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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 31 Jan 1946

Vol. 31 No. 4

Rent Restrictions Bill, 1944.—Committee (Resumed).

Debate resumed on amendment No. 57.

Before the Adjournment, I understood that, in view of what had been said on this section in relation to these amendments, the Minister would consider further whether or not this section was in a satisfactory condition and would endeavour to meet the point of view put to him.

I did not say that. The court must be satisfied that it is reasonable to make these orders and the question of the greater hardship must be considered. That is sufficient restriction. The person who wants the house must satisfy the court that it would be a greater hardship to refuse him than to put the other person out. As regards the question of having another person residing in the house, an invalid who was a relative of the party might choose to come to live with him. The court has to be satisfied on the question of greater hardship. Unless the court considers it reasonable to make the order, they will not do so. That provision as to reasonableness was in a different part of the section when the Bill was introduced. As it is now, it governs the whole section. The court has very wide jurisdiction. It will be for the court to decide the question of greater hardship and I am satisfied that the provision is fair and reasonable.

In amendment No. 57, Senator Duffy seeks to delete the words "or to reside". These words are contained in the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, Section 5 (1) (d). They were repeated in Section 4 (1) (d) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1923. They are continued in this Bill. In my opinion, the words "to reside" are governed or controlled by the words "bona fide” which precede them, so that the court must be satisfied that the person for whom the house is required proposes to reside bona fide with the landlord.

I do not know whether there have been many cases on this sub-section or not but I do not think that any harm can be done by allowing the words to remain. As the Minister pointed out, a patient in hospital may be about to come home to reside there. A relative abroad may be about to come home. No harm has, so far, been done by these words, and I submit that Senator Duffy has made no case for their deletion. Therefore, I suggest that he should not press his amendment.

I do not know what kind of case Senator Ryan expected me to make. It seemed to me that the case was self-evident. The case I want to make now is that, when there was a hard-faced Tory Government in Great Britain, the Rent Restrictions Acts then in force were amended so as to make it easy for a landlord to go into court and secure possession from an occupying tenant.

The Government in this country in 1923 followed that practice and these words were also inserted in the Act of 1923, but I do not think that is the kind of argument that would appeal to the Minister. If I remember anything of his political views, they seemed to me to suggest that much of the legislation of his predecessors should have been undone. This is an opportunity for him to undo some of the injustices caused by the Act of 1923 and I cannot imagine I could make any stronger case for taking these words out of the Bill than to remind him that they were inserted by his predecessors when they had a free hand to do almost anything they liked.

They were not so bad as all that.

Senator Ryan mentioned the case of a person coming out of hospital. The Minister also makes the point that it enabled a person coming out of hospital to reside with the landlord of a premises as a justification for the recovery of possession, but I would point out that if, in fact, the landlord had a relative in hospital who was likely to come to his house to reside, the moment that relative in hospital reside with him, he is entitled to recovery of possession if the application is reasonable under the Act, even if these words come out.

I am not asking the House to remove the provision in the Bill which enables a landlord to secure possession of a premises required by him for the accommodation of somebody residing with him, whether relative or not, but you will remember that the Bill goes on to provide that the landlord is entitled to possession if he can show that somebody is residing with him or about to reside with him for whom he requires the premises, or that they are wanted by a tenant, or somebody employed by a tenant of his in some other house.

All these provisions take away materially from the protection afforded to an occupier, and you will observe that so long as these words mentioned in No. 57 remain a landlord is required to show that it would be a greater hardship to refuse than to grant an application, or that there is alternative accommodation reasonably equivalent for the occupier —not that he must show that there is alternative accommodation— and that it would be a greater hardship to refuse the application. All he needs to do is to show that one of the grounds exists. I think at least whether we carry this amendment or refuse to carry it, we should know what is provided in the Bill. We should not leave ourselves under any illusion or the public under any illusion.

I think that the Senator ought not to get away with this idea of his. All that it is proposed to do is to give the court a right to grant an order for possession, if the court is satisfied that it is reasonable to do so, having considered all the circumstances. There is no absolute right given to a person to get possession; it is a matter for the court if it considers it reasonable, and I would like the Senator to get that fast in his mind.

Is the amendment being pressed?

Yes.

Amendment put and declared negatived.

I move amendment No. 58. I have already made the case for it:—

In sub-section (1), page 20, paragraph (e) to delete the word "either" in line 49; and in line 53 to delete the word "or" and substitute the word "and".

This is unacceptable, Sir. There are alternatives regarding the greater hardship, in the opinion of the court, but apparently the Senator wants both to be included in the Bill. I do not think it at all reasonable. If "either" is there the court can make the order. The Senator wants to provide that the landlord would have to prove that greater hardship would be caused by refusing the order and that alternative accommodation should also be provided. I think the matter is adequately covered by allowing the word "either" to stand.

Amendment put and negatived.

I move amendment No. 59:—

In page 21, before sub-section (2), to insert the following new sub-section:—

(2) Where on an application by a landlord to recover possession of a dwelling it appears to the court that the landlord purchased the landlord's interest in such dwelling during the currency of the tenancy subsisting at the time of the making of the application, no order for possession shall be made unless the court is satisfied that prior to the sale to the landlord of the landlord's interest in such dwelling an opportunity to purchase such interest on reasonable terms was given to the tenant and not availed of.

This is a proposal to insert a new sub-section. It deals with a situation where somebody other than the landlord formerly owning the house makes application to the court for possession. In other words, the premises are sold, the purchaser comes into court and makes this case of greater hardship or the other pleas contained in the sub-section with which we have dealt. The amendment proposes that possession will not be granted unless the court is satisfied that, prior to the sale of the landlord's interest in the dwelling, an opportunity to purchase on reasonable terms was given to the tenant and not availed of. We can imagine the case of a person in possession of a dwelling house for many years. The landlord then dies and the representatives of the estate sell this house amongst other property, without giving the tenant an opportunity of buying the house. Then the new landlord goes into court to look for an order for possession. I am endeavouring to ensure that, so long as this new Bill remains in force, an order for possession will not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the tenant then in possession was given a reasonable opportunity to purchase the premises on reasonable terms.

I think the position has been so far, at least in any case in which I have been interested, that where it is proved that at the time the landlord purchased the premises the tenant was in possession, the court thereupon takes the view that the landlord bought the property with his eyes open and that, in these circumstances, the greater hardship would lie if the tenant were dispossessed. That, to my knowledge, has been the practice up to this and, in view of that, I do not think that Senator Duffy's amendment would meet the case.

