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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 12 Mar 1959

Vol. 50 No. 15

An Bille um an Tríú Leasú ar an mBunreacht, 1958—An Coiste (Atogáil). Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 1958—Committee Stage (Resumed).

Tairgeadh an Cheist arís: "I gCodanna I agus II, go bhfanfaidh fo-alt 2º d'alt 2 mar chuid den Sceideal."
SCHEDULE—SECTION 2.2º.
Question again proposed: "That in Parts I and II, sub-section 2º of Section 2 stand part of the Schedule."

This is the sub-section that provides that members shall be elected on the system of the single non-transferable vote. The whole debate to my mind, so far, has shown what I said on the Second Reading to be true, that the decision to try to establish a system of election on the single non-transferable vote was taken first and that the arguments were found later. This is clear from the confused, limited and often contradictory case that has been made by the sponsors of the Bill. I propose to give just a few of the many examples of confusion and contradiction that are apparent.

In order to prove that P.R. has not worked satisfactorily in this country, the sponsors of this Bill have been arguing that P.R. has not worked in other countries. They have produced a series of examples from all over the world that have no relation to the kind of P.R. operated here. We have been told that there are some 300 varieties of P.R. and last night Senator Lenihan told us that no P.R. system in the world is like ours. Surely there is confusion and contradiction here. If, out of all the 300 systems, we have a unique one, it seems to be rather futile to spend so much time in this debate arguing that P.R. did not work in those other countries where it bears no relation to our own P.R. system. If the P.R. system here is unique, it seems to me it is wrong to suggest also that the P.R. system here is an English system. If the P.R. system which we have is, as Senator Lenihan tells us, unique, then it must be Irish.

Secondly, there is the fact that it was solemnly enshrined in our Constitution. I say that unique system was solemnly enshrined in our Constitution by referendum and all through this debate we are being told how important and solemn a thing it is for the people to decide an issue in a referendum. The people decided in the enactment of the Constitution that P.R. was to be the system of election and they decided, in doing so, that it was our Irish system.

Surely these are examples of inconsistency and, I suggest, waste of time. When I made the case on the Second Reading and illustrated how the straight vote system had not worked democratically in England or in Northern Ireland, the Minister in his reply suggested that if I thought that way, it would be advisable for me to go and lecture the English people on their system. That is very inconsistent on his part because we have been told by the sponsors and supporters of the Bill of all the wrong things that are happening in France and Italy and South America. If the Minister is to be consistent, it would seem to me that for us to suggest to his own Party that they should go on a lecture tour to tell the people of Italy and France about this subject would be just as relevant as that he should suggest that I make a tour of England.

I do not intend to make a tour of England or America. I am here as an Irish Senator and I shall do my duty, so far as I see it, in opposing the removal of P.R. here. I do not propose to concern myself with whether or not the English do wrong. I think they do, or it may be right for them, but it certainly is not right for us and I am going to confine my efforts, such as they are and limited as they are, to my own country.

As it happens, I do go to England quite a lot and I happen to know a number of political people. Strange to say, they are not Conservatives and they are not Labour. On several occasions, I have been asked to speak on the subject of P.R. in a certain constituency in England, but I refused to do so. I said it would be quite wrong for me to go to another country and start criticising their system of government which is a matter for themselves. I have gone to meetings there and listened to the speeches, but although I was several times asked to go on the platform and say a few words, I declined to do so, and, I think, rightly.

Another example of confusion—it may be due to seeing the same thing in different ways, which I suppose is quite human and natural—was this. Senator Mullins, in a very painstaking effort, traced the history of British elections since the beginning of the century. I was not quite sure what he was trying to prove, but, to my mind, he did prove that the straight voting system operated in England and which it is proposed to bring in here, eliminated small Parties and Independents, so that in Britain they are eventually left with only a Labour Party and a Tory Party and a negligible number of Liberals, in spite of the fact that the Liberals got a considerable number of votes. I do not think there is a single Independent in the House of Commons, unless those who are rebels from the two big Parties and who will inevitably vanish at the next election. A.P. Herbert recently put his name forward as an Independent candidate, but I heard him say on television that he was a realist and that he would be wasting his time going up, that his only chance was to go up as a candidate for one or other of the Parties. Therefore, he withdrew his candidature.

To my mind, Senator Mullins proved one thing—I do not know whether it was what he was trying to prove—and that it is that as a result of the single non-transferable vote, England had got just two big Parties, one completely Right and one completely Left. They have this swing from nationalisation to denationalisation, this swing from the public ownership of council houses to the enunciation that people should own their own houses. You have these amazing Right and Left swings which achieve anything but the stability we are told this type of vote would achieve here.

The sponsors of this Bill see nothing wrong in eliminating small Parties and Independents. They more or less blatantly said that. That is the difference between us and the supporters of this Bill and this sub-section. They see nothing wrong in that and we do. We think it is a most dangerous and undemocratic thing to wipe out small Parties and Independents.

As I am on the English system, I should like to revert once more to the effect the single vote has on the creation of safe seats. There is no doubt at all about it. This system creates a very large number of safe seats. It means, in practice, that a large number of the electorate never get a chance of doing anything about their representation, either Party representation or individual representation. It is well known both in the Tory Party and the Labour Party that people are allowed to have safe seats for life. The electors are reduced to rubber stamps.

Let us deal with the case of Northern Ireland. Ministers of all our Governments and their individual supporters have expended many words, hours and a lot of travel time in reviling the system which prevails in the North. On this question of safe seats, the position there is interesting. Senator Mullins usually does not attach much importance to this question of safe seats. He always rather questions the accuracy of the number of safe seats created by this form of voting. I should like to quote something already quoted from The Indivisible Island by Frank Gallagher, in which he says:

"In the ten local elections in urban areas since Partition, the average of uncontested seats in Northern Ireland from 1923 to 1955 was 59.6 per cent. The average in local elections..."

—which I presume will come here if this goes through——

"...in rural areas was the amazing percentage of 94.9 per cent., that is 95 seats in every 100 in the local government bodies in the rural areas never have been contested in almost a generation."

Can anybody say that is a good system? I agree with the strictures we have directed towards the system of government in Northern Ireland, but it is very inconsistent and blind to turn around now and say we will adopt that system, thereby cutting the ground from under all the arguments we have been using for so many years. It is really astonishing that such a proposal should be brought seriously forward and presented to us, as it has been, in such a way that we on this side are made to feel that we are resisting progress, stability and democracy. Once you establish the safe seat for any Party, it means, in effect, that the candidates for those seats are selected by the Party. You might as well not have the electorate at all. You might as well turn it over to the Party Whips.

There is another point which I do not think has been referred to. We are told that one of the most important things we shall have as a result of the single non-transferable vote is an obvious and clear alternative Government. I suggest that is not true at all. Unfortunately, wrong arguments in this case will come home to roost. The Government are taking a very serious and dangerous step in pushing this Bill through. They may have very red faces when the next election comes. They laugh at it now, but it is practically mathematically demonstrable that there may be an Opposition so small that it may not provide an alternative Government or a shadow Cabinet of Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries.

Suppose the Opposition were composed of 40 members or less, representing three or four different Parties, or at least two Parties, Labour and Fine Gael. Where will you get an alternative Government there? This whole thing was designed to do away with small Party Government and Coalition Government. The fact is that the only shadow alternative Government it will inevitably create is a Coalition Government. You would require about 20 to fill the ministerial positions and the positions of Parliamentary Secretaries, not to mention the Party Whips and other essential officials. This is one of the most dangerous things that will emerge. It will be too late when that happens, and it will not be any consolation for us to say that we told you so.

Finally, I should like to say I do not think our system of P.R. is perfect. We have been faced, as the sort of logical conclusion of supporting P.R., with having only one constituency in the whole country. We are not arguing that. We are not out-and-out proportionalists in a purely mathematical frame of mind. We stand for the system we have at present, with all its faults and limitations. We know it is not perfect, but we think it is the best thing. The Taoiseach himself said in the past that it is quite a good form of election. We think it is the best form of election and that the one now being proposed is a bad form of election, in itself, and very bad for this country.

I have listened to this question being debated for several months in the Dáil and Seanad. Out of all these debates, there is one thing which seems very clear to me, that is, that the most undesirable feature which the Opposition see in this measure is that it forces prospective coalitions to make their bargains before an election, rather than afterwards. One Leader of an Opposition Party in the Dáil complained very bitterly about this and claimed that the Opposition groups had a right to make a deal; that we had not the right to prevent them but that this straight vote would prevent them. The leader of another principal Party here in the Seanad complained that the idea was to force bargains beforehand, as he put it——

Give the quotation.

——to force bargains to be made before elections, thus giving the individuals the power to blackmail the other Parties. Running through all this is the same idea, that the coalition groups do not want to be forced to bargain before elections. They want to wait until the electors have elected their candidates —no matter on what policy or on what plea—then the bargains would be struck afterwards. Another opponent of the change, in the Seanad, complains that by means of this proposed change, we would force Parties to make pre-election pacts in every constituency, as he put it.

On a point of order, would the Minister quote the passages from the people whom he is accusing of having made such statements? He stated that a Leader of the Opposition has complained about a certain matter and he should give the quotation.

I gave the quotations before and I am quite prepared to give them again. I want to complete the statement that I was making, that another opponent here complained that the proposed change would force Parties to make pre-election pacts in every constituency and he complained that this type of bargaining, before the elections, would, as he put it, debase Irish political life. There was no complaint about the bargaining after the elections. This gentleman wanted Fianna Fáil to continue to refrain from coalescing but to be there as convenience so that the others would coalesce. As he objected to bargains before the elections, he could not ever get a coalition formed unless there was bargaining at some time, and if it was not before the election, it would have to be afterwards.

We did not get the quotations yet.

P.R. when it runs its full course in a country, and when its evil influences are not fought in the same way as they were fought here by a very intelligent electorate and appealed to by a very intelligent Party, tends to create this multiplicity of small Parties. That is admitted by everybody—by the Leader of the Opposition in the Dáil and by the various groups here—and no one of these small Parties can, of themselves, form a Government, except by an extreme tolerance on the part of all the other Parties in the Dáil. Therefore, they must get elected by the people on the assumption that they are going to form a coalition and they do not tell the people—they cannot tell the people—ahead of time what the Coalition Government's policy is going to be, whether it is nailing the Union Jack to the mast, or nailing the Republican flag to the mast. No one knows of the compromises or how they are going to work out.

No one knows when the blackmailing starts after they have formed a Government, or of the threats that the Government will be overthrown, if one small group or another does not get its way. No one knows, or can foretell, what will happen in such circumstances. If the small groups themselves cannot tell, what chance has the electorate who are appealed to to vote for them on various pleas during an election period? They have none and, in fact, it could be said that the result of P.R., the type of government it creates, is the unknown coalition of rather small groups and the type of Ministry it creates, in the control of various Government Departments by the unknown nominees of these various groups.

We know that in the coalitions that operated, the nominees of the small Parties behaved like the independent princes, running their own little bailiwick without consulting their colleagues in the Government and often announcing policies that their colleagues in the coalitions had never heard of. The Leader of the Government, the Taoiseach, could not carry out, or deprived himself of his powers of carrying out, his constitutional function of selecting the Deputies to hold the positions of the various Ministries, and of keeping to himself the right to dismiss them, if they did not function, as he thought, well.

When it is boiled down, P.R. has worked out disastrously in a number of other countries and would work out here in the same way, but for the opposition of Fianna Fáil supporters throughout the country and the Fianna Fáil Party. It works out most undemocratically. Democracy, if it is to be real and true, should give the people some rights to decide policy, some right to decide who is to control their destiny for the period of five years. The average voter has no chance in the world to give these decisions when there are nothing but small Parties offered. The Parties themselves cannot tell what the coalition's policy is going to be, so they cannot definitely and clearly indicate to the voter to whom they are appealing for support what the policy is to be.

It can be said that P.R., instead of operating so that people can rule, functions in a manner that enables the leaders of small Parties to rule. It is not government of the people, by the people and for the people, as true democracy should be, but it is government of the people by small Parties and for the small Parties. The number of small Parties we have here do not go to the trouble of becoming any bigger because they find they can jog along nicely without killing themselves. They can get nine or ten seats and that guarantees them a couple of Ministries in a Government. That is all right for the small Parties and the leaders of the small Parties, if their ambition lies that way, but it is very bad for the country.

If we are to have real progress, we should have real and practical debates between a Government and their alternative, whether that alternative is the large Party or a traditional group of small Parties recognised as being the alternative Government. But we cannot get that if the people are confused by a great number of small Parties, each shouting loudly and demanding the implementation of policies which, when they are all added together, are impossible to implement within any reasonable period.

The system of election that forces a number of these small groups to come together, if they are willing to come together, under a single banner or to keep traditionally together so that people will know that, if they are elected, they will form a Government, is a good electoral system. We cannot debate in the Dáil and the Seanad all the points of interests of 3,000,000 people. There must be some way of debating at a lower level certain of the items that come up for political decision. The fewer and the more major the type that come ultimately to be debated in Parliament, the better for national progress.

It can rightly be claimed that if there is a system of election that will tend to create here two Parties, each of which is broadly representative of the various sections of the community, as they are in Britain, Canada, New Zealand or the United States, then those Parties would debate at constituency level, club level or county level within their organisation and resolve many difficulties that should be resolved dealing with a number of complaints and satisfying many individuals who have a right to have their complaints heard and dealt with, or have explained to them the difficulties of having their complaints dealt with satisfactorily or the difficulties in the way of a satisfactory solution. The straight vote system tends to create that general type of organisation and that is why we are proposing it. We believe it will be helping our country and that we are bound to make more progress than we could possibly make under P.R. if it is allowed to run riot in Ireland, as it ran riot in other countries.

