I move amendment No. 7:
"To delete the section."
In moving this amendment I feel, like St. Paul, on a certain occasion, that I am beating the air. To begin with I sought to make clear on Second Reading a point to which Senator Hayes has just now referred, namely, that the Minister for Justice is the Minister who should be in charge of Section 9. Therefore, I am beating the air in addressing my arguments to the Minister for Education. The Act of 1908, which was a very complicated and elaborate enactment, was itself a consolidation of Acts. The Government, in 1934, very wisely took out the first part of the 1908 Act and made it into Act No. 15 of 1934—"An Act to amend the law relating to the protection of infant life, and for that purpose to amend Part 1 of the Children Act, 1908." Then, last September, in the last day of last September, the Most Reverend Doctor Collier, Bishop of Ossory, at a public meeting where he subscribed to a fund in aid of an industrial school, drew attention to the clamant need for legislation in regard to industrial schools.
In 1934, the Act which was passed, had taken one section. The Bill now before us takes up another section, another slice or slab, so to speak of the Principal Act of 1908—so much of it, that is to say, as may be piloted through the Oircachtas by the Minister for Education. But before the Minister for Education can be asked to discharge his special function we have to assume a number of things. One of these is the existence of Juvenile Courts and the law with regard to who should be brought before a Juvenile Court, how he shall be brought, what shall be the evidence and so on. So much of the Act of 1908 as deals with that is before us and, therefore, I do not blame the Minister for Education. On the contrary I sympathise with him that he has here public responsibility for this particular section whereas it is the Department of Justice from whom it emanates and who are really, in the background, responsible for it.
Let me take the Act of 1908 and the particular section that I am assailing. As I pointed out on Second Reading the section which is to be amended by Section 9 of this Bill has to be read along with the whole range of descriptions in sub-section (1) of Section 58.
We have here: "If a child is found wandering and not having any home or settled place of abode, or visible means of subsistence, or is found wandering and having no parent or guardian, or a parent or guardian who does not exercise proper guardianship." Then the Bill, as it left the Dáil after amendment on Report Stage, omitted the technical words, "found wandering...with no parent or guardian." If we pass the amendment, as I have no doubt will be the case, this (b) would read as, "is found not having any home or settled place of abode or visible means of subsistence, or is found having a parent or guardian who does not exercise proper guardianship," that is, a destitute child who has a parent who does not exercise proper guardianship. Paragraph (c) reads, "is found destitute, not being an orphan but whose parents are undergoing penal servitude or imprisonment." This is really the incorporation of the Act of 1929, to add to it, "or is found destitute, and is not an orphan, and whose parents or surviving parent, or in the case of an illegitimate child his mother, are or is unable to support it." The child is destitute because the parents are destitute. I am asking the House to consider the effect of introducing into the Act of 1908, to be read with it and operative as part of it, this insertion in the Act of 1929. Further down there is a proviso "that the courts shall not make an order that the child be sent to an industrial school on the grounds stated in paragraph (h) unless the child's parents consent to such order being made."
Unfortunately, it is very complex. The Minister himself admitted, in introducing the Bill to this House, that it was a notable example of "legislation hy reference." Lord Justice Hewart, in his sensational book, "The New Despotism"—I think that is the right title—points out that one of the things that belong to this craze of modern bureaucracy for legislation by reference is a determined resolve to make the legislation unintelligible to the ordinary man. I ask the House to read this Act as already passed. We shall have this, that the court before which a person is brought as coming within one of these descriptions—say, within the description (h): "if satisfied, on inquiry, of that fact, and that it is expedient so to deal with him, may order him to be sent to a certified industrial school." The juvenile court or district justice may not order him to be sent to an industrial school unless the parent consents. "Unless the child's parents consent, or his surviving parent, or, in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother, consents to such order being made." One familiar with the Act of 1908 would immediately turn to sub-section (7) of Section 58—"where, under this section, a court is empowered to order a child to be sent to a certified school, the court, in lieu of ordering him to be so sent may, in accordance with the provisions of Part II of this Act, make an order for the committal of the child to the care of a relative or other fit person named by the court, and the provisions of that Part shall, so far as applicable, apply as if the urder were an order under that Part."
