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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 25 Sep 1940

Vol. 24 No. 25

War Risk Insurance for Property—Motion.

I move:—

That, in the opinion of the Seanad, the Government should formulate a scheme of war risk insurance for property, and take the necessary steps to put the scheme into operation.

I put down this motion in the knowledge that the question it raises is a very difficult and a very complex one, and that neither this Minister, nor any other Minister, nor any Government of any kind, can, by waving a magic wand, arrive at a satisfactory solution of it, because it does partake to some degree of the nature of a prophecy of what is going to happen in the future. At the same time, the matter is one upon which we have already, after years of experience of war and a shorter experience of what is known as total warfare, a certain amount of information. The motion asks the Government to prepare a scheme of war risk insurance for property. The question was raised here about four months ago and the Minister for Industry and Commerce said that the matter had been considered and he would promise that it would receive further consideration. I think we would be all agreed that it is now more urgent, and is made more urgent, not only by general happenings in the world and in a neighbouring island, but by a disaster which occurred within our own territory and in a rural area. The problem, for many reasons, is not an urban one. It is not a problem that concerns the cities only— the destruction of property in war—it also concerns rural areas. Neither is it a problem which concerns the comparatively small number of property owners only. It might be said—the Minister nearly went so far as to say it himself when replying here before—that these people are capable of looking after themselves, but the position of property-owners, and the consequences of the destruction of property, whether of stocks or buildings, are of concern to other persons besides the owners, and it is in its national aspect and from the point of view of its effect upon employment, upon supplies, and upon the normal life of the people, that I should like to ask the House to consider it, and the Government to take action upon it.

The question also is not, of course, one which is in any sense one of Party politics. Ministers have frequently told us recently that we are well within the war zone, and an Army officer, broadcasting the night before last from Dublin, said that it was the wish of the Government that every householder should supply himself with an air raid shelter. We can see, therefore, that the problem is one of general application and, it would appear,. of immediate urgency. Sometimes, in this kind of case, one asks for a committee to consider the matter, but it seems to me that the matter has already been considered by the Government and that the Minister would welcome an opportunity of stating what conclusions have been arrived at. On the 27th May the Minister for Industry and Commerce here contrasted the position of a person whose life was in danger, and said that that kind of man might very reasonably say that insurance for him might be considered before any question of insurance of property was taken up. The truth, of course, is— and I should like to deal with it at the outset—that there is no contrast or opposition at all between the two things, insurance for life and insurance for property. Life can be insured even against war risks, and I think that most life insurance policies which were in force before the war covered, and still cover, risk of death by enemy action. In any event, circumstances with regard to loss of civilian life in modern warfare have radically altered. In every conflict Governments have assumed responsibility or a measure of responsibility for the dependants of soldiers who are killed or wounded, but unfortunately for us all, Sir, the distinction between civilians and soldiers in warfare, and their danger in warfare, has now almost entirely disappeared, and, in certain phases and in certain places, has disappeared to the detriment of the ordinary civilian. Civilians and their property are now in the front line of warfare, and what formerly applied in the way of compensation for the dependants of soldiers must, I think, in the nature of things and within the measure of the resources of the State, apply now to the dependants of the ordinary civilian. We speak in Irish of the bearna baoghail, or the gap of danger, but there is now no gap of danger into which the soldier can leap to the defence of his fellow-citizens, and the A.R.P. warden, the first-aid worker, or the fireman may find himself, in certain circumstances, in more danger than a member of the actual armed forces of the State. It seems to me, therefore, that in so far as lives are concerned a national effort must be made, and I have no doubt will be made, to come to the rescue of dependents of persons who lose their lives in war, and to allow these dependants to continue their normal life in the State.

The question of property, as I said before, is on a different footing, and I should like to deal with its importance, apart altogether from its amenities or profits to the immediate owner. The existence of stocks, machinery and buildings is necessary to provide work and to provide the very means of livelihood for ordinary people. From that point of view, certain kinds of property are much more important than others. Property is necessary for the raising of revenue either for the State or for local bodies, and it affects them both directly and indirectly. Its importance, therefore, as far as normal life is concerned, can hardly be over-estimated. The owner of property has certain obligations, but in the circumstances of war it is actually impossible for an owner to assume all the obligations of insurance. Just as his resources are limited, so the resources of the State are limited, but a combination of both, while not providing total cover, would, I think, provide partial cover and provide a certain stability and force, which would help employment when one would wonder what it is that can be done to ensure reconstruction after damage.

There has been, as I said, a certain experience of what has happened in the war, leading to certain conclusions. I think it was in 1937 that a committee in England considered the question of war risk insurance and came to the conclusion that the amount of damage that would be done in what is called total warfare would be enormous and incalculable, and that, therefore, no scheme of insurance or compensation could be formulated. In spite of that, in 1939, certain provisions were made in England under the War Insurance Act with regard to damage to stocks, and, strangely enough, since the intensification of aerial warfare in England, it has been stated that the total damage in relation to the whole sum of property in the country is by no means as great as was thought. The most recent figure that I remember is that in the month of August 800 houses were destroyed out of a total of 13,000,000. There was also a recent statement by Mr. Keynes, the economist, that if £1,000,000 worth were destroyed every night for a whole year, the total sum would not be an appreciable percentage of property in Great Britain.

Only 4 per cent.

It would only be 4 per cent., Senator Douglas tells me, so that an insurance rate of 4 per cent. would cover it completely. In England, therefore, it has been concluded, under actual war conditions, that the problem is one which is manageable and which can be handled by the Government. Ordinary companies, however, will not, of course, take the risk. A very high premium in this country applied compulsorily all over the country would put certain persons out of business and have serious results for the moment, but contributions presumably could be kept within certain limits and Government guarantees also.

There can be no doubt at all, and the Minister will agree, I think, that should a disaster occur, and should we have actual losses by war action, the question of reconstruction upon the cessation of hostilities will have to be regarded as a national task. I think that can be regarded as being beyond doubt. It must be done on a national basis and it must be done on an organised basis. A declaration beforehand of Government policy would, therefore, be of very great value indeed. It would be an assistance to employment, to the accumulation of stocks for an emergency and to the preservation of ordinary standards of life. A premium of 3 or 4 per cent. would be a very great burden. A premium of 1 per cent. might be possible, or an increase on the ordinary fire insurance premium paid to an extent which might be agreed upon between competent persons and the Government would, at any rate, provide a fund. There are, of course, persons much more competent than I am to give an opinion on the matter, but one would like to know if the Minister could tell us, for example, the total amount of fire premiums paid on stocks and buildings in the State for one year, and whether, if that amount had been doubled for the year since the beginning of the war, how much would now be available in a fund to meet war damage.

The question is important and it is important not only in the cities but in the country towns and rural areas which, as we know, derive their stocks from wholesalers in the city. If city stock is destroyed, that destruction will have its repercussions far beyond the limits of the particular town or city. So far, the only property destroyed has been a co-operative creamery in a very remote part of the country. Then, of course, we have the position which is being dealt with in England by the Government undertaking the whole risk, that is, the position of a great number of people who are purchasers, owner-occupiers of their house and whose houses may be destroyed. They are already paying, compulsorily in most cases, I think, a fire insurance premium, but in a national scheme of reconstruction after the war, their position would surely have to be rather like what it is now in that they will have to be put in a better position than those who have made no such provision.

