principally of Judges, should have the authority to prepare rules governing costs; general rules which will be submitted to the Seanad and will be in the nature of legislation, if approved of by this House. I am surprised that this amendment should come from Senator Brown. The number of cases where the costs following the event would not rule are so much more numerous on the Chancery side of the Court, that I am rather per plexed it should come from him.

From the many interviews I have had with the representatives of the Bar Council, I understand that the Bar Council has agreed with the provisions as they stand in this respect, and we submit that this is the only practical way of dealing with the matter.

I do not object to administrative legislation and the rule making authority on the question of costs. I try to draw a distinction and with great respect, I do not think that the question of the liability to costs is administrative legislation. It is positive legislation, and it is not carrying out by machinery what is provided by the Act. We are told, quite rightly, that in a subsequent section of this Bill all the rules made by the rule making authority must lie on the Table of both Houses, and if either House objects to them they will not come into effect. In theory, that is an excellent provision, and it gives control in a matter of this kind to either of the two Houses. I need not say that a technical question like liability to costs is not one which would be brought home to anybody here except to the one or two lawyers who are in the assembly. For practical purposes I am greatly afraid that the provisions would not give the kind of protection which I want by my amendment to give against legislative interference with the right to costs.

I was going to say, after listening to the Attorney-General, that he based his main argument against Senator Brown's amendment on the feelings of the Bar, and from what I was able to gather, I take it, so far as that goes, that Senator Brown has also got a fair amount of opinion from the Bar, so that it is a matter merely of statement. What does occur to an ordinary citizen who knows nothing about legal matters is what Senator Brown has been saying, namely, that the rules may be laid on the Table, but the ordinary citizen will know nothing about them. Therefore, the protection of laying the rules of Court on the Table is really no protection at all for the public. Undoubtedly this is going to be an administrative change of which none of us laymen can judge at all, and if we vote for the Clause as it stands, we are undoubtedly making a change that none of us business men understands. I should think it is very dangerous to make a change that will interfere with the general rules as to costs which those who bring actions understand, and know what they are undertaking when they take up any action. This is one of the Clauses which, I think, alters the existing law without any adequate justification or without any demand from the public.

May I point out, on the matter of change, that the change would really be effected by the amendment, because under the existing law the rules as to costs are made by the rule making authority, consisting of judges, and if the Seanad has confidence that judges of an equal calibre will be appointed under this Bill, they should have equal confidence with that entertained in the past that judges would make suitable provision as to costs. There is a great variety of matters, such as the bringing of an action in one Court instead of in another, and the old rules as to persons without a certain jurisdiction suing in another, that have in the past been entrusted with absolute confidence to a rule making authority of judges. Unless the confidence is shaken as to the judges to be appointed under this Bill, I suggest that there is no reason for the change, and a change is really made by Senator Brown's amendment.

May I ask if the rule making authority in the future is going to be the same as in the past?

Substantially under this Bill.

The Attorney-General will not take me as agreeing to that.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

That is a matter I am afraid which admits of controversy.

Amendment put and declared lost.
Section put and agreed to.
SECTION 23.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

The motion is that Section 23 stand part of the Bill. I see there is no amendment to this Section, but might I point out to the Attorney-General that it fails in two respects to accomplish the purpose which I am sure the framers intended. The obvious intention was to prevent any judge sitting on appeal in any matter originally tried by himself, that is to say that no judge should be a member of any Court of Appeal to determine any matter heard by that particular judge. This Section is defective in two respects. First, it makes no provision for cases tried by a judge with a jury. They are omitted. Secondly, the words "that no judge shall sit on the hearing of any appeal from any judgment or order made by him, either alone or with any other judge" are defective for this reason. A judge may sit with other judges and be a dissenting judge. In that case the order is not made by him, but by his colleagues, and if the Section stands as it is, that judge would be entitled to sit on appeal if he were the dissenting party. I would suggest the following words, "provided always that no judge shall sit on the hearing of an appeal in any action tried before him, whether with or without a jury, or from any judgment or order heard by him, either alone or with any other judge."

I think these are very important matters, and the draftsman will bring forward an amendment for the next stage embodying those suggestions.

Section put and agreed to.
SECTION 24.
When any action shall be pending in the High Court which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court, any party to such action may, at any time before service of notice of trial therein, apply to the High Court that the action be remitted or transferred to the Circuit Court, and thereupon, in case the court shall consider that the action is fit to be prosecuted in the High Court, it may retain such action therein, or if it shall not consider the action fit to be prosecuted in the High Court it may remit or transfer such action to the Circuit Court in which the same might have been commenced, or to any court that may appear suitable and convenient, upon such terms, in either case and subject to such conditions, as to costs or otherwise as may appear to be just:
Provided that the High Court shall have jurisdiction to remit or transfer any action, whatever may be the amount of the claim formally made therein, if the court shall be of opinion that the action should not have been commenced in the High Court but in the Circuit Court or in the District Court if at all.

I beg to move, in line 21 to insert the words "or any other Circuit Court." The amendment I put down as to Clause 24 is more in the nature of a question than anything else. I do not know whether the Attorney-General means it is to apply to any Court, or that the words would mean going down to a District Justice's Court. In moving the amendment, I would like to say that it is very difficult for a layman to understand whether, under this clause, the old rights that the plaintiff suing for a sum of money due, had in applying to the High Court to have the case tried there, are done away with, and whether the words in this mean that under certain conditions the judge of the High Court must send the case, which under the old arrangements could be tried in the High Court, to the Circuit Court. The reason I am mentioning that is because it comes again in clause 7, and segregates the amount of money in cases to be sent to the Circuit Court. As matters have been in the past, the trader who is owed a debt in the country could apply to the High Court, and it is a very simple legal proceeding to have an order made for the payment of his debt.

If this clause means, as I am told it does mean, that most of the cases up to £300 can be, and practically must be, sent down to the Circuit Court, what the commercial community feel is that they had hitherto an inexpensive method of establishing their claim in a court of law. The case was tried here. Their books could be easily produced, and all the evidence given. If this clause means that a majority of the cases up to £300 will have to be referred to the Circuit Court, it means that the trader will have to send his books, witnesses, and so forth, to the country town where the case is to be tried. I am only asking for information now, and I would like the Attorney-General to be kind enough to explain whether this section means that the majority of cases which used to be tried in the High Court up to £300, will now be sent down to be tried in the Circuit Court, and also whether they are to be sent to any court, or only to another Circuit Court?

Might I ask whether the words "shall not consider the action in the Court" mean that the action will first take place in the High Court and that the argument of the plaintiff or defendant will be heard by that Court, or is it that on the ipse dixit of the plaintiff or defendant that the High Court can send it to the Circuit Court?

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

It is quite plain what is contemplated whether it is a wise position or not. It is a well known and familiar procedure. It means that in any action capable of being brought in the Circuit Courts under the new jurisdiction, if brought instead in the High Court, the defendant who has been brought into the High Court in that action may apply to the High Court and ask them to say that it is not a fit action to be prosecuted in the High Court and that it should be transmitted to the Circuit Court. Of course both parties will be heard in the High Court which before it makes any order will go into the matter fully.

It is not a mandatory order on the High Court?

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

No.

In answer to the enquiry of Senator Jameson, the position is that under the Constitution the High Court has jurisdiction in every case. We cannot by this Act take away that constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, so that an action may be commenced in the High Court, but it will be then for the defendant, if he is so advised to say "it is oppressive that this case should be brought against me in the High Court and I ask you to send it to another Court." Under this section, as it stands, the High Court can remit to a Circuit Court where the action may have been commenced; that means the Circuit Court of the defendant's residence or to another Circuit Court. For instance, they might remit to the Circuit Court of Dublin if convenient for both parties, or they might remit a similar action to the District Justices if within their jurisdiction. It leaves it entirely in the discretion of the High Court to say where the action should be remitted, if it should be remitted at all. In considering that, the rules will provide hereafter, as in the past, as to matters such as comparative cost, convenience and such like considerations. I submit that under this the High Court has full jurisdiction to see, on the one hand, that defendants shall not be oppressed, and, on the other hand, that plaintiffs shall have every facility for suing for their just debts.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

Perhaps I will qualify what I said in answer to Senator Guinness' observation. There is one new departure in this clause which enables the High Court, if it thinks fit, to remit the action not to the Circuit but to the District Court.

May I ask the Attorney-General if this section enables a case to be remitted to the District Court which was originally out of the jurisdiction of the District Court? Because apparently, from the wording of the section it would, and surely it could not have been the intention that a case which could not have been originally tried in the District Court would be sent there.

Under the proviso it is expressed that an action may be transferred to the District Court or the Circuit Court if it is an action that could have been commenced there.

Which should not have been commenced in the High Court.

In the Circuit or District Court if at all. I have no objection to putting something in the Bill so that a case remitted to a District Court will be within the prescribed limits of the District Court jurisdiction.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

I think that is almost necessary. If you put in the words "or District Court" it would meet it.

I will have an amendment prepared on the next stage.

What I want to be certain is that you will not be compelled to remit an action to the District Court that should not have been commenced there.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

Do you wish your amendment put?

No; the Attorney-General has met my case.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.
Section 24 was agreed to.
Question: "That Sections 25 to 31, inclusive, stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
SECTION 32.
The appeal, in case such certificate or leave to appeal is granted, shall be heard and determined by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the report of an official stenographer present at the trial of the appellant, with power to the court to hear new or additional evidence, and to refer any matter for report by the judge before whom the case was tried.

I ask your leave, Sir, to raise certain points in connection with this section. I have not tabled an amendment, because I did not feel that at the present stage I knew enough about the subject. This use of shorthand notes for the purpose of possible subsequent appeal is a very important feature of the Bill. It received the commendation of no less an authority than yourself, and it has hitherto escaped criticism by the other legal members of this House, but it seems to be so great an innovation on anything that we have been accustomed to that it ought not to pass this House without having very full consideration, and consideration on more information than the text of the Bill affords or than came out on the Second Reading. One of the claims made for this Bill, I imagine, is that it would be a poor man's Bill, and make legislation not so onerous on the poor man as it has sometimes been in the past. The points which occur to me in connection with this will, I think, be best brought out by some questions about it. They lie under the headings of costs, and also practicability. Perhaps the Attorney-General would be kind enough to take a note of the questions I shall ask, because I want to make up my mind as to whether I should move an amendment, either now or on the Report Stage, and the information which he gives will guide me one way or another.

