The Bill which the Minister is proposing to us this afternoon can be viewed from many aspects. I think there are three particular aspects that are most important. Firstly, we can look at this Bill from the point of view of the general arrangements for public finance in this State. We can look at the Bill from the point of view of the organisation of financial business in Dáil Éireann or we can look at the Bill from the point of view of the organisation of financial debate in Seanad Éireann.
In discussing the Bill in Seanad Éireann it is natural that we should concentrate on the first and the third of these—the effect of the Bill on the general arrangements for public finance and its effect on the proceedings of Seanad Éireann.
It is the practice in all democratic countries that the greater part of central government expenditure should be the subject of an annual Vote. This is something which happens in all democratic countries. A quick glance at our current Book of Estimates indicates that in this country 70 per cent of Government expenditure, both capital and current, is voted annually, the remaining 30 per cent being standing charges which are not considered by the Dáil and the Seanad in each individual year. It is with this 70 per cent, these voted services or Supply Services, that we are concerned in the Bill today.
It is also the practice of all democratic countries that these voted moneys should be the subject of a very careful scrutiny by one or other of the Houses of Parliament. Adequate control of this voted money implies such substantial discussion. Indeed, the Bill before us today arises largely because Dáil Éireann has found that four or five months is not a sufficient length of Parliamentary time for the adequate discussion of those voted services because all this discussion must take place, it is necessary in some way or another to make temporary provision during the early part of the financial year for the Government to carry on the services pending their final approval and final appropriation by Parliament.
There are three ways in which this is normally done. Some countries adopt the procedure of just allowing the Government to carry on, and then finally passing the appropriations for the voted services. This is the practice in some Scandinavian countries. The second way of tackling the problem is to allow the Government to carry on, not with complete freedom but on the basis of the Estimates for the financial year that is passing and nearly spent. This is the practice in Switzerland and many other continental countries. The third way of tackling this particular problem is for Parliament to pass a provision making available a sum of money on a temporary basis by means of what is traditionally called a Vote on Account, a system which we in this country took over from Britain and have operated up to now.
The Minister has described for us in his speech recommending this Bill the system which we follow—the Vote on Account and the accompanying Central Fund Bill — which give the Government four months' supply of money until the passing of the Appropriation Bill sometime before the first week of August, when this temporary supply would run out. It has happened, as the Minister has described, that Dáil Éireann has found these four months insufficient. They have tried to meet it in recent years by various devices. They have tried to meet it by starting to debate the Estimates before the Book of Estimates was out. They have resorted to the device of debating the Estimates on token Votes after the Estimates had actually been legally passed. These temporary measures the Dáil now considers, by the passage of the present Bill, to be undesirable expedients which would be better replaced by some more rational permanent procedure. Accordingly, the Minister comes to us now with this Bill, which has passed through Dáil Éireann, and which empowers the Government to spend up to four-fifths of the old year's Estimate instead of the present one-third of the New Year's Estimates. The Bill also, in contrast to the old Central Fund Bill which merely granted a lump sum, appropriates these provisional Estimates to the several services and makes provision for the amount of provisional supply to be adjusted as the Estimates are passed.
These things are all desirable and, I think, will be accepted by the Seanad without very much debate. But, the Bill goes further. The Bill not only increases the amount of supply from one-third to four-fifths, not only introduces detailed procedure for doing this, but goes on to make this a permanent provision. The Bill not only alters the nature of the supply which is given but, in doing so, abolishes the annual nature of the Vote on Account, the annual nature of the Central Fund Bill. Accordingly, because this involves the removal from the Seanad calendar of events the debate on the Central Fund Bill, it is something which should be carefully examined by Seanad Éireann.
In this examination we want to be quite clear about what the role of the Seanad is in matters like these. There is no difficulty in getting headlines to guide us in regard to the relevant roles of the Government, the Dáil, and the Seanad in monetary matters because these are actually laid down in our fundamental law, they are actually spelled out in the Constitution, Article 17 of which lays down quite clearly that the right of initiative in regard to financial legislation rests with the Government, and the Government alone. It is only on the basis of a message signed by the Taoiseach that the Dáil can proceed to discuss financial matters. So here we have clearly the right of initiative belonging to the Government alone. It is equally clear in Articles 17 and 21 of the Constitution that the right of decision on financial matters belongs to the Dáil alone, not to the Government, not to the Seanad but to the Dáil. It is made clear, in that Money Bills can only be initiated in the Dáil, that the Seanad can only make recommendations on Money Bills, in contradistinction to other Bills where the Seanad make amendments.