We have had the experience of the proportional system running riot in other countries. We do not have to rely on the evidence we can produce here. No one can deny that P.R. did in fact create the weaknesses of which Hitler took advantage to impose upon the German people the dictatorial régime he imposed on them. No one can deny that Mussolini came into power in a similar way. No one can deny that a few months ago the system of government they had in France collapsed because of the weaknesses of the proportional system.

They have no proportional system in France since 1946.

I have given the evidence of the French proportional system in the Dáil and I do not wish to hold up this debate by repeating it. Anybody who wants to know of this system of P.R. that was in France last year can look up the official journal of the French Republic: Le Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise of 2nd October, 1956. They had the proportional list system all over the country, except in some cases where it was rather nearer to our system.

In other words, it did not apply to the whole country.

Our type of P.R. was in operation wherever Communists were strong in large cities or portions of large cities. The proportional system applied to all the rest of the country. There were nine or ten seats in a constituency, and if the allied parties got a majority of the votes, they could take all the seats and divide them among themselves, among the Parties who combined to get a majority, according to the number of votes each of these Parties got.

Combining before the election?

They had to combine before the election.

You suggest that here?

No, I do not suggest it at all. I think it was unfortunate that they had the proportional list system in France. The French people are a bit like ourselves; they can put up with a lot and the French are dealing with that problem, and we are dealing with it here.

I think the Minister said, but I do not think he meant it, that the French in certain parts had our system. I think it is true to say they never had P.R., with the single transferable vote, in any constituency ever.

Yes, they had, in certain constituencies—in the outskirts of Paris.

With the single transferable vote?

I would question that.

I can show the Senator the evidence. I can assure him that in the elections there were certain constituencies in which the Communists were strong and in which they had the proportional system with the single transferable vote, but in the rest of the country, they had this other system apparentment, or the proportional list system. If an allied group of Parties got a majority, they could take over all the seats in the constituency and divide them up proportionately according to the number of votes each group got.

Will the Minister——

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

What is this now?

It is a question. Is not what the Minister describes—those pre-election pacts, with the groups coming together and taking all the seats afterwards—exactly what he recommends here—that there should be these pre-election pacts and then the two large groups here and whoever gets a majority taking all the seats in a single constituency? Is that not precisely what they have in France and what the Minister says caused the downfall of France?

I am sorry if the Senator cannot follow me. What we are proposing is to get rid of the election system which postpones the bargaining until the votes have been obtained. If there are to be bargains, the people should have a say in them. After all, this is a democracy and in a democracy policy should be subject to the rule of the people and they should have some say in the type of bargaining they are promoting by their votes.

My point is that there is no difference between what the Minister recommends here and what he disagrees with in France.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

I suggest the Minister should be allowed to proceed. If Senators want to put counterpoints, they can do so when the Minister sits down.

I do not intend to debate this matter because I think it is quite obvious to any person that there is a fundamental difference. One of the very healthy effects of the straight vote system is that it will force the smaller groups to make their bargains beforehand. They will not afterwards be in a position to blackmail. I am sure there are other Senators who want to speak and I do not want to take up any further time. I feel the people will understand what is involved in this referendum. The Seanad itself has given a demonstration to the voters which shows that the people may consider themselves very lucky in getting an opportunity to decide this for themselves. But for the fact that Fianna Fáil have such a majority in the Dáil, the people would never get that opportunity. We believe very strongly it is the people who ought to decide what their system of election is to be.

Recently during the debate on this amendment in the Dáil Fine Gael objected to the system of election being frozen, as they put it, in the Constitution. The system of election was deliberately frozen into the Constitution by Fianna Fáil in 1937, but it was pointed out that if it did not work out fully satisfactorily, there was another clause in the Constitution which gave the people a right to amend the Constitution and to change the electoral system. When we froze it into the Constitution, we did so because we did not want to allow purely temporary majorities in the Dáil and Seanad to tinker with the electoral system. The system of election is of such vital importance that the people themselves should be called on to take a hand in deciding what it is to be.

We are proposing to freeze this change in the Constitution so that it cannot be amended and played about with for purely temporary Party advantage, by a temporary majority in the Dáil or Seanad. The people will appreciate the opportunity they are being given and when they come to vote, they will express their confidence in the proposals Fianna Fáil are making to amend the Constitution. They will get rid of a system of election that very adversely affected three of the greatest nations in Europe, and substitute for it, a system which has operated successfully in three or four of the most successful democracies for over 100 years and for 200 years in some of them.

On a point of order, is there some kind of agreement about taking a vote at 12.30, or am I wrong in that impression? I was not here when it was decided in the House.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

The Leader of the House is not present, but I think our intention was that if the debate on the Referendum Bill concluded, we would go on to discuss the Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill.

May I urge Senators to exercise restraint in the hope of coming to a decision before 1 o'clock?

An attempt is being made to arrive at an arrangement within the next few minutes to have the vote before 1 o'clock.

Thank you, Sir.

The Minister intended to give certain references to what the Leader of the Opposition and other members of the House said in regard to pre-election pacts. I think the Minister probably has forgotten to do so.

I gave them in my Second Reading speech here, but I shall repeat them, if the Senator wishes.

I should be very glad.

At column 1077, Volume 171, of the Official Report of 26th November, 1958, Deputy Norton, the Leader of the Labour Party in the Dáil, said:—

"If you elect one in the single member constituency on the single transferable vote, then two Parties can make a deal and their combined votes would put out the other person....

"It is because even that door is closed that I am more convinced than ever that this Bill is a political hoofle."

At column 264, Volume 50, of the Official Report of the Seanad Debates, Senator Hayes said:—

"That is the idea; you must bargain beforehand, give individuals power to blackmail."

The Minister has not yet given the reference to the Leader of the Opposition.

There is another quotation from Senator Quinlan on 5th March, at column 1109:—

"The worst feature of all this proposed change is that by means of a single seat constituency, you force Parties to pre-election pacts in every constituency and county. That, surely, is a type of bargaining that we should not introduce or debase our Irish political life with."

The Minister has not yet quoted the Leader of the Opposition on the subjects of pre-election pacts. He did not gives us that reference.

I did; I gave the blackmail reference.

The Minister quoted Deputy Norton.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

He was referring to Senator Hayes.

The Minister was not clear on that.

I could take five or ten hours at least in tracing all the absurdities that have crept into this debate during the past few days, but I want to be brief. First of all, it is as well to emphasise to Senator Lenihan and others that what we have here is our own. It is an Irish system, devised for Irish conditions and it has worked well under Irish conditions. Let us not forget that and, if we want classification of the electoral systems, the only feasible classification is, one, the Irish system—the one we have, the one we are proud of—and, two, the Belfast system. That is the only classification that conveys meaning.

I take grave exception to what Senator Lenihan has suggested about lunatic candidates. That was one of the flags he waved, and it is a flag that was waved by the Minister as well. We all take grave exception to that. In my home constituency of Cork, who are the lunatic candidates, according to Senator Lenihan's classification? First of all, you have two candidates for Fine Gael, Mr. Birmingham and Senator Barry. I need not tell anybody in this House that Senator Barry is one of the most respected citizens we have in Cork and I resent, and I think the House should deeply resent, anyone referring to Senator Barry as a lunatic candidate. The candidate on the Fianna Fáil ticket who had the lowest poll for two years was Donal J. Daly. Again, I think the Fianna Fáil Party should resent having him classified by a Fianna Fáil spokesman as a lunatic candidate. After all, they saw fit to appoint him a director of the Sugar Company in August 1958. Is it that they appoint only lunatic candidates to such posts?

I just could not grapple with Senator Lenihan's weird distortion of the P.R. system. Is it possible that he does not understand it? I sat for hours listening to him, and I think the best way to deal with him on that subject is through the columns of the newspapers. In the newspaper reports, the people will see the muddled thinking that is activating the supporters of this Bill, but I would point out that by changing the system, we are heading into very dangerous waters. Less than 50 per cent. of our people are living in rural areas, so that now the stage is being set when it will be good politics for a Party to lean towards the urban section of the community, and play one section of the community against another.

The proposed change sets the stage for class warfare, so that by appealing to the urban sections and by prescribing all sorts of hairshirt remedies for the farmers—such as they have got in the last year or so—a Party can seek to secure the support of the less intelligent section of the urban vote. Such a Party, if it can get 40 per cent. of the votes in an urban community, under the single seat, non-transferable vote system, is almost certain of winning in 95 per cent. of the urban constituencies. If that happens in 85 to 90 per cent. of the urban constituencies, such a Party can be returned with a majority in Dáil Éireann and take over the Government. It can thumb its fingers at the rural sections of the community, something that no Party has been able to do up to this. Thank God, P.R. has made our Parties appeal to all sections of the community and has not encouraged them to play-off one section against another.

However, with the proposed change, 40 per cent. of the vote in urban constituencies will give a majority to a Party in Dáil Éireann, and that Party can afford to show antagonism towards rural Ireland. In that event, 40 per cent. or 60 per cent. of the constituencies can give a majority and that is less than a 25 per cent. minority. That is the Frankenstein monster that is being brought into Irish political life.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

It would be well for the Senator to address the Chair.

A lot of play has been made with conditions in the North and I think I could quote no greater authority to the Government Party than the present Chairman of their own Parliamentary Party, Deputy Joseph Brennan who, when speaking at the inter-Parliamentary Union meeting held in London, in September, 1957, spoke as an Irishman. We applauded him; we were all with him. The Leas-Cheann Comhairle was present also. The motion down for discussion was "The Control of Parliament over Government," and Deputy Brennan spoke against Partition. We have been told here that all we need is a Government, and we can forget about Parliament, but that was the motion under debate. Deputy Brennan, as reported on page 814 of the report of the inter-Parliamentary Union, stated:—

"Take a region of say, 1,250,000 people, divided into a heterogeneous"

—that is, the Unionists—

"and a homogeneous group,"

—that is, the Nationalists—

"as I have mentioned, the heterogeneous group consisting of 60 per cent. of the total"

—the very same figure as was given here by Senator Lenihan from the Government Benches—

"and the homogeneous comprising the remainder, i.e., 40 per cent."

The heterogeneous group is 60 per cent. and the homogeneous, or the Nationalists, he puts at 40 per cent.

"It may be possible for the heterogeneous group to get 77 per cent. of the parliamentary representation"

—that is, the Unionist group; they may possibly get 40 seats out of 52—

"and the other group only 23 per cent."

That is, 12 seats out of 52. That is what the position is at present. That shows that it takes twice as many votes in the Six Counties to elect a member of the Opposition as it takes to elect one of the Unionists.

Deputy Brennan's conclusion—I commend it to the Government and to Senators on the other side of this House—is as follows:—

"Would not this, if it were possible in such an instance, be a negation of democracy and of parliamentary representation and control?"

Deputy Brennan holds it would be a negation of democracy and of parliamentary representation and control. Well spoken, Deputy Brennan! We all applaud him and hope he will say the same thing here.

What a hope!

Perhaps, then, the Government Party may not feel so complacent about this beautiful device of the single seat constituency. I refer the House to the inevitable splits that take place in large Parties. Mr. Kennedy Roche outlines them in his letter of January 30th, 1959, in the Irish Times where he lists the movements in the past—movements in which splits took place. We start with the Irish Confederate split in 1640; Grattan's Patriots split after 1783; O'Connell's Repeal Movement split; the Fenians split at various times. In our own time, we have had the tragic and unfortunate split in 1922. Every big national movement in the past has split. Remember, they split facing the straight vote and knowing the division of effort it entailed. Can we guarantee that Fianna Fáil will not split? Let Senators ask themselves that question sincerely and honestly. Remember, if Fianna Fáil do split, you are here creating the ideal system to drive it forever into the political limbo. That will be brought about by the non-transferable vote.

Senator Lenihan talked about the young men, the young men who will be selected in the Party conventions. You will have your convention and you will select a candidate to contest the constituency. How will you do it? There will be at least three proposed. Immediately, you will find yourself in difficulties. What will you do? Will you take the candidate who polls the highest vote, or will you, as you do when you are selecting a rate collector, a lord mayor, a Party official, eliminate the third man and vote again as between the two remaining candidates? If you do that, you will be using the principle of the transferable vote, because those who voted for the third candidate, in the first instance, will now have to make a choice as between the first and second. You will be using their No. 2 vote.

Of course, there is nothing wrong or undemocratic in that. In fact, it is the only common-sense practice to follow. Even in electing the captain of a hurling team, that is the principle adopted. Just because there are eight and one of the eight gets eight votes; another, seven; another, six; another, five; another, four; another, three; another, two; another, one, you do not just pick the man with the eight votes. In fact, that is not the way it is done in our councils, either. Then why should we adopt it as the system in our national council?

Senator Lenihan has demonstrated the thimble-rigging in relation to the third candidate in a constituency. The Taoiseach illustrated it very clearly at column 885. Remember, he was presupposing then that the major crime had been committed against the Irish nation and we were down from the three seat constituency to the one seat constituency where gerrymandering can take place. We may not do it by areas, but if we adopt any procedure that deprives substantial blocks of voters of representation, that is gerrymandering just as heinous and odious as what goes on across the Border. No amount of ex cathedra statements by the Taoiseach to the contrary will get away from that fact. The Taoiseach says: “Let us not hear anything more about the mathematical accuracy of the existing method.” It would be laughable, were it not so tragic, to find the Taoiseach, and others, picking on the minor faults in the present system, while, at the same time, glossing over completely the major crime that is being committed, a crime which will deprive 60 per cent. of the voters in a constituency of any representation whatsoever.

Let us have fairness; let us have honesty; let us, above all, have decency in politics. Let us admit that the example comes from across the Border. That is why we should really call this the "Belfast system", though I notice in the Official Report it has been changed in many places to the "Balfour system". But that is just as good a name—I am not complaining about it—because, after all, "Bloody Balfour" was no friend of this country, any more than the people who want to adopt the Belfast system.

