It is with great regret that I find myself compelled to object to a Government Bill almost in its entirety. My objection comes under two main heads. I say this Bill makes possible the collection of excessive statistics. It also makes possible undue interference with the liberty of the subject. It seems to me to indicate a belief in the regeneration of the country by means of statistics, or, at all events, by the use of statistics by the Government and by interference in every kind of private, semi-private, or commercial endeavour. It seems to indicate that the interests of the community at large will be served and that the country will benefit. In the light of such experience as I have, I have the most profound disbelief in both. The Government is a combination of individuals, and, no doubt, is representative of the people, as it is duly elected and more or less represents them. It is possibly a collection of wise individuals who are possibly actuated by the best of motives, but in matters of this kind we ought not only to consider the present but the future, and it is most undesirable to have a thing which would enable a different set of men with different interests to do things very much contrary to the interests of the nation at large. However wise members of the Government are, the interests of a highly developed community are so diverse and complicated that it is impossible for any Minister or for the Government as a whole to know as much in any one field of endeavour about a particular business as the people actually engaged in it who have made a special study of it.
Hitherto, powers to acquire statistics have, I think, although I do not consider myself an authority on the subject, been taken by Acts referring to one kind of occupation or problem or to a group of kindred occupations or problems. We begin by the simplest cases, such as Census Acts and Registration Acts, which are obviously necessary or justifiable. Then you come to a more debatable kind of legislation requiring statistics from individuals such as joint stock companies Acts. They are for the protection of shareholders and the investing public, just as Factory Acts are for the protection of employees, and both of those, though more debatable, are, in the main, justifiable. When powers have been obtained for that kind of thing, the powers of the Minister have been actually defined in each case in the Bill. They have been restricted to specified appointments for reasons given.
When legislation is, so to speak, on a narrow front like that, there is one great advantage when one thing is taken at a time. It gives full opportunities for discussion and adequate criticism because attention is concentrated on the particular subject for which statistics are sought; it is therefore subjected to the full light of day, and more or less detailed reasons have to be given as to why those powers are sought. Any restriction on the liberty of the subject or the giving of unreasonable powers is much less likely to go through, because the whole thing can be fully considered. This Bill seems to me to short-circuit that kind of thing altogether. Once passed, a Minister can practically ask anything for any purpose and there is no further opportunity of criticising an action of that kind or for the putting of any reasonable limits to any demand.
That is one aspect. The other is the interference with the liberty of the subject. The powers taken appear to me to be hardly defined at all. They are, to all intents and purposes, unlimited. The provisions of Clause 16 would appear to give some protection, but when one goes into them they really do not, and it seems to me almost anything that is arbitrary and unnecessary can be done. The Minister must define the nature of the statistics which he proposes to ask for, but he need not justify them or seek further powers. He can go on from the Bill. The instruments through which those powers are to be exercised are not only Civil Servants but every other person who is at the time being employed in or about the extraction of the statistics. That opens the door more widely. You are not even confined to the activities of Civil Servants in making inquiries about your affairs. Anyone might be appointed for a specific purpose, and then we are subject to no control whatever.
It seems to me the Bill renders possible—I do not say it aims at it—the abolition of privacy in private or semi-private concerns. There is a provision in Clause 11 that an officer may ask for any record or document or for any written or verbal information. I do not want to discuss a serious measure in any frivolous frame of mind and I do not intend to make the suggestion I am going to make in any frivolous frame of mind. As a matter of fact, these words cover such extreme demands as the demand from a man to hand over his bank passbook, or a doctor's case-book may be asked for. The records of competitive businesses may be asked for. Questions may be put to doctors and solicitors about their clients. It also appears to me that individuals may be put to expense in making returns or disclosing documents. Sometimes the discovery of documents takes a great time and entails great expense.
Now there are certain safeguards about providing secrecy, but it seems to me that no safeguard, no matter how carefully devised, would be able to tackle this matter of preserving secrecy because it would be extremely difficult to prove that any civil servant, and impossible to prove that any man engaged for that purpose and who is not a civil servant, had disclosed information that might be to the detriment of people in their private affairs. It would be impossible to prove that a civil servant or other person had disclosed such information.
Apart from the general issue, I have had myself twenty years' experience in statistics, on a fairly large scale, and that experience has taught me to believe that there is a great tendency to have too much statistics, even in private business. There is a much greater tendency to have too much statistics, rather than too little. With regard to statistics that I am in the habit of being asked for by Governments, I can only give my personal opinion, arrived at after considerable experience, that many of these statistics cost a great deal of money to compile and never serve any useful purpose afterwards. We have no assurance that the very wide power sought under this Bill will be used wisely and moderately. No doubt that is the intention, but there is no guarantee that we shall have a continuance of such intention as that.
Life is short; one Government succeeds another, and you never know who you are going to have handling the tremendous powers contained in this Bill. It would have a serious influence if misused and it would render possible bureaucratic authority of the most complete kind, and, in my opinion, it would constitute a grave interference with the liberty of the subject. I have looked through the Bill with a view to seeing whether useful amendments could be suggested which might modify the dangerous possibilities of it, to which I have called attention, but I almost despair of being able to do so. Wider, and, perhaps, more thorough consideration, and more time, may enable us to do so. I feel compelled to criticise the Bill in its entirety and, holding the views I do about it, I feel I am justified in doing so. If any of us feel, very strongly, that a thing is not in the interests of the community, it is our right, and our duty to oppose it. I think this Bill is a very dangerous measure, and I hope it will be found possible by wiser and more experienced heads than mine to bring about some modification of it which will render it less so.