I move amendment No. 3:—
To delete sub-section (7), lines 24-32.
Sub-section (7) of Section 7 provides:—
"(a) where a person who is a member of the board becomes a member of either House of the Oireachtas, he shall, upon his becoming entitled, under the Standing Orders of that House, to sit therein, cease to be a member of the board.
(b) a person, who is for the time being entitled under the Standing Orders of either House of the Oireachtas to sit therein, shall be disqualified from being a member of the board."
That is the sub-section that, I suggest, should be deleted from the Bill. I think this raises a question of rather general constitutional interest affecting other boards besides this board, but anything I have to say will apply simply to the Transport Board, which is the subject of this Bill. With the growth of boards of this kind, and with the expansion in the number of organisations in semi-public ownership, the number of people engaged in the management of the public services will become greater and greater. I for one, cannot see why such people should be excluded from taking part in the public life of the country in other ways if they wish. I cannot see it. I do not say there are no reasons. The reason I put down this amendment was partially in order to tempt the Minister, or invite the Minister, to elucidate this question and to state what the reasons are for putting this into the Bill, because, certainly to me, at any rate, the reason is not self-evident. It does not stand there without any proof, and I would like to know what the reason is. I think it probably is some sort of subconscious recollection of the great parliamentary controversies of the 18th century, both in this country and in England, where there was a question of the pressure by the Crown on the Executive and the principle came into our parliamentary life that place-men should be excluded from the Legislature and that people holding for profit under the Crown should be ineligible to sit in the House of Commons or present themselves for election. I cannot help feeling that some notion of that kind underlies the insertion of this provision in this and other Bills which we have had in recent years in this country. I cannot help feeling that at the present time in the circumstances of this country these provisions might easily introduce a very undesirable wedge between business and public life. One of the advantages of our parliamentary system up to the present has been that it has not been entirely run by professional politicians. There were people who have taken part in the discussions in the Houses of Parliament who have been very experienced in the business and professional world, in "the city", in agriculture, and so on. I think that has greatly enriched the quality of parliamentary life and the value of the opinions of the members of various Houses of Parliament.
The tendency at the present time, in this country and elsewhere, whether we like it or not, is towards a greater degree of public operation and control of essential services. We have the Central Bank Board, the members of which are debarred from the Oireachtas, we have the Electricity Supply Board, and now we have this board, and I have no doubt that we will have a number of other boards in the future. I think it is desirable that the Seanad should consider the propriety of exclusion of this kind when these boards are being set up. The supply of first-class business ability in this country is not unlimited, and may not be so very great; and it does seem to me to be rather a pity, rather a waste, if people who have qualities which are suitable for the running of these gigantic commercial undertakings should be deprived of the possibility of contributing their share to the public life of the country. I think it is undesirable from the public point of view. I would have thought that the proceedings in the Dáil or Seanad would be added to by the presence of people who had first got experience of the running of big undertakings, such as the railways, the Central Bank, and services of that kind. I also think that people in these boards might, possibly, have a certain amount of experience, might gain a certain amount of experience, might gain a certain amount of general knowledge of things outside their specialised functions by taking part in parliamentary discussions, by coming to the Dáil or Seanad and hearing what people of other outlooks had to say. In other words, unless there is some political or constitutional reason for this divorce between these two functions, it seems to me that, on the face of it, it is capable of doing more harm than good.
I would like to know from the Minister what is the reason for the insertion of this provision in the Bill because, I take it, it is put in for some considered reason, and I would like to know what the considerations are. From the point of view of the individual (because I have already tried to state it from the point of view of the community) from the point of view of the individual, it seems it is an unfair choice, that a man of ability and ambition, a man who has shown qualities necessary to rise to the top of his own profession, selected to represent various interests on these great national industries, and national boards, should be excluded from public life. It seems to me an unfair choice that a man should have to make. Why should a man be excluded from public life, from taking part in parliamentary activities and debates, from going on the ladder which might lead to ministerial office in the Government of the country, simply because he is giving his services to one of the nationalised industries? It seems to me rather unfair. On the other hand, why should a man who elects to serve his country in Parliament by being a member of the Dáil or Seanad, why should he be excluded from a whole range of profitable occupations from which he is not excluded under the present system of privately-owned railways, and so on? It seems to me that it is putting a certain curb on legitimate ambition and depriving certain able people from serving their country in two directions instead of one.
Senator Counihan moved an amendment which attempted to define some of the qualifications of some of the members of the board and that, I think, is very reasonable. It would not be at all unreasonable if the legislation setting it up were to state certain qualifications and the sort of people who could be appointed. The Central Bank Act of 1942 contains a definition of the people who can be appointed to the board. Three of them are banking directors and the other five are persons who are experienced in agriculture, trade or commerce and, in addition, two of these may be civil servants. Parliament has, to some extent, at least, circumscribed the discretion of the Minister in setting up that board. Here we have no positive definition at all. The Minister for Industry and Commerce—I do not refer to the present Minister; as was said earlier, there will be many other Ministers in future—has complete unfettered discretion to appoint anybody he likes. Certain negative qualifications are set down: the Minister cannot appoint a bankrupt, a convicted criminal, a person who lives outside Ireland or a person who is not an Irish national, a person who is certified insane or a person who is a member of the Dáil or Seanad. In other words, we are left among the ineligibles and not amongst the eligibles. That seems to me to be scarcely flattering to us as a House or to the other House of the Oireachtas.
However, I do not propose to delay the House on the matter. As I say, it does seem to me to raise a question of rather wide constitutional importance. With the growth of nationalisation, is there going to be an ever-growing wedge driven between business and public life? If a man decides to serve his country in one capacity, is he to be excluded from serving it in another? There may be reasons for such an exclusion. I want to know what they are and that is why I put down the amendment.