Skip to main content
Normal View

Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 23 Jun 1965

Vol. 59 No. 1

Extradition Bill, 1965: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The main objects of the Bill are, first of all, to put our general extradition law on an up-to-date basis; secondly, to make fresh provision for the enforcement here of British criminal warrants, which have been unenforceable since last July, following a decision of the Supreme Court; and, thirdly, to provide for the enforcement of Northern Ireland warrants.

The extradition of offenders other than to Britain and Northern Ireland is dealt with in Part II of the Bill. In drafting this Part we have in general followed the text of the European Convention on Extradition, a multilateral Convention prepared under the auspices of the Council of Europe and opened for signature in 1957. It came into force in 1960 and has so far been ratified by six member States of the Council, namely, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Turkey. It is proposed that, when the Bill becomes law, the Convention will be ratified by this country and that, on ratification, an order will be made by the Government under section 8 of the Bill. The effect of that order will be to bring into force as between ourselves and the countries which have already ratified the Convention, reciprocal arrangements for the extradition of offenders in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Subsequently, negotiations will be commenced with other countries with a view to making appropriate extradition arrangements with them as well.

In this connection I think I should say that the Bill has been made as flexible as possible to facilitate the making of extradition arrangements with as many countries as possible notwithstanding that the extradition practice of some countries may not be quite in accordance with that of the Convention. This is, of course, subject to the maintenance of certain minimum standards, such as the prohibition on the extradition of political offenders, which the Bill insists upon. For example, some countries insist that before a person is extradited from their territory, sufficient evidence must be produced which would, according to their own law, justify the person claimed being committed for trial if the offence of which he is accused had been committed in their own territory. That is, in fact, the position under the present law, contained in the Extradition Act, 1870, and in the law of countries following the Anglo-American tradition in this respect. In many other countries, including most European continental countries, evidence that a warrant has been issued by a competent court or authority for the arrest of a person in respect of a criminal offence, together with evidence that the offence is an offence under the law of both the requesting and the requested country, is sufficient. Some countries will not allow the extradition of their nationals in any circumstances; others are prepared to do so.

Under Part II we shall, as I have said, be in a position to negotiate agreements with countries with varying practices and traditions. We shall be free to conclude extradition agreements, on a reciprocal basis, with Governments whose law requires a prima facie case to be furnished and with those countries who are prepared to allow their nationals to be extradited. Any order made by the Government giving any such arrangement the force of law must be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made and there is the usual provision for having it annulled by resolution by either House of the Oireachtas.

If previous experience is any guide, however, it is not likely that Part II of the Bill will be availed of to any great extent in practice, though in legislating for the future it is reasonable to proceed on the basis of increased commercial contacts with foreign countries and the increasing likelihood of international criminals coming on to our territory. The fact is that the Part of the Bill which will be more frequently used will be Part III, which sets out fresh arrangements for the enforcement here of warrants of arrest for ordinary criminal offences issued in Britain and provides for the extension of these arrangements to Northern Ireland. It may be anticipated that a hundred or so warrants will be executed here annually under these provisions, so that this is the portion of the Bill to which I expect Senators will devote the greatest attention. For this reason I think I should explain briefly the background to it.

Up to last year our warrants were executed in Britain, and British warrants were executed here, under the authority of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, as adapted. An Extradition Bill had been introduced in the Dáil in 1963 which proposed to continue these more or less automatic arrangements for the enforcement of British warrants and for extending them to warrants issued in Northern Ireland. A number of safeguards were introduced by the 1963 Bill into the arrangements; these were based on recognised principles of international extradition practice. For example, extradition for political, revenue or military offences or for offences carrying less than three months was prohibited and restrictions were imposed on the endorsement of warrants for summary offences. Moreover, it was provided that any person arrested under a British or Northern Ireland warrant should be given a reasonable opportunity of consulting a solicitor if he desired to do so. After the Second Stage and Committee Stage had been agreed by the Dáil early in 1964, it was held, first of all in Britain by the House of Lords and then by our Supreme Court in unrelated habeas corpus actions, that the existing arrangements were invalid. Since then British warrants have been unenforceable here. Our warrants remained unenforceable in Britain, too, for a short time after the court decision I have referred to but the British authorities, as a temporary measure, were able to make an Order in Council which was effective to make our warrants enforceable again in Britain. At the time they undertook to introduce legislation to replace the 1851 Act procedure, and the necessary Bill, which has been the subject of discussions between ourselves and the British authorities, has passed the British House of Lords and is expected to pass their House of Commons shortly.