That is my view, too. A person who buys a house in these circumstances has got to take the chance that the court is going to take the view that it would be a greater hardship to dispossess the tenant than to give him an order for possession. It is the landlord we are dealing with all the time and the tenant's rights are amply safeguarded in Section 37 so that it is not necessary to introduce a provision of this kind.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 37 agreed to.
SECTION 38.

I move amendment No. 60:—

In page 21, before Section 38, to insert the following new section:—

(1) Where on the application of the landlord an order for the recovery of possession of controlled premises is made by the court under this Act and, at the time of making the order, the court is satisfied that the occupying tenant or his immediate predecessor in title with the consent of the landlord for the time being or otherwise reasonably expended on or after the critical date, any amount on improving or on the structural alteration of the premises or on the decoration of or repair to the premises and that such expenditure would, if this Act were not in force, have added to the letting value of the premises, the tenant shall on giving up possession be entitled to be paid by the landlord compensation of such amount as may be agreed upon or, in default of agreement, shall in accordance with the provisions of this section be determined by the court.

(2) The compensation awarded by the court under this section shall be such amount as, in the opinion of the court, represents the capitalised value of the added letting value of the premises at the termination of the tenancy as is attributable to the improvement, structural alteration, decoration or repair (as the case may require) which is the subject of such compensation.

(3) The capitalised value for the purpose of this section of the addition to the letting value of the premises mentioned in the next preceding sub-section of this section shall be fixed by the court having regard to the probable life of the improvement, structural alteration, decoration or repair (as the case may be) and to all other relevant circumstances, but shall not in any case exceed twenty times the annual amount thereof.

(4) Where compensation is payable under this section by the landlord to the tenant and the court is satisfied that such tenant has received from the landlord benefits by way of reduction of rent or otherwise in consideration, expressly or impliedly, of such improvement, structural alteration, decoration or repair as is mentioned in this section being or having been made, the court shall deduct from the compensation such sum as the court shall think proper in respect of such benefits.

The proposed new section is an effort to secure compensation for a tenant against whom an order for possession is granted by the court. You will remember, Sir, that early on this Bill was amended so as to exclude the item of repairs from the matters which would be considered in relation to the fixing of the rent. First and foremost, there is the question: Will the tenant pay the rates? I think it is assumed for the purpose of arriving at the net rent that the tenant will pay the rates. Provision was also made in the first draft of the Bill on the assumption that the tenant would be liable for repairs. That was deleted in Committee in the Dáil but there is no provision for taking into account expenditure by a tenant on repairs to premises the subject of an application to the courts. It seems to me that if the court makes an order giving the landlord possession, it is reasonable to claim that if the tenant in fact has made substantial improvements which would have the effect of giving to the premises a higher letting value, if this Act were not in force, he should be entitled to compensation for these improvements.

I may say that this provision is lifted almost entirely from the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1931 so that these provisions do already apply to houses covered by the Act of 1931. I am endeavouring to secure that they will apply to houses which are not covered by the Act of 1931 but to which the present Bill would apply. There is no new principle involved and nobody could say that it would be a hardship on the landlord, taking over premises that were substantially improved at the expense of the tenants, if he had to pay compensation for such improvements.

I think this amendment is much too far-reaching, and really not appropriate to a Bill of limited duration of this kind. The Senator has stated that the provision already appears, though I should not imagine that the circumstances are identical, in the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1931. I am not quite clear what premises are included in that Act or are excluded from this Bill but let us examine this proposal. It seems to be patently absurd. What is the significance of the words: "with the consent of the landlord for the time being or otherwise?" That word "otherwise" requires examination.

"Or otherwise reasonably expended".

If the landlord agrees to certain things being done there might be some justification for compensation but "or otherwise"——

"reasonably expended".

I submit that you cannot allow improvements done without the consent of the landlord to be considered as a matter for compensation. That is, I think, the fundamental doctrine on which the whole matter must be determined. Otherwise the tenant, of his own free will, may do a number of things which might be held reasonable but which might in point of fact be far too luxurious for the character of the building. Again, why bring in the item of repairs? No occupier who contracts to do repairs is entitled to compensation for those repairs. The repairs are merely making good the wear and tear and deterioration of the property. I do think that this amendment is a most dangerous one, and should not be accepted.

I am afraid I cannot agree with this amendment, nor do I think that it will in any way do what Senator Duffy has in mind. If that amendment were in this Bill immediately after Section 37 I have no doubt whatever that when the district justice came to consider the question of greater hardship he would consider that there was never any hardship on the tenant because the tenant was going to get certain compensation. In fact, therefore, if the amendment were in the Bill I think it would mean that there would be less restriction on possession than there is in the Bill as originally drafted. I think the amendment would to a very large extent defeat one of Senator Duffy's objects.

Quite apart from that, the amendment itself in some way deals with the principles that are in the Landlord and Tenant Act, but it quite omits cognisance of two things. First of all, so far as the Landlord and Tenant Act is concerned, before the tenant can get compensation for improvements he must serve an improvements notice, so that the landlord will have an opportunity of objecting that the work to be done is not in fact an improvement at all. In my opinion, that is one vital objection to the amendment as worded. The other objection I have to it is that it takes into account the occupying tenant or his immediate predecessor in title, but in this Bill we are quite clear that a statutory tenant is to be prohibited from selling his interest, and I cannot see what reason there is for incorporating the wide words "predecessor in title" where one tenant succeeds another, unless you admit the principle that that tenant had bought and paid cash for the interest.

Or inherited it.

If the Senator meant to incorporate merely somebody who had obtained it by will or inheritance, he would have found a precedent for that in the 1931 Landlord and Tenant Act, where there is a specific distinction in certain parts between purchasing occupiers and occupiers who merely come along and take the premises after the death of the original tenant. I cannot anticipate any district justice not taking the view that, with this section in, there would never be any hardship on the tenant. Therefore, I think it would completely defeat the idea the Senator has in his mind of widening and extending the provisions of Section 37. Of course what does happen is that if the justice is in any doubt at all as to what is the hardship involved in the case—if he thinks there is genuine hardship on the landlord but that there is some hardship on the tenant—he defers giving judgment on the matter; he says that for six months, or whatever period he thinks is fair, he is not going to give an order for possession. In that way he evens out the hardship, so to speak. With this amendment there the tenant would never even get that opportunity of looking for other premises.