Speaking for myself, I was under the impression, reading this tortuous piece of legislation that, if the parent refused consent, the effect of it would be that, whereas, under sub-section (1) of Section 58, the Juvenile Court before which a person is brought as coming within this description, if satisfied on inquiry, of that fact, and that it is expedient so to deal with him, may order him to be sent to a certified industrial school; that may not be done if the parents refuse consent and the court is obliged to adopt an alternative —set out in sub-section (7). On further study and closer thought, I see that that is not so. It would provide ample facilities for the earning of guineas on briefs, if we took no notice of this. The effect is that, if the parent refuses consent, as is contemplated, in the Act of 1929 now to be fused in this, then the description of the court is not that it is empowered to order a person to be sent to a certified industrial school, because the situation is created by incorporating (h) as one of the descriptions, and putting in this proviso, and the court, insofar as it is concerned either with a (h) description child or a young person, is not empowered. It is conditional upon the consent of the parent, and the failure of the parent to give consent is an absolute bar.
Consequently, the interpretation which seems to be the rational one for this, because it is not any longer as in the Act of 1908, as amended, is that the district justice—or the Circuit Court— has two alternative courses in his discretion. As a matter of fact, the situation, if that portion of Section 9 is passed into law, will be one of absolute deadlock. What is the court to do where a parent refuses consent? Under the proviso, the justice would issue an order sending the child to an industrial school. Can he issue any order? There is one way, out of it, of course, namely, the one that will be abhorrent to everyone, but which will be legal, to treat the person who refuses to give consent as coming under Part II of the Act, Section 12. Remember that the reason for the child being before the court at all is that the child is destitute through the destitution of the parent, that the parent is unable to support the child. Here is Part II of the Act. Prevention of cruelty to children and young persons, Section 12, sub-section (1). I will read only such of it as is pertinent, as it is very long and complicated:
"And for the purposes of this section a parent or other person legally liable to maintain a child or young person shall be deemed to have neglected him in a manner likely to cause injury to his health if he fails to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid or lodging for the child or young person; or if, being unable otherwise to provide such food, clothing, medical aid or lodging, he fails to take steps to procure the same to be provided under the Acts relating to the relief of the poor."
The situation, I submit, is that if we pass into law this fusion of the Act of 1929 with Section 9, the result will be that the protection of the child can be secured only by putting the stain upon the parent of having been indicted for cruelty to the child and found guilty. That is not, I suggest, a way out that will recommend itself to any reasonable citizen. That, I submit, is the situation that will arise. To bear me out in that, I have here a case that was before the Children's Court in the city on 8th November, 1940: National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, plaintiff, against—I will not mention the name—"Rose X", who was charged with the wilful neglect of her child, Rose, aged three years and ten months. The child was illegitimate, born in 1936, and placed out to nurse, St. Patrick's Guild paying 30/- per month until the mother should succeed in getting work. The mother is now employed as a house-and pariour-maid at—I substitute for the actual name—"Abracadabra”, at £30 per year, all-found. Since April the mother, now engaged to be married, has failed and neglected to contribute to the support of her child.
As a matter of fact it transpired at a later hearing that the girl had become engaged to be married and that she was saving up to furnish the new home and consequently claimed to be unable to make the contribution to St. Patrick's Guild. That being so, she was, of course, culpably in arrears and was called upon to make her payments. She neglected to foiitributu to the support of the child. The charge at first brought was under Section 58 (h) of the Children Act, 1929; that is, the charge first brought by the complainant on behalf of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was brought under what we are now discussing, hut it was then the Act of 1929. A witness on behalf of St. Patrick's Gaild gave this evidence:
"Since the 11th May, 1940, we have got no payment from the mother for maintenance of her child. There is now due by the mother to the Guild £12 for eight months at 30/- a month. The mother will not consent to have her child sent to an industrial school. She refuses her consent."
The order made was to adjourn the application for conviction for neglect to enable the mother to reconsider her position and to give her consent under (h) of Section 58 and at a later date that was the sequel to the proceedings. The mother, rather than have the exposure that would have been consequent, gave her consent. So this magnificent proviso of parents being allowed to refuse consent and so on is not quite so fine as it looks.