As a result of the court decisions to which I have referred and of the discussions with the British authorities, Part III of the present Bill provides for further and extensive modifications of the former arrangements for the enforcement of British warrants and requires that every person arrested under such a warrant must be brought before the district court and that he must be allowed a period of at least fifteen days to consider whether he wishes to exercise his constitutional right of habeas corpus or the statutory rights given by section 50 of the Bill of applying to the High Court or to the Minister for Justice for a direction for release on various specified grounds, such as the political or military character of the offence. Of course, the person to whom the warrant relates may wish to leave the jurisdiction earlier and in that case he may consent to do so but his consent must be given before either a district justice or a peace commissioner. Moreover, a person may not be surrendered unless the offence is an offence under both our law and British law. The maximum penalty attaching to the offence for which a person may be surrendered is being raised from three months to six months and provision is being made for provisional arrest in the absence of the warrant in case of urgency. All these modified provisions will, of course, apply to the reciprocal arrangements we will be having with Northern Ireland for the first time since they ceased to operate some thirty-five years ago.

Both this measure and the earlier measure have been generally welcomed, especially, I think I can say, in so far as they propose to put an end to the present immunity enjoyed by persons accused of the most serious crimes who escape the consequences of their acts by merely crossing the Border. It is a matter for gratification also that we shall now be in a position to proceed to have extradition arrangements with other countries on the basis of a statute of the Oireachtas. I should like to acknowledge, and express my appreciation of, the co-operation we have received from the British and Northern authorities both in relation to the 1963 Bill and the Bill which the House has now before it. Such co-operation offers every prospect of our being able to secure in due course an arrangement for the reciprocal enforcement of court orders and judgments between our respective jurisdictions in non-criminal matters.

As soon as this Bill has become law, I propose to press ahead with arrangements for this extended co-operation in the legal field. I shall place emphasis on trying to get a scheme into operation as soon as possible for the enforcement of maintenance orders, that is to say, court orders for the support of married women and their children who have been deserted.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the Bill will commend itself in principle to Senators as a necessary step in the promotion of the administration of justice between ourselves and other jurisdictions and that they will agree to give it a Second Reading.

The Bill is obviously a very necessary measure and when it is finally passed into law it will, I hope, abolish the uncertainty which has existed up to the present time and will remedy the situation which gave rise to the rather unseemly proceedings which took place in the Philip Arthur Quinn case in our courts in the last year. Perhaps, it was inevitable that the then state of the law should have given rise to these somewhat unseemly proceedings which reflect no great credit upon some of those who took part in them. Perhaps, it may not have been their fault; perhaps it was. But, at any rate, one hopes, when this fairly detailed measure, which has obviously received great and detailed consideration in the drafting, is passed and is in operation there will be an end to the uncertainty which has existed up to the present time.

The Bill, as presented, rather surprised me when I had finished reading it. I had gathered from the newspapers, and I would have thought, that the Bill would deal entirely with extradition but it appears the position will be that there will be no extradition agreement between this country and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but that there will be extradition arrangements in relation to other countries which are parties to the International Agreement on Extradition. What the reasons for that are I do not quite know. I was hoping the Minister might throw some light on the circumstances which determined that there would be no extradition agreement between this country and Great Britain. Of course, there is a different situation with the interflow of people between this country and Great Britain and between this country and Northern Ireland. It creates a different situation from that which obtains between this country and, say, any of the Continental countries.