I think there is something in the amendment. There is no doubt that it is a hardship on a person who has expended money on improvements, and increased the letting value of the house by those improvements, to be pitched out without any compensation. Senator Sweetman suggests that the justice or judge would say that if the tenant is getting compensation there is no hardship on him. I do not agree with that at all. I think possibly a better argument against the amendment would be to say that if the tenant can prove that he did expend money on improvements the court would consider it a tremendous hardship if he were to be evicted from the house. I think that is a better argument against the amendment. Of course I agree that this amendment as it stands could not be accepted, because there would have to be notice given to the landlord. He would either have to get an opportunity of objecting to the repairs and improvements or an opportunity of doing them himself and increasing the rent. I agree that the words "predecessor in title" could not be considered, but perhaps the Minister might look into the matter between this and the Report Stage and make some concession.

I am not prepared to consider it. If this required to be done, it would have to be done by amending other Acts, and not under this Bill. The whole provision of compensation for improvements is contained in the Act of 1931. Even statutory tenants have their rights under that, provided they have taken the necessary steps. If there were going to be any amendment, it is not under this Bill it would be done. It would not relate to a Rent Act but to the Landlord and Tenant Act. I thought it would have been out of order; it really is a Landlord and Tenant Act amendment rather than an amendment to a Rent Restrictions Bill.

In so far as it may be a matter of decorations which are not covered by the other Act, one tenant might do a lot of decorations, which he likes very much, but which from the point of view of the landlord, when that tenant goes out, might not be of any value but utterly deleterious because the next tenant possibly would not touch them with a barge pole.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 61:—

In page 21 to delete the word "lawfully" in line 31, and after the word "sublet" in line 32, to insert the words "in accordance with the provisions of Section 40 of this Act".

I understand the word "lawfully" might be taken to protect the landlord's interest. As a matter of fact, I believe it has been so taken in cases which were decided in Dublin. My difficulty is that I have not yet found out the definition of "lawfully". I do not know where exactly I would find it.

In a dictionary. Ask the Taoiseach to give you a special dictionary.

Speaking about some amendment the other night, the Minister stated that it would be well to have the Act, so far as possible, self-contained, and to do away with the need for reference to other Acts where possible. I propose then, instead of allowing the word "lawfully" to stand, to insert a definition on the lines suggested in No. 67. What I propose is that in sub-section (4), before paragraph (c), a new paragraph should be inserted as follows:—

(c) that the tenant will not sublet the premises or any part thereof without the consent in writing of the landlord, and if he obtains such consent the terms of every subletting shall be submitted to the landlord for his approval and the letting can only be made with such approval.

Now, I take it that that is really the sense in which the word "lawfully" is intended to be used in this Bill, and, if a definition of the word is included in this Bill and the necessity for reference to other Acts can be obviated that would be an advantage when this Bill becomes an Act. In looking up cases recently in regard to subletting, I came across a very remarkable case known, I think, as Sisk v. Cronin, and that had to do with a case where a house was let to a tenant who did not actually occupy the premises, but later on his brother occupied the premises.

The landlord initiated an action for recovery of the premises and it was held that he was entitled to that but, in the meanwhile, the premises had been sublet to the brother. Now, my point is that the brother might have been a ne'er-do-well or might have had some other objectionable features about him, but in this case, although the original tenant did not occupy the premises, and his brother did, the court held that the brother was entitled to remain there. The purpose of this amendment is to see that such premises cannot be sublet without the consent in writing of the landlord, and that the terms of every such subletting shall be submitted to the landlord for his approval. I think that if that provision were made a lot of unnecessary litigation would be avoided.

There are many such cases, but the case I have mentioned is one with which this amendment would deal. I have heard of innumerable cases where this abuse of subletting prevails. I am sure that we all know of cases where the person occupying premises has sublet them at three or four times the rent that the owner of the premises is receiving. Incidentally, if this amendment were accepted, it would go a long way towards remedying these abuses in regard to the subletting of portions of houses used as flats, because the owner of the premises would then know what was happening in regard to the subletting. I think that everybody will agree that the premises should not be sublet without the consent in writing of the landlord. If that were done, such a practice as I have referred to, in the case of the two brothers, could not occur. I do not think there should be any objection to that, except, possibly, in the minds of some solicitors, who seem to have a doubt as to what the word "lawfully" means. I understood that the word "lawfully" had a definite meaning, but I have asked many solicitors what the word meant, and they could not tell me.

I would ask the Minister to give sympathetic consideration to this amendment, because, in regard to this matter of subletting, if he would agree to the amendment, it would make a lot of people who are interested in house property much happier than they are at present. Such people are very uneasy at the moment, and I think that the acceptance of this amendment would clear away a lot of difficulties and would tend to bring about a resumption of the buying of houses for letting.

I think that the word "lawfully" can be very easily defined. It is the opposite of the word "unlawfully". Premises cannot be lawfully sublet if there is a clause in the yearly tenancy or lease prohibiting subletting, but if there is no such clause, the tenant is entitled to sublet, and I do not think that the statutes are opposed to subletting either. I think that, about a century and a half ago, there was some question about a period of seven years, during which the tenant could not sublet without the consent of the landlord, but apart from that every tenancy enables the tenant to sublet unless there is something in the lease, document, or agreement, preventing him from doing so. Accordingly, if there is no specific objection in the agreement to subletting, then such subletting is lawful.

As regards the question of rent, I do not think that any tenant is entitled to charge a sub-tenant more than the statutory rent, and I think it is illegal for him to receive more than what he is paying to the landlord, and if he were brought into court, the landlord would be entitled to get back the excess. I do not think Senator O'Reilly should press this amendment because I think that the law covers the point, and when we come to consider Section 40 I think we can consider that matter in connection with tenancies generally.

There is another point here. This section only deals with statutory tenancies, whereas Sections 38 and 39 deal with ordinary tenancies. That is in addition to Senator O'Dea's point, that when the landlord is setting a house he puts in such clauses.

Would it be possible, where there was collusion between a tenant and a sub-tenant in regard to the rent, for the landlord to be a party to the proceedings, and for him to appear to show that there was such collusion and that the agreement, therefore, should be upset? Would that be feasible?

