League of Nations (Obligations of Membership) Bill, 1935—Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Minister for External Affairs (The President)

To enter into any lengthy explanation of this Bill would be to waste the time of the Seanad. It is, in form, a simple Bill. The main clauses are intended to empower the Executive Council to make orders to carry out our obligations as a member of the League of Nations. From one point of view, the substance of the Bill is contained in the Schedule. These are proposals which were put before the Co-ordination Committee of the League of Nations and adopted by practically all the members. As I indicated in the Dáil, there are some omissions from these proposals, as adopted, but they refer to things which would be quite out of place in our Bill— instructions to Governments and matters of that sort. If Senators refer to the Schedule, they will see that the first proposal has reference to the export of arms to Italy and Ethiopia. In the first place it asks nations which have put a ban on the export of arms to Ethiopia to lift the ban. In the second place, it recommends Governments to put an embargo on the export of military material to Italy. The second proposal relates to financial measures. The purpose of this proposal is to prevent the giving of loans or credits to the Italian Government, Italian corporations or persons resident in Italy. Proposal three deals with the prohibition of the importation of Italian goods—that is, the importation into the various countries which are members of the League of goods manufactured in Italy. The next proposal relates to an embargo on exports of certain goods to Italy. The fifth proposal has reference to the organisation of mutual support, mainly having regard to the most favoured nation clause in existing treaties. That is the main substance of the Bill.

The operative clauses are Nos. 1 and 2, whereby the Executive Council may, by order, take all such measures, impose all such prohibitions and restrictions and do all such things as shall, in the opinion of the Executive Council, be necessary in order to carry into effective operation all or any of the measures mentioned in the Schedules. Under Section 2, powers are given to make ancillary orders and, under Section 3, power is given to amend or revoke such orders. Under Section 4, an exception is made in the case of religious and humanitarian bodies. Section 5 prescribes the penalties for contravention of these orders. Senators will notice that there is a penalty of £100, or imprisonment for six months, on summary conviction, and, in cases of indictment, the penalty is two years' imprisonment or seven years' penal servitude or a fine, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the court. Under Section 6, there is the usual provision that orders made by the Executive Council shall be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and, if annulled within a period of 21 days, shall cease to operate, without prejudice to anything that may have been done in the intermediate period. I shall be happy to answer, so far as possible, any questions that are put to me or to deal with any points that Senators may raise, but, at this stage, I think it is unnecessary to enter into any long explanation of the Bill. The fact is that, in bringing in this measure, we are simply fulfilling the obligations which were undertaken when this State became a member of the League of Nations and which continue so long as the State remains a member.

Mr. Johnson

From the inception of the Saorstát, I was a supporter of the proposition that the Saorstát should be a member of the League of Nations. I urged that at the very beginning—in the debates, I think, on the Constitution—and I support the proposal now that we should do all we can to further the objects of the League. I am not satisfied that the Minister for External Affairs has done well in introducing this measure with so bald a statement. The occasion is one which would, I think, warrant, even demand, a much fuller statement to justify the attitude the Government has adopted with, I think, the support of the vast majority of the people for the action so far taken. I am not inclined to agree entirely with the view, which appears superficially to be correct, that the introduction of this Bill is merely a fulfilment of the obligations of League membership and is, more or less, an automatic act. The relevant section of the Covenant places upon the members of the League who have signed the Covenant certain obligations. The English translation of the section reads:

"Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall, ipso facto, be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League which, hereby, undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.”

It would seem to follow inevitably that all members of the League who were out to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant would sever relations with the offending State. The Bill as drafted and the resolutions of the Co-ordinating Committee do not ask that all trade relations shall be severed. They are not absolute, I take it. Therefore, there is a certain amount of discretion left to the States, members of the League, as to how they shall fulfil their obligations. I take it that that must be so, because of the form in which these resolutions of the Co-ordinating Committee have been framed, inasmuch as they make certain definitions, therefore excluding something outside the definitions. Certain things may be imported, certain things may be exported, certain relations may be continued, notwithstanding the apparently absolute prohibition that Article 16 involves, so that as it is not absolute law, binding on States, members of the League. We must take it that it is for the States concerned to interpret as they deem best the obligations of the Covenant into which they have entered.

Therefore, I think the President would have been justified, and that it would have been desirable, if he had attempted or had, in fact, justified the decision of the Saorstát as a member of the League, that an act of war had been committed by the offending State against the States members of the League. If he does not justify his decision in that respect, then the implication must be that he is merely following a majority decision of the members of the League which, as I read it, is not implied in the Covenant, which still allows each State to act as a sovereign State in the decision on this matter. The obligation remains with the President to justify adhesion to the opinion and decision of members of the League by an overwhelming majority, that Italy, in its action in respect to Ethiopia, had broken the Covenant, and by so doing had committed an act of war against the other members of the League. It would not have been difficult, if one is to judge by what one is able to read, for the President to have justified his action in agreeing that an act of war against members of the League had been committed. The story that has appeared in the public Press reflects, I take it, what was presented to the members of the League in conference, that for at least a year preparations have been in course for this aggressive act upon a fellow-member of the League on the part of Italy. The Covenant which Italy had entered into bound her to submit questions that might lead to war to arbitration; certainly not to take action on its own account to punish the alleged offender.

The reported statement that appears in to-day's newspapers of the Note sent by the Italian Government to members of the League that have committed themselves to this action and to sanctions, makes one point, which asks that Italy should be excused because of the fact that the League has not done its duty in the past.

"The Co-ordinating Committee," the Note says, "had elaborated the details and scope of a number of measures of an economic and financial character without taking into account in any way the fact that sanctions of this nature had never been applied in the case of previous conflicts which had developed in much more serious conditions, owing to the fact that no request had been even made previously."

I think the Italian Government had some justification or some excuse to make under that head, that the League had not taken action of this kind in other cases where covenants were broken, but, so far as that is the case, the representatives of the Saorstát, at any rate, had not been acquiescent parties to the neglect of the League where previous offences had been committed. The value of the League of Nations in the future is going to be tested by its action in this case. That is commonly accepted as a fact and can hardly be denied. It has been faulty in its failure to act in the past, and unless action of a very salutary kind was taken in respect to this particular offence the members of the League might as well cease to pretend to be bound by their covenants.

The case in question seems to be a most flagrant and blatant violation, deliberate and determined, apparently with the intention of challenging the rest of the world to abide by their Covenant. The pretence—and I think it is merely pretence—that the dispute at Wal-Wal needed to be dealt with punitively has gone by the board. It is now given as an excuse that slavery has continued in Abyssinia. It is generally admitted that the State which is known as Abyssinia, or, as someone reminds me, Ethiopia, is not as advanced as others in modern civilisation. For instance, it has not the same armaments as civilised countries have; it does not know how to use poison gas; it does not know how to blow up towns and cities as effectively as civilised nations are able to do so.

Dr. Gogarty

It is not as civilised as Britain!

Mr. Johnson

It is by no means as civilised as Britain. Because of all this, it is suggested that Italy alone should take upon herself the power, the authority and the duty of civilising this backward country. Well, that is a policy, of course, that we are not by any means unfamiliar with. The same argument was used by many people in the past and they got away with it. No doubt it was thought that the same excuse could continue to apply. Well, if that is always to be allowed as a justification for aggressive action on the part of a great power—a colonising power—then Italy is justified. But if the nations of the world have come to the conclusion, either that there is no need for any more such colonising by force or that this immoral act is unjustified by the laws of nations; if the League Covenant meant anything; if the Kellogg Pact meant anything, or if the treaties between States meant anything, then this kind of action must cease, and the sooner it ceases the better.

