Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 1 May 1935

Vol. 19 No. 24

Constitution (Amendment No. 19) Bill, 1935—Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a second time."

Minister for Lands (Mr. Connolly)

This Bill came on here in the ordinary course on the 11th July, 1933. At the time it was brought in here for Second Reading the Seanad, by 30 votes to 7, passed an amendment postponing the Second Stage of the Bill "pending the consideration by, and report of, a Joint Committee of both Houses of the Oireachtas on the changes, if any, necessary in the Constitution and powers of the Seanad." The "stated period" under Article 38A commenced in relation to this Bill on 28th June, 1933, and the Bill reverted to the control of Dáil Eireann on 28th December, 1934.

I understand that in the drafting of the Constitution three drafts were submitted by the Committee dealing with this question of the delaying powers of the Seanad. Two of these reports suggested a delaying period of 108 days. The third report suggested a period of four months. In the Constitution, as it emerged from the Dáil, the period was fixed as 270 days. That was in operation until 1928, when it was decided to extend the period for which a Bill could be held up by the Seanad to 18 months, with a further holding up period of 60 days. This Bill reduces the 18 months period to three months. Dáil Eireann has by Resolution again sent the Bill to the Seanad for its consideration, and it is now before the House for Second Reading. Assuming that the Seanad persists in rejecting the Bill, the Bill will, nevertheless, be deemed to have passed both Houses after the 10th June, 1935, that is, 60 days after the passing of the motion in the Dáil re-sending the Bill to this House. This Bill, as Senators know, is a one-clause Bill, stating the change of period. I do not think there is anything more that I need say on it at this stage.

Mr. Douglas

When this Bill came before the Seanad on a previous occasion circumstances were somewhat different from what they are to-day. At that time there was a keen political controversy. The Government was afraid that this House might exercise the powers that the majority could then have exercised and have delayed for the required period the various measures which the Government wished to bring into force. The position is now different. There is no serious likelihood, at any rate in the near future, of the majority in this House refusing to pass any measure introduced by this Government.

Mr. Healy

Hear, hear!

Mr. Douglas

Therefore, the proposals in this Bill need not be discussed from the point of view of political expediency, but should be discussed from the point of view of the principle involved in them. As a matter of immediate practical politics I do not suppose it makes any difference whether this Bill passes to-day, in two months time or, indeed, at all. As far as the immediate effect is concerned, therefore, any remarks that I make will be made having regard to the general principle involved in the Bill rather than to its immediate effect. I should like, first of all, to deal with one reference that was made by the Minister. If I heard him correctly I think he stated that there were three drafts prepared by the Constitution Committee, and that one of these recommended a delaying period of four months. That is half true, but as stated by the Minister it is really quite inaccurate. The period of four months recommended in one of the three drafts provided that at the end of the four months a Bill was dead if the Seanad had not passed it with no provision whatever for it being passed over the head of the Seanad. That misstatement was made by the President in his first speech. It was corrected by me when I read to the House the actual words of the third draft. The Minister for Justice, who was here, got a copy of the draft which was in the possession of the Government, and he stated in this House that what I had read was quite correct. The President referred to it himself on another Bill dealing with this House, and said that he had not been as careful as he might have been and admitted that it was not correct to say that a delaying period of only four months was proposed. It was proposed definitely in that draft, although I should mention that it was not that draft which was made the basis of the Constitution, that at the end of a period of four months the Bill should be dead unless it was a Finance Bill. The position would have been totally different to that which is visualised in this Bill.

Having dealt with that I should like to refer briefly to the question of three months or five months delay as desirable for a Second Chamber. Now, whether or not this particular Chamber remains for any length of time—whether this country is to have a Second Chamber lies, of course, in the lap of the gods or, perhaps, I should say, of the Government—I do not think this is the time to discuss that. Possibly we may have to discuss it later. But, in his speech dealing with the Bill proposing the abolition of the Seanad, the President stated that his difficulty was to devise a really effective revising Chamber. He stated he was not in favour of a Chamber with long powers of delay, but if he could conceive an effective revising Chamber, then I gathered from his speech that at any rate he would consider it if he did not quite say that he would be in favour of it.

Let me now come to the question as to whether an effective revising Chamber ought to have the power of delay limited to three months with a further more or less useless period of two months, making a maximum of five. In my opinion, a revising Chamber should include in its membership the best and the most competent of its citizens representing as many points of view as possible. It should, if possible, add to the general ability of the Dáil. Are you going to get in a Second Chamber citizens of such a character, quite irrespective of the Party that they generally support, if the delaying period is limited to a maximum of five months? In the form in which this Bill comes to us, although a Bill can be delayed for five months, the effective revising period is limited to three months, because if the Bill has not been dealt with in this House before the three months have elapsed the Bill can be passed, over the head of the Seanad, by the Dáil passing a resolution and sending the Bill again up here. Therefore, the additional period of two months is, for all practical purposes, of no effect. If, in very exceptional circumstances, it was thought desirable to delay the Bill for a further period of two months, there would be the power to do that, but I imagine that it would be only in very rare circumstances that that power would be exercised so that the real period under this Bill is three months.

Many Second Chambers have powers of delay until a general election is held. Some of them have even greater powers of delay, but I do not suppose that in any modern democratic country anyone would advocate powers of delay greater than until the next general election. We may take it that the present Government has no approval whatever for what it conceives to be a delaying Second Chamber. It is no secret that when the Constitution of this country was being discussed that both the Constitution Committee —the majority of them, if perhaps not all—and the Provisional Government were not in favour of what one may describe as a delaying Second Chamber; that is, one which would have a lengthy power of delay. Whatever one may feel about it, I think we may take it that there is not, at the present time at any rate, any substantial body of opinion in this country in favour of a Second Chamber with lengthy delaying powers.

The opinion generally held, I think, is that if there is to be an efficient Second Chamber in the Saorstát it should be for the purpose of revision. Now that revision can take, shall I say, two forms. It can merely be a number of persons sitting around the Minister and making a few suggestions to him knowing that if he does not like them it cannot do anything; or it can be a revising Chamber which can assert its opinions knowing that there will be at any rate a period of a few months in which public opinion outside may influence the Minister as regards getting him to accept its amendments or improvements. Personally, I do not believe that anything less than the original nine months, with some right of referendum or some other right of appeal, would be really effective. If you start to improve this House, or if you try to devise a new form of Second Chamber, then you will find yourself immediately up against a power of delay limited to a maximum of five months.

As to the particular form of this Bill, to my mind it is definitely bad. Assuming for the moment that you accept the five months—the method of a first delay of three months and then sending the Bill back for a further two months—I can conceive no argument for it. In the original Constitution the period was nine months. If a Bill was not passed within the nine months, then the Executive Council could take the necessary steps to have the Bill passed over the heads of this House except in cases where this House exercised its right to appeal to the Referendum. When the period is short the extra two months become a farce. When the period was extended and the Referendum removed—the period being extended to 18 months—there was a case for a further revising period of two months because during the 18 months circumstances might have changed and by agreement between the two Houses necessary amendments in a Bill which was going to be passed might be introduced. I cannot now see the case for those additional two months if a Bill comes back at the end of the period of three months. I think it would have been far better, and I still put it to the Government, that if they must have a maximum five months period, simply to provide five months. This other machinery is cumbersome and under the new circumstances will serve no useful purpose at all.

I know that nothing that one says now will make any difference, but at the same time I still believe that in the near future or later on it will be found advisable to have an effective revising Chamber in this country. I believe there is a very strong feeling among all Parties in favour of a suitable Chamber. There are, however, difficulties in getting one on which we would all be agreed, but I honestly believe that the three months period provided in this Bill, even though there be this additional period of two months, is not long enough and will be found in practice to be ineffective. I may mention, although it is not of much importance, that this year we had a Bill before us which the Government themselves found it not desirable to pass finally into law until certain other measures were brought in. That Bill was with us—I am not sure of the exact time—I think about four months —at the desire of the Government themselves. I mention this to show how short the period of three months as provided here is. If this Bill had been passed the Government would have had to take steps under the Bill which I think would be absurd when it was at their own wish that the Bill was delayed.