I am sorry Senator Ryan is not here. He would need to learn something about research trust funds. It is not because a trust fund was left by Sir Robert McDougall that the funds have to be used to propagate the ideas of Sir Robert McDougall. The aims of that trust fund could not be more praiseworthy. Senator Ryan read them, but he could not see the implication. It is clearly stated:—

"The purpose is to advance and encourage education in connection with the art or science of government, or other branches of political or economic science, and to encourage the study of methods of government, or civic, commercial, or social organisations."

A most laudable objective to which to devote a trust fund. In the interests of decency, let Senator Ryan not continue his native sniggering at such a laudable and benevolent trust fund. We have heard a good deal about the Kellog Foundation. It also is praiseworthy. There had been Macra na Tuaithe, and others. Does that mean that they and the others have to teach people how to eat wheatflakes?

As the arrangement is to finish at 1 o'clock, I do not wish to say any more now except to protest at the implication last night by Senator Ó Maoláin that in some way I contributed last Thursday to preventing a vote being taken. I was out in the Lobby at 7 or 7.15 p.m. when Senator Hayes and Senator Ó Maoláin had a consultation. We were all anxious for a vote that night. Senator Ó Maoláin did not want it and he just said he would talk it out. In other words, we were told there was not to be a vote and we were free to talk and do what we could to educate the people.

In voting on this measure, I feel that we in this House have done our duty, but it is only a beginning. We have to get it to the newspapers; we have to get it to the people; we have to get it to the debating halls. We have to ensure that this catastrophe cannot happen Irish life, that a 40 per cent. minority in our cities can impose their will upon rural Ireland to destroy everything we hold dear in this nation.

I was a little disappointed that the Minister was not more explicit on the matters with which we are concerned in this sub-section, namely, the removal of the electors' power to express a preference between candidates before them or, in other words, the actual question of the transferable or the non-transferable vote. I want to cite the example of the Six Counties at present in which, in any constituency, if a Sinn Féin candidates and Nationalist candidate stand for the same constituency, they are cutting each others' throats, as it were.

You cannot know, furthermore, the relative strength in a constituency in the North—the relative strength of Sinn Féin and Nationalist. You cannot know their relative strength and support, unless they are prepared to split the anti-Partition vote by standing one against the other, Nationalist versus Sinn Féin, Sinn Féin versus Nationalist. Sinn Féin tries, by what I might call a kind of patriotic blackmail, to persuade all the Nationalists to step down in their favour and out of their way—which seems a manifest injustice and which would not be necessary if they had the single transferable vote there, even with the single seat constituency. With the transferable vote, all could stand for election and the electorate could publicly discriminate between them without weakening the non-Unionist vote.

That seems to me an example that is very clearly before us. It is an example of the kind of injustice that is being brought about by abolishing the transferable vote and removing a power which our electors now have— and which those in the North have not got—the power of expressing a preference as between two tendencies which might have some points in common as well as expressing a preference as between Parties. I should like to hear the Minister on that point.

I want to add my voice in support of this Bill, and particularly Section 2. I have been associated with public life since 1918, when we had the straight vote system. As a young man, I participated in the 1918 elections and I have been associated with elections which were held in all the years since then.

We have had something like 14 general elections under the P.R. system since 1922. I feel the Government are quite justified in giving the Irish people an opportunity of effecting a change, if they consider they want it. I daresay there will be no hard words in this contest, as has more or less been pictured by the Senator who has just spoken.

When the Irish people are asked to determine whether or not they approve of this proposal, they will give the matter a lot of thought and then give their decision. Anybody who has taken an interest in the political affairs of this country during the past 40 odd years, and particularly any person who has been associated with any of the various political Parties in this country during that time, is well aware that the leaders of Cumann na nGaedheal, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had a certain appeal for certain sections of the Irish people. It can be said, in relation to the Fianna Fáil Party, that the Leader of that Party had a very strong appeal for a vast volume of the electorate. Viewing the whole political picture to-day calmly, surely the Government are quite justified in letting the Irish people decide whether they want a change?

We may make up our minds that were it not for the great respect for and loyalty to our political leaders since 1922, the respective major political Parties would not have got the support which, in fact, they did get down through the years. The majority which Cumann na nGaedheal or Fine Gael got in days gone by, or the majority Fianna Fáil got, might not have been possible, but for the fact that we had outstanding leaders who were respected by both sides. I believe the Government are quite justified in giving the Irish people an opportunity of deciding for or against this question.

You cannot keep it from the Irish people.

Are the Irish people not being asked to decide it? They will be given that opportunity, I take it, in the month of June. Since 1922, we have had the P.R. system of election in this country. Were it not for the troubled times we have been through since then, I believe that the question the people are now about to be asked about changing our electoral system would have been asked of them in days gone by. Consider the period from 1922 to 1932. Having just got self-government, it is probable that no Government in this country at that time would ask to have a change made in our electoral system. Then we had the economic war and the outbreak of the Second World War. At such a time, no Government could ask that such a change should be made. In 1948, the first Coalition Government came into office. They could not very well make up their mind on whether or not they would be justified in asking for a change. Now we have a Government with a large overall majority, who feel they can give the people the privilege, mind you, of deciding whether or not it is necessary to have a change in our electoral system.

I am convinced that when the people accepted the Constitution in 1937, they believed it would be reviewed within the ensuing 40 years. That time has now come upon us and the Irish people are privileged and honoured to have that opportunity. In their wisdom, I believe they will accept the recommendation of the Government and vote to have the change made from P.R. to the straight vote system of election.

There can be no doubt that, were it not for the leaders we had here over the years, we would not have enjoyed the stability of government that we have been so fortunate to have. The Government are quite correct in giving the people the opportunity to vote on this question. I am certain that the people, in their wisdom, will not be so pessimistic as some Senators have been for the past few days. The Irish people are not fools. They will vote for the right thing, be it for or against this measure. I believe the right thing will be the amendment of the Constitution, as is at present proposed, and the non-transferable vote in single seat constituencies for this country.

The Government are doing the right thing. As is very obvious from this debate, the Irish people are being given a chance to decide for themselves whether or not we should alter our system of election to that of the straight vote and single seat constituency. In my opinion, that change is due.

Before you put the question, Sir, may I draw attention to the failure of some of the bells in some parts of the House to operate? The Division bells were not heard in some parts of the House.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

When?

There should be some way by which that could be remedied, not only from the point of view of what we are doing now but for general use.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Do I understand that there is an agreement that the question will be put now, because the Chair has no knowledge?

If the bells do not ring, that is very serious.

I suggest that we try them.

Is there any way in which the matter could be remedied?

Give a slightly longer period, for example.

The Taoiseach said the same thing in the Dáil two years ago and it was reported in the Irish Press.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

I shall put the question. Apparently there is agreement upon this. It is the first intimation that the Chair has had of that fact. Agreements are made outside the House and the Chair is not communicated with.

Cuireadh an cheist.

Question put.
Rinne an Coiste votáil: Tá, 25; Níl, 28.
The Committee divided: Tá, 25; Níl, 28.

Tá.

  • Ahern, Liam.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Carter, Frank.
  • Colley, Harry.
  • Connolly O'Brien, Nora.
  • Crowley, Tadhg.
  • Dowdall, Jane.
  • Farnan, Robert P.
  • Fitzsimons, Patrick.
  • Hayes, Seán.
  • Hogan, Daniel.
  • Lahiffe, Robert.
  • Lenihan, Brian.
  • Lynch, Peter T.
  • Ó Ciosáin, Éamon.
  • Ó Donnabháin, Seán.
  • Ó Grádaigh, Seán.
  • Ó Maoláin, Tomás.
  • O'Reilly, Patrick.
  • O'Sullivan, Ted.
  • Ruane, Thomas.
  • Ryan, Eoin.
  • Teehan, Patrick J.
  • Walsh, Laurence J.
  • Walsh, Louis.

Níl.

  • Barry, Anthony.
  • Baxter, Patrick F.
  • Burke, Denis.
  • Carton, Victor.
  • Connor, Patrick.
  • Crowe, Patrick.
  • Crowley, Patrick.
  • Davidson, Mary F.
  • Donegan, Patrick.
  • Fearon, William R.
  • Hayes, Michael.
  • L'Estrange, Gerald.
  • McGuire, Edward A.
  • Murphy, Dominick F.
  • O'Brien, George A.T.
  • O'Donovan, John.
  • O'Keeffe, James J.
  • O'Leary, Johnny.
  • O'Quigley, John B.
  • O'Sullivan, John L.
  • Prendergast, Micheál A.
  • Purcell, Frank.
  • Quinlan, Patrick M.
  • Roddy, Joseph.
  • Sheehy Skeffington, Owen L.
  • Sheridan, Joseph M.
  • Stanford, William B.
  • Tunney, James.
Tellers:—Tá: Senators Carter and Ó Donnabháin; Níl: Senators L'Estrange and Murphy.
Question declared negatived.
Faisnéiseadh go rabhthas tar éis diúltú don cheist.

We are adjourning, Sir, until 3 p.m. I take it that it ought to be possible to finish the remainder of the Committee Stage of this Bill by six o'clock. I do not know whether that is possible or not, but for my part I should be very anxious to do so.

If there is any use in expressing a desire to do so, I shall express the same wish.

Sitting suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.
AN SCEIDEAL—ALT 2. 3º.
SCHEDULE—SECTION 2. 3º.

There are two amendments to Section 2, sub-section (3), in the name of Senator Sheehy Skeffington, Nos. 3 and 4. May I suggest that the two amendments be discussed together and, if necessary, separate decisions be taken?

Tairgim:—

I gCuid I, Alt 2. 3º, line 9, "tríocha" a scriosadh agus "tríocha a cúig" a chur ina ionad;

agus

I gCuid II, Alt 2. 3º, líne 13, "thirty" a scriosadh agus "thirty-five" a chur ina ionad.

I move:—

In Part I, Section 2. 3º, line 9, to delete "tríocha" and substitute "tríocha a cúig";

and

In Part II, Section 2. 3º, line 13, to delete "thirty" and substitute "thirty-five".

The two amendments I have put down should be discussed together, and I think they could even be voted on together. The purpose of my amendments is to change the 30,000 and the 20,000 in the sub-section which reads as follows:—

"The number of constituencies shall be determined from time to time by law, but the total number of constituencies shall not be fixed at less than one constituency for each thirty thousand of the population or at more than one constituency for each twenty thousand of the population."

My proposal is that for "thirty thousand" we should read "thirty-five thousand" and for "twenty thousand" we should read "twenty-five thousand." In other words, I want to raise the proportion of population to Deputies. It seems to me that to have one Deputy for each 20,000 of the population is to commit us to having too many Deputies and I think even the figure of 30,000 per Deputy as a maximum will give us too big a Dáil. The result of accepting my amendment would be to reduce the number of Deputies. At present, as I read it, and in relation to our present population, this sub-section would give us a Dáil ranging from 96 to roughly 145 members, perhaps 146 or 147, as at present. Under my amendments, the size of the Dáil could not go beyond about 116 and might go as low as 83.

I do not think 116 as a maximum number of Dáil members is too small. I think it is a quite big enough. I notice that in Britain, while we have at present one Deputy for about every 30,000 of the population, they have one M.P. for only every 70,000 or 80,000 of the population. Furthermore in the British House of Commons, the amount of committee work required of M.P.s is considerably greater than the amount of committee work required of Deputies under our system. The number of committees is greater, and the responsibilities of those committees are greater, and the amount of active time spent by M.P.s in committee is considerably greater than it is in relation to the Dáil. Even for that reason alone, it ought not to be necessary for us to have quite such a high proportion of Deputies per head of the population.

My suggestion is that if we have one Deputy for every 25,000 or, at most, 35,000, it would be quite sufficient and the Dáil would be big enough. I think I speak for quite a number of people in the country when I say that many people think 147 Deputies too many. Clearly there is a minimum figure beyond which the Dáil should not fall. The minimum figure as proposed by me here would be 83 and it is possible that might be too small, but under the terms of my amendments it would be possible to have a Dáil of 116 members. My submission is that that would be entirely adequate for the work required of our T.D.s. It is possible that they might have to attend individually a little more strictly than they do at present. In this House, we do not run into the same difficulties as they appear to in maintaining a quorum. It is possible that that burden might be placed upon them a little more heavily if they were fewer, but I do not think that a reduction to 116 members would be a hardship on the nation, even if it did require a little more active service from some T.D.s

It may be legitimately held that a Dáil of that size would not give enough scope for a fair-sized Opposition, but it is clear that the scaling down— although under this Bill it might weigh more heavily upon the Opposition— would be roughly proportional. Although the Opposition would be smaller in number, so, too, would be the Government Party. You ought to be able to find within a Dáil of 116 members enough to form a Government and a reasonable Opposition, unless the Opposition is really to be virtually wiped out under the provisions of this Bill.

I do not want to say any more on that. I just want to request that our ratio of Deputies per head of the population should be brought down a bit. Even if we only have one T.D. for every 35,000 of the population, which is the maximum figure I suggest, we shall still have two members of the Lower House per head of the population more than they have in Britain. Our proportion will be twice as big as they have found necessary in the House of Commons.

On the face of it, this amendment would seem to be attractive. No doubt, the electorate feel that a reduction in the number of Oireachtas representatives would be economical. Whether it would be an efficient reduction and economical is something to which we should have to give further consideration. We must realise that the usual Cabinet must be drawn from a figure of half 147, or perhaps a little more. That poses difficulties for the Leaders of Governments or the Leaders of Parties who take part in Government.

Let us frankly face the fact that the standard of public representation here is not particularly high. That difficulty will be increased by this legislation. In spite of what Senator Lenihan has said, if this legislation does anything, it will reduce the quality of those elected as public representatives. If we can retain P.R. and increase the number of representatives from each constituency, I would agree that we could do with less than 147 and come down perhaps to the figure mentioned by Senator Sheehy Skeffington; but if you reduce the number to 116 under the single seat constituency and you have to draw a Cabinet from 60 men, many of whom are docile and perhaps of low quality, you reduce the efficiency of the Government you elect.