I am not sure that the form this Bill takes is necessary. It would seem to me that a Bill asking for authority to implement the Covenant obligations that we entered into by this Article was all that was necessary, and not to leave it to the Co-ordinating Committee to say how many of these sanctions should be applied. It is perhaps as well that the course that has been taken was taken because of the fact that other countries did not interpret their obligations under the League as it seems to me this country ought to interpret these obligations. I think I heard it said—I am not quite sure of my ground on this point—that the method of interpretation of statutes, treaties and covenants that is prevalent on the Continent of Europe differs from that which is prevalent in English-speaking countries; that is to say, that the covenant or treaty or statute is taken as the ideal to be reached if possible, not as something imperative and commanding. It occurs to me that that probably is the reason that the Co-ordinating Committee have taken this line. They have drawn up certain suggestions, certain advice, which they believe would be acceptable to the nations, leaving certain loopholes through which those who desire can escape. I, for instance, see in this Bill how the whole thing can be made null and void by a reference to humanitarian organisations without a definition of what is humanitarian. I know there are certain organisations in Italy which might well be termed humanitarian. They are working with the Government, by the Government, and with the authority of the Government, as part of the general State organisation with a certain autonomy in their control. They can well be called humanitarian. Now the funds provided for the assistance of such humanitarian organisations might well be used by the State, and consequently it seems to me fairly easy for anybody so desiring to escape from the obligations that are sought to be imposed by these measures which, no doubt, will become law.

But, with all that, I take it that the Ministry desires approval of its action, first in agreeing with other States that Italy was the offender, that by its action in respect to Abyssinia Italy had committed an act of war against other States members of the League. and. secondly, that having committed that act of war. punitive action of an economic and financial character should be applied. I think it is necessary that this State should join with all the other States who are willing to assist in applying those sanctions, to bring this war to an end with as little cost as possible, and, even more important in my view, to make it much less likely in future that States will enter upon punitive expeditions and refuse to call them war, as Italy has done in this case. I do not think it is likely that the Abyssinian people will come through this conflict without immense loss and terrible suffering. I do not see that any action that can be taken, certainly by this State, is going to deprive the Italian Government of the joy of wiping out and destroying the Abyssinian people.

I do think that once sanctions are applied, it should be a resolve on the part of States members of the League that no matter what length of time may be required, they shall not cease to be applied until everything that Italy gains will have been given back to the Abyssinian people. I think the suggestions that are being made at the present time for agreements between France and Britain and diplomatic compacts regarding the future distribution of influence in Abyssinia bodes ill for the Abyssinian people. It is my view that the members of the League ought to bind themselves not to allow the offending State to derive any benefit, no matter how long the period may be, from its action in respect of Abyssinia and its attack upon the integrity of that State.

Mr. Baxter

Naturally Senators, like Deputies, approach this question with a considerable degree of timidity. The President was very unlike himself throughout this debate. We, who have very much less information than he has, feel ourselves in a position of considerable difficulty in taking a final decision in this House on this Bill which, by its consequences, may have very remarkable effects on the whole civilised world. I think, instead of saying just as little as was humanly possible, the President should have availed himself of the chance of putting before the Parliament and the people of this country all possible information which has come to him in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs and as head of this State. From his visits to Geneva over a number of years he has learned much. He has sat at the head of the Council of the League of Nations, and he has come in contact, rubbed shoulders, so to speak, with the leading statesmen of the world, those whose acts and whose thoughts in these difficult days are going to decide the future of the hundreds of millions who dwell on the earth's surface. He could indeed— and I am rather surprised he did not, because he is capable of doing it—have put the debate in the Dáil and in this House on a very much higher plane.

This is a problem at which the people of this country, standing apart as we are in our very insular position, could look with very clear consciences though at the same time with a somewhat uneasy mind. We are free to take decisions in a way in which other nations cannot feel themselves free to act. The decision that this State is about to take now should be taken, in my view, in the way in which we took a decision a fortnight ago, when our credit, so to speak, was at stake in another fashion. We had a demonstration of unanimity amongst all Parties and amongst the leaders of our people here, to support the conversion scheme and to prove that the financial credit of this State was as high as that of any State in the world. That atmosphere was created by a man who has said as bitter, and perhaps as unfair, things of his opponents as any man in this State. It was statesmanship on his part so to behave, and he has succeeded to a remarkable degree. All credit to him for the measure of success he achieved. He went about it in the right way.

Perhaps in a way I can say with more frankness than most members, that I, like the President, did not like the Treaty when it was signed. Unlike the President, when the Treaty was registered at Geneva I applauded the achievement then, and when a few weeks ago the President found himself in a position to stand up at the Council of the League of Nations and say on behalf of our people here that he came there as a free representative of a free people, had he there prefaced his remarks by saying something like what the Minister for Finance said, that thanks to the vision, the courage and the endeavour of the men who had gone before him, he was able to come there as the representative of a free people, I believe those few words would have enabled the people of this State to face this problem in the right spirit and in a way that would have been a safeguard for our future.

I feel that we are only talking on the fringe of this subject. I think that the President is the one man above all others who could have raised this question up to its proper level. I think it is true that there is absolutely no enthusiasm in this country for support of this measure. I somehow feel that, even with the President himself, there is anything but enthusiasm. I listened with considerable pride to the President's first speech at the Council of the League of Nations. I wonder have his contacts there produced such an immense change in his point of view as to turn him from the cynical mind he displayed a couple of years ago to become the enthusiastic supporter of the Covenant that he appears to be to-day? Have the statesmen of Europe so changed in that short space of time? My opinion is that human nature is not capable of such a change in such a short space of time.

I think this country is making a great mistake by not entering much more seriously and much more deeply into all the implications of the decision we are about to take. The President is asking us to stand by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the decision which it is sought to obtain here today—support for sanctions—must be interpreted, as far as we are concerned, as standing for the Covenant of the League of Nations. A question that I should like to have answered by the President is this: Does the Covenant of the League of Nations still exist? It is true that, as far as one can judge, there has been practical unanimity in the speeches which have been made on the President's expression of opinion at Geneva. Some fault undoubtedly was found with his conduct there. It was not that fault was found with the good he did; but that he did not do enough good. The view held was that the President, in the peaceful frame of mind in which he was, ought to have availed himself of the opportunity offered to straighten out the tangled relations which the disturbed conditions between this country and England——

Cathaoirleach

I cannot allow you to follow that line. It is outside the scope of the Bill.

Mr. Baxter

I bow to your ruling, Sir. If it be not possible for me to pursue a point which I thought I was in order in referring to, I go on to this point, which is really the fundamental question to be considered by this House. I do seriously suggest, in the first place, that the League of Nations of which this State first became a member does not exist to-day, and I go on further to suggest that those who are standing out foremost in the world as the champions of the Covenant of the League are not standing for the Covenant of the League, and that since they have given their signatures to the Covenant, they have deliberately, flagrantly and openly broken that Covenant. If such be the case, would it not be wiser for us to examine the position and to get all the possible information available from the President before we finally cast our bread upon the waters and take a step from which it will be very hard to retreat?

We read in the English Press that because of the attitude of Britain in the Council of the League of Nations, she has again been restored to the moral leadership of the world. I should like to hear from the President whether or not Britain has been responsible for giving a lead in the imposition of sanctions against Italy. I am not suggesting that, if it be true that Britain gave the lead, it is for that reason our President is supporting it—nothing of the kind. But I want to ask: had Britain not given the lead, would there be any question of the application of sanctions at all? There is a great deal to be said on this question, and I think it is pertinent to raise these matters here. I will quote from a pamphlet issued by the New Statesman, and refer to the agreement of 1906 between France, Great Britain and Italy. This agreement stated that the three “shall co-operate in maintaining the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia.” A number of agreements and protocols were signed, some of them going back to 1891, recognising virtually the whole of Abyssinia as an Italian sphere of influence. That was in 1906. In 1923, France and Italy combined were responsible for bringing Abyssinia into the League of Nations, and in 1925, when Britain was a member of the League, and when Italy and Abyssinia were also members, we find that there was an exchange of notes between the Italian and the Baldwin Governments on 4th December. The pamphlet states:—

"The British Ambassador in Rome wrote to Signor Mussolini, and, beginning with the vital importance to Egypt and the Sudan of maintaining the flow of water from the Blue and White Niles, he referred to the so far fruitless attempt to obtain a concession for a barrage on Lake Tana."

I might read on, but this communication which passed from the British Ambassador in Rome to Signor Mussolini indicated a desire for the co-operation of Italy with Britain, so that both together could win from Ethiopia for Britain a concession to build a barrage between Lake Tana and the Sudan. For Italy, Signor Mussolini replied on December 20th, 1925, noting in particular that the proposals of 1919 were now acceptable, and expressing the hope that friendly co-operation might be further extended so as to cover all Italian and British interests in Ethiopia. The Duce promised support for the dual British plan of a barrage and road, in return for British support of the railway projects. He added that, in the event of either Government failing to secure a concession, the Government which had obtained satisfaction would not relax its efforts on behalf of the other.