I do not know, and I am not satisfied in my own mind, that there are any good reasons why an extradition agreement which is somewhat more detailed and which requires more stringent safeguards than are being provided in Part III should not be put into operation. For a proper understanding of the Bill it is essential to get quite clearly into one's mind that the extradition arrangements in Part II of the Bill relate to foreigners, non-citizens of this country, whose extradition is requested by another Government with whom we have extradition arrangements.

I should say that in Part II no citizen of this country can be extradited to any other country, if I am correct. We do not extradite our own citizens. In Part II of the Bill we will not send our citizens charged with criminal offence to Great Britain or to Northern Ireland. It is essential to get that distinction clearly in mind, that the extradition arrangements in Part II do not relate to Irish citizens.

As I read through Part II of the Bill I was quite happy in my own mind that here, certainly in section 25, we are providing that the documentation which must be provided by the requesting Government is gone into in full detail and that every effort is made to safeguard the rights of the person being extradited and that every effort is being taken in section 25 to make sure that a person is being extradited solely for an extraditable crime or offence. In so far as that section is concerned one can have only commendation for it.

Similarly, in section 29 of the Bill one finds that care is taken to make sure that the person brought before the district court for the purpose of having an extradition order made against him is fully safeguarded and his interests are looked after. Among other things, the court making the order has to inform the person to whom it relates that he will not be surrendered except with his own consent in less than 15 days, and must also inform him that he has a right to apply under section 4 (2) of Article 40 of the Constitution for an order of habeas corpus. One again commends that procedure as being fair and reasonable to a foreigner or anybody who is charged with an offence and whose extradition is sought by another country.

But I was somewhat disappointed and, indeed, surprised that the rights and safeguards we are according in Part II of the Bill to foreigners are not being similarly accorded, or certainly accorded in as clear terms, to our own citizens when an extradition order is being sought or what, in fact, is an extradition order against them, this business of endorsing or backing warrants. A person for whom a warrant is sought has to be brought before the district court but in the case of our own citizens the district court will be under no obligation to tell them of their right to habeas corpus. Why that is so I do not know. It seems to me that they should be informed of that right. They have not to be informed either of their right to appeal to the Minister or to the High Court if they have the view that the offence for which they are to be extradited is political or an offence against military law or a revenue offence. Why these provisions are omitted in relation to our own citizens I do not readily understand and I should like to hear from the Minister why that is so. A facile argument can be made. One can say that every Irish citizen is presumed to know the law of his own country, but that is a rebuttable presumption, and very easily rebutted in the case of criminals who know nothing about the law except how to break it.

I am somewhat disappointed to find that there is less regard for safeguarding the rights of our own citizens than there is for foreigners. The safeguards provided for foreigners are being provided because Part II of the Bill which deals with the extradition of foreign persons from our country follows the lines of the international convention. It seems to me on first reading and as a matter of first impression at any rate that we should give to our own citizens the same break as we give to foreigners on our soil.

Having said that perhaps that end of the Bill, section 48, can be readily enough amended in order to have the district justice inform the person who is before him of his rights in the same way as he is bound to inform a foreigner of his rights, the Bill goes on to sections 54 and 55, which I must say will call for a little more scrutiny on the Committee Stage. There is always, of course, a difficulty of knowing, when a warrant is out for something that is said to be a crime in England, how our courts can establish whether the offence named in the warrant is, in fact, a crime under English law. That is one of the difficulties that have arisen in some of the habeas corpus cases where warrants were challenged by persons sought to be extradited to Britain. Although we can read English statutes and English decisions as a matter of practice in our courts, our courts do not pretend or purport to interpret or say what is the effect of an English statute or to say that certain facts constitute a particular offence under a certain statute of the United Kingdom or Northern Ireland.

In order to get over that difficulty section 54 provides that the matter shall be dealt with in a very summary way and one which I think could not commend itself to any constitutional or criminal lawyer or, indeed, to any layman. What we are providing under section 54 is that a warrant, once it is issued in England and appears to be regular on its face, may be taken by the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and if it appears to him to be all right then he can take the person to whom it refers into custody. That is fair enough. The Commissioner of the Garda Síochána is not a law officer or a judge and does not have to inquire too minutely into something that appears on the face of it to be in order. Then we find that the Commissioner is bound to accept a certificate which appears to be given by the authority or by the clerk or other officer of the authority by which the warrant was issued—a certificate that the offence to which it relates is by the law of England an indictable offence and not also a summary offence, or that it is a summary offence punishable by a specified period of imprisonment.