It will be noticed that what is left in the amendment is that although the juvenile court or district justice acting as a juvenile court is satisfied on inquiry that it is expedient so to deal with the child before him, that is to say, to make an order sending the child to an industrial school, the veto of the parent is sufficient to hold up that. The veto of the parent, or the parent's supposed rights, come in with regard to the next point:
"Provided also that if an application is made to the Minister for Education by the parents or surviving parent or, in the case of an illegitimate child, the mother of the child committed on the grounds stated in paragraph (h) to a certified industrial school for the discharge from such school of such child, the said Minister shall, if satisfied that the persons or person making such application are or is able to support such child, order such discharge of such child."
Now, here is an enactment proposed that shall imperatively command the Minister to hand over the child Irom the industrial school to which, in his exercise of his judgment, the circuit court judge has ordered the child to be brought. He must give thf child up to the custody of the applicant on no other ground than that he is now able to support the child. Of course, a lawyer could easily make a case in favour of this, a plausible case. "A child found destitute and with the parents unable to support it"—that is only one thing, not two, because it is not "the child destitute and the parents so-and-so"; it is "the child destitute through the destitution—because of or consequent on, the destitution of the parent." Following out the thing, with close regard purely to technicalities of the legal system, as the ground for the committal to the industrial school disappears, once the parent or someone on behalf of the parent, satisfies the Minister that that ground has disappeared the committal is to be discharged. That, I admit, is a strictly legal view of the matter, but this is an Act to amend and extend the Children Act, 1908, and the Children Act, 1908, declares itself to be—this is the Long Title of the Act:
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the protection of children and young persons, reformatory and industrial schools, juvenile offenders, and otherwise to amend the law with respect to children and young persons.
In virtue of that, is there legislative interference with the relation of parent and child? I appeal for the answer to that to the Constitution, our fundamental law. In Article 42 of the Constitution Section 3 (2) it is set out:
The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions that the children receive a certain minimum education—moral, intellectual and social.
The important section for this purpose, Section 5, deals with exceptional cases where the parents for physical or moral reasons—maybe both—cannot. support a child, "fail in their duty towards the child, the State as guardian of the common good by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents with, always, due regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child." It is because the child has rights, the exercise of which is denied to it by the failure of the parent that the State as guardian of the common good must interfere, and it is the duty of the State—as they say in this case—through the Minister in charge, to see to it that the child gets a proper bringing up. But here in this case it is sufficient to make the Minister hand over from the custody of the industrial school the child committed to it, if the application is one that the child can be supported. I quoted from the Scottish Act on the Second Reading which is quite in harmony with the Constitution. Section 49 there declares that the principles regulating all dealings of the Juvenile Court with the child or young person are to be inspired with the one idea— namely, that it is for the welfare of the child, for the care and protection of the child, and for the reformation and welfare of the youthful offender.
It is for the welfare of the child that the Juvenile Court is brought into being and that the case is heard, and provision is made for dealing with it through the instrumentality of the Juvenile Court. There is no such provision in our amending Act, and certainly there is no such provision in the Principal Act. I wanted to quote the exact words—I am afraid I have not got them at hand—of Lord Justice Lindley in the case of McGrath, in 1893, under the Guardianship Children Act, England, where he declares that the welfare due to the child means not merely support in physical wellbeing or comfort but spiritual welfare as well. Here there is a proviso that the Minister is to be satisfied that the persons or person making such application are, or is, able to support such child. There we have substituted, notwithstanding our Constitution, a lower idea of what is good for the child and the young person, although in a later section, Section 13, there is an amendment of a Principal Act directing what is necessary for the protection and welfare of the youthful offender. That is to say, that in this very Bill, the term of law, the exact significance of which is in accordance with the terms of Lord Justice Lindley, is employed and placed on this printed document. Here we have set out on the right hand page that it is good enough that they are able to support the child, and opposite to that is a consideration for the welfare of the child, although the welfare includes immeasurably more than support and is in harmony with the requirements of the Constitution.
Now it may be said that all that is destructive criticism, but I had intended, if I had an opportunity, to put in an amendment that would be constructive in meeting all the requirements of the situation, as I submit it. It would have allowed the words to remain, that the court shall not make an order that a child be sent to a certified industrial school on the grounds stated in paragraph eight if the child's parents, or the surviving parent or, in the case of an illegitimats child, its mother, or the councils—because by Section 6, let me say in passing, local authorities have a voice in these things —if the child's parents or the surviving parent or in case of an illegitimate child its mother or the county council, objects to such an order being made, upon the grounds that the custody, maintenance, care and welfare of the child is at the time of such application sufficiently provided for, and the court is so satisfied, and by order so certifies, it discharges the application upon these grounds. There is a way out there.