Where did the Covenant of the League come in there? That was two years after the admission of Abyssinia into the League of Nations. In 1926, the Emperor addressed a protest to the Secretary-General of the League for circulation to the member States, and, in 1928, a treaty of conciliation was concluded between Abyssinia and Italy. We then come on to 1935, and I want to suggest that the behaviour of certain members of the League, and their attitude to Italy during those years, was actually an incitement to Italy to do what she is doing to-day. That was done in spite of the pretensions of these people that they were adhering to the Covenant of the League. So definite was the evidence of that fact that we have the Morning Post of September 18 last publishing an article by its diplomatic correspondent “from authoritative quarters (the Foreign Office and Government circles)” which contains the following passage:—

"The inconclusive conversations to which Signor Mussolini refers are interpreted as being the conversations he had with Mr. Anthony Eden in Rome in June. In these conversations it was understood that Mr. Eden pointed out that the situation had developed to a point at which British policy was no longer founded upon considerations of British colonial interest; but upon such wider issues as maintenance of the peace in Europe and of the authority of the League of Nations."

It was only in June of this year that Mr. Anthony Eden pointed out to Signor Mussolini the changed attitude of the British Government and Signor Mussolini up to then was convinced of the line which the British Government would pursue in certain eventualities.

We know all about the various conferences which have been held as a result of the efforts of the Council of the League since then. We know that at one point the British Government brought a representative of Africa but would not bring him before the conference, and that when the crisis was being reached, the meeting of the Council to take up the whole question was postponed from August 25th to September 4th. "The three Great Powers, France, Great Britain, and Italy, were then to endeavour to come to an agreement as to the future of Abyssinia, in negotiations without Abyssinia, and based, not on the Covenant, but on the 1906 Treaty.""In these negotiations"—and they took place on 4th September last—"the British and French Governments proposed to Signor Mussolini concessions in Abyssinia that were a violation of their obligation under the Covenant to respect and to preserve against external aggression Abyssinia's territorial integrity and political independence, and were prepared to let Italy use war as an instrument of national policy to secure these concessions if the Abyssinian Emperor refused to yield."

What is the position at the moment? The last report we had of the efforts of the League indicated, so far as we can judge, that carte blanche has been given to France and Britain to find a settlement, and I should like the President to tell us if that settlement is going to be found inside the Covenant of the League, or if it is not going to be a further effort to take from the Abyssinian people something which they are unwilling to give and something which is actually a breach of the Covenant on the part of those nations, but without which a settlement cannot be found? The President can invite an audience. I may entirely misread matters, but I ask myself if the President were Mr. de Valera in opposition to-day in the Dáil, what would have been his line on this policy of sanctions? My belief is that he never had a better case in his life as leader of the Opposition than he would have had against this policy.

Mr. O'Neill

Why did not the leaders of the Opposition move?

Mr. Baxter

I can answer that, at least so far as I see it superficially. The leaders of the Opposition are responsible for this State being a member of the League. All this gives us an indication as to how wise and careful we must be in taking these decisions, because when the decision was taken to enter the League on the part of the people of this country, the President of to-day was not a party to it. But he is the inheritor of the things that have gone before, and he cannot change from the policy laid down by his predecessors so easily. I do not know if he even desires to change, nor am I even suggesting that there ought to be a change. I am raising these questions because I believe they ought to be raised, because I think they are of vital concern to us, and because there ought to be information on them when we are taking this decision.

I have grave doubts as to the sincerity of these people who are leading this policy of sanctions against Italy. Mind you, I do not see what the alternative is. I am not going to indicate that I know there is an alternative nor am I even going to suggest that it was very easy for the President of this State to do other than what he did in Geneva, but what was done there was, I presume, done by him with his eyes open. I am convinced that he knows much more about this than I or any of us here. He has been sufficiently cynical of these people's efforts in the past and he understands sufficiently well the motives animating many of the statesmen of Europe to be able to judge what exactly they are aiming at. I wonder whether or not there would not be more wisdom in a sort of Monroe doctrine policy for the people of this country, so far as the League of Nations is concerned? Anyhow, I think it is a question that ought to be examined. It possibly has been examined by the President, and we shall be glad to hear from him if that be so.

When we first succeeded in having the Treaty registered at Geneva, the feeling was, or at least my own feeling was, that it was done not with the aid, support and connivance of Britain but against Britain's desires. My feeling anyhow was that we had got out into the world in spite of Britain's efforts to keep us back, and that, having once planted our flag amongst the peoples of the earth, we could not be so easily pushed back. We have also lost a great deal of the inferiority complex that was part of our make-up in those days. We have no desire for conquest. There is no territory available for us.

Mr. Dowdall

The Six Counties.

Mr. Baxter

We have not won much territory there in the last four years. It has been argued, and we did feel, that the League of Nations ought to be a protection for weak States. We did feel that we should possibly have protection there. I do not know, and I am wondering very much. So far there has not been very much protection for Abyssinia. It is true that we also find in this document that, since 1935 was entered upon, the Abyssinians have agreed to give Britain a concession with regard to the building of a barrage at Lake Tana which she was seeking through the co-operation of the Italians since 1925. Britain has been reminded by Italy of the fact that now that they have got their concession they ought to keep the 1925 agreement. Britain has got what she wanted so far. I think we ought to look at it a little farther ahead. Judging by the efforts of the Italians in Abyssinia, they have conquered thousands of square miles, and although it may take them years, the appearances are that they are very likely to succeed. But I wonder what the other European States are going to do if there is evidence of success for the imperialist ambitions of Italy in Africa? Will Britain be satisfied not to fight for the concessions at Lake Tana that she holds to-day from the Abyssinians, and will the imposition of those sanctions not inevitably lead to a military conflict?

Now the President has acquiesced in the policy of sanctions, and it has been put to him in the other House: does this not involve us eventually in a military undertaking? I believe that would be all wrong. There may be no way of extricating ourselves at the moment, but I think that we ought to have it from the President to-day, frankly and unequivocally with all the knowledge that he has in his possession, that whatever else happens this country is not going to be asked to acquiesce in any policy of military sanctions, and that while he remains at the head of the Government the State will not be a party to introducing any such measure here.

Further, we ought to ask ourselves in how far the League of Nations is valuable as a court of appeal to this country in any eventuality? There are problems even to-day which some people think might be brought there, but they are not being brought there. Looking to the future, one may ask who are likely to be our aggressors here? If the President and his followers were consulted on that question they would say that there is one people, and one people alone, that we need have any fear of. It ought not to be so, but that is the statement which would be forthcoming from many of them. If that be so, and if aggression should come from our neighbour. I put it to the President how valuable would the Council of the League of Nations be to us as a court of appeal? If it is not to be a source of strength for us or a protection for us in a difficulty of that sort, why then should we involve ourselves in all the consequences which must inevitably come from the dishonest diplomacy of statesmen who have motives which we here in our island home can never understand?

I believe that when the President first spoke at Geneva there was a feeling in this country amounting almost to unanimity for what he said, but I suggest that that was born of the conditions that drive an Irishman always to stand up for what he considers the weaker side. People felt that Italy appeared to be the aggressor then, but they did not know, and they do not know even yet, that Italy's aggression in Africa has its roots in the activities of France and Britain in the past. France is following Britain because she fears Germany and wants Britain's help in the future. Now they are parties to this policy of sanctions and they are succeeding in drawing a ring around Italy and her people. Italy has a growing population and is a comparatively poor country. She is like a swollen river bursting its banks. Both France and Britain are a party to this policy of drawing a ring around Italy and her people. Italy is going to suffer in this conflict just as the people of Abyssinia must suffer. I suggest that as this conflict progresses and as the sufferings of the Italian people become obvious, as they must, there is definitely going to be a reaction in this country. Perhaps the bald facts of the situation, the sinister moves and efforts of the men who are behind all this and who have brought this situation about by their greed, who by their vacillating weak conduct of affairs of being able to say neither "Yes" nor "No"— when all this becomes known to the people of this country, my own view is that they would prefer to be able to stand back with their hands clean, having little to do with either.

