The determination of Dáil constituencies is governed by section 2 of Article 16 of the Constitution. Subsection 3º of that section reads as follows:—
"The ratio between the number of members to be elected at any time for each constituency and the population of each constituency, as ascertained at the last preceding census, shall, so far as it is practicable, be the same throughout the country".
The purpose of this Bill is to spell out clearly in the Constitution the meaning of the words "so far as it is practicable". This is done in effect in the proposed new subsection 3º which is contained in the Schedule to the Bill and which is being substituted for the existing subsection 3º of section 2 of Article 16. It sets out precisely the maximum divergence from strict mathematical parity of population per member permitted for constituencies and the factors which may justify a divergence up to that limit. The subsection fixes a maximum divergence of one-sixth from the national average population per member and provides that regard must be had to the extent and accessibility of constituencies, the need for securing convenient areas of representation and the desirability of avoiding the overlapping of county boundaries. This maximum divergence and the other factors will, in the event of the Bill being approved, apply whether or not the constituencies are multi-member or single-member.
I should like first of all to deal with the proposed requirement to have regard to the desirability of avoiding the overlapping by constituencies of county boundaries because it has a direct bearing on the size of the divergence proposed.
It is generally recognised by authorities on electoral matters that constituencies should, as far as possible, be based on local communities. It is an undeniable fact that there is a strong feeling of local patriotism within our counties which should be respected.
There is also the point that much of a Deputy's work relates to matters within the competence of the county council. In addition, the whole process of registration of electors and holding of elections is geared to counties. Apart from these rather obvious reasons for adhering to county boundaries, constituencies based firmly on local administrative divisions will obviously command more public confidence than purely arbitrary creations. If the present system is retained, the aim should be that as many constituencies as possible should consist of a complete county or of two grouped counties, the boundary in each case coinciding with the county boundary, or should be wholly contained within the boundaries of one county. If single seat constituencies are adopted, the commission to be set up will be facilitated in their task if they can take county boundaries within the proposed limit of divergence as a firm frame of reference in creating constituencies.
These are some of the reasons why the breaching of county boundaries was avoided where possible at all revisions of constituencies prior to 1961. At the 1959 revision, in no case was part of a county attached to the whole or part of another county to form a constituency. This involved in certain instances a divergence from the national average of population per Deputy to the extent that the number of population per Deputy varied from 16,575 to 23,128. This revision was, I should emphasise, endorsed at that time by all Parties in both Houses of the Oireachtas.
As we all know, the 1959 revision was declared by the High Court to be unconstitutional. This decision of the High Court resulted in the present scheme of constituencies in which 16 counties are affected by the attaching of part of a county to the whole or part of another county or counties. During the debate on the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1961, which determined the present constituencies, this aspect of the proposals, i.e. the breaching of county boundaries, was severely criticised by prominent Opposition spokesmen to the point of demanding amendment of the Constitution. Unless the Constitution is amended as proposed in this Bill it is doubtful if any county in Ireland could remain intact at future revisions of constituencies.
If the widespread breaching of county boundaries is to be avoided it is obviously necessary to allow the population per member in constituencies to deviate to some degree from the national average. It would be necessary to allow a deviation of nearly one-third above or below the average to avoid the breaching of all county boundaries and indeed, this would not be out of line with the position in many other democracies.
The deviation of one-sixth proposed in the Bill would, however, avoid the breaching of county boundaries in the big majority of cases. With multi-Member constituencies this deviation would, on present population figures, enable all constituencies to be wholly contained within the individual counties or in pairs of counties which have a tradition of grouping. This would not be possible within the deviation of 12½ per cent suggested by the informal Committee on the Constitution in their arguments adduced in favour of a change in the relevant constitutional provisions.
I must make it absolutely clear, therefore, that the maximum deviation of one-sixth proposed in the Bill is the smallest deviation which would, in general, enable the breaching of county boundaries to be avoided and would keep constituencies within our county framework. I may say in passing that a deviation of this order would be necessary for the purpose irrespective of whether representation is based on population or on electorate. However, because of the fact that the proportion of adults in the total population varies considerably throughout the country and because the census enumerates all those resident in a particular place on the specified day, including babies and their mothers in maternity hospitals, all those in children's institutions, patients in hospitals irrespective of their normal place of residence, people staying in hotels, students at colleges and aliens, the overall results of the operation of a divergence within these limits, confined to taking account of the factors mentioned in the Bill, will do no more than in general equate the value of a rural vote to that of an urban vote—if it even does that.
Having decided on a maximum divergence of one-sixth, it was necessary for the Government to decide on the other basic factors, in addition to preserving county boundaries intact, to which regard should be had at a determination of constituencies. The Government have always taken the view that the special difficulties of persons living in large, thinly populated constituencies should be recognised. The Bill accordingly provides that regard shall be had at a determination of constituencies to the extent and accessibility of constituencies and the need for securing convenient areas of representation.