My first question is: Are these stenographers to be Civil Servants, paid by the State and pensionable? If so, at what rates; or are they to be engaged by the job, so to speak? In either event, what is this estimated cost? I can imagine that the cost of this kind of work might be very great indeed. I have had a good deal of experience, and I have no doubt that many members of this House also have had, of shorthand notes of proceedings of various kinds. When the matters are of such real importance and a great deal turns upon the reporting of what has been said, it has to be done by a very high-class expert, and you cannot get such experts for a small rate of remuneration. It is not reasonable to expect it. In some cases I imagine an enormous volume of reports will come up with an appeal, and, of course, the notes have to be taken, because it cannot be known whether an appeal is going to be made or not, so that the cost has to be incurred, in the first instance, as the Bill stands. My next question would be: Who is to appoint or engage these stenographers, and what is to be the standard of their qualifications? Are they to have any legal knowledge? Of course, that would tend to make such stenographers more expensive, but, on the other hand, very much more efficient, because I can understand that a stenographer who has some knowledge of the law, and knowledge of the kind of things that are going on around him, would be very much facilitated in making a proper report.

Then, what are to be the safeguards against bribery? It is quite obvious that there is an opening for bribery in such a matter as that. Then, are the litigants to bear any share of the cost, or is the State to bear the whole of it? because that seems to me to be an exceedingly important matter. Who is to bear the cost of it? Is the party who makes an appeal to bear the cost, or are both to give notice beforehand that they may wish to appeal and so share it, or what is to be the procedure? Then, what is to be the guarantee against men of straw, in the event of this expense being incurred, and the party responsible not being able to pay? In the case of unrevised shorthand notes my experience is that they are often incomprehensible. Out of that arises the question as to whether it is usual for reporters to ask the speaker as to what he really said, and so correct their notes from that. Will that be permissible in this case? A court of law is rather different from proceedings at most meetings. If he is to be allowed to do so, does that apply in the case of the plaintiff, the defendant, the counsel, witnesses and, in fact, anybody who has spoken or who has had any serious share in the case? If not, it seems to me that the notes will tend to be very often incomprehensible, and in any event, there is the question of the enormous volume of notes that I presume will have to go up. It will be a very voluminous thing to deal with as against the judge's notes.

These are my questions, and I do not know whether to move an amendment or not, but if the Attorney-General would be kind enough to give the House some information on these points I would know what to do. I may say that this particular Section is only with regard to criminal appeals but, of course, it has a bearing on Section 60, and if the amendment in the name of Senator Haughton were passed, it would rather prejudice the consideration of the points that I have raised.

The inquiries which Senator Bagwell has addressed to me have been raised on Section 32, which is a Section dealing only with the Court of Criminal Appeal, and I think that in relation to that court there can be no question, that this is a new departure, a Court of Criminal Appeal in Ireland. In England when a Court of Criminal Appeal was established it was provided under the Act that shorthand notes should be used for the purpose of appeals. These notes are notes of the evidence and of the judge's charge. The stenographer is relieved by the fact that he does not record counsel's speeches. The questions that Senator Bagwell has put are of a general character, and are not really specially directed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. I understand it is contemplated that these stenographers will be part of the ordinary court staff, that is to say, they will be Civil Servants, who, when they are not recording evidence, will be engaged otherwise in the court offices. They will be certificated by the Civil Service Commissioners, in the same way as every other civil servant is. Consequently, they will be people employed at a salary, and not paid by the folio, which seems to have been the unfortunate experience of Senator Bagwell, because folios, or as one stenographer of my acquaintance always described them, "foliage," has a habit of mounting up. You will, therefore, have persons who are civil servants on the ordinary staff of the courts employed, when cases are at hearing, recording evidence and judges' charges to juries.

We have experience here of something similar at the moment. In each of the two Chancery Courts in Dublin there is a stenographer who records all the evidence, which is afterwards accepted by the judge as judges notes, and used for the purpose of appeal, and so far as I know, and I think Senator Brown will bear me out, these two stenographers' work has always been regarded as most successful and of the greatest value. Having said that these people will be ordinary staff appointments, I think the question of bribery and corruption hardly arises. I take it the suggestion was that if persons were employed from outside they might be approached in some way. I do not think one need deal with that, I think I have answered the questions of the Senator.

There is an amendment tabled in the name of Senator Haughton, who is not in the House to-day. He asked me to move it for him, but I do not think, on the whole, that it would be necessary to move it. It is merely to change the word "stenographer" in the Section into "stenographers," the idea being that if two stenographers happened to be engaged in the same case, that would not be provided for by this Section. I have spoken to the Attorney-General, and I agree with him, that what lawyers know as the Interpretation Act, would get over that difficulty, and the word used there would be used in the plural, if the circumstances required.

Senator Haughton also spoke to me on this matter, and asked me to state on his behalf, from interviews he had with Pressmen of long experience, that they said it was a physical impossibility for any one stenographer to keep his mind concentrated to do the work he is supposed to do under this particular section. For instance, take a six hours' sitting of a Court, with an average, not a very high average, of evidence being given at the rate of 150 words a minute. That runs into 9,000 words an hour, and for six hours 54,000 words. The average column of our daily newspapers, the "Independent" or "Freeman," contains, they say, about 1,600 words, so that if you divide 1,600 into 54,000, you get 34 columns. Of course it would be physically impossible if a man followed one day's work, unless he worked all night, to transscribe his notes into longhand. It does not follow that he will have to write the whole 34 columns, as it is only in certain cases there would be an appeal. In a day's sitting, perhaps, there would be no appeal, but as Senator Bagwell has said, the stenographer would not know that, and he would have to take all these shorthand notes. Therefore, it follows he must be there continuously, with all this strain on him. So much importance must be attached to the accuracy of his notes in the case of appeal, and to such an extent will the decision in the Appeal Court rest on the accuracy of his notes, and the fact that one man cannot continue to keep his mind concentrated for six hours, with a possible break of half an hour in the day, that Pressmen of experience say that it would be absolutely essential to have a second stenographer. Granted even that they are most skilled stenographers, cases will occur in which the stenographer will not catch exactly what has been said. There is the famous case, known to members of the Bar here and of the solicitors' profession, where Baron Dowse was one time fearfully misreported. My recollection is that some Counsel presented a knotty legal problem to him, and the learned Baron in reply said, "You might as well ask me to write a Greek ode." You can imagine his horror in the morning when the learned Baron appeared in the Press as saying, "You might as well expect me to ride a Greek goat." There is an instance, where all the Press representatives made that mistake. I only instance that to show that stenographers might slip, and, possibly on that slip will depend the ultimate decision on appeal. If stenographers are not allowed to correct their notes, as they frequently do when they are in doubt, by asking the speaker what he meant to say, it would be a dangerous thing in a case of this sort, but it is the only resource they have. I have been more than once applied to by stenographers here to know what I said or intended to say, and I could not tell because the inspiration had passed.

I confess I am puzzled about these stenographers. I seek for information about this White Paper. Can the Attorney-General tell me where this item of stenographers appears, and how it is arrived at? I see an item—"Shorthand in county offices, £6,000." I presume it is included in that sum. I think it is due to this House to have a detailed statement of the cost of these stenographers, because if you take the reporting of this House as an indication of what stenographers can be expected and fairly asked to do, I note they are changed here every quarter of an hour. Well, important as our proceedings are, I venture to say the record of a trial on which possibly a man's life may depend is infinitely more important. I assume there will be only one stenographer who, as far as we know, is going to work all day. I imagine, although the Attorney-General was not clear on that point, that notes mean ipsissima verba, of witness and Counsel examining and cross-examining. Otherwise it is quite valueless, as a case may turn on the answer to one question on cross-examination. How many of these stenographers are contemplated, and how are they to be distributed? If he cannot do so now, will he give an undertaking that this will be done before we are asked to pass this Bill?

Before finally deciding that the report of the stenographer or stenographers shall be handed to the Judge of the Court above in order to decide the case, without hearing further evidence, does it not seem an antediluvian sort of process, considering that we have not lost faith in the ingenuity of the Irish race? There are mechanical methods of recording conversations or evidence. Although this section lays it down that the record of stenographers will be taken as evidence, would it not be as well to leave the possibility for the future without altering the Act, of availing of the latest invention of recording instruments which will not be influenced by any motives whatever?

AN LEAS-CHATHAOIRLEACH, at this stage, took the Chair.

I wish to say a few words on this matter which has been introduced by Senator Bagwell, because it touches the fringe of a much bigger question that will inevitably arise when we come to consider the subsequent sections of this Bill. I refer now to the fact, greatly to be regretted, I think, that the Seanad of the country are asked to commit themselves to a Bill, containing many revolutionary sections, which will inevitably involve very large outlay, without the slightest information as to the probable cost. In a speech I made on the Second Reading of this Bill I pointed out that when the Committee were invited to take up the consideration of what the new Judiciary should be, and to make recommendations to the Government, that Committee was led to believe that simultaneously with the constitution of the Judiciary there would be a reorganisation of the staff and a setting up of the machinery necessary to carry out the Bill itself.

The invitation, extended to every member of the Committee, was put in such terms that it was calculated to convey that impression, because they were invited, not merely to make recommendations as to the new Judiciary, but also to make recommendations as to the reorganisation of the staff, and as to the machinery that would be necessary for the purpose of setting this Bill in motion. Speaking for myself, and only for myself, I say here deliberately that I would have hesitated long and often before being a party to the making of the recommendations contained in this Bill, were it not that I believed it was the intention of the Government, before the Bill was set in motion, to have its machinery set up and its staff re-organised, so as to be in a position to tell the Seanad, the Dáil and the country, before they committed themselves to it irrevocably, what the expense was likely to be. In this connection I would like to read to the Seanad some words that fell from the lips of the President yesterday, if he will allow me say so, in a very wise and statesmanlike speech. His text was: "That we must balance our national Budget," and on that text he said this:

"Within the national Budget, then, they must look for any improvements that were to be effected, and there was no use in tabling very attractive programmes the expense of which it was beyond the capacity of the country to bear.