I still think that although its vote will make no difference, this House should not acquiesce in this period. As I say, we are not dealing now with a question of immediate political expediency, because that does not arise. We are asked to accept this Bill as a desirable principle for a Second Chamber. I do not think it is, and I do not propose to vote for it for that reason. It does not matter in the slightest whether it is passed to-day or at the end of the two months.

Mr. Bagwell

I should like to say a few words about this Bill. I intend to adhere pretty strictly to the exact purport of the Bill, which is to reduce the holding time, and if I make any other remarks which go beyond that on the general principle, I may perhaps be excused by the House, in view of the fact that it is a different House from that which originally debated this matter and that there are a number of new adherents who have never heard this question discussed. The Bill appears to deal only with one of the many functions of a Second Chamber, that is, its ultimate function, which is not often exercised, but which is not the least important of its functions. It is not the least important power or the least of the reasons for which Second Chambers exist in nearly all civilised countries. The function is the holding up of Bills which the Party in power in the first House will not amend or will not amend enough to satisfy the majority of the people in the Second Chamber, the Seanad, that the Bill is good enough to become law. They still think that it is not in the national interest; that they are justified in holding it up; that it ought to be held up to give time for reconsideration and time for party passions to cool off and for second thoughts, which are often best, to supervene, and for individual conceits and enthusiasms to modify in the interval, in the hope that the result will be, which it very often has been, a less extreme measure, or, perhaps, a new deal altogether.

This Bill proposes, in effect, a three months period for holding up measures of that character. The question is: Is it enough? I do not think it is nearly enough. This is not a question like that of the second thoughts of individuals. It is often held that second thoughts are best. That rather applies to individual persons, but, in matters of legislation, the thing is on altogether a bigger scale than that, and the speed altogether slower, because you are concerned, not with individuals and their points of view about a particular thing, but with the wishes of the electorate, and all that takes a very long time to change.

The three months limit would also tend greatly to discredit the importance of a Second House with the Party in power, whatever that Party may be. That is obvious. They will give a great deal less consideration to criticism and will feel that it is not worth their while to bother to the same extent to meet criticism in the Second Chamber, and, therefore, it affects the other, and the main, function of this Seanad, which is the amendment of Bills. There has been an enormous amount of amendment done here since the Seanad first began, and it should be remembered that although there have been many animated debates, the great majority of the enormous mass of amendments have been by consent. That has been the case quite recently. It has been the case since the present Government came in, and I see no change in that respect. There have been very great modifications of Bills in this House. They have been good modifications and the legislation has been better for them, as a matter of fact. I do not say that the reduction of the holding up power to, in effect, three months makes the Seanad useless, but it does tend to diminish very much its utility, for the reasons which I have mentioned, and, therefore, I think this is an occasion when people who think as I do ought to speak against the Bill—even although the practical effect of doing so might not be very great—if only to register a protest on a matter which is of very great importance to the country.

It should not be lost sight of that Upper Chambers tend to give stability to free institutions. I make that assertion which many people perhaps will not agree with, but if you examine it, it will be found to contain a great deal. In countries where the democratic form of government has collapsed and where you have dictatorship, a good, strong Second Chamber might very easily have saved them and might have preserved for civilised countries more liberty than they have now got. It naturally tends to be the case, I think, that an Upper House is against such things as dictatorships, whether of individuals or parties, and really, the main function, if you look at it dispassionately, of a Second Chamber is to preserve the liberties of the people of the country in which it exists. There is a great danger of liberty disappearing if there is too much haste and too much legislation passed in the heat of party politics and that is what we are here to correct. It should not be forgotten that the United States, a very great country, which has now existed for a considerable time and which has been an eminently democratic country from the start, has a Senate and, in fact, it is a very important item in the general make-up of the Government of that country.

France, a very different country, but a highly civilised country, has had a very dramatic history with a great deal of ups and downs. They were suffering at one time from a monarchy which was not only tyrannical but also extremely inefficient and they did away with it by, perhaps, what is even nowadays the most famous of all revolutions. They passed through all sorts of vicissitudes and different forms of government and so on, but they found, as a result of experience, that they had to have a Senate. They have a Senate, and it is a very important item in the Government of France. It is the result of experience that a Second Chamber is a necessity for a country if it is to be a really free, democratic country, and for that reason I do not believe that the three months period is a sufficient holding up power. I think it would lower the status of the Second Chamber in this country very much, because, as I have said, I think Governments would tend not to bother about criticisms coming from the Seanad as much as they have hitherto done. That would be bad for legislation, and, therefore, I shall vote against this Bill, even if only as a protest.

Mr. Milroy

I have endeavoured to follow the few perfunctory remarks with which the Minister for Lands and Forests sponsored this Bill here to-day. It was not easy to do so, but from what I could glean during the few minutes in which he detained the House in sponsoring a Bill which has calculated and far-reaching effects on this House, he gave me the impression that if his view represented the Government point of view, the mentality of the Government is in this State, then it is steadily growing to know less and less and less about more and more and more of what are the functions of a Second Chamber. To use the phrase made use of by Senator Bagwell, second thoughts are best. I had hoped that since this Bill was last before this House, the truth of the wisdom of that old adage would have dawned upon the mind of the President and his advisers in connection with this Bill and what it proposes to do, and it was not without some relief and hope in this direction that I saw, a short time ago, an evidence in the Press that, in respect to one matter of considerable importance, the President had learned wisdom from the passage of events and had unhesitatingly given utterance to the better informed judgment which he had acquired as a result.

I refer to his reply to the resolution from the Clare County Council forwarded to the Government requesting the repeal of the Public Safety Act. I am not going to discuss that Act but I am simply going to draw an analogy. One paragraph of the reply will be sufficient to indicate what I mean. That paragraph said:

"In his (the president's) opinion the necessity for some form of special legislation to maintain public order will remain until the free vote of the people is accepted as the means of deciding policy."

(Irish Times report, 16/4/1935).

I think that discloses an illuminating alteration of opinion from what was uttered by the President in reference to the same measure in the Dáil on March 14th, 1931, when he said: "The ordinary law is quite sufficient to deal with anything that has been referred to by the President in the long list which he has given." That shows that President de Valera has absolutely reversed his previous point of view. I think it was a courageous and a fine thing to see a man in his position unhesitatingly making public declaration of that change of attitude and I hoped that the same spirit of sound public policy would have secured an equally radical revision of judgment in regard to this measure we have now before us, and that we would have been spared the necessity of having once more to justify not merely the powers and constitution of the Seanad but the very existence of a Second House at all.

Now, Sir, I object emphatically and resent these clumsy amateur attempts at vivisection on this assembly for the sake of facilitating a Fianna Fáil jamboree or clearing the path for the advent of a filleted Republic. The Government speakers claimed that they have a mandate for the reconstitution of this House. I think that is dubious, but even assuming that it is true it is a mandate for the constitutional revision of the House and not to disembowel and hamstring it. Since this Bill was last before us there has been a persistent and malignant campaign carried on and pursued by the organ which supports the present Government—the Irish Press—to vilify and misrepresent this House in the public mind—a persistent, unscrupulous and unwarranted campaign. Speaking at a dinner in the Gresham Hotel on January 22nd last, I think it was, the Minister for Industry and Commerce said that “they all knew from experience that in any propaganda campaign judicious exaggeration was a very useful weapon.” I do not know if the extracts which I propose to read will be regarded by the Minister as coming within his definition of judicious exaggeration—I think I could find another and briefer term by which to describe them—but at any rate they reveal the atmosphere and environment in which this Bill was born and nursed and they show the despicable manner in which it has been sought to rally an uninformed public opinion into a spurious indignation against the Seanad, which House, I assert without the slightest fear of effective contradiction, has served this State and its people faithfully and well. Let me give the House a few samples of this judicious exaggeration. I quote from the Irish Press of April 19th, 1934, which said:

"A handful of partisans in the Seanad have deliberately set themselves to defeat the wishes of the majority of the electors in the Twenty-Six Counties."

