Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 11 May 1949

Vol. 36 No. 11

Courts of Justice (District Court) Bill, 1949: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Minister for Justice (General MacEoin)

The main purpose of this Bill is to provide for an increase in the maximum number of district justices. Originally, under Section 68 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, the number of district justices was limited to 33. The Courts of Justice Act, 1928, provided, however, for the appointment of not more than four assistant justices. No further change was made until 1946, at which time there were three assistant justices holding office. In the meanwhile, the volume of business in the district court had increased considerably, particularly in the Dublin Metropolitan District, with the result that it had become necessary to employ temporary district justices on an ever-increasing scale. A stage was eventually reached when as many as seven or eight temporary justices were being employed almost continuously. Manifestly this was a most undesirable position and one that should not be tolerated any longer than was absolutely necessary. Accordingly, in the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act, 1946, provision was made for an increase to 40 in the maximum number of justices. The office of assistant justice was abolished at the same time so that the actual increase in the permanent strength of the District Court Bench was four, that is to say, that, under the new arrangement, there were 40 jusstices as compared with 33 justices and three assistant justices under the old system.

Following the enactment of the 1946 Bill, the three assistant justices then in office were appointed justices and permanently assigned to the Dublin metropolitan district where, in fact, they had been continuously employed for several years previously. There were then six justices permanently assigned to Dublin. The four additional justices appointed were not permanently assigned to any district, the idea being that they would be available to be assigned, from time to time, to any district in which their services might be required. They became known in consequence as "moveable" justices. It was thought, or, at any rate, hoped, that the four "moveable" justices with, perhaps, occasional assistance from "temporaries", would suffice to meet all requirements, including the provision of reliefs for country justices while on holidays or on sick leave, as well as the extra help which, it was known at the time, would continue to be required in Dublin for some considerable time to come. In point of fact, two of the "moveable" justices have been employed exclusively in Dublin ever since their appointment and a third "moveable" justice has been similarly employed in that district for the last 15 months or so. It has been necessary to allocate the fourth "moveable" justice for more than one-half of his time to assist in one of the districts adjacent to Dublin, in which the volume of work for several years past has been more than the permanently assigned justice could cope with.

In view of what I have said, it will not, I am sure, come as any great surprise to Senators to learn that the hopes entertained at the time of the passing of the 1946 Act have been completely falsified in practice. The services of temporary justices have continued to be required although, admittedly, on nothing like the scale on which they were required before 1946, but, nevertheless, to an extent sufficient to be still a source of serious concern to the Government. Except for one brief period last year, there has been no time since 1st October, 1946, when there has not been at least one temporary justice operating, and on occasions there have been as many as four, five or six. In the period of two and a half years, from 1st October, 1946, to the 31st March last, temporary justice were employed to an extent which was the equivalent of more than two full-time justices. So far as can be foreseen at present, additional assistance to much the same extent will continue to be required for a long time to come.

As I have explained, two of the "moveable" justices have been employed exclusively in the Dublin metropolitan district for the last two and a half years, and as these two justices were doing exactly the same work as the permanently assigned justices and as there was no prospect of being able to do without their services in Dublin in the foreseeable future, the Government recently decided that these two justices should be given the status of Dublin metropolitan justices and be thereby entitled to the increased salary of £1,430 as compared with the salary of £1,300 per annum payable to an ordinary justice operating outside the Dublin metropolitan district. The Government, in pursuance of this decision, formally assigned the two justices in question permanently to the Dublin metropolitan district as from 1st April last. The present position, therefore, is that instead of having four "moveable" justices as was contemplated by the 1946 Act, we have only two and one of these is at present immobilised in Dublin and is likely to remain so immobilised for a more or less indefinite period while the other will continue to be required to devote at least one-half of his time to one particular district near Dublin.