"It would be necessary always to consider that, while they occupied the position of trustees of the nation, they must see that no inroads were made on the reserves of the nation that future generations would be called upon to pay for.

"They must then consider every service in relation to its costs and value. They must balance normal services with abnormal services, and they must be prepared to meet and defeat extravagant proposals, even when these extravagant proposals were fortified by arguments that, if a serious national crisis were to arise to-morrow, the Government would not hesitate to borrow large sums of money to deal with it.

"Once they started in that direction there was no limit to the amount the people would be called upon to bear, and the ultimate future of the country would be seriously compromised by having to pay extravagant sums for services which, even if secured, might not fulfil all the promises made about them."

I venture to say, applying these words, that it is an abnormal thing that the country, the Seanad and the Dáil, should be asked to pledge themselves to all the recommendations that are put forward in this Bill, and to the changes it must inevitably introduce into our Judiciary, with consequent heavy cost, without the slightest indication of what that cost is going to be. I cannot imagine, and certainly never heard of any great measure of this kind which must inevitably involve the country in obligations amounting to thousands of pounds, being introduced into any Parliament or assembly without the Government giving to that assembly some estimate at least of what the expense is going to be. We are taking this plunge in the dark—absolutely in the dark—as to what it is going to involve the country in financially. I would again urge the Government, before these Courts come into operation, that they should organise the staff, that they should organise the machinery, and, before the Bill is actually put on the Statute Book, that they should come before the Houses and tell them what the estimate is going to be, what they anticipate the cost will be, so that the country will at least know the obligation it is taking on itself, and not be in a position afterwards of bringing the Seanad, the Dáil or the Government to task for letting them in for some extravagance, some liability far in excess of anything they anticipated.

May I give an illustration of what I mean. I said that I would never commit myself, and speaking only for myself, to many of the recommendations in our Committee's Report had it not been in the belief that the Government before giving effect to them would make up their own minds and take the country into their confidence as to what the cost was going to be. I speak more particularly in regard to the expenses connected with the Circuit Courts. I had in my mind, owing to the abolition we recommended of the divisions that hitherto existed in the High Court, by which the High Court is set apart into certain water-tight compartments, there might have been an opportunity for a good deal of economy in the staff, and that the redundant staff could be used for the purpose of the offices that would become essential in the new Circuit Courts. I do not know whether it is accurate or not, but it has certainly been stated publicly in the newspapers, and I have been informed by some of the responsible officials that these statements are accurate, that since our Report was presented, nearly nine months ago, many drastic economies have been effected in the staff of the High Court. People there in a position to know state that these economies have reduced that staff to a minimum, and that the changes under this Bill will not permit of any further reduction in the High Courts staff.

That means the country is going to be confronted with an unestimated and an enormous expenditure in connection with the Circuit Courts. They are to become, for the first time, really High Courts. They are getting powers to enter up judgments, to register judgments, and a variety of things that will involve in every Circuit Court a reproduction, not perhaps on the same scale, but a reproduction of all the staff that is at present attached to the High Court and the Supreme Court in Dublin. What that will cost with all these stenographers as well as the other expenses, I cannot possibly estimate. It will be an enormous bill. While I am not suggesting for a moment that the changes may not be well worth the money, I do at least suggest to the Government that they would be well advised before they finally put this measure on the Statute Book to inform themselves of what they apparently have not yet arrived at, namely, what the estimated cost is going to be, and take the Dáil, the Seanad and the country into their confidence on the matter.

The only suggestion we have ever had as to the expense that will be involved in these great revolutionary changes is to be found in the White Paper. That is wholly illusory. Any one who has read it knows, and in fact the Government themselves state on the face of it, that they are the purest speculations and that they are not to be relied upon as accurate in any way. As I say, we are asked now to embark upon this new change, this revolution in the judicial system. If we put these courts actually in motion it would be too late for us to go back if we repent of the expense. Surely, as a matter of ordinary business prudence, and of ordinary common sense, it is the duty of the Government before they set up these new courts with all the consequent machinery they will necessarily entail to inform themselves in the first place of something of the nature of what the extra cost is going to be. When they have so informed themselves they should communicate it to the Dáil, the Seanad and the country so that the Houses of Parliament and the country may, if they so wish, and before it is too late, say "this experiment is going to cost too much. It is not going to be worth the money and we are not in favour of undertaking it."

I believe this experiment will be worth the money, but at the same time I cannot conceal from myself, and I would be unfair to my colleagues in the Seanad if I attempted to conceal from myself the fact that it would involve a very large outlay, indeed. It will entail a very heavy extra burden on the public and upon suitors. and, therefore, I would suggest to the Government once more before this Bill is put on the Statute Book, that there should be issued to the members of each House, and to the public, a detailed statement, an estimate of a real and bona fide character of what the extra expense and cost of this experiment is going to be.

If it should be considered a sufficiently serious matter for the Seanad to make recommendations in connection with financial matters to the Dáil, I expect that the Dáil will give those considerations very careful judgment. I am somewhat at a loss in examining this question and in tracing its history, in going over the whole course of events that have occurred since I first wrote the letter asking this Committee to take on this laborious and very heavy task. As to retaining the old Judiciary as it has been known, with all its traditions, I say, "no, we are not retaining it." As to violating the Constitution, I deny and repudiate it absolutely. Since this Bill was first printed we have gone before the electorate. The electorate had an opportunity of considering it in every single phase, in every single Section. Not in one instance, in any part of the country—and I went through every part of it—did any member of the Bar or Bench come out to attack me or to say: "This is expensive: this is humbug; you are taxing the people of this country, and you are placing upon them a burden they cannot bear." Not in one single instance in any part of the country did any gentleman come to me and say: "You are trifling with the Constitution of this country, and you are placing upon the people an imposition for the purpose of change."

I have observed, in reading the Press for some time past, an extraordinary disposition to discount, to belittle, to reduce the status of the Executive Council of this State and its officers in every possible way, and to endeavour to bring the two Houses into conflict. I think that that idea has not the consent of any member of this House or the Dáil. I say that if the Seanad, in its judgment, considers that this Bill should be held up, I am prepared to hold it up for the 270 days. Furthermore, I am prepared, if 36 members of this Seanad consider this matter deserving of such consideration, that it should be put to the plebiscite of the people. I am prepared to meet any person, in any part of the country, and to discuss before the people, who are the real majesty in this State, every single Section and every line of this Bill, and to let the people decide for themselves whether or not the time has come when we should make a change. We are told this is expensive, that it will be an extravagant luxury for us to take on. I have examined the returns which have been submitted to me by our officers, and find that something like 240 patronage positions are held or were held in the Four Courts, and only 61 were open to competitive examination. If it be the intention that we should maintain a system in force like that, I say it is out of date in this country, and that we are done with it, and are going to be done with it in the future.

I think the President quite mistakes the drift and purpose of my observations. For example, with regard to the patronage vested and exercised hitherto in the Four Courts, one of the express recommendations we made in our Report was that that should be done away with, and that every appointment should be filled up by promotion, as in the Civil Service, that promotion to have regard to seniority of position and merit. Then with regard to his suggestions—apparently intended to refer to the observations I made—that I was in any way attacking this Bill, or seeking to preserve the old order of things, he is completely mistaken. He had only got to look through the Report to which I signed my name, and to which I was a party, in which we recommend all those changes which have been practically bodily adopted by the Government. My criticism was directed to an entirely different thing. It was directed to this: Let us know, so that we cannot be blamed hereafter, and will not be blamed hereafter; let the public know; take the public into your confidence as to what the new changes are going to cost, and if the public are satisfied that they are worth while paying for—and I said I thought they were—it is for them to decide, and not for us. How can they decide in the absence of the slightest information?

Has anyone ever known a Bill of this kind introduced by any Government that had not simultaneously with it a statement circulated to both Houses pointing out what the estimated cost was likely to be? I only asked that that precaution should be taken in this case, and did not do this in any opposition of any sort or kind either to the Government or to the Bill. I feel a sort of father to this Bill, because, as I say, I was Chairman of the Committee which made the recommendations which have been adopted by the Government, and I am keenly anxious, far from preserving the old state of things, to see this Bill put into operation. But I thought it right to let the Seanad know, speaking at any rate for myself, and I believe for many of my colleagues on that Committee, that when we made the recommendations we were ourselves, of course, in the dark as to what the cost would be, but we considered all along that before the Bill was actually put upon the Statute Book the Government would take the public, the Dáil and the Seanad into its confidence and give them some idea, some figures, so that they might see to what extent they were pledging the credit of the country. That is the sole and only criticism I intended to make, and I do not think that the observations I made at all warrant the suggestions made by the President.

I have only got to say that since this Bill was introduced and during the time it was in the Dáil, a member of the Government stood for election in the City of Dublin. The City of Dublin is, I suppose, the cream of this country, and there are people in it well qualified to weigh, to judge and to see what the meaning of a Bill of the importance of this particular measure is. There are in the City of Dublin all the judges, I believe, except those who have trekked— I think there is only one, the late Lord Chancellor, Sir John Ross. This Bill was open to them; they are voters here, and they had some interest in it during that time.

During that time I myself spoke on a platform in Dublin, and the Attorney-General himself spoke, and if this Bill suffers from all the infirmities which now have been seen for the first time, that was the time, and these were the opportunities for raising these questions. We desire in these matters neither to hoodwink nor hide from the people, any of our responsibilities. They are big and serious enough, and it would be unfair to the people in matters of this kind that they should be at any disadvantage whatever in considering the important matters in this Bill. The facts are that this Committee was asked, in view of the extraordinary changes that have taken place, to recommend to us a system upon which the public would lean with confidence. That system may be expensive. We have not yet found it is too expensive. We have submitted a return to the Dáil in connection with it, and the last sentence of that document says: "It will be understood that the portion of the statement which refers to the future cost must be taken with the reserve necessary in the case of an attempt to forecast the probable cost of a system which is not yet in being, and the details of which have not yet been settled." If I understand anything about estimates, and I have had some experience of them, first in the Dublin Corporation and later in the Oireachtas, I say that that statement is a fair one. The cost may be much more. On the face of that particular document it is unlikely that the costs will be equal to the cost of an inefficient service, upon which the public do not lean with confidence.