It is also embedded in the Constitution that the Seanad has only 21 days to deal with Money Bills, as against 90 days in regard to other Bills.
Nevertheless, it is also clearly spelled out in the Constitution that the Seanad has rights in regard to financial matters, these rights being the right of review and the right of making recommendations to the Dáil, because the Articles of the Constitution that limit the power of the Seanad to make decisions in regard to Money Bills also give it a specific right in that the Constitution lays down that every Money Bill must be sent from the Dáil to the Seanad for its recommendations.
Accordingly, we should be quite clear that while the right of the Seanad in these matters is a subordinate right and while the role of the Seanad in these matters is a distinctly smaller role than that of the Government or the Dáil, nevertheless, this is a basic constitutional right. The Seanad has not only the right but it has at all times the power conferred on it by the Constitution to deal with the Money Bills sent to it and to deal with them not as things which have to be automatically approved of by the Seanad, not to deal with them as a matter of routine business needing only a rubber stamp, but the Seanad has a constitutional duty to examine all Money Bills with great care with its own particular expertise from the point of view of the collective wisdom of this Seanad in the general public interest. This is something which is true of all Money Bills and, of course, it is true of this particular Money Bill which is before us today.
In recommending this Bill to us today the Minister has adduced several arguments. He told us, in his opening address, that this Bill "seeks to improve the machinery for considering Government financial policy so as to ensure that the time devoted to this purpose may be put to the most effective use". The Seanad, I am sure, will be eager to help the Minister in this particular respect. In debating this Bill, it is for the Seanad to discuss its provisions from the point of view of ensuring that the time devoted to the purpose of considering Government financial policy in the Seanad will be put to the most effective use.
In proposing the Bill to us the Minister has indicated that there are two grounds for criticism of the present arrangements for the conduct of financial business in Parliament. The first of these grounds is that "the effectiveness of the debates on the Vote on Account and the Central Fund Bill are greatly reduced by the absence of full information regarding Government financial policy and the state of the economy in general". The second disadvantage the Minister quotes is that which "arises from the pressure of Parliamentary financial business, particularly in the Dáil in the summer session because the Finance Bill, all the Estimates and the Appropriation Bill must be disposed of before the end of July".
The Minister has said and proposed to us there are—and here I agree with the Minister—two main faults in the present procedure. Firstly, there is the fault the Minister has put forward of the duplication of debate and the holding of debates at a time which, in the Minister's opinion, does not allow for effective debate. Secondly, there is the fault that the Central Fund Bills passed up to this allowed for only four months' supply, which meant that a tremendous amount of work had to be crowded into the four months between April and July. The Minister proposes two remedies. The remedies he proposes are to increase the amount of supply from one-third to four-fifths and also to make the Central Fund Bill a permanent measure.
I would suggest there are two faults and there are two remedies but I would like to distinguish between them carefully. I would like to suggest that a very large measure of what is unsatisfactory about the present financial arrangements, both in the Dáil and Seanad, could be met by a revised type of Central Fund Bill which increased supply, without necessarily making that a permanent provision. There is a double onus on the Minister if he is to convince the Seanad of the wisdom of what he is doing here. He must prove it is necessary to increase the amount of supply from one-third to four-fifths of the year. Beyond and above that, which I think will be a relatively easy task, he must also convince the Seanad that the exigencies of public business in both Houses demand not only that the supply should be increased but that the principle of annuality should be lost in regard to the temporary grant of supply and that what is needed is a permanent rather than a temporary measure.
To deal first with this question of the extended amount of supply, the position that arises at the moment due to the restriction in temporary supply to four months is that the Dáil finds that it cannot complete its work on the Estimate by the end of July. This not only hampers the Dáil in its conduct of financial business but also distinctly hampers the Seanad in its review of financial resolutions sent to it by the Dáil and in the conduct of its own debates on financial policy. The result of the fact that the Dáil cannot complete the Estimates in time leads to creating, as the Minister said, during the summer session the circumstances recurring year after year whereby the Seanad has received the Finance Bill and the Appropriation Bill very close together. These two Bills, one dealing with taxation and revenue and the other with expenditure and matters of administration, come into the Seanad one on the heels of the other. Indeed, as the Minister will recall, in the year in which we still are these two Bills were discussed by the Seanad in a single debate. The relatively short four month term of temporary supply disturbs not only the business of the Dáil but also that of the Seanad.
