The object of this Bill is to provide comprehensively for safeguarding official information, that is, of course, in so far as it is possible to do so by the provision of adequate penalties for unauthorised disclosure. The Bill will replace the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 and 1920, which, although adapted by an Adaptation Order made in 1928, are largely inappropriate in our present circumstances.
The deficiencies in the Acts were recognised during the emergency, when the necessary provisions were made by way of emergency powers orders. Since then, by the Defence Act, 1954, certain other provisions of the Acts have been replaced, such as those relating to trespassing on or photographing military installations. Obviously a major overhaul and re-enactment in modern form of the remaining provisions is long overdue. The present Bill is put forward therefore as containing the provisions which are necessary and appropriate for safeguarding, on the one hand, the ordinary type of confidential information which circulates among Government Departments and Government commissions and, on the other hand, information whose disclosure would be serious enough to be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State.
Part II of the Bill deals with the first class of information, that is, ordinary departmental information and confidential information in the possession of State contractors, where normally the safety of the State would not be involved. It also deals with certain offences relating to official dies, seals and stamps and the forgery of official documents.
Section 6, which is also in Part II, deals with the retention of official documents and articles and empowers a Minister or authorised officer to give directions for the return or disposal of official documents in cases where the persons in whose possession they are have no longer any right to retain them. Special provision is made for secret or confidential official documents retained by persons who formerly held office as Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries. Subsection (3) of the section gives power to direct that these documents be returned but the power is limited to original documents and the power of giving directions may be exercised only by the Taoiseach.
Part III is concerned with the communication of information to the prejudice of the safety or preservation of the State. The main provision is contained in Section 9, which makes it an offence to obtain, record, communicate, publish or possess certain information relating to security matters in any manner prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State. Senators will appreciate that it would be difficult in many cases to prove positively that a person accused of communicating information did so in this prejudicial manner. For this reason the provisions of Section 10, which are complementary to Section 9, make it prima facie evidence that a person charged under Section 9 has done the act in respect of which he is charged in a manner prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State if he has been in communication with or has attempted to communicate with a foreign agent or with a member of an unlawful organisation.
I want to emphasise that Section 10 does not create an offence of itself and it allows the person accused an opportunity of proving that the communication he has had or is presumed to have had with a foreign agent or a member of an unlawful organisation is quite innocent. The prosecution will have to establish, first of all, that the act of communicating or obtaining or any other act mentioned in Section 9 was in fact done by the accused: Section 10 merely raises a presumption, in certain circumstances, that the accused, when he did the act, had a particular object in mind.
Section 12, which was amended as a result of representations made in the Dáil, enables proceedings for an offence under Section 9, or for an offence under Part II committed in a manner prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State, to be held in camera. In its original form the section enabled the prosecution, on application, to have the entire proceedings—other than the verdict and sentence—heard in camera. The provision as it is now stands in the Bill limits the power to have an in camera hearing in two respects. First, it requires the prosecution to specify that the publication of any particular evidence to be given or any particular statement to be made would be prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State; and secondly the section now provides that only the part of the hearing which is concerned with that particular evidence or statement must be in camera.
I did not find it possible to accede to a further request that the court should have power to direct that a hearing should be held in public not-withstanding the prosecution's contention that particular evidence, if disclosed, would be prejudicial to the safety of the State. I am firmly of opinion that the responsibility for deciding what evidence is or is not prejudicial to the safety of the State should be a matter for the Executive and not for the courts. It is the Executive, and not the courts, who are responsible for the national safety and it would be undesirable that such matters should be the subject of a public hearing. Moreover, the Executive very often have information which would make it clear that an innocent-looking document held an entirely different meaning for other persons.
Part IV of the Bill contains provisions about legal proceedings and other supplementary provisions. Senators will see that Section 13 distinguishes between ordinary offences under Part II and offences under Section 9 or any offence under Part II committed in a manner prejudicial to the safety or preservation of the State. In the ordinary Part II case, the accused person must be tried summarily and the maximum penalty on conviction is a fine not exceeding £100 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or both fine and imprisonment. In the second case, the accused is triable on indictment and the maximum penalty is a term of penal servitude not exceeding seven years. This section emphasises the fundamental difference in character and in seriousness between the two types of offences.
I think the maximum punishments provided for in each case fairly reflect the views of most people as to what should be the punishment for the most serious offence that might be committed under the two different provisions. I was surprised to find it suggested that a civil servant, who disclosed confidential official information in breach of trust, should not be liable to any criminal sanction whatever and that the disciplinary penalty of dismissal would be adequate punishment for his action. I cannot accept this at all. It has long been the law that disclosure of ordinary confidential departmental information is a criminal offence, quite irrespective of whether the security of the State is involved in the disclosure. Civil servants are entrusted with a great deal of information about people's private affairs and considerable damage could be caused by unauthorised disclosure. Leakage of official reports and other confidential information might result in considerable financial gain to some persons.
Moreover, if citizens felt that the only sanction against disclosure of information entrusted by them in confidence to Government Departments or commissions was the penalty of dismissal, they would be likely to be reluctant to come forward and produce the information at all. There is no proper analogy between information voluntarily entrusted to private firms and that entrusted to Government Departments, usually in response to a specific requirement and with the threat of penalty for failure to make a full disclosure.
Section 14 provides that proceedings may not be taken for any offence under the Act without the prior consent of the Attorney General. The only exception relates to Section 9 offences, that is, where the safety of the State is involved. In these cases Section 14 allows arrest and remand in custody or on bail before the Attorney General's consent is obtained but it provides that no further proceedings shall be taken until that consent is given.
Turning to Sections 15 to 17, Senators will observe that these provisions are concerned with offences under Section 9. As might be expected in such circumstances, powers are given of arrest without warrant and for obtaining search warrants and information about suspected offences under Section 9, all of which partake of an emergency character. It is always difficult in peace time conditions to regard with equanimity any provisions of this kind and, indeed, it is to be hoped that the necessity for operating them will not arise. But it is unfortunately necessary to have these provisions available in case they are required and to take care that, in the event, they will prove to be adequate for bringing to justice any persons who may put the lives of our citizens in jeopardy. I do not think that, from this point of view, the provisions of Sections 15, 16 and 17 are anything other than a reasonable balance between the legitimate rights of ordinary citizens and the vital necessity for taking prompt and effective action either in an emergency situation or in the circumstances obtaining before an emergency is formally declared.
Before concluding I should like to say a word about the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 2, which was the subject of detailed consideration, and indeed criticism, while the Bill was passing through the Dáil. This subsection provides that a certificate given by a Minister under his seal that specified information is secret or confidential is to be conclusive evidence of that fact. I can appreciate that there is a reluctance to concede the principle of obliging courts to accept certificates of particular facts to be conclusive evidence. But I was satisfied, after a very full debate on all the various aspects of this provision, that it is a reasonable and practical one. I want to emphasise that the certificate must be given by the Minister personally under seal and not departmentally by one of his authorised officers. This is, in effect, a continuation of a tradition in accordance with which the courts have always accepted the word of a Minister of State that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose particular information.