Like Senator Jameson, I feel in the position of a plain citizen forced into the position of being a second at a quarrel that hardly concerns us, a quarrel between lawyers. The Seanad is more or less forced into being witnesses of a quarrel of a highly technical nature, and if we are not careful we might accept the values that the principals put on their own phraseology, and forget the responsibilities of the Seanad to the country. As far as I can see, the Bill of which our Chairman has described himself as the father, and then more or less put himself in the position of the father of Oedipus who proceeded to expose his own child, is now like a cat left biting its own tail, instead of being sent on its business of rat-catching. That is to say that we may be responsible for holding up this Bill, and whatever advantages it will bring to the country people may be loth to accept and realise them because they involve a severe wrench from the old and only conditions which we have been hitherto able to envisage. Without casting back very far, or making an unkindly analysis, there is hardly a man who will say that these conditions from a political point of view or from a judicial point of view were deserving of the country's gratitude.

Never in any country, in which the heritages of the Roman law remain, has such a mischievous and corrupt system grown up as that behind the bulwark of Dublin Castle, and of which the legal profession were the strongest and most capable of maintaining. The only objection I heard from people outside to this Bill was that it might humiliate the legal profession. Without any thought of personality, I think that the legal profession would feel very much estranged if it were taken away from humiliation, not such a humiliation as being subject to a Minister, elected by the people of this country, but the humiliation of being dependent on the faintest breath or wind of what might be political opinion in England. It was able to trim its sails in a manner creditable to Sir Thomas Lipton's skipper when there was talk of a new Lord Lieutenant. That is the history of the legal profession in this country. That position is, I hope, gone for ever, and I hope that those who are about to hold up this Bill will remember that. We will be held responsible to the people of Ireland if we hold up the benefits of this Bill. The withholding will be much more expensive than any possible combination of High Courts, officials, lawyers, and shorthand writers. We must give the people an indication of the permanent change of conditions, and that is the reason why I urge the Seanad to follow the magnanimous and characteristic statement from Senator the Earl of Mayo when he appealed to it not to hold up another Bill for the sake of a trout or a salmon.

It is said that in England when the Government were enquiring into the conditions of things in Ireland, one gentleman said, "I notice a good many solicitors and doctors connected with this movement, but no barristers. Why is that?" And the answer was, "Because they do not know which side is about to win." If we who are not professionally interested in the law have to wait until the barristers come to a definite decision upon this highly intricate question in which we have been involved we will wait a long time. I think that harmony between the two Houses is much more important, and I urge the Seanad to put this Bill through.

AN LEAS-CHATHAOIRLEACH

You are departing a little from the subject matter of the clause.

I seem to remember that the Second Reading of this Bill was carried almost unanimously, and therefore I should like, with all due respect to you and the Seanad, to bring back the Seanad to the amendment now before them. We have heard a great deal from our Chairman about expense, and have heard a statement from the President of the Free State in which he said that a report had been prepared and that with regard to this Bill it was not too expensive. I take his word for that. Now let us come to the amendment. It is a question of stenographers, etc., and when you begin talking about stenographers, you find every sort of suggestion broadcasted. We have heard of the danger of improper stenographers. We have heard it asked how can they stand the work, how can they sit up all night, and sit up all day and all that sort of thing. Allow me to say that we have got to the Committee Stage of this Bill. With regard to stenographers, we have heard it definitely stated that they are to be civil servants, and that when not working in the Courts taking down the evidence they will be employed doing other work. Also, they are not to take down speeches and statements of Counsel. That is very satisfactory. I trust that we will now go on with our business, and with all due respect again, I do not like Second Reading speeches when we are doing the Committee Stage of a Bill.

The question of amendments has been referred to by the Earl of Mayo. I moved no amendments. I asked for information, and I thank the Attorney-General for having given it. I know a great deal more about the question now than I did then, but I still reserve my right to move an amendment on the Report Stage.

Question—"That Section 32 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
Sections 33 and 34 were agreed to and added to the Bill.
SECTION 35.
The Minister for Home Affairs may at any time and from time to time after the passing and before or after the commencement of this Act, but with the concurrence of the Minister for Finance in respect of any matter affecting public revenue or expenditure make rules to be styled "Rules of Court" for carrying Part I. of this Act into effect (including the hearing of appeals from the Circuit Court and cases stated by the District Court), and may annul or alter the said rules and make new rules. In particular rules may be made for all or any of the following matters:—
(i) Pleading, practice and procedure generally in all civil cases, including revenue cases and proceedings as to the validity of any law having regard to the provisions of the Constitution and proceedings in the nature of a petition of right;
(ii) pleading, practice and procedure generally in all criminal cases before the Central Criminal Court or any Court of the High Court Circuit or the Court of Criminal Appeal;
(iii) the sending out of Commissioners of the High Court Circuit at such times, to such centres and for such amalgamated districts as shall seem fit;
(iv) the sittings of the Central Criminal Court for Dublin and such neighbouring counties as shall be determined by such rules and the cases that shall be disposed of by it, which shall include all cases not disposed of by Commissioners of the High Court Circuit, or in which the venue has been changed to the Central Criminal Court at the instance of the Attorney-General or the accused;
(v) the use of the national language of Saorstát Eireann in the said courts;
(vi) the mode of address to be adopted to the judges and the robes and official dress to be worn by the Bench and the Bar;
(vii) the commencement and duration of the sittings and the vacations;
(viii) the fixing and collection of fees;
(ix) the adaptation or modification of any statute that may be requisite for any of the purposes of this Act and all subsidiary matters.
Such rules of court shall be made or annulled or altered only with the concurrence of a majority of a committee consisting of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, and two practising barristers, of the senior and junior Bar respectively, to be selected by the Council of the Bar of Ireland.

I move the following two amendments:—

In Section 35, to delete all from the words "the Minister for Home Affairs" in line 45 to the word "expenditure" in line 48 and substitute therefor "the rule making authority for the Supreme Court and the High Court shall be a majority of a Committee consisting of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland and two practising Barristers, one of the Senior and one of the Junior Bar, to be selected by the Council of the Bar of Ireland." And in Section 35, line 22 (page 10), to delete all from the words "such rules of Court" to the end of the Section.

I would like to express a wish that we get back to the atmosphere of criticism. I would like to protest very strongly against the remarks made by Senator Gogarty with reference to my profession, because I do feel they were as unfounded as they were irrelevant to this discussion. Now, we come to business again. My first amendment needs a very slight verbal addition to make the wording of it run into the section. At the end it needs the words "who may," and it will then run on, "who may make rules." The objections to Section 35 were stated so fully on the Second Reading of this Bill by the Chairman and myself and several other Senators that it is unnecessary for me now to go into them at any length. The section as it stands makes the Minister for Home Affairs the rule-making authority for the High Court and the Supreme Court. Though he must act, in the words of the section, with the concurrence of the majority of the Committee of Judges and others there, still, the initiative under the section as it is drafted remains with him, and not only does the initiative remain with him, but having got the concurrence of the judges, he has an absolute veto on what they suggest. In fact, he is the rule-making authority, and he can veto the method in which the judges of the High Court and Supreme Court desire to carry out the practice and procedure of their own courts.

It is suggested that the rule-making in this is not changed from the mode in which rules are made under our present system. That is not so. The Lord Lieutenant in Council, and he was purely a formal person in doing so, was in a sense the rule-making authority under the Judicature Act, but he was obliged to act on the recommendation of the rule-making authority, that is, a majority of the Committee of those judges. The rules which are to be made by the authority are almost as important as the Bill itself. There are many hundreds of them, and they regulate the entire practice and procedure of the Courts. Therefore, they should be made by the judges, or the judges will not be independent in their own house. What business has the Minister for Home Affairs to interfere with matters of this kind? He is a layman, and in nine cases out of ten he is without any technical experience of the meaning of those rules. He will be acting on the advice of some member of my profession. But what business is it of the Executive to interfere in matters of this kind, and what good thing will be achieved by their having the power to interfere in those matters of procedure and practice in the courts? The amendment I propose makes the majority of the Committee consisting of the Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court, the President of the Incorporated Law Society, and two Barristers, the rule-making authority, without any interference by the Executive or anybody else. The section as amended must be read along with Section 97 of the Bill.

Section 97 states:—

All rules of court made under this Act shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas within fourteen days after they are made, if the Houses of the Oireachtas be then sitting, or, if not, within fourteen days after the commencement of the next session of such Houses, and if a resolution is passed by either House within one month after the rules have been laid before such House to the effect that the same or any of them should be annulled, the rules or rule referred to in such resolution shall be null and void, without prejudice, however, to the validity of any proceedings meantime taken under the same.

That Section puts the control of the judges as a rule-making authority where it ought to be. It puts it in the proper place, and it puts it where it was meant to be, under our Constitution, because under the Constitution judges are to be independent of everything save the Constitution and the law. If, however, the Attorney-General thinks that the control of these two Houses should be more definite—and I am quite willing that that should be so—I would be very glad to add to my amendment words which will effect that object. I am quite willing, if he does not think that Section 97 gives sufficient protection and sufficient control over any rules which the rule-making authority may make, to alter my amendment, because, as I said in speaking to one of the previous amendments to-day, the placing of rules on the Table of either of these Houses is not a process which necessarily leads to their being seriously considered. Therefore, I would suggest to the Attorney-General that if there were added to the amendment which I am moving, words which would bring in a resolution of both Houses as a necessary condition for those Rules coming into effect, I would be quite willing that my amendment should go on and say: "Provided that no rule made by the Rule-Making Authority shall take effect until sanctioned by a resolution of each of the two Houses." That would absolutely put the control here. It would necessarily bring the attention of the two Houses to the Rules and to their nature and effect, and if that were done, then the complete control over this Rule-Making Authority would be in the two Houses, where I respectfully submit it ought to be. I therefore move my amendment as it stands, and I will ask the permission of the Seanad to add that proviso.