"It is the abuse by those Senators of their position, the using of it to defeat democratic government, which has compelled the abolition of the Seanad."

"It was obvious that nothing could reconcile these men, who had established themselves as a permanent veto on the Irish people's will. The Bill to abolish the Chamber they had deliberately reduced to the level of an anti-democratic cabal was the only course left to the people's leaders."

On March 22nd, 1934, the Irish Press referred to this House as a hand-picked Chamber and said:

"For a hand-picked Chamber, whose British members assembled in strength yesterday to strike their blow against democracy, to obstruct this nation, can only end in taking from them all opportunity to continue their scandalous abuse of powers they should never have had."

And this is the paper, "Truth in the News," which last Monday in its leading article had the temerity to quote the dictum of Tone: "To unite the whole of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissensions," and goes on to urge that "all the children of the nation are to be cherished, excluding neither the Irish Party, nor the Orange leaders, nor any other section." I suppose, Sir, as there is an exception to every rule, the members of this House are the exception to the all-embracing cherishment of this journal. I have a couple of more pearls to display from the columns of this organ of amity, unity and truth—truth in inverted commas. On June 2nd, 1934, it said——

Mr. Lynch

Might I ask, Sir, is this relevant or is it in order? Is it relevant to this discussion?

Cathaoirleach

I think it is relevant, for this reason. This is a Bill truncating the powers of the Seanad. I think the Senator is trying to argue that the truncation is unjustified and he is quoting records to prove his contention.

Mr. Milroy

I would like the Senators to realise that this Bill is striking at certain fundamental functions of this Seanad, and to secure a certain spurious popular public opinion behind this attempt to mutilate the Seanad, this kind of propaganda has been indulged in, and if this is not the occasion—when the members of the Seanad are assailed individually and collectively—to reply to and expose the lying nature of these comments, I do not know what is relevant to the discussion on this Bill. However, Sir, if these matters are jarring on the nerves of Senator Lynch, I am very nearly finished with them. On June 2nd, 1934, the Irish Press said:

"It (the Seanad) put its anti-democratic and anti-national bias above all considerations of its own usefulness.

"It deliberately and of set choice became the embittered instrument of an ejected Government. It rejected the major measures for which the people by an overwhelming vote had called; it amended many Bills only to destroy them; and whirled along by this consuming antagonism to the people it at last decided to refuse the Executive the power it sought to preserve order and protect the people from a coup d'état.”

On December 13th, 1934, it said:—

"Instead of endeavouring in any way to reflect the known desires of the electorate—one of the most democratic in the world—the Seanad majority set itself to prevent the people's mandate being translated into legislation."

Now these are my extracts. That is the evidence upon which the Seanad has been tried in the mind of the public. That is the evidence for the prosecution, and I venture to say that neither of the two Republican King's Counsel on the Government benches would prosecute upon evidence of this nature which even a superficial examination would show to be lying from the beginning— or perhaps I should call it "judicious exaggeration." I do not know if supporters of the Government will regard this as judicious exaggeration. To my mind it is yellow gutter journalism of the meanest, most contemptible and most lying nature. I hope that the Irish Press will give a verbatim report of this statement.

When this Bill was first introduced into the Seanad the Minister for Justice appeared to explain and defend it, but he did not justify it then, and it has not been justified to-day. That may be why a speech by the Minister who supports it to-day was so brief, because he knew it could not be justified. Since this Bill was first introduced into the Oireachtas there has not been one address by a Minister or Government Deputy or Government Senator that has been in any way of a convincing nature in its defence. We in the Seanad have replied to this Bill in the most definite and conclusive manner. We recollect, when the Minister rose to reply, the feeble, unconvincing nature of the address which he made to try to rebut the arguments which the Opposition had put forward on the Bill. There was one interesting incident in that debate which I think is worth recalling. Senator O'Hanlon, while speaking, had quoted from the Irish Press—I hope Senator Lynch will not be alarmed—the following:—

"In the Twenty-Six Counties, however, the Seanad since its first creation has given itself the duty of obstructing public opinion, and endeavouring to defeat its control of legislation."

Senator MacEllin queried if that was not quite true, and Senator O'Hanlon asked where were the proofs. Senator MacEllin replied:—

"There will be lots of them when I come to speak."

Senator MacEllin spoke, and though his remarks occupied about two columns of the Official Reports, from beginning to end there was not one scrap or iota of those proofs he had threatened to produce. In fact, he made no attempt to produce them. I am sorry he is not here to-day. He might have given some more effective demonstration to this House of his contention, and the contention of the Government, that the Seanad is an obstacle which stands between the Irish people and their expressed desires.

When the present Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance was in opposition in the Dáil he used frequently to taunt the back-benchers on the then Government side of the House with being what he called "dumb-driven cattle," who walked into the division lobbies without having really considered what they were going to do and in mere response to the wishes of the Party Whip. Now, I hope, Sir, that that taunt will not be merited by some of our friends, the Fianna Fáil Senators, to-day. At the beginning, after the Minister had spoken, knowing how barren of argument and reason his statement was, I thought that perhaps some Fianna Fáil Senator might come to the rescue or that perhaps the Fenian's Son from Portmarnock's velvet strand might have stepped into the gap and supplied what the Minister had omitted. I regret the absence of our cheerful friend and I suppose one reason why the Minister for Lands has not displayed himself to-day as really rising to the requirements of the occasion is that he has not found himself able to disentangle his brain from his immortal labours of annihilating the cattle trade. If it were not for that pressure on his grey matter he might have made a better effort to defend Government prestige. But, at any rate, Sir, I ask that we shall have an honest vote on the motion in this House to-day. Charges of acting solely from party considerations and selfish motives have been made vehemently and repeatedly against the members of this side of the House. Let us, I ask, have from Fianna Fáil Senators some indication that they will not now act on those reprehensible party lines which they so severely censure in others. I believe that there are on the Government benches to-day Fianna Fáil Senators who do not assent to Government policy in regard to this House—who do not regard this Bill as either justified, necessary or desirable. I believe there are Senators on the Government side of the House who take that view, and I want to know will they now give us an example of that courage and non-party attitude which they have been so vehemently demanding from us, by voting on this Bill free from the fear of the Party Whip and according to the convictions of their consciences, or will they act the part of the dumb-driven cattle and, in mute and inglorious fashion, assist in the work of mutilating and degrading the status of this House, which Senator MacEllin very aptly described on one occasion as "the first assembly in the land."

Some time ago I was reading an account by De Quincey of the last day of the old Irish House of Lords. There is a remarkable passage, I have not got the exact words, where he speaks about there not being a murmur or a buzz of protest from those hereditary legislators of the Irish nation. He wondered of what witchcraft had Pitt possessed them that he could so deprive these men of their sense of patriotism and honour of their country. I am putting this kind of argument to members of this House. If there is any analogy to be made between that House and this one, this is the next House that has fulfilled their functions and it will be a nice thing to recall that members of any party can allow their existence and the principles upon which the constitution of Houses like this is based, to be whittled away, not because they are convinced it is necessary, but because the party whip flicks at them and they have not the moral courage to resist it. It will be all the more remarkable that they have denounced and censured in others those very practices which they are afraid to disclaim themselves. I ask sincerely that Senators of all parties will not lightly dismiss these considerations and will, before they comply with the requirements of the Government, pause and reflect upon and try to realise the reactions and effects of the measure upon the functions, the status and the existence of this House.