In these circumstances it was abundantly clear that additional assistance would continue to be required and the Government, having carefully considered the matter, came to the conclusion that the wiser course, on the whole, would be to increase the number of permanent justices rather than carry on as has been done for the last couple of years by appointing temporary justices. The Bill, accordingly, proposes to raise to 42 the maximum number of justices that may hold office at any one time. The figure of 42 is a maximum figure and I would like to emphasise that there will be no obligation to have that number of justices always. No doubt, if at any time, the state of the business in the district court so warrants, the number of justices employed will be reduced accordingly, this being done by not filling vacancies as they occur. On the other hand, it may be as well that I should make it clear that I can give no assurance that, even with the maximum number of justices raised to 42, it will be possible to dispense entirely with temporary justices but we may hope that their services will be necessary only very occasionally. As I said when introducing the Bill in the Dáil, to maintain a permanent establishment of justices sufficient to meet all and every kind of emergency would be a needlessly extravagant arrangement but we should try to secure that the permanent establishment is as nearly adequate as possible so that the occasions upon which recourse must be had to the services of temporary justices may be reduced to a minimum. This is the underlying idea in Section 3 of the Bill and is one which I believe will find a ready acceptance on all sides.

The second matter with which the Bill deals is concerned with the retiring age of district justices. Under Section 15 of the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act, 1946, all justices must retire on reaching the age of 65. The only exceptions to this rule are three of the present Dublin metropolitan justices and the present Cork City justice who have a right to remain on until 70 by virtue of a provision in the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. There is one other justice whose age of retirement was extended to 70, under Section 47 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936. This particular section empowered the Government to extend the retiring age of a justice assigned to an Irish-speaking district provided that the Government were satisfied that he was able to do the work of his courts through the medium of Irish and that he was not suffering from any disability which would render him unfit to continue to discharge the duties of his office.

The Bill, as originally introduced in the Dáil, proposed to confer power on the Chief Justice, after consultation with the Minister for Justice, to continue a district justice in office from year to year after he had attained the age of 65. The maximum period for which a justice might be so continued in office was to be five years and the justice would each year have to satisfy the Chief Justice that he (the justice) was not suffering from any disability which would render him unfit to discharge efficiently the duties of his office.

Somewhat to my surprise, I must confess, this proposal met with considerable criticism from members of the Opposition in the other House. It was argued that it was a mistake to reverse the decision which had been embodied in the Act of 1946, fixing a retiring age of 65 for all justices. I want to say, first of all, with reference to this particular criticism, that I do not accept the proposition that what we are proposing to do in the Bill amounts to a reversal of the 1946 decision.

Properly understood, the proposal in the Bill amounts to no more than a modification of the 1946 decision by getting rid of the inflexible rule of automatic retirement at 65, but subject to the provision of adequate safeguards with the object of securing that any justice who may be continued in office after 65 will be able to discharge his duties satisfactorily.

Apart from the provisions of Section 47 of the 1936 Act to which I have already referred, and which conferred power to extend the retiring age of justices assigned to Irish-speaking districts, a precedent for what is now proposed is also to be found in Section 35 of the Court Officers Act, 1926, which empowered the Minister for Justice, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, to extend the retiring age of county registrars up to 70. This latter power has been frequently availed of during the past 20 years.

While I myself am inclined to think that it is proper and desirable that the normal retiring age for justices should be 65, having regard to the nature of their duties and, in particular, to the amount of travelling that has to be done by justices in country districts, I may, perhaps, be permitted to recall that the Joint Committee of the Oireachtas, which in 1930 examined the working of the Courts of Justice Act, unanimously recommended that the age of retirement for district justices should be extended to 72.

It is true, of course, that that recommendation was not accepted by the Government of the day, and I would not myself be prepared to recommend to the Oireachtas that it should be accepted now. But if a committee of the Oireachtas, upon which all Parties were represented, apparently saw nothing wrong with a proposal that the normal retiring age for all justices should be 72, then I fail to see why the much more modest proposal contained in Section 2 of the Bill should evoke such strong criticism.

It was urged also in the Dáil that the duty of deciding whether a particular justice should be continued in office after reaching the age of 65 should not be entrusted to any one person, no matter how high his standing might be. In defence to the views expressed by the Leader of the Opposition in the Dáil I agreed to bring in on the Committee Stage an amendment which has been incorporated in the Bill now before the Seanad and the effect of which is to entrust the duty in question to a committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General.

Senators will, no doubt, have observed that provision is made in Section 2 for consultation with the Minister for Justice. This provision is considered desirable because there may be circumstances affecting the particular justice seeking an extension of his period of office or the position generally in the district court at the time of which the Minister for Justice might be aware and which it might be proper to bring to the notice of the committee before they decide to extend the retiring age of the justice. The committee, however, will have complete discretion in the matter and will not be bound by any representations or suggestions that might be made by the Minister.