As a layman, or one who has made only a very elementary excursion into the province of the law, I felt it was my duty to try to inform myself at first hand on this important matter, and I have tried honestly to approach the whole question with an impartial and historical sense and with no bias. In the course of my enquiries I have come to this conclusion, and I think it is a fact, that this departure, in this measure which gives the Executive the initiative in the matter of Rule-Making, is unprecedented in any country, and not only in the British Empire and in America. With these facts before us I think that the matter requires to be seriously and cautiously examined. The tendency has been to take this power more and more away from the Crown where, by virtue of the close association in the early days between the Crown and the judges, it rested, and to take it more and more into the province, on the one hand, of the judges and the profession, and on the other hand, of Parliament. But in no case has there been, as far as I can see, any tendency in the countries I have mentioned to bring it into the province of the Executive. This matter was debated at very considerable length in the House of Commons in the year 1883, when the Rules made, I think I am right in saying, under the Judicature Act of 1881, or some Act, were laid on the Table of the House.

The debate was interesting, and certain speakers emphasised the importance of this subject. If any further emphasis is wanted, I think we have it to-day when the Attorney-General refers to these Rules of Court as of the nature of legislation—I think he said administrative legislation. In that debate Sir Hardinge Giffard, afterwards Lord Halsbury, a man of great legal experience, described these Rules of Court as "A silent and secret method of altering the law." He was speaking at the time as an advocate, not in any official capacity. He was, in fact, arguing that these Rules in this case should be suspended for further consideration. He also referred to them as "A new code of law which was rapidly becoming a statute." So we find this main fact on which, I think, a layman has a right to form a judgment, that if you pass this section as it now stands you are giving the Executive very considerable power in the province of legislation, even of administrative legislation—call it that if you like. I must confess that I pay great reverence to these old-established constitutional principles, and they have not assumed the form they have without very good reason. It is essentially a matter on which this House should take a long view.

You have this tendency of the three branches of the political machine, or whatever you call it, to keep separate and apart. You have the legislature, you have the Executive, and you have the judiciary, and although in this country now, and in Great Britain, there was a very considerable fusion, or liaison, between the Executive and the Legislature—much more so than there was in America—there was always that very strong and marked positive tendency to keep the judiciary quite apart. It is that independence of the judiciary which safeguards the liberty of the subject, and I think at no time is it more important that the liberty of the subject should be fully safeguarded than at the present. There have been various attempts in other countries, and it is to America I refer specially, to introduce newfangled, or rather unproved methods, I should perhaps say, into the control of the judiciary and, I should like to read, bearing in mind some remarks that have been slightingly made on the old system, what the result produced there has been, because it is important that we should see where we are going. A little thing it may be to-day, but it introduces a very dangerous principle, and it may lead us into a very undesirable position. This is from Lord Bryce's recent book on "Modern Democracy," where he compares the judicial systems of six countries, France, Switzerland, the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

"In many of the American States where the Judicial Bench is still filled by popular election the judges are far from competent, and in a few they are suspected of corruption. Everywhere the administration of criminal justice is so defective that a very high authority has called it a disgrace to American civilisation. In France the inferior judges are not altogether trusted."

In the other four countries, three of them express the tradition on which the Judiciary in this country has been based. In these four countries the character of the Bench stands high. For that reason, it is very important, I submit, that we should safeguard any inroad of the Executive popularly elected into the province of the Judiciary. You may say there is a very wide gulf between the popular election of judges and the provisions of amendments like this. I say it is the thin edge of the wedge, giving the Executive power to interfere in matters that are at least quasi-legislative. Senator Brown has referred to the question of initiative. I would refer to the question of divided responsibility. I cannot conceive it a good thing to divide responsibility, as it must be for this rule-making authority between the Executive and the Judiciary. It may be only in a minor way, but it must lead to cases of friction between these two important branches of the State, and the less we get judges mixed up in relations to the Executive the better. We had a slight case of that over a Bill recently before us, where there was a good deal of what I might call the semi-political point of view exercised by the Justices and Judges in certain Courts, and where that point of view was commended by the Government.

I submit that Judges will not unnaturally be on the defensive on matters of this kind, when the Minister comes, naturally with no special technical knowledge or authority, briefed or advised by the Attorney-General, with rules perhaps not altogether undesirable, but being initiated by him and not by the profession themselves. For this reason, therefore, and for the fundamental reasons I have tried to stress, the great importance proved by long and traditional experience, I do claim that the administration of justice in the Courts, no matter what some people might feel about it, gives everybody a fair and impartial trial. I submit that it is very dangerous, without the experience of other countries, and without something more substantial put before us, to embark on an experiment of this kind which does break down the important division which should exist between the Executive and the Judiciary.

It is only with a great deal of diffidence I take a very brief part in this debate, and for the same reasons that many others have remained silent, that I am not at all informed in matters of law. Consequently, I can only express the uninformed man-in-the-street opinion regarding this particular amendment. It is, of course, easy to make a very good case for the amendment, once its supporters insinuate that it infringes in any way on the independence of the Bench or Bar. Such insinuation immediately arouses the alarm and indignation of every advocate of free and unfettered administration of the law so far as the judges are concerned. But does it do that? That is what I am trying to inform myself on. As far as I can gather, these Rules of Court are merely detailed necessary arrangements for the administration of the law, and they can be made cumbersome and expensive or cheap and efficient according as the rule-making authority may decide. It is the aspiration of the ordinary or would-be litigant to get as cheap a law as he can, while, of course, getting good and fair administration of the law. The judges in any cases on which they adjudicate are not interfered with, as far as I can gather, in the least degree by this section as it now stands. It is alleged that in the past the Rule-making Authority made rules of a very expensive and elaborate character, that a good deal of the work was deputed to judges that could be discharged by clerks, and that one of the governing objects of the rule-making authority was to make a good deal of work for judges and to assist advocates in getting as much fees as they possibly could.

If that has been the case, I think it is desirable that there should be some link between the legislature and the Rule-making Authority that would act as a sort of check on a profession which has the monopoly of the Courts of Justice, and which may, in the natural order of things, while human nature is as it is, exploit the general community, because of the necessity of litigation in the ordinary administration of the law. The Bar is a great and honourable profession, but one outstanding characteristic, at all events, of it is that almost without exception lawyers are prepared to squeeze their clients dry, financially speaking. The ordinary man in the street, rightly or wrongly, looks on every lawyer as a legalised robber. That may be a great exaggeration, but it is the popular opinion, and any measure that would tend to prevent the exploitation of the public generally by expensive, elaborate and unnecessary Rules of Court will commend itself to the ordinary citizen. Take the ordinary case of an action for slander or libel; the two principals find they have to wade through interminable bye-ways before they can meet each other face to face in a fair trial of the ordinary action. It is believed that in nine cases out of ten this elaborate detour, every yard of which must be paved with gold, could be avoided if it were not for the desire of the Rule-making Authority to make work for judges and to assist lawyers to extort fees which may be quite unnecessary, if some more simple but none the less efficient form of justice were evolved,

A good deal was said on the Second Reading about the question of the dress that the Bench and the Bar ought to wear, and I hope this talk about the wig and the gown will not unduly influence the Seanad. Personally I think they are not in the slightest danger, and that they are going to remain. Some people allege that they are one of the relics of barbarism. That may be so, but they are certainly a picturesque relic, and I cannot see very much chance of having them replaced by anything more dignified or artistic. Personally I should be prepared to support any motion or amendment that would secure the retention of these particular robes if that were the expressed desire of those who have the right to wear them. The ordinary man in the street wants as good law and as cheap law as he can get, irrespective of whether it is picturesque or otherwise, and it is from that point of view that I think this particular Amendment should be approached. There is, of course, the fact that all Rules of Court must be laid on the Table of both Houses, and may be annulled by a resolution of either House. But as Senator Jameson pointed out, the mere fact of laying these rules on the Table is only a very nominal guarantee. In the majority of cases they may never be examined, and even when they are examined there is nobody to explain them. If exception is taken to them, who is to be the representative of the rule-making authority here? Is it to be the Minister for Justice? And unless he has had some part in the making of these rules will he be able to explain their implications, removing all misunderstandings that may arise? That is a consideration that must not be lost sight of in such a very important matter. I do not know whether the Minister for Home Affairs would be the proper person, or whether it should be the Attorney-General, but I think there should be some direct link between the two.

A good deal of caution should be exercised before we destroy the old order so as to be sure that we set up a better order in its place. But when we talk of the old order one cannot forget—and it was a very deplorable fact—that the old rule-making authority was mainly composed of judges who were almost invariably made judges as a reward for political services rendered. It was a notorious fact that in hardly a single case did a Tory Government appoint a Nationalist K. C. as a judge, or a Liberal Government appoint a Unionist K. C. If that was the order then, and if, notwithstanding that, Senators here say that everybody got a fair trial, I do not think we need be unduly alarmed that we are going to have an unfair administration of justice or any great corruption because the Minister for Home Affairs is present at the making of the Rules of Court.

It is, I think, rather an exaggeration to say that the Bench in Ireland was a credit and that in every case a man was sure of a fair trial. It is a fact that we have had legal luminaries, judges and others, who would be a credit to any country or any Bench or Bar. On the other hand, we have had our "Peter the Packers," and we have had our "Judge Keoghs" and a large number of exceptions that tend altogether the other way. For that reason I shall feel compelled to vote against this amendment, while sincerely desirous of maintaining the absolute independence of the Judiciary and giving, as far as possible, the fullest protection and fullest liberty to those who make the Rules of Court. After all, the section protects the Rule-making Authority, as a Minister cannot make any rules or annul any rule without the concurrence of a majority of the rule-making authority. I think that that ought to be sufficient guarantee, and it is due to the public generally for protective purposes, if only from the ravaging propensities of the legal profession as far as costs are concerned, that there should be some link, some representative of people other than those of the legal profession.