What is the law in England as to what is a summary offence in a particular case or what is an indictable offence is to be determined not even by a magistrate in England or in the usual way of determining a matter of foreign law in our courts by an affidavit made by a practising barrister or a practising solicitor, but merely by a certificate of a magistrate's clerk somewhere in Scotland, England or Wales that such and such an offence is an indictable offence or a summary offence. This is to be regarded by this country as being the law in England and it cannot be questioned by the Commissioner nor, indeed, if one reads section 55, can it even be questioned by the courts unless the court sees good reason to the contrary. Since our courts will not take a British statute and say "We interpret that as meaning that this is not an indictable offence", I cannot see how our courts can go behind the certificate that is to be issued by a clerk in any of the magistrates' courts or the Mayor's court in London, so that even our Supreme Court or our High Court in habeas corpus proceedings which may be instituted by any of our citizens in respect of whom a warrant has been issued must take judicial notice of the authenticity and correctness of the certificate issued by the clerk of the magistrate's court in England and there is an end to it.

Whatever may be the difficulty of establishing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, or to the satisfaction of the district court, what is an indictable offence in England, or in the Isle of Man, or wherever people may be extradited to under Part III of the Bill, I do not think this House should be satisfied that the provisions of sections 54 and 55 of this Bill are the appropriate way for a self-respecting country, with its own independent courts, and with a Constitution pledged to safeguard the rights of the individual, to deal with what is, of course, a difficult problem. Difficulty is no reason for this kind of short cut which literally pulverises all the safeguards which exist in our criminal law, for our own citizens, within our own domestic jurisdiction. It is in marked contrast to the treatment we are giving to foreigners who will be extradited under Part II of the Bill.

Having said that much, there is very little else I have to say. We have in operation at present a system of legal aid for certain categories of persons charged with criminal offences. I am wondering whether the Minister can tell me if the legal aid which is available to citizens of our own country who are charged before a district court will be available to them in relation to these proceedings in the district court. I do not know whether that is so. I am wondering whether a person who comes before the district court under Part III of this Bill will be entitled to avail of the legal aid provisions which were recently introduced, and whether, in fact, we are going the further distance to make this legal aid available to him if he makes an application to the High Court under section 50, or if he is applying to the High Court in habeas corpus proceedings under Article 40, section 4, subsection (2) of the Constitution.

Apart from those observations we can consent to the Second Reading of the Bill and the principle contained in it. I hope the Minister will deal with what seem to me to be the very real defects in relation to the extradition of our own citizens. In the various constitutional law cases that go through our courts from time to time, the High Court and the Supreme Court have as an unshakable principle for the interpretation of statutes, that the Legislature always examines these provisions with meticulous care to ensure their constitutionality. This Bill strikes at one of the most important constitutional freedoms—and that freedom is one of the reasons why the Constitution exists—namely, the freedom of the individual, and I hope that the urgency which I appreciate obtains in relation to this matter, and the necessity of getting persons charged with criminal offences and, in some cases, convicted criminals, out of the country, will not prevent the Minister from giving full consideration to what I consider are the serious defects contained in Part III of the Bill.

I welcome this Bill which certainly was badly needed because of the collapse of the machinery which existed between this country and Great Britain for exchanging people charged with offences. The machinery which exists under the old Extradition Acts between this country and countries other than Great Britain appears to have been working reasonably well. It did not give rise to any difficulties in the past, but the machinery between this country and Great Britain collapsed completely during the past year. It was essential that some legislation should be introduced, and this legislation seems to meet the needs very adequately.