I raise the matter not for the purpose of putting forward criticism or advancing the merits of any particular scheme, but in order to give the Minister an opportunity of stating what conclusions the Government arrived at after consideration and after our experience here and elsewhere. It seems to me that there are two principles from which we cannot escape. In the first place, the loss in the national interest must be shared and, in the second place, there must be a national plan for the repairing of damage done. It is obvious, even on a cursory examination, that that plan would have to give certain priorities as between dwellings, business houses and workshops. Business houses, workshops or factories are obviously much more important than dwelling houses. If I can go to my work and get my pay, whether as salary or wages, I can at any rate live and make some provision for an emergency or for temporary housing. If I am left with my house and deprived of my income, or of any prospect of having an income, my position is, of course, much worse. It is, in fact, very bad indeed and much more difficult to remedy. There may be differences between buildings and stocks and machinery. In the case of a certain type of shopkeeper, his stocks are more important than his buildings, because he might carry on business in a temporary building if he had stocks. If business can be carried on, employment will be given, money kept in circulation, and normal life, to some degree, maintained.

The Minister, who is here this evening, took what I might perhaps call a rather casual view of the matter of stocks on the last occasion on which he spoke on this matter, when he said that the incentive to make a profit is the cause of the importing and the carrying of the stocks; but I wonder if the Minister for Industry and Commerce listens when the Minister for Supplies is broadcasting. I am sure he does—I do myself, strange to say—and the Minister for Supplies recently exhorted shopkeepers to carry as big stocks as they possibly could, and he even asked ordinary householders to stock, if they could afford it, an unusually large amount of food supplies. That exhortation was not made on the ground of profit, or personal safety, or gain, but as a matter of national policy. It seemed to me that the Minister for Supplies was entirely correct in his attitude, and, if he was, the Minister for Industry and Commerce must look on those who hold stocks in the country as having some claim to consideration not only as persons looking for profit but also as persons doing a national job of work.

What I should like to urge is that a declaration of Government policy should be made in the matter. I am far from thinking that the Minister, as I said at the outset, can wave a magic wand and give us a complete solution. I know he cannot, but he certainly can do something to grapple with the situation and prevent people from being in a state of complete uncertainty and discouragement which is bad for spending and bad for employment. Either the Government themselves, or after consultation with certain interests, should come to a conclusion with regard to a compulsory contributory scheme. There must, I think, be a reasonable contribution from the owner and there must be State assistance so that production and employment can continue. The best and the cheapest proposition for all the citizens is that, after a period of destruction, the State should give all the help it can to restart works, to replace stocks and machinery and to let normal life be resumed, because on the resumption of that normal life will depend the payment of wages, rates and taxes and the maintenance of social services. The problem, unfortunately for us, may be a rural one as well as an urban one, and it goes much beyond the interests of the individual who has suffered loss. I urge that a declaration of Government policy would have a good effect and would be much more valuable if made now than if made after the event.

I wish to second the motion, and I propose to speak later in the debate.

I agree with the proposer of this motion, and I think that the present position is about as unsatisfactory as it could be. It is obvious that we, in common with other countries, run the risk of war damage. The question, therefore, is: if such damage arose who would pay for it? If the misfortunes of war should come upon us it would be unfair that the burden of making good the damage should be borne by the individual who has suffered that damage. I think that such damage should be regarded as a national loss, and I would suggest that the Government should announce immediately that any loss due to war damage would be made good out of the National Exchequer.

If this view were accepted, it has then to be considered whether, if such payments should become necessary, the money should be raised in the ordinary way by means of taxation designed to spread the burden as equitably as possible over the whole community, or whether some insurance scheme should be sponsored by the Government. In Britain, as the proposer of the motion said, there is a Government scheme for the insurance of commodities, but it is only now that they are considering the insurance of other property. If any damage should be done in this country, I feel that the poor individual who just has his furniture as his sole possession, or the property owner, is as much entitled to consideration under a scheme of this sort as the owner of commodities.

The advantage of an insurance scheme, of course, would be that it would enable a fund to be accumulated out of which losses could be made good in whole or in part. If such a scheme had been started at the outbreak of the war, a substantial sum would now be available, even if only a moderate premium had been charged. One of the Irish insurance companies with which I am connected put forward the basis of such a scheme as far back as 1st September, 1939, and I suggest that if action had then been taken the problem would have been much easier of solution than it is now. I fear that the time for setting up a satisfactory insurance scheme has gone. I feel that quite definitely. Even if you were to start a scheme to-morrow, unless a fund could be speedily accumulated it would not be an insurance at all; and in order to accumulate an adequate sum speedily, I think it would now be necessary to charge a very high rate of premium, probably £3 or £4 per cent. Unless the scheme were compulsory, I feel that the great bulk of the people would be unable to pay premiums based on a figure as high as that.

Even if it were compulsory.

Yes. The fact that it is compulsory does not make it any easier for the people to pay, and of course the difficulty of collection under any compulsory scheme would be enormous. There is also the point that high insurance premiums, under a compulsory scheme, would tend to deter traders from building up reserves of stock as they have been advised to do by the Minister for Supplies. It would also tend towards the practice of passing the increased cost on to the consumer, as far as that could be done without bringing on the trader the attentions of the Prices Commission, and in any event it would have the inevitable tendency to increase costs and increase the cost of living.

Taking all those matters into account I feel that, on the whole, a solution of the problem must be something in the nature of a Government declaration that war damage will be treated as a national loss. Even without such a declaration, I agree with Senator Hayes that, if there were such damage, at the end of hostilities it would have to be faced up to as a national loss. Certainly the individual could not deal with it, and the insurance companies could not deal with it either. There is one suggestion which I would make to the Minister, and I think he might consider it now, and that is that there might be a scheme for the registration of property at risk, either a compulsory or an optional scheme, but at any rate let every individual, every firm and local authority, declare the value of the property and pay a registration fee of, let us say, 10/- per cent. That would, in any event, give something in hand, and if at a later date money had to be raised to pay for war damage, the scheme of registration might well be used as a basis for the collection of the amount required to deal with such damage. It seems to me that that is as much as the community can now afford to pay, and it does seem to me that if such a scheme of registration were undertaken it would give the Government most valuable information in the unhappy event of the country becoming involved in the war.

I am sorry to say that I have not given this motion by Senator Hayes much consideration, because I received it only quite recently. I just want to say one thing with regard to the comment he made on Professor Keynes' most interesting speech, in case there are any Senators who may not have heard it. The first thing to remember with regard to his figures is that the population of London is exactly double that of the whole of Ireland, and if the amount of destruction done in London were done in Dublin the cost of it would be perfectly colossal. I think we must remember that if the destruction in London seems small it is because the British have filled the air with armadas of aeroplanes, and that they have tens of thousands of anti-aircraft guns to keep the raiders away. It seems to me that what you might make on the roundabouts in the negative way of losses that you did not experience in the knocking down of houses you would certainly have to lose on the swings of the aeroplanes and anti-aircraft guns which you would have to buy.