I should like, even at the risk of it being again suggested that I am endeavouring to be hostile to a Bill, every substantial feature of which I am in favour of, to point out to the Seanad some reasons why I think they ought to adopt this amendment. In the first place, I think the Senators who have suggested reasons against it have completely overlooked the provisions of the Constitution, because I have no hesitation in saying that if that amendment is not adopted this section as it stands makes a substantial inroad upon the independence of the judges in the very exercise of their functions which the Rules prescribe, thereby violating the express terms and language of the Constitution itself. I want to call the attention of the Seanad to it because I do think that it is not realised yet what a splendid charter of personal and private liberty this Constitution confers even upon the humblest citizen in the Irish Free State. The English judges, as I said the other day, have a sort of traditional independence derived from the fact that some three centuries ago a law was passed which made it impossible to remove them except for misconduct. But the curious position is this, that to-day Parliament, which is supreme in this matter under the British Constitution, can pass a law depriving them of that independence, and the judges would have to submit to it. In other words, in the unwritten British Constitution, Parliament is supreme and no principle of the unwritten Constitution is safe from Parliamentary interference. The British Parliament to-morrow could pass any law repealing any provision of this unwritten Constitution, and the judges and everybody else in the land would be bound to obey.

Our position under our written Constitution is entirely different. The judges are secured by that Constitution in an independent position. Not only is their independence guaranteed by the Constitution, but they are also endowed with a further extraordinary power and privilege, and that is the privilege of testing every piece of legislation that was passed by the Dáil or Seanad, testing it by the one test: does it comply with the Constitution; and if they find it does not comply with the Constitution they are entitled to over-rule it. That is their position under the Constitution, and let there be no mistake about it. I will read the precise words which confer this charter of independence. They are found in Article 69:—"All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their functions." How do they exercise their functions? Turn to this Bill and you will find that the Bill itself declares how they are to exercise their functions. Section 22 of the Bill, which we have already passed, says: "The jurisdiction vested in and transferred to these courts shall be exercised so far as regards pleading, practice, procedure, etc., in the manner provided by Rules of Court." Therefore, these Rules of Court are the very machinery under this Bill itself by which judges are to exercise their independent functions. How can they exercise their independent functions through such rules? How can they retain their independence if these rules are to be prescribed for them by an outside authority? You have in the United States the principle established by the written Constitution in express terms that the courts are to be independent of the control of the Executive. The Executive cannot touch them in any shape or form. On the other hand they have the power, the priceless privilege as regards private liberty and security of personal property, of declaring that any Bill passed by the Legislature of the United States is or is not a violation of the Constitution.

Why, at the very outset of the foundation of this judiciary, upon which this great privilege of independence is conferred, should you be asked to encroach on it? Why should you introduce into the very subject matter through which they exercise their functions, and through which this Bill says they are to exercise their functions, namely, through these rules, the outside influence of the Government? I implore the Seanad to see to it that they keep the Executive and the judges wholly apart. You have no security for independence, you have no security for personal liberty and freedom unless you have an independent judiciary. Although it may be said that this is a small thing to introduce the Government, and to place them between the judges and the people in the matter of these rules, I want you to remember that these rules are the very medium, and the very machinery through which they are supposed to exercise their independent judgment. No judiciary could carry on without rules, just as in the same way we could not carry on here, in a small degree, without our Standing Orders. There must be rules through which the judges will exercise their functions, and if those rules are to be imposed on them by an outside authority, and that that authority is the Executive, then I say this independence conferred on them by the Constitution is a sham and is no longer a reality.

I put it on a higher ground. Of course, my opinion is only of the importance that anyone attaches to it and does not decide the matter, and I do not profess, and I have no authority to decide it. I think the Seanad will give me credit for having no axe to grind, as I have no connection now with the Bar or the Judiciary. I have passed away from both. My sole object is to see to it that this great charter of liberty under the Constitution is preserved intact, and that no encroachment, intentional or otherwise, will be permitted upon it. If these judges are to go to the Minister for Home Affairs, or to any other member of the Government and say: "You are the people to tell us and to dictate to us what machinery we are to employ in putting our functions in force" what becomes of their independence?

Why the Government have gone out of their way to do this I know not. I am satisfied it is an infringement of the letter of the Constitution, and for this obvious reason. The only restriction under the Constitution on the independence of the judges is as to matters of procedure. What the Constitution says is, that matters of procedure are to be prescribed by the Oireachtas and not by the Government. Senator O'Farrell has stated that the mere laying of these regulations on the Table of the House is not really a sufficient protection, because the ordinary member of the Dáil or Seanad is not sufficiently lawyer-like to understand them. Senator Brown has met and anticipated that objection. Under the Constitution the Oireachtas must approve, adopt and ratify, before it can become valid, any provision, any rule, any order dealing with procedure. That is what the Constitution says, not that the Executive are to do it, but that the Oireachtas are to do it. Surely, so long as the Oireachtas have the power, and voice, and the right either to accept or annul any of these rules, the country is safe from any injustice or from any irregularity. What conceivably greater security or guarantee could any country have than that its supreme Parliament should be supreme in the matter of procedure, and should have the right to veto or accept any rule put before them?

No one wants to interfere with the constitutional prerogative of the Oireachtas, conferred on it in express terms under the Constitution. But that is the limit to the independence of the judges. There is no authority to be found in the Constitution for any other limit. There is no authority in the Constitution for the introduction of the Executive into this matter. I deplore it from the point of view of the Executive itself. Let us test it for one moment. Under the old law that was in force at a time when the judges had no charter of independence, when it was pure tradition, but there was no charter, no declaration, no written statement that they were independent, what was the practice? The Rules of Court were prepared by the judges. They framed and recommended them to the Lord Lieutenant. The Lord Lieutenant represented the Crown, who under the theory of the British Constitution, is the fountain of justice. The courts are his theoretically; they are called the King's Courts. He is the fountain of justice. Accordingly following the British practice, the Rules after being framed by the judges were sent to the Lord Lieutenant for his formal approval as representing the King. That was the only check on the judges' unlimited powers of framing rules. All that is departed from, and no longer can judges make recommendations.

The Minister has imposed upon him by the Bill the unpleasant task of framing the regulations himself. As Senator Brown has pointed out, he will have to consult some expert in doing that. In nine cases out of ten he may not be a lawyer, or may be a lawyer without any training. He will have to consult an expert or fall back upon a precedent. What is to happen? See the position in which the Government may be placed, a most unpleasant position not only for the Minister but for the Government. The Minister frames rules and sends them for concurrence to the judges. The judges reject them. What is to happen? Is the Minister to frame another set? If he does not how is the machinery of the Courts to be carried on? Why are you dragging in this unnecessary way the Executive in this matter which goes to the very root of the independence and jurisdiction of the Judges, and which, if you insist on it, will inevitably result in friction and quarrels between the Minister and the judges? If the Minister and the judges disagree, as they inevitably will do, must do in human nature in certain cases, what is going to be the solution? You have a deadlock. There is no provision in the Constitution providing a remedy. There is no provision in the Bill providing a remedy. If the Minister's recommendations or draft rules are not accepted by the majority of the judges what becomes of them then?

Take again this matter to which reference has been made as another illustration, the dress of the Bar. We sat, I think, for nearly three months in Committee over this recommendation. Never once throughout that entire three months was there any hint of any desire or intention on the part of the Government to introduce the Executive in the making of the rules. We discussed these rules ad nauseam, and never once, as I say; was there a hint given that the Government intended to have any responsibility for them. Take another illustration of what might happen. Suppose the Minister dictates, or tries to dictate, a uniform to the Bar or Bench which they do not like. The Bench have already passed an unanimous resolution in favour of retaining their existing costume. The Judiciary Committee, with the exception of one, were unanimous in favour of the retention of the wig and gown, but they declined to make any recommendation upon it because the dissenting member said that he would bring in a minority report, if we did, and we did not want to break up the unanimity of the Committee on a small matter of that kind. You are giving to the Minister power to dictate the uniform to the Bar, and if the Bar have that independence which they used to possess, and which I think still exists, and say, “No, we are not going to be dictated to,” what is to happen?

Call a strike.

Yes, but how does that remedy it? That is a natural observation, and one which I was going to make, but how does that remedy the situation? I thought that Senator O'Farrell rather went out of his way in suggesting that the judges of the old days were sources of suspicion by reason of the fact that they were appointed for political deeds, but does he realise that the system which he holds up to opprobrium is preserved by the Constitution? The judges of the future are to be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Government, so that that very system is perpetuated. Had it not been for this provision in the Constitution I for one would have tried to get my colleagues on the Committee to embark on a new method, and leave the appointment of judges to the nomination of the Bar Council, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. The Constitution, however, prevented us from doing that, and the very thing which Senator O'Farrell has been holding up, is the very method preserved by the Constitution.

I quite agree that in the old days the Government, being anxious to have their law officers in the House, naturally encouraged lawyers to enter into the political arena, and ambitious lawyers found that a short cut to promotion. I quite agree, and I am not enamoured of that system, but however good or bad it is, it is preserved in the Constitution, and in the future you will have aspiring young barristers in the Dáil, performing political services for the Government in the hope that they will be brought into the Ministry, and given their reward. The system is the same as it was before. The real root of my objection is that this is an infringement of the Constitution. I say it is unnecessary, as the Constitution provided a safeguard in making these rules subject to the approval of the Oireachtas, and not the approval of any Minister. Secondly, I say it is a mistake from the Government point of view, and if they insist upon it, they will live to regret it. It will make us the laughing-stock of the nations of the world, if at the earliest start of our new judiciary there was to be strife between the Government and the judges, or the Government and the Bar of the day over some question of uniform or costume or some question as to how they were to carry out and regulate their procedure.