There is only one other matter to which I wish to refer, and that is the repeal of Section 47 of the 1936 Act. With the enactment of Section 2 of the Bill there will no longer be any necessity for the Government to have power to extend the retiring age of justices in Irish-speaking districts. In fact, it would be clearly undesirable that there should be two separate authorities vested with the power to extend the retiring age of certain of the justices. The Bill accordingly proposes to repeal Section 47 of the 1936 Act.

Mr. Hawkins

The Minister when introducing this Bill gave a detailed outline of what it proposed to do, as well as increasing the number of district justices from 40 to 42. He made it plain that the passing of the Bill does not entail that permission is given for the appointment of a number of temporary justices, in addition to those already provided for. I think that we should have now reached the stage, having emerged from the emergency and all the legislation and court work that arose out of it, when there should be some decrease in court work, and that it would not be necessary to appoint additional justices. A stage should be reached when, at least, the services of those temporarily employed to get rid of arrears of court work could now be dispensed with. Has any consideration been given to that question, or is this Bill being rushed through both Houses before a redistribution of the court areas has been gone into?

I should like to know if there is any information available concerning the work discharged by district justices. I am quite sure that there must be many districts in which there is very little court work from one end of the year to the other, while in adjacent districts, as in the case of dispensary doctors, there would be a volume of arrears over a long period. I think that by carrying out a redistribution of work in court areas we might be able to avoid being asked to consider the appointment of additional justices. I should like to have heard that some attempt was made to provide the people with cheaper law and to extend the jurisdiction of district courts. It is well known that small, trifling, cases have to be sent to the circuit courts because district courts have not the necessary power to deal with them.

The introduction of this Bill should have been availed of to give the public a simple code of law, a code that would be less expensive for trifling cases, in which those interested have often to travel long distances from rural areas to attend Circuit Courts and also to employ counsel. As it seems to be the policy, we should avail of every occasion to go into such questions in the light of present circumstances. When the court areas were first carved out, the mode of transport that is now available, as well as other facilities, was not there. For these reasons I suggest that the matters I have referred to should be given serious consideration in the near future. I am sure that the Minister and the Department are aware of the position, and that being so, we must rely upon them, if they consider that additional justices are needed to expedite cases coming before the courts.

Another question that arises on this Bill is that—while the Bill has been improved since its introduction—concerning the retiring age, where Parliament agreed that 65 should be the retiring age. It is correct, of course, to say that provisions were made for districts in the Gaeltacht where it might not be possible to get a man capable of transacting business in Irish and where it might be essential for the existing justice to carry on for a number of years, provided he was capable of doing so. We know that the function of a district justice requires that a man be not so much physically fit as mentally clear. He must be a man who is clear and alert enough to take in the various arguments put forward and to give a sound judgment. It is very difficult to decide when a person is or is not in such a state of mind. This Parliament gave a measure, a measure that was to apply to all persons, which laid down as a basic rule that the retiring age should be 65. No good reason has been advanced by the Minister, to my mind, that we should depart from that decision now. We are making a provision for the appointment of additional persons. The case can nowhere be made that there are not able barristers and solicitors who are quite prepared and willing to take over the position of district justice. There is no lack of persons capable of filling the position, and there is no good reason for the extension of the age from 65 to 70.

We are to make provision in this Bill for one section of the people, a very small section which only comprises 40 persons at the present time and 42 when the Bill is passed. We are asked this, I understand, for one particular person. I am not interested in the individual as I do not know the person and it is not for any personal reasons that I am putting forward this argument. On the one hand, we are asked in this Bill to deviate from a principle which was accepted a few years ago, whereas on the other hand, we are compelling experienced civil servants, experienced employees of local authorities and heads of various Departments to retire at 65 as no provision is made for them. I hold that if we pass a Bill applying to one section, if we are to be consistent, we should apply it to all sections. We all hope at some time to reach the age of 65, and if a committee were appointed or if it were left to the Chief Justice to decide whether we should be accepted as being capable of carrying on, we would hope to be accepted. Having made a decision applying to all State and local authority employees, no case can be made, or has been made so far, for deviating from that policy in connection with district justices.