The Dáil has considered this matter, and has considered that it prefers to extend the period of temporary supply of money to what is in the present Bill rather than to curtail discussion of the Estimates. This, of course, is a matter essentially for decision by the Dáil, but it is quite appropriate here to say that in my opinion it was a wise decision of the Dáil to extend the period rather than to curtail the discussions. It is one that will be welcomed by the Seanad, because it will also solve the recurrent problem that the Seanad is faced by the Finance Bill and the Appropriation Bill both coming to it in July, the Finance Bill frequently coming too late to be discussed with effect and too late to be amended to any effect due to the fact that it has frequently been discussed here in the Seanad when the Dáil has already adjourned. These are problems which will be solved under the present Bill. The Appropriation Bill will no longer come to us in July. It will come around November or December, at the end of the year and this, indeed, is something which the Seanad will most heartily welcome.
In reference to this question of the timing of these Bills I should like to ask the Minister a question. Am I right in understanding that there still is an obligation that the Finance Bill will have to be dealt with within four months of the Budget resolutions? As I understand it the position at the moment is that under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act of 1927 there are certain time limits after which Budget resolutions passed by the Dáil cease to have any statutory effect. I would like to ask the Minister if it is his intention to leave the law un-amended in this particular State. Why I raise the matter is this: if the Minister finds it feasible to bring his Budget in somewhat earlier in the year there might be some advantage in extending the period in which these resolutions have statutory force from four to six months. In the general work of introducing more flexibility into the working of financial business both in the Dáil and in the Seanad this is a point to which the Minister might well turn his attention. There is, as I say, very little reason for the Seanad to disagree with the proposal that the Minister is making to extend the supply period.
However, when we turn to the question of the Minister's proposals to make the provisions of this particular Bill permanent provisions, this is a matter on which agreement will be much less ready. I feel that this is a distinct point. The Minister is asking the House to agree to two distinct things in regard to the amount of supply and in regard to the question of a permanent measure. If the Minister had brought in an annual Bill incorporating the principles of the present Bill and had merely left out in the relevant sections the phrase "in every subsequent financial year" the Bill would, indeed, have got a very ready and hearty endorsement from the Seanad. But in making the measure a permanent one, the Minister has brought in a Bill which in this respect may well benefit the Dáil but certainly will not benefit the Seanad, and this I think is where the nub of the debate on this measure in the Seanad should come.
Let us look at the financial debates of the Dáil and of the Seanad and contrast the position in those two Houses. The Seanad devotes far less time to financial debates than does the Dáil. On matters of general expenditure the Seanad at the moment debates these matters once a year on the Central Fund Bill. In a sense it is true, as the Minister has said, that this corresponds to the debate which occurs over a much longer period in the Dáil on the Vote on Account. As Deputy Corish mentioned in discussing this measure when it was going through the Dáil, the Vote on Account is not the only occasion on which the Dáil discusses general expenditure and general financial policy from the expenditure point of view. These matters are frequently topics of the two-day adjournment debates which occur in the Dáil before the close of the sessions. They also, of course, frequently form the larger part of the discussion which takes place on the question of the general policy of the Government on the Taoiseach's Estimate. Thus in the Dáil there tend to be several occasions on which general expenditure is discussed as against a single occasion in the Seanad.
On the matters of detailed expenditure, these are discussed once a year in Seanad Éireann when the Appropriation Bill comes to us at the end of the year. Very often, and I would say most often, the Appropriation Bill comes to the Seanad after the Dáil has adjourned. To this single Seanad debate of two days there correspond discussions in the Dáil on the Departmental Estimates, discussions which up to now have taken five months of Parliamentary time and which under the present Bill will occupy up to ten months of the year. The Bill is before us because the Dáil has not found these five months adequate to discuss matters of detailed expenditure, so that against very many opportunities in the Dáil to discuss these particular matters we have one single debate in the Seanad.
We turn to the other side of the ledger to look at the question of taxation and Government income, and we find once again a single occasion for debate here in Seanad Éireann on the Finance Bill when it comes to us. In the Dáil we have a lengthy discussion on the Budget resolutions—particularly on the general Budget resolutions— followed by a lengthy debate on the Finance Bill. It is clear then that it is hardly fair to talk as if as a result of this measure both Houses would be, as it were, giving up the same thing. It may be that in absolute terms one can speak of the Seanad giving up one debate on the Central Fund Bill and the Dáil giving up one Debate on the Vote on Account, but if we look at the total amount of time devoted to financial business in both Houses we realise that the giving up of one single debate by the Seanad has a much more severe effect on the allocation of its time for financial business than the elimination of one debate in the Dáil.