While I say that, I find a difficulty in saying, at the same time, that I am not going to support this Bill, and that is because of our commitments in the past. I do feel, however, that we have gone more than far enough. I think that the President ought to tell the people of this country whether or not there is any foundation for the kind of case which I make. If that be done we can very well feel what the mind of this country is likely to be on this question in three months, six months or twelve months hence. Whoever else may become involved, it ought to be clear from this day forward that we are not going to be any party to the application of military sanctions against Italy, and that in doing what we are, we are doing it with heavy hearts, that we are not filled with the conviction that it is all right: that we are a party to a policy which others have made for us, and that, to a considerable extent, we are the victims of circumstances. Perhaps it may be admitted that at the moment there seems to be no alternative to the step we are taking, but that if it were possible for us reasonably to extricate ourselves it would be the wiser thing for us to do that.

We have before us the example of countries like Austria, Hungary and Switzerland, who have got much more from the League of Nations, and hope for much more from it in the future than we can. We had one member of the Government Party down the country on Sunday saying:

"Some people did not seem to realise the position regarding President de Valera's statement at Geneva. It meant that this State would take its full share with other nations against Italy."

I would like to have the President's interpretation of that.

"Some people criticised them, but for once in a way England did the right thing."

I wonder!

"If we, as members of the League of Nations, defaulted, action might be taken against us."

I think the President ought to disabuse the minds of the people of this country on that point.

Dr. Gogarty

This Bill is about the greatest triumph in Mr. Anthony Eden's career. It ought to be called "The Diddling of Mr. de Valera Bill." The position is this: we find the champion of Irish independence in a fight that has gone on for 750 years now abetting the slave-owning, slave-driving imperialism of Ethiopia. It is not understood generally that in Abyssinia there is a dominant race which decimates, enslaves, and maltreats those under it. We find now that we are backing England up in slave-driving. I hope that the President, since he has allied himself to the maintenance of two million slaves, will not jib any longer at the two Tommies who hold our nation in bondage from Spike Island. I hope that we will not hear anything further from him about the slavery caused by the British Government by the presence of two Tommies in Spike Island when we are backing up the enslavement of two millions in Abyssinia. Perhaps it would be worth while for the House to hear something of the conditions that at present obtain in Abyssinia. Let me give this quotation from the British Consul there. He is writing about anthropophagy or cannibalism and the ritual bleeding of children. He says:—

"With regard to anthropophagy, it is sufficient to mention the case of the Tishana who devoured a messenger of the British Consulate at Maji."

This is how the British Consul relates the facts:—

"Haili —— was taking letters, in company with another man, from Maji to Addis Ababa. Passing through the Tishana country they were surprised by the natives and Haili was captured. He was taken alive to the chief's village, where he was kept alive for five days. Each evening there was feasting and dancing while he was brutally tortured, until on the fifth night he died. His body was then divided up and eaten."

That is what the Irish Free State finds itself standing for now. That is the liberty that President de Valera championed when he was diddled by Mr. Eden. Why, when he sat down to dinner with Mr. Eden, did not the President say to him: "You cannot ask me to support that with your history in connection with the Zulu War, the Afghan War and the Boer War. Because Italy wants to clean up the greatest scar on the face of black Africa you want me to help you and to apply sanctions against Italy. I am already festooned with your sanctions, and now you want me to put them on other people." That is one side of the story. Inevitably sanctions must lead to war, and you are going to starve Italy. There is just one little loop-hole in the Bill. Humanitarian societies are to be exempted, but the greatest humanitarian race on the face of the earth is the Italian race. We got our Christianity from Rome, and its inventors, philosophers and statesmen civilised Europe, while the people of Britain were going around blue. As Senator Baxter said, there will be a great reaction in this country. It will only be an extension of what has already come from the Irish College in Rome, the complaint by Monsignor Curran about the attitude to the members of our race there. What will the future be like when the pressure gets tight and when war is made on the Italian people? Per square mile, Italy has a larger population than any country in the world except Belgium. England has unoccupied African colonies which she seized. The Germans have a colony there, and there is a French-African Empire which extends from Morocco to Madagascar. We are asked to take this step in respect of savages who are oppressing their own under-race. We are asked to throw our army into the hands of England without even making terms with them. Why not say to England that we cannot stand for black savagery? Where was her League of Nations when she sent us her Black and Tans? It appears now when it is a question of Blacks and Tana. The quotation that I have given only refers to cannibalism. Listen to this, which is what the Irish Free State is now supporting:—

"Another atrocious practice in Abyssinia is cannibalism for magical purposes and the ritual bleeding of children (Conti Rossini, Æthiopica). That this practice still exists at the present time, while Abyssinia is a member of the League of Nations, is proved inter alia by a recent episode referred to by Marcelle Prat in the Journal of Paris, August 8th, 1935. This was the ritual murder of a baby girl for the purpose of sprinkling with her blood the body of an old dying chief, in order, according to the belief, to restore him to life.”

President de Valera should have made exceptions or conditions. He could not help, of course, following up what we, so to speak, let him in for by getting ourselves into the League of Nations. There is only one League of Nations—that is Great Britain. I look upon Geneva as a suburb of Westminster, a factory of righteousness and public opinion. We brought back our representatives from Westminster and we should bring them back from that vaudeville, Geneva, where Great Britain leads the chorus. Great Britain will be up against France because the bloc in the South of Europe is France and Italy. If Great Britain continues to Balkanise Europe—to use the phrase of Dean Inge, the late Dean of St. Paul's —she cannot afford to have a solid bloc of Latin nations there, particularly as they might divide the Mediterranean in two. We are, therefore, standing for a double imperialism—black and British. I have nothing but admiration for Empires. But the President might have said to Eden: "I cannot stand for slavery. I have been cursing your nation all my life for enslaving us. Now you are asking us to stand for slavery, cannibalism and ritual murder when the one civilising influence in Europe is trying to clean things up. What did you wage your five wars for? For gold and not for civilisation." In this sad and gloomy picture which I have painted, there is one bright and cheerful spot. We are now associated so closely with these black Rasses that we might adopt the only commendable custom we have heard of in Ethiopia—that is, the chaining of the debtor to the creditor. If Ras Thomas were chained to Ras de Valera and they were fettered to opposite ends of a 15-foot chain, surely we might expect a settlement of the annuity question, particularly as Ras Haile Selassie is a descendant of Solomon and they could submit the problem to the judgement of Solomon. You all know how he tried to split the difference of old with the one who "carried the baby".

Mr. Milroy

I should have had very serious misgivings for the future of this State if the President had not taken the attitude he did at Geneva. I disagree with his opening observation to-day—that he considered it a waste of time to speak at length on this Bill. I think that it is a Bill that warrants a very complete statement from him as its sponsor and as head of the State. This act is, emphatically, an outstanding act of sovereignty. It is one of our interventions as a sovereign State in international affairs. It is one of the few acts of this State that could be so characterised. This act can be judged from two standpoints—the general moral, or ethical, position involved and the question as to how far national self-interest enters into the matter. The efforts to give effect to the Covenant of the League have brought into very clear relief the varied difficulties that stand in the way of securing that humane considerations and ideals based on justice will influence, not to say govern, the decisions of States in their relations with one another. I do not think that this is a matter to be treated with anything bordering on flippancy or jest. When the League was founded, I think there was, throughout the countries that were cognisant of what was happening, very strong hope that something other than mere brute force or diplomatic intrigue would be the dominating factor in regulating the rights of peoples and the relations between States. It was, I think, in the hope that the accession of the Saorstát to the League of Nations would be a step in securing that the relations of the Saorstát with other countries—especially with one other country—would be governed by these ideals, and that it would assist in securing that humane and ethical conception of international relations throughout the world that the Saorstát entered the League. I think that that consideration largely motived the efforts of the Saorstát to acquire membership.

I supported the League from the beginning. When the matter was mooted in the Dáil, I urged, to the best of my recollection, even greater expedition than the Government of the day seemed prepared to adopt to secure admission to the League of Nations. Looking back on what has transpired, I still believe it was good statesmanship for this State to adopt that policy, that it had the possibility of tremendous advantage to the people of this State, and that not to have availed of the opportunity would have been an omission which might have had very unfortunate consequences for this State. The fact that a position arises when decisions have to be made which one is reluctant to make, decisions which involve relations of such a type as one would desire should not be created—this does not necessarily create any difficulty, so far as I can see, for those who see the position clearly. I agree with what the President said on previous occasions that a great many of the arguments and suggestions that have been made, bearing on this question, would have greater relevance if made when the proposal was put forward to enter the League of Nations. To-day, they are irrelevant to the matter at issue. I would have been filled with disquiet and apprehension for the future of this State if the President had taken up any other attitude than he did at Geneva.