It is just as well that this matter was brought to a head by the Supreme Court in this country and the courts in Britain recently, because the situation which existed was in many respects an undesirable one. I think the Supreme Court took the right view on this matter. They were right to reverse the stand which they formerly took on the provisions of the Petty Sessions Act, 1851. It was clearly undesirable that a person accused of a crime in Great Britain should be taken out of this country without being allowed any opportunity whatever of taking habeas corpus proceedings, or questioning the validity of what was being done. That was the position under the situation which existed up to a few months ago, and that was, in fact, done on a number of occasions.

The safeguards which are provided in this Bill appear to be generally satisfactory. I think we must face up to the fact that it will not be possible to provide safeguards that are in all respects perfect. There may be certain loopholes, and certain cases which will arise under the Bill as it now stands, in which justice will not be fully done. I doubt whether it is possible to frame a Bill in which justice would be done in every possible case. It seems to me that the provisions for allowing a person who is to be extradited sufficient time to take whatever proceedings he thinks necessary, and the provisions which exclude certain offences not generally regarded as criminal offences, meet so far as possible the necessity of ensuring that justice is done. As I say, it may be that in the course of time we will find that it is not possible to provide for every possible eventuality. As the position stands at the moment, and so far as we can envisage the situation which will arise, this Bill does in a practical way meet the necessity of giving the safeguards which are desirable to the person involved.

Section 22 provides that in certain cases it will be necessary to produce evidence to show that the person accused has committed the offence which he is alleged to have committed. It seems to me that this provision could give rise to very great difficulty. I do not know whether it is intended that it should ever be written into an extradition agreement because if it is these extradition agreements will be made between this country and various countries other than Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the rules of evidence and the rules in regard to the onus of proof in most of these countries vary very considerably from this country. In many cases the onus of proof and the evidence required to obtain the conviction are considerably less stringent than the law of evidence in this country. Consequently, a court in this country might find itself in the position that the evidence would be quite sufficient to convict a person in the requesting country but not quite sufficient to convict a person in this country. That will cause a conflict which it will be difficult to deal with. In my view it is undesirable and this question of writing in to any agreement the necessity of producing the evidence as well as producing the other documents and proofs will almost certainly lead to a great deal of difficulty if it is included. Furthermore, you might have the position where a court has not merely to be satisfied that the offence is an offence which comes within the terms of the Bill and that the warrant is a valid one. If it has also to consider the evidence it will, in fact, have to try the case and this is not a desirable position.

Section 14 deals with the question of extradition of Irish citizens. It says:

Extradition shall not be granted where a person claimed is a citizen of Ireland, unless the relevant extradition provisions otherwise provide.

I should like to ask the Minister if he would tell us whether there is any machinery in operation at the moment for extraditing Irish citizens to countries other than Great Britain. I should also like to ask him whether it is intended or envisaged that in the future under this Bill extradition of Irish citizens will take place.

There is just one further point to which I should like to draw the attention of the Minister and that is in relation to repeals. There are a number of repeals of Acts dealing with this matter in the past and in several cases the whole Act is repealed, and, generally speaking, these are re-enacted in the present Bill. There are two Acts —the Extradition Act of 1870 and the Extradition Act of 1873—in which the entire Act, except for one section, is repealed and the one section in each case is a relatively simple and short one. It seems to me a great pity that an opportunity was not taken in this case to repeal the whole Act and to reenact the section in question in this Bill. It would certainly make the position a great deal less confusing and would be of more assistance to practitioners to have as much as possible of the law in relation to extradition in this Bill and not have to refer to two previous Acts for two very simple sections.

I should like to put some questions to the Minister. Some of what I should like to say is, perhaps, more relevant to Committee Stage than to Second Stage. Nevertheless, if one were to consider putting down amendments, the answers to some of the questions should be given to us. I should like to associate myself with what has already been said. It is quite obvious that the general spirit of this Bill is acceptable to us and will clear up a situation that has been unhappy, time-wasting and unfortunate in many ways. Senator O'Quigley made the point clearly that the Bill may turn out not to be sufficiently specific or may turn out to be, in fact, not quite in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.

