Skip to main content
Normal View

Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 14 Dec 1939

Vol. 24 No. 4

Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 1939—Committee Stage.

Sections 1, 2 and 3 agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill."

I am opposed to Section 4, because I am opposed to the idea of creating a Minister without portfolio, and the more I reflect on the reasons in favour of it given yesterday by the Tánaiste, the more sinister the proposal seems to me to be. I can quite see that there is a need in every Cabinet for the co-ordinating of intelligence, but I submit that such co-ordination ought to be the duty of the Taoiseach, and none other, and that assigning any such functions to a subordinate Minister could have no good effect, but might have the bad effect, of relieving the Prime Minister of the responsibility that ought to be his, and also teaching Ministers in charge of Departments to narrow their vision to their own Departments.

At the present moment we have the Taoiseach with three portfolios, the portfolio of the Taoiseach, the portfolio of Education, and the portfolio of External Affairs. When that situation obtains, it is surely grotesque at the same time to be seeking authority to add to the Government a Minister without portfolio. If the Government has to be increased it should be by adding to it people who will take up some of the burdens at present pressing on the Taoiseach.

I think there is an extra reason, emerging out of recent legislation, for being very unwilling to authorise an addition to the Government of an unspecified number of Ministers without portfolio, and that reason is the fact that we have made Ministerial posts pensionable. I do not say that this Government would do it, but it is conceivable that a Government might exist in this country which proceeded to pack unnecessary Ministers into the Cabinet who did not have to do any work, who were not fit to do the work of looking after Departments, but who, after a certain lapse of time, would be in a position to retire and draw £500 a year for life from the public funds.

This pull about a Minister without portfolio may possibly have its origin in the desire to regularise the position of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. From what the Minister for Finance told us yesterday, it is quite clear that you cannot have a Department of State unless it is provided for by statute. There is no Department of State known as the Department for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures and, therefore, the Minister who bears that particular title is, in effect, Minister without portfolio. His position will have to be regularised as there set out in the Title of the Bill. Without going into personal criticism it seems quite clear, however, that this provision for a Minister without portfolio can be availed of when a Minister has made a mess of his particular job and when it is desired to remove him, but not to any other Department.

Two points that have been made on this Bill were that the Minister without portfolio would co-ordinate the working of other Ministries, and would do some thinking. I myself am quite alive to the fact that any Minister who does his job rightly is apt to be overworked. He has to do the work of his Department; he has to do his work in the Parliament and in addition he has to keep his position in the country. The effect of these three obligations is to make his job a very unenviable one and to make it more than a full-time job. Any method that would relieve Ministers from that over-work and from too much responsibility would be welcome. But from the point of view of economy of public funds, I personally feel that there is no validity at all in the argument about economy. If you could have a scheme which would give Ministers more freedom to do their work it would be a different matter, but from my short experience of Ministerial office and from my long experience of looking at Ministers working I cannot, for the life of me, see how a Minister without portfolio would do anything to relieve the burden which falls upon his colleagues. One of the methods which has been adopted—it was adopted by the last Government and more particularly by the present Government—was the appointment of Parliamentary Secretaries. The Minister for Finance has a burden to bear and if he has a Parliamentary Secretary or two Parliamentary Secretaries, they may relieve him from portion of that burden.

What particular use a Minister without portfolio would be to the Minister for Finance I cannot see. Certainly the Minister for Finance, when speaking here yesterday, did not give us any enlightenment about that matter. I think the Minister for Finance was joking when he talked about the Minister without portfolio working for other Ministers. Because there is nothing more likely to cause trouble in a Department than to have a man coming in and saying: "Well, boys, what are you doing to-day?" I think the Minister for Finance, who is by no means a foolish man, knows that very well. It is the business of the Prime Minister or the Taoiseach to co-ordinate the work in particular Departments. That is the business of the heads of Governments here and elsewhere. They very often find it a very difficult task. The human equation in that particular task is a very difficult thing to handle and certainly nobody else but the head of a Government can handle it or make any approach to handling it. Our position here is that the Prime Minister, as well as being Prime Minister or Taoiseach himself, holds two portfolios. That would indicate a particular lack of confidence in his colleagues both in the Government and in his own Party. Certainly the job the Taoiseach has in the administration of any particular Department is rather to have liberty for general assistance to his colleagues and also liberty to think.

If I were the Minister for Education or the Minister for Industry and Commerce, doing a hard day's work and having to attend to a great deal of legislation in the Dáil and Seanad, as the Minister, say, for Industry and Commerce would have, I would have no confidence in a man appointed at the same salary as myself who would have to do my thinking for me. In the nature of things he could not do my thinking for me. I should do it for myself. While I could get assistance from the Minister for Finance or the head of the Government, I cannot understand how a person like that holding a difficult Ministry could get any assistance from a Minister without portfolio with nothing to do, neither in the other House nor in this. But the Minister for Industry and Commerce or his colleague, the Minister for Finance, can give no tangible reason with regard to what this Minister without portfolio is going to be like, so I am forced to the conclusion that the section introduced in this Bill is to regulate the Ministry of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, to leave him his emoluments and to leave him nothing to do. I would not begrudge the money for any scheme which would lighten the burden upon Ministers under our present system.

I am very much in sympathy with the remarks that have fallen from the two Senators who have just spoken. But I approach this matter rather from a different angle. We are told that a Departmental Committee had been sitting to try to see what economies, if possible, can be made. I cannot help feeling that the results are disappointing. I understand the suggested economies are something in the region of £500,000 sterling out of services totalling £30,000,000. That £500,000 is certainly a very small economy. Yet on top of that we have a Bill or proposal of this kind to appoint extra Ministers. My experience of Government Departments is that when you appoint an extra person, he has, of necessity, to live up to his position and he has to collect around him an impressive gathering. He has to have a new office with a secretary and officials. Otherwise he is nothing in the eyes of the others. It is a psychological fact that there must be this expansion, not exactly to meet real work, but to carry the prestige of the position of Minister. I feel that the more you multiply these things, and I say it deliberately, rather ornamental heads and the other overhead charges you incur, the more difficulty you will find in making economies. You make compulsory overhead charges in connection with new Ministers. It maybe a War Ministry and the staff come under the pensionable establishment and they continue there all the time. I am not satisfied that the matter has received sufficient attention from this angle. The Government should seek in every possible way to make economies. What you are doing at present is trying to live at a Rolls Royce standard on a Ford car income. Altogether the overhead charges are excessive and I feel this is only a further illustration of that fact. I do not see in this special case—considering what the sections of defence are, only an Army, a very small Air Force, I think I am right in saying, and as regards the Navy, I think I am right in saying a very small Navy—why there should be any necessity for a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. Surely those two activities could be Departmental activities and not Ministerial activities. This is all on the basis of undue extravagance, living beyond our means and inflating our over heads at a time when stringent economy should be followed in all Departments and in all activities of this State.

I do not think any reasonable argument has been put up against this Bill. With regard to Senator MacDermot's arguments, it is quite evident that his uneasiness is not caused by anything that might happen under the present Government. He has stated that. But it is quite conceivable, he says, that a future Government might pack the positions with their own followers in order to provide them with pensions when they went out of office. I do not think that is a reasonable argument at all because if any Party is sufficiently strong to become the Government there is nothing to stop them from altering existing legislation and creating that new position. That, therefore, is not a reasonable argument. The argument used by Senator Hayes is founded on personal grounds. He seems to have some grievance against the present Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

Mr. Hayes

Not at all.

I accept the Senator's explanation, I will not call it an apology. The Senator says he cannot see that it would do any good except to provide for a Minister who has made a mess of his job. Not knowing very much of the intricacies of Government Departments, for a long time I thought it would be desirable to have some Minister who could go from one Department to another as a sort of efficiency expert. I do not know what is the idea behind this, but that was my own idea. Senator Hayes laughs. He does not think that we can provide from the Fianna Fáil Party anyone who could be an efficiency expert on anything.

That is not what I was laughing at, but I accept that.