We have to look ahead in considering this matter. We have experience to guide us. We recollect that, prior to the institution of the Free State, the national movement, and those who led it, made exhaustive and strenuous efforts to secure from various States recognition of our sovereignty and that we failed utterly. We know that in the League of Nations we got full and complete recognition by the representatives of the assembled nations of our status as a sovereign State. What is at stake is not so much the recognition of that status but the guarantee of its security. We have at the moment, in our association with certain States in the Commonwealth of Nations, a very effective guarantee of the security of our status. In our association with Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa we have a very effective and definite guarantee against external aggression and a guarantee of the security of our sovereign status. But we have to look forward to eventualities. We have to look to the possibility of that situation which has been foreshadowed on more than one occasion by the President, leading to the extinction of that guarantee by the withdrawal of the Saorstát from the Commonwealth. Once that goes the existing guarantee of security vanishes, and we have no alternative guarantee such as might exist in the League of Nations. We have then no guarantee whatever of the security of our sovereign status or even of recognition of our sovereign status save such as we might have in the capacity of our people to defend this nation by force of arms. If you look at Abyssinia to-day, if the Covenant of the League fails to save it, the position becomes futile. If the menace of aggression which would confront this State on such an occasion were anything like the aggression that confronts Abyssinia to-day, our capacity to maintain our sovereign status, sovereign rights, or national rights would be a very poor substitute for the guarantee we have at present in our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations.

That is a very pertinent matter to bear in mind, because it brings this home to us, that if the League of Nations Covenant is maintained, and if we are at any time menaced by aggression, we have there a security or an alternative source of protection to appeal to. If the Covenant breaks down or goes by the board in the present case, or if the efforts of the League of Nations prove futile, and if brute force rides dominant and triumphant through Abyssinia, then we have to consider this, that there is no guarantee for this State in endeavouring to maintain its position as a sovereign State if it stands alone, or withdraws from its associations with other sovereign States. I am not saying that for the sake of raising a controversial issue or for the sake of taking anything in the nature of a party political view of this. I hope this matter has been considered by the Government. Judging by the statement of the President, I think they realise, and that he has realised, the significance and the value of the League of Nations in regard to our international position. He must realise, and every thinking man must realise, that if the efforts of the League at the present time fail, if the Covenant cannot be given effect to, human liberty or national liberty in small States throughout the world is faced, I will not say with a new danger, but with a continuation of the old danger, instead of the new dispensation that they dreamt of when no longer was brute force, diplomatic intrigue or the ambitions of dominant personalities to rule human relations, and when the decisions of their peoples were to be accepted.

I believe we have got to a stage where there is a departure in international counsels. I believe that since the Great War there has been a clearer and a fuller appreciation of human rights, national rights, as well as the fundamental considerations which should govern them than ever existed. I believe that as there are difficulties in securing that these things shall prevail unchallenged there is no reason why we should take the cynical view and say that the efforts to secure that these things shall prevail should fall upon all. I am supporting this Bill. I am not doing so with any great enthusiasm but because it is the essential thing to do.

I ask the President to explain with a little more detail than the reference he made to it to-day, paragraph (c) of Proposal 5, which makes provision for the mutual support of States applying sanctions:—

(c) Be willing, after the application of economic sanctions, to enter into negotiations with any participating country which has sustained a loss with a view to increasing the sale of goods so as to offset any loss of Italian markets which the application of sanctions may have involved.

I should like to know what bearing that has upon the Saorstát. I am sure it was drafted by those responsible with full knowledge, and that they were acquainted with what loss the Saorstát could sustain by the loss of Italian markets. What States are prepared to recoup the Saorstát for its losses in that respect? To what extent is the Saorstát prepared to provide a market for these other countries that will lose their markets in Italy? What is the nature of the products we would then undertake to import or to consume and so on? I take it that this is a matter upon which facts and statistical information are available, and it strikes me that it is a point upon which information would be very desirable. There should be no difficulty in furnishing it, as I assume that the provisions of this Bill are not merely a reprint of official documents circulated by the League but are framed upon reference to the effect of the measure upon this State. I should like to reiterate that in my view the League of Nations is not a sort of international merry-go-round which provides an opportunity for joy-rides for people from distant States in very salubrious air. It should be, if it is not, a centre where the best minds of the different peoples meet to try to find a peaceful solution of their mutual difficulties, and from which they proceed to procure happy lines of mutual relations. One could speak scathingly of the background of some member States. One could produce historical evidence of suspicions and doubtful motives. That is not the point of view which should govern our outlook.

Whether the Constitution of the League of Nations at the moment be doubtful, I believe its creation was a real step forward on the very, very hard path which humanity has had to trace, and that a break down or a frustration of its efforts would be a tragedy for humanity. It would be appalling for this generation to contemplate the evils and the horrors that might result or lead the next generation to face the almost inevitable agony, on a more colossal scale, of a recourse to the shambles which desolated Europe from 1914 to 1918. I do not believe any man or woman with any idea of what is good or noble or right in human relations or human hopes will have any view in this matter, except the firm hope that the League of Nations will be successful by its action on sanctions in bringing this conflict in Abyssinia to an end, and by its effective use of sanctions demonstrate to all peoples and all States, who might be inclined to secure their object by means of warfare, that the success of their projects cannot be any longer pursued by means of armed conflict, but will have to be submitted to the arbitrament of reason and justice.

Mr. Blythe

I support this Bill without any hesitation. Like the first two speakers who took part in the debate, I regret that the President, both here, so far, and in the Dáil, has kept the discussion within such very narrow lines. There is no doubt that a good deal could be said for preventing the debate from taking on too wide a scope, but then I think there is need for the President to place the knowledge which he has at his dosposal, because of his office, before the country. Nobody here can know exactly what are the factors with which we have to deal so well as the Minister for External Affairs. The debate to-day, so far as it has gone, I think, is not unrepresentative of the sort of talk which one will hear all over the country. My view is that if the President fails to deal with these matters more exhaustively and if he fails to give the lead to public opinion which should be given, then ultimately we shall not have that degree of unanimity in the State which we ought to have and which we easily could have in this matter. I think if the Government attitude is not more fully expounded, then the various factors which are at work may lead to a division of public opinion in the country which I would regret.

There are many things influencing the minds of one group or another. There are a great many people who have a certain feeling for Italy. They would admit perhaps that this is most unprovoked and most unjustified aggression, but they will point out that there is a teeming population in Italy and that France and Britain, which are now by way of being guardians of the peace, had themselves in former times seized all the great stretches of undeveloped and backward territory available. There are many other things in people's minds. There are people who, simply because the British are taking one view in this matter and one line of action, are inclined to oppose it. As I have said, I think this Bill represents the right attitude for the State. I think that, perhaps, what we can do in this matter is in the main a gesture. I do not suppose that our economic relations with Italy are so important that what we do is going directly to have any great effect on the issue of the struggles that are going on. At the same time, I think we have as a country a duty to do our part and that we should do it. I think it is the duty of the Government not merely to take the initial steps, but also to see what is requisite to ensure that public opinion remains steady and that the attitude of the country is one of support for the League of Nations.

I agree that it is not right to regard our action in this matter simply as one of carrying out a promise, simply as one of behaving in as dignified a way as possible in the position in which we find ourselves as a country. If there is any conviction that the attitude now being taken is likely, taking all the factors into account, to be of benefit to humanity at large, and so of benefit to this country, then we ought not be content simply to say that the obligations were there and we fulfilled them, because obligations are not perpetual. The thing to do in these circumstances would be as soon as we could to rid ourselves of these obligations. Personally, I think that the action proposed to be taken is capable of defence apart altogether from the fact that there was an obligation accepted when we entered the League of Nations. I do not say that we would not have taken any action if we had not been in the League of Nations, but I think that this application of sanctions, as it affects any individual country, is defensible in itself. There have been other breaches of the Covenant and there have been other acts of aggression, but it seems to me there has been no breach of the Covenant so blatant and serious as this one. The action of Italy, in my opinion, left the League of Nations no real alternative between applying sanctions and dissolving.