Now, Sir, the suspensory powers with which this House has been endowed were not given for the purpose of obstructing Government policy and they have not been used towards that end. If, in the considered judgment of the majority of this House, certain proposals for legislation are contrary to the best interests of the State and the people, this House is entitled to call for delay in pressing forward such proposals until the people whose interests are involved are given an opportunity to consider and pronounce on them. That, it is conceded, the Seanad has done on a very few occasions but it would have been lacking in its manifest duties and functions if it had not done so. I want to ask has the interval that has transpired since this Bill was last before us been utilised to give the people an opportunity to consider either the action of this House or the Bill itself. If it has not been possible to do that within the 20 months that have elapsed since the Bill was last before us, what possibility is there of such being done with regard to measures of a similar nature when the period is reduced to three or five months?

I want to know has the Government given any reconsideration to the matter? Has it given any consideration to the amendment which the House passed on the occasion when the Bill first came before us? Has it given any consideration to the motion which it passed at the same time asking that a Committee of both Houses be set up to consider what changes, if any, are necessary in the constitution and powers of the Seanad? That resolution has appeared on the Order Paper of the Dáil every day that that House sat since the Seanad passed it, and it provided two things—first, proof that the Seanad would not stand in the way of any wise revision of its powers or constitution, and, secondly, it provided an opportunity for the Government to make good the declaration that it aimed at some reconstitution of this House on lines more in accordance with democratic ideas. We are entitled to know from the Minister why that opportunity has not been availed of. We are entitled to have some explanation why the Dáil was never given an opportunity to discuss that motion. If they are serious in their desire to have a second House on lines more democratic than this one, surely this motion:—

"that it is expedient that a Joint Committee consisting of five members of the Seanad and five members of the Dáil, with the Chairman of each House ex-officio, be set up to consider and report on the changes, if any, necessary in the constitution and powers of the Seanad,"

was the very opportunity the Government had sought for and which they should have been glad to avail of. The fact that it has been allowed to appear on the Order Paper of the Dáil since June, 1933—I suppose it appears again to-day—without giving members of that House an opportunity to consider and discuss it is reducing Parliamentary procedure to a farce and is a prostitution of the forms of Parliamentary conduct. We are entitled to some explanation from the Minister. I see the Minister is smiling. I read somewhere that laughter is the beginning of revolt or reform. I hope that it is the beginning of a revolt on the part of the back benchers against these methods and reform on the part of the Government of its peculiar methods of dealing with these things.

The Seanad has not acted as an obstructive body. It is as democratic in its instincts, ideas and actions as the Dáil. It has not acted, to use a phrase of the President in which he gave his impression of the nature of a Second Chamber, as "a remnant of the defensive armour of the ascendancy class." In no case in which the Seanad exercised its powers to hold up a Bill were there not grave major issues of principle and of far-reaching effect involved which justified the Seanad in calling for delay. Let it not be forgotten, that, even with its present powers, the Seanad is impotent to block permanently the passage of a Bill if the Dáil insists on its passing. Its utmost power is that of delay which, in the hectic atmosphere which has prevailed in this young State, is a very desirable and, I think, necessary thing to have in some part of the Oireachtas.

One fact in regard to this measure has received scant attention. The Seanad has been pilloried for not passing this Bill when it came up before—pilloried as opposing the people's will. I wonder if any Senator has thought it worth while to ascertain what was the expression of the people's will as indicated by the vote on the Final Reading of the Bill in the Dáil. The Dáil consists of 151 Deputies, including the Ceann Comhairle. On the final vote on this Bill in that House, the figures were: For, 57; against, 32. So that out of a total membership of 151, only 57 voted for this measure—a minority of the Dáil. We have this measure presented to us with the authority of a minority of the entire membership of the Dáil, and we are held up to odium, ridicule and malignant misrepresentation, as reactionary, anti-democratic and opposed to the will of the people, because we asked that such a measure should be delayed in order that all the issues involved should be considered by a Committee of both Houses. If by proposing the setting up of that committee the Seanad was not attempting to ascertain the will of the people and attempting to arrive at a peaceful solution of this problem, I do not know what it was doing.

I began my observations with a quotation from President de Valera, and I should like to conclude with another quotation from a speech delivered by him. Speaking at a meeting of the National Executive of Fianna Fáil on 29th March last, the President is reported as saying:—

"When we accepted office, we assumed the obligation to maintain peace in the community and to safeguard all citizens against violence. That is our supreme duty as a Government, and must be fulfilled."

That was a welcome utterance from him, and, in my opinion, a sound and unassailable principle upon which to base the attitude of the Government in regard to certain phases of actual and potential disturbance in the State. I hope it will not be departed from. But when the President speaks of "supreme duty" I should like to remind him that this House and its members have also a supreme duty to the community to discharge—the duty of examining measures which come before us, not from the point of view of the interests of a Party, nor even from the point of view of the Government for the time being, but from that of the community as a whole. If, upon such examination and consideration, such measures appear to the majority of the House to conflict with the real interests of the State, to be inimical to its welfare, and prejudicial to its tranquillity, it is the supreme duty of the Seanad in such circumstances to exercise what powers it possesses to ward off such evils and try to secure such delay as will give an opportunity for a reasoned and true judgment to prevail. That the Seanad has done without fear or favour. That is the basis of the indictment against it. It is, however, an indictment which we need not fear to be brought to answer before the tribunal of the people's judgment.

Mr. Dowdall

The House will, no doubt, learn with pleasure that I have no intention of attempting to imitate the rhetorical flummery of the last speaker, to whom we listened for three-quarters of an hour. There were two points in the address of the Senator to which I should like to refer. He read a number of extracts—some of them recent—from the daily papers. Having done so, he said that that was the evidence on which this measure was based. I should like to draw his attention to one outstanding piece of evidence which was not included in the extracts. He appealed to the back benchers on this side, and I shall remind members on the opposite side, who should have known better, of a vote they gave on one occasion. A measure was introduced here which gave the power of life and death to a military tribunal, which was intended to supersede and override the power of even the Supreme Court. Before that measure was introduced in this House, a time table was brought before the House and approved. Before the Bill had been printed or circulated, before a single member of the Seanad had seen it, that was done. It was introduced on a Friday and passed on a Saturday. That is the evidence by which, if this House is to be judged——

Mr. Milroy

Why do not the Government repeal it?

Mr. Dowdall

I do not say now whether that measure was a good or a bad one, whether it was justifiable or unjustifiable. I am referring merely to the irresponsibility of a body which is supposed to weigh legislation and interpose delay where delay is desirable. That is the testimony by which I shall always judge this House. A greater display of irresponsibility on the part of responsible men I cannot imagine. As I have been challenged, I may say that my view with regard to a military tribunal exercising judicial functions is now what it was then. Senator Milroy asked why, with all this delay, this Bill was not referred to the people. I ask him one question in that regard: Which Party abolished the referendum?

Mr. Milroy

Why did you not restore it?

Mr. Jameson

In a debate of this kind, we generally have expressions of view from supporters of the Government in answer to speeches from this side of the House. I have been waiting for some Senator to get up and explain why this Bill should be passed by the Seanad. I have waited in vain. Senator Dowdall accuses some of us of having voted for what may be called a coercion Bill. There never was a Bill of which we so much disapproved. As some Senators explained, our only reason for passing that Bill was the absolute assurance of the Government of the day that it was necessary for the safety of the country. I do not suppose there were any bigger opponents of the Bill than we who voted for it on that occasion—for the reason I have given. I do not think that the subsequent history of that measure ought to be debated here. It would raise much too serious a question for the Government at the present time. I did think that Senator Dowdall would have some better stick to beat us with than that.