It would be possible for a Government to disregard public opinion and accept the opinion of the Opposition if they thought there was an efficiency expert there. I can see no reason in the world why co-ordination could not be brought about. I take it that the Minister for Supplies has to deal with the Department of Industry and Commerce and with the Department of Agriculture. I take it that he has to go to the Minister for Agriculture and, in the words of Senator Hayes, say: "Well, boys, is there anything I can do here?" I can visualise him going to the Department of Industry and Commerce and saying: "Perhaps there is something we can do about the importation of wheat. I have been to the Department of Agriculture and they tell me that they can only produce a certain amount." I think that is reasonable. I see no reason why the same thing could not apply to other Departments.

Who is now co-ordinating those Departments which the Senator says require co-ordination?

I take it that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures is co-ordinating the efforts of the various Departments under that head.

I gravely doubt it.

I can understand that the Senator would have grave doubts that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures could do anything.

I did not say anything about what he could do. I do not believe that he has, in fact, tried to co-ordinate the work of the Minister for Supplies and the Minister for Agriculture.

The trouble is that people do not say exactly what they mean; they expect us to interpret what they imply. My own opinion is that the general run of people regard the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures as a very suitable man to co-ordinate anything in that way particularly in connection with defence. I think the only crime he has committed, or the only inefficiency he has displayed from the point of view of the Opposition, is that he failed to create a revolution in this country. When he took over the Department of Defence a lot of people had their ears cocked to hear the shots going off because of a revolution. If that Minister never did anything else in his life but the work which he did for six months after the Fianna Fáil Government took office, I believe that the thanks of the Irish people should go out to him for that service alone. It is a pity that we should bring personal matters of this kind into a debate on this Bill. I appeal to Senators to examine the Bill on its merits and leave out personalities.

The person bringing in the personal note is Senator Quirke, and none other. So far as I am concerned, I made no criticism of the holder of the particular Ministry as a person. I have always met with the greatest courtesy at his hands; I have no wish to attack him at all. But what I do maintain is that, in this country, a Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures is an absurd Ministry.

If the Minister for Defence is worth his salt he is perfectly capable of co-ordinating the Army, what we have of an air force, and what we have of a navy. He is not called the Minister for the Army only; he is called the Minister for Defence; that includes in its ambit all such defence forces as we have, and any capable Minister for Defence could do all the co-ordinating that is required. I do not believe that in any strategic sense the Minister who is now the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures is being asked to co-ordinate. I have never heard an intelligible description of what his work consists of. I have heard nothing to suggest that he is, in fact, co-ordinating the strategy of our Navy, our Air Force and our Army. I do not believe he is; I do not believe he has been asked to. I am not saying he is incapable of it; but I am saying that he is not doing it, because I do not believe it is the policy of the Government that he should do it. If I am wrong in that, no doubt the Tánaiste will correct me.

Senator Quirke stated that I did not object to this Bill in relation to the present Government, but only in relation to future Governments. That is not so. I said that one particular objection was the danger of people being pushed into the Government for the sake of the pensions they might get. I said that that might not apply in regard to the present Government. But that is perhaps the most remote of the objections that I made. The other practical objections apply as much to this Government as to any other.

I associate myself with what Senator Hayes stated; indeed, it was what I said myself in other words; that the person who should do the co-ordinating of the various Ministries is the Prime Minister, and nobody else can effectively take that job off his shoulders. In England, if we are to draw any lessons from what happened elsewhere, Sir Thomas Inskip, who was a man of subordinate standing, was put in as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence and held that post during a year or two, and it is notorious that he was a dead failure.

No; I do not agree.

I shall change what I have said into this: that there are many who believe that he was a failure, of whom I am one. At any rate, when the war came, a change was quickly made and somebody was put in with definite technical qualifications who found himself in an entirely different relation to the Ministers for the various Departments concerning war from the relation in which Sir Thomas Inskip had been. Co-ordination by a subordinate is in itself a topsyturvy idea, and because it is embodied in this Bill I consider that this particular section is a thoroughly bad one.

I hope that in dealing with this I shall not digress into personalities, but rather examine it from the point of view of reasonableness and common sense as we have been requested to do. The term "Minister without portfolio" is possibly a solution of certain Governmental difficulties where something in the nature of a war Cabinet is created inside a Cabinet. To relieve the Ministers who form the internal Cabinet from Departmental duties might be essential and possibly was found essential in connection with the War Cabinet in Great Britain in the past. There are, however, some modern Parliamentarians and Parliamentary critics who think that, even in so far as an inner war Cabinet is concerned, it is not advisable even to deprive those men of Parliamentary or Departmental responsibilities and one can reasonably conceive the necessity for such responsibility being still left with those who have the great responsibility of such an inner Cabinet. Furthermore, when a Minister is left with a sort of roving commission anybody who has any knowledge of Cabinet Ministers and Departmental difficulties and jealousies realises immediately that it is impossible for a Minister, who has any Departmental responsibility and who is possessed of a sort of roving commission, to move in and out and to suggest, even with the best intentions, anything in the nature of a better system or better ideas for these Departments; that he will not be well received, but will be treated as an intruder, and his position inevitably becomes an ignominious one. I can understand Sir Thomas Inskip not being the success that he was intended to be, even if he had greater capacity than he is well known to possess. If you are going to create only one Minister without portfolio, instead of having something of the nature of an inner Cabinet, the Minister without portfolio will find himself without work to do and, in so far as he does intervene, I am afraid his intervention will be considered impertinent. Hence, having regard to the experience of Cabinets elsewhere, I do not see any reason for having provision for a Minister without Departmental responsibility enshrined in this Bill.

I think it will be generally accepted that if the Government were not satisfied that a section of this kind were necessary, they would not have put it in the Bill and asked the Dáil and Seanad to concur with them. Our experience is that a power similar to that which this section gives would be very useful. I think that Senator Hayes' suggestion—that it is linked up to some extent with the present position of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures— has some foundation. With all respect to the views of the Senators who have spoken, I maintain, from my experience, that the power to have such a Minister or such Ministers appointed is very useful. I occupied for a time the position of Minister for Local Government and Public Health. I was fairly fully occupied in that position, but I often had to preside over sub-committees of the Cabinet to discuss a variety of matters. To have to do that was a very heavy burden on me, but I had to do it frequently. In times such as the present I have to do it fairly often. It would be very useful if one member of the Government was free to take charge of special matters referred to Cabinet sub-committees. That has been my experience.

I go further and say that if things could be so arranged that you would have two or three persons who could be asked to devote themselves to a study of special subjects it would be very useful. Take a subject in which I, as Minister for Local Government, had considerable interest—the co-ordination of social services. Members of the Dáil from both sides—the same may have happened here—have suggested over and over again that it would be a good thing to co-ordinate our social services. That matter was discussed at the Cabinet and I was asked several times to take it up. I should have liked to go into it fully. As Minister for Local Government, I went into the matter several times, but I never had the time to finish it. If you had two or three members of the Government who could be detached to sit down and study a special subject like that, it would be of advantage to the Government and to the country as a whole. Despite the economic mentality of Senator Sir John Keane, one might effect savings nationally from that procedure—not so much savings in £ s.d., as savings of a humanitarian kind which would be of incalculable advantage to the country as a whole. That is to say, if you could get all these matters as quickly attended to as all Governments faced with these problems would like to have them attended to. I was glad to notice the generous mood in which Senator Hayes said he would not stop at any expense to enable Ministers to be relieved of some of the burdens that oppress them in their offices. The burdens on every Minister are heavy—on some they are heavier than on others. Senator MacDermot suggested, I think, that instead of enlarging the views of Ministers and enabling them to interfere with other people's Departments, the idea should be to narrow them down and to keep them within the strict limits of their own Departments.

I suggested that that might be the result of appointing a co-ordinating Minister—that it would be a hint to other Ministers to become, more and more, Departmental hacks.

