We cannot oppose this Bill, because it is urgently necessary, having regard to the fact that the decision referred to by the Minister would really render illegal all the decisions previously arrived at by the Circuit Courts and all the costs awarded by them since the Court of Justice Act came into operation. What happened was this. The Oireachtas in its wisdom increased the jurisdiction of the local courts. There used to be County Courts having jurisdiction up to £50 in contracts and up to £30 valuation with regard to lands. In other respects it was limited in the same measure.
You increased the jurisdiction of that local court and you changed its name to the Circuit Court. But you did not make any provision for a scale of costs in respect of any action in the Circuit Court. The judges, whose duty it is to administer the law, found it necessary to adopt the principle, which, I think, was a fair principle, that in cases exceeding the old limit of the County Court jurisdiction they would award costs on such a basis as would give to the parties a reasonable indemnity against the expenses that they had sustained. The judges acted so reasonably that for many years there seemed to have been no objections. But then a case came up to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Taxing Master in one of the actions tried in the Circuit Court. When the matter came to be investigated it was seen at once that there was no statutory authority for awarding any costs in the court. Certainly there was no authority for awarding any costs above the scale that was in existence with regard to the old County Court. In that case, which did come before the Supreme Court, the costs incurred by the plaintiff were £90. That included out-of-pocket expenses exceeding, I think, £50.
As a result of the decision all the plaintiff now gets is £4. He loses considerably. He was the successful party and had justice on his side. Now justice has been declared, but at a very considerable loss to him. I think it is right that the possibility of a repetition of anything like that should be put an end to. The object of this Bill is to legalise all the assessments of costs which had been made up to the date of the passing of this Bill, and for the future and until a plenary measure is introduced to allow the courts to go on according to the principles which they have hitherto adopted. These principles were found to work well. I am very sorry that the Minister found it necessary in this Bill to make a special exception in the case which has been the origin of all the trouble. That is the case that went to the Supreme Court. The exception is made here in Section 3 (2), which reads:
Nothing in this section shall apply to any costs which before the passing of this Act were directed by the Supreme Court to be taxed on any particular principle appointed by that court in respect of those particular costs.
Therefore, the plaintiff in whose case the illegality, if I may so express it, is discovered, is the one person who will have to suffer. I think I could not make any serious objection to that, because if the plaintiff were to get more costs than the £4 which had been awarded by the decision of the Supreme Court the defendant would have to pay, and the defendant would be entitled to object. Moreover, I think it is a very good principle that where a court has arrived at a decision between parties, that decision should not be interfered with by legislation. I think the principle is good, but the particular individual suffers considerably.
The reason I go so fully into that is with the object of making a suggestion to the Minister that the party who suffers under that exception which is here introduced should be indemnified in some way. There is a precedent for indemnifying a litigant in these circumstances. There was a case from Bray that went to the Privy Council, the decision in which was nullified by legislation. When that case and the Bill dealing with it came before this House, I suggested that the parties should be indemnified, and the parties were in fact indemnified. I suggest to the Minister that the same rule should be applied in this case. This is one isolated case which has been the cause of this legislation.
I have only one other observation to make. It is a very curious and very unusual thing that Courts of Justice should be compelled to function for a great number of years without proper legislative machinery. They should have had a scale of costs from the very moment that they started on their judicial work. These courts have been working for nearly seven years, and there was no scale of costs to guide them. No pressure of public business is sufficient to justify a fact of that description. It may be said that you could not agree as to rules. The Seanad was responsible once, they say, and the Dáil was responsible on another occasion. Whoever was responsible, it is somewhat of a reproach to all parties concerned. I hope that the larger measure, which is to be introduced as a result of the report of the Joint Committee which sat in reference to the Courts of Justice, will be introduced within a reasonable time.
I have another objection to make. It appears that this scale of costs in respect to the Circuit Courts has been the subject of dispute in the Dáil and in the Seanad. Until it comes before you, I make no observation in regard to that scale of costs except this: that in my opinion the scale of costs is too high. You may think it is a very remarkable thing for a lawyer to say that the costs are too high, but in my opinion the scale of costs is in many respects excessive and ought to be reduced. It is wrong that litigants should be compelled to pay more than reasonable costs. It is no advantage to lawyers, because our advantage lies in allowing people to have free access to the courts and getting justice on reasonable terms.