Mr. Dowdall

No.

Mr. Jameson

I fear that we are getting away from what we should concentrate on: that is a debate amongst ourselves as regards our own domestic affairs and about the standing of this House. I had really and truly hoped that we would have heard from some of the Senators opposite some good reasons advanced for this Bill, and why they propose to vote for it. I firmly believe that this Bill means the extinction of the Seanad eventually. I would like to have heard from some of the Senators opposite why they are going to vote for it. It would be interesting to hear why they should be anxious to vote for the extinction of the Seanad. They might also tell us what, in their opinion, the Seanad has done wrong in the past which justifies the introduction of a Bill of this character.

I had a great deal to do with the discussions that took place prior to the establishment of the Seanad. I took part in those discussions in the first beginnings of the Free State. I sat with sundry other Irishmen and discussed the question, principally with Arthur Griffith, of how the government of this country was to be carried on. Long discussions took place about the Dáil and about a Second Chamber. All of us at that time, whether we were Nationalists or what people would now call Conservatives or Unionists, agreed —and Arthur Griffith was as strong on it as anybody else—that it was an essential part of government in this country, especially while the State was in the making, that we should have a Second House to consider the measures introduced by the Government. On that basis, and on the arrangements made by Arthur Griffith himself, it was agreed that we would have a Second House.

I am looking around now to see if there are here some of the members of the First Seanad—of those who sat in the Seanad when, to a large extent, we were a select House. There is no doubt that was the position then. In those days all the members did honour and care for the dignity of the Seanad. Of course, we argued and debated on the various measures that came before us. Sometimes we voted for the Government; sometimes we voted against it. We split up into various divisions. We had not Parties then, but on the very grave measures that came before us, measures affecting the welfare of the country, we got consideration of them from all sides. Many difficult problems were presented to us, and I may say that the views of the Senators of those days weighed greatly with the Government. Many important alterations were made in the measures introduced by the Government of the day.

There is one thing that I think Senators ought to remember, and it is this: that where you have a free thinking Seanad a great deal of useful and necessary work is done. A Minister comes here in charge of a Bill. Senators speak on it. They suggest alterations and improvements. Very frequently private consultations follow, with the result that the views expressed here are adopted by the Government, and important modifications are made in Government measures. All that results in great benefit to the country. Under this Bill you are going to destroy absolutely all kind of senatorial influence. I wonder do the Senators opposite think so badly of their own House, of its dignity and usefulness, that they are prepared to vote for this Bill. I greatly regret, nobody more so, that Government influence should be so strong that our friends opposite, without argument and without discussion, are simply going to vote for it. It is an awful pity, I think, that they should do so. It is not what the Seanad ought to do. I dare say that our friends opposite will beat us when we go into the division lobby. Well, at any rate, if they do we can point to this, that we have spoken out our thoughts about this Bill and about the usefulness of this House.

I must say that I wonder very much at the Government bringing in this Bill. Those of us who attend here regularly, and see what the Government can do when a division is called, must wonder at the action of the Government. Why could they not leave this Bill on the shelf? They have already got what they want. Nobody is opposing them. They do not seem to be threatened from any quarter here, and yet they bring it in. It is a pity, I think, that the Government should bring it in, and particularly for the reasons given by Senator Douglas. Undoubtedly, everybody sees that some changes must be made in the Seanad. A time will come when final arrangements about it must be made. When that time arrives we are going to be faced with a measure of this kind on the Statute Book, a measure which means that not more than three months will be allowed for holding up a Bill, no matter how doubtful it may be. With that staring you in the face when final arrangements are being made for the new House, you will, I suggest, have enormously damaged any chance there might otherwise be of getting a decent Seanad. As some Senator has already suggested, you will not get the type of individual who would be of use—I mean a good, sound citizen with a knowledge of his country, who has his own opinions about things, and the intelligence and courage to speak them—to come here when he knows that the Seanad will have practically no power whatever. That type of citizen is not going to waste his time here—in an Assembly that will be powerless and practically useless.

In my opinion we should have a Second Chamber in this country. I cannot believe that the Senators opposite are persuaded that we ought not to have a Second Chamber. I hope they will get well into their heads that in voting for this Bill to-day they are voting for the abolition of the Seanad. I do not know what their obligations to the Government may be, but this is a domestic matter connected with the future of this House and of a Second Chamber in this country. The vote which Senators are about to be called upon to give on this Bill is, I venture to suggest, of far more importance than some people seem to think. We have quite a small attendance here to-day. I would have thought that there would not be a vacant seat in the House to-day when this Bill came on for Second Reading. I had expected that those who proposed voting for it would have stood up and told us why they were going to do so. All that we have heard so far is the accusation from the other side that we voted for a Coercion Bill. If we did, in the circumstances that prevailed at that time, that surely is no reason why the Seanad should commit hari-kari to-day. I do think that Senators ought to pause a bit. I am now addressing a very different House from that which was first set up here, but I still think it is a useful House. No matter how the matter may be put, this is a place where people of free opinions can come and say what they think, and where others can get up and answer them in the same spirit. We always have had free debate in this House. I look on it as one of the saddest things that have ever happened in this country that Senators are going to vote to-day on this Bill and that the vote of the majority will practically end the Seanad.

Mr. Lynch

As I understand it, the Bill before the House proposes to limit the period during which legislation sent up from the other House can be held up here. That period is defined in the Bill, and that is the question that we shall have to vote on. I regret very much that, in the exercise of that freedom of speech to which Senator Jameson has referred, I had to listen to some of the speeches that preceded his. The speakers certainly took full advantage of that freedom of speech which we are told people have enjoyed in this House. I regret very much the spirit in which this discussion has proceeded. On the question as to whether the length of time during which this House can hold up proposed legislation should be curtailed or not, I regret very much the spirit in which that has been discussed by Senators on the other side. We have been asked to say why this Bill should be passed.

I had not the honour of being a member of the House at the time that the Bill was postponed in 1933, but even at that time one or two things happened that struck me as possibly requiring that the enabling period for this House to hold up legislation should be curtailed. On that I propose to say a few words and not on the question of the French Senate or the American Senate or on the bicameral system of legislature. On none of these topics will I say one word, for reasons that occur to myself. On the question which I respectfully suggest is the one that should be considered here, namely, whether the period of time should be curtailed or not, I propose to make a few observations. Before I became a member of the House there was one piece of legislation held up by the Seanad and it struck me as a rather astonishing thing that the Seanad should have held it up. We have heard it suggested—indeed, the Seanad considers it to be one of its functions—that we are here as a revising Chamber to protect the liberties of the people, and so forth. Now it has occurred to me from my reading, and from the reading of history it must occur to any person, that if you want to have a proper and regular system of Government one thing that seems to be necessary for that—it is conceded, I think, from all sides—is that you should have an army, a standing army, and before you can have a standing army you must have legislation to deal with discipline in the army and the payment of troops. That has been recognised in England for a great number of years. It has been recognised in every country. As I understand it—if I am in error, I hope I will be corrected by those who were members when this matter to which I propose to refer occurred, and whether it occurred or not they can inform the public and inform themselves—a Bill was introduced into this House some time last year—I am not quite sure of the time—to regularise the preservation of a standing army in this country. While I do not know if such a Bill was ever thrown out of the House of Lords and I do not know whether such a Bill was ever thrown out in other countries, when this House interfered with legislation which proposed to preserve a legally constituted standing army, when it rejected that Bill, it struck me that it was an error of judgment upon their part which would justify the introduction of a measure like this to curtail the period of time for which they could hold up legislation.