Senator Sheehy Skeffington has raised a fundamental question concerning representative Government in this country. For weeks past, we have had a great deal of talk on the other sub-sections. I do not think any issue is of greater significance for the future of parliamentary Government than this. I do not think it is a small matter. It is not merely a question of whether 25,000, 30,000 or 35,000 people should elect a Deputy. We have to look ahead and see whether the country will continue the present system of election or choose the single member constituency. I think the country will decide to continue the present system.

We must look to the future and see what sort of Parliament we may get from any system of election. Our Parliament here has grown up. Heaven knows, it was a miracle it stood at all. I think we are all agreed on that. We are in the position to-day that we can say democracy is sound in the country. But I am not so satisfied that our democratic institutions are so secure. We must make our contribution to ensure to the fullest of our ability that they will be made more secure. I am against the proposed system of election because I think it will weaken our parliamentary institutions, but I shall leave that. I am opposed to this amendment because if we are to reduce the number of parliamentary representatives in the vast, thinly populated areas of the country, these areas will have no parliamentary representation at all. The future of this country may be approached in one of two ways. If you are a countryman, as I am, you may desire to see the people of the country survive, increase in numbers, develop their industry, their culture and their way of life, believing that it is best for the nation that it should be so; but I am afraid the other point of view is dominating political thought to-day. If it is not dominating it in a positive way, the development taking place reveals an attitude of mind prepared to permit the supremacy of the view that an urban civilisation is the more desirable.

We must strike out against that concept now. I shall not raise my finger to produce any situation that may leave the people of the country with fewer representatives than they have at present. If we are to cut the number of Deputies, then, in the main, it is rural Ireland will suffer. It does not matter whether you have the single member constituency or not. If there are fewer of them, the Deputy will be further away from his constituents than at present. Some Deputies may say that at times they are too near their constituents. We know that all sorts of duties and responsibilities are put on them which, in a way, ought not be part of their function. But that is the trouble in parliamentary Government.

There is this notion, as I said earlier, that Parliament can do everything for people. Many of the things for which they seek aid from their parliamentary representatives, they might do for themselves, but that is another matter. If you separate these people from their parliamentary representatives by cutting down the numbers, then parliamentary Government will suffer and the people in the country, in the backward places, will suffer. We will not keep the people in the backward areas and they will not be cultivated and, in consequence, our production and standards must fall. We can do that if we want to, but if we are to do it, let us do it with our eyes open.

A great deal could be said, and perhaps a great deal should be said, in regard to the subject of our personnel in the Dáil, their sense of responsibility and in regard to the attitude of the country—and indeed, perhaps of the Executive—to the members of the Dáil. What will command the respect of the people for our parliamentary institutions is, in the main, not only the success of our parliamentary institutions for the purpose for which they were devised and constructed, but the quality of the people who represent the electorate in Parliament.

That is a matter that could not get too much attention or too much thought. When Senator Sheehy Skeffington speaks of reducing the number of Deputies in the Parliament, we have to look at the Parliament as at present constituted. In the main, I suppose we can say that there are not so many professional politicians in the Dáil. There are not very many people living on the pittance they receive as Dáil Deputies. Many of them had a way of life before they came into Parliament and a number of them have built up something for themselves over the years. I consider that very desirable. The kind of person who is most suited and most competent to do parliamentary work, and to serve the country and its people, is the person who has a stake in the country himself. If he is a commercial man like Senator McGuire, or Senator Burke, or on the land, like myself, or engaged in some other way of life, like Senator Hayes, or Senator O'Donovan, or Senator Lenihan, or others in this House, he is able to talk the language of the people because he is living amongst them; he knows what it is to go into the fairs or the markets, or into court to fight his case. That is the sort of person we must aim at trying to have in the Parliament of the future.

If that is the type of mind that we want to get to serve the people, we have to look at Senator Sheehy Skeffington's proposal. If you increase the number of people who are to be served by a Deputy, you might as well make up your mind that he will have to concentrate all his time serving his constituents. The demands which the electorate make to-day on Deputies are very considerable. I do not know any Deputy who can meet all the demands made on him, or give all the services he is required to give. I do not know if there is one; if there is he would probably be very successful in an election. If there be such a man, he is a man who must devote all his time, every day, thinking and planning how he is to give this sort of service, and he will not have much business of his own to look after. If he has a business of his own, then he will neglect it and if he neglects it, he will not have it for long. Then, you can get another type of representative and I do not think that the attitude of the people to that type of representative is the attitude that people ought to have to our parliamentary representatives. Mind you, we have to concede the fact that people are critical of our parliamentary representatives to-day.

I think there is a great deal of unfair thinking and sloppy talk about our parliamentary representatives. It is terribly unfair to a great many of them. They are just ordinary human beings, with the same defects as all human beings, but man for man, and woman for woman, they compare very favourably in their standards with their counterparts in other countries, where they have traditions for as many centuries as we have for decades. When you come to this point, and when you examine some of the criticisms and some of the charges which are levelled against our parliamentarians, and when you think of the way in which they are rewarded for their services, it is, in my judgment, a humiliation to say that these people are being rewarded at all, certainly in the monetary sense.

The position is that a Deputy receives something over £600 a year, and we know of all the talk that goes on about that sum being free of income-tax. There is not a rate collector in my constituency who is not paid more than our parliamentary representatives; there are probably one or two dozen in the county council who are paid more. When you think that there are men in the Dáil, decent, sober men, who have gone into debt to serve their constituents, you realise that it is not at all as it should be. It is bad for the supremacy of our parliamentary institutions; it is bad for their stability and it will bring about a situation in which we will not be able to attract into political life the type of man we want. I want to see a continuance in political life of the farmer with a few acres, or with many acres, but whether he has few or many, he will not have any unless he is put in the position that when he does his parliamentary work, he will not be out of pocket.

That is the truth to-day. There are many people in this House who are defeated political candidates. I am one of them myself. I would stand as I fought and I would go down under the same conditions as when I failed to be elected and I would not take back a single word, or a single action, and I am sure, whatever side we are on, that is the attitude of us all. How can a man have principles unless he is prepared to stand for them and to take the risk of being defeated, and if he is defeated under such circumstances, is that cause for rebuke? It is, in the minds of some people. I think there is altogether too much silence on the part of people in public life in regard to these criticisms of our people in Parliament.

We are now given the opportunity to discuss this question in a calm atmosphere. If this matter were raised in the other House, it would be very difficult for people to talk about themselves. We do know what they have said in the other House about their own business and conditions. I must say this, that I do not think any of the Executives have given enough thought to the status of the Deputies in their Parties. I do not think that they have given enough consideration to the position in which many of them find themselves and I do not think they have looked far enough into the future to see the consequences of not doing that now. There are a few young men in this House, in both Parties. They are politicians. That is nothing to be ashamed of. We were all young men and we did not think we were politicians, or that we were ever going to be politicians, and we did not go into the cause we tried to serve as politicians, budding or otherwise, but we did try to serve. There was no point in the people of our generation taking the risk that had to be taken then, if we were not to have followers and a succession of people to raise the flag, as we were prepared to do.

Our parliamentary institutions can stand only on the basis of young men coming along to serve. The prestige of our Dáil and Seanad, especially our Dáil, is to a great extent dependent on the calibre, education, allegiance to principles and the clear understanding of principles we find in the young men who are coming in now from this and other generations to serve. Such men will not go into Parliament if it is to be a labour of poverty and if it is to be degraded by every one who cannot get into it, or perhaps has not the courage to stand for it. Parliament will not be well served by such people doing everything, by the written and spoken word, to degrade and denigrate people who are there.

Senator Sheehy Skeffington has raised —I shall not say inadvertently, because I am quite certain he never does anything by inadvertence—an issue of fundamental importance. I am quite certain he knows the implications of the amendment he has put down and we should welcome the opportunity he has given us to say what we think on this question.

I should like to express my admiration of the courageous remarks Senator Baxter has just made. What he has said is particularly pertinent to the type of ill-founded public criticism we find to-day of our institutions of State and of the people who participate in their working. I agree with him in his defence of these institutions and of the Deputies who do the practical work involved. I believe that Dáil Deputies are in many cases ill-rewarded in every sense for the services they render, day in and day out, to the community.

As Senator Baxter has said, the amendment is wrongly founded in that it will lead to a reduction of the representation in our rural areas. The rural areas are the bulwark, the stabilising influence, of this community and anything that would effect a reduction in the strength of the voice they can bring to bear on the councils of State would be a bad thing. Successive Governments have recognised that in the various electoral Acts since before and after the Constitution by weighting the constituencies in favour of rural areas. We all know that the provision in relation to the numbers in each constituency means that the rural areas have a representative for every 20,000 and urban areas one for every 30,000. The acceptance of Senator Sheehy Skeffington's amendment would mean that many areas in the West and South would have a smaller representation than they otherwise would have. For that reason, I oppose this amendment vigorously.

I join with Senator Baxter and Senator Lenihan in opposing this amendment. The present representation in County Donegal is seven Deputies and if this amendment were accepted, the population being 122,000, the representation would be four Deputies. In the City of Dublin, with a population of 539,000, it would mean a representation of 21 Deputies. The area of Dublin City is one-forty-third of the County of Donegal. The representatives from Dublin City represent an area of approximately a square mile and are saved travelling expenses in going round the constituency. The rural Deputies would be in a very unfortunate position as compared with that of an urban Deputy.

Senator Baxter has pointed out the importance of rural Ireland in the economy of our country. In the booklet issued by the Department of Finance, Economic Development, page 208 sets out:—

"The immediate potentialities of increased agricultural production are very great. The realisation of these potentialities in any large degree would, by increasing the purchasing power of the farming community, raise generally the demand for goods and services, leading to expansion of industry and additional employment."

If that is the case, we are entitled to say that those who live directly on agriculture will enjoy a fuller life and the living conditions of their community will be improved. There is a danger, however, that the steady fall in the rural population will mean that they will not be adequately represented in the Oireachtas and the vital importance of their interests and the overall economic position will not be properly emphasised. It is essential that our agriculture remains competitive in a world market. Our purchasing power is derived largely from the work of our farmers and it will be necessary to continue increasing the investment in the soil as is suggested in the Government White Paper.

The logical conclusion of Senator Sheehy Skeffington's argument, basing representation entirely on population, is that, as Dublin University constituency is approximately 5,000 as against 20,000 in the National University, Senator Sheehy Skeffington should put down an amendment whereby representation of Trinity College should be one Senator as against three or four in the case of National University. However, a provision in that regard is enshrined in the Constitution and no attempt is being made to alter that. This amendment would militate seriously against the interests of rural Ireland, having regard to the increase in the population in the urban areas. If the commission would give a larger representation to the population in rural areas, it would be best for the country ultimately.

Any of us who know the work of Dáil Deputies, irrespective of their Parties, will agree that Deputies are overworked and underpaid. This amendment has nothing to do with the remuneration of Deputies, but it has to do with the work of Deputies and as its adoption would mean that they would be even more overworked than they are, I oppose it. I agree with what Senator Baxter has said, but I would stress one aspect of the question which he did not mention, that is, the difficulties of people who have no other income or means of support except their Dáil allowance. It is bad for democracy if you have a situation in which good people cannot afford to seek election to Dáil Éireann or, if they secure election, cannot afford to sit in Dáil Éireann. That is a terrible situation and it is very bad for democracy. I do not know what can be done in regard to the overworking of Deputies. Probably the Deputies and the Parties are themselves largely to blame because of the kind of competition that has been built up between them through the years in dealing with every sort of complaint, and every sort of inquiry from their constituents.

A feeling has grown up in this country that a person cannot get his rights, his entitlement, unless he makes an approach to a Deputy, or Senator, or some public representative. I do not know why that is so, and from what I know of the constituencies across the water, it does not seem to be the case in Britain. Here we have a situation in which nobody thinks he can get his rights in regard to an old age pension, or anything like that, without making representations to a Deputy to write to a Department. We have all had experiences of that sort. I do not know whether or not Deputies could form a trade union of their own, or at least agree that that sort of nonsense should stop. There is no need to approach a Deputy or a Minister to make representations for a person's rights. Quite clearly, he will get them in the normal course.

Perhaps the Parties could assist Deputies by providing more secreterial service, but, again, only the larger Parties, probably, could do that. It is a fact, and those of us who know anything about it cannot deny that Deputies are overworked with those sort of inquiries and representations which, in many cases, are unnecessary. If this amendment were passed, it would, to some extent, cause them to be even more overworked than they are at the present time.

If Senator Sheehy Skeffington's amendment were adopted, it would mean approximately 30 fewer Deputies in the Dáil. Some of the fears expressed by those who oppose the amendment of the Constitution were, that Fianna Fáil or whatever Party had an overall majority, would get an inordinately high proportion of the seats, and that the Opposition would have such a small proportion of the seats that they would be unable to form the nucleus of an alternative Government.

If the total number of seats in the Dáil were reduced by 30, it is quite clear, that if those who oppose the change are correct, the Opposition would be still smaller and their chances of forming a Government, their chances of being a nucleus of a Government, would be still smaller. Consequently, it seems to me, that if Senator Sheehy Skeffington believes in the danger of the stronger Party being too strong, and the Opposition groups being too small he must realise this will make the position even worse.

There is another point. Under this proposal, it would be considerably harder for an Independent Deputy to be elected. The smaller the constituency, the smaller the electorate, the better chance there is for a strong local personality to be elected, regardless of his politics. This would make it much harder and that would be a bad thing. The same goes for minority groups or small groups who may be members of a minority. There may be a minority group concentrated in a locality and if that locality is made bigger, the number of votes required to elect one of that minority group will be higher. Thus it will be hard for that minority to have a Deputy elected.