I do not think that it is likely that any Minister would become a Departmental hack. I am sorry if I misinterpreted the Senator. If Ministers became so narrow in their view that they could not understand the working of other Departments, they would not be satisfactory Ministers. That, however, is not possible because at every meeting of the Government matters come up for consideration from several Departments. A Minister does not have at every meeting of the Government items on the agenda from his own Department. Propositions from other Departments come forward for consideration and a Minister, if he is to do his work properly, must study the subjects put up to the Government by the several Departments. He will not, therefore, be long a Minister without getting a knowledge of the working of the several Departments.

In the Dáil and in the Seanad, we all get some knowledge of that kind, because if one is to discuss the Bills that come before these Assemblies one must study the subjects which interest one. The Minister has to get a more detailed knowledge than members of the Oireachtas and, in that way, he serves an apprenticeship. To have spent a long time in the Dáil or Seanad is a good apprenticeship for any Minister. He would not be as valuable if he came straight into the Government without knowledge and experience of Parliamentary work. One acquires that experience and knowledge in dealing, over a number of years, with the ordinary legislation that comes before the Oireachtas. I strongly recommend this proposal and, if it could be arranged, I think it would be a good thing if there were in every Government at least two or three persons who could be spared to do special study and special planning as occasion might arise. I say that as the result of a very long experience of the Dáil and Seanad and of seven years' membership of the Government.

Are we to take it that, when this Bill is passed, two or three persons will be added to the Government?

I do not think there is any likelihood of that but I am giving the Senator the benefit of my experience. It is my view that that would be very useful but I do not think it is likely that any addition will be made to the Government. If we could spare members who would not be heads of Departments of State and make them Ministers without portfolio, they could, in my view, do very useful work. The work is heavy. Senator Hayes, although, as he says, he has not so long an experience of Ministerial office as others have had, has been close enough to members of the Government and to the Government itself, and I am sure that Senator Fitzgerald, the ex-Minister for Defence, would corroborate what Senator Hayes has said as to the hard work a Minister has to do. That work is not finished when he does the job that is given to him in connection with his own Department; he has to take time, after his ordinary day's work is done, to go into all the various matters that may come up. I know that that is the only time that I get to look into the various papers and documents that are given to me. It is not an eight hours' day or a 16 hours' day; it is sometimes longer that Ministers have to spend in order to keep themselves up to date and to study, not alone the work of their own particular Departments, but of all the Departments which have matters to submit to the Executive Council. I am sure that that was true of the last Government, and I know that it is certainly true of this Government and that, as Senator Hayes pointed out, it is more than a full-time job. For that reason, I am convinced that it would be a valuable service to render to any Government if you could have somebody that would be detached, so to speak, and who could give the necessary co-ordinating help. Let us take the problem of the co-ordination and re-organisation of all the social services—I mention that as one case. I think that problem might, with great advantage, be given to a sub-committee of men who, for three or four months in the year, or six months, if necessary, would be free to do that work, and I believe that it would be valuable to the country as well as to those who would be affected by the particular work that was given to that sub-committee.

I am as anxious as any man in the Dáil or Seanad, or outside, to secure economies. Even a small economy is of value in these times and I would not hesitate to save £1,700, or even £100, anywhere I could save it, in reason, but with regard to the money that it is suggested may be spent here —in case any money is spent—being a question of extravagance, or of undue extravagance, as Senator Sir John Keane suggested, I think that, even from the financial point of view, a value could be reaped for the nation that would certainly counter-balance any expense that an additional appointment might require.

I should like to point out that the Minister's opening remarks are liable to a grave misunderstanding. He said that we must assume or take it for granted, naturally, that the Government would not have included a section of this kind in the Bill—I think he was referring to Section 4—unless there was good reason for it. Now, I should like to take up that point. If we are to act on the assumption that the Government would put nothing in a Bill unless they were going to act on it, and that we must take it for granted that there was good reason for it, then there is no point in having this legislative Assembly. The whole construction of this State provides that those who are executively responsible, when they see that a certain change in the law is required, have to come and propose that change to the reason of the Legislature. If the Legislature is to act in the way the Minister seems to suggest, and if we must take it for granted that a clause would not be inserted in a Bill unless there was good reason for it, then you simply vitiate the whole idea of the Legislature, and we must either do away with Parliament altogether or accept that idea.

The Minister then went on, purporting to make a case for this section. I am not saying that a case cannot be made for it, but I do say that the Minister has not made a case for it. He talked about how beneficial it would be to have these experts or well-intentioned people to do the jobs that Ministers are too busy to deal with. We know that a Minister can work for as long as he likes or for as short a time as he likes, more or less. In some circumstances he works longer hours, and in other circumstances he works shorter hours, but so far as co-ordination is concerned, the whole scheme of the Cabinet is directed towards co-ordination. You have the various Departments of State which can be shared out amongst a number of Ministers, and you then have the Taoiseach. Now, the Taoiseach has a Department, known as the Taoiseach's Department, but, strictly speaking, its function does not categorise definitely any particular department of State activity. The Taoiseach's Department and the Taoiseach have essentially a co-ordinating function. The Taoiseach, as it were, should grip together all the various Departments, controlled by various Ministers, and then the Cabinet has joint responsibility and the Cabinet meets under the direction of the Taoiseach. The Taoiseach, by virtue of his office, being concerned with no particular Department, every ordinary Department of State is divided up amongst various Ministers, and the Taoiseach has what you might call a watching brief and a co-ordinating function as to all of these Departments.

I had not time a moment ago, or had not the opportunity, to question whether or not the Tánaiste, by the Constitution, has been made to have a specified Department of State. If we turn to Article 28 (6) (1), we find that it says that

"the Taoiseach shall nominate a member of the Government to be the Tánaiste."

Then, sub-clause (2) says that

"the Tánaiste shall act for all purposes in the place of the Taoiseach if the Taoiseach should die, or become permanently incapacitated, until a new Taoiseach shall have been appointed."

And sub-clause (3) says that

"the Tánaiste shall also act for or in the place of the Taoiseach during the temporary absence of the Taoiseach."

Then, clause 7 (1) says that

"the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste and the member of the Government who is in charge of the Department of Finance must be members of Dáil Eireann."

Now, I do not know what the legal advisers would say with regard to that, or whether you might say that, notionally, prior to the Tánaiste being Tánaiste, he must be a member of the Government. The Article says that the Taoiseach shall nominate a member of the Government to be Tánaiste. At the same time, I should like to be told whether or not we are legally advised that a specific Department of State must be categorically directed by the Tánaiste. I cannot see it in that part of the Constitution.

With regard to the matter of a Minister without portfolio, I was ready to hear the Minister make a case with regard to his power, but it would appear that he can do nothing except to impinge upon himself into the function of the Taoiseach. The Taoiseach is responsible for the whole co-ordination of Government services and Government policy. What is this other man, or these other men, going to do? The Minister made some sort of suggestion—and mind you I do not quite accept that—as to having someone, who would be acceptable to certain people, to be responsible for the co-ordination of social services. That is what I understood the Minister to say, and if that is the intention, then I take it that, once this Bill is passed, you are going to have a man whose functions will be specifically directed to that. On the other hand, if it is not the intention to appoint a co-ordinating Minister to go into the matter of social services, then that remark of the Minister has no reference to what is before us and is dealing with purely imaginary things. Now, I could think of dozens of purely imaginary things, and mention them, without any reference to what is before us.

Let us take this question of the co-ordination of social services. I might point out that the term "social services" is an ambiguous sort of term, but we will agree that the Local Government Department, the Land Commission, and various other Departments, administer some sort of social services, that the Department of Finance deals with old age pensions and so on, and that the co-ordination of the whole lot might be appropriate. How can that be done? This idea that you get some sort of expert from outside who arranges it all is altogether wrong. It would have to be done by the representatives of the Departments at present administering these services. It would be mostly Department officials who would do it and, ultimately, a report would be made and presented, presumably, to the Taoiseach, for consideration by the Cabinet sitting as a Government. The various Ministers involved would have to be represented at such a consideration, either personally or through their officials.