I am a little unhappy not so much about the definitions that are included as the matters mentioned which are not covered by definition. I suppose it is clear what is meant in section 38 by "any citizen of Ireland does any act outside the State". I take it the State means the Republic of Ireland. I suppose any citizen of Ireland means the Republic of Ireland although, if we consult our Constitution, we find that the name of the State is Éire or, in the English language, Ireland. It might be contended that this applies to all Ireland for I notice section 41, Part III, specifically mentions Northern Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. I should like to ask the Minister is Northern Ireland here to be taken as Northern Ireland defined by the 1925 Agreement which was passed and ratified by Dáil Éireann in 1925 or 1926. I am afraid there may be ambiguity arising out of the failure sufficiently to define. If a citizen of Ireland means a citizen of the Republic it probably should be put in in those words.

I notice also that among the definitions themselves on line 5 of page 4 "political offence" does not include the taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State or a member of his family. In my opinion it is quite right to exclude a political offence. I do not know whether the full implications of this are clear but it would appear that you may be extradited for assassinating a Prime Minister, his wife or child, or wife of a Prime Minister under a monarchy or, perhaps, even in a republic provided that the Prime Minister and President is the same person. There might be an argument here as to why, for instance, the Royal family in Britain would have, as it were, this protection under the Bill, but the family and person of the Prime Minister would not. I suppose, in America, this would apply to the President and his family. In one or two other countries it is not absolutely clear just who is the Head of State. I am not really sure that it is worth making this exception. I should like to hear the Minister's comment on the necessity for including, or rather excluding, this particular form of what might be a political offence.

Section 19 is what I would regard as commonsensible and humane in that here we are not going to hand over under this Bill people to be tried for a capital offence under the laws of another country where the offence would be regarded in the Republic as a capital offence. This seems to me to be a good section and one which is soundly based.

On the other hand, I am a little puzzled by section 44 which refers to another excluded offence in addition to a political offence. Apparently, here, a revenue offence is excluded. If you are merely bilking the Revenue Commissioners themselves—according to the spirit of the Bill before us—that is regarded as perfectly normal practice and not something to be condemned and certainly nothing to which we would attach any odium. I do not know whether this is the Minister's or the Government's view or whether there might not be bad example in the Bill. Even citizens of Ireland might be encouraged by this particular subsection to feel that they could cheerfully defraud the Revenue Commissioners and that this would be merely a revenue offence. I am a little puzzled as to why this should be put in—as if it were of an equal standing with or of an equally forgivable nature as an offence under military law which is not an offence under criminal law or a political offence. In other words, I should like to hear the Minister's defence for the exemption of revenue offences. What is there that is so intrinsically pardonable about revenue offences?

There are two other sections about which I should like some clarification. They are sections 35 and 50. The point I would like to make is that it would seem to me—I think many members of the House would agree with me—that, perhaps, these two sections give too much power to the Minister. Section 35, subsection (1) says:

whenever the Minister is of opinion, in relation to a person who is for the time being on remand or awaiting his surrender under this Part that extradition is prohibited under any provision of this Part or of the relevant extradiction provisions, the Minister may at any time refuse extradition and shall thereupon order the person, if in custody, to be released.

This is done without any reference to the courts. The Minister decides this himself. I do not know whether the House is happy to give such complete power not only to the present Minister, in whom we have confidence, but to his successor, to decide in his opinion alone, without the decision of any court, that this particular offence does not come under the Extradition Bill. I should much prefer if the matter were referred by the Minister to the courts.

Section 44, subsection (1) states:

a warrant shall not be endorsed for execution under this Part if the Minister or the High Court, on the question being referred to the Court by the Minister, directs in accordance with this section that it shall not be so endorsed.

Here is the implication that the Minister may refer the question to the High Court. I should like to feel that in these circumstances he should refer the question to the High Court or to the courts at any rate and not that he should have his own power under the Bill. It should be up to the courts of law to decide this matter. It seems to me that it would be necessary to limit the power which the Minister seeks in relation to this matter.

Section 50, subsection (4) says:

A direction under this section may be given by the Minister on any of the grounds set out in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (2).