The person who is paying the excess rent is the person who has the grievance. If he does not move in the matter I do not see who could be expected to do so. If he is prepared to pay what can be done? If he is not willing to take the protection of the Act no one can force him to do so. He is the person that is being injured.

The Minister will admit that the question of subletting is a very serious one. When one reads the innumerable cases that occur one is bewildered. I came across one case where a tenant sublet the whole of a house, with the exception of one corner which he reserved for himself. Seeing that there is such a variety of such cases it would be an advantage to put in a definition, such as is suggested in the amendment. It would do no harm.

It would make the position perfectly clear by removing the uncertainty that now exists. The definitions given are not as comprehensive as what I suggest, whereby a tenant should have the written consent of the landlord before subletting and should submit each subletting for approval. The landlord would then have control of the premises. That would ensure that there was no collusion between the parties. Collusion might lead to other complications. There can be no objection to the amendment except that of redundancy.

Is the amendment being pressed?

Not if the Minister is prepared to consider the matter further. I do not ask for a promise to that effect.

I do not think it is acceptable.

It involves a rather important principle. I suggest that the points I raised are of importance.

Perhaps the Minister will reconsider it. It is quite wrong for a tenant to sublet property as against the landlord and get the benefit. Would it not be possible for the State to say that where there was collusion it was an offence, and where proved would be punishable? There is every temptation for collusion. The position is most unfair.

When there is collusion it means practically robbing a landlord by evading the restrictions in the Act. I think it is the Government's responsibility to see that landlords are protected against what I call fraud.

I cannot see that point. The landlord has certain rights and if he wants to protect himself against subletting he can do so when arranging to let a house to a tenant. If a sub-tenant is prepared or volunteers to pay more than the amount limited by the Act that is his lookout. The landlord cannot get any more. If a tenant says that he is prepared to pay twice as much I do not see how that could be stopped. As the law stands a sub-tenant can go to court and say that he is paying twice as much rent as he should be paying, and can get back the excess amount. How is there any fraud there on the landlord?

I think a good landlord should be able to control not merely the tenant but the sub-tenants on his premises. I see no objection to the giving of control in a case where a person gets possession of a house and later allows another person to come in. In a case I know of while there was nothing very objectionable on the part of the people themselves, the whole character of the street was altered. The position lends itself to the greatest possible abuses. I do not think anybody would have a word to say against the giving of control in such cases. I might mention a case where the sale of his interest by a tenant was completely held up because of a sub-tenancy. The lessor was not responsible for the sub-tenancy, but although the other person was anxious to buy, the whole business was held up on that account. That indicates the importance of controlling the tenancy and the sub-tenancy. I appeal to the Minister to give further consideration to this particular aspect of the matter, as it lends itself to abuse. I am not referring to the financial end at all.

I do not want to prolong the debate on this point, but I wish to draw the Senator's attention to clause (b), sub-section (1) of Section 37, which reads:—

"(b) any person (being the tenant, any individual residing with the tenant, or any of the tenant's lodgers or sub-tenants) has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to adjoining occupiers, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to to be used for an immoral or illegal purpose....

These are grounds for getting possession. Section 40 applies only to statutory tenants. Other tenants are provided for in Sections 38 and 39. Reasons are provided under which the court will be entitled to grant possession.

I agree. They contemplate cases of tenants who have been there for some time, when it was then found that they were objectionable.

Sub-tenants and lodgers are also covered.

It would be far more important to deal with the matter in advance and give the owner of the place an opportunity of considering what type of sub-tenant should come in. In a provincial town, it is not always easy to put the law into motion. All sorts of practical difficulties arise. The question of evicting a person is a very serious matter—so serious that most of the building societies and insurance companies will refuse to lend money on houses in the provinces, because they know that, if any difficulty arises about the payment of instalments, it is very unpleasant to have to take ejectment proceedings. If a tenant is already in, it is very objectionable, from the local standpoint, to have to take proceedings to put him out. The trouble should be cured in advance by controlling the ingress of the tenants, and that is the main purpose of my amendment.

As regards the Minister's point about the introduction of "Section 40" into my amendment, I had thought it better at first to leave out "Section 40" and to put in "in accordance with the provisions of this Act". On consulting a person of fairly considerable experience and legal training — he is in practice in Dublin—I was informed that the proper place in which to put this provision was Section 40, because it governs a number of similar matters. That may be wrong. I intended to have Sections 38 and 39 self-contained, but I was advised that that was the wrong place to put in the words. If, on consideration, it was thought better not to put in "Section 40" but to say "in accordance with the provisions of this Act", Sections 38 and 39 could be made self-contained, and no reference to any other Act or authority would be necessary.

The Minister says: "The tenant has a right to sublet, and why not allow him to do so?" Does it not occur to the Minister that he is taking away a number of rights from the landlord? Why hesitate to take some rights from the tenant? Why is it not feasible to say that, while premises are controlled, no tenant shall be allowed to sublet without the consent of the landlord, notwithstanding anything to the contrary. If you limit and restrict the operations of the covenants in a lease which are favourable to the landlord, what objection is there to restricting some of the rights of the tenant, if justice results?

Is the amendment being pressed?

The Minister does not seem to be willing to accept it.

I am satisfied with the section as it stands.

Would you not consider the suggestion I have made?

I do not think that I would change my opinion.

On that understanding, I shall look into it but I do not want to hold out false hopes.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
SECTION 39.

Is amendment No. 62 being moved?

The same arguments apply to that amendment as to the last amendment, but, for the purpose of record, I formally move it as follows:—

In sub-section (2), to delete the word "lawfully" in line 45, and after the word "sublet" in that line to insert the words "in accordance with the provisions of Section 40 of this Act".

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 63:—

In page 22, at the end of the section, to add a new sub-section as follows:—

(4) For the purpose of this section the word "family" shall mean and include father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson, stepdaughter.