I have not the slightest doubt that, whatever contribution might be exacted from the profiteers in the shape of insurance, in the end it is the Government that would be forced to pay by raising taxation, and I am sure that any Government would be glad to do so. But surely it is not simply a case of money and nothing else. If the hundreds of millions of pounds which would have to be produced to put things back where they were before they were knocked down could be found in this country, I think it might be possible to put some things back, but I do not think they could ever be put back in the way they were before they were knocked down, if anything like the scale of destruction which has taken place elsewhere even in this short time should happen here. I imagine if we ever became involved it would be on the same gigantic scale as it will eventually be in England. Therefore, it seems to me that to face up to the problem now, to make any definite rule about it, would be very difficult. To my mind, it would be a matter of waiting to see what happened. If it could be done by means of insurance now it would be a very good thing, but I do not think the people would stand for it and I do not think they would raise the money that some of the speakers might anticipate raising in that way.

I share the view of Senator Brennan that at this stage—I would actually go so far as to say even at an earlier stage—insurance to cover what is contemplated is not practicable. I also feel that the extremely interesting speech of Senator Hayes was, to a large extent, a plea rather for Government compensation than for insurance. If the principle of insurance were adopted, it is difficult to see how you could have the sort of discrimination between different classes of property for which Senator Hayes asks. He pointed out that it was more important that the factory owner, for example, should be compensated than the owner of the private house that was destroyed. I think that is true, and if you had a State scheme of compensation the State would naturally give priority where it was considered priority ought to be given; but if you had a scheme of insurance under which we were all paying the same premiums then it would be grossly unfair that we should not get the same benefits in consequence of our premiums.

Senator Robinson thinks that the Government ought not to make any declaration at all, and I cannot say I agree with him. Perhaps it does not matter very much so long as no damage is actually occurring but, as Senator Hayes pointed out, there has been some damage already in Wexford—I do not know whether compensation has been obtained from the German Government for that as we were told it was going to be. There may be other cases and there may be deliberate damage done here and deliberate damage on a large scale. If there is, it will be intensely depressing for all concerned to have no assurance from the Government that they are going to do anything about it. I think, in principle, that it should be understood that the community as a whole must bear the cost of war damage, though in the actual provision of the money and the allocation of labour and materials for repairing damage I agree that priority should be given according to the national importance of the establishment concerned. I speak myself with a certain personal feeling on the subject because I am unhappy enough to possess a house in London which has been wrecked by a bomb, and certainly it would give me much more peace of mind if I knew the British community was going to do something about it some time or other.

I think there will be no difficulty whatsoever in accepting the two principles which Senator Hayes suggested should govern the position which would exist if by any chance the risks which he fears were to become realities and we were to find ourselves subjected to destruction by war. Those two principles were that the loss occasioned by the war, so far as life and property were concerned, must be shared, and that there would be a national plan for reconstruction. The Government, this time last year, very shortly after the outbreak of war, when this question of war risk insurance for property owners was first raised, indicated that that was a problem which would arise for consideration at the end of the war and that it would be dealt with according to the resources which are available to the community. I think that that is the only reasonable position which the Government can take up in a matter of this sort.

When was that said?

I was then Minister for Finance and, in reply to a question, I stated that.

The end of the war is too late.

That is an aspect of the matter with which I could deal, too. If we are to assume that we are involved in a war and that by reason of that involvement property is damaged either in the City of Dublin or elsewhere, is there any person going to suggest that in the midst of hostilities we are going to be able to undertake a plan of reconstruction or that we are then and there going to be in a position to compensate fully any person whose property may have been damaged? I hope we are only talking hypothetically and that we shall continue to talk hypothetically until the war no longer rages, but, are we to proceed on this principle, that in the case of damage to property it is going to be first come first served, and that a person who happens to be lucky enough to have his property destroyed while the resources of the community are still unencroached upon is going to get reasonably full compensation and that the poor person who managed to stick it out to the end, when our resources are perhaps exhausted, is going to get nothing? It is quite clear that, on the principle which Senator Hayes has outlined, the national loss must be shared, it must be shared equally and equitably and that, accordingly, the compensation which any person may secure must be proportionate to our resources to compensate everyone who has suffered.

Surely we actually diminish our resources if we refrain from making good certain sorts of damage at once.

I am not going to commit myself or the Government more definitely than I have already stated. Indeed, in regard to the question of compensation for damage to property, perhaps I am not the Minister most competent to speak. It would be a matter for the Minister for Finance rather than for the Minister for Industry and Commerce. I may be more interested in the other aspects of the problem, those which relate to the insurance of stocks, but, at any rate, I should like to continue. The difference between accepting the two principles which Senator Hayes has submitted to us and which the Government accepts, and launching a scheme of insurance is, that in relation to a scheme of insurance a definite specific obligation is undertaken to each particular person who takes out insurance and that it is the basis of insurance that the premium which is to be collected in return for the acceptance of that obligation should be proportionate to the risk. Who is going to be competent in our present circumstances to assess the risks and to fix the premiums for war damage? Insurance also, I think, proceeds on this principle, that the cover is only extended when conditions are normal and when the risks that are to be accepted are normal also. At the present moment, if we were to fix a premium for war risk insurance it would be fixed on the basis that we are at peace and that we wish to remain at peace and that there was not any prospect that our desires in that matter would not be realised.

Why not do that, then?

If so, what is the risk of damage?

If that position is correct, why not act on it?

What is going to be the risk of the damage? The risk of damage, we may assume, would be infinitesimal and the premium would be correspondingly infinitesimal. But what is feared is that these conditions may change and that, instead of the damage being an abnormality intruded into normal conditions, destructive damage would become the normal condition and we should have to pay compensation upon a basis in which damage was the normal condition in return for premiums that were fixed on the assumption that peace and the absence of damage were the normal conditions.

Now, that is the great difficulty in relation to this matter, that there is no actuarial basis for any such insurance scheme as has been suggested and, accordingly, it would be, I think, sailing very close to the wind indeed if the Government were to say: "We are prepared to institute a scheme of insurance in order to cover the risk of damage to property". I do not think, if war came here, that there is any insurance fund that we could build up that would grant full compensation to every person who might have property damaged, and there is certainly no insurance fund that could be built up on a contributory basis, as the result of premiums collected, which would enable us to do that.

Would not half a loaf be better than no bread?

It might be, but a crumb is very little use to a starving man.

And the promise of a coffin, when he dies, is worse.

Senator Brennan suggested that the position would have been better to-day if a scheme such as has been advocated here had been instituted 12 months ago. Let us examine that. In connection with the problem of providing some sort of cover for stocks—and it is a much easier problem, difficult and all as it is, than that of providing some sort of cover for damage to property—we have to start on this assumption, that there are about £15,000,000 worth of stocks of insurable commodities in the country. What is going to be the premium on those stocks? What are we going to relate it to? Are we going to relate it to the premiums normally paid to cover fires or civil commotion?