I should like to ask the Minister how many, if any, district justices have been retired under the 65 rule since this decision was made. If any have, I think an injustice has been done. If we are to change this regulation for one or two persons—or, as I said before, for one—or even for a greater number of people, if any person has been compelled to retire at the age of 65 I say that an injustice has been done to such a person. I do not wish to make any further case in connection with this because I think the House and the Minister understand that it is not a good thing to depart from an accepted principle and to leave to one, two or three people to decide whether an individual is capable of carrying on in such an important capacity. What will the qualification be?

It is improvement to have a committee rather than an individual to decide, but if that committee decides that A, who has reached the age of 65, is a fit person to maintain his position and if in a few weeks time the committee decides that B, whose application is before it, is not fit to occupy that important position, no matter how just their decision may have been, it will be suggested that that decision was influenced through some other channel rather than by the evidence before that body. I would advise the Minister at this stage to re-examine the question. If that re-examination is not going to be given, then I think that the only course open to the Minister is to open the door to all civil servants and all State and local authority employees who are or who will be affected, now or in the near future, by the rule of retirement at 65. If we do not do that we are doing an injustice and creating a favoured class of a small number of people.

I conclude with that and with the recommendation that at some stage the Minister and his Department might consider giving cheaper law and extending the areas and jurisdiction of the district court.

Mr. J.T. O'Farrell

I really do not think that any principle is involved in the Bill. It is rather a matter of expediency. I would suggest to the last speaker that the interests and welfare of district justices are not so much involved as the interests and convenience of the State. After all, any district justice who has been allowed to serve until the age of 65 has no genuine grievance if he is then asked to retire. If he is asked to stay longer it is not to oblige him but to enable the work of the courts to be done more effectively and more punctually than would otherwise be the case.

I do not see any consistency in allowing High Court judges to remain on until the age of 70 and in requiring district justices absolutely to retire at the age of 65. I fancy that the mental strain and the alertness necessary on the part of a High Court judge is just as great as on the part of a district justice and if the former is considered in all cases to be capable of discharging his judicial duties up to the age of 70 it is rather difficult to suggest a reason why a district justice should be finished at 65.

Of course, no two men are absolutely alike in physical or mental capacities. Some men are young at 70 while others are old at 50. I think it is sometimes a great pity to have a rigid rule that applies to all men in a particular class. The result is that you have to get rid of, and retire into the backwaters of oblivion, men with splendid capacities based on great experience who could render splendid service for some years longer just because a rule applies without exception. On the other hand, I think it essential that there should be some age at which men should have to retire, and 65 is a reasonable age. Some of us have had to retire at 60 without complaint, but it depends on the form of employment in which you are. If there is any post in which experience is of value and should not be lightly cast aside, it is on the judicial bench. This Bill would seem to be not for or against the interests of any particular set of individuals, but merely a matter of necessity where the work of the courts is concerned. Any justice who retired at present at the age of 65 would not, in those circumstances, have any complaint to make.

I do not know whether there is anything at all in the suggestion that this Bill has been brought in for the benefit of one person. I fancy that is not so. I feel that no Minister worthy of the name would be guilty of introducing a Bill to the Oireachtas for the benefit of one particular person, unless there were very special reasons for doing so. At any rate, that is beside the point. We accept the Bill on its merits, as the causes stated by the Minister seem to be ample justification for its introduction.

Mr. Lavery

I have only a few words to say on the Bill, which is one within a very narrow compass. Senator Hawkins referred to some matters not raised by the Bill. He did so only in order to suggest that they might be discussed or considered at some future date. That is a very dangerous line to take, because observations of that kind can be very provocative. It is very easy to state a particular point of view on some very important question, like that of cheaper law for the people, and then, having made your point, as if there was only one side to be put, to leave it at that. Some people think that cheap law is always bad law; some people think it is far better for district courts to have frequent sittings in various small places all through the country, so as to give quick and rapid decisions in small cases, and that you serve the needs of justice better by keeping the jurisdiction of the district court within reasonably low limits, in order to enable that to be done, rather than charge the district court with jurisdiction of a higher kind which would involve substantial sums for poor people, or comparatively poor people, who are entitled to have their cases very fully argued before they are decided. On this question, on which one could speak at great length, there are considerations to be taken into account on both sides. The matter is not raised by the Bill. Senator Hawkins has indicated one view and I feel I should indicate another, as I have done already, perhaps sufficiently, which is, that it may be better that the district court should be able to decide rapidly and, it is to be hoped, efficiently and justly, small cases.