This amendment seeks to give a wide, but not too wide, definition of the word "family" in this section. As the section stands, not merely is provision made for protecting a tenant after his contractual tenancy has ended by making him a statutory tenant, but there is further provision made that, after the statutory tenant has died, his wife or her husband, as the case may be, and, after the death of the wife or the husband, any member of the family may remain on in the tenancy, creating a rather new kind of tenure to the law, which has known fee simple and fee tail but now is to be faced with a kind of tail collateral, whereby the right is given practically to any relation of the tenant to remain on in the premises, no matter what the effect on the landlord. It is perfectly reasonable that you should not put out the immediate household—that the mother and the father, the son and the daughter, should be allowed to remain there. I suggest that there should be an extension to include the grandfather and grandmother, grandchildren and stepchildren, but I think that it ought to stop there. As a matter of fact, there is a strong argument against allowing houses to be crowded out by collateral relations of the tenant. The pioneer of housing for the working classes was Octavia Hill, who started, in London, a scheme analogous to our own Iveagh Buildings, and who found it necessary to have only two rules for the tenants. One of the rules was that no relatives were to be allowed to go into a particular tenement, because that led to overcrowding, and there could not be control under those circumstances. If any tenant is desirous of making certain of this kind of family succession, cousins or aunts or nephews will come to live in the house, so as to secure it after the death of the tenant. That is quite outside the purpose of this Bill. I suggest that the definition I have given to "family" is quite sufficiently wide and that you should not allow it to have the too-wide connotation of almost any degree of relationship.

I think it better to leave the word"family" there as it is and let the court decide on the particular case. If we accept these different relationships, there might be some great cases of hardship, for instance between brothers and sisters, and I think the best thing to do is to leave it as it is and let the court decide who is a member of the family.

The courts cannot do that.

They have already done it.

But they cannot pick and choose. In England, I think, cousins are allowed in, but I am not quite sure on that point. There is nothing in this section giving any idea of what the family would be. It is a vague word and it might include persons of almost any degree of relationship. The courts would apparently have no power to shut out aunts and cousins.

In certain circumstances it might be a hard thing to do. It might cause great hardship.

Under this section, the court cannot possibly have the power to say that, in the case of house A, a cousin is a member of the family, and in house B is not. They cannot say that in house C an aunt is a member of the family and in the next house say she is not. The definition should be the same whatever house it is and whatever the conditions of the family. For the guidance of the courts you must give them a definition in the Act because the courts cannot give a different definition from case to case. I submit that it is a really quite unnecessary provision to leave it as wide as that.

When I read the amendment first I thought it was a pretty reasonable amendment, but then when I began to think it over and to remember all the cases that came to my notice, I thought that the thing was entirely incomplete. We all know dozens of cases where a niece comes in to look after old people and lives with them until she is practically an old woman herself. Under this amendment, she would be excluded, and so would a nephew or an illegitimate son or daughter. If you are going to do it at all you must have a regular list of people and I think the Minister's attitude is the right attitude.

The difficulty I see is that if you extend the word "family" and include the words "residing with", even a wife would be required to reside with her husband or she would not be entitled to retain the house. The wife might be away earning her living, or she might be absent because of some little disagreement and it would be a great hardship if she could not come back if she wanted to, and live in the house, even though she was not residing with her husband at the time of his death.

The same argument would apply to sons and daughters. I would be in favour of the amendment as proposed by Senator Kingsmill Moore, but I think that they are excluded in another way by saying that they must be residing with the tenant at the time of his death.

What is the position of, say, an unmarried daughter who is bona fide and succeeds to the tenancy, but who marries within a short time and goes to live with her husband elsewhere? Can she remain as the tenant, or can she put in anyone she likes?

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Is the amendment being pressed?

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 39 agreed to.
SECTION 40.
Amendment No. 64 not moved.

I move amendment No. 65:—

In sub-section (3) to delete paragraph (a), page 22, and insert in lieu thereof the following paragraph:—

(a) a statutory tenant shall not, as a condition of the assignment or giving up possession of controlled premises or any part thereof, ask or receive the payment of any sum, or any other consideration by any person other than the landlord.

This is a very necessary amendment. In the 1923 Act there were words introduced that a statutory tenant might not take money from anybody for giving up possession. That was introduced with the object of ensuring that a statutory tenant should not make money out of his tenancy. The object was merely to protect him with a roof over his head and not to allow him to make a profit out of it, but on the wording of that particular Act a question did arise as to whether a statutory tenant could sell his tenancy to an outside person, taking money for it, and putting it into his own pocket, which was clearly against the object of the Act, because he was then putting into his own pocket money which by right would belong to the landlord.

This is designed to make the matter clear. It provides that a person who stops on as a statutory tenant, though he may assign his property, shall not be allowed to take any money for the assignment, or shall not be allowed to take any money, if he assigns it free, for giving up possession. In other words, it attempts to prevent abuse of the Act, but still, no doubt, it will be done covertly.

I accept this amendment.

I would like to say a word about it. I am opposed to the amendment and also to sub-section (3) of Section 40. There seems to me to be very little difference between the wording of the two. Sub-section (3) says:—

"A statutory tenant shall not as a condition of giving up possession of controlled premises ask or receive the payment of any sum, or any other consideration, by any person other than the landlord."

If you read on to another sub-section, sub-section (4) (b), you find:—

"That the tenant will not assign the premises or any part thereof without the consent in writing of the landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld..."

I would like, first of all, to have the words "statutory tenant" defined.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Perhaps you had better deal with the amendment first.

When we were discussing the matter last night, Senator Kingsmill Moore rightly stated that the authorities, so far as he could remember, held that anybody who got a notice to quit became a statutory tenant. I have since looked them up and find that was so. From the year 1923 to 1926, when the Act said that a notice to quit was not necessary, the landlord who served a notice to increase rent also served a notice to quit. Therefore, all those tenants are statutory tenants, if the decisions are right. I hope they are not right and I hope we will make them right by the amendment of this Bill and make it clear that nobody is a statutory tenant unless the court has refused an order for possession on the grounds that he is a statutory tenant. If it can be held that everyone who got a notice to quit is a statutory tenant, then most of the town tenants are statutory tenants.

Sub-section (3) comes along and says that a tenant can get nothing for his interest in the premises. He may assign them if he gets the consent of the landlord, but he must not get one penny for it. What harm does it do to the landlord if he got £8,000 or £10,000, what the premises are worth? How does that harm the landlord? The landlord will get a solid and substantial tenant and will receive his rent as he received it before. He will be as well off as if the premises were assigned to a man of straw, or to somebody to whom he consented.

