This Bill has three principal objects. First of all, it proposes to provide for the survival of causes of action on death. Secondly, it proposes to deal comprehensively with the law as to concurrent fault. Finally, it proposes certain miscellaneous and important reforms in the law of tort. As the Bill is accompanied by a full and detailed Explanatory Memorandum, I assume that Senators would wish me to confine myself to the principles involved in the Bill.
Part II of the Bill is concerned with the survival of causes of action on death. It is proposed to amend the law to ensure that all actions except certain excepted actions listed in Section 6 will survive the death of either party. At the present day, the application of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is confined to the law of tort and the effect of Part II will be that all tort actions, other than excepted causes of action, such as breach of promise and defamation, will survive death. Damages for pain or suffering or personal injury or for loss or diminution of expectation of life or happiness are being excluded in Section 7.
The assessment of what I may call happiness damages has given rise to considerable difficulty in England particularly in view of the fact that the test to be applied is an objective one. Moreover, it has been said that the maximum amount that can be awarded is £500; and in assessing damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts in England account must be taken of any damages payable under the survival statute of 1934. On a full consideration of this problem it seemed to me that what should be done was to give more damages to the dependants of a person who lost his life due to the wrongful act of another. The dependants and not the estate are the real sufferers, and this all the more so where the estate goes to a stranger under the will of the deceased. Accordingly, Section 49 of the Bill provides for an additional head of damages in a fatal case in order to compensate the dependants for mental distress resulting to them from the death.
The total of the amounts awarded in any one case will not exceed £1,000. The amount for each dependant will be assessed by the judge and indicated separately in the award. The idea of providing compensation for mental distress will be completely new to the common law and the relevant provisions in Section 49 will apply for a trial period of three years. Before the end of that period the law will be reexamined having regard to the actual cases where damages for mental distress have been awarded.
It is proposed to keep records of each case decided in the courts. I suggest that the figure of £1,000 is a generous one, which compares more than favourably with £750 which is, I understand, the top amount awarded for what in Scots law is known as solatium or solatium doloris. The principle of awarding compensation for moral damage is an attractive one and it has operated successfully in Scotland and in France. We shall see how it will work in this country. The present system of confining damages in fatal cases to purely actuarial or financial loss means that a husband can recover nothing for the loss of his wife, unless he can prove economic dependency, which very often he is unable to do. Before I leave this subject, I may mention that mental distress under the new proposal will, of course, have to be proved.
Concurrent fault is dealt with in Part III of the Bill. The liability of concurrent wrongdoers, contribution between concurrent wrongdoers, and contributory negligence are covered exhaustively. Wrongdoers will include persons who commit an ordinary civil wrong, technically called a tort, persons who are in breach of trust, and persons guilty of a breach of contract.
The Tortfeasors Act, 1951, which has been found in practice to be unsatisfactory, is being repealed. Apart from the fact that it leaves a number of problems unsolved, the Supreme Court have held that the Act does not allow for third-party procedure to settle matters of contribution in the injured person's action, where the injured person has not sued all the tortfeasors. The proposals in the Bill are specifically designed to avoid as far as possible a number of actions in respect of the same accident or occurrence. Except in exceptional cases, all issues, whether of liability, damages or contribution, will be settled in the one action.
Section 34 of the Bill will get completely away from the existing law in negligence cases. Where a person suffers damage as a result of the negligence of another, the law is that he recovers all or nothing depending on contributory negligence on his part. Subsection (1) of Section 34 proposes that instead of this "all or nothing" rule, damages will be apportioned according to the degree of fault of each party. Thus a person, who suffers damage in an accident to the extent of £600, for which he is found one-third to blame, will recover £400. This is a fair and equitable system which has met with approval in every legal jurisdiction in which it has been introduced.
Parts IV and VI of the Bill propose to re-enact and bring into line the existing statutory provisions as to both ordinary fatal accidents and fatal air accidents. The law as to the heads of damages to be awarded is, as I have already indicated, being amended so as to allow compensation for mental distress, Part V of the Bill makes certain purely consequential changes in the Workmen's Compensation Act. These changes are necessary because of the amendment in the law of contributory negligence.
Part VII of the Bill contains certain miscellaneous provisions dealing with the law of tort. The main changes in the law will be found in Sections 58, 60, 61 and 62 and I shall deal with these sections separately.
Section 58 will enact that the law relating to wrongdoing will apply to an unborn child for his protection, as if he were born, provided he is subsequently born alive. The Section is drafted as declaring the law. This is to avoid any implication that the case against the former Great Northern Railway Company, decided by an Irish Court of Appeal in 1890, is in fact the present law, which, indeed, it may very well not be.
Section 60 will abolish the defence of nonfeasance by a road authority. As the law has stood since the famous case of Russell v. The Men of Devon, decided as long ago as 1788, a road authority are not liable for damage resulting from mere nonfeasance, that is to say, from mere neglect to perform their statutory duty to repair the road. But a road authority are liable for negligence in the execution of their duty. In other words, they are liable for misfeasance. Section 60 will provide certain statutory defences for a road authority; and the factors to which regard must be had in determining whether a road is adequately maintained are set out. The new section will come into operation on a day not earlier than the 1st April, 1967.