There is also to be considered that the District Court has a tremendous body of work to do. It deals not only with civil cases within a limited jurisdiction but also with criminal cases of a very wide kind. Apart from that, it is its task to make a preliminary investigation in the case of indictable offences. I do not think it right to say that the district court in any part of the country is doing very little work. In fact, the experience of most district justices is that they are pretty hard worked and it is hard to find spare justices to take on when necessary to cover the volume of work at a particular time. Of course, these are not matters that arise under the Bill, which is a simple measure providing for an increase in the number of justices. Senator Hawkins has agreed that the Minister is the best judge of the number of justices that are necessary. That is obviously so. It is certainly within my knowledge, in the position I hold at present, that there are delays and that there have been complaints of delays, especially in Dublin and other districts, through the pressure of work and the inadequate number of justices available to deal with it. There are some cases—I do not say they amount to a public scandal but they show the situation exists—where people charged with offences, or who have cases to be tried, have to wait an unreasonable time before they are heard. There is no doubt that some increase is necessary, though, as the Minister said and as Senator Hawkins recognised, some ease may be obtained in the redistribution of court areas. That is a very difficult problem, which also will require legislation and will have to be considered separately. It does not arise at present.

One question which does arise is that of the retiring age for justices. It must be remembered that the judicial task is one specially calling for ripe experience and for the sound judgment that comes, or is thought to come, with mature years, and certainly ought not to be lost, as many members of the House will agree, as early as the age of 65. I had a very learned teacher at one time and one of his sayings was: "Man attains the use of commonsense at 30—if ever". I do not think age is a very good guide, but there has to be some general rule and there it is. The appointment of any judicial person does not take place until maturity, in the sense of 30 years at least or upwards, has been attained. That is quite different to servants of local authorities or civil servants, who commence their careers at 20 or perhaps earlier and who have a recognised career of 45 years before they attain the age of 65, at which time they have earned a pension which may or may not be adequate, but is at least some provision for their later years. It is not outside the experience of members of this House that civil servants who retire at the age of 60 or 65 are by no means spent forces and employ themselves very usefully and bring the benefit of their great experience and ability into other spheres of life, to their own advantage and that of the State. The civil servant who retires at 65 has by no means ended his useful career as a member of the community. It may be that his most valuable work is still to be done. Any of us can think of examples of men who retired at 65 and who have done useful work.

A judge is in a different position, whether he be a member of the District Court bench or in a higher position. The holding of his position is, in a sense, a disqualification for many spheres of activity. I can illustrate that from particular examples, if necessary. It is not a desirable thing that a man who has held judicial office should go back to the practice of the only profession which he is qualified to practice, the law. I do not say there is anything wrong in that. There is nothing wrong in it, and instances have occurred where retired judges in various courts have gone back to the practice of the profession. Although it may have happened, and it may not be a very serious thing in itself, it is in some degree undesirable. Certainly, for members of the judiciary to come back and practise in the courts in which they previously practised is highly undesirable. I could draw upon the fund of my experience to show that that view has been generally taken.

I have mentioned already that justices and judges are appointed at a later age than the age at which civil servants or employees of local authorities enter upon their careers. If they are appointed at the age of 45, they have 20 years' service at 65, and, if they are appointed at 50, they have 15 years' service at 65. They will have small pensions if they are retired arbitrarily and necessarily at 65. They will be in a degree unfitted for taking up any other career, because the practice of the law is practically the only career open to them and they are therefore in an entirely different position.

It has already been adverted to that judges of the Supreme Court, High Court and Circuit Court sit to the age of 72 in one case and the age of 70 in another. It has also been adverted to that justices in Irish-speaking districts may be continued in office until the age of 70, a clear recognition that their faculties are not considered to be dulled, even though they exercise their judicial functions through the medium of Irish. Irish has many virtues, but I do not know that it has any preserving qualities, that it preserves the brain from decay and that justices in Irish-speaking districts might be supposed to retain their intelligence to a later age than justices elsewhere. But the Dublin justices also sit to the age of 70, and a very strong case—a case which I would think is reasonable—could be made for fixing the age of retirement of all justices at 70. In these days, with the aid of medical science and the tenor of life in general, I think it is generally recognised that mental powers ordinarily do not decay at as early an age as 65. As Senator O'Farrell has said, men vary infinitely but one must make a general rule, and 70 seems to be the age at which it may be assumed that the ordinary man will still be able to bring to bear upon judicial problems, not only ripe experience, but a keen and alert mind.