Mr. Blythe

I should like to refer first to the point raised by Senator Lynch because he has got the story entirely wrong. There was no Bill concerned with the Army rejected by this House, and I do not think for a moment that the House or, in fact, any section of it, would have considered rejecting such a Bill. What happened was that the period of an extending Bill was reduced from twelve months to three months in order, if possible, to induce the Government to reconsider what appeared to be their policy with regard to a very serious matter. From the foundation of the Army up to that time, no man without a regular course of training had been commissioned in the Army. For a period of years, the position had been that only men who had gone through a regular course of training were commissioned. The Government, then, for reasons of its own, commissioned a considerable group on political grounds. That caused considerable alarm. The alarm may or may not have been justified. It may not have been the intention of the Government to go any further with the matter, but no assurance could be obtained from the Minister that it was not their intention to go any further, and with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Government, the Seanad reduced the period of extension to three months. When the Bill next came up, the nine-months period of extension was agreed to, so that what Senator Lynch appears to think happened did not happen. Nothing in the slightest like it happened and there was none of the irresponsibility which he would allege in evidence in the Seanad.

Senator Dowdall alleged that the passage of the Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Act by the Seanad showed irresponsibility. In my opinion, it would have been irresponsible for the Seanad, in the circumstances, not to have facilitated the passage of that Bill. Whatever one might have thought about the action of the Seanad two years ago, I do not think any reasonable man can now doubt that that Bill, or some Bill very like it, was necessary, and I do not think that any responsible man can doubt that, having regard to the history of this country, to the circumstances that prevail, to the organised forces that exist and are likely to exist for some time, government can be carried on here without exceptional powers and without some sort of special or exceptional tribunal. The reason for that is that there is no more vulnerable institution than the jury system; there is nothing which a group of determined men who are organised can more speedily make unworkable; and, therefore, I take it that the position now is that the Bill then passed by the Seanad has been proven to have been a necessary Bill. I do not say that every detail in it was necessary or that the sort of tribunal which it set up was the only tribunal that would meet the circumstances, but, at any rate, the plea of the Government for the Bill at the time has been reinforced by the facts to such an extent that I think no further argument about it is necessary.

I think the strongest arguments against this Bill are those put forward by Senator Douglas. It seems to me unthinkable that this country will carry on for any length of time with a system of single Chamber Government. It seems to me that while Senators may not be quite as great a protection as Senator Bagwell seems to think for popular liberties and while popular liberties may disappear with a Seanad in existence just as they would disappear when there is no Seanad, the danger of their disappearing in the absence of a Second Chamber is very much greater. It means, if there is no Second Chamber, that any inflamed majority in the single chamber may rashly enter upon a course from which there is no turning back and, without intending to destroy popular liberties, they may, in some period of heat, begin a process which must go on. It will find itself on a sort of slippery slope, to use a very familiar metaphor, and be unable to come back. It seems to me that a properly constituted Second Chamber is one of the best safeguards —in fact, I believe it is the only effective safeguard—that can be devised for the democratic liberties of the people.

There may be many views as to how a Second Chamber ought to be constituted but I think one thing certain is that it ought to be of a different complexion, shall we say, from the popularly elected Chamber. It ought to be either without such strong Party divisions or to have special representation. It ought to have an economic basis or something which would ensure that when legislation passes the two Houses, there have been two rather distinct points of view brought to bear on that legislation. I believe that compared with an effective Second Chamber, things like referenda and powers of the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional and so forth are entirely useless. Without a Second Chamber and without the safeguards it gives to the courts, the courts would be unable to give any effective protection to the popular liberties and I believe similarly that the referendum is liable to be an instrument of oppression rather than otherwise in such circumstances.

Believing that a Second Chamber of some sort is an absolute essential, I agree with Senator Douglas that the period of three months is too short a period to make it an effective Second Chamber, no matter what its constitution may be. I can imagine certain constitutions which, because of the inherent strength they would give a Second Chamber, might make it a bit more effective, but probably those constitutions would not be agreed to. I am thinking for the moment of constitutions involving the sitting of members of the Hierarchy and so forth. I have not heard these types of constitutions advocated, and any constitution I can imagine being adopted for a Second Chamber seems to me to involve the giving to it of longer delaying powers than three months. I do not regard delay as one of the normal functions of a Second Chamber at all. I think that while, occasionally, it may be correct for a Second Chamber to hold up legislation, its real business is to revise it; not to destroy its main principles or to reject, generally speaking, the main principles of legislation that may come before it, but rather to ensure that safeguards are inserted, if safeguards are necessary, and to see that the details are such that, as I have said already, the Government, in some time of popular excitement, will not enter upon a course which leads to disastrous results, but then, some power of delay seems to me to be essential in order to enable revision to be effective.

There has been a good deal of emphasis laid on the number of amendments passed by the Seanad to various Bills. In my opinion, those amendments really represent by far the least important part of the Seanad's share in the shaping of legislation. Some of the amendments have been very important, but a great many of them have been rather in the nature of changes. Speaking frankly, I often thought, as a Minister, that some of the amendments inserted by the Seanad, and agreed to under pressure, were of little value and that they were simply alterations rather than amendments. On the other hand, it is not, as I have said already, the amendments effected in the House, whether they were changes of words, verbal changes, or whether they were amendments of considerable substance, that mattered. It is the fact that here was a body, during the major part of its time not constituted on Party lines, which was going to discuss freely everything that came before it and which, broadly speaking, was going to vote freely on everything that came before it, because for a great number of years the Government of the day could not rely on having a majority on any ordinary matter that came before the Seanad. There was some little Party system, but it was not an effective Party system, and the House considered everything that came before it freely and on the merits, and was influenced in its decisions by the speeches actually made in the House.

To that extent it was different from the Dáil, because at no time, of course, did any speech in the Dáil ever influence a vote there. Of course, it must be so in any Assembly which is run on Party lines. The speeches that influence votes in the Dáil are only the speeches made at Party meetings before the Dáil assembles, but the Seanad, being run on non-Party lines, broadly speaking, considered matters on the merits as they saw them, and the Government was liable to find itself defeated on almost any issue that arose here in the Seanad. The result was that in the framing of legislation, the kind of debate that could take place on the particular issue in the Seanad was borne in mind, and there is no doubt at all that, because of the debate in the Seanad having to be borne in mind, the general tenor and texture of legislation was modified. I think that was all to the good because, in very few instances, did the Seanad insist to the end on an amendment. It simply passed it, let the country see what alternative proposal could be put up, forced the matter to go back to the Dáil and occasionally asked for a conference of the two Houses, but in general it agreed, if the Dáil was not willing to meet it, to let its amendments lapse. There was always a reserve power of insistence there, and of holding up a Bill for a considerable time, and, consequently, both the criticisms and amendments of the Seanad had to be very seriously considered by the Government.

If there is only a delaying period of three months, I think the Seanad is robbed of a great part of its effectiveness, because the Government is not forced to consider the criticism or point of view of the Seanad to an extent which would make the Seanad really effective. I do not say at all that 18 months is a necessary period. Personally, I had experience of the Seanad, when the period was nine months, coming here as a Minister, and although, in addition to the nine months, there was a referendum, I do not think anybody took the referendum proposals very seriously. Some people in the Seanad may have, but I do not think the Government took the referendum proposals very seriously or feared that a referendum would be forced on the country, so that so far as the relations of the Government and the Seanad went, the position was that the Seanad had a nine months delaying period and that period was sufficient to cause the Government to give the fullest consideration to the point of view and to the amendments of the Seanad.