The Constitution and the whole form of government—I think that certain changes should be made, but not this— assumes that there are various Departments of State, and some Minister is responsible to the Legislature in relation to every act of State carried out through these Departments. At the same time, there is a joint responsibility which imposes a general responsibility on the whole Government in relation to these acts, no matter by what Department. You have the Taoiseach who deals with no particular Department of State. At the present moment, he does, because the Taoiseach at the moment is in charge of the Department of External Affairs, and also of the Department of Education. There is no reason why, under the Constitution, he should be in charge of them. The Constitution does not advert to his being in charge of any specific Department whatever. Consequently, if you like to put it that way, the Constitution assumes a Minister without portfolio, called the Taoiseach. That is a special Department and, as I said before, the function of that Department is the co-ordination of the whole State policy and of the activity of various Departments.

The Minister has not attempted to make a case for this clause. He has suggested that inasmuch as the Government proposes it to us, we should accept it, but if we take that line, there is no reason to have a Dáil or Seanad, because once the people know that the Government has proposed something, they will realise that the Government would not propose it if it were not necessary. Consequently, he has—I will not say "misrepresented"—misunderstood the general State arrangements with regard to the Cabinet, and a Minister without portfolio kicking around would be more of a nuisance than he could possibly be of use, because the authority and responsibility is already defined. To have a man butting in, without responsibility and without authority, when there is already somebody there with responsibility and with authority, only makes for disorder. I should be quite ready to give sympathetic hearing to any proposal for what is contained in Section 4, if a case is made for it.

I should like to ask: Is it a fact that, by the Constitution, no one can hold the office of Tánaiste unless he is already, and remains, in specific authority, and responsible for a definite Department of State, or one of the State activities? If that is not so, if that is not the correct interpretation of the Constitution, the Constitution already provides for two Ministers without portfolio, and what is the purpose of Section 4? I am quite open to conviction that, in these circumstances or as a general line of policy, such a provision is necessary, but the case has not been made to the House.

Senator Quirke thinks that into this matter there should not be introduced any personal criticism of Ministers. That, of course, is so, to some extent, but it is extraordinary how thin-skinned people become when they come into office, as compared with their attitude at another time. It is quite open to us to say that a particular Minister did not do his job. That is the simplest possible form of criticism, with nothing personal in it. At present, we have a Minister for Defence; we have a Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence; and we have also a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, who has a salary, an office and a motor car, but no Department, and nothing that any intelligent person can see for him to do. This section of the Bill—and I think the Minister is in agreement with me now—was introduced to legalise his position, and, taking that particular position, the only general conclusion one can draw is that the great usefulness of this provision in legalisation is that when you think a man is not doing well in a Department, you can take him out, leave him his emoluments, and prevent him doing any more harm in the particular Department.

No criticism that I could make of the Fianna Fáil Party could be as grave as the criticism the Taoiseach has made of the Fianna Fáil Party by taking two Departments himself. That is an implication that there is nobody available in the Government or in the Party to manage either External Affairs or Education, and it is a position which is quite absurd. A Parliamentary Secretary managed the Department of Posts and Telegraphs from 1927 to 1932. It has had a Minister since, and the Minister for Finance will, I think, agree with me that the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs can easily find a great deal of time. He is practically a Minister without portfolio. The Department of Posts and Telegraphs is a great organisation which goes on by itself, so to speak, or by its officials. It does not at all involve the matters of policy that arise in Industry and Commerce, or that would arise in Education, if that Department were being properly handled.

The talk of a Minister without portfolio being an efficiency expert is, of course, for anybody with experience of government, quite ridiculous. Efficiency experts, presumably, come in from outside. I am not arguing for them by any means, but they would come in from outside and, similarly, the Minister's statement here this evening that a Minister without portfolio, or two or three such Ministers could go into such matters as the co-ordination of social services is, of course, a misunderstanding of how these things are done. The Government has at its disposal—this Government has freely availed of it, and so did its predecessor —the whole country. If they want to set up a commission on anything, they have only to ask certain people to go on it. If the commission is not good, it is the Government's fault. A colleague of mine at University College, Dublin, who was on the Banking Commission, had so much work to do that he had to get somebody else to do some of his lecturing for him. In spite of that, he was implored to go on the Agricultural Commission, and his opposite number in Trinity College, the professor of economics there, is also a member of it. The Government is not short of people to whom it can transfer problems which it merely wants examined. You do not require a Minister without portfolio to examine certain problems such as those the Minister for Finance has mentioned this evening. One has merely to think of the Agricultural Commission, the Banking Commission, the Vocational Commission, and dozens of others, to realise that one can get along without a Minister without portfolio doing these things.

Senator Quirke, I think, quite misunderstands the position when he talks about the Minister for Supplies interviewing the Minister for Industry and Commerce and the Minister for Agriculture. The Minister for Supplies has a portfolio and he has responsibility and power; and if the Minister in the Department of Agriculture asks: "Can you do something?" the Minister for Supplies can get something done about it. The Minister without portfolio, the gentleman going around with a full salary and full free time, cannot do anything about it. All he can do is interrupt the Minister for Agriculture or the Minister for Industry and Commerce in their work, unless he is a very remarkable person indeed, and if he is a very remarkable person indeed then he ought to have a Department. From what I have heard, there is really nothing to be said for this. The Minister for Finance, of course, being an old politician—I say the words without any disparagement—can produce an argument for anything, but I do not think he himself believes in this thing at all, good, bad or indifferent. How can this Government appoint two or three Ministers without portfolio when they cannot find in the Party either a Minister for Education or a Minister for External Affairs? The thing is absurd.

I think I gave my word to the House that I am convinced this is useful. If Senator Hayes will not accept my word, I cannot help it. I do not think anything I can say would carry any weight with him.

Mr. Hayes

I accept the Minister's word that he is convinced, but I think the good reason why the Minister is convinced is that a colleague of his is in difficulty. They took the step first, and are legalising it afterwards.

It is one of the greatest arts to be able to convince oneself of what one wants to believe.

I am not so sure the Minister is convinced that it is in the public interest.

Question put.
Committee divided: Tá, 21; Níl, 15.

Blaney, Neal.Byrne, Christopher M.Colbert, Michael.Concannon, HelenaCorkery, Daniel.Goulding, Seán.Hawkins, Frederick.Hayes, Seán.Healy, Denis D.Honan, Thomas V.Johnston, James.

Kennedy, Margaret L.Lynch, Peter T.MacCabe, Dominick.McEllin, Seán.Mac Fhionnlaoich, Peadar(Cú Uladh).Magennis, William.Nic Phiarais, Maighréad M.Quirke, William.Ruane, Thomas.Stafford, Matthew.

Níl

Campbell, Seán P.Counihan, John J.Crosbie, James.Cummins, William.Fitzgerald, Desmond.Foran, Thomas.Hayes, Michael.Hogan, Patrick.

Johnston, Joseph.Keane, Sir John.Lynch, Eamonn.MacDermot, Frank.Madden, David J.Rowlette, Robert J.Tierney, Michael.

Tellers: Tá, Senators Corkery and Goulding; Níl, Senators M. Hayes and Madden.
Question declared carried.
Question proposed: "That Section 5 stand part of the Bill."

Why is it that in Section 5 the Taoiseach is given power to transfer Departments to and from Ministers, while in Section 7, during the temporary inability of Ministers, you require action, not by the Taoiseach, but by the Government? This matter would be relevant on either Section 5 or Section 7, but, since we are considering Section 5, I should like to say that I do not quite understand it. In Section 5 the Taoiseach has certain powers and in Section 7 it is the Government. Is there any reason for the change?

As the Taoiseach is the person who is responsible for an individual being in the Government, and being a Minister in charge of a Department, it is thought proper that he should also be the person to transfer. In Section 7 it is purely a matter of arrangement and the Government usually decides what Minister will substitute another Minister.

Question agreed to.

Question proposed: "That Section 6 stand part of the Bill."

This means that the Government can at any time transfer the Department of Defence to the Minister for Education. They will keep on calling him the Minister for Education, but they will let him discharge the duties of the Department of Defence.