I think that if Italy's action had been passed over without any movement by the League of Nations, then the League's value would have disappeared and that it would have been best to wind it up, because no country in it, no small country particularly, could feel that there were any benefits it could derive from membership of the League or that it could in any circumstances obtain any protection from the League of Nations. My opinion is that to this country the continuance of the League of Nations and the growing effectiveness of the League of Nations are important. It is only through the preservation and the growing strength of the League of Nations or some similar international society, that a rule of law amongst nations can be established. For the big nations it is probably not a vital matter that there should be a rule of law among nations. The big nations can defend themselves against attacks. They can perhaps agree amongst themselves to exploit others, and while there may be many individual nations amongst them, who want a rule of law and justice amongst nations, it is not vital to the big nations, as things stand, that they should have this rule of law. It seems to me it is vital for small nations.

Senator Milroy said that we had membership of another association of nations which does give us protection from aggression, aggression both from within that society and aggression from without it, but circumstances may change, and I think it will always be to the benefit of a small nation which wants to be law-abiding in the international sense, which has no desire to look for loot or spoil, to invade other territories or seize the possessions of other countries, that the machinery for the establishment of a rule of law amongst nations should continue and should be strengthened. Of course, the action that has been taken against Italy is not without its dangers. Too great success of the sanctions might produce results which a great many people fear. They might produce changes in Italy which would have various ill-effects and which might in turn tend to disturb the peace of Europe. But I think that the situation is such that there was no alternative before the League of Nations but to decide that the country which had broken the Covenant and which had made war upon a fellow-member should be proceeded against along the lines which have been decided upon.

Now, it is possible that the League of Nations may be killed by this struggle. It is quite possible that the strain of applying sanctions may lead to divisions and may lead to a conflict which will cause the League of Nations to split up and disappear, but the alternative to that was allowing the League of Nations to die ignominiously, and I think it is better that the risk of its breaking up on this issue should be taken than that the whole scheme which was envisaged when the League was created to establish the reign of law and peace among the nations, should be simply abandoned without an effort. I do not think that what is important now is so much that the sanctions should be successful as that the attempt to apply the sanctions should be honestly made. It may well be that they may not be successful. It may well be that Abyssinia or any part of Abyssinia cannot be saved, but I think that if the nations comprising the League carry out their obligations sincerely in this matter, then we shall have a new era opened for the League. Up to this, it has always been a matter of doubt whether it was really going to grow into anything effective or not.

I do not want to belittle what the League has done up to the present. It has done a great lot of good in many directions. It has done a lot of things that can hardly be seen or measured. I believe our own membership of the League has been of advantage to us vis-a-vis Great Britain on many occasions, though it is hard to say what the British attitude would have been if we were not members of the League. Although there has been a great deal of good achieved by the League, the effectiveness of the League of Nations has always been open to considerable doubt. If there is a right attitude taken up now by the great majority of the members of the League in regard to the application of sanctions, then, whether its efforts succeed or not, the League of Nations will have taken on a new character. There may be a possibility of changes or developments which will make it a real guarantee of world peace and a protector of the rights of all nations, particularly small nations.

I do not think that any of us need be disturbed by the thought that in supporting sanctions we are hindering the Italians in the great humanitarian work of the liberation of slaves. Personally, although some people seem to be impressed by such Italian propaganda, it repels me. The use made of it seems to me reminiscent of the methods of Hamar Greenwood. I hope, though, that in that connection, as in others, the President will reconsider the attitude that he has adopted. It may be good enough for some people, but if you take public opinion as it stands I do not think it is good enough to say: "Here are our obligations and we are fulfilling them." There is an amount of discussion and misunderstanding in the country, and it is the duty of the Government to meet it. It is important for the Government to see how they will meet it. I do not think it is right for them to allow opinion to drift, as it is drifting, and not to take into account the necessity for maintaining the greatest possible measure of agreement and the greatest possible measure of unanimity within the country. I do not want to pursue matters that have been pursued elsewhere, though I do agree that, while the action the President has taken in this matter is right, it is his primary duty to undertake the ending of the disputes that immediately affect ourselves.

Mr. Douglas

A good deal of time has been spent in discussing this Bill, and I do not want to take up much more, but I should like to have the opportunity of briefly expressing my approval of the Bill. The last speaker has dealt with a good many of the points with which I should have dealt if I had been speaking before him, and he did so, possibly, better than I could, and with a few unimportant exceptions I agree with what he stated. I agree with him, with Senator Johnson and others, in feeling that the more often the President has the opportunity of dealing with these and kindred matters relating to the League, at times when his remarks will be adequately reported, as he can count on when speaking in this House, and almost anywhere, the better it will be for the country as a whole, because I think that, to some extent, the past weaknesses of the League have been due to the fact that the peoples of Europe have been very badly informed indeed of the problems that came before the League, and have exceedingly little knowledge, with the result that when serious crises arrived, there was no real public opinion to force statesmen to do the right thing when it happened to be the awkward thing.

I do not quite agree with what I understood to be the point of view of Senator Johnson at the beginning. While I agree that the more the President can tell the people, the better it will be, I do not think it is for the Oireachtas to decide on the evidence whether the 54 nations who decided that Italy was the aggressor were right or not, because I cannot see how it would be possible for the League to function at all if the nations were not prepared to support the considered judgment of their own representative —in our case, the President—when they hear the evidence on a matter of that kind, and if after it was even to be thought that the representatives at Geneva of this and other countries were to come back and explain in detail the evidence so that Parliament would judge whether their decision was right or not, I cannot see how there would be any future of any kind for the League, and I, therefore, feel that whoever our representative be—in this case the President—he had behind him the confidence of the vast majority of the people and even that of those who are opposed to him. From the information available to us there is every evidence of that, but even if we had not had as much information, I believe that the only course is not on the question whether we should belong to the League or what action, as a State, we should take, but on the question, which is more or less a judicial one, and which the League will have to face, as to who is the aggressor. One must trust one's own representative to take the right decision in company with those of other States. I know that Senator Johnson does not doubt the decision. He made it perfectly clear, but on principle I rather disagree with what I took to be his view.

Mr. Johnson

May I say that I did not suggest that the case should be made here for us to decide. I suggested, and I assert it now, that it is the President's duty to tell the Oireachtas and to give to the Oireachtas the evidence on which he decided.

Mr. Douglas

I hope I did not misrepresent Senator Johnson. I certainly did not intend to do so, but I believe that the kind of information which would be most valuable is information as to what happened at Geneva, the reports of the Committee of Conciliation, the extent to which Ethiopia was prepared to go, the proposals for international assistance to help Ethiopia to deal with slavery and other matters. That kind of information is of more value than a detailed account of, shall we say, the evidence such as would come before a court on which one decides the explicit point as to whether the Covenant had been violated or not.

Senator Baxter, I think, spoke the kind of thing which a great many people are saying. I wonder if he and those who talk like him fully realise what would be the position in Europe if all the nations were to take the attitude towards their Governments that because certain nations — assuming, which I do not accept for the moment, his historical statements with regard to treaties and the interpretation he places on them to be correct—had not acted rightly towards Ethiopia in the past, they were not bound to support the joint action of the League in doing the right thing now. I do not think he believes that, but that is the natural implication of his type of criticism. What future could you hope for in Europe if that was to be the attitude taken?

He said that the President had no enthusiasm for this measure, and he said that there was no enthusiasm for it in the country. Of course, there is not. How could you have enthusiasm for a measure imposing sanctions? If those sanctions are really successful, it means suffering for the ordinary people living in Italy. No right-minded person could have enthusiasm for a measure of that kind, any more than we could have enthusiasm for going to war. It is a thing which is done with the greatest reluctance and with no enthusiasm on the part of anyone, whether they support the President politically in other matters or not, or, like myself, support him in this matter though not in many other matters. Senator Baxter also said that the President was not enthusiastic about the Covenant. That is the kind of statement which those of us who have supported the League in this country and elsewhere for many years have heard repeated again and again. The President made it as clear as daylight that he wanted to see the Covenant changed. Those of us who believe in the principle of the League have all along pointed out the faults in the Covenant. We wanted to see the Covenant improved. We recognised that a rule of law means the creation of a public opinion which will improve international law and which will get a better standard, and we want increased power, moral power, at any rate, on the part of the League to carry out these improved standards. We do not believe that you can get that by breaking the Covenant as it stands at the present time or by refusing to carry out your obligations under it.