The Minister again has power to release any person from the jurisdiction of this Bill. This seems to me to be too great a power to give to the Minister. There may be justification for it and I may, perhaps, have misinterpreted the Bill but, speaking as an ordinary citizen. I would feel happier if the Minister had to appeal to the court before deciding that a particular application for extradition did not come within the jurisdiction of the Bill. Apart from that, the Bill should have our support.

This is a technical Bill but there are one or two points I should like to raise in regard to it. In the course of his statement the Minister did not indicate the number of Irish citizens who might be affected by the Bill when it becomes law. I gather that about forty countries are concerned in this matter and that it is based mainly on the European Convention in a general way. There is just one point that springs to my mind at this stage. When the Bill becomes law could Dr. Singer, if he were discovered in one of these 40 countries, be sent back here to face our courts again under the reciprocal arrangements?

I gather that the Bill is retrospective but I could not find in any section of it whether the period of retrospection is limited or unlimited. That, of course, would make it more difficult for the Minister to give some idea of the number of persons who may be affected by the Bill.

With regard to the last point by Senator Rooney it can be anticipated there are roughly 100 people a year, give a few either way, who will be affected by these arrangements. The Bill will apply, in practice, almost entirely to Britain and Northern Ireland. Over a long period of years, a number of warrants were executed here in accordance with arrangements which we presumed to be valid. Every year, up to last July, about 80 to 100 people were extradited from here to Britain and from Britain to here.

Senator O'Quigley made reference to some differences which exist between Parts II and III. He is right to some extent but not in his contention that we should have a formal extradition arrangement with Britain. In fact, Part III of this measure, in conjunction with the British Bill, amounts to such an extradition arrangement. Part II is more in the nature of an enabling provision. It enables us to participate in extradition arrangements with, first of all, countries which are parties to the European Convention, and also with any other country. The USA, for example, is a country with which we should like to have extradition arrangements but it is not, of course, a party to the European Convention. Part II as it stands will enable us to make a suitable arrangement with the USA, as well as with other countries who have yet to become parties to the Convention. So far only six members have ratified it. When this Bill becomes law we will have arrangements with Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Turkey. These are the members who are already parties to the Convention.

There are, of course, differences in the arrangements made under Part II and Part III and I would emphasise first of all that in matters such as extradition, where agreement has to be reached between various countries, no Government can be a completely free agent. The European Convention, for example, was drawn up only after long and painstaking negotiations in which a common formula was adopted by agreement between various countries, one of which was ourselves. Similarly, with regard to Britain and Northern Ireland, Part III of our Bill coincides with the corresponding Bill going through the House of Commons at the moment and both were framed after painstaking negotiations between ourselves and the British and Northern authorities.

We were not entirely free agents in the matter which Senator Sheehy Skeffington mentioned, that is, the exemption from the category of political offence of the taking of the life of a Head of State or a member of his family. This is a matter which European countries generally insist on having and if we want to ratify the Convention we have to agree with that too. It is implicit in the idea of extradition that there must be give and take between one country and another. That is why there may be matters here which appear anomalous but without some element of compromise agreement would never be reached.

It is obviously desirable that this measure of agreement should have been reached between us and the other countries in the Council of Europe which have signed the Convention and that this measure of agreement should have been reached between us and Britain.

Another reason why there is a distinction between the arrangements in Part II and those in Part III is that Part II is necessarily of very general application. It sets out the broad basis for concluding extradition arrangements with countries with which up to now we have had little to do in the way of apprehension of criminals. Part III, on the other hand, is putting in statutory form the special arrangements between us and Britain and Northern Ireland, arrangements which recognise that we are dealing with people with very much the same code of law and legal procedure as ourselves.

I do not think it is practicable to cavil as Senator O'Quigley has done at sections 54 and 55 under which the Commissioner of the Guards and the courts may accept certain documents.

It surely must.