The difference between Senator Sheehy Skeffington's amendment, and the Bill as it stands, as Senator Ryan pointed out, is somewhere about 30 seats. Under the Bill as it stands, the seats in the Dáil would run, given the present population, somewhere between 100 and 150. Under Senator Sheehy Skeffington's proposal, the number of seats would run between 83 and 116, according to his calculations. The principal result the country wants from an election is a Government that can run the affairs of State. If we reduce the numbers on the Government side of the House to 50 or 60, it will be very difficult to get a panel of Ministers.

Senator Barry joined Senator Sheehy Skeffington on other occasions in bemoaning the fate of Oppositions—that they would be wiped out—but on this occasion he pointed out, very rightly, that the Government might have only 60 members under Senator Sheehy Skeffington's proposal and that that was too small a number from which to select 12 or 13 Ministers, or whatever number there would be, plus a number of Parliamentary Secretaries. It is for the reason that we want a substantial number of Deputies in the Dáil in order that a fair Government can be selected from the half who get the majority, and in order that a fair number will be left in opposition, to form an effective Opposition, that we favour having more seats per 10,000 of the population, than they have in very highly populated countries. In Britain, they have one seat for every 80,000 which gives them a Parliament of 600 members or more.

We require minimum representation to do effective work and to elect a Government, and it has been generally agreed for a number of years, that around the 20,000 or 30,000 mark is the correct population figure for a constituency. That gives us somewhere around 130. It has given us, over a number of years, from 134 to 147 seats. It may work out that way in the future. I do not think it is too many for the work which Deputies have to do and it is not too many, certainly, to give a fair selection of Deputies to become Ministers.

I have felt that in raising this matter I am taking an opportunity, which does not often come to us, of expressing an opinion as to the optimum size of the Dáil. In fact, the present clauses before us, and which I am seeking to amend, repeat the figures which are in the existing Constitution. I felt that this was a good opportunity to test the opinion of the House, to give an opportunity of deciding that, on the whole, our Dáil is a bit too big, by about 30 members. I cleave to the view that it might well be a better Dáil, if there were about 116 rather than 147.

I could not help wondering while Senator Baxter was speaking, whether if the Leas-Chathaoirleach had been in the Chair, he would have allowed Senator Baxter to refer at such great length to the pay of T.D.s I felt that perhaps you, Sir, were a little kind to him in that respect, because, of course, that matter is quite irrelevant to my amendment.

The Chair would like the House to appreciate that.

I have every sympathy on that point. I share Senator Baxter's view on this question of paying T.D.s properly for work well done, but that has nothing to do with my suggestion. One might even say that the argument would go the other way—if there are fewer T.D.s each of them could be paid more, with the same amount of money available. My amendment has nothing to do with the rate of pay.

I share Senator Baxter's preoccupation, furthermore, with the necessity of maintaining the prestige of parliamentary Government. I should be critical of it in some ways, but, in general, I share his view that we have nothing to be ashamed of in relation to our parliamentary representatives, or the way in which the Dáil works. However, I think the prestige of the Dáil rests more upon the quality of the T.D.s than upon their quantity. I do not think it follows that a reduction in quantity, for which I am asking, necessarily means a reduction in quality. It is clearly conceivable that it might even improve the quality, if the quantity were slightly reduced. After all, the reduction for which I am asking is not an enormous one; it is a reduction of about 30 seats.

It is said, rightly, that many T.D.s do a lot of practical work. That is quite so, but so do the members of the House of Commons. I would stress the fact that a lot more committee work is demanded of them and, of course, their travelling, on the average, is more difficult than ours. Dublin is a good deal nearer to the most outlying constituency than London to the more outlying constituencies in Britain. Even so, they find it sufficient to have one M.P. for every 80,000, whereas we are asked in some cases to have one T.D. for every 20,000—four times as many.

Senator Lenihan put forward the view that the two figures in the sub-section are there so as to allow a representation of one T.D. per 20,000 in rural areas and one T.D. per 30,000 in urban areas. I am afraid he has not adverted to sub-section (2) of Section 4 of this Bill, which lays it down emphatically that "the population of each constituency, as ascertained in the last preceding census, shall, so far as it is practicable, be the same throughout the country." There is no question of allowing it to vary from constituency to constituency. Therefore, his contention is ill-founded.

Senator Louis Walsh said that T.D.s have a big area to cover, particularly in sparsely populated country areas. The area they will have to cover in the single seat constituency—if the Bill goes through and the amendment we passed yesterday, rejecting the single seat idea, is not maintained—will be considerably reduced. In other words, it is the intention of the Party with which Senator Walsh is connected that the area served by an individual T.D. shall be very seriously reduced by the present Bill. Therefore, I do not feel that his argument about the size of area to be covered is a valid one.

He may say—and I think it is a legitimate point—that if I am eager for equity of representation, I should remember that the number of graduates who elect the Dublin University members is small—it is roughly about 5,000—as compared with the figure he gave for National University—about 16,000, I think—and, therefore, that I should be eager for the same change there. There may be some value in that. However, I would remind him that all the other Senators except the 11 appointed ones, were sent here by a total electorate of about 1,000 or 1,200 and, therefore, what is sauce for the goose might well be sauce for the gander.

What I am asking in this amendment is that there be about 31 fewer Deputies. I do not think a Dáil of 116 good Deputies would be ineffective or too small. It would be a better Dáil, and in many respects it would be capable of working even better than the present one. I was a little surprised to hear Senator Ryan shedding tears for the appalling effect this amendment would have (a) upon Opposition Parties, (b) upon representation of Independents, and (c) upon representation of small minorities. I am afraid those were crocodile tears. Frankly, I do not believe that Senator Ryan has any concern for how well minorities will be represented.

I was not shedding tears for them; I was saying that, if Senator Sheehy Skeffington is sincere in being concerned about the representation of minorities and Independents, this amendment of his will do the opposite to what he would like the Bill to do.

I accept that. Probably I was being a little unfair. The point is that, no matter what the effect of the whole Bill is, the effect of my amendment could not be to exaggerate the effect of the Bill, as the effect of my amendment upon Opposition, Independents, minorities and so on, would be exactly proportional to its effect upon the Government representation. In other words, the reductions under my amendment would be exactly proportional. I realise that he was arguing ad hominem, but I do not think his argument holds.

Briefly, then, I believe that the best maximum figure for Dáil membership is not 150, as it would be under the provisions of the Bill, but somewhere nearer to 120. That would be quite sufficient and would not in any sense lower the standards of the Dáil. On the contrary, it would raise those standards. I should like the opinion of the House tested on that point.

I am very much in agreement with the excellent sentiments put forward by Senator Baxter. I note the very relaxed and impartial atmosphere which prevails here now. It shows that we can work together and discuss a problem impartially and on its merits. I hope we get a great deal more of that work. The issue raised by Senator Sheehy Skeffington is a major one, on which a decision should not be taken lightly or quickly. In fact, there should be very careful investigation and examination before a decision is taken. We have to ask what our representatives are for and that opens up a vast field. We have to see whether Deputies and Senators could be shorn of a great deal of the routine work they have to do at present. On the other hand, we could examine as to whether much more valuable use can be made of their time than is made at present, whether we can develop really effective committee systems and so take a more modern approach to our work, a much more effective and efficient approach and one in which, I have no doubt, we could co-operate together far better than has been the case in the past.

There are a number of vital issues involved. This pinpoints the necessity, after some 30 years of self-government, for having a calm and detached look at how we are getting on and where we are going. We need not be ashamed or self-conscious about having to do that. The American Government, which has been held up to us, has done that at least nine times during the past 70 years. It is a regular feature of political life there. They have an impartial and detached investigation of government. They even probe into the very philosophy of government itself. The most recent example of that was the Hoover Commission. The issue before the House now is a very large and important one. It is one to which we cannot give an immediate answer. It is like the issues raised in the proposed change from the multi-seat constituency and the transferable vote to the single seat constituency and the non-transferable vote. My whole objection to that is that we just do not know where we are going because we have not examined into the case fully.

May I suggest that matter has been disposed of?

I am merely drawing an analogy with Senator Sheehy Skeffington's amendment. I suggest we keep this in mind and that Senator Sheehy Skeffington press for such a commission and such a review of our Government in general. From such review will emerge the number of public representatives necessary and the other changes it is desirable to make. I suggest, therefore, that Senator Sheehy Skeffington does not press this amendment.

Cuireadh an cheist: "I gCodanna I agus II, go bhfanfaidh mar chuid den alt na focail a tairgtear a scriosadh amach".

Question put: "That in Parts I and II the words proposed to be deleted stand".
Faisnéiseadh go rabhthas tar éis glacadh leis an gceist.
Question declared carried.
Níor tairgeadh Leasú 4.
Amendment No. 4 not moved.
AN SCEIDEAL—ALT 3.
SCHEDULE—SECTION 3.

I move amendment No. 5:—

I gCuid I, alt 3, 1º, líne 13, "insan dá bhliadhain déag" a scriosadh agus "insan deich mbliadhna" a chur ina ionad;

agus

I gCuid II, alt 3. 1º, líne 18, "twelve" a scriosadh agus "ten" a chur ina ionad.

In Part I, Section 3. 1º, line 13, to delete "insan dá bhliadhain déag" and substitute "insan deich mbliadhna";

and

In Part II, Section 3. 1º, line 18, to delete "twelve" and substitute "ten".

The change involved here may appear to be a slight one but it appears to me it would be better to revise our constituencies at least once in every ten years—the lifetime of two Parliaments. The practice across the water is that under the House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Acts, 1944 and 1949, a boundary commission is set up which must report at intervals of not less than three years and not more than seven years". Therefore, in suggesting that our constituencies should be revised at least every ten years, I am not making an impossible request. In the circumstances of our country there is a factor which does not obtain across the water; we are losing something between 40,000 and 50,000 people by emigration every year. In 12 years, therefore, we might lose 500,000 or 600,000 people. That is the equivalent of 30 constituencies. For that, and other reasons, I think a slightly shorter interval between revisions would be better.

It has been generally accepted for a long time that a constituency revision once in every 12 years is sufficient, but the clause in the present Bill, in fact, enables revisions to be carried out more frequently, if that is desired. The clause reads:—

"A constituency commission shall be established from time to time when determined by the President. but not less frequently than once in every 12 years."

If the Government advises the President to set up a commission once in every five years, that can be done. It is a permissive clause. It compels the Government to hold a revision at least once in every 12 years.

There are, of course, changes in population from the country to the town. In my constituency, the rural population has gone down because of the mechanisation of agriculture and, simultaneously, the population in the towns is going up. Unfortunately, industrial expansion is not proceeding sufficiently rapidly in parts of the country to absorb those who are no longer wanted on the land. But that is not an Irish phenomenon. In the United States of America, 7,000,000 disappeared off the land in ten years. However, that has nothing to do with the argument here. I was led into it in reply to Senator Sheehy Skeffington's reference to emigration.

The existing clause will allow revisions to be held more frequently than 12 years, but it compels the Government to have such a revision at least once in every 12 years.

In the light of the Minister's statement that this is a permissive clause, I am satisfied that by drawing attention to my own feeling in the matter, and I think the feeling of some others, that 12 years might in many cases be too long, I have served the purpose I intended to achieve in tabling the amendment.

Tairgeadh an Leasú siar faoi chead.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Tairgim Leasú 6:—

I gCuid I, Alt 3. 4º, líne 26, "chinnfeas" a scriosadh agus "mheasfas" a chur ina ionad;

agus

I gCuid II, Alt 3. 4º, líne 32, "determined" a scriosadh agus "deemed" a chur ina ionad.

I move:—

In Part I, Section 3. 4º, line 26, to delete "chinnfeas" and substitute "mheasfas";

and

In Part II, Section 3. 4º, line 32, to delete "determined" and substitute "deemed".

It is merely to request that in the following sub-section which is sub-section 4º of Section 3, one word shall be changed. The sub-section reads at present:—

"The members of a constituency commission appointed on the nomination of the Chairman of Dáil Éireann shall have been selected from the members of Dáil Éireann who are determined by him to be in opposition, and on a basis and in a manner determined by him."

The second use of the word determined is legitimate, but the first use of it seems to me to be wrong. It is not the Chairman of the Dáil who determines whether an individual shall be in opposition or not: it is the individual Teachta Dáil. I think what is meant here, and I think the drafting was a little clumsy, was that they shall be selected from members of Dáil Éireann who are deemed by him to be in opposition and on a basis and in a manner determined by him. My amendment is to change the first word "determined" into the word "deemed".

I am strengthened in my view that the original drafting is not a happy one by noticing the two Irish words that are being used. The first word that is used is the verb "cinnimh" which means, according to my copy of Dinneen's Dictionary (1904 edition, page 138), “to fix” or “to appoint”. The Chairman of the Dáil is not “fixing” or “appointing” these people to the Opposition—the definition runs: “to fix, to appoint, to decide, to resolve, to agree, to decree, to determine or to assign”. I think it is clear from that definition that in relation to the word “determine”, “cinnimh” means to determine only in the sense of fix, appoint, decree. The Chairman of Dáil Éireann does not decree or fix or appoint or assign people to the Opposition.

If we turn the word "determine" into "deem", as my amendment suggests, we get the Irish word "measaim", which, according to Dinneen's Dictionary, page 476, means “to think, to deem, to judge, to consider, to regard, to value, to esteem, to estimate, to suppose”; that clearly is the meaning of the spirit of this clause. I think there has been a certain amount of drafting clumsiness there. We would look silly if we left the word “determined” there in the first place, and for that reason I move to replace it by the word “deemed”.

The Chairman has to decide. He is the person to whom it is given to make the decision as to whether or not a Deputy is in opposition, generally in opposition. If the Chairman were called upon to decide in relation to the Seanad, there would be some difficulty from time to time in determining who should be treated as a member of the Opposition for the purpose of giving them rights. This clause is designed to give the members of the Opposition the right to have three members selected from them to represent their interests. As a number of Independents are selected who do not want to put themselves down as being either pro-Government or anti-Government, or attached to the Opposition or attached to the Government, it was thought wise to leave the determination to the Ceann Comhairle. I expect he would determine that a person was in opposition only if he had an interest in being declared in opposition for the purpose of getting advantages under this clause in having a say in the selection of the three people. I do not think it would be improved very much or at all by substituting "deemed" for "determined."