I strongly agree with Senator Blythe that it is a mistake to support this Bill only in the belief that we are doing it because we have to. Senator Baxter more or less implied that he sympathised with this Government in having to take over obligations from their predecessors. They did not have to. They could have given notice that this State was going to withdraw from the League of Nations when they came into power, and, speaking from memory, if they had done so, we would not now be members of the League. They did not do so, and, to my mind, they took the right step in not doing so. That is no reason why all Parties should not support them, but if you are simply going to take the ground that, because the League, by a very large majority, has decided that Italy is the aggressor, we are therefore bound to do exactly what is decided upon by certain Committees of the League, you are making a mistake and do not understand the present basis of the League.

Senator Baxter, first of all, said that we could not help doing so, and he then said that we might follow the example of Austria, Switzerland and Hungary. They are not being turned out of the League, but they are refusing to carry out the sanctions. They are the nations which Senator Baxter thinks we should follow, thereby showing at one part of his speech that he recognises there is not a complete obligation. I do, however, think that there is a moral obligation, and so far as any gain, any safety, any protection, any possible hope of an appeal in case of disputes is concerned, if we were to refuse in this matter—a relatively unimportant one for us from the material angle, but extremely important from the point of view of taking our stand as a nation in the world— I cannot see how we could possibly at any date in the near future expect to be able to ask the League either to protect or assist us in any matter in relation to which there may be a dispute with any other nation, whether inside the British Commonwealth or not.

I have spoken longer than I intended but I want to reply to one other point of Senator Baxter's. I do not agree with his interpretation of some of the treaties and the actions which he read out to us. It would take far too long to go into them, and I have not got the documents here, although I have read most of the things that seem to be reliable. He used one word, however, which I do not think can fairly be applied. He said that many of these actions were virtually an incitement to Italy to take the action she has taken. I think that is not justified, whatever case he may be able to make for unwise and possibly wrong action in the past. He also said that the League had given carte blanche to France and Britain to find a settlement. I do not believe that is true. My understanding is—and I hope the President will confirm me if I am right, because I think it is a matter of very considerable importance, as we are members of the League—that the French and British Governments have been invited to endeavour to find a settlement to which the Emperor of Ethiopia will assent and to which the League will give approval. That is a totally different thing from the statement that carte blanche has been given to France and to Britain. If I thought that carte blanche had been given to France and Britain, I would agree that we ought not to support the League in an action of that kind.

Senator Gogarty's enthusiasm has brought him to-day to a state of extreme anti-British sentiment. On that I make no comment, though I have the feeling that he is more actuated by anti-President motives than anti-British. If Senator Gogarty a year ago had asked this Government to bring before the League—assuming, of course, that he had brought evidence —the existence of slavery in Ethiopia or in any other nation in the League, I would have supported him, and if Italy had suggested that international action should be taken on practical lines to assist Ethiopia in the abolition of slavery and other undesirable things which are said to be there and which, for all I know, do exist there, I believe he would have been on right lines. But, if you are going to admit the right of any one nation to take the law into its own hands, as seems to be clearly the case at the present time, I see no future for international law, and, further than that, I see practically no future for the smaller nations of which we are one, because we are pretty certain to do some things, whether we all like it or not, which other nations will consider highly undesirable, and if we admit the right of bigger nations to take the law into their own hands to deal with what we may do and which is regarded as undesirable, we are giving up entirely the claims which most of us in this country have stood for for centuries.

The President

As I think I said in the Dáil, I quite understand the feeling of Senators here that I should have perhaps used this occasion to speak more widely on the question of the League of Nations, and perhaps even the merits of the present quarrel between Italy and Ethiopia; but I very deliberately chose a different line. I do not agree with Senator Blythe that there is any real difference of opinion amongst our people. I believe that on the plain issue that is here before them they are substantially agreed. They recognise that we are members of the League of Nations. They recognise that that membership involves certain obligations, and they are satisfied that this is an occasion in which these obligations should be fulfilled. Now, that is all that is material. As the last speaker has pointed out, nobody can show enthusiasm for a measure of this sort. It is a painful thing that one has to engage in sanctions, but there is no other way by which a restraint can be put upon nations that are prepared in their own interest, for some reason that appears good to themselves, to break the obligations which they have entered into. It is because we believe that these obligations which were entered into by members of the League ought to be kept, and that it is for the good of humanity generally that they should be kept, that we are engaged in taking our part in these sanctions, but we do so naturally with a feeling of sorrow that such should be necessary.

Now, with regard to our people, it is only natural that our people should be suspicious on occasions like this, and it would be a very big mistake for anyone to hope to go out on a campaign of this sort and be able to remove those suspicions. In fact, it would be highly dangerous to do so, because it might give to our people the feeling that their Government was led away by some wild enthusiasm and did not have a proper sense of the dangers that exist in a situation of this sort. There is no doubt, as was pointed out here by one or two speakers, that the past history of the dealings of certain imperial States with Ethiopia leaves a very bad taste in the mouth of anyone who reads about them, as I have, in detail. That is a fact, and there is a suspicion abroad amongst our people and amongst the plain, common thinking people of the whole world, that some of these States at present might not, under other circumstances, be enthusiastic in carrying out their obligations under the Covenant. That suspicion can only be removed by watching carefully that the action of the other members of the League, in supporting the Covenant, does not tend to a result in which Abyssinia, so to speak, would be partitioned out amongst the States in question. What every small State has to look to in the present instance is to see that their co-operation and their support in maintaining the Covenant should not be utilised to the advantage of any imperial power whatever.

Now, every person in this country, I believe, is thinking like that. Our history teaches us to think like that. There are very few of us here who were not able to think and form judgments some 20 years ago. We know perfectly well what doubts we had in our minds 20 years ago as to what were the objects which were behind the Great War of that period. It may be necessary, as Senator Blythe seems to suggest, that we should go out on a campaign to explain to our people what is the reason for our action and what advantages are to be derived from the League of Nations, and so on, but in my judgment this is not the time to do that. If we have to talk about the League of Nations, its value, and so on, my opinion is that we should do that on another occasion, and that we are doing the best thing for our people now, by simply doing our duty as we see it at the present moment and by keeping a watchful eye on the results.

I do not think it necessary to deal with some of the statements that were made here. I think every Irishman knows perfectly well how, on an occasion like this; everything that is wrong in a country can be used as an excuse by a Power that wishes to take possession of that country. I am not saying that the facts stated are all untrue, but I do hold that whether they are true or false they are no excuse. As Senator Douglas has said, if these evils exist, and I think it is admitted that many of them do exist, then there is a way for ending them, but that is not the way that has been tried by the State that has broken the Covenant. That is my view. My personal view is that I would support—I would support them also as a representative of this State—any measures that were taken at Geneva to try to improve the conditions in Ethiopia, and, if necessary, professes to take, on behalf, if you like, of civilised humanity, strong measures to try to improve the conditions there, though I know that would be regarded generally as something immediately outside the scope of the League. Ethiopia is a member of the League, and it was not brought before the League until the decision to make war upon her had already been reached that Ethiopia should be expelled from the League if she did not remedy certain evils that were said to exist there. That is the course that one would naturally expect to have been tried if there was real sincerity behind the case that is being made.

I think then that, in the main, the purpose we ought to have in mind is that the League of Nations will best be served by passing this Bill and acting in agreement with the other nations. As Senator Blythe pointed out, this action can be little more than a gesture. We are not one of the nations that are going to suffer most by it. We will suffer to a certain extent. Certain hardships may come to some of our people as a result of these sanctions, but mainly our greatest suffering is our sorrow that we should have to engage in measures of this kind in order to preserve the peace of the world and to preserve one of the members of the League from having its freedom taken away by another member that had contracted not to take it away but to support it.