The Minister indicated, and the Dáil appears to agree with him, that there is little harm done in eliminating the Vote on Account debate in the Dáil because this debate has apparently been duplicated by other debates. The Minister seems to feel—Deputies in Dáil Éireann made no objection to this — that this was an ineffective debate and that it was impossible to have an effective debate in the Dáil on financial policy in February or March.
I do not agree that the situation is the same in Seanad Éireann. I do not agree, and I do not think the majority of Senators will agree, that debates which have been held here on the Central Fund Bill from year to year, have been ineffective or uninformed debates. I think the Minister would have a good case, which could easily persuade the Seanad to allow the Central Fund Bill to disappear and the debate on it to disappear with it, if he could show that the debates in the Seanad have been ineffective or uninformed or debates which have been poorly supported by the members of the Seanad.
I believe the Seanad will agree with me that this debate has always ranked of the nature of an event in the Seanad's calendar. It has always been a two-day debate and the number of speakers offering has always been so great that later speakers are inevitably curtailed in their freedom of speech by the necessity to close the debate at the end of two days. Indeed, I can recall only one occasion on which the debate did not last two days and that was in the present financial year when many of the members of the House were physically engaged elsewhere, it being polling day in the mid-Cork by-election, while the others who attended in the Seanad had their thoughts elsewhere.
The Central Fund discussion in the Seanad can be defended on the ground of a high standard of debate down through the years. It has been of interest, not only to members of the House, but to others outside who are interested in having the views of the Seanad as a whole, and of individual Senators, on general Government policy at the particular time of the year. I do not think it can be said that it has been an ineffective debate and I do not agree with the Minister when he says it is not possible to have an effective debate in February or March on general financial policy. I do not agree with him when he says it is essential to be provided with the Book of Estimates, the economic statistics and the Budget proposals to have an effective economic debate.
Indeed, the proof of this is the fact that the Seanad has had effective economic debates in February and March and that a great deal of information is available for effective financial debate at this time of the year. It may be that the official Government estimate in regard to the national income for the previous calendar year is not yet available to the House but the estimate made by the Central Bank for the national income of the previous calendar year is available well before March. I doubt if the Minister can point to any year in which there was a difference between the estimate of the Central Bank and the final official figure which would make any difference to a financial debate. The general economic statistics for the calendar year are available by March and, considering that our national income accounts and also our social accounts, are based on the calendar, rather than the financial year, there is, I think, an advantage rather than a disadvantage, in having a debate at this time, which could be looked at from the national income and expenditure point of view. Indeed, this has been the theme of many good Central Fund debates in this House.
There is the further point that the Minister, in framing his Budget statement, goes to a great deal of trouble to consult various interests about what their views are before he takes his last look at the economic situation and makes up his mind what will be the Government's financial policy for the ensuing financial year. I see no reason why the Minister should not continue to consult, in open forum, Seanad Éireann, and have the benefit of the collective wisdom of the Seanad and the individual wisdom of Senators as well as having the recommendations of those other people who have, perhaps, more private interests to look after in regard to the Minister's proposals in his following Budget.
If this debate is to go, as the Minister suggests, what then is to be done? I consider the Minister is being unduly glib in saying: "Yes, there are three debates now. These can easily be telescoped into two. It is quite easy to unite this debate with the debate on the Finance Bill, everything will be all right and Senators may, indeed, be better off than before". I do not think this is so. I consider the Minister could have brought in a splendid Bill which would have cleared up most of the difficulty about the Central Fund Bill and still keeps it as an annual Bill. I am realistic, and I do not think there is any great hope of persuading the Minister, at this stage, to revert to the idea of an annual Central Fund Bill. If it does not suit the Dáil to have a debate in March, this is no compelling reason why the Seanad should be forced to telescope two of its major financial debates into one.
The Seanad would have the option of combining the present Central Fund Bill either with the Finance Bill or with the Appropriation Bill. If we attempt to combine it with the Finance Bill we will find ourselves in some degree of trouble. We already have in the Finance Bill, even without going into the details of the proposals of every year's particular Finance Bill, enough to discuss here on the Second Stage of the Finance Bill. We have to consider, every time the Finance Bill comes up to us here, the general problem of the burden of taxation. We have to see also what are the different taxes which the Minister has proposed in his Budget speech, which is not debated in this House. We have to examine these proposals to see what is their effect on the allocation of resources; we have to examine the Minister's proposals for certain types of taxes in regard to their effect on different individuals and organisations; we have also to discuss the details of the individual taxes he is proposing. I think there is enough material here for a two-day debate on Second Reading without bringing in the whole question of the expenditure side and without bringing in the whole question of general Government expenditure.