I am afraid I am not really convinced by the Minister's argument. I do not feel that he has met my case. I do not feel that the function of the Chairman of the Dáil is to fix or assign these people into opposition. What is his function in relation to this Bill, is to consider or regard them as being in opposition. Now, it is the second meaning that is conveyed best, I think, by the word "deemed" and by the verb "measaim" in Irish, whereas their allocation, fixing, appointing, or decreeing is conveyed by the first use of "determine" and by the Irish verb "cinnimh." We are leaving something rather clumsy in this Bill, if we do not make this change.

I should congratulate Senator Sheehy Skeffington on the work he has done on this amendment. He has endeavoured to make a distinction between the two things the Ceann Comhairle has to decide. He has gone to Dinneen's Dictionary for the purpose of discovering the difference between two particular Irish words. The Senator has got the correct definitions from Dinneen.

This sub-section is compelling the Ceann Comhairle of the Dáil to determine something—not to give an opinion on something. They are two different things. I may think that Senator Skeffington is in opposition: "measaim" is the Irish word he wants to use. But if I am put into the position that I have under my hand and seal to declare for some particular statutory purpose that he is in fact in opposition, well, I am determining that, it seems to me. Therefore, clearly the word "determine" in both cases is the correct word.

There is something more involved than merely having an opinion. There is having an opinion, in the first instance, and in the second instance, putting that opinion into operation for a particular purpose. The Ceann Comhairle may very well be wrong. Anybody may be wrong in particular instances. What he is asked to do here is to declare and determine that, for the purposes of this commission, particular people are in opposition. He must, in the first instance, have an opinion that they are. Here he is asked to determine it, but not to state his opinion.

I think in this case, though I do not like to admit it, that Senator Hayes is right and I am wrong, and I wish consequently to withdraw the amendment.

Is it not well that there is somebody to explain the Bill?

Tairgeadh an leasú siar, faoi chead.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Tairgeadh an cheist: "I gCodanna I agus II go bhfanfaidh Alt 3 mar chuid den Sceideal."
Question proposed: "That in Parts I and II Section 3 stand part of the Schedule."

In this section, we are dealing with a fundamental change in the constitutional procedure in relation to the determination of constituencies. The only country in the world that I know of that has a commission like the commission proposed to be established under this Bill is Ceylon. In Ceylon, there is a delimitation commission consisting of three people appointed by the Governor-General. Oddly enough, Ceylon happens to be at the end of a great mass of land, like Malta, Gibraltar and Tasmania, which were referred to by Senator Lenihan last night.

A great deal of misunderstanding has developed in the country about the proposed commission. We are used to the appointment of commissions to inquire into and to determine matters in a more or less democratic way, but this proposed commission is anything but democratic. There are many people, even people who are actively interested in politics, who are under the misapprehension that this commission will be like the Liquor Commission, the Commission on Income-Tax and the Commission on Irish, to which it will be possible for them to make submissions. It does not seem to be understood that there is no indication in the Bill that the people whose interests will be affected by the findings of the commission, the people who will be placed in the various constituencies, will have any say, good, bad or indifferent, by either written or oral representation. There is no assurance that that democratic procedure will be adopted and, from the Bill, it does not appear that it is intended that that procedure will be adopted.

Emphasis has been laid on the principle that the people ought to be the judges in the matter of this amendment of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, they should be, and the people have already enshrined that principle in the Constitution. The people should know that under this Bill they will not be able to approach their Dáil representative to say that they do not think they should be in a particular constituency and would prefer to be in another constituency, because the whole procedure and the ultimate determination of the boundaries will lie with the commission, subject to the provision in sub-section 2º of Section 5 under which two-thirds of the members of the Dáil present and voting may amend the report.

There have been instances of towns and boroughs being brought into other constituencies or counties under the Local Government Act, 1879. That procedure created annoyance which has persisted to the present time. When the import of this provision in the Bill is fully realised, I do not think that the people will be satisfied with it.

This provision is notable for the upset it causes to other parts of the Constitution which are already well settled. First, it is making an inroad into the legislative power of the Dáil and Seanad. The commission will be the body that shall determine the boundaries, whereas, under the Constitution, the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is vested in the Dáil and Seanad. Under this amendment of the Constitution, it is not intended that the Seanad shall have any power whatever in regard to this aspect of electoral procedure. The Seanad will have no say and the Dáil will have a say only to the extent that not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting can amend the report of the commission. That is undemocratic and out of harmony with the Constitution. It illustrates how ill-conceived this Bill is and that it is a matter of indifference to the Government what effect it will have on well settled procedure in the Constitution, or on the relationships between the people and the Oireachtas, or between the Oireachtas and the Government. This section is handing over legislative power to a seven-man committee, subject to a veto by Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann has no part in it.

Serious as that is, it is not as serious as the effect which the provision in regard to the appointment of a judge as chairman will have on the judiciary. An independent judiciary is one of the safeguards provided in a democracy. The independence of the judiciary rests not only on the fact that their tenure of office is not terminable, save for misbehaviour, but also on the respect which the people have for the judicial organ of State, the respect which people have for judges, whether of the High Court, the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court or the District Court. Undoubtedly, there would be a great deal of controversy about any report which the proposed commission would issue. If the Bill is passed in its present form, the controversy will centre around the member of the judiciary who is its chairman. That is a most unwholesome thing as far as the independence of the judiciary is concerned. In view of the practice that judges shall not speak on political matters and shall not take any active part in politics, it is not right that they should be drawn into so highly controversial a political matter as the setting out of constituency boundaries. That is altogether wrong in principle and unwholesome, and is likely to undermine the status of the judiciary and the respect for it in the minds of the people.

It is provided in the section that minor matters relating to the commission shall be determined by law. I do not know whether that law will have any effect upon the extent to which the report of the commission could be debated in the Dáil. That is a matter, of course, that could be determined by law. A Government with a large majority might well consider that it was in the public interest to stifle criticism.

Apart altogether from these objections in principle to this commission, as I have already pointed out, I do not think the commission will function properly in circumstances which it is not difficult to foresee.

It is provided that the commission shall be constituted of seven people, one of whom will be a judge of the High Court or Supreme Court, three members of the Opposition, and three members of the Government Party. It is also provided that the quorum for meetings of the commission will be four, and that the commission may act notwithstanding vacancies in their membership. That means that the safeguard, about which there has been so much discussion, of having a judge as chairman will be abolished. Indeed, that safeguard may not exist at all because, when the commission is constituted, and a judge of the High Court or Supreme Court is appointed as chairman, there is nothing to prevent him from resigning. Neither is there anything to prevent the commission from functioning while he might be ill and, since the commission is to report within six months, it is quite conceivable that the person who was appointed chairman could be ill for a period of six months, and that the commission would be fully entitled to act, notwithstanding the illness of the chairman. Therefore, the safeguard which is to be provided is one which the ordinary circumstances of life can nullify at any time.

Apart from that, judging by what one can imagine would go on in that commission, it is quite conceivable that the judge appointed as chairman might place his resignation in the hands of the President. In those circumstances, you would have a commission consisting of six people unable to agree with one another. Then you would have the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 4 becoming completely inoperative. If the commission cannot agree upon a report, and cannot present their report within six months, would the Minister say what will happen in that set of circumstances? Will the Government appoint another commission and have another go at it? If that is to be the case, it seems to me to be a most haphazard constitution to give so important a body as this in the fundamental law of the land. Indeed, it shows very little respect for the people to ask them to enact so nugatory and imprudent a provision as this.

We have heard a great deal about democracy during the discussion on this Bill and about the interests of the people being properly safeguarded, but in this section there is a provision that no court shall entertain any question as to whether the commission has been properly constituted or any question as to whether the determination or revision of boundaries of constituencies has been properly carried out. That is contained in sub-section (6) of Section 4. but I have not yet seen any justification for excluding from the courts these questions as to the propriety of the conduct of the commission and as to the propriety of the constitution of the commission. It seems to me that this exclusion savours of a fear the Government have that there will be certain matters which will be open to question, and which they do not want to be brought out into the light of day in public court. I do not know of any other justification for that. That provision is one which must create a great deal of disquiet and suspicion as to the reasons for it. As I have said, the ideas incorporated in this section are, to my mind, most undemocratic and I do not intend to repeat myself on that.

Since the Government are so enamoured of the British system of elections, and since they have such a high regard for the democratic manner in which it enables democracy to survive and thrive in Britain, it seems to me that when they were offering the people the British system, they might have gone the whole hog, and offered them the same safeguards and the same advantages as the British Government offered their people in relation to the fixing of the boundaries of constituencies. One of the great things about the British Constitution is that, in the circumstances of Britain and the British people, the system has worked and, in relation to our Constitution, in which P.R. is enshrined, it too has also worked in our circumstances.

The British, when they were dealing with the redistribution of seats in the Redistribution of Seats Act, 1944, also set up commissions. They set up four commissions, one each for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and one of the things they provided for in that Act was that a commission which would delimit or mark out boundaries of constituencies would not have on its membership Members of Parliament. That was an attempt to get a commission that would, at any rate, have the appearance of impartiality to the public. The chairman of the commission in each case was the Speaker of the House of Commons and the other members to constitute the commission were to include the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, and the Director-General of Ordnance Survey. It is not the personnel of the commission which is important for the purposes of my argument. What is important is that the commission is intended and is made to act in a democratic manner.

It is also provided that a commission set up under the British Act must publish its proposals, with regard to the changing of constituency boundaries, in newspapers circulating in the areas affected by the proposed changes. It is also provided that members of the public may then make representations to the commission, after publication of the proposals. To me, that seems to be a great deal more democratic than the procedure suggested in this Bill and, if we are to have the British system of single member constituencies, with the single non-transferable vote, and a commission, we might as well have had the lot, and had a provision enabling people to exercise their right to make representations to the commission. For some reason that has not been disclosed, that has not been done.

The British Act goes even further in that it provides that if a commission thinks fit, it may cause a local inquiry to be held in respect of any constituency or constituencies. That is not provided in this Bill and I do not see in the circumstances that the commission must report within six months, any law can be enacted which would enable the things that persons in British constituencies can do to be done by people in constituencies here. For that reason, I think, in the first place, that the commission will not work. In the second place, I think it is most undemocratic and has no regard whatever for the rights of the people whose interests will be vitally affected by the changes to be made by this commission. Therefore, I oppose the Section.

I entirely agree with Senator O'Quigley. This commission, in my opinion, is far from democratic. It is different from any other commission we had in the past. If P.R. is abolished, there will not be so much need for gerrymandering, but if the referendum is defeated, there is no doubt that there will be the greatest need for gerrymandering, if Fianna Fáil want to rivet themselves in power and we could have the same gerrymandering of constituencies as we had here in 1947.

This commission is above the courts, and we wonder why. We should be jealous of, and guard, the rights and functions of our courts in any true democracy and we claim to be a true democracy——

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

I think the Senator would be well advised to leave that discussion for a later amendment.

I think it comes up in relation to this commission because we hear plenty of talk about liberty in general.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

There is an amendment to the next section which will enable the Senator to make the kind of speech I think he has in mind.

Which section? We are now dealing with 1º, 2º and 3º. We are dealing with the one that says "a Constituency Commission shall be established from time to time when determined by the President, but not less frequently than once in every 12 years." We are also told that we are dealing with the next two sections.

Sub-sections.

Yes, sub-sections. What is your ruling, Sir?

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

I am pointing out to the Senator that he is entitled to make the speech he seems to want to make under the next section, when we come to it. There is an amendment to it, amendment No. 10.

I hold that this section is unjust and unfair because I do not agree that politicians should be the people to fix these constituencies. I agree with Senator O'Quigley when he says the English system is better with people such as the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages and somebody from the Statistics Office— or whatever it is called in Britain— acting on these commissions ex officio. One point the Senator did not mention is that when the job is done, the results come back to the House of Commons and the House of Lords and there is an opportunity for a full discussion.

I do not want to transgress the rules of order by anticipating other sections, but there is legislation proposed in sections which we shall reach later, clearly setting out the intention of the Government to ensure that there is no other official debate on the activities or the results produced by the commission, once the work is done. No court can consider it; there will be no debate in either the Dáil or Seanad. That is unfair and unjust and I submit should not be carried out.

I agree with Senator O'Quigley that a member of the High Court or the Supreme Court is not the proper person to act as chairman of the commission. Imagine the dilemma of a person who may have been at one time a member of a political Party. I say this in no slighting manner against members of the judiciary, who may have been at one time members of a political Party and who are faced with a choice. The position I envisage is that when such a person has complied with all the requirements in the following section, Section 4, and has addressed himself to the geographical and administrative features of the area and finds there are two or three ways in which he can produce a single seat constituency, does he not find himself in a very invidious position that he knows quite well that if he does it one way, he suits the Party of which he was a member 20 years ago and if he does it the other way, he suits the Party which he opposed 20 years before? What is the man to do? He is fair-minded and his reaction might be to make quite sure that he would not suit his own Party. If he feels very keenly, however, that his Party was, and is, the right Party for the country, the temptation is to fix that constituency, within the law and within the instructions he has got, to suit the Party in which he was or is interested.

We all know that all members of the judiciary here are appointed largely on—I would not like to say a political basis—a basis related to the services given by the members of the Bar to political Parties. I do not see anything wrong with that; it is done in America. It is one way of doing it, but we cannot avoid the fact that it is done here. We see it every day and we know this is a fact. From reading Deputy McGilligan's speech in the Dáil, I know that in the High Court and in the Supreme Court, there are people from our side and our Party who have been appointed there. There are some from the other side. I think he mentioned a Fianna Fáil ex-Senator, a man who stood twice for election for Fianna Fáil. I submit we have the same sort of person. Also, we have two Fianna Fáil ex-Attorneys-General two people who acted as public prosecutors under Fianna Fáil.