There is nothing new in Section 6; it is a rearrangement of the old section.

Question agreed to.

Section 7 agreed to.
SECTION 8.
(1) A Parliamentary Secretary who is a member of Dáil Eireann shall have the right to attend and be heard in Seanad Eireann.
(2) A Parliamentary Secretary who is a member of Seanad Eireann shall have the right to attend and be heard in Dáil Eireann.

Senator Douglas is, unfortunately, absent. In the circumstances, I shall move amendment No. 1:—

In sub-section (1), at the beginning of the sub-section, to insert the words "Unless Seanad Eireann shall by resolution decide otherwise."

Section 8 gives the right to a Parliamentary Secretary, who is a member of one House, to attend and be heard in the other. The Constitution provides that a Minister shall have the right to attend and be heard in both Houses. The Constitution further provides, in Article 15, for the rights of each House of the Oireachtas. It points out that each House shall make its own rules and Standing Orders, and so on. I submit that when the Constitution conferred powers upon the House to make its own rules and Standing Orders, that naturally includes, for decision by the House, what non-members of the House will have the right to attend. Since the Constitution goes a step further and gives the right to a Minister, specifically, to attend and be heard that, on the well-known principle, excludes everybody else from having a statutory right.

I do not think it is in the power of a statute to give a Parliamentary Secretary authority to appear in the Seanad. As a practical question, I think I would never take exception to a Parliamentary Secretary appearing and speaking in the Seanad; as a practical question, I would always agree; but I think it is a mistake to endeavour to go over the head of this House to give a right by statute which, I think, cannot be conferred by statute, but should have been conferred in the Constitution. I think, therefore, this amendment would make the matter right, short of the whole section being deleted: "Unless Seanad Eireann shall by resolution decide otherwise, a Parliamentary Secretary who is a member of Dáil Eireann shall have the right to attend and be heard in Seanad Eireann." He would not require permission, but the right to prevent him would still be preserved in the statute.

Mr. Lynch

The question may arise, would the amendment moved by Senator Hayes override the Constitution? The Constitution is a superior document. If the section cannot override the Constitution, then I submit that no amendment of the section can override the Constitution.

Does it not bring the Bill into harmony with the Constitution—is not the effect of the amendment to make the Bill harmonise with the Constitution?

Mr. Lynch

The Senator referred to the Article of the Constitution which makes no mention of any person entitled to be heard in the Seanad other than a Minister. Therefore, it must be understood that only Ministers may be heard here.

I agree that it would be better if this section were deleted. The Constitution provides that a Minister has the right to attend here. We can confer on any other person the right to attend and be heard in the Seanad. The matter first arose, in the case of the old Seanad, with regard to the Attorney-General, who was not a Minister. It was found that he wanted, on the Courts of Justice Bill, 1924, to address the House, and, since he was not a Minister, he had no right to attend the House, but the House gave him the right. You could, for that matter, give the right to the chairman of the Trades Union Congress, if he did not happen to be a member of the House. This amendment would preserve to the Seanad the right to decide that a person should not be heard. It would nullify really, from the point of view of rights, this particular section. It would preserve the Constitutional right of the Seanad to say whom it wanted to hear and while the Constitution prescribes that a Minister must be heard, it does not prescribe that somebody else cannot be heard.

Is it not clear that the rights, duties and functions of the Government are fundamental and that, as only fundamental matters go into the Constitution, the rights, functions and duties of a Government should be embodied in the Constitution. It was subsequently that the Oireachtas in its wisdom decided to appoint Parliamentary Secretaries. They are not members of the Government. They are not responsible for policy. They are not head of a Government Department solus. A Minister is responsible to the Dáil for the policy of his Government. It strikes me that as the Oireachtas is the only body entitled to legislate in this State, you are endeavouring to give one part of the Oireachtas a right to veto what the two bodies do. The two bodies are the only bodies that can legislate and you are, if you like, endeavouring to say to the Seanad: "You have a right to veto what the Oireachtas has a right to do by saying that you will refuse to hear a Parliamentary Secretary." I think the rule that Senator Hayes referred to is not an enactment. The Standing Orders of Seanad Eireann are not enactments. Neither are the Standing Orders of Dáil Eireann enactments. An enactment is what the two Houses do. The Second House had nothing whatever to say to our Standing Orders but they will have to say whether we will have to give audience to Parliamentary Secretaries or not. I think it is a very dangerous principle to embody that you will not interfere with the legislative authority of the Oireachtas and by a rule endeavour to veto an enactment of the Oireachtas.

If you ask me whether a Parliamentary Secretary should come here in the interests of the Minister or in the interests of his Department I probably would say that it would be for the Seanad to say whether they wished to send for him or not. I would be prepared to say whether the Seanad would have authority to ask a Parliamentary Secretary to attend for its own interests or not, but to endeavour to prevent him by a rule of the Seanad is, I think, a very bad principle to introduce.

Where is the principle Senator Hogan speaks about? Is he for or against the amendment? I am not clear.

I am against.

I personally might think that the matter is a matter of courtesy in a way and could be left to the Seanad, but in view of the section that follows and the delegation of certain functions that might arise under that section—and probably will arise under it—to a Parliamentary Secretary, it was thought by the Government that it would be well if both Houses of the Oireachtas would agree that a Parliamentary Secretary should have that right as well as a Minister. The Dáil has agreed and it would be, well, an unbalanced arrangement, not to use any stronger word, if the Dáil has agreed and the Seanad will not agree to the suggestion. I am surprised that Senator Hayes and Senator Douglas did not go the whole hog and put down an amendment to delete the section. What it proposes to do in effect is practically that and, I think, personally and without disrespect, if they had such a dislike of the idea that a Parliamentary Secretary should have the right in the Seanad, as he will have in the Dáil, that it would have been a better thing to do if the two gentlemen concerned in putting down the amendment had put in that the section be deleted.

That can still be done, surely?

It could, of course, yes. But in connection with the next section necessity has arisen, largely through decisions in the court, that makes it advisable for a Minister to have the power to delegate certain routine duties, duties that are onerous and take up a good deal of time, to Parliamentary Secretaries. There would be a saving of time for a Minister and perhaps saving of time in the two Houses as well if Parliamentary Secretaries—without having responsibility, the Minister still retaining his full responsibility—could have the right to appear in either House and discuss the matters delegated to them and be asked questions there and give information there. It is in view of the succeeding section and the power that is sought there that we asked that the Seanad should give the right of audience to a Parliamentary Secretary here. We obtained a similar right in Dáil Eireann.

Would the Minister deal with the constitutional point as to whether there is in fact power in a statute to confer this right upon a Parliamentary Secretary?

I am not much of an authority on Constitutions.

I have no objection to the thing itself, that is to say, I think as a practical question, a Parliamentary Secretary should certainly be allowed to address this House. I think a member of the House who disagreed with the Government of the day should not take up the attitude of objecting to a Parliamentary Secretary attending in the House, but I do think that when you have a written Constitution, that when you profess respect for it, you should observe it, and I doubt very much that there is any power at all to confer this right by statute. This amendment was framed yesterday rather hurriedly and if it were adopted it would leave the position that a Parliamentary Secretary could come in but that the right would remain in the Seanad to decide by resolution that he would not be heard—a right which I would hope myself would not be exercised. But I am perfectly confident that this is another of the great many breaches which the Government have made in the Constitution.

I am advised that Article 28A of the Constitution provides for the right of audience for members of the Government. The Government is advised that this does not preclude the making of corresponding provision in respect of Parliamentary Secretaries.

I would like to hear the reasoning behind that, because if I remember the Constitution rightly it specifically states that each House has the right to make its own rules. It specifically states that a Minister has the right to attend here. I think, as an ordinary legal dictum, when a specific exception is made, the mere fact that it states that a Minister can attend, irrespective of what decision or what rules the Seanad may make, the interpretation is then that it means that nobody else can attend and that the law of the Seanad making its own rules remains except in so far as it is varied. The Minister tells us merely that the Government is advised. That advice, I presume, was a reasoned statement as to how it is that, although the Constitution gives power to the Seanad to make its own laws governing its own procedure and its own orders, specifying at the same time that a Minister has the right to come here, it is then interpreted that without requiring an amendment to the Constitution an ordinary statute can be made varying that.