You are possibly depriving an old man without money who wants something to live on, and cannot make any provision for himself, out of a business premises he has built up for many years. He will not come under the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1931, because the landlord has not attempted to dispossess him. He is held to be a statutory tenant, and, therefore, you are depriving him of a saleable interest in this matter. It is a serious proposal, and if carried out will have dreadful effects. I would suggest that sub-section (3) be amended to bring it into accordance with sub-section (4) (b). Then there will be consistency in the section. At the present time there is no consistency because a man can sell or assign if he gets the consent of the landlord but no matter what consent he gets from the landlord he cannot take a penny for his interest. I would suggest to the Minister that he should consider an amendment somewhat on these lines: to insert after the words "any person other than the landlord" the words "unless the assignment is made with the consent of the landlord or by way of an assignment without such consent where the court has determined that the withholding of the consent was unreasonable." That would make the matter consistent.

Even then the tenant could not sell without the consent of the landlord, but the landlord could not withhold consent if the court considered that that was unreasonable. That would not deprive the tenant of a very valuable interest. As we all know, houses in a town, where the tenant resides on business premises, are worth thousands of pounds. That interest can be determined by the landlord serving notice to quit. Of course the landlord will serve notice to quit unless something is put in the Act to prevent his doing so. The Minister may also consider that possibly this question should come under Section 37 because under Section 37, if a landlord brings the case to the court after notice to quit is served, he will get an order determining the interest of the tenant even though he does not prove that he requires the premises for himself and the question of greater hardship does not arise. I submit that, unless he brings himself within some of these sub-sections, the court should have power to dismiss the case and revert the tenant to the rights he held before the notice to quit was served. If you do not do that, you are confiscating very big rights but you are not injuring the landlord. The landlord gets nothing in any event.

I find it almost impossible to follow Senator O'Dea. I am not, of course, a lawyer but it seems to me that once a tenancy is up, the tenant has no rights according to the ordinary law. He has not got valuable rights which he can sell. If the State comes in and makes him a statutory tenant it seems to be nonsense to talk about his losing valuable rights which do no harm to the landlord. It may not under the law deprive a landlord of money but it will deprive landlords of general rights because it will mean that everybody will become a statutory tenant. If that principle were adopted any rights of landlords in this country might be forfeited for ever. When a bargain is made, and a lease has ended, there is only one reason for making the occupant a statutory tenant and that is to prevent hardship. There are no other legitimate or fair grounds for it that I can see. I cannot understand the argument of Senator O'Dea.

The same thing was said when the Land Acts were going through.

Mr. P. O'Reilly

I cannot understand why the Minister was so ready to agree to this amendment seeing that the amendment might destroy some very valuable rights and interests that a statutory tenant might develop in his premises. Suppose a statutory tenant developed a small business, he would have a goodwill interest in it. Probably he could sell that goodwill apart altogether from the premises and assign the premises without any money consideration but unless the tenant could do that——

What class of premises?

Mr. P. O'Reilly

Assuming a shop were developed and that the tenant became a statutory tenant, if that tenant could not receive money for these rights it would be a terrible hardship on the tenants.

I am afraid that I find it equally difficult with Senator Douglas to follow Senator O'Dea. Of course the plain fact of the matter is that the tenant of business premises has certain rights under the Landlord and Tenant Act if he has been carrying on business for three years in certain circumstances.

On a point of order, I referred to cases where notice to quit was served several years ago before the Act of 1931 at all was passed, as well as to cases that occurred since. There was no Landlord and Tenant Act at that time, therefore the tenants could not get their rights. If it is held that once the rent is increased and notice to quit is served every person is a statutory tenant, all these people can then be thrown on the road.

I am afraid I do not still understand Senator O'Dea but perhaps I can understand him better when I read the report of his remarks in the Official Report.

The whole gravamen of this question as I see it is very simple. The whole purpose of this Bill is to protect people who are not well off from having to pay too much in rent for their houses. Whether these people have to pay too much by way of a lump sum plus a small rent, or too much by way of a large rent, makes very little difference to them when they come to pay it. If we were to do what Senator O'Dea suggests, then it would merely mean that any person who wanted to be in a position to rent a house within the control limit would have not only to pay the controlled rent but in fact would have to pay down in addition a large sum of money. The reason for this Bill is that there is a shortage of houses, and, in consequence, there are too many applicants each time a house becomes vacant. If the statutory tenant were prepared to sell, then we would have exactly the same thing as we have in respect of other houses in Dublin at present, which are going at fantastic prices, as Senator Quirke will agree. Senator O'Dea's suggestion would mean that the poorer classes of people would have to pay some fantastic price and that a man who had not got perhaps £400 or £500 to put down would not be able to get a controlled house to rent. I understand that the whole purpose of this Bill is to avoid that.

I thought we had discussed this matter sufficiently on the definition section and that was the reason I agreed to accept the amendment. The whole question that arises seems to me to be whether we are going to allow an incoming tenant to be mulcted in the form of a lump payment. As far as small shopkeepers' rights are concerned, they are protected under the Landlord and Tenant Act and these rights are not being interfered with here. As Senator Sweetman has pointed out, the purpose of this Bill is to give people occupying houses a certain security and to prevent increases of rent beyond a certain amount.

I am afraid there is still misunderstanding. The Landlord and Tenant Act was passed for the protection of people undoubtedly, and it did give a certain amount of protection to certain people. It prevented a man being put out of his house if he was a yearly tenant and had carried on business for a period of three years, or, if he had a shorter term than one year's tenancy, if he had carried on business for seven years, and if he was wise enough at certain times to give notice to the landlord that he required a renewal of his tenancy, a fact that is not at all known to many of the tenants in this country. But remember this, that it is only since that Act was passed, where the landlord serves a notice to quit, that the tenant can claim his rights under that Act. As I mentioned before, thousands of notices to quit were served between 1923 and 1926. According to decisions, all those people are statutory tenants. They cannot claim under the Landlord and Tenant Act because the landlord now does not claim possession. Therefore, they do not come within that Act at all. A cute landlord can keep them at bay as regards that Act. Whereas other people are protected, and have got their rights under that Act, numerous people are not given the benefit of the Act of 1931.

Then that is the Act which requires amendment, and not this.

Definitely.

I am considering that point, as a matter of fact.

If the Minister tells me that he will consider an amendment of that Act——

Not under this Bill.

I know, but I should like that there would be no delay about it, because I can see now that this Bill— which does a lot of good—can do a tremendous lot of harm.

Oh, it can not.

And so can the Act of 1923, I admit. It was left open to the landlord to do certain things and deprive the tenant of valuable property. That is what I want to prevent.