When these people become members of the judiciary, I agree completely that they accept the responsibility of being non-political and of being fair in their judgments. But do not the Minister and House agree with me that it is not fair to place a man, no matter to what Party he originally belonged, in the invidious and frightful position of fixing a constituency boundary when he knows quite well from his previous political experience what will suit one side and what will suit the other?

Taking a practical example; suppose he has to fix a constituency where there is a town, where some local authority always had a majority for one Party, and that town consists of two-thirds of the electorate and he wants to include that town in one constituency or another, suppose there is a candidate for one Party living in the town, while the candidate for the other Party lives outside it. Obviously, he knows if he fixes it in a certain way, it must help an individual candidate who will stand and probably stand for the next ten years, if he is a young man. That is a temptation and a load we should not put upon these men. We should leave it, as the British have left it, to the head of the Statistics Office and to people such as those who fix the constituency boundaries in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

The provision for the election and the appointment of a member of the Constituency Commission is, in my view, unfair. It provides that the President may remove a member after consultation with the Council of State and after consultation with the Taoiseach, if he happens to be a Government nominee, and with the Ceann Comhairle, if he happens to be an Opposition nominee. I submit the word "consultation" means nothing here. All it means is that the President meets these people and has a discussion with them, and then says: "I am going to remove Deputy A or Deputy B." On one occasion, I held the view that a member of the Milk Costings Commission should have been removed because he came outside and spoke about what was happening inside, and as a result, pressure was exerted on other members of the commission. In this case, I do not think that would be a valid reason for removal. A person may be removed only for incorrect conduct while acting as a member of the commission or, while still a member of the commission, for incorrect conduct outside it.

A commission must be inviolate. The word "commission" means that it has full power. In the case of the Milk Costings Commission, the argument was put forward that you could not limit it in the time it would take to produce its findings. This commission is limited in its time; therefore, it is not a commission at all. A member may be a nuisance and may create trouble for the other members, but if you remove him, it is not a commission. A commission must not be subject to dictation from outside. If a member is in the position that he knows he can be removed by forces outside the commission, then it is not a commission at all and that procedure would be unjust and unfair.

Under sub-section (7), the quorum is fixed at four. The commission consists of six members and a chairman. While it may sound far-fetched, I submit that, in certain circumstances, the entire three members representing the Opposition could be removed and the commission could still function with the chairman appointed from the High Court by the President and with three Government nominees. The commission could produce its findings and nobody could say "boo" to it.

Is it right that we should put through legislation which leaves the Government in the position that they alone can fix the constituency boundaries? In such a situation, if I know the judiciary of this country, the chairman of the commission would resign, but he could be replaced by a man more amenable, and in such a situation, the Opposition would be unable to make its opinions felt and would have no hand in the fixing of the boundaries.

The framework of this section will bring up once more the town versus country complex. When you fix the constituency boundaries in this manner, you get a political flavour. That will mean having a solid block of votes in a constituency which should be in another constituency. If the members of the commission act as I think they will, we shall have the town versus country complex again, and it would be a very bad day for Ireland if we allowed it to proceed.

I spoke on only one occasion, the Second Reading. In the course of my remarks, I mentioned why this body was being set up and I pointed out that the Government were endeavouring to be extremely careful and fair to avoid any criticism that politics were being introduced. To prevent that criticism, they proposed the appointment of a commission above reproach.

I also referred to the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition in the other House in connection with this commission. I deplored them because I thought they were a very bad headline for the Dáil and Seanad. I deplore the fact that members of the legal profession appointed by the Government, as it is the right of the Government to appoint them, should be referred to in such a derogatory manner as the Leader of the Opposition referred to them in the Dáil and as the Senators who have spoken here to-day referred to them. I was a member of this House when another member, who certainly was never a supporter of Fianna Fáil, was appointed a judge. I refer to the former Senator Kingsmill-Moore, who was appointed a judge by Fianna Fáil. Is he "a lickspittle for Fianna Fáil"?

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

That line is not appropriate to the debate and should not be pursued. Individual members of the judiciary ought not to be referred to by name by any members of the House.

I referred to the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition in the other House. I want to give a further quotation from those remarks. At the beginning of his speech, he indicated it would be practically impossible for anybody to divide a constituency or a county area by any system which would make it favourable to one or other of the existing political Parties. I quote from column 1021, Volume 121 of the Dáil Debates. Deputy Costello said:—

"I want Deputies—— to realise that we have in this country conditions entirely different from those that exist in England or America. In Ireland we have a homogeneous public opinion."

—some of us have expressed that view here already—

"In England you have a concentration of Labour due to industrialisation and, due to historical reasons, you have a concentration of people who traditionally vote Conservative. Bournemouth, and I think Sussex County, can always be relied on to vote Conservative. In the East End of London and in parts dotted all along the map of Great Britain it can always be said: ‘That area is Labour' or ‘That area is Conservative'. It is that which has enabled the two-Party system to exist in Britain.

We have not had that here. We have a homogeneous public opinion and there is no way of saying that in Kerry, such an area votes for a particular Party or that that area can be relied on to vote for a particular Party. Neither can it be said of an area in Donegal, the Midlands or elsewhere."

Surely those remarks show the members of the Opposition in the Dáil, and the members of the Opposition here, that it is extremely difficult for any commission which is set up to divide the constituencies in a partisan way. Geographical conditions must be taken into account and such things as the inlets of the sea and the outlets of rivers. Surely to goodness, any sane, thinking person will not insinuate that there can be wholesale wrongs done to any Party, or to any section of the community, by this commission? It was, to my mind, an extreme attempt to be fair and above reproach that a judge of the Supreme Court should be appointed with six representatives, three from whatever Party constitues the Government for the time being, and three from the Parties the Ceann Comhairle deems to be in opposition.

I understand that ordinarily the Department of Local Government revises the constituencies, and the number of seats, and that the Department of Local Government puts the revision to the Houses of the Oireachtas. There is a departure from that procedure here and, to my mind, the departure is to set it above reproach, by having such an independent commission to decide the matter. The commission is deciding problems that certainly do not allow for any great injustices to any section of the community, or to any area of the country.

The Leader of the Opposition in the Dáil also criticised this system of appointing a judge, and I must be allowed again to point to the deplorable attitude adopted by that gentleman. He deplored having a judge appointed as chairman of the commission. That, I think, was a bad lead and if we can take a lead from that, as representing the seriousness of the arguments which have been put up against this Bill, and against this commission, we can take it that the Opposition have a very bad case.

I shall repeat the quotation here, at column 1030 of the same volume, where the Leader of the Opposition says—he is putting words into the President's mouth——

"He may say, ‘Thank you, gentlemen, I have consulted you. That is all I have to do. I will appoint CD,' who is a tool of the Government in power, who is what the late Kevin O'Higgins would have called a legal careerist, who got his job on the bench because he was the lickspittle of a political Party. That is the system supposed to give us impartiality and supposed to create public confidence in this white sepulchre, the commission set up under this Bill."

I deplore that attitude and I think it is a very bad line of approach. It is uncalled-for that that line should be taken in either House of the Oireachtas. I think that in no case could any criticism be made that any member of the judiciary, appointed by either Government, has acted in any way that could be criticised while he held such office. We appoint the judiciary to interpret the laws as we enact them and to administer justice. It is unfair to suggest that members of the judiciary, from the District Court to the Supreme Court, are unfit, or improper people, to decide these things. Members of the judiciary have to inquire into litigation between citizens and in criminal courts and they have acted on tribunals set up by the Oireachtas.

This is such a simple thing compared with the duties involved where matters of life and death have to be decided by the members of the judiciary and this simple effort to avoid criticism of the scheme, to have it supremely fair, has been subjected to this uncalled-for criticism by members of the other House, and by members of this House. I think all the points raised on all the sections of this Bill, and the alternatives suggested, have been justified in debate, but for the Opposition to come along with this venom to criticise the members of the judiciary is, I think, a disgrace to this House, as well as to the members of the other House. That is strong language. Members of the Fianna Fáil Government have appointed opponents who were in the Oireachtas. There may be others but two come to my mind—Mr. Justice Kingsmill Moore and Judge Fionan Lynch, who was an old colleague in 1916, and was appointed as a judge by a Fianna Fáil Government. Is the criticism to be taken seriously that there was something wrong in appointing them? It is the right of the Government to appoint them as judges. I do not know, at any rate, that criticism has ever been levelled against them for doing their job unsatisfactorily.

I claim that we are entitled to criticise this commission and also to criticise the Government for the setting up of this commission. Listening to Senator Ó Donnabháin, one would think that the Fianna Fáil Party were a conscientious Party that would not stoop to anything underhand. Unfortunately, they have not proved themselves such in the past, and as far as we are concerned, we cannot trust them in the future.

He stated that in an endeavour to be very careful, this commission was being set up, that it was above reproach. In my view, it is just a case of whitewashing to try to make everything seem all right. Remember that a commission can be a cover for anything. The Senator also stated that he deplored what the Leader of the Opposition had stated about judges in the other House. He claimed that judges are as human as anybody else. As the majority of them are Fianna Fáil, both in the High Court and the Supreme Court, we all, to our grief, know how human Fianna Fáil can be at times.

He stated that no commission, if it were set up at the moment, could divide constituencies into favourable areas for any Party. Senator Ó Donnabháin stated that. I do not intend to go back over all the gerrymandering that was done in 1947, but I shall give one or two examples. Sligo-Leitrim was a Fine Gael constituency and returned at one time five Fine Gael candidates out of seven. Dublin South-West was a predominantly Fianna Fáil constituency. At the time I speak of, there were six seats in Sligo-Leitrim for an electorate of 69,000. Although everywhere else in the country the Taoiseach was trying to make smaller, three seat constituencies, he amalgamated Sligo and Leitrim and made it a five seat constituency. In Dublin South-West, you have a three seat constituency with an electorate of 29,000. In other words, it took over 14,000 votes to return a Fine Gael Deputy in Sligo-Leitrim, whereas a Fianna Fáil Deputy could be returned in Dublin South-West with a little over 9,500. If that was not gerrymandering by a political Party, I do not know what gerrymandering is.

We also know what happened in my constituency. The town of Athlone was put into County Longford for certain reasons. We know also that Youghal was taken out of Cork and put into County Waterford in order to beat a certain individual, a prominent member of the Fine Gael Party, at that time. As regards gerrymandering in the North, under their system of election, in Derry, where you have 29,000 Nationalists and 18,000 Unionists, the Unionists return 12 members to the local council and the Nationalists only eight.

It is only right that we should question the composition of this commission. There are three members from the Government side to be nominated by the Taoiseach and three from the Opposition to be nominated by the Ceann Comhairle. There is to be an independent chairman who is to be nominated by the President, and to make it look better, they have provided in the Bill that the President must have the advice of the Council of State.

The chairman of this commission has extraordinary powers, powers that were never given to the chairman of any commission in the past. The Council of State, we are told, are to advise the President. That is more whitewash. This Council of State has 14 members; nine of them are Fianna Fáil and the politics of the other five are not too well known. In any case, Fianna Fáil have a further advantage there.

Let us deal with the group from whom the chairman is to be selected. One member of the Supreme Court has been a Fianna Fáil Deputy and an Attorney-General for a number of years. Another was selected as a Fianna Fáil candidate and was not elected by the people.

In relation to a statement made by Senator Seán Ó Donnabháin, Sir, you suggested that that line should not be pursued.

I gave no names.

May I suggest that the line on which the Senator is going also should not be pursued?

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

I should prefer that it would not be pursued, but deciding that the Senator is not entitled to do it is another matter. However, I should prefer if it were not pursued.

After listening to the remarks of Senator Seáan Ó Donnabháin, I shall pursue it. Another member was selected as a Fianna Fáil candidate. He was not elected by the people, but he was Attorney-General for the Fianna Fáil Party afterwards. Another member was a member of the Seanad for the Fianna Fáil Party and another has been a State prosecutor under a Fianna Fáil Government.

Now let us come to the High Court. One member ran for election for Fianna Fáil and was not elected by the people. Another was a Fianna Fáil Senator for a time, and all the others were either public prosecutors or Attorneys-General under a Fianna Fáil Government. One of those members is to be appointed by the President and it is only fair to ask: would he forget his love for the Fianna Fáil Party and for the Taoiseach, even though he is a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court? I doubt if the Nationalists in the North would be satisfied, in the event of a constituency commission being set up by the Governor-General, if the Governor-General were to select a judge of the Northern Court as chairman of the commission. In any case, a judge is not the best person to be chairman of this commission. His job is to deal with judicial matters and no matter what is said here, this is a political matter. It is only natural to expect that people who were Fianna Fáil politicians in the past but who are now on the Bench, would be likely to think exactly as the Taoiseach is thinking at the present time.

Before the Minister speaks on this matter, there is a question that might be asked. A judge of the Supreme Court or High Court is to be appointed as chairman of this commission. Have the judges been consulted on that matter and are they in agreement that a judge should be appointed for this work?

I did not expect that there would be such a heated discussion on this section because, having read the section, I for one could not devise a better method of appointing the commission envisaged. Scrupulous care is being taken under this section to give fair representation to both sides of Dáil Éireann on this commission with an independent chairman. I do not know of any better way of appointing the members of this commission. However, no matter what method of appointment would be adopted under this Bill it would be adversely criticised by the members opposite. If you could appoint six saints on this commission, presided over by an independent chairman, they would still oppose it.

The chairman would have to be an independent archangel.