I think, therefore, that it would be possible to find something between three months and 18 months that would be a satisfactory period and sufficient to enable the Seanad to really discharge its revising functions effectively. If this Bill is passed I think it means that a sort of wrong point of view is endorsed which may create difficulties in the future, because I believe if the Seanad goes some sort of Second Chamber will have to be created in which the experience that this particular Chamber possesses would be valuable, and I think that the members of this House ought not to endorse a period so short as three months.

Mr. Johnson

The speech of Senator Milroy was perhaps the most important speech attacking the Bill, or rather I should say it was the most vehement. He attacked it as if the Bill before us dealt with the question of the existence of a Second Chamber and I wondered what sort of speech he will make, without repeating his arguments of to-day, when that other matter comes before us. He made one statement which I think is a rather dangerous argument. He referred to the absence of a mandate because of the fact that only one-third of the membership of the Dáil voted for this Bill. I think he might turn the argument round and say that only 28 or 32 or 40 at different periods of the discussion in the Dáil voted against the Bill though it was possible for the Opposition to gather as many as 67—so that the opposition to the Bill might be said not to have been very strong. It is a dangerous argument and I would recall to Senator Milroy the fact that the Constitution itself was passed by only a small minority of the total membership who were entitled to be present in the Provisional Parliament. Forty-seven Deputies voted in favour of the Second Reading of the Constitution out of a total of 127 who were entitled to be present, and there were 86 who had taken their seats. It is a dangerous line of argument to say that there was no mandate.

Mr. Milroy

I never said there was no mandate.

Mr. Connolly

You did, it is on the records.

Mr. Milroy

I drew attention to the vote. I did not follow that up by the argument that there was no mandate.

Mr. Connolly

I think it is quite clearly on the records that you did.

Mr. Johnson

There was no purpose in quoting the figures unless they had that implication. I have been reading the debates and my own speech on the Second Stage of this Bill and I am satisfied to reiterate the statements I used at that time. I was encouraged by the speech of Senator Blythe to-day; apart from the conclusion he arrived at his views are largely in agreement with my own. I think the conclusion that a three months delay with a possible extension of two months is sufficient in ordinary circumstances, but I think that the point he made about the manner in which the Dáil attends to its business shows the importance of having a Chamber where Bills can be examined critically. He told us that speeches in the Dáil never influenced the voting. Speeches in favour or against proposals are made at Party meetings and once the Party has decided anything the members of the Party vote for it in the House. That is what he said in effect and I am afraid it is very true. It is the fault of our Parliamentary practice that we have departed from the principle and practice of argument and discussion of measures for the purpose of reaching a common understanding. It is time that a change should be made in our Parliamentary practice and a Second Chamber is necessary so long as the present system of deciding proposals in Party meetings prevails. Senator Jameson drew attention to the discussions of measures in this House from time to time, of arguments adduced and of defects shown in the legislation brought here from the other House. I do not think that this Bill will affect that position in the least unless it is contended that behind all our discussion we must have a sense of power to resist the Dáil.

If that is the intention the case is complete for this Bill and even for the more drastic measure for the abolition of the Second Chamber. For if anything is clear it is that the representative chamber shall be supreme. But the case for revision by the Seanad is not affected by this Bill at all. I take it that the three months period is to show that if the Seanad challenges a Bill then the Dáil, as the supreme authority, can exercise its overriding powers and pass the measure over the heads of the Second Chamber after a period of reasonable delay. The normal procedure will be that after discussion in this House amendments will be sent to the Dáil and will be examined, and if they are not passed within three months after the original Bill had left the House they will be vetoed. This Bill is not going to make any drastic change such as some of the Senators spoke of. What is done is to insure that the Dáil will be able to meet any challenge made by the Second Chamber, and if that challenge is not issued then discussion, examination and argument will be as effective to-day as in the past. It may do more, because I hope that argument, discussion and reason will prevail to a greater degree than it has done hitherto. Unless this House is contending that power must be always at the back of its discussion, then there is no case made against the limit of three months delay. If the Seanad at any time desires to challenge the position of the Dáil, then I say the three months delay is sufficient. Senator Blythe refers to the criticism of the Seanad in its action over the Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Bill. To my mind the gravamen of the charge against the Seanad was not for opposing the Act but for passing the Act without discussion, without consideration, and without examination, and thus abandoning its functions as a Seanad. The passing of the Act was bad, but passing it without discussion was infinitely worse.

Mr. O'Hanlon

I see the Minister rising—I hope he is not going to make an introductory speech at the conclusion of this debate. I say with great respect that there has been no argument advanced for the Bill which is now before the House. Senator Lynch put forward one argument as to why this Bill should be carried, and that was disposed of and dealt with by Senator Blythe.

My friend Senator Dowdall advanced the argument that because this House voted on one occasion in a certain way, its powers must be curtailed, and perhaps it must be abolished. It is a very heavy sentence to impose on any legislative chamber, because on one occasion it did something with which we do not happen to agree, to say: "Therefore, wipe it out; abolish it." That is the argument we have heard in favour of the Bill. Senator Jameson in dealing with Senator Dowdall's remarks, said that we had been accused of unnecessary haste, and asked why we voted for the Coercion Bill. Senator Dowdall did not object to the reasons for it at all, but the means. He could not condemn it, and the reason he could not was because his own Party have adopted it. In answer to the call of the Executive, who had information of a very specific character—at least they told us they had—the Seanad voted, and probably in a manner that brought them into danger. Simply for that reason, the House stands condemned and must be abolished.

It is not necessary to cover all the arguments made for the abolition of this House or for its continuance, but I merely want to point out one inconsistency. This Bill limits the holding-up of measures by the Seanad to three months, and there is in the process of becoming law a second Bill to abolish the House altogether. I certainly think that one thing the Government ought to do is to stay its hand and not to throw on this House this totally unnecessary Bill, making it a practically negligible quantity in legislative affairs, if they propose to abolish it in eight or nine months. The Fianna Fáil Party has an effective majority in this House, and the least that it might do is to stay its hand and not to whittle down the powers of this Chamber and make it practically negligible for the few days it will continue to exist. If the Government proceed with this policy its last days will have arrived in November or December. It is nothing but a totally unnecessary step to limit its powers, so that it cannot be the normal part of the legislative machine for those months.

Mr. Farren

On the last occasion on which this Bill was before the House, I said it was a Bill upon which I should not like to give a silent vote. I said that personally I would prefer a decent Bill to abolish the Seanad to the Bill then introduced. I am still of the same opinion. No matter how this House votes to-day, this Bill within a few days will automatically become law. A vote one way or the other, therefore, does not matter three straws. I said that on the last occasion and I am going to vote to-day as I voted on that occasion. That vote will not count for anything, but there is a question of principle involved. I think that members of this House should examine this Bill apart from Party outlook, if I might say that. I do not care what Government introduced it, I would vote against it on principle.

I have been in the House since its inception and from my experience I am perfectly satisfied that if this Bill is passed into law the House will become a farce. So long as this House could use its powers to delay certain measures, even for the period of nine months as originally in the Constitution, it was a great safeguard. I think there is no country in the world that requires a revising Second Chamber more than ours, and I say that with full knowledge of the facts of the case. Temperamentally, our people are very strong-willed. We know that in hot blood we do things that in cold blood we are sorry for. In all sincerity, I say that no matter what Government happens to be in power, it is an advantage to them and to the rest of the community that there should be a revising Chamber here with powers of delay, and the people might be satisfied that there was such a Chamber to prevent them doing things that afterwards they were glad they had been prevented from doing. As I said, it does not matter three straws what way the vote goes to-day, but for consistency's sake I will vote to-day as I did on the last occasion when the Bill was before the House.