A new liability is being imposed on road authorities and it is only reasonable that they should be given sufficient time to take necessary action in regard to public roads, and bridges, pavements, etc., forming part of such roads. It must be realised that the liability is really a liability being imposed on the local ratepayer whose interests must be taken into account. The section strikes a fair balance between those using the roads and those whose financial responsibility it is to maintain the roads. The law has, as I have pointed out, been there since 1788; and, in justice to those who have to pay the bill, it cannot be lightly changed over-night.
Section 61 proposes to allow proof in bankruptcy of claims for unliquidated damages. On examination of the law of bankruptcy as it impinged on the proposals in the Bill, it appeared to me that there was no valid reason why claims for unliquidated damages arising out of a breach of contract, for instance, negligence in the case of a paying passenger, should be provable while claims for unliquidated damages arising out of an ordinary tort should not. Section 61 will allow claims for damages or contribution in respect of any wrong to be provable in bankruptcy where the wrong was committed before the bankruptcy. Where the damages or contribution have not been liquidated, the court may make an order for the assessment of the amount. This accords with the provisions of Section 46 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1872 in regard to unliquidated damages in the case of a contract or promise.
Section 61 will not, of course, operate in a case coming within Section 62. The latter section proposes that moneys payable under an insurance policy in respect of liability for a wrong will go directly to the injured person instead of into the wrongdoer's estate. What is involved is the extension to all liability policies of the provisions in regard to an approved policy contained in Section 76 (4) of the recently enacted Road Traffic Act.
Part II of this Bill is on the lines of proposals made by Dr. Glanville Williams of the University of Cambridge in his book, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence. These proposals were based on a study of the law in Britain, Canada and this country and also on the pioneer work of the United States authority, Professor Charles Gregory. I should like to express my appreciation for the help that Dr. Williams gave us and for the unstinting way in which he was always ready to let us have his views on various aspects of the law with which this Bill deals. I should also like to express my thanks to the Bar Council and the Council of the Incorporated Law Society for their valuable and constructive observations. Lastly, I should like to thank the members of the Special Committee of Dáil Éireann for the work they did in the detailed examination of this Bill.
I should mention that we are now, and for the first time in any common law jurisdiction, attempting codification in a branch of the law of tort. We have tried to avoid as far as possible the use of technical phrases with restricted meanings. The Bill has naturally to be examined against the background of the common law. However, I suggest it should be examined on the basis of the legal principles it establishes and the obscurities in the law that it purports to resolve. As the Bill ranges over a wide territory, I considered that it would be desirable to accompany it with a detailed Explanatory Memorandum. Since the Bill was first introduced in Dáil Éireann, it has been substantially amended in some respects. I have had the Memorandum re-written and expanded and I trust it will be of assistance to Senators in studying the Bill.
The law of wrongs is of importance to lawyer and layman alike. Indeed, over half the actions that are heard in our courts are personal injuries actions. A prime purpose of this Bill has been to facilitate and encourage settlements out of court and to avoid where possible multiplicity of actions as respects the same set of facts. The advantage of having whole branches of the law dealt with comprehensively in one statute is obvious.
I commend this Bill to the House. I trust that it will achieve what, at the outset, it was intended and designed to achieve.
Before I conclude, I should like to refute any suggestion that this Bill has been rushed or that it has not been given the most careful consideration. In the first instance, it was circulated in draft form to all Government Departments where it has been carefully scrutinised as all such legislation is. Then I sent the Bill to the Bar Council and to the Incorporated Law Society. They examined it in detail and let me have the benefit of their views. I sent it also to the Law Schools of the Universities here and to the Law School of the Queen's University of Belfast.
In preparing the Bill and amending it, we have carried out a comprehensive comparative examination of the systems of law here, in Britain, in the United States of America and in Canada. The latest piece of legislation on this subject in a British Commonwealth country was passed in South Africa, the South African Apportionment of Damages Act, 1956. We examined what was done in that Act very carefully and have taken it into account in the wording of our Bill. As I have indicated, we were in close contact with Dr. Glanville Williams of Cambridge University who has given our Bill detailed and careful examination and has been unstinting in his co-operation.
It will be readily agreed, I think, that before we went into the Dáil at all this Bill was very carefully considered. Then when we went to the Dáil that House facilitated me in having a Special Committee set up to deal with the Bill. In that Committee we had four senior counsels, prominent practitioners all of them, and two solicitors. They and the rest of us on that Committee, these experts and the nontechnical people, scrutinised the Bill very carefully and thoroughly and we amended it in several important respects. As I mentioned in my earlier remarks, I have been able to have the Explanatory Memorandum rewritten completely for the benefit of this House so that Senators would have an Explanatory Memorandum which would be exactly related to the Bill as it was coming into the Seanad. I know that is no more than they are entitled to but nevertheless it is an earnest of our good faith that we did provide Senators with such an Explanatory Memorandum and at short notice. Therefore, I would suggest to the House it would be wrong to get the idea that this very important piece of legislation has been rushed in any way or that it has not been very carefully considered.