Finally, the provision in the Bill is that the question of extending the career of a justice beyond 65 shall be dependent upon his continued capacity to discharge his work, which is to be certified by a committee. As the Bill was introduced it was provided that the Chief Justice, as head of the judiciary, should be the person to inquire into that matter and give the necessary certificate, and that he should do so after consultation with the Minister for Justice. It was, of course, highly desirable that the independence of the judiciary should be preserved and that this question should be determined not by any member of the Executive, but determined, and determinable only, by a member of the judiciary. It was thought, and, I think, rightly, that the Chief Justice was the proper person to do that.

An amendment was accepted in the Dáil by the Minister and now forms part of the Bill providing that, instead of this matter being inquired into by the Chief Justice, it shall be inquired into by a committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General. For myself, while I do not think the matter is one of any serious moment, I do not regard it as an improvement. I think it would have been better to have left it to the single individual who has to perform many functions of the kind in the control of the exercise of judicial office. I think he was the appropriate person. However, that is no longer under discussion and a committee is now proposed as the body which should deal with it.

Senator Hawkins made the point that this committee—and the individual, the Chief Justice, if it had remained his function—would be open to suggestions, if they passed one particular case and declined to pass another. I think it is sufficient to say that people holding responsible positions and entrusted with the discharge of responsible duties must be trusted to discharge these duties and if there are suggestions made against their bona fides, they ought, by virtue of their positions and the respect they ought to command, to be able to face up to these suggestions. There are judges deciding questions every day, from the highest to the lowest, and there is always a dissatisfied litigant —they cannot satisfy both sides. Justices and judges every day have to meet the imputations of persons who do not trust them, persons who may not trust them and who may say that they are influenced by some consideration other than the proper discharge of their duties.

Whether a man is a judge or holds any other position in life—a business executive, head of a company or carrying on his own business—he has to make decisions and do things which will be unpopular with somebody, and the only way in which the work of the State, the work of the courts or the work of business people can be carried on is by people standing up to their responsibilities and discharging their duties, and, if people impute improper motives to them, by repudiating the imputation and trusting that people of goodwill will believe that they have discharged their duties properly. I think that is sufficient answer to the point made by Senator Hawkins. I know that suggestions of the kind are made at times, but I do not think that any person who attains to the office of Chief Justice, President of the High Court, or, I hope, Attorney-General, will fail to discharge that duty, or even more onerous duties, or will fail to face with equanimity any suggestions of the kind that may be made.

Mrs. Concannon

I do not think the Minister had any great difficulty in making a case for the two material sections of this Bill. With regard to the matter of the maximum number of justices, everybody has acknowledged that no one can decide it so well as the Minister. He knows all the circumstances and these circumstances, as he outlined for us in his introductory speech, made it evident that at present we need more justices. He also pointed out that it is a maximum, and we may hope that, if our morals improve, that maximum need not necessarily be reached. Unfortunately, it does seem necessary at present, and it certainly obviates what everybody acknowledges was an undesirable thing—a perpetuation of the system of appointing temporary justices.

With regard to the power in Section 2 to extend the retiring age of certain justices, I read very carefully—I was interested for many reasons—the discussion in the Dáil and it seemed to me that the argument rather assumed that 65 was a sort of sacrosanct age. We know how that age got in. It is the retiring age in the Civil Service and, I think, for teachers. Unfortunately, it is not the legal retiring age for women teachers, who are very badly treated in this respect, and I should like to interject a protest on their behalf. At all events, that is how the age of 65 got in, but, as Senator O'Farrell and Senator Lavery have pointed out, in the case of these people, they go into the service young and continue in the service for a great number of years in order to quality for a pension. It may not be adequate, but at least it has some relation to their salary. That is not the case usually with district justices and it ought not to be the case because for a district justice you want somebody who has had a good deal of experience. You do not want, as somebody said in the other House, briefless barristers. District justices will be far more suited to their tasks if they have had experience and come to the position at a rather ripe age. If they do that, they cannot have very long periods of service if the guillotine is to fall at 65. I am sure that consideration weighed with the Minister, as it would weigh with me if I were in his place, in extending the age, under proper safeguards, as appears to be done in this Bill.