All pre-1961 revisions had regard to these considerations and the 1959 revision, which as I have already said was endorsed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, made concessions in respect of these factors involving departures from the national average of population per Deputy greater than would be possible under the proposed amendment. The factor of the extent and accessibility of constituencies—taken in conjunction with the limit of one-sixth divergence—will, as I have pointed out, have the indirect result of making it possible to keep the rural vote in general equal in value with the vote in the bigger cities.
This leads me to deal with some misconceptions which exist regarding the proposed tolerance. First of all, it has been argued that the tolerance will result in votes in rural areas having a greater value than votes in urban areas and that rural areas will get greater, and urban areas less, representation than that to which they are entitled. In order to correct this erroneous idea I propose to show how application of the tolerance provision cannot have this result.
Under the Constitution, Dáil representation is based on population. The proposed tolerance of one-sixth is also based on population. The present national average population per Deputy is 20,028. In theory, therefore, a rural area could get one Deputy for not fewer than each 16,690 of the population and a city area one Deputy for not more than each 23,366 of the population. But the percentage of electorate per population is not the same in rural and urban areas. In fact, and this is an essential point, the electorate as a percentage of the population is appreciably higher in rural areas than in city areas. The total national electorate expressed as a percentage of the total population is 59.4 per cent. The percentage in the constituency of Dublin North-West is, however, only 50.96 per cent whereas in the constituency of South-West Donegal it is 67.74 per cent. If, therefore, one Deputy were allocated to South-West Donegal for each 16,690 of the population and to Dublin North-West for each 23,366 of the population, the average electorate per Member would be 11,305 in South-West Donegal and 11,907 in Dublin North-West. This is very close in each case to the national average electorate per Member of 11,899.
If, however, representation in these two constituencies were based on equality of population per member, as required by the present Constitution, the electorate per Member in South-West Donegal would be 13,567 and in Dublin North-West only 10,206, giving the city vote a much higher value than the rural vote.
I could give many more examples to show that under the proposed tolerance there would be very little difference between the value of rural and city votes, whereas under the present Constitution there is definite discrimination against areas outside the larger cities and boroughs. Indeed, if nothing is done to correct this injustice, all the indications are that the gap between the value of a vote in the cities and elsewhere will grow with anticipated increases in the non-voting population of the cities, arising from increases in the numbers of students, the increasing regionalisation of institutions, et cetera. I do not think that city voters expect or want to retain such favourable treatment and I trust that Senators will endorse the principle of one-man-one-vote of equal value which is inherent in the proposals in the Bill.
There are a few further points I should like to mention on this question of tolerance. The idea of a tolerance is not something new. A tolerance of this order was applied at all revisions prior to 1961 and the 1959 revision involved a greater deviation from the national average than that now proposed. The maximum tolerance of one-sixth proposed is substantially smaller than that applicable in other countries. In Britain, for example, the deviation in constituencies ranges from 60 per cent below the national average electorate per Member to 80 per cent above. This means that the electorate per Member in the largest constituency is 450 per cent greater than in the smallest.
Finally, the tolerance cannot be applied arbitrarily; it must be used in the circumstances outlined in the Bill, namely to take account of the extent and accessibility of constituencies, the need for securing convenient areas of representation and the desirability of avoiding the overlapping of county boundaries. In fact, it will be mandatory to have regard to these factors in determining each constituency.
Apart from the need to define the phrase "so far as it is practicable" in the existing subsection (3) of section 2 of Article 16 of the Constitution, the subsection also suffers from a defect, only recently come to light, that due to the inclusion of the words "at any time" a revision of constituencies could well have to be carried out after each quinquennial census in the future. The census results recently published show that at present 24 of the 38 constituencies do not comply with the legal interpretation of the Constitution and that a revision is, therefore, now required. A revision could thus have to be made in the lifetime of each Dáil making a reasonable continuity of representation impossible. The proposed new subsection does not contain any such requirement. The practice in this respect would also, therefore, revert to that which obtained prior to 1961 of revising the constituencies once every 12 years.
I should like to acknowledge that the Bill as passed by the Dáil includes a number of provisions which were suggested by Opposition spokesmen. One of these ensures that a revision of constituencies shall not take place during the interval between the date of a census and the publication of the final results thereof.
I shall conclude by posing two questions on which I should like to hear the views of the Senators. Is there a defect in the Constitution requiring amendment and if so, how shall the amendment be effected? With regard to the question whether the Constitution requires amendment, the Opposition Parties demanded it in 1961 and, in the course of the recent debate in the Dáil, Deputy J.A. Costello admitted that there exists what he called a "Constitutional infirmity".