What is going to be the basis of our judgment in fixing these premiums? I cannot find any. But, if we assume that a premium of 10/- per cent. were taken—and such a premium has actually been suggested to me—it would be inadequate. If we make it 4 per cent. we will be told it is too high, and indeed it would be a very heavy burden upon stocks, a burden which would reflect itself in a considerable increase in the cost of living for every single individual in the country, not merely for the person who has the stocks, who owns the property, but on people who have no stocks at all, who have to live from hand to mouth and who, beyond the fact that when they buy the commodity it helps them to maintain life, are not securing any advantage out of it. I was assuming that the premium would be 10/- per cent. and, on £15,000,000 worth of stocks, that would bring us in £75,000. We have to deduct from that the cost of administration, the cost of collection, the cost of assessment and checking and all the other working expenses. If we assume, and it is a pretty optimistic assumption, that all these costs would not exceed 10 per cent., we would have as an insurance fund to cover the total risk of £15,000,000 a sum of £68,000. I do not think that the absence of that £68,000 aggravates the problem either for the owner of the stocks or anyone else.

I think the Minister's calculation is not quite correct. I think it should be £250,000.

Anyway, it is only a little detail.

It is not a detail. The figures are here and I find that 10/- per cent. would yield a sum of £75,000.

On £50,000,000?

I said £15,000,000. I do not think the Senator will find me wrong in these facts.

I understood the Minister to say £50,000,000.

No, £15,000,000. But even if it were £250,000 to cover £50,000,000 worth of stocks, is the situation any better? So far as the £250,000 is concerned, there is no problem at all for anybody, because the damage would, in the light of the principles I have laid down, be fairly fully covered.

The Minister anticipates the total destruction of these stocks at the same time?

How do we know? One Senator has already pointed out the extent of the damage in London, notwithstanding the extent of the resources with which they have equipped themselves to prevent damage. Do not assume that if this State is involved in war and, if damage does arise here, that it is going to be anything less than total damage.

It is not total damage in London.

If the Senator can equip us with all the facilities for defence which are available in London, I would be inclined to agree with him that it would not be any worse here than it is in London, but until we are as well equipped, it is only reasonable to assume, if an attack were made upon this city or upon our country, that the damage would be much more widespread than it is in London. Accordingly, the difficulties of dealing with this question as a problem of insurance would be intensified.

I think, so far as damage to property is concerned, we shall have, in fairness to everybody concerned, to confine ourselves to the principle that it is not capable of being dealt with as an insurance problem, that we shall have to accept the equity of the principles which Senator Hayes has laid down, that the loss will have to be shared by everyone and that at the end of the war there will have to be a general national policy for reconstruction. We must deal with it in that light. There is no other way I can see that it can be reasonably dealt with.

In relation to matters of this sort, we could not give precedence to property over life. The Senator has indicated that it has been the custom hitherto, when wars have been waged and won, for the victorious State to compensate its soldiers for the losses they have suffered and the risks they have undergone, by granting them pensions. Of course, pensions are not universally granted. They are granted to the dependents of those who have lost their lives but, as a rule, these pensions have been finally determined only after the cessation of hostilities and I think, even in regard to the loss of civilian life in this country, that the kind of permanent provision which we should be able to make for the dependents of those who have lost their lives will depend entirely upon the situation which we may be faced with after the war.

In relation to the question of compensation for stocks, it has been represented to me that the fact that there is an absence of cover against war risk has deterred people from laying up stocks which otherwise they might have done. We have been investigating that somewhat exhaustively. Numerous proposals have been submitted to us, and we have tried to draft some of our own, and discussions have taken place between officers of my Department and those who might be thought to be competent to give advice in this matter, with the object of formulating a scheme which would be workable and which would be within our resources, because it would be of no value whatever to any person if a scheme were launched which obviously would be beyond our capacity and which would not, in fact, give that assurance which is needed.

There are difficult questions to be considered in that connection. Senator Brennan has mentioned a number of them. What premium are we going to ask people to pay? I have pointed out that a premium of 10/- per cent., which was first suggested by those who approached us in relation to the matter, would be wholly inadequate. A premium of 8 per cent. in present circumstances might be also inadequate. Where, then, in reason, are we going to secure a figure which will be proportionate to the risk which we run? Then we have the other question— whether we are going to make this compulsory or make it voluntary. If we make it compulsory, we do spread the risk in the greatest measure but we are up against two difficulties there. First of all, are we going to bring into the scheme people who feel that they do not want to be insured at all? It would be a mistake to assume that the demand for this scheme is universal amongst industrialists, merchants and those who have valuable properties in this State. Since the matter was first mooted in this House, I have received very weighty representations from some of the most important concerns in the city protesting against the adoption of such a scheme. They have apparently examined the matter for themselves and have come to the conclusion that it is not possible, in existing circumstances to afford them adequate cover and that the cost to the community of undertaking that obligation would be prohibitive, that is, if you are going to adopt, in terms of assurance, the principle, that you are entering into a specific commitment with every individual from whom you collect a premium to repay him the full cost, perhaps, of any damage he may suffer.

As I have said, some of the largest concerns in this city are very strongly opposed to any scheme of compulsory insurance. These are people who would be able to pay but who regard the premium, which they estimate would be the adequate premium, as imposing a burden on their business altogether disproportionate to the amount of benefit and protection which the scheme would give them. As against that class, you have the other, and perhaps the much more numerous, class of small people who could not pay the premium. If we are going to make this scheme compulsory, how are we going to deal with them? Are we going to compel them to fix a value on their stocks? Are we going to start to check the value, or are we going to give power to officers of the State to enter every man's store and assess the value of the stock which he may have there, irrespective of whether he wants it insured or not? Having done that, if they still refuse to pay the premium are we going to invoke the law to compel them to pay it? You say: "Very well, leave them and make the scheme a voluntary one". Suppose we do leave them, and they constitute, as they may well turn out to constitute, the majority of the owners of stocks in this country, what becomes of this principle of insurance, of spreading the risk? Does not the spread become narrower and more restricted, and must not the premium become higher? Is the State, in respect to that narrower class which is prepared to pay the premium, to impose an obligation upon the people who do not want insurance to honour commitments which the State makes with those who do want insurance? As I say, these are points that have to be considered, and it is going to be exceedingly difficult to draft any sort of scheme of insurance that will give the sort of cover which has been suggested as necessary in order to meet the present situation.

There is, however, in respect to the whole of this problem, one ray of hope, and that is that a number of people in those industries in regard to which the need for a scheme would seem to have most greatly impressed itself, have come together and are forming mutual insurance societies. That would seem to be perhaps the best solution of all of the problem, because if those who are engaged in any particular trade or industry can agree amongst themselves that they are going to make the risk of war damage a common charge, well then, they can make arrangements which will be mutually acceptable to all of them, and they will leave the State free to deal with people who are unable to enter into such common obligations because perhaps they have not the resources or because, at the moment, they do not see the need to provide against such risks.

I should not like, however, the House to assume from all that I have said that the question of insurance for stocks and commodities has been definitely turned down. We are pursuing that matter further and perhaps within the next month or six weeks I may be in a position to make a more definite pronouncement in regard to it. From what I have said Senators can see that it is not the plain and simple problem that it might be assumed to be from some of the statements made in the Press or from some of the remarks made here in regard to it.