I believe we may well be in difficulties here and we may have inadequate debate if we attempt to combine this in this fashion. This may well defeat the very object of the present Bill. The Minister has said the object of the Bill is to streamline proceedings, to get a more effective discussion and to get the best use out of parliamentary time which is being devoted to financial matters. I think, indeed, this very purpose might well be defeated if we attempted to combine these things in one debate.
Let us see what could well happen if we attempted to combine the present debate on the Central Fund Bill with the debate on the Appropriation Bill. I think that here again we are getting two broad subjects mixed up together. At the moment the Seanad discusses general Government expenditure and general Government policy on the Central Fund Bill. It discusses details on the Appropriation Bill. It has to discuss on the Appropriation Bill all the details which the Dáil takes between five and ten months to discuss on the Departmental Estimates. The Seanad would then be faced with the problem of having to debate both the question of general expenditure and the question of detailed expenditure in the one debate. This would be unsatisfactory.
The Dáil itself, I think, recognises the fact that you must make a distinction between detailed Estimates and general Government expenditure. When it comes to the end of the Departmental Estimates and is faced with the Taoiseach's Estimate, what does the Dáil do? The Dáil on the Taoiseach's Estimate does not spend the time allocated to it discussing the operations of the Central Statistics Office, which could be a fruitful subject for debate. The Dáil does not spend its time on the Taoiseach's Estimate discussing the operations of the Government Information Bureau, which could well be a fruitful subject for debate. It discusses Departmental Estimates for months, and then decides there is need for a debate to deal with the broader issues, the Departmental issues having been dealt with, and the Dáil then does that on the Taoiseach's Estimate. The Dáil can do that on the Taoiseach's Estimate but, if this present proposal goes through, the Seanad will be asked to do both of these things in the one debate, a thing the Dáil itself is not prepared to do.
If we look to the practice in other countries we find the same sort of thing. We need look no further than to Britain because, of course, it is the one which is closest to our own institutions. We find that the British practice is to distinguish quite clearly between a discussion on the Estimates from a general policy point of view, and a discussion on the Estimates from the point of view of detail. So much so, that the Estimates Committees to which the selected British Estimates are sent—and the reports of the Estimates Committees are published and are of great value to anyone trying to understand how the Departments operate—are absolutely precluded from discussing general policy. These Estimates Committees are concerned only with the details of expenditure. They are concerned only with the question of whether value is being got for the money which is being spent. The question of policy is outside their ambit.
I think we will run into very severe difficulties if we try to telescope three debates into two, no matter how we try to do it. I submit to the House that a separate debate on general financial policy, a debate on general expenditure policy is necessary. Indeed, I think we should have those debates and that in the future as well as in the past March would be a suitable time for such debates. In the future we will have the Finance Bill in June, I hope, and not in July as happened in the past. I hope that when the Minister talks of freeing parliamentary time that this is not a vain aspiration and that we will get the Finance Bill in good time. I hope we will get it in June and that we will get the Appropriation Bill in November or December. I think this House can contribute a great deal to the public discussion on financial policy by also having a debate in March.
I ask the Minister to meet the House in this regard, and I ask him specifically to meet the House in this regard by agreeing that the statement which under section 5 of this Bill he will present to the Dáil every March, in regard to the amount of temporary supply to which he is entitled, will also be laid before the Seanad. I ask the Minister specifically to agree to come to this House for a two-day debate after that statement has been tabled. The Seanad will have something to offer the public and something to offer the Minister by having a two-day debate on general financial policy at that time.
To summarise then my attitude on this Bill. I should distinguish between the two purposes of the Bill: the extension of the time of temporary supply, and the making permanent of the Central Fund Bill. The extension of the period on temporary supply will, I think, be heartily welcomed by the Seanad as a help in solving some of its difficulties as well as those of the Dáil. In regard to the way in which this is done, I think it is better to leave the details to be discussed on Committee Stage and to concentrate on discussing the broader points during the Second Stage debate. I believe the making of this as a permanent Bill will rob the Seanad of a major debate and that no case has been made that this is desirable in the public interest. I believe some provision should be made for a two-day debate in March, and I think if the Minister would meet the Seanad in this respect the Seanad would endeavour to provide, and would succeed in providing, what the Minister is looking for in this Bill—informed and effective discussion on Government financial policy.