On that matter to which Senator O'Dea has referred, I think the plain fact of the matter—but people did not think about it—is that they could have come in if they had been there for seven years.

I am talking of numerous cases between the Act of 1923 and the Act of 1926. Notices to quit were served, and people were made statutory tenants. I do not agree with that at all. I know that our circuit judge held that a new tenancy had been created, and that the person was not a statutory tenant, and would not be, without another notice to quit. I think there was great justification for that, but it has not been followed by other courts.

I do not agree with Senator O'Dea's definition of Section 19 of the 1931 Act, but this is not the place to discuss it.

Amendment No. 65 agreed to.

I move amendment No. 66:—

In sub-section (4), paragraph (b), page 22, line 43, to delete the words "which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld".

I am very pleased to know that the Minister looks favourably on amendment No.65. This is really a corollary of amendment No. 65. It is rather a technical sort of matter, and, not being a lawyer and not being sufficiently acquainted with the technicalities of these matters, I should like, with the permission of the House, to give the opinion of a person who has had great experience of this sort of law. He states:—

"In no previous Rent Restrictions Act or amendment of same are there any such words as ‘which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld".

Who said that?

I will not mention the name here, but I will give it privately to the Senator if necessary.

They are in the 1931 Act.

I said Rent Restrictions Acts. I am aware that the words are in the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1931.

The 1931 Act is not a Rent Restrictions Act.

Here is the opinion which I have been quoting:—

"In no previous Rent Restrictions Act or amendment of same are there any such words as ‘which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld' in reference to the landlord's consent to assigning or subletting either. These words do occur in the Landlord and Tenant Act, but the two Acts are not in any way analogous. They treat with different matters. In the Landlord and Tenant Act you are dealing with cases where there are leases or long terms in question, apart from the Act altogether. Consequently, the tenant would naturally have some interest in assigning the premises when there is still a part of the original term to run, but in the case of the Rent Restrictions Act and in this new Bill there is no period of time to run in connection with the existing letting, and nothing to assign except the artificial legal period made or granted by the Rent Restrictions Acts themselves.

Section 40 in the new Bill provides that the tenant is not to receive any purchase money in assigning the premises. That, of course, shows that he should not be allowed to assign, which shows that he has no financial interest in the premises beyond his own tenancy, and if the Bill is allowed to stand as it is, with the words ‘which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld' in it, it would be giving him a direct interest in assigning the premises. It would then be practically impossible to prevent his selling his interest for money, even though the receiving of the money is forbidden, as it would be impossible to know when he did receive cash or other consideration for the transfer.

It is understood the Rent Acts are passed to protect tenants themselves, to secure them against unfair increases or to prevent them being unfairly ejected, but there is no reason whatever, morally or legally, why they should be given the right to assign to another person the tenure which they have in the premises under the Rent Acts."

In other words, if those words are allowed to stand, having regard to the manner in which the court has at all times interpreted the meaning of those words, the last trace of the landlord's interest in the premises will disappear. This provision is being inserted for the first time in a Rent Restrictions Act, an Act which, as stated already, deals with rent restrictions and not with the relations between landlord and tenant as set out in the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1931. Take the case of a tenant who arrives at a time when he himself wishes to leave the premises. It may be because of old age, or for one of various other reasons. A friend comes along and says: "I would like to go in there", and there is some suggestion that if the landlord's consent can be obtained he will not see him short at Christmas or some other period, and the Act is then got round in a manner which nobody can prevent. The condition is that the landlord's consent is to be obtained, and here is a provision that the landlord must not unlawfully withhold his consent. The tenant then goes to the court. I am advised that the effect of this is that practically all sales will cease. The last right of the landlord disappears. This is a matter which is going to affect, amongst other people, members of the legal profession. As Senator O'Dea seems to be opposed to this sort of thing, I wonder what the Law Society will do as a matter of discipline when they come to hear that he is objecting to an amendment such as this. It certainly is not going to be in the interests of the profession. Something similar applies to auctioneers, although I would not say that Senator Quirke would be interested in this.

I would not suggest, nor do I think that anybody else would suggest, that any Senator here would put his own personal interests before the interests of the general public, and I think that Senator O'Dea should also protest against such a suggestion.

Mr. P. O'Reilly

I do not think that Senator P.J. O'Reilly meant it in that way. I think he only made the remark in a humorous way, and it is so seldom that Senator P.J. O'Reilly displays a sense of humour, that I think we should forgive him on this occasion.

I am thankful to my namesake for coming to my rescue. I used the words mentioned by Senator Quirke in what I intended to be a humourous sense, but I now see that it is dangerous to display a sense of humour here. On previous occasions when trying to put across a little humour I got very little encouragement either. I think, however, that the display of a little humour occasionally would do no harm. Perhaps after this explanation I may be allowed to indulge in this line a little bit more.

I look upon this amendment as the most vital one submitted. I am advised to that effect by others and I believe it myself. The Minister has stated that he wants to keep within the provisions of the previous Rent Restrictions Acts as far as possible. In this connection here is another bit of humour which I hope the Minister will forgive. May I tender the advice given by someone: "Stick close to your desk and never go to sea." I am afraid, however, that the Minister has already gone to sea when he inserted the line in this Bill which the amendment seeks to have deleted. In this way he has entered on very dangerous waters. He has imperilled the whole Act and changed its character. That is why I submit that the amendment should be accepted.

I think I may say that, as a matter of fact, I have no personal interest in this matter. I have only one case of a tenancy, and that is likely to last much longer than I will, but I do not know why Senator P.J. O'Reilly was advised in this way. This applies to every lease, covenant or agreement—I have not got the right part of the section of the former Act —but it is sub-section (2) of that section, which is to the effect that it shall be unreasonable to withhold a reasonable sum in respect of such sum as may have been incurred by the tenant in respect of such expenses as may have been incurred by him, if there has been agreement or consent on the part of the landlord. In other words, what the tenant has to do now, in the case of any lease, is to ask the landlord to consent to such a provision, and if the landlord refuses and goes to court, and if the court says that that is unreasonable, the matter is dealt with in that way. This Bill is only following the wording of the section in the original Act.

Mr. P. O'Reilly

The words which Senator P.J. O'Reilly wants to have deleted were inserted with the consent of the Dáil, and I take it that the Dáil wanted these words inserted as a direction from the Oireachtas to the Legislature.