In conclusion, I desire to say that the Constitution prescribes that the judges are to be independent in the exercise of their functions, and they can only exercise these functions through the rules and regulations which under the Constitution are to be made by the Oireachtas, and by introducing the Minister into this Bill, you have, in my opinion, transgressed the Constitution. I make these remarks not in any spirit of hostility to the Bill, because this clause is not necessary to the Bill. In my opinion, it disfigures it, and the Bill would be far better without it. I make these remarks out of an honest sense of duty, because I am anxious to an extent perhaps greater than any man in this assembly to see that our new judiciary will have a fair chance and will be started under a charter constituting a truly independent judiciary, and that the men appointed to it will realise their powers and responsibilities, and will not be fettered in the exercise of their functions by any restrictions imposed upon them by the Government or anybody else. It is because I feel this so strongly, and because I feel it is not only a ridiculous but an unnecessary provision, which disfigures the Bill, that I believe that it is my duty to make these observations upon it.

May I offer a few observations on this matter? The section, as it stands in the Bill, substantially gives effect to the recommendation of the Judiciary Committee, subject to this, that it inserts a link between the Rule-making Authority prescribed by the report of the Committee, and Parliament. The link is the Executive Minister responsible for the administration of justice. That has been described here as an unprecedented departure. These were the words of Sir John Keane: "The rules under which the courts at present carry on, and which were made as recently as 1905, are made under the Irish Judicature Act. I think that when the text is looked at, one will see that so far from being a departure, it is substantially the same thing." Under the Judicature Act it was prescribed with regard to the Rules of Court that "the Lord Lieutenant may, at any time after the passing and before the commencement of this Act by an Order in Council, on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, make rules."

It is not the judges who made the rules but the Lord Lieutenant by an Order in Council, and when we turn to the actual rules of 1905 we find that they were made by the Earl of Dudley, with the assistance of Mr. Jonathan Hogg, Sir Henry Robinson, and Mr. Frederick Wrench and two judges. Turn to the English Judiciary Act and you find the rule-making authority prescribed there. In the Act of 1875, which reproduces a similar provision in the Act of 1873, it is provided that Her Majesty may, at any time, after the passing of the Act, or before the commencing of the Act, by an Order in Council, make rules. No one made any ribald observations about the facts that Her Majesty was making the rules and why? Because in both cases the effective party bringing in the rules was the Executive of the day. The responsibility was thrown on the Executive to see that the rules were made, and they were to be made in Ireland with the concurrence of the judges, and in England on the recommendation of the judges. Where then is the unprecedented departure? In England, presumably the Secretary for State advised Her Majesty to make those rules and she made them. In Ireland, here in this Bill, we have put the plain fact on the face of the Bill that the Minister for Home Affairs is to make rules with the concurrence of the judges. It is said that the Lord Lieutenant exercised no authority. In comparatively recent times I understand the Lord Lieutenant on at least two occasions vetoed the rules made by two of the judges.

Will the Attorney-General give the instances?

One was in connection with company rules, and I forget the other. The making of rules is not a judicial function. The judges, under the Constitution, are to be independent in the exercise of their functions, subject only to the Constitution and the law. The making of rules is entrusted to them as a matter of convenience. It is really administrative legislation, but because of their contact with the administration of the courts, their peculiar knowledge, and their practical experience, they are asked to draw up rules which become statutory by being brought before Parliament. Can anyone suggest that instead of having rules prepared such as those here prepared, if we introduce them by a Bill in the Dáil and pass them through so that they become an Act, that such an Act would be a violation of the Constitution, and if not, how do they become a violation of the Constitution when made in the form of rules? The reason is that the framing of rules is a delegated legislated act and not a judicial function. If such a Bill were introduced in the Dáil it would be introduced by the member of the Government responsible for the administration of justice, the Minister for Home Affairs. In the same way, if those rules were prepared he lays them on the table for the approval of the Dáil.

I respectfully submit there is no justification for saying that this is an interference with judicial independence in the exercise of judicial function. It is a case in which the legislative powers in certain respects of the Parliament are delegated to the judges, and the results of their legislative effort are brought in by the Minister and submitted for approval. Is there any reason why the Minister should be introduced into a matter of this kind? I turn to page 20 of the Report of the Judicial Committee. You will find suggestions for dealing with matters in a certain way in pages 20 and 21. There is a whole series of nineteen items which it is proposed should be disposed of by officials. Why is that recommendation here? The reason is that under the old rules made by the judges these matters were disposed of in court by judges, while they might rightly be disposed of by an official in an office. We have a Master of the King's Bench Division who here is practically without the functions discharged by the Master in England. All those matters are largely formal. When we come into court we see two or three judges disposing of them at large expense both to the State and the litigant. This recommendation of the Committee is that they should be disposed of as a matter of course by the Master in his office, a cheap and speedy method of disposing of them. If you have judges drawing up rules without control, how are you to prevent judicial matters being disposed of by judges in court? A number of other things will crop up which will keep the number of judges beyond a certain limit.

LORD GLENAVY

Will not the Oireachtas, under your Bill, have power to remedy all that?

It is remedied by the present rules in England.

What I am suggesting here is that in the original preparation of the rules to be laid before Parliament it is the duty of the Government to see that these important economies should be given effect to in the rules. It is for the purpose of dealing with matters like that, that it is essential to have the Minister responsible for the rules before Parliament and capable of being called to answer if the rules do not by this simple method effect these economies. We have had experience. Take the forms used in court. We have had experience of how those matters may be used even in defiance of the wishes of the great masses of the people. It was with the greatest difficulty, some time ago, that the Government succeeded in having taken from the forms used in court the offensive expression "Southern Ireland," which was on the head of all the forms used until quite recently. It was with great difficulty that amendment was secured, and only in face of the resistance of one very important member of the Bench. The Minister bringing in rules will see that matters like that will not occur. He will refuse to be responsible for rules that will include matters of that kind. It is said: "If a deadlock arises, where is the solution?" I do not know why this matter of dress, or, as some people call it, "millinery," has given rise to such an extraordinary amount of excitement, unless it is being used for the purpose of side-tracking other things.

What is the remedy if a deadlock arises? The remedy is a Bill in Parliament which it will be the duty of the Minister for Home Affairs to introduce. That Bill will solve the difficulties and cut them out. Parliament is asked to hand over to judges certain legislative duties. It is asked to preserve a link of responsibility in the Government which introduces rules made under that delegation. That delegation is a matter purely of convenience. I do say and submit here that there can be no violation of the Constitution in this thing done by way of a rule when obviously the thing can be done by an Act of Parliament.

Does the Attorney-General seriously suggest that an Act of Parliament should be passed, giving the Executive control over the Judiciary?

No, sir, I have not suggested that. The judges are to be independent in the exercise of their functions as judges, subject only to the Constitution and the law. That cannot be touched. But here a certain devolution is made. It was, I thought, a remarkable argument of, I think, Sir John Keane, when he said that because this was legislation therefore Ministers must be excluded from contact with it and it must be left entirely to the judges. I fail to see the force of that reasoning.

Subject, of course, to the control of the Oireachtas.

If this amendment is carried we shall have a procession of Judges advancing to the Tables of each of these Houses and laying the products of their labours there. So far from this being a departure, under the existing Judicature Act, the Lord-Lieutenant is there as the concentration of the Executive. The Queen is in the English Act as the executive head, and one can find nothing in the way of a departure, save that here a democratically elected Minister is the person whose responsibility it is to bring these matters before the Dáil.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

resumed the Chair at this stage.

I wish to speak in favour of this amendment, and I wish to speak in the capacity of the man in the street, as Senator O'Farrell did. The opinion of the man in the street is very important. In a matter of this kind his welfare is still more important. The Attorney-General has told the House that there are precedents for this section in the shape of previous practices, both in this country and in England. I confess that that does not impress me in the least as regards the merits or demerits of the section. We are making a new arrangement here. Let us have the best one, the one that will produce the best results, quite apart from precedent. I believe that the question of an Executive initiating and making Rules of Court is not a technical question. It does not appeal to me as such at all. It seems to me that a matter of principle is involved. I think that that power on the part of the Executive would seriously curtail the independence of the judges. There are certain cases in which it is common knowledge that great independence is given to certain people, captains of ships, for example. It has been customary through all the ages, because it is the only way in which you can arrive at a satisfactory result.

Judges, too, should be extraordinary independent. They should be put into a position of independence similar to that of the captain of a ship. They have to administer justice and they have to command the confidence of the people generally. The more independent they are the more likely they are to command that confidence, in my opinion. It seems to me that Article 69 of the Constitution is so simple that it is capable of being interpreted almost as well by a layman as by a judge, and it does seem to me that the judges ought to be left in the position in which that Article 69 intended that they should be left. I do not think they would be in that position if the initiative in the matter of such a thing as Rules of Court were left in the hands of the Executive. I support the amendment. I feel bound to do so. I think that the independence of the judiciary is one of the things at the very root of everything.

In studying this Bill I have been at a loss all through to find out why the Government took the line they did in the drafting of the Section we are dealing with, and why they seem so determined to get the control in the drawing up of the Rules of Procedure. The Attorney-General has explained the motives which I did not understand. He has told us that it is to effect economies, to get economies which could only be secured by making the Executive responsible for the Rules of Court. Now, that we come to look at that as the motive, I wonder is it really the best way of securing the control of the Executive over these economies. There seems to me to be two things that the Seanad ought to bear in mind. One is the upholding of the independence of the judges, which means the liberty of the subject and the individual, and the second is the control of the Oireachtas absolutely as the last source of authority. By the method proposed in the Bill the Executive Government, instead of controlling the action of the Houses, try to control the action of the judges themselves directly. The control of the two Houses will be the looking at the Rules of Court, as laid on the tables. They will be drawn up by the Executive of the day, who will presumably have secured the consent of a majority of the members of the judicature mentioned in the Bill. If there is a deadlock then, from what the Attorney-General tells us, we will be asked to deal with a Bill on the subject of the Rules of Court.