So many points have been raised, and so many new points have been dealt with by the Minister that, unless I were to take up the time of the House at great length, I would find considerable difficulty in expressing my point of view in regard to all of them. There are very few points, however, raised either by the mover of the motion or by the Minister, to which I have not given some thought or which I have not heard discussed by persons interested in this question. I want to confine myself to a few points which seem to me of the greatest importance. First of all, in order that there may be no doubt remaining afterwards, I want to ask the Minister a certain question. Am I to take it on behalf of the Government, which means on behalf of the State, that the principle is accepted that should there be damage to individuals or to property during the war, the principle of State liability according to its resources, is accepted by the Government? The Minister has stated that he said that on a previous occasion. I do not doubt for a moment what he said.

I did not state it in these precise words.

I am sorry. He made use of some such statement, and I should like to know whether it meant that or not. Am I to take it from his speech to-day that is now the view of the Government? If it is, it changes the whole aspect of the matter very considerably. If it is not, then I think it is time that we had a very carefully prepared statement as to what is the view and the attitude of the Government. We are facing a time of very considerable difficulty. The Minister has very properly pointed out that we have no knowledge which would enable us to know exactly what the danger in future may be. We do know that we are in what is called the war zone. We know, as was pointed out by Senator Hayes, that the nature of the present warfare—and we have no reason to think that it will be fundamentally different if it does come here —means that the civilian, his home, his property and his business, which is by no means always a matter of personal property—are in the forefront of the battle. Whereas in the past the State accepted liability towards soldiers and their dependents, it cannot in future confine liability, in a time of war, with any measure of justice, simply to what are called combatants, because as far as one can see, non-combatants are likely to be in the front line.

Although that is so, I do not think there is any ground whatever for the pessimism of the Minister when he tells us that if there is damage done we must be prepared for the possibility of 100 per cent. damage. He said that the stocks represented £15,000,000, and told us that we should be prepared to pay for the destruction of stocks. If there was 100 per cent. destruction it would not matter whether we could pay or not. Bad and all as things may be, I do not think there is any evidence that in any country there is any danger of 100 per cent. damage to stocks, even in warfare as we see it to-day. I think that is an unduly pessimistic view. I hope it is not the view of the members of the Government, even though it be the view that has been clearly stated by the Minister.

I have been in England comparatively recently. I was in the North of England, where I have business connections, and where important industries here are dependent in the matter of supplies. One thing that seemed clear to me was that, although there had been air raids every night for three weeks, the proportionate amount of damage done—I do not want to underrate it—was relatively small, and that at the rate of destruction it would take, probably, ten or 20 years before 100 per cent. damage had occurred in any industrial district in England. While I do not want to underrate this problem, which is a real and difficult one, I think the Minister is basing his consideration as to whether or not there is to be a scheme of war risk insurance on the assumption that he must allow for a possible 100 per cent. damage to stock representing £15,000,000. If so, then I think he is bound to reject it.

There was nothing in anything I said that could possibly entitle you to put the construction you are now putting on my remarks.

I am extremely sorry if I misunderstood the Minister, but I think he mentioned £15,000,000 and asked what would 10/- per cent. on that amount to. Some Senator questioned whether we would have to deal with 100 per cent. for the whole £15,000,000, and he gave me the impression that he thought the State would be prepared for that eventuality.

No. I said in relation to the City of Dublin that if we were to be attacked, then, with the defensive resources we have at our hands, we could not possibly relate the amount of damage done here to the amount of damage done in London. I said in relation to this comparatively undefended city we might anticipate practically total destruction.

I thought the £15,000,000 related to the country as a whole and not to Dublin. There is no need for argument if that is the Minister's view. I do not think that there should be any real fear of total destruction. I do not think there is any need to base any scheme on the assumption of total damage. I view the whole problem in a rather different way to that in which the Minister approached it, and, to some extent, different to the approach of certain other Senators. It seems to me that preparation to ensure the carrying on of the normal life and trade of the country is just as much part and parcel of preparation for modern warfare as the provision of military defence or as the increasing of supplies for the army or the creation of the local security force or similar measures. They are all part and parcel of the defence preparation of the State, and it is as important for the State to issue a clear statement as to what its attitude will be towards people who are in the front line in their homes as to what it will do for soldiers killed or injured when dealing with certain types of invasion. There is a real need for a clear statement. I seem to be more optimistic than the Minister.

I am inclined to take it from his speech that it is considered by him that at the end of the war there would have to be a scheme of compensation for damage but that it would have to be based on what the State could afford at the time. I take it that he favours some such scheme. If that be the case I think he is right. I do not think it can be avoided, but the sooner the Government makes it clear—I do not think they have yet made it clear— the better for everyone. It would add to the national morale, and would reduce a certain amount of fear about the building up of stocks which I believe exists in some trades. But that does not meet the whole case. You will at some date after the cessation of hostilities have to consider the question of compensation. You will have to provide, in addition, some method by which you can deal with more urgent matters before what will be regarded as the final date ending hostilities. The question of stocks should include furniture and essentials in houses of private individuals, particularly poorer people.

Even if part of Dublin is destroyed the country must go on and we must all try to live. The whole nation will have to live even if Dublin ceases as a centre of distribution, and other centres for stocks will have to be found. We cannot sit still and say: "We are not going to carry on." Obviously, if the Houses of Parliament are destroyed we can, if necessary, meet in a barn. We would not start to build an elaborate Parliament House until the end of hostilities. As far as essential stocks and the livelihood of the nation is concerned these would have to be replaced as quickly as possible and, to my mind, there should be no question of waiting for a Government scheme. A Minister has recently been urging shopkeepers to carry maximum stocks, and if they go to bankers and other people to finance them, they should be in a position to say that they are able to insure these stocks. I want to deal with that particular problem because I regard the maintenance of stocks spread over as widely as possible to be an essential part of our plans for carrying on the life of the country even in war time.

Do you differentiate between necessities and luxury goods?

I will deal with that point when I come to a note I have dealing with compulsion. If you assume, as I do, that a scheme of insurance for stocks is desirable, it does not seem to me that the premium which you are going to charge is necessarily a premium which will provide at an early date a fund to cover the whole amount of what would be regarded as a reasonably possible risk. It is the difference between an immediate payment in full and what would be provided afterwards by the State for which the person or firm is paying the premium. The rate of 10/- per cent. was suggested; it would provide a fund which might or might not be adequate. Probably, in the case of serious damage, it would not be adequate but it would, at any rate, provide something towards the total. The premium would be paid, not for getting insurance in the sense that the payers would be the only persons who would be compensated, but— the State having accepted the principle that compensation should be to some extent based on the national economy at the time and that every person would be compensated—it would be paid in order that he would be compensated at once and not have to wait until the end of the war.