If Senator O'Dea would look at lines 12 and 13 on this page, I think he will find that so far as they are consistent with this Bill, it is more or less on the lines of the 1931 Act. I am not quite sure whether the 1931 Act would, in fact, govern these matters—I would have to consider the Interpretation Act before I would be as positive in my view as the Senator has been in his. Passing from that, however, my real difficulty is that I am afraid if these words are left in, or if a situation is permitted to exist which these words seem to employ, the evil to which I have already referred will remain, and it will be practically impossible to prove whether a statutory tenant is getting a hand-over or not for the tenancy. I am afraid that if this is left in you will have the situation remaining in which "key money" will be there underground, and that the really poor tenant who has not a lump sum of money to put down will be left in the position that he cannot get possession of a tenancy. The position will be that it will be very difficult for such a tenant because the out-going statutory tenant knows that he cannot, legally, demand "key money", and the incoming tenant, knowing about that, realises that he cannot get possession unless he is prepared to put down a lump sum for "key money". Therefore, the person who cannot afford to put down that money cannot get the tenancy, and you will have the same kind of underground business going on all the time.

I am more concerned about the principle of the thing which hands over the tenant's rights and denies the landlord. I think it is most unfair and unjust to take away from the landlord certain rights and to allow the tenant to benefit, and the matter of public interest is concerned here.

If you pass away from the law, there is very little to be done about the matter. As Senator Sweetman has pointed out there is very little to be done in the case of people passing money from one to the other, underground, so to speak. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me that it is just the same as the black market: the fellow who buys the stuff at an exorbitant price is just as bad as the fellow who sells it, and the receiver is as bad or worse than the thief.

Everyone present will at once agree with Senator Quirke when he says that unless the laws are respected very little can be done. It is equally true, however, to say that the laws should be designed so as to make it as easy as possible to comply with them. If this amendment is accepted it will make it more difficult for people to evade the law. I remember being in Switzerland some years ago and being told that it was very rare for a single case of larceny to occur. I often wondered if that was due to the very fine character of the people or due to the efficiency of the laws. I think the two, more or less, work together. It certainly makes it more difficult to have evasion of the laws. That, in addition to the other point, is a strong recommendation for this proposal.

I would be glad if the Minister would explain the paragraph in sub-section (4). As it originally stood a tenant could not assign statutory premises. Now he can. Why it was changed is not clear to me. Anybody with any experience knows that if you say to a tenant that he cannot do it without the consent of the landlord, the latter cannot refuse unreasonably except in very exceptional circumstances, such as the carrying on of improper or extremely noisy business or an injury to the neighbourhood. We know from experience that that means that the landlord cannot refuse consent. But why have the right to assign to someone else? If there is the right to assign he might as well have the right to sell. I think Senator O'Dea's case has something in it. If there is nothing of value why give the right to assign? If there is the right to assign should there not be the right to receive something for it? The whole case here is that when the State creates a statutory tenancy it is simply protecting a man against hardship. It is not intended to have any money value. But here we are giving a money value which he can assign to someone else. If he cannot receive money why give him the right to assign?

Everybody seems to be losing sight of the fact that certain tenants are being deprived of certain rights that they always had, seeing that there was nothing to the contrary in their leases. They could build up their premises and sell them for large sums of money.

If they had leases they would not be under this Bill.

And if the leases expired?

How could we deprive men of what they had not got?

This Bill invites a landlord to determine a tenancy. It will determine every tenancy and deprive tenants of the right to sell what they could get thousands of pounds for. In that case it would be better for many tenants if this Bill was not here, and they would not be disturbed.

A statutory tenant is a person who has had a tenancy already determined by law. If there was no Rent Restriction Act a bailiff could go in next day.

Supposing he had rights under the Landlord and Tenant Act?

Then why waste time on this Bill?

A tenant cannot exercise that right unless the landlord serves notice to quit.

This provision was inserted in the Dáil—I think it was Deputy McGilligan moved it—in order to bring it into line with the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1931. Clause (b) does not say "may" but "shall not assign without the consent of the landlord", and later we added "which shall not be unreasonably withheld". If a landlord unreasonably withheld his consent, a tenant had the right to go to the courts to decide whether consent was unreasonably withheld. There was a very long debate in the Dáil and I was satisfied that there was no reason why it should not be brought into line with the section in the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1931 quoted by Senator O'Dea. I do not admit that this is going to be open to the abuses that Senator Sweetman visualises.

Could the Minister give some idea of the grounds on which consent could be reasonably withheld?

The courts would have to settle that.

I think it is not good enough to say that the courts will have to decide. We are passing legislation concerning what will be the law in operation. My experience is that where there is power to sublet or assign, which cannot be unreasonably withheld, that means in effect that the landlord must give consent. I believe there are exceptional cases, but I feel confident in telling the Minister what in practice occurs. He seems to think that the landlord will have many reasons for withholding consent. I maintain that he will have none.

Supposing a landlord has a house let to a man, who is not his employee but is the employee of a company with which he is intimately associated, and that the tenant decides to leave the area. The company wishes to put another employee from somewhere in the neighbourhood into the house, which is not held by virtue of the employment, because the landlord is not the actual employer. That appears clearly to be a case in which it is reasonable enough for the landlord to say that he wants to give the house to another tenant of the same type. In such circumstances, I should like some direction from the Minister as to whether a case like that comes within the section. It appears to me that it is not the ordinary direct employment which restricts possession, but that that is a case for which provision should be made, especially in these days, when a good deal of business is carried on by way of private company, when ownership is different. Frankly, I do not see what benefit is conferred on a tenant by being entitled to assign premises, unless he is going to get something for doing so. Unless he is going to get something for it, I cannot see what benefit he obtains. If the Minister could explain what benefit he is going to get, without getting key money or the premium which he is prohibited from getting, I should find it easier to understand the form in which this paragraph is drawn. As drawn originally, it was absolute sense. Even though the Minister has told us who suggested it in its present form, I am afraid it does not mean anything.

Progress reported. Committee to sit again on next day of meeting.

The House might now decide when it will next meet.

I suggest that we meet next Wednesday. If we do so, we should be able to finish the Committee Stage of this Bill and the two motions on the Paper.

That is agreed.

Acting-Chairman

We shall also have the Report Stage of the Housing Bill.

The Report Stage of this Bill could be taken two weeks later.

The Seanad adjourned at 9.5 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 6th February, 1946.

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