The customary provision is made at Section 2 for the continuance in force of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts for another year, that is, up to the 31st March, 1943. This year the Bill contains some additional sections, mainly of an amending nature. The purpose of the majority of these is fairly clear from the context, but I shall explain them briefly.
The number of acting promotions which has taken place in the Defence Forces since the commencement of the emergency has rendered it desirable that specific provision should be made in the Acts for this class of promotion. Existing legislation, while adequate, is of a general nature and does not distinguish between substantive and acting promotion. It is also desirable to cover by legislation the question of reversion from acting higher rank, which has hitherto been dealt with in Army regulations. Acting promotion carries with it, of course, the liability of reversion at any time. The necessary provision in regard to commissioned officers is now being made at Section 4, and in regard to non-commissioned officers and men, at Section 5.
As regards Section 6, the civil courts have had before them a number of cases in which irresponsible soldiers were found guilty of damaging civilian property in such ways as by breaking windows. As the law stands, the courts in such cases are unable to make orders in regard to compensation with the certainty that they can be met, although, in similar circumstances, a court martial or a soldier's commanding officer can order deduction to be made from the man's pay. It would be wrong, however, that civilians injured in their persons or property by soldiers outside military quarters should have to look to military courts for redress. It is proposed, therefore, to give the civil courts the necessary power to deal adequately with offences of the nature which I have mentioned by the enactment of Section 6.
Section 7, in so far as the main principle is concerned, is a repetition of a section in last year's Act which provided that no soldier or reservist would be entitled to be discharged during the emergency. For administrative reasons, it is desirable that the method which has been adopted in practice of deciding the status of men held in Army service under that section when their ordinary engagements have expired should be covered by legislation and this is now being done.
Section 8 is also a slightly amplified version of a section of last year's Act. The addition consists of the application of the procedure set out in the 1925 Act to officers of the Reserve of whom there is now a large number out on permanent service. Last year's section related only to officers of the Forces.
Sections 9 and 10 have for their purpose, mainly, to ensure that the Defence Forces (Pensions) Scheme, which refers to military ranks only, will equally apply to marine ranks and grades of rating and that persons holding military rank, on being transferred to the Marine Service, may be given the equivalent marine rank or grade of rating or vice versa.
Sections 11 and 12 are in the nature of qualifications of Section 57 of the No. 2 Act of 1940 and Section 8 of the Act of 1941, which provided that temporary officers, soldiers who enlisted for the period of the emergency and Reserve officers and men out on permanent service, would, on return to civilian life, be entitled, subject to certain conditions, to be restored to their former civilian employment.
Those sections were enacted to protect the interests of the classes mentioned. The basis of such protection is, however, the State's expectation of receiving good and loyal service and it is considered that the State should not continue to extend its protection in this important matter to persons who do not give satisfactory service. In addition, the former employer himself must receive a degree of protection.
I feel that nobody will cavil at the proposal that dismissed officers and soldiers, discharged with ignominy or by sentence of court martial, should lose their right of reinstatement in civilian employment. Where an officer is dismissed, serious misconduct is invariably involved and, since the officer has failed to give good and loyal service, he has forfeited his right to the protection of the State. The soldier dismissed with ignominy or by court martial sentence is in an exactly similar position. A further consideration is that the former employer could not reasonably be expected to reinstate such an officer or soldier, particularly if the dismissal or discharge was occasioned by an offence of a criminal nature.
Neither, I think, can objection be taken to the proposal to deprive of their right of restoration to civilian employment soldiers discharged for having wilfully made a false answer on attestation, for misconduct or on conviction by the civil power. Any doubts which Senators may have in the matter will be resolved on consideration of the following points: A soldier who, on attestation, makes a false answer of such a relatively harmless nature as giving a wrong age or address, is not, as a rule, discharged if that fact subsequently comes to light. Discharge takes place only where a serious misstatement is involved. A soldier who makes a wilfully false answer of such a nature that he must be discharged when that fact is discovered obtains a contract with the State by false pretences and puts the State to considerable expense for his training, maintenance, equipment and payment. He has not, therefore, any right to State protection. Again, a soldier discharged for misconduct is invariably guilty of some serious offence or misconduct. A record of discharge for misconduct, naturally, affects a man's prospects in civilian life and for that reason the military authorities are reluctant to discharge a man on that ground if such a course can be avoided. Where there is no option but to effect a soldier's discharge for misconduct, it may be taken that he is definitely of an undesirable type and it would be most unjust to require a civilian employer to reinstate him in his former employment. A soldier is not as a rule discharged as a result of conviction by the civil power unless his offence is of a definitely criminal nature and, in such cases, again, the position of the former employer must be considered.
I do not think that I need say anything about the third category— unapprehended deserters. These are the persons mentioned in Section 11 as persons to whom Section 119 of the Principal Act applies. Apprehended deserters are not specifically covered because of the fact that, on being apprehended, they are not as a rule discharged but, after having served the sentence imposed on them by the military authorities in respect of their desertion, are required to complete their army engagement with a period equal to the period of absence and detention added. If, however, they are discharged on completion of the term of detention, discharge is effected "for misconduct" and Section 11 will apply in such cases.
It is, I think, unnecessary for me to say more on this subject, except to add that the proposed sections will not prevent an employer from reinstating a former employee but will only remove the right to reinstatement. The employer may, if he so desires, take back into his service any person to whom Sections 11 and 12 apply, so that it is quite possible that many such persons, if the circumstances of their dismissal or discharge from the Defence Forces are not of a definitely criminal nature, may find it possible to secure re-employment in their former work or business. That, however, is a matter for the employers to whom the State will, through the enactment of Sections 11 and 12, have given a reasonable and necessary degree of protection against having to reinstate persons of clearly undesirable character.
As regards Section 13, it has been found that, in the majority of cases, there is no necessity for the procedure set out in Section 54 of the No. 2 Act of 1940 in regard to persons arrested as suspected deserters, because the arrested person admits from the beginning that he is a deserter. It is now being provided, therefore, at Section 13 that, in such cases, the arrested person will be handed over to the appropriate military authorities without any formalities, the existing procedure of bringing an arrested person before a district justice or peace commissioner for inquiry being retained for persons who deny that they are deserters or for cases where any doubt exists.