I should have thought that the control of the Executive over the matter would have been a great deal better exercised through the control of the Oireachtas, that these Rules of Court should be examined, not by the two Houses on whose tables they will be laid, but by the Executive, whose duty it would be to see that they are right. We will all admit that, because it is on the advice of the Executive that the Crown worked in the old days. No doubt there was this amount of control over the Rules, that if there was anything blatantly wrong the Government of the day could always draw the attention of the Houses of Parliament to it, and get it rectified. That was the control, and the direct control, of the Executive and of Parliament, and it is essential that we should keep that. But if we adopt the proposal in the Bill we remove altogether the assistance of the Executive Government in their advice to the Oireachtas. We are laying the grounds of a direct squabble between the Executive and the judges, and to the extent that the Executive secure control we are interfering with the independence of the judges. I may say if we leave the judges as the Committee suggested, and as is suggested in Senators Brown's amendment, and wherever the Executive sees anything wrong, dealing with it by bringing the matter before the Oireachtas, as they ought to do, then we have the direct control of the Executive on all these Rules of Court, and that is the only control that, in my opinion, ought to be used in regard to the judges and the judicature.

In all other matters they should be absolutely independent, and it is one of the most essential things that one could imagine that they should not be under the control of a popularly elected Executive which, as the Attorney-General says, they are placed under by the Bill as it stands. He put the words, I think, in as clear a shape as they could be put, that a popularly elected Executive is to draw up the Rules of Court for the judges, under which they are to carry on their functions. This Bill, according to the Attorney-General, undoubtedly places the judges under the control of a popularly elected Executive. This is the very thing which I and everybody I have ever met and everybody who has spoken in this House wishes to prevent. I cannot imagine why the Executive should give up their position as the Executive, their position as leaders and controllers of both Houses, perfectly certain to have the most adequate control, through the Houses, of every Rule of Court that can be made, for a position to take a right to do things in regard to the judges which for ages and ages has been fought by the people. They are not fighting as in the old days the Tudors and the Stuarts fought for their lineal successors. I heard the President the other day make a statement which if I had a minute to spare I would like to ask him about privately. It was this: that the Executive of the day could not be supposed to be meddling in such a matter, and that he could not imagine any Executive in this country doing anything for 20 or 30 years. I am merely quoting from memory, in the President's presence, but we are establishing a Bill here for all time. We are making a law which will regulate the regulations between the Executive and the judges for all time, and surely members of the Seanad can see if we pass the Bill in its present form that a popularly elected Executive may use the power which this Bill gives them to do things which will interfere with the liberty of the subject. We have tasted enough of it in this country, and I believe, although the Government think they are making a step in advance in the Free State, that they are bringing us back in keeping some of the worst traditions we have been working under for many a long day. I would ask them to look into this question of how real Executive power ought to be exercised through their control and position in the Oireachtas, and keeping the Oireachtas as the one final authority on the subject, but that the independence of the judges ought to be absolutely secured.

I am another example of the uninformed layman entering into this discussion with considerable hesitation. I am glad to be able to find common ground with you, Sir, and Senator O'Farrell in the desire not to see the wig and gown discarded. I would be glad to see them retained. We can all see the "importance of headgear." The other day when it became known that Mr. Ramsay Macdonald went to see the King in Buckingham Palace with a silk hat, the effect on the Stock Exchange was immediate; shares went up, and fears regarding a Labour Government disappeared. I do not think our people are less impressionable than the English, and the effect on the ordinary citizen of the wig and gown is to give more respect to the majesty of the law, than if the new Rule-making Authority prescribed judges should wear home-spuns. I have heard a good deal about the independence of the judges, and I subscribe to everything that has been said. For the ordinary citizen the independence of the judges is a buckler and a shield of liberty. By independence the ordinary man understands independence in their judicial capacity, independence in their judgments, independence in coming to decisions without fear, favour or affection; but it is quite another matter to claim independence for setting up rules. I do not see how it will imperil their dignity or independence to allow a representative of the Executive to have some say in the making of rules where public money is to be expended. We must not forget that the English had a representative on that Rule-making Authority. I understand the Lord Chancellor, who was a member of the Executive, took part in the drafting of the Rules under the old regime. I do not see why there should be this outcry against the Minister for Home Affairs having a say in the making of these Rules. It is, I think, largely distrust, on the part of those who support the amendment, of the Government. I should be sorry to see the Seanad endorse that distrust.

I should like to ask a question for an explanation. I think we all recognise that the language of Bills is sometimes confusing, and you want to get away from a good deal of the language in order to find out what exactly is the meaning. I do not think the matter has been alluded to here before—it may have, in passing, but not very clearly. If you take the section as it stands, cutting out a few words that may be irrelevant, it reads: "The Minister for Home Affairs may make rules, to be styled ‘Rules of Court,' and such Rules of Court shall be made with the concurrence of a majority of a Committee consisting of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court." Is the Minister, under these conditions, a member of the Committee?

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

He is not a member of the Committee at all.

The word is "Committee." It states that such Rules of Court shall be made with the concurrence of a majority of a Committee, and as it appears in the first part of the Clause that the Minister for Home Affairs may make Rules, reading the two together, I should understand that the Minister is only a member of the Committee called altogether to frame these Rules, and that he had a vote on these in Committee as any other member of the Committee had. That is a point upon which I would like to get an explanation from the Attorney-General.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

You have only to look at the section to get the explanation for yourself. The section begins:—The Minister shall frame Rules, and then these Rules shall come into force if the majority of another body called a Committee agree.

The words are:—"Rules shall be made with the concurrence of the majority of the Committee."

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

I am only giving you my opinion, but I think the meaning is clear.

If the Attorney-General is to make any further contribution to this debate I should like if he would deal with one point which does not seem to me to have been dealt with fully. I am one of those who is trying his best at considerable difficulty to form an intelligent opinion on the debate as we have heard it. I take it that we are unanimous, and that the Attorney-General is with us in our desire to maintain that in all their proper functions the judges shall be independent, and if that is so there is no use talking further about that. We are dealing now with the effect of the particular amendment and its exact meaning. It would appear, unless I misunderstood him, from the speech of the Attorney-General, that what he desired to achieve was a Government check on expenditure and kindred matters, and that he did not regard the proposal in the Bill as departing from practice. I gathered the intention was that the Minister would act very much in the same way as the Crown acted in the past in England, or as the representative of the Crown acted here. If that is the case it should not be beyond the wit of man to make such alterations as would make that clear. I would further like to know the objections to the proposal made by Senator Brown by which the rules would definitely come before the Parliament which, I presume, in the case of a Government responsible to the Dáil would give them the control required. I think it would help us if the Attorney-General would say what is the main difference between the two proposals, as both seem to me to give the Government a check on the Rules of Court.

The burden of the argument of the Attorney-General, as I understood it, was that the responsibility of making rules for the procedure in the courts of law ought to be and was on the Executive of the day. He proceeded to show, or rather tried to show, that there was a precedent for that under the existing systems in this country and in England; that is, that the initiative in the matter of rule-making was under these systems in the Executive. He cited our own Judicature Act under which the Lord-Lieutenant in Council made the rules. Every lawyer knows that the Lord-Lieutenant in Council did not make the rules. They were made by the Committee of judges and other lawyers. They were only sanctioned by the Lord-Lieutenant in Council. As far as I am aware, in an experience now of over 40 years, I have never known that to be anything but a formal sanction. The Attorney-General then proceeded to instance the system in England under the English Judicature Act. With great respect he could not have cited a worse precedent than that. There were three stages under the English Judicature Act in the history of rule-making. The great body of the English rules under the Judicature Act of 1874 were made before the Act was passed. They were scheduled in the Act and they were made by Parliament. So important was it that Parliament should have the control over the procedure which was to be defined by these rules, that the original Judicature rules which were the basis on which all subsequent rules have been made, were actually part of an Act of Parliament and were made by Parliament. That applied to the rules which were made before the passing of the Act. There was then one short stage of a few months when the rules were made after the passing of the Act and before it came into operation. Those were made—and it is those the Attorney-General has cited—by Her Majesty in Council, equal to the operation which was performed by the Lord Lieutenant in this country. After the passage of the Act of 1881 and for 31 years since, no Rule of Court in England has had the sanction of any Order in Council or of anybody outside the judges. There is, therefore, no substance in the suggestion of the Attorney-General that there is a precedent in England for the initiative in the matter of rule-making ever having been given to an Executive Minister.

The Attorney-General has also argued that this is not an interference with the independence of the judges. I cannot myself understand how it can be seriously contended that that is so. Surely, the entire procedure in their Court, which is to be the subject matter of these rules, is a matter for the judges themselves? If the Executive Minister has the right to say: "You shall do this or you shall not do that." surely there is interference with the independence of the judges? It has been suggested that this is a small matter. I ask the Seanad to say that this is not a small matter. It is not a matter of saving the expense of litigation. It is a matter of principle under our Constitution. I very seriously ask the Seanad not to be carried away by the arguments we have heard here about this being a small matter and not really interfering with the independence of the judges. I tell the Seanad very seriously that it does and I ask the Seanad very seriously to support this amendment.

Amendment put.
The Seanad divided.—Tá, 13; Níl, 23.

  • J. Bagwell.
  • S.L. Brown.
  • Countess of Desart.
  • Sir Nugent Everard.
  • Mrs. A. Stopford Green.
  • Sir J.P. Griffith.
  • H.S. Guinness.
  • A. Jackson.
  • Right Hon. A. Jameson.
  • Sir J. Keane.
  • T. Linehan.
  • Earl of Wicklow.
  • W.B. Yeats.

Níl

  • H.L. Barniville.
  • Mrs. E. Costello.
  • W. Cummins.
  • P. de Loughry.
  • Sir Thomas Esmonde.
  • T. Farren.
  • M. Fitzgerald.
  • T. Foran.
  • O. St. John Gogarty.
  • C.J. Irwin.
  • P.W. Kenny.
  • J.C. Love.
  • J. MacLoughlin.
  • E. MacLysaght.
  • Earl of Mayo.
  • Colonel M. Moore.
  • G. Nesbitt.
  • M. O'Dea.
  • J.T. O'Farrell.
  • B. O'Rourke.
  • W. O'Sullivan.
  • J.J. Parkinson.
  • Mrs. J. Wyse Power.
Amendment lost.

AN CATHAOIRLEACH

I suppose, Senator Brown, that renders it unnecessary to move the next amendment?

Question: "That Section 35 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
Motion: "That the Committee Stage of the Courts of Justice Bill be adjourned"—put and agreed to.
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