Is there anything new about a Parliamentary Secretary attending here representing the Minister? I am fully aware of previous occasions on which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Local Government attended here to represent the Minister.

The Senator has completely misunderstood the point. I presume the Seanad would always agree that a Parliamentary Secretary should be allowed to appear here, but the Constitution, which is the basic law of the State, says that each House of the Oireachtas makes laws governing its own procedure. At the same time it specifically states that a Minister has the right to appear before the Seanad. Now I understand, although I do not pretend to be a legal expert, that when an exception in that way is made, as in this case in the Constitution, it implies, when you say that a certain person can come, that nobody but that person can come. That is the ordinary legal interpretation. Here the Constitution has said that the Seanad itself decides everything in effect as to who may or may not appear before it. A Minister may come before us because the Constitution at the same time says that a Minister may appear here. Now, by ordinary legislation, not an amendment to the Constitution, a change is made in effect in the Constitution and in the legal interpretation of it. The Minister tells us that the Government is advised that this can be done by ordinary legislation, but he has not given any grounds for that opinion. As far as I can judge, on the face of it, it does require an amendment of the Constitution.

This section is really a limitation of the powers of the Seanad in relation to its own affairs and its powers are defined in the Constitution. An exception is made in relation to Ministers. Another exception is now being made in relation to Parliamentary Secretaries. The Senator says that Parliamentary Secretaries have appeared here. Certainly they have and presumably when a Parliamentary Secretary appears here, he appears not by virtue of a statute but by virtue of the Constitution. I have a copy of the relevant Standing Order here. It states:—

"A Parliamentary Secretary, who is not a member of the Seanad, may by leave of the Cathaoirleach, attend and be heard during the different stages of any Bill or the debate on any other matter in which the Department of the Minister to whom he is assigned is concerned."

He appears here by virtue of that Standing Order made by the Seanad under the powers conferred on the Seanad by the Constitution. Now a Bill is being brought in taking that power from the Seanad and doing that by ordinary law. The Seanad has that power by virtue of the Constitution. This Bill does not purport to be an amendment of the Constitution. Consequently, it does seem to me that the power taken in this Bill is outside the scope of any ordinary legislation in this country. The Minister has told us that the Government is advised that this change can be made under the Bill, but I should like to have some reasoned statement on the matter.

May I ask do the Standing Orders of the Dáil allow a member of the Seanad who is a Parliamentary Secretary to appear and speak there?

I could not say.

Again I do not think that is relevant. The Dáil certainly has power under its Standing Orders to permit anybody to appear before it. The Dáil, in its own wisdom, can say "yes" or "no" to the question whether a Parliamentary Secretary, who is not a member of the Dáil, may appear before it. The Dáil has that same right under the Constitution as we have.

The question never arose in the Dáil because there was never a Parliamentary Secretary or a Minister who was a member of the Seanad.

There was a Minister.

There was a Minister. That is quite right. He appeared in the Dáil.

I have no doubt that if there was a Parliamentary Secretary appointed from the personnel of the Seanad, the Dáil through ordinary courtesy, and to suit its own convenience, would provide under the Standing Orders that he could appear there.

Assuming that this House passes this measure, would our Standing Orders be in conflict with the Constitution?

The Standing Order would be in conflict with this particular statute.

Our Standing Orders would be supererogatory. We would be reaffirming something which was already provided for.

Supererogatory or derogatory? I should say derogatory. I do not see that there is any reason why we should pass this amendment. We still, according to our Standing Orders, have the right to decide this question.

Our Standing Orders are still there.

May I suggest that if our Standing Orders were contrary to a legally enacted statute in this State, then the statute would take precedence and would be valid against our Standing Orders. If passing this Bill makes it law—I do not say it does—that Standing Order would be of no effect because we could not make a Standing Order contrary to the law. My argument is that you cannot by ordinary legislation, implicitly or explicitly, enact something which is contrary to the Constitution

We have our status and position under the Constitution.

Deputy Fitzgerald cannot suggest that the fact that we had already made Standing Orders gave us power to limit the power of the Oireachtas by these Orders. These Standing Orders dealt only with this House. The translation of the particular Article is not as clear as the Irish original. I assume that those who drafted the Constitution first drafted this Article in Irish and then translated it into English.

That is a hopeless assumption.

It may be hopeless, but I think it is the proper assumption. The Article in Irish reads:—

Déanfaidh gach Tigh ar leith a riaghlacha agus a bhuan-orduighthe féin...

I think the expression "ar leith" indicates that these regulations are made specially for the Seanad. Any attempt to limit the power of the Oireachtas to legislate is to elevate the Standing Orders of this House beyond the power and authority of an enactment. The Oireachtas has the power to legislate. The Seanad has not power to legislate of itself. The Oireachtas is entitled to legislate, and an attempt is being made here to suggest that this Standing Order limits the power of the Oireachtas to legislate.

The Senator has misunderstood me. I have here a copy of the Constitution, with Irish on one side and English on the other. If I am asked what the Irish means, I submit that it means what is expressed in English on the other side, for this reason—that the Irish purports to be a translation of the English. The English was written in first, and was afterwards translated into Irish on the opposite page. In quite a number of instances the translation, if I may say so, was done very badly. I do not say that because we have made a Standing Order we have no power to legislate on this matter. The Oireachtas has power to legislate within the terms of the Constitution, and it can legislate beyond that, and change the Constitution itself, when it specifically states that the Act passed is an amendment of the Constitution. This Bill before us is not stated to be an amendment of the Constitution. Article 15 of the Constitution provides:—

"Each House shall make its own Rules and Standing Orders, with power to attach penalties for their infringement, and shall have power to ensure freedom of debate, to protect its official documents and the private papers of its members, and to protect itself and its members against any person or persons interfering with, molesting or attempting to corrupt its members in the exercise of their duties."

What I suggested earlier was that the Constitution gives the Seanad power to control its own arrangements. The Constitution states that "a member of the Government" has the right to appear here. Inasmuch as the Constitution specifically states that a member of the Government has the right to appear here, then implicitly, by legal interpretation, it means that nobody else has, except the members of the Seanad. I am prepared to be convinced about this, but the Bill before us says that somebody else, not a member of the Government and not a member of the Seanad, has the right to appear and speak here. The Constitution, which is not the ordinary law, says that each House shall have the right to make its own Rules and Standing Orders. Therefore, the Constitution gives us power to make Rules with regard to this House.

This is a Bill which purports to make rules for this House; to exercise powers granted by the Constitution to the Seanad and to the general legislature. Consequently, I raise the point as to whether this section in the Bill is not, implicitly, a variation of the Constitution. I will give an instance of the sort of thing that may arise. This Bill says that a Parliamentary Secretary shall have the right to appear before the Seanad. We have at the present moment a Standing Order which gives him the right to appear. That Standing Order was made by the Seanad by virtue of the power granted to it under the Constitution. Suppose that later on we change our Standing Order: that we reverse Standing Order No. 42. We would then have a Standing Order made by the Seanad under the power given to it by the Constitution saying that a Parliamentary Secretary may not appear here, and at the same time a provision in an ordinary Act, which is not an amendment of the Constitution, saying that he has the right to appear here. Suppose further that we were to go before the courts, the question to be determined there would be this: whether ordinary legislation could take from the Seanad a function, privilege or power conferred on it by the Constitution. It is not a conflict between the power of the Oireachtas to legislate and the power of the Seanad to make its own Standing Orders, but it is a conflict as to the right of ordinary legislation to take away from or add to a power granted specifically by the Constitution.

Section 28 of the Constitution provides:—

Tá sé de cheart ag gach comhalta den Riaghaltas bheith i láthair agus labhairt i ngach Tigh den Oireachtas.