There is another way also through a study of the Scottish Act. In one of the Schedules to that Act—I think it is Schedule 2, of 1937—the Department of Education—in our way of speaking it would be described as the Minister for Education—is entitled to have reports as to the progress being made by the child or young person detained in one of these certified schools, and when satisfied by the report of progress, may allow on licence the going out of the child to live with its parents if that environment be sound, morally. That also is an opening. Instead of defying the Constitution, and taking the lower idea of support as it is requisite to satisfy the Minister, the opening is given there. The whole of this Section 9 requires recasting, so what I am proposing is what is frequently dane in those cases when an Act is out of date: to repeal, recast and re-enact.
I suggest that that is what should be done now—take back this, make it out in close relation to the Constitution and to the developments that we have been made aware of through the legislation of 1933 in England and Wales and 1937 in Scotland, namely, take this in close relation to the Constitution and to the development that we may be making whereof there were examples through the legislation in England in 1908, in Wales and England in 1933, and in Scotland in 1937. What is really at the basis of all this is that between the Act of 1908 and the English Act of 1933, and the Scottish Act of 1937, there is the difference between the Christian philosophy and the certain ideology that some people have held and which belonored to the ancient Roman paganism—the idea which said "Give the mother back her child."
In that connection, you had the "pater potestas” of the Roman law in pagan times, whereby the father of the family owned the children as chattels, and you had the case of children being sold into slavery three times and thereby being freed from parental control. All these things have to be considered, and I think that the idea that it is the parent's right to do what he likes with the child is a wrong conception of the parent's right and duty here. Parental right is based on parental duty. As the Constitution says, in sub-section 5 of Article 42, in exceptional cases, “Where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents”—in other words, the right of the child, as an individual person, is still surviving, and the State must, come to the rescue of that child. The child, in other words, as Senator Mrs. Concannon has pointed out, becomes a ward of the State. We are all familiar with wards in Chancery. The State, in this case, must become the custodian and must intervene on behalf of the rights of the child, notwithstanding what may be put forward on behalf of the rights of the parent.
Here, in Section 58 of the Principal Act there seems to be a conflict between the sacred right of the child to grow up as a good citizen and what is known as ordinary human affection. I am strongly in favour of the Constitution which asserts the rights of the family and which appreciates the enormous benefits to a child in growing up in the bosom of the family, but what we are dealing with here now is a case in which the family environment has been broken, and in Section 58 we are dealing with cases where it is assumed that the matter is merely due to causes beyond the control of the parents—in other words. That the parents, through one cause or another, are unable to control or protect the child.
Now, it seems to me that that is a case for special treatment, and I think that it is a matter for reconsideration of the whole case. I know that it is useless to make that plea to the Minister for Education, because the decision really does not rest with him. We are in this unfortunate position: that the first part of the Act of 1908 was organised from the point of view of infant life direction, and came under the Department of Local Government and Public Health, as well as the Department of Justice, and the remainder of this work will have to be taken over, at some later date, by the Minister for Justice. This part, as I have said already, of the work of the Minister for Education belongs, also to the Minister for Justice, and because we have these two separate Ministries dealing with this matter, we are in this unfortunate position; but it seems to me that, under the Constitution, and owing to the fact of the various Ministers, who are members of the Cabinet, having responsibilities shared, there should be a conference between the two Departments, so that any measure that would be passed would make clear to parents, and to members of our Parliament, what was being done in connection with the educational side of the care and protection of children and young persona, and would be put into some coherent fashion.
I pleaded for that on the Second Reading of the Bill. I think it is a most unfortunate thing that there is a view prevalent that ignorance of the law can be pleaded. As a matter of fact, that is not so. Apart from the legal formulae, it is quite irrational, we are told, to hold such a view, as that ignorance of the law is no excuse; but how are we to be regulated in our conduct if the lawyers themselves seem to be ignorant of the law or what it means?