Minister for Lands (Mr. Connolly)

I did not go to any great pains or to any length in introducing this Bill, for the simple reason that I felt that the main Bill which affects this Seanad in its practical work is the Bill which has yet to come to this House, namely, the Abolition of the Seanad Bill. I suggest that Senator Milroy's very vehement speech would have been more applicable to the Abolition of the Seanad Bill than to this measure. This is a single-clause Bill changing the period of operation of the delaying power of the House, and the only reason it has been brought forward is to comply with the technique of parliamentary legislation. This Bill may be rejected to-day and it may be passed. If it is passed that ends it. If it is not passed, it automatically becomes law on the date I mentioned. Therefore I do not see any justification for working myself up into a state of rhetoric on a measure of so little practical importance to this House, but I am interested in a great many of the things said about the Bill and I would like to refer to one or two of them.

Senator Douglas spoke, and I accept what he said, with regard to the position of the original delaying period of four months. There have been various comments made on the attitude of the Seanad on various matters such as the independence and reasonableness of the Seanad. Possibly prior to the advent to power of this Government, there was a considerable amount of discussion, argument and reason, but I have yet to remember on any one occasion when an amendment was proposed by any of those who were in opposition to the late Government that it was carried. My memory may be at fault, though I do not think it is, but the adaptability and reasoning of the Seanad disappeared entirely when certain steps were taken by the present Government.

I want to intervene at this point to express my regret that we have not yet got in this country, in spite of what Senator Jameson says, anything like an independent Seanad, and we may as well face that fact, frankly and brutally. We had a Seanad in agreement with the preceding Government, conservative, pro-Commonwealth and pro-British, and that Seanad dug its toes in when a progressive move towards the complete independence of the country was taken. References were made as if the only thing the Seanad ever did was to deal with the Public Safety Act. Senators have referred to the indecent way in which that measure was rushed through this House in one and a half hours. I was leader of my small group, and I got seven minutes to discuss it. We must remember that that was not the only measure that came before this House. When this Party came into power we had very definite things before us in the way of national progress from our point of view, and whether those were right or wrong, the country voted for them. I refer to the Oath Bill. What was the attitude of the Seanad? Was it independent in the nice discursive way it is suggested we always have had here? I suggest we have been getting merely sob-stuff on the lines of a deathbed repentance. Senator Milroy talks about mandates. He now repudiates his statement. He says we had no mandate for reducing the period of delay. We had a definite mandate for the abolition of this House——

Mr. Milroy

"As at present constituted."

Mr. Connolly

We got it at both elections.

Mr. Milroy

"As at present constituted...." Is that the abolition of the Seanad?

Mr. Connolly

It means the abolition of the Seanad.

Mr. Jameson

Thank you. We are getting some information. Now we know where we are.

Mr. Connolly

You know where you are. It has always been made clear where you are. Senator Milroy talked about "judicial exaggeration" and about "yellow journalism." We have had a surfeit of it, supplied by people like Senator Milroy and his colleagues in this House. He talked about "dumb-driven cattle," who have to answer the Party whip. Unfortunately, and I say "unfortunately" deliberately, it is the position that we have to have such a thing as Party government and Senator Milroy knows better than anybody else what the Party whip is and what it means to exercise independence. That is the reason he is here now. We have heard about the attitude of this House and of its defence of democracy. We are told that it is standing between the people and, perhaps, a dictatorship. That is extremely interesting. When there was a referendum in the Constitution of the Oireachtas, we know what happened. We know that the referendum was abolished. The people who were the loudest supporters of the idea of the referendum when the Constitution was being drafted and afterwards voted for the abolition of the referendum, the fact being that all the formalities had been completed to have a referendum on a certain issue which was going to prove awkward to the Government. The Constitution was, therefore, amended to suit the Government's purpose. Senator Jameson speaks about a free-thinking Seanad. I am quite satisfied that Senator Jameson would like to see a completely independent Seanad where everybody would express his views freely. He has not been able to get his way even in regard to that. One of the really independent Senators was beaten in the last election simply because he was independent. That defeat did not come from Fianna Fáil or even from Fine Gael. The truth is that the man—he differed more from me, perhaps, fundamentally than anybody else in the House—who exercised most independence in voting and speaking, was, because of his independence, defeated. We should all like to see things different from what they are. I personally should be very happy in a House where questions would be decided according to abstract principles. We are, perhaps, victims of the Party system but, up to the present, no other system has been evolved.

Senator Blythe has spoken a great deal about the Seanad power of delay. He made a very liberal speech. I do not want to introduce any bitterness into the debate but one could not help feeling amused to hear Senator Blythe arguing for broad, liberal principles when one thought of his attitude in this House not many months ago. It seemed to him then that parliamentary legislation was a thing of the past, or ought to be. There is, perhaps, no great virtue in consistency but, on a fundamental question of this kind, it is unusual to change one's views so rapidly. Not much requires to be said arising out of the long and vehement speech by Senator Milroy. Senator Milroy will, no doubt, repeat, and enlarge on, his speech when the question of the abolition of the Seanad arises. The whole policy in respect to the Seanad has been due, in the first place, to the unreasonable, the defeatist and the obstructive attitude which this House took up on matters of primary national importance on the way to complete independence and, secondly, to the fact that we found it necessary to deal with a certain type of opposition with which the country was faced. Nobody in the country can fail to observe and contrast the difference between the attitude of the Seanad on the Wearing of Uniforms (Restriction) Bill and the attitude of the Seanad on the Public Safety Bill, which was passed after one and a half-hour's debate. Nobody can fail to realise exactly what the purpose was in that case. These are the reasons why the Seanad has been dealt with as it has been dealt with. It has committed hari-kari and the people have been entirely disgusted with the attitude the Seanad has adopted.

To come down to brass tacks, where does the authority of this House spring from? It is a hand-picked, self-elected body. That applies to me as well as to every member of the House. There are two courses open. Either the Seanad will be a really independent body, free from Party control, or it will be a duplicate of the Party machine operating in the Dáil. If it is to be a duplicate of the Party machine in the Dáil, I suggest that it is not necessary. If it is to be a hand-picked group of certain interests who will decide whether the country is to go on or not or whether the Government is to be impeded in the preservation of the peace and of law and order, then I say there is no justification for the existence of the Seanad—certainly not for the Seanad as we know it to-day. I should like to see in existence a revisionary body. I should like to see such a state of public opinion that we could have a genuinely independent revisionary body but I cannot see how that is to be achieved. If we cannot have that, no case can be made for this House.

Question put.

The Seanad divided: Tá, 20; Níl, 21.

Tá

• Boyle, James J.
• Chléirigh, Caitlin Bean Uí
• Comyn, Michael, K.C.
• Connolly, Joseph.
• Cummins, William.
• Dowdall, J.C.
• Duffy, Michael.
• Fitzgerald, Séamus.
• Healy, Denis D.
• Honan, Thomas V.
• Johnson, Thomas.
• Kennedy, Thomas.
• Keyes, Raphael P.
• Linehan, Thomas.
• Lynch, Patrick, K.C.
• MacParland, D.H.
• O Máille, Pádraic.
• O'Neill, L.
• Quirke, William.
• Robinson, Séumas.

Níl

• Bagwell, John.
• Baxter, Patrick F.
• Bigger, Sir Edward Coey.
• Blythe, Ernest.
• Brown, Samuel L., K.C.
• Browne, Miss Kathleen.
• Counihan, John C.
• Douglas, James G.
• Duggan, E.J.
• Farren, Thomas.
• Garahan, Hugh.
• Hickie, Major-General Sir William.
• Jameson, Right Hon. Andrew.
• McGillycuddy of the Reeks, The.
• Milroy, Seán.
• O'Connor, Joseph.
• O'Hanlon, M.F.
• O'Rourke, Brian.
• Staines, Michael.
• Toal, Thomas.
• Wilson, Richard.

Tellers:—Tá: Senators S. Robinson and Dowdall; Níl: Senators Douglas and Milroy.

Question declared lost.