Every member of the Government shall have the right to attend and be heard in each House of the Oireachtas.

Under that provision a definite right is given to a member of the Government to attend and be heard in each House. Very definitely, nothing appears anywhere in the Constitution about Parliamentary Secretaries. Their office is one which is provided for by statute. There is no attempt to amend the Constitution in asking the Seanad in this Bill to give the right of audience to Parliamentary Secretaries, or to any other member of the Dáil or anyone outside. As I see it, there is no amendment of the Constitution in that. There is nothing to prevent the Seanad saying, for instance, that the Lord Mayor of Dublin will have the right of audience here at any time the members please. As Senator Hayes said, there is nothing to prevent the Seanad from giving the right of audience here to the chairman of the Trade Union Congress. The Seanad has the right to make any Standing Order it likes. It also can, if it so desires, take out of its own hands the right to make a Standing Order with regard to Parliamentary Secretaries appearing here, by putting a section in the Bill saying that it will give them that right. The Seanad has the right to enact an amendment of its own Standing Orders by putting a section like this in the Bill.

I agree that we have the right to amend our Standing Orders. We also have the right to reamend them. We make these Standing Orders by virtue of the power conferred on us in the Constitution. We can make a Standing Order allowing anybody we like to appear and speak here. We also have the right to take away that privilege again. If we pass this Bill, is it going to be the law of this land? In that case, if later on we change our Standing Order under the power that we have in the Constitution, we are going to have our Standing Order saying one thing, and an Act, purporting to be a legal statute, saying the opposite. Which will be right? We base our right to make Standing Orders on the power conferred on us by the Constitution. Those on the other side will say "But here you have ordinary legislation". In the case of a conflict between ordinary legislation and the Constitution, legislation purporting to change the Constitution, the Constitution is the law and not the specific enactment. The Minister says that we are given this power to make Standing Orders. We have the power to give the right to other people to appear here. Under that power, we are exercising a right that we have. We are not taking that right away from ourselves. We can change our minds, but here, by legislation, we are purporting to take from ourselves a power conferred on us by the Constitution. Can that be done?

Would the Minister then tell us what is going to be the position? On the basis of the Bill that is now before us, suppose we change our Standing Orders to-morrow and say that no Parliamentary Secretary shall have the right to appear before us, which is going to be operative—the Bill or the Standing Order?

The Seanad has the power to make Standing Orders, but it also takes a part in the making of the legislation of the country. If the Seanad, of its own free will, passes a section of a Bill which is in conflict with the present Standing Orders: if in doing that it is conscious that it is altering its own Standing Orders, then I take it that the Seanad is saying, in effect, we will amend our Standing Orders. There is nothing to prevent the Seanad doing that.

I hate being troublesome about this, but there is a Constitution which, presumably, is permanent. I am not purporting to be a political prophet, but here is a purely hypothetical case which I wish to put to the House. Next month, let us suppose, you have a general election. A month or so later you have a new Seanad which is composed, presumably, of new men. They discover what rights they have under the Constitution, and they say to themselves: "By Jove, we have the right to do everything about this body, as to who can speak here, appear here, and so on." They go ahead, and then are told: "No, you have not those rights. Your predecessors participated in a change of the law, and you have no right now to exercise the power that was granted to you by the Constitution unless the law of the land is changed. Consequently, we can do that."

What is the proper way under the Constitution of providing that Parliamentary Secretaries can appear here? By Standing Order. But the Government, for some reason of their own, propose varying it and changing the law. What I am arguing is that any act done by the Seanad does not take away the power given to it by the Constitution. Consequently, the Seanad can change its mind later, but the Seanad, by changing its mind, cannot change the legislation of this country. That would require an Act of the Oireachtas. It seems to me that if you pass this Bill you could have a case in the courts whereby the Seanad would say: "We base our claim in this case on the Constitution, which has not been changed, giving us certain powers." If the Attorney-General appears for the Government and says: "Here is the Act that has been passed," it seems to me—and I have no doubt a case can be made by legal advisers to the Government—that the decision will be that an Act purporting to take from the Seanad powers given to it by the Constitution is null and void. Consequently, what we are proposing to pass now is only a waste of time. I am sorry for taking up some of the time of the House on this point. This legislation is absolutely unnecessary, as it is inconceivable that when a Parliamentary Secretary responsible for certain State activity which requires some elaboration in front of the Seanad proposes to come before the House, we should be so hard-shouldered as to refuse to let him talk in this House.

What is all the talk about, so?

The Constitution says that it can only be changed by a Bill specifically setting forth a change in the Constitution. This Bill actually purports to take away a right conferred by the Constitution. I do not think it can do it. It does seem ridiculous to bring in Bills here which, if they are challenged in the courts, can be declared null and void.

I have been listening for the past hour to discussion of trifling details, as to what is likely to happen at some time in the future. Is the House going to stand in its own light? If the House passes this Bill as it is, even if we have a general election and a new House, is it going to stand in its own light deliberately to hold up the ordinary business?

Of course not; that is exactly what I am saying.

I take it that commonsense still prevails in the Seanad.

If the Constitution is inconvenient, scrap it!

I should have thought the Seanad would be much more loath to make a change than I am.

The impression left in my mind by the statement of the Minister is that it will bring this legislation entirely into conflict with the power of this House to make Standing Orders. Is that advisable? Parliamentary Secretaries have always been received here and I presume that they always will be received. So why not accept the amendment and leave us the powers we have under the Constitution to make such Standing Orders as we desire? Why make certain of those powers rigid, as the passing of this section will make them rigid and undisturbable by the House subsequently? Why not leave the matter as it stands at the present time and let the Minister accept the amendment?

It is quite true to say that the Seanad has power to take part in legislation. It is quite true to say that the two Houses of the Oireachtas have power to pass legislation proposing to abolish the Seanad or to reduce the Seanad to complete nullity. But the two Houses have not power, by ordinary legislation, to take away from an ordinary citizen rights conferred by the Constitution. We have a recent decision in the High Courts to that effect. You cannot take away from the ordinary citizen those rights which the Constitution gives him, and still less can you take away from one House of the Parliament powers given to it by the Constitution. I will not take the trouble to explain it any further than that, yet I think that is the fallacy in the Minister's argument.

Amendment put and declared lost.

I move amendment No. 2:—

To add at the end of the section the following new sub-section:—

(3) Every Parliamentary Secretary exercising the right to attend and be heard in a House of the Oireachtas of which he is not a member shall be subject to the rules and Standing

Orders of the House in which he attends.

I would have no objection in the world to do this, except that it seems to me to be a kind of reflection on the individual.

I forget the word the Minister used. Was it "supererogatory"?

The Bill will have to go back to the Dáil if this is accepted.

I think that is the Minister's objection to the other one, too.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put: "That Section 8 stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided: Tá, 23; Níl, 9.

  • Byrne, Christopher M.
  • Campbell, Seán P.
  • Colbert, Michael.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Corkery, Daniel.
  • Goulding, Seán.
  • Hawkins, Frederick.
  • Hayes, Seán.
  • Healy, Denis D.
  • Hogan, Patrick.
  • Honan, Thomas V.
  • Johnston, James.
  • Kehoe, Patrick.
  • Kennedy, Margaret L.
  • Lynch, Peter T.
  • MacCabe, Dominick.
  • McEllin, Seán.
  • Mac Fhionnlaoich, Peadar
  • (Cú Uladh).
  • O Buachalla, Liam.
  • O'Dwyer, Martin.
  • Nic Phiarais, Maighréad M.
  • Stafford, Matthew.
  • Tunney, James.

Níl

  • Alton, Ernest H.
  • Counihan, John J.
  • Crosbie, James.
  • Fitzgerald, Desmond.
  • Hayes, Michael.
  • Johnston, Joseph.
  • Keane, Sir John.
  • Lynch, Eamonn.
  • Madden, David J.
Tellers:— Tá: Senators Corkery and Goulding; Níl: Senators Crosbie and Fitzgerald.
Question declared carried.
Remaining Stages put and agreed to.
SCHEDULE.
Question proposed: "That the Schedule be the Schedule to the Bill."