With regard to some of the special points that have been raised, Senator Johnson said that I should point out in general what was the evidence that determined me to agree that Italy had violated the Covenant. I think the evidence is so obvious to everyone that it hardly needed to be stated. The fact was clear, and the Italian Government had admitted that it had crossed over the frontiers and was making war on Ethiopia. That was a course of action which it was bound not to engage in without having submitted the dispute to settlement by pacific methods. These methods were not availed of in the requisite time, and it was obvious that there was a resort to war in violation of the obligation of the Covenant to seek first pacific methods. That is all that was necessary then, as far as I was concerned, to decide the issue finally. Like most Senators and other people interested in public affairs, I have read pretty widely the whole of the literature connected with the dispute, but it does not lead me very far except to this point: that if Italy had a case, and I am not saying that there is not a case to be made, then Italy should have made it otherwise than by invading and occupying territory and by making war on Ethiopia.

Senator Milroy raised a point as to what losses we were likely to suffer, and asked what other nations had requested us to enter into trade to permit them to sell to us things for which they had a market formerly in Italy. As far as we are concerned, the total amount will not be very large. I think it will be in the neighbourhood of £80,000. That figure refers to goods consigned from Italy. If our statistics enabled us to attribute to Italy the goods that actually came from Italy, it would probably be somewhat greater. The figures that we have relate to the country of assignment only. We have arranged that in future our statistics will be based on the country of origin, but Senators may take it that, roughly, our trade with Italy was in the neighbourhood of £80,000. We have not ourselves entered into or sought negotiations with other countries to give us the market that we have lost, and other countries have not, I understand, applied to us to enter into negotiations as far as they are concerned. That is all that I can say at the moment on the point raised by Senator Milroy.

The whole question of our membership of the League of Nations is like most questions. It is one in which there is a balance. You have to balance the pros and the cons. Our entry, I take it, was dictated, in the first instance, by the hope that for ourselves membership would be a certain guarantee of future security. We had wider hopes that we would take our share in securing the reign of law. That is a matter about which some people may differ, but, in any case, there was, I suppose, the hope of, so to speak, killing two birds with the one stone: of obtaining security for ourselves and also contributing our share to the general bringing about of pacific methods for settling disputes which formerly were settled by resort to war. Whether our hopes in that respect can be realised or not, is a question on which there is likely to be difference of opinion. We know that such efforts were made in the history of mankind in the past and that, because of the natural selfishness of human nature, these efforts failed. When we enter into combinations, as I think I pointed out in some statement I made on this subject at Geneva, or here, when nations or individuals co-operate with one another for certain purposes, their selfishness leads them to get as much out of the co-operation as they can, and, very often, to give as little towards it as they can. As long as dividends—if I may use the expression—are being paid, they are very loyal to the combination, but the moment it is necessary to contribute something or to bear some burden or hardship in order to maintain co-operation, natural selfishness prevents them from being quite as enthusiastic as they were in sharing the dividends. It is not when the advantages are being shared but when the sacrifices are being shared that we have the test—the test which will determine whether the co-operation can last or not. When the test comes those only will be prepared to make the sacrifices who have clearly in mind what the advantages are. If, while you are getting the advantages you lose sight of the sacrifices for which you may be called upon, or if you lose sight, when asked to make sacrifices, of the advantages for which the sacrifices are being made, it is quite clear that you are getting a completely one-sided view of the whole problem. At present, what is necessary is that we should bear whatever hardships are to be borne in the full knowledge that what we are bearing them for is going to be to our advantage ultimately and to the advantage of the world.

That is a question upon which there is doubt at the moment. There is a doubt in the minds of a number of people as to whether the sacrifices that may have to be borne by every State-member which engages in these sanctions will be justified by the ultimate results. If there were a definite conviction that the sacrifies would bring the fruits for which they are being made, I do not think that anybody would grumble. There is, however, that doubt, and I think it is a healthy doubt. By having that doubt, we may make it less easy for States, for their own selfish interests, to avail of the sacrifices made by others. I am not by any means sorry that our people occasionally ask these question as to whether the various States in the League are completely and absolutely sincere in this matter or not. I do not think that that is harmful at all. If the same state of mind existed in every country that exists here, I do not think it would be harmful, provided only that people were not led, because of that doubt, to deny the aid which is necessary to maintain the League. If you withhold your service, if you do not give your aid properly and loyally, then you are doing your part to bring about the wrong results which you fear may be brought about by the action of others. While there may be doubts of this kind, these doubts should not lead us to withhold the aid we should give as loyal members of the League in order to make the League successful. If that be done, I shall be satisfied. We are doing our part loyally here.

Some people ask why this is the first occasion for the League to take action and why the League did not take action previously. Even in the countries that are most strongly in favour of the League, there are large sections of public opinion which are not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to make the League really effective. If people remember that, they will realise why it was that, in certain cases, the League was not as ready to take action as some people would expect. I can give my own experience when I first went to Geneva. The Japanese crisis was then on. To me, that was a clear case of aggression, and I had no hesitation in giving my view to that effect. The methods of the League were resorted to for a certain period. If I had to judge, I would have held, without any hesitation, that there was a clear violation of the League Covenant in that case. Why was not action taken then? Well, a beginning has to be made some time. That is all I can say in excuse of that. There were certain circumstances at that time which made the application of the obligations under the Covenant difficult. I think it would be better for the League if action had been taken, and I am not trying to excuse in any way the failure to act. But, in a matter of this sort, one must take all the circumstances into account, and it must be remembered that Russia and the United States were outside the League at the time. While I strongly represented, so far as the representative of a small country could, that the sanctions of the League Covenant should be carried out, nevertheless, I understood the difficulties that lay in the way.

In the same way, there are difficulties, and great difficulties, in applying sanctions in the present case. The fact that they were not applied before would not be an excuse for inaction now. That attitude would be completely and absolutely wrong. We should regret that action was not taken by the League in the other case rather than use that as an excuse for inaction now. My conviction is that our people fundamentally understand the question, that what we hear is not criticism of the Government's action in doing what it did, but doubts as to the sincerity of certain States in their support of the League in the present instance. I do not think that we can entirely remove that. It is in the nature of things that it should be present. The only way by which it would be removed not only now but in future would be by all States showing, in connection with the ending of the present dispute, that their action is really in accord with the principles of the League. The public opinion of the world will judge these States by the results, and it will not make, in my opinion, for the good of the League that there should be any failure on the part of these States to act solely in the League's interest. In every case in which the League has to take action, there will be certain States which will be more interested than others. The State attacked will generally have more interest in its defence than any other State would have and there will be certain States in every crisis which will have more interest in the issue than other States will have. It will always be suggested that these States are taking a special interest in the issue for selfish motives. The very fact that they have some special interest does give them a special driving force. That is quite clear. If we think not of the present dispute but of disputes which may occur in the future, we can see in advance that a number of States will have a special reason for using the League. The League will be there for their protection, and they will be using its instruments as an alternative to using the methods they might possibly adopt if the League were not in existence. That is a natural state of affairs. When a crisis arises, we must not always say that, because certain States appear to be more interested than others, that, in itself, shows that the League is fundamentally faulty. It is natural that certain States should take more interest in the present case than other States, and, while we may be suspicious of them, we must not, on that account, say that the idea of a League of Nations is a bad one or that it is utterly unworkable or that human selfishness will finally triumph over altruistic feelings. I do not think that much good would be done by going into further detail on this question.

I hope that when we come to the Estimates in a few months, the whole question of the advantages and disadvantages of membership of the League of Nations will be the subject of discussion in the Dáil. I think it would be very appropriate that it should be. It is well that these things should be decided in advance so that, when the occasion for carrying out our obligations comes, we shall not start examining, for the first time, the question whether it is advantageous for us to be members of the League or not. I hope we shall have here the same unanimity in support of the measure that we had in the Dáil. The unanimity we had in the Dáil is, notwithstanding Senator Blythe's view, fairly representative of the unanimity that exists in the country. There is support for the Government in bringing in this measure and acting loyally by the League of Nations. At present, I think that that is all that is required.

Question put and declared carried, Senator Gogarty dissenting.

Mr. S. Robinson

I move:—

That, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Standing Orders 79 (1) and 85, the Committee Stage and Report Stage of the League of Nations (Obligations of Membership) Bill, 1935, be taken to-day.

Mr. Comyn

I second the motion.

Question agreed to.

Seanad Éireann debate - Wednesday, 13 Nov 1935

League of Nations (Obligations of Membership) Bill, 1935—Second Stage.

Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 13 Nov 1935