In my view it is much better to leave a discretion to the Commissioner. If he is not satisfied about a particular document, he can ask for further evidence. In fact, the very effect of its being discretionary has an advantage which seems to meet the situation advocated by Senator O'Quigley. Anything of a compulsory nature making it mandatory on the Commissioner or the courts to accept such documents on the evidence which is tendered would surely be contrary to the point of view expressed by Senator O'Quigley. As we have it, we authorise the Commissioner to accept these duly authenticated warrants at their face value, but he has a duty, if he has any doubt, of not accepting the document and asking for further evidence. That would appear to be a desirable situation.

Senator Sheehy Skeffington raised a point in regard to the Minister having functions regarding the release of a person apprehended in respect of an offence if the Minister takes the view that the offence is not an offence to which extradition applies. This is in ease of the person apprehended. It is an additional safeguard under Part II. Not alone is he safeguarded by being brought before the District Court and by being able to make the case that his offence is a revenue offence, a political offence or an offence under military law which is not an offence under ordinary criminal law, but he may go subsequently to the High Court or the Minister for a decision. This power possessed by the Minister to release the prisoner surely is in ease of him and ensures greater justice. I could see Senator Sheehy Skeffington's point if it were in reverse and if there were powers which could authorise the Minister to direct a person to be extradited.

Under Part III the Minister has power under section 44 to prevent the arrest of a person under a warrant by directing that the warrant will not be endorsed or executed. In other words, as part of the administration process the Minister may direct the police not even to arrest a man if it is brought to his notice and if he feels for reasons of justice that the warrant is faulty and that the offence in his opinion is not an extraditable offence. He may before the arrest process gets under way direct that the warrant should not be endorsed for execution. The same position applies under Part II also. So, to have these various avenues of protection for the person apprehended is I feel all important. The extradition of any person from the State at the request of any country is not a matter to be done lightly and it is, I think, in the interest of liberty and the interest of the citizens that the person against whom it is sought to be done should have the utmost protection possible. The various matters I have referred to are designed to give the widest possible scope to a person who is caught in that situation to ensure that no injustice is done to him. As I have said, we are providing ample safeguards both before and after arrest. Where the warrant is executed and the person is apprehended he must be brought before the district court. He may not be removed from the jurisdiction for 15 days and within that period he may go to the High Court for consideration as to whether or not his offence is extraditable, or to the Minister and either one or the other may direct his release.

Apart from the statutory right under section 50 to apply to the High Court or the Minister, we have spelled out here in section 48, as a result of an amendment in Dáil Éireann, that the person apprehended has the right of habeas corpus under the Constitution. There is, therefore, the utmost protection that any citizen can reasonably ask for.

The point was made that we cannot extradite any of our own nationals to countries covered by Part II but section 14 provides that this can, in fact, be done by an extradition agreement. We could make such an arrangement under Part II, which is largely permissive.

Will they have free legal aid?

That is a matter for the discretion of the courts and it is not one in which I am disposed to intervene.

Does the Act apply to these people?

The Act does not apply. This is not a criminal matter, so that the courts in their interpretation of whether or not legal aid should apply in my view could not grant legal aid in cases or applications arising out of this Bill. That is my view but it is entirely a matter for interpretation by the courts. Legal aid is confined to criminal offences which are being tried here. I do not think that cases to which this Bill would apply would come into that category, but it is entirely for the courts to interpret and far be it from me to intervene on this point.

A number of other points have been raised which would probably be more appropriate to the Committee Stage. This is a measure which I would like to see as perfect as is humanly possible because it is concerned with the fundamental matter of human rights. We had a constructive debate in the Dáil and we incorporated certain amendments which further safeguarded the rights of persons to be extradited. I would be very glad, indeed, if constructive amendments are put down for my consideration between now and the Committee Stage. Some of the matters which have been adverted to would perhaps be best dealt with in that way and given full and proper consideration. If the matters warrant it, they will be included as amendments to this measure, which we hope will provide the basis for extradition arrangements not alone with Britain and European countries but with many other countries so that we can regard this as one step further towards the universal rule of law that we would all wish to see established throughout the world.

Could the Minister make available a copy of the corresponding provisions of the measure now going through the British Parliament and have it put into the Library?

That is a very sensible suggestion and we can get that done.

Question put and agreed to.
Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, 30th June, 1965.
Top
Share