The question of compulsion was raised and the Minister showed the various difficulties, most of which—as he puts them—I admit. There is always a difficulty in deciding where the line is to be drawn. In the first place, I understand that in Great Britain—whether they did it successfully or not—they made a distinction between what Senator Sir John Keane describes as luxuries and essentials. At any rate, they took certain types of stocks and did not make it compulsory to insure them. I think it was permissible. Certain types of stocks were made compulsory, but the very small stock was exempted. I am not sure of the figure, but I think the stock under £1,000 was exempted. There was no provision by which it could be insured voluntarily and, personally, it seems to me that that was a mistake. The way to get over the question of compulsion is to leave out the small man, by making a margin of £1,000 or £2,000 and making it possible for him, if he is willing to pay the same rate of premium, and by leaving out luxury stocks. I have an open mind as to whether or not it would be desirable that these luxury stocks should be allowed in on a voluntary basis. I would be in favour, if the experts dealing with this business think it would strengthen the scheme as a whole. From the national point of view, obviously, it is not essential that they be insured and the individual point of view must come after the national.

Would the Senator tell us how he would deal with the case of a chemist who might sell essential medicines, yet the bulk of whose trade may be in cosmetics? How would he deal with large city stores where the stock may consist of all sorts of articles, some of which could not be described as anything else but necessities and others which could not be described as anything but luxuries? What possible way would he have of assessing the value of the stocks to be insured? Let him look at the practical difficulties in the shape of these things.

The Minister has information, no doubt, which I have not got, but I do not visualise retail chemists' stocks which would have a large proportion of cosmetics and be over £1,000.

The Senator has only got to look at the chemists' stocks in the centre of the city, to see that by far the most valuable portion consists of cosmetics.

I doubt very much if very heavy retail stocks are held generally over the country. The Minister's idea may be that they carry large stocks for profit, but that is not so. You carry a stock as small as you can, while maintaining your turnover, and the smaller the stock in relation to the turnover the greater the profit. A chemist carries a very small stock and gets his supplies frequently.

Deal with the wholesaler.

In the case of the wholesaler the stocks will be easily divided. He makes his returns for insurance purposes. He will have stocktaking returns once or twice a year, and I do not think he will be in a difficult position in regard to insuring his stock of one class of commodities without necessarily insuring the other. When you come to the question of settling insurance claims, there are, of course, a great many problems—Senator Brennan could explain that point better than I could—but there are recognised ways in which those questions can be met. Figures for purchases and sales of a particular type of stock are the only method by which you can ascertain the total stock at a certain time, and I do not believe, as far as the wholesaler is concerned, that there would be a fundamental difficulty in differentiating between different classes. I admit that with regard to the small retailer there would be a difficulty, as he would not be able to show from his records what was a cosmetic sale or what was one of patent medicines. I am not prepared to follow the Minister in saying whether a great many of the medicines at present on sale should not be regarded as national necessities: I have grave doubt that some of them are no more important than cosmetics.

Who is going to assess the value of the stocks which are insurable? Who is going to assess the damage? I gather that in Great Britain the fire insurance companies are not doing it and that there is no method of appraisal, that there is no standard for appraising the damage. It is so easy to talk about this matter in terms of insurance, but the moment you begin to apply the ordinary machinery of insurance to this problem it breaks down.

I must confess that I cannot see that. If my place is burned down as a result of an incendiary bomb, why cannot the same method of appraisal be applied as if it were burned down through some carelessness on the part of my staff? The Minister may have some point which I cannot see. There are recognised methods: it may not be done by insurance companies; as a matter of fact, it is not done by insurance companies even in the case of their own liability. There are recognised firms who do it and a few valuers act for all the insurance companies here, if my information is correct. I really do not believe that that point is one of serious difficulty, if the principle were agreed to. Small people to whom the Minister has referred and who might decide they would not be insured would not, I think, be found to hold the bulk of the stock in the country. It may be in the Minister's mind that the majority of holders would decline to insure. I think it is perfectly possible that, if people believed that the State would come along anyway, there are a number of people who would prefer not to pay their 10/- per cent. and who would take the risk in the hope that, if they were unfortunate, they would be dealt with liberally afterwards. I think that would not be in the national interest, and where the business is sufficiently large and has a stock of over £2,000, it should be made compulsory. It may not be in the national interest that luxury stocks should be kept large but, frankly, I do not see that there is a serious difficulty regarding luxury stock.

I should like to make one other point before concluding. The Minister refers to certain companies which have been formed to provide what I think he called insurance, but which I would prefer to call a pool, and he sees in that a ray of hope. I cannot agree with him. By the very nature of things, these companies have to ask either for a heavy payment or guarantee. Different schemes have been mooted. There is one well-known through published advertisements. As regards the others, I do not know whether they are going on or not, but there is either to be a payment or a guarantee or a combination of both. In the case of a guarantee there is to be a pay-out within nine months of a total of 5 per cent. of the whole of the value of the insured assets of the concern. If that is to be regarded with Ministerial approval, it raises a very serious problem for the directors of large companies who are not dealing with their own property. They will be faced with the question of whether they are justified in doing nothing, and, therefore, making no provision at all against damage, or whether they are justified in undertaking a liability to pay one-twentieth of their total assets, thereby, possibly, crippling their concerns.

Now, the paying out of one-twentieth of the capital assets in cash would be a very serious undertaking indeed for most companies to face. It is causing many of them very considerable misgivings at the moment. Speaking for many people, I can say that the very fact that these pool schemes are being proposed makes it all the more urgent that the Government should, as soon as possible, make its attitude perfectly clear so that it may be possible for those who are in the serious position of having to safeguard the interests of a large number of people, and very often of a considerable number of employees, to reach a decision.

Senators have seen certain statements made with regard to schemes for the formation of a pool in which the risk will be shared by those who share the guarantee, and they have heard the statement of the Minister that we must not take his statement as turning down a scheme of insurance on stocks. The net result of that is to leave people in almost a worse position than they were before this debate opened. Most people would prefer a scheme covering their stocks to any scheme of mutual pool that could be devised, but in the meantime we are very much in the air. I believe it would be far better for business that the Government should make a statement that they had decided not to have any State-assisted insurance scheme. People would then know where they were, and decisions could be made accordingly. I very much hope that if the Government does make a decision it will not deal only with stock insurance, and that it will be one that will make clear what the attitude of the State is towards war losses. The experience on the other side, terrible though it has been, does, I think, suggest that there is no need for any kind of pessimism or that you must prepare for anything like one hundred per cent. damage. It is a very remarkable fact that you have an economist of the eminence of Mr. J.M. Keynes stating that if you take England as a whole you could have £1,000,000 worth of damage per night, and that even with that, at the end of a year there will be only 4 per cent. of the total damage. When you realise that, as far as stocks are concerned, they have collected during the year 3 per cent., it means that on the other side they have made very considerable provision already.

I think it is a mistake to assume that it is too late now to make a start. I think one of the reasons why a start was not made last September was the feeling that the damage was either to come very quickly or not at all. Most people feel now that if the damage does not come very soon it will not come at all. I think that the future is utterly incalculable. The damage may not come for years, it may be very sudden, or it may not come at all. I think some provision should be made apart from any end of the war scheme, by which some kind of prompt compensation will be made by the State such as may be necessary to enable people to carry on. In my opinion that scheme should be started now. If it be decided, as I hope it will be, to formulate a scheme for some kind of war risk insurance, then I think that insurance should be on stocks. I should also like to see it on small dwellings, though not on large buildings. If that is done, then I urge, do not put on a prohibitive premium. If it is necessary to have a premium and to get together a large fund, let those who participate in the scheme undertake to make payments over four or five years. It would be impracticable if people are to be asked, in the case of insurance on stocks, to make huge payments in one year for the purpose of providing an immediate fund. I think the payment of the premiums should be spread over four or five years, it being always understood that if the danger passed the Government would stop payments when sufficient funds had been collected. In view of the general attitude taken up by the Minister, I am more than ever convinced that insurance of stocks is a sound principle, especially as we are all agreed that ultimately the State would have to come along and do something to meet the damage.