Yes. It appears to me that some of the members opposite take a very poor view of the judiciary. As Senator Ó Donnabháin has already said, a very bad lead was given to them by the Leader of the Opposition in the Dáil. I shall not go into this matter any more fully than that. It is very undesirable to refer to the judiciary in the way it had been referred to in this House to-day. Remember, the fact that a man has been associated with a political Party does not take from his integrity or his efficiency. From the way some people have spoken here, one would think that the fact of a person belonging to a political Party is something to damn him for all time. Why should we take up that attitude? It is, to my mind, the worst form of inferiority complex, and the sooner we get away from it, the better.

In his contribution to the debate on this section, Senator L'Estrange took up an extraordinary attitude when he said that nothing was good in Fianna Fáil. That was an extraordinary statement for a Senator to make. Everything Fianna Fáil does is wrong, according to him. While listening to him, I was reminded of the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. The Pharisee could see no good in the Publican, and that is the attitude Senator L'Estrange has taken up in this House to-day.

I thought Senator Mullins objected to quotations from the Bible.

Let us get down to the section in a serious way. Senator O'Quigley referred to the possible resignation of the chairman of the commission. In the first place, I think it would be highly unlikely that the chairman would resign, because a member of the High Court or the Supreme Court, if appointed chairman of such a commission, would regard it as part of his judicial functions to preside over that commission. After all, very often in the ordinary course of events, members of the High Court and the Supreme Court have been appointed by the Oireachtas to various functions which could be regarded as semi-judicial and, in fact, they regard them as part of their duties and perform them conscientiously and according to their judicial judgment.

The same can be said of this, that this is a semi-judicial function. A judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, as the case may be, would be appointed in a semi-judicial capacity and, no doubt, it would be his duty to preside over the deliberations of the commission in a just and impartial way. Now if the judicial chairman of the commission were to resign, there is nothing in the section to prevent the appointment of a successor.

There is nothing in the section to allow it.

There is nothing to prevent it.

There is nothing to permit it.

The chairman could be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Council of State. If the chairman can be appointed in the first instance, a chairman can also be appointed subsequently, no matter who his predecessor was.

There is no such provision.

It is quite obvious. The President would have the same power, and the same authority, and the same function, in appointing a person to succeed somebody who had resigned as he has to appoint a chairman in the first instance.

Senator L'Estrange went, more or less, off the rails in his approach to the section. He mentioned the question of gerrymandering and purported to give us some examples of gerrymandering that took place in the past during the period of office of a Fianna Fáil Government. The matter of the distribution of the seats was, at the time, the function of Dáil Éireann. If the Senator will throw his mind back, he will remember that the members of Dáil Éireann in 1947, in the full light of day, went into this whole question. What is the use of talking about gerrymandering when the public representatives of the people went very fully indeed into the whole matter? We heard no reference to gerrymandering from any responsible Deputy, as far as I can remember.

Indeed we did.

I question that statement.

I should like Senators to produce some evidence of that. The members of the various Parties in the Dáil approached this matter with open minds. They approached it objectively and I do not think there was any disposition on the part of Deputies on any side of the House to encourage gerrymandering.

Who took the seat from Mayo?

I shall not discuss that now; I am not in a position to go into all the details. As I said before, no matter what the personnel, this commission will be faulted. Fault will be found with it, but I do not believe the members opposite are at all sincere, nor do I believe those who criticised the commission in the Dáil were serious in their criticisms. In the course of the debate on the Second Reading, the Tánaiste referred to this section and said it was not the last word and if the members of the Opposition could point to a better system of appointing the commission, or would put down amendments to the section, their suggestions would be sympathetically considered. Were there any amendments put down to the section?

The Senator is an innocent man.

I do not think there were. This is a fair method of appointing the commission. The Government Party will get fair representation; the Opposition Parties will get equally fair representation. I do not see how we could get a better, or a more impartial chairman than a member of the judiciary—a member of the High Court or the Supreme Court.

This section deals with the appointment of a commission and it seems to me rather beside the point whether or not the commission can be regarded as impartial. To my mind, they will be designed as the rubber stamp to the proposals drawn up in the Party rooms of Fianna Fáil. The position now is that the Department—in other words, the Minister for Local Government—brings forward proposals for the revision of the constituencies and these are criticised and debated in the full light of day in Dáil Éireann. What is proposed is that the Minister will put his proposals to this commission and within six months, the commission will be obliged to put a rubber stamp on those proposals. Does any Senator imagine that, in that short space of time, a commission of seven could examine all those proposals in detail? Will they have sufficient local knowledge to criticise them objectively and put forward alternative proposals? What is being set up here is a facade in the form of a commission to rubber stamp the proposals drawn up by Fianna Fáil for the new single member constituencies.

It is really unfair to ask that a judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court should preside over a commission of this sort. I do not in any way doubt the impartiality or ability of those judges to deal with matters of law in courts of law. What one of them will be asked to do here is to preside over this commission, get the proposals from the Department of Local Government—which, of course, would have been drawn up already by the Fianna Fáil people—and say in a matter of six months, whether they are approved or not. I think it is wrong that a judge should be put in that position. It is unfair to him. He is not being asked to act as a judge to interpret the law and deal with a matter in a court of law; he is being asked to deal with a political matter, that is the reallocation of constituencies, in a short period of time. It is really debasing the judiciary to bring a judge into it at all.

Let us look now at the composition of the rest of this commission. Three of the ordinary members of the commission are appointed by the Taoiseach and the other three are appointed by the Ceann Comhairle of Dáil Éireann. I know the people on the other side will tell me that the Ceann Comhairle of Dáil Éireann at the moment is not a Fianna Fáil Deputy, that he is a Labour Deputy. That happens to be the position at the moment. However, the tendency is for the Party in power to have as Ceann Comhairle a member of their own Party. In other words, we will have the rather ridiculous situation that the Taoiseach, a member of Fianna Fáil, will appoint three to act on this commission; and the Ceann Comhairle, a member of Fianna Fáil, will appoint the other three—three whom he would deem to be in opposition.

One may say that the Ceann Comhairle, before making any such appointment, would consult with the Leader of the Opposition and would make an appointment of those recommended or proposed by the Leader of the Opposition. That, However, is not in the Bill; the Bill does not say that. The Ceann Comhairle might appoint three innocuous members of the Opposition——

There are none such.

I am glad to hear that. However, there is the possibility that there might be three who would be regarded as harmless or not too questioning of the proposals of Fianna Fáil for the redrawing of the constituencies. For those reasons I oppose the section.

As Senator Ó Ciosáin pointed out, the Opposition members put down no amendment to this section. It has been before them now for a good number of months. If they had been really concerned about the section, they had plenty of time to put forward amendments.

It was interesting to hear Senator O'Quigley taking the line he did about the judges, in view of the line his leader took in the Dáil. Senator O'Quigley was concerned lest we might pull these innocent judges into political controversy. Deputy Costello thought they were all Party lickspittles, that they could not be dragged down any further. As Senator Ó Donnabháin pointed out, Deputy Costello had no hesitation in saying what he thought about them.

The experience of our people and of members of the Dáil and Seanad over the years has been that, by and large, and indeed without exception, the judges have acted honourably as between citizen and citizen and as between the State and the private individual. It was in view of their record in that regard, and in view of the suspicions which might be aroused throughout the country if we continued the old system of fixing boundaries by the Dáil, that the Government decided to put into this Bill to amend the Constitution that the chairman would be a member of the judiciary.

Senator Hayes asked whether the judges were consulted. I do not think they were. I have not heard that any of the judges were consulted in this matter. In a lot of other Bills we pass here, we assign certain duties to judges. I have never known them not to accept the duties imposed upon them by the Oireachtas. I feel certain that a member of the judiciary, of the Supreme Court or High Court, will accept the rather onerous job of presiding over this commission and I feel, too, that he will carry out his functions in a manner which will give general satisfaction.

This commission will not work behind closed doors. It will not issue some secret decisions, which will be implemented in secret. Everybody throughout the country is interested in the question of the constituency in which he and his family will be voting. The judge, the chairman of the commission, is helped by the six members of the Dáil. The result of their work will be reviewed by a lot of people who take a very active interest in the constituency boundaries.

I do not want to discuss the next section in detail because we have not come to it, but it is clearly set out in that section that the boundaries must be drawn on a fair and equitable basis in accordance with the provisions of the section. Whether or not the commission carries out its work fairly will be a matter open for discussion throughout the country and in the Dáil. If the Dáil by a two-thirds majority decides that the commission has acted unfairly, they can reject the report of the commission. The reason why we put in two-thirds as the number requisite to reject the proposals of the commission was that if it were a simple majority, it might be alleged that the Government of the day, having a majority, could keep on rejecting the reports of commissions until such time as it got something that suited its own political book.

I do not know how Senator Murphy can say that the judge who undertakes this task will be a mere rubber-stamp, who will put his name to a scheme of boundaries drawn up by the Minister for Local Government and his advisers. The chairman will have to take responsibility for the document to which he puts his name, and I am sure the Department of Local Government will assist him by giving him all the data it can in relation to constituencies. Heretofore, the Dáil took the decision as to constituency boundaries, without the aid of any commission; the procedure was that officials in the Department of Local Government drew up an approved scheme, submitted it to the Minister and, if he approved of it, he then put it before the Dáil.

The last time boundaries were revised was in 1947. There were, I am sure, allegations of gerrymandering; I would be very surprised if there were not some allegations of that kind in such a debate. But, by and large, it was agreed that the scheme was as good as could be got. Like all the other works of man, it was not perfect; but it was as good as could be got. There was a dispute between Wexford and Mayo as to which constituency should have an extra seat. The Government, in order to make certain that there could be no allegation of unfairness, left the matter to a free vote of the House. I forget how the matter was decided.

Senator O'Quigley and Senator Ó Ciosáin asked what would happen should the chairman resign? The President has power to appoint a chairman in the first instance. He also has power to fill any vacancies that may occur. A query arose in relation to the quorum being four and in relation to the fact that the chairman, plus the three Government members, could carry on the work, even though the three Opposition members resigned because of some allegation of unfairness. If such allegations should arise, we would hear all about them. The matter could be debated and, in the last analysis, it is the people themselves who will be the judges as to whether there was foul play practised against political opponents.

I agree thoroughly with what Deputy Costello said in the Dáil about gerrymandering. He said it was impossible in our circumstances; we have the same type of population all over the country, and no political Party could have any surety from year to year as to the way the population of a certain area might vote. The people might vote for Fianna Fáil one year, for Fine Gael next year, and for some other Party the year after. I think it would be impossible to gerrymander. It is most important, however, that not only should fair play be done in a matter of this kind, but it should be quite apparent to everybody that fair play has in fact been done.

We have made our proposals. I think they are reasonable proposals. I believe the vast majority of the people will hold that we have at least made an effort to outline a scheme which will give fair play to all. Not everything in relation to the commission has gone into this Amendment of the Constitution Bill, but it is provided in Section 6 that "subject to the provisions of this article, any matter whatsoever relating to constituency commissions, or their members, may be provided for by law". That sub-section contemplates that there will be a Bill brought forward, if necessary, to settle details in relation to commissions. If such a Bill is brought forward, then Deputies and Senators will be in a position to put in amendments to ensure that the provisions are in keeping with the basic fair play promised in the constitutional amendment itself.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Before I call on any other speaker, I am anxious to discover what is in the mind of the House. I should like to remind the House at this stage that a number of amendments still remain to be decided that may cause a great deal of controversy and take up a great deal of time.

Why not suggest that the section be put?

Would 6.15 p.m. do?

What about now?

Not later than 6 p.m.?

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Could we not put the question now, before I call on anybody else? Some of the arguments made on this section could overflow quite easily into the next section.

That is right.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Much of the argument made would be in order on the next section, but I do not want to deprive any Senator of his right to speak now.

There is a peculiar piece of English in sub-section 7º of the section, which reads:—

"The quorum of a constituency commission shall be four, and a commission may act notwithstanding vacancies in their membership."

"A commission in their membership." I note that that is tied up with a phrase in the Constitution. I take it that it is tied up with a phrase regarding a commission which sits if the President is ill. Article 14 (3) of the Constitution provides: "The said commission may act by any two of their number." I note that, in the interpretation of the Act, the plural includes the singular and the singular includes the plural. However, I cannot see why you should have a phrase like "the commission may act notwithstanding vacancies in their membership." I think it is quite plain that it should be in "its" membership.

You have the same thing in reference to a Government in the Constitution.

That is fair enough.

While I agree with the Minister that in colloquial language, you may talk about a Government and their responsibility, I should point out that this is something which, presumably, will last a long time. There are many ways of getting over the obstacle. You could say "vacancies in the membership" or you could say "The commission may act, notwithstanding vacancies in the membership." Here, it is specifically "a commission." In the earlier part of it, the reference was to "the commission". I am not making any point about it, but I think it does not look well.

Is it not in the Constitution already? As the Senator said, it is in the Constitution.

It is perfectly good grammar. The argument is ridiculous. "Commission" is a collective noun.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

May we take it that it is agreed to?

The Minister says that if the chairman of the commission resigns, dies or retires, the President may appoint somebody else. I have examined a number of statutes appointing statutory bodies. We rather specialise in the appointment of statutory bodies in this country. You will always find in the case, say, of a board appointed for a period of five years that where a member of the board retires, resigns or is relieved of the post, there is a provision that the Minister may appoint somebody else for the remainder of the period of office of the outgoing person.

May I shorten the discussion? I brought to the attention of the Seanad the fact that Section 6 provides:—

"Subject to the provisions of this Article, any matter whatsoever relating to constituency commissions or their members may be provided for by law."

This Amendment of the Constitution Bill is long enough without adding to it all the details the Senator and others can think up. As it stands, it provides power for the President to appoint a chairman, if a vacancy arises for any reason.

Then we are passing a new decision which I had not contemplated on reading Section 6, namely, that, by legislative act, we will be amending the Constitution. That is the substance of what the Minister says.

That is nonsense.

It is not. I know well the outlook of the Minister and his Party.

Cuireadh agus d'aontaíodh an cheist

Question put and agreed to.
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