Sompla eile an sceideal so den bhfonn atá ar an Rialtas gach aon rud d'atharú. Socruíodh leitriú don Ghaedhilg oifigiúil sa bhliain 1922. Chuamar i gcomhairle le daoine oilte tuiscionacha agus b'é Cléireach na Dála, Colm O Murchadha, a bhí i mbun na hoibre. Fuaireamar scéala a bháis iniu—go ndéanaidh Diá trócaire air—scoláire cruinn léigheanta do b'eadh é agus níor chuaidh sé ro-fhada leis an leitriú simplí. Bhí ciall agus fuinniméid leis an scéim a ceapadh. Dé chúis an t'atharú. Tá "dlighidh" anois in áit "dlí". Tá fhios agam nach é an Tánaiste fé ndear é agus ní dóigh liom gurab é an Taoiseach féin a dhein an t'atharú. Do réir mar is cuimhin liom-sa tá sé sin ar thaobh an leitriú simplí agus ar thaobh an chló Románaigh chó maith.

Is dóigh liom go bhfuil an ceart agat.

Tá fhios agam go bhfuil agus mar sin eá bhfuil an t-údar le fáil. Cá bhfuil an láimh i bhfolach mar adéarfá. Cad a thug ar an Taoiseach imeacht ón scéim leitrithe a cheapadh. Taobh amuich den leitriú tá focal nua againn anso. Cad as do "eachtracha". Cad na thaobh ná déanfadh "coigríche" an gnó. Is dóigh liom gur cheart a bheith sásta le focal atá á úsáid le blianta. Is cuma cad é an tuairim a bheadh agat féin mar gheall air. O fuaireas an Bille seo d'fhiafruíos de cháirde liom ó Chorcaigh, ó Chiarraighe, ó Chonnachta agus ó Thir Chonaill ar airíodar nó an bhfacadar riamh "eachtrach". Níor aithin éinne é na níor thuig éinne acu é. Níl ciall ná cúis leis an atharú atá anso ar an nGaedhilg oifigiúil a bhí ann ar feadh sé bliana déag. Is amhla atáimíd ag cur siar an chluig. Tá Séathrún Céitinn níos mó ná trí chéad bliain curtha agus bhí sé sin sásta le "dlighe". Tá na daoine seo ag dul níos fuide. Níl aon amhras ná go raibh Gaedhilg ag Céitinn. Caithfidh páistí an lae iniu leitriú d'fhoghluim atá níos deacra ná mar a bhí ag Céitinn agus ag údair eile roimhe.

Maidir leis an leitriú, is dóigh liom gur eirigh an leitriú seo as an gCoimisiún a cuireadh ar bun. Cuireadh Coimisiún ar bun le féachaint isteach san leitriú agus é do cheartú agus caighdeán do chur ar bun. Bhí daoine ar an gCoimisiún sin ábalta labhairt ar gach canúint in Éirinn agus scrúduigheadar go mion na focla a bhí sa Bhunreacht. Is dóigh liom gur leanadh comhairle an Choimisiúin sin sa Bhunreacht, agus táim ag glacadh anois gurbh iad na fuirmaí atá sa mBille seo, an leitriú a bhí le fáil sa Bhunreacht. Níor thug mé fá deara an scéal seo ach má ghlacaimíd leis an mBunreacht, is dóigh liom gur ceart dúinn glacadh fósta le leitriú an Bhunreachta do bhrí an Choimisiúin údarásach a chuaidh isteach san sgéal.

Níl an focal "eachtracha" sa Bhunreacht.

Cé cheap an focal sin?

Níl fhios agam.

Táim chó haosta anois nach maith liom morán d'aon-tsórt atharú. Ba mhaith liom rudaí d'fhágáil mar atá siad chó fada agus is féidir agus chó fada agus bhaineann siad le Gaedhilge chó maith. Ní maith liom an leitriú simplí. Bhí taithighe fhada agam ar an leitriú eile agus b'fhearr liom leanúint le mo sheanlitriú.

B'fhéidir go bhfuil, ach tá daoine ann adeireann ná fuil an ceart agam-sa nó agat-sa air sin. Dubhras so Dáil nuair bhí me ag tagairt don Bhille seo gur cuireadh Coimisiún nó Coiste ar bun agus go raibh ar an gcoiste sin ollamhain Ghaedhilge ó gach coláiste sa tír. Tuigim anois nach raibh an ceart ar fad agam san méid sin.

Ní dóigh liom sin. Ní mar sin a bhí.

Tá liosta annso agam de na daoine a bhí ar an gcoiste sin agus seo iad na hainmneacha: an tOllamh Eoin MacNéill; Pádraig O Siochfhradha—is dóigh liom gurab é "An Seabhac"; Colm O Murchadha— go ndéana Dia trócaire ar a anam; chualas go bhfuair sé bás indiu agus scoláire ceart breagh bhí ann, mar adubhairt an Seanadóir O h-Aodha; Peadar MacFhionnlaoich, Seanadóir— Cú Uladh; Shán O Cuiv; Micheál Breathnach—níl fhios agam cé hé——

An tOllamh Tomás O Máille—go ndéana Dia trócaire ar a anam; tá sé marbh leis— an tOllamh Tomás O Raithille; an tOllamh Osborn O h-Aimhirgín; Risteárd O Foghludha, agus an tOllamh Séamus Ua Searcaigh. Sin iad na daoine a bhí ar an gcoiste sin agus ní dóigh liom gur féidir linn a rá nach daoine iad go bhfuil eolas cruinn ar an dteanga aca, ag gach ceann aca.

Bhí an díobháíl déanta roimhe sin.

Níl fhios agam faoi sin, ach tuigim gur thóg an Taoiseach tuairim furmhór díobh agus gur ghlac sé leis an moladh a fuair sé ón gcoiste. Is do réir na molta sin do shochruigh sé glacadh leis an nGaedhilg atá ann anois agus leis na hainmneacha atá sa mBille. Is deacair aon locht fháil leis sin mar daoine údarásacha a bhí sna daoine seo. B'fhéidir gur féidir linn coiste eile a chur ar bun agus daoine údarásacha do chur air— ollamhna Gaedhilge sna Coláistí do thabhairt le chéile, agus gan éinne ach iad do chur air. Tá cuid aca a bhí ar an gcoiste seo——

Tá cuid mhaith aca in aghaidh an leitrithe seo.

Tá. Tá an tOllamh O Raithille ina aghaidh. Bhí Colm O Murchadha ina aghaidh leis.

Tuigim go raibh an tOllamh O Raithille ina fhabhar.

I bhfabhair "dligheadh"? Sé i bhfad uainn an t-olc!

Sin a dubhradh liom, ach do ghlac an Taoiseach le molta furmhór na daoine a bhí ar an gcoiste sin agus mar a dubhras, is deacair locht fháil leis sin, mar is daoine údarásacha iad. Má thugann siad moladh maidir le litriú is deacair gan glacadh leis. Má cuirtear coiste dá leithéid sin ar bun agus má thugann siad molta dhuit, saghas masla ar an gcoimisiún a molta do dhiúltiú, agus níor mhaith liom, agus níor mhaith leis an Taoiseach aon tsórt masla do thabhairt do dhaoine údarásacha mar na daoine seo, maidir leis an nGaedhilg.

Leas-Chathaoirleach

Sí an cheist í: Gurb é an Sceideal a bheidh ina Sceideal don Bhille.

The question is: That the Schedule be the Schedule to the Bill.

You are asking us solemnly to vote that we consider the Irish words in one column as more essentially correct than the words in the other. I doubt if this body is competent.

Deir an Seanadóir Ó hAodha é sin.

I could get a dozen equally eminent men who would disagree with every word. The thing to do was to leave matters alone.

It is one of those things that cannot be decided by a vote. You first stuff a committee and then take a vote.

Question put and agreed to.
Title put and agreed to.
Bill reported.
Top
Share