I think that so far as the majority of the members of the House are concerned this may be regarded as a rather open question. It is one on which we would require a good deal of information before we could be expected to pass judgment on it. Having listened to the Minister and to other speakers, I am of the opinion, no matter what scheme may be devised, or whether any scheme is devised, that Ministers and the State cannot absolve themselves from the responsibility of trying to restore, in the event of damage being done, the property of the State to a condition in which the country's affairs can be carried on as usual. I am not in a position to offer an opinion as to what would be the better method to follow—the scheme suggested by Senator Hayes and Senator Douglas, or one that the Minister might produce. What I am concerned about is this: that we should have a clear statement from the Government, if there is the destruction of life or property, that there is going to be some authority to restore property and to compensate for the loss of life in so far as that is possible.

I found it rather difficult to follow the line of reasoning followed by the Minister. At one point of his argument he seemed to suggest that we ought not to contemplate a scheme of insurance because, as he said, you would have to provide against a total loss. Even supposing we did suffer a total loss, then surely somebody will have to make an effort to provide compensation. If I had responsibility, and if I believed, as the Minister seemed to, that there was going to be total loss, I would immediately set about doing what the Minister seems to have a great objection to do. We have been told that we have stocks in the country to the value of £15,000,000. If the war goes on for two or three years, and if we suffer a total loss, then if nothing is done in the meantime as regards making provision for compensation, it will be impossible to do anything sensible at all when the war is over due to the utter confusion that will prevail, the inability to get information, and the other difficulties with which we will be confronted at that time. If one believed, as the Minister does, that we are going to have total loss, then the right thing to do would be to send inspectors into every store in the country to get records of stocks. That would be the way to ensure that, when total loss did come, equitable compensation, so far as possible, would be forthcoming.

I should like to hear the Senator on the inspectors if that were done.

I should not be anxious to have the inspectors but, when property is blown up, you send down inspectors to the ruins. That was what was done when the British left and after the civil war. They went to the warehouses and shops and made calculations as to what was stored there. They looked up such invoices as were available, but many of the invoices were burned. There were no reliable records of trading, and it would be impossible to decide what was equitable compensation. If you are to have total destruction, that inspection should be done before it comes if equitable compensation is to be allowed. Of course, this may never happen.

Perhaps the Senator would help the Minister by telling him what proportion of the stocks in the country he thinks would be destroyed in such circumstances.

I have no idea of what total war is like and I have not the Minister's responsibility for providing defence against it. But, whether a country is at war or on the fringe of war, you have got to do your best to live a full life. You will not win a war by being half-hearted about it. You will not win a war by not knowing whether you are in it or not, and you will not save a city by not knowing whether you are going to defend it or not or whether or not you will get the means to defend it. I do not know what proportion of the total stocks would be destroyed.

Does the Senator know anybody who does?

No, but you thought that the total stocks would be destroyed.

I suggested that that was the extent of the possible risk.

That would be the greatest amount of risk, but surely there are marginal risks which would be much lower than that. I believe we should try to carry on our ordinary lives and that we should carry stocks for that purpose. Stocks of artificial manures, for instance, will be required. The stores will now be used for storing grain. I should like to know what is the position in Campile.

That does not arise on this motion.

We have creameries turning out from eight tons to 10 tons of butter, value 150/- a cwt., per day. Suppose you have total destruction of one of these creameries, what is going to happen? Are you going to leave it until the end of the war in that position? What is to happen to the thousands of farmers in the locality who have products to be manufactured for the use of the people of our own towns? Are they expected to go into the banks and get the necessary money? It would not be so easy to get them to do that. I am afraid you would have waste and destruction of valuable products and that knowing that their property might be blown up, they would not put up a thousand pounds to carry on the manufacturing process temporarily in a crude way. There ought to be some statement by the Ministry regarding cases like that. The trade of half a county could be dislocated by the destruction of one pivotal point. We do not know how we stand in that connection and our minds are not any clearer as a result of the Minister's statement to-day.

This is an internal question. It is not a question on which the Minister should be rushed into a decision but, at the same time, it is of sufficient urgency to warrant a clear statement from the Government as to what their line of action would be. There was a certain amount of destruction in Campile. What are the Government doing about that? We are not at war, and let us hope will not be at war, but even our neutral position did not prevent that destruction. We do not know that more of that may not come to us. What is to happen the concerns that are blown up, if it does come, between that period and the end of the war, which may be three or four years hence? These are questions which are agitating the minds of people in the country. We ought to know where we stand. My own view is that the State must, in the last analysis, be responsible for seeing that, so far as it is able, equitable compensation will be awarded to citizens who suffer loss during this period.

I was rather astounded by the statement of Senator Baxter, that we ought to know where we stand. That is the difficulty. None of us knows what a year or two years may bring upon us. The difficulty in regard to insurance is that, before you had an adequate fund built up, you might meet with a loss which would absorb the whole of the fund. A large quantity of oil or some valuable commodity might be destroyed in one night and that loss might absorb the whole fund. I do not see how you are to deal with a matter of that kind unless you take power to pay out only a proportion of the loss. We are, I think, looking at the question too much from the point of view of carrying on the life of the community on the old peace-time methods and we are giving too much attention to vested interests. I have often made a plea for vested interests under ordinary conditions but, in case of total war, you have got completely to alter your outlook and realise that, if these calamities happen, it may be necessary for the State to undertake the essential services. It may be necessary for the State to take control of the existing resources and see that they are pooled for the benefit of the community. I do not think you can expect to carry on on the present method of private trading, which is admirable in peace time, in a period of total warfare.

You have got to deal with these emergency questions as they arise. In London, they have a large measure of communal feeding, under the direction of the local authority. That completely cuts away from the old methods and, I have no doubt, trenches, to a great extent, on vested interests. I am afraid that vested interests, in time of war, have to be sacrificed for the general good, and that there can be no hard and fast rules—that the State will have to carry on essential services. In this connection, we must have regard to the redundancy of present methods of distribution. The country could probably be run with one-third of the existing shops, and it would be utterly impossible for any scheme to replace everything lost at once, when essential services may have to be maintained on a much reduced scale. That is why I feel that it is very hard for the Government, during the continuation of the war, to formulate any cut-and-dried scheme. It is impossible for anybody to say at any given moment where we stand. Senator Baxter referred to the destruction of a creamery. I think that the existing creameries in that area should be able to absorb a large proportion of the milk which formerly went to the destroyed creamery. All these matters have to be dealt with as they arise. The only method is that suggested by the Minister—that the question of compensation must be left over until after hostilities and that, during hostilities, we must carry on as best we can, largely under the direction of the State.