It is a particular procedure that I myself suggested—I am not sure whether it was on the Courts of Justice Bill or some other Bill—because there is a precedent in the practice of the universities. The retiring age for professors in the universities is 65, but governing bodies of the various colleges and the president of the college can, if they like, ask for an extension from year to year up to 70, which is being done in this Bill. I suggested that because I thought it would meet a great many difficulties. I was very pleased to find this provision in the Bill. I do not know whether I can claim maternity of it. It is commonsense. Anybody would have thought it. I am glad of it and I welcome it.

I would also point out that the post of district justice is one of the few positions open to solicitors. They are really the cinderellas of the legal profession. Barristers and others have all sorts of openings. We ought not to pare things down so much. We ought to give them a proper chance. Very often, if a solicitor takes a post as district justice, he has to give up whatever practice he has and, perhaps, a good practice. In one case that I know of the person concerned gave up a practice that he could have passed on to his son. He sacrificed that to serve his country in the very important and noble function of district justice.

Another argument that occurs to me is that if we make 65 the sacrosanct age for retiral, it is logical, if we want logic, to give old age pensions at 65. The theory underlying retirement at 65 is that everybody is past his best work and should be put on the scrap heap at 65. I do not see why old age pensions at 65 would not be perceived as a logical consequence.

For these reasons, I welcome the Bill and I am glad it passed through the other House. I am not in a position to judge as to whether it was an improvement or not—I think it was an improvement—to have the committee. A district justice would welcome the advice of colleagues such as the President of the High Court and the Attorney-General, and consultation with the Minister for Justice. I think all that gives proper safeguards. It is a good thing that district justices should be allowed to continue from year to year, under proper safeguards, for the public good.

General MacEoin

I am very grateful for the manner in which the Bill has been received. It would be a mistake for me to attempt to improve upon the advocacy of Senator O'Farrell, Senator the Attorney-General and Senator Concannon. They have argued as to why the Bill should be passed. I should like to say, for the information of Senators, that the question of the districts is under consideration. It is not an easy matter. We will have to bring in additional legislation and there is a question of the worsening of conditions of members of the judiciary which I do not want to go into but which could be rather difficult to overcome. While we hope, by this little token of goodwill, perhaps, to buy off, not one, but all of them, we might be able to do something that would be in their interests. I do not put that up as a reason for bringing in the Bill.

The reason for bringing in the Bill was to get rid of the permanent appointment of temporary district justices who were, as a matter of fact, mendicants on the doorsteps of an executive. They could not be free because they were being appointed now and then again, and all that sort of thing, and there was the danger that the independence of the judiciary was to some extent being undermined. We want to get rid of that. We hope that the number provided for in the Bill will be the most that we will require. There may be some unforeseen circumstances in which a district justice might get ill, or two or three might be ill at the same time. If that should happen and we are not able with the number we have to meet the requirements of the community, we will have to appoint a temporary district justice, but we hope it will be only to meet a very grave emergency or some unforeseen circumstances.

As I said in my opening statement, it was not possible to cover every situation that may arise, but we have gone as far as we can. We hope that with the development of time and the abolition of many restrictions that we have had the number of district justices may not be required, but I would point out that there were other courts in existence during the emergency which are not now operating. These courts did a lot of work with which the ordinary courts are now dealing. We want to get to normality as far as possible.

The question of the extension of the jurisdiction is being examined, and I know well that when the Bill is introduced to the Dáil dealing with districts and the extension of the jurisdiction, the Minister will not have as easy a time as he had on this Bill. There will be many points of view put forward with very great vigour, but there is no necessity for me to deal with that now. We hope that these temporary district justices, who will now be permanent, will do all the relief for holiday work and everything else, where necessary, and that where there are, as has happened in the City of Dublin, long cases where depositions have to be taken, there will be somebody who can be assigned to a job so that people will not be kept in custody and their constitutional rights infringed, except for the shortest possible time. It is a very important matter. I am doing my best and the Government is doing its best to give everybody, not only good administration of the law, but speedy and equitable administration of the law. For that reason, I recommend the Bill to the House for acceptance.

Question put and agreed to.

Committee Stage ordered for Thursday, 12th May, 1949.