I suppose the Taoiseach included in his reasons that the credit squeeze was to a large extent responsible for unemployment because it is quite certain that, before the Garden of Eden had vanished and Eden along with it, unemployment had begun to mount. The cause of unemployment—I think it is a platitude of the economists — is insufficient total expenditure within the framework of the economy. During a credit squeeze, I think it is equally incontestable that expenditure is reduced within the economy. A credit squeeze thus helps to increase unemployment and I for one do not believe you can stem unemployment by large scale unemployment relief schemes, unless you relax in many respects the credit squeeze. Therefore, the immediate initiation of large scale unemployment relief schemes, in my opinion, calls for the immediate relaxation of the credit squeeze; otherwise. I think you are operating two directly opposed policies. On the one hand, by the granting of, say, £1,000,000 here and there, you are closing or endeavouring to close one floodgate of unemployment, and, on the other hand, by operating a credit squeeze, you will leave open two larger floodgates of unemployment.
I would say that the immediate relaxation of the credit squeeze would involve such steps as telling local authorities to go ahead with certain schemes they have already planned and for which in many cases they have obtained sanction and which are held up through the operation of the credit squeeze. I do not think there is any lack of schemes. Many local authorities have schemes all ready to be put into operation.
I think, further, that such institutions as the Irish Sugar Company and the E.S.B. have schemes that only await sanction or finance to go ahead with. I think that the credit squeeze to a large extent has been responsible for the hold-up of these schemes. The Taoiseach at Cork announced that he recognised the necessity for dealing with the unemployment situation. He announced that £1,000,000 would be made available for immediate works of a productive character as an unemployment relief measure.
While I welcome the granting of that money, I would suggest that it is completely inadequate. In the short space of time at my disposal, I do not propose to speak too long as I am sure there are other Senators who would like to say something on the matter. I think that the £1,000,000 is largely fictitious. When you deduct certain sums payable to certain institutions, as a matter of fact, only between £250,000 and £500,000 are available for productive employment.
Further, I would point out that the effect of this expenditure in reducing unemployment is largely, to my mind, counteracted by the credit squeeze. In one particularly glaring example, there has been a reduction of £600,000 in the moneys available for the provision of employment in rural areas during the winter months — a reduction of £600,000 from the figure granted for these equivalent months during the period 1955-56. I am not sure whether it is necessary to say how that sum is made up. Roughly £500,000 of it was for supplementary road grants and £50,000 for local authority works grants. The other £50,000 is made up of various sums.
The point I am making is that, therefore, the unemployment situation is unlikely, I hold, to be remedied by the measures already proposed and, again, the credit squeeze is largely to blame. What is needed is obviously large-scale unemployment relief schemes necessitating large-scale expenditure. I do not believe this can be provided without an immediate change in financial policy.
This brings me to my last point. Large-scale unemployment relief schemes cannot be introduced, even for an interim period, without immediate financial measures designed to direct capital investment. An Taoiseach in his speech in Cork has correctly argued, I think, that any large-scale reduction in unemployment must be based on national development. He has gone on to argue, in turn, that this must be based on increased investment. He restricted himself a little too much, I think, in emphasising the part which savings must play in this investment and in devoting a considerable part of his speech to an appeal to private investors to repatriate at least part of their foreign investments. I have one or two observations which I intend to make on this point, in conclusion.
First of all, I would say that interim large-scale employment schemes are impossible without adequate direction of capital investment. Capital investment of the kind required, I hold, and hold very strongly, cannot be financed purely out of savings, even if our savings were at present at the maximum figure. On the contrary, they are at present declining, and, over the past four years, they have been reduced by, I think, £70,000,000 in 1953 to something like £47,000,000 in 1956. I hold that, during the credit squeeze, savings are likely to decline further.
Again, we find contrary policies operating. On the one hand, people are urged, and urged very rightly, to save, but, on the other hand, the restriction of credit undoubtedly causes them to eat into their savings. Therefore, I submit, finally, that large-scale unemployment relief schemes necessitating large scale expenditure can be financed adequately only when the Government acts through the Central Bank to control the investment policy of the commercial banks. The establishment of the Investment Board provides some evidence that this may be done, but its power seems to be largely advisory and I think the crisis demands very urgently that power must be used to control the investment policy of the commercial banks. I think that step is as necessary to short-term interim planning as it is to long-term planning for ten or 15 years.
In conclusion, I would say simply that, as part of my request to the Government to initiate immediately large scale unemployment relief schemes, I would urge that in order to do so they should relax the credit squeeze, where relaxation is necessary in order to promote employment and, secondly, that they should take immediate steps, acting in consultation with the Central Bank, to control the direction of policy of investment of the commercial banks.