I have very little to say in conclusion. I put down the motion in order to see whether the Minister had, as a result of consideration, anything very clear to say. I listened to him with great care, and it may be my own fault, but I did not gather anything very clearly from him. I was very careful, in moving the motion, to say that my interest was not that property owners should be compensated but that, where property was destroyed and where its destruction influenced the life of the community, an effort should be made to enable the life of the community to be carried on. That does not imply, by any means, total compensation; it implies partial replacement, but at any rate replacement for the moment, within the measure of our resources and to such an extent as would allow necessary services to be carried on. To that extent I agree entirely with what Senator Sir John Keane has said, and I think I stated as a principle—one of two principles—with which the Minister agreed, that the State would have to take steps itself and that there would have to be considerable organisation and planning for reconstruction when the war was concluded.

I felt, however, when the Minister was speaking, that he was like a person who was obliged to defend himself in a debate, whereas no attack of any kind was made upon him. I said myself, in the beginning, that the matter was an extremely difficult and extremely complex one, and what I feel, from listening to him, is that whatever consideration he has given to the matter, and whatever experience we have had or whatever experience he has gleaned from elsewhere, has not shown him any light at all. For example, take the statement that you cannot have any scheme now because, if you have, it means first come, first served. That statement puts the matter on an entirely wrong footing. As I said, I am not proceeding on the basis that a man who has something and loses it ought to get it back from the State. I am proceeding on the principle, as I mentioned before, and which Senator Sir John Keane mentioned, that when a man loses something and the loss is not only personal to himself but affects the community, then there is a much more important principle involved than first come, first served. For example, take the case of Campile, which appears to me to be entirely relevant in connection with this matter because it is the one example of war damage that we have occurring in our own area. Supposing that the damage was greater than it was and that all the people employed in that creamery were to be unemployed as a result of the damage, are we to understand that until the end of the war no effort of any kind was to be made by the Government, by the State, by the citizens generally, to remedy that situation in that particular place? I have no particular knowledge of the case. It may very well be, as Senator Sir John Keane has said, that other creameries could do the work, but I suspect, from what I know of the place, because I have been there, that that is not the case in that particular instance. If that is not the case in that particular instance, are we to understand the Minister's policy to be that the State must take no interest in that matter until the war is over, and then, within the measure of our resources, do something about it?

Perhaps I may be permitted to intervene for a moment. We have been talking about the situation on the assumption that we should be engaged in hostilities and be attacked, and that this damage would be done in the course of this attack upon us. That assumption has been underlying the discussion on all this question of war risk insurance. We have not been dealing with the sort of isolated case such as occurred at Campile at all, and what I said in relation to the situation which would exist here if we were actually engaged in hostilities and in defending ourselves has no relation whatever in regard to Campile, and certainly none to a situation in which we have been making a claim for compensation.

What is the position in regard to Campile?

In relation to that, I suggest that it is a question that should be addressed to the Minister for External Affairs.

The people did not get anything yet in the creamery there?

I gather that they have.

Well, let us assume that we were not at war and that a particular creamery in a particular area were destroyed; surely it would be our business to do something about it? You cannot, of course, lay down the rule, in a war, that everything must be reinstated, but neither can you lay down the Minister's rule that nothing should be done in a war until the war is over. That is absurd.

I have not said so.

Well, I am back on my favourite hobby-horse. We will have to speak Irish, because I seem to fail to understand the Minister's English. Let us hear what he did say. What he said, and what he repeated a few moments ago when he intervened, was that you could not possibly compensate for damage or replace damage done.

I did not say "replace". I said that the question of compensation would have to be deferred until the end of the war, when it would be dealt with in accordance with our resources. There are other ways of providing for replacement than on the basis of compensation.

You might have replacement but not compensation.

You might have replacement out of funds provided by loan. Does that not occur to the Senator?

Oh, yes, it occurred to me, but it did not occur to the Minister when he was on his feet himself.

The question did not arise. We were dealing with the question of compensation.

I hope the Minister understands me clearly, but I certainly fail to understand him as clearly. I made it clear that the existence of certain stocks was necessary to a man making his living, to a number of people making their livings, and to the carrying on of normal life, and that even in a state of war something must be done from the replacement point of view, and I understood the Minister to say that it would not be considered. Now, he says that it would be considered. As a matter of fact, war means the destruction of your resources, and the prosecution of the war and the winning of it, if you do win it, very often mean the replacing or rebuilding of your resources so as to fill the best possible national purposes. Therefore, it is clear that the whole question of replacement would not have to wait until the end of the war, and it is interesting to have got that from the Minister. Senator Robinson told us that immense damage might be done and that you might have no money to replace that damage. It is, quite possibly, it would appear now, not a question of money at all; it might be a question of material, a question of labour, or a question of organisation; and that might be very much more important than the actual question of money itself. If the State survives, and with whatever resources the State would survive, it would have to take whatever steps were open to it to take, by special organisation and by special methods, and abandoning old methods, to replace what had been destroyed.

I do not like to have this matter discussed merely by parsing a particular word and analysing what it means, like the word "insurance". I know, of course, that war is abnormal and I know, and everybody knows, that when you apply the word "insurance" to a war situation you are using a normal word in an abnormal manner.

And, therefore, misleading.

I know that the word "insurance" cannot be applied to an extraordinary situation like this, but there is just no handier word to use that I can think of. Perhaps "compensation" or "replacement" would be better.

There is no premium in connection with compensation.

I would not agree with Senator Brennan, however, that the matter is one in which persons who have stocks should not be called upon to make a contribution themselves. I think they should, and the State should undertake to do, within the measure of its resources, whatever may be necessary to do in order to continue normal life and employment. I can easily see, even in the case of war, places in Dublin and in the country which, if they were destroyed, would certainly need some effort to replace them at once, if the resources were available. If the resources were not available, of course, nothing could be done and we should have no satisfaction out of it. I think the English scheme is to leave out the people with stocks under £1,000, and I think the British have undertaken to reinstate—if that is a better word than compensate—houses and furniture for people whose total family income does not exceed £400 a year. The figure would probably not be as high as that here, but some such figure might be adopted. The Minister worked out a nice mathematical business about 10/- per cent. on £15,000,000. He counted the cost of collection and found out that there was a sum of £68,000 to make up for damage of £15,000,000. He mended his hand on that, too, and he really treated this matter as a debate. He reminded me of students who debate such motions as "You can have no true democracy until you destroy the police," and who make excellent arguments for that kind of proposition. I think this matter is of much greater importance, and should not be dealt with in that manner.

However, there is one point clear from what the Minister said. It is that the matter is complex and difficult, but that with regard to stocks he is consulting certain people to see whether anything can be done. I merely want to repeat in conclusion that the replacement of stocks in a war situation should be done on a national priority basis, that is to say, it should not be done in the interests of the owners, but in the national interests, and I think it is incumbent on the Minister to make a declaration that that will be done. I think that, in spite of the fact that he has not made the matter clear, that is what he will eventually do, and if so, we shall have effected something by having brought this matter before the House and by having had it debated.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
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