With regard to the manner in which the infirmity should be dealt with, the amendment proposed in this Bill will, in effect, revert to the position which existed and was acceptable to all Parties prior to 1961. I must make it perfectly clear that failure to amend the Constitution as proposed in the Bill will result in frequent revisions of constituencies involving wholesale breaching of county boundaries, with consequent frustration for the people, their representatives and for political Party organisations, and unfair discrimination against areas outside the big cities.
In commending the Bill to the Seanad, I trust that the proposal will be debated in a constructive manner, bearing in mind that it is the people who will ultimately decide the issue at a referendum.
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution Bill is to enable the people to decide if single-seat constituencies and the straight vote should be substituted for the present system of multi-seat constituencies and the transferable vote. The new provisions which would be inserted in the Constitution are set out in the Schedule to the Bill.
Parts I and II of the Schedule contain the provisions relating to single-seat constituencies and the straight vote and are, of course, the most important in the Bill.
Parts III and IV are consequential. In effect, they propose to regulate the number of constituencies rather than the number of Members of Dáil Éireann.
Parts V and VI, which make up the greater part of the Schedule, contain provisions relating mainly to the proposed constituency commission. These provisions are relatively uncontroversial. They have, on the whole, been constructively debated in the Dáil and have been amended to meet points raised. They might, I suggest, be more appropriately discussed at Committee Stage.
The kernel of the Bill is contained in the two subsections set out in Parts I and II of the Schedule. Subsection 1º provides for single-seat constituencies and subsection 2º requires that Members shall be elected by means of the straight vote. I shall deal with each in turn.
The multi-seat constituency has many disadvantages. The large size of many constituencies and the competition between Deputies—even members of one Party—bring about the situation that each Deputy is fully occupied in constituency matters, often of a trivial nature, to the detriment of his highly important duties in relation to legislation, and national economic, financial and social policies. Competition between candidates of the same Party can lead to disedifying intrigues —"the machinations of the multi-seat constituency." as a recent newspaper article put it. The system has an inherent tendency to keep out potentially strong new candidates particularly where the return of an established member of the same Party would be endangered. The system of election necessitating a ballot paper with a large number of names, some of them unknown to most electors, and a complicated system of transferring some of the votes an indefinite number of times, in which the element of chance plays an important part, is not conducive to producing the best results. There have been cases of candidates who have headed the poll at the first count and have subsequently to the mystification of the voters in the constituency failed in the processes of counting and transfers to secure election.
Contrast this with the single-seat constituency. It will be much smaller —in some cases only one-fifth of the size of an existing constituency. Consequently, the amount of constituency and organisation work will be considerably reduced, leaving the Deputy more time for his duties as a Member of the House. The fact that he is the only Deputy for the area means that he will not be driven by competition from other Deputies into currying favour with electors by pretending to obtain benefits for them which, in fact, they are entitled to receive as of right. This will further reduce constituency work by making it feasible for the Deputy to confine such work to what is really necessary in the interest of his constituents.
At the same time, because of the more reasonable area of the constituency and the smaller number of people involved it will be possible for the Deputy to give better service to his constituents in regard to local and personal matters which really require his attention. It will also alter for the better the whole tone of public life which is adversely affected at present by the inevitable tendency of multimember constituencies to foster the belief that benefits and services and even public appointments are obtainable through the intercession of Deputies. This better atmosphere and the new status of Deputies should attract a better type of prospective candidate and the political Parties will, in turn, have every incentive to put the best man forward. In the small constituencies which will be established, containing an average of about 11,000 electors each, personal factors will be very important and each candidate must be prepared to win on his own merits as well as the merits of the policy he supports. It will no longer be feasible to put forward candidates in the hope that they will be elected on the transfer of votes of outstanding individuals. The number of candidates going forward in a constituency will be fewer than at present with normally only two or three serious contenders, all of them well known to the electors of the area. It will then rest with the electors to elect the best candidate, taking into account his qualifications and his policy. The Deputy who is elected will look after the true interests of the whole constituency—otherwise he will lose his seat at the next election and be replaced by a better representative. Our case then is that the single-seat constituency will raise the standard of parliamentary life, attract a better type of candidate, encourage Parties to put forward the best candidate available and, in a clear-cut confrontation, make it possible for the voters to elect the best man.
At national level the single-seat constituency will also have beneficial results. While experience abroad suggests that it does not, of itself, prevent the emergence of a multi-party system or guarantee an overall majority for the Government of the day, it does at least prevent the worst shortcomings inherent in the present system and it gives the people a much better opportunity of avoiding indeterminate election results and, therefore, a better chance of electing a government. With no vested interest in individual constituencies inhibiting the selection of the best candidate and with no conflicting interests to dissipate the efforts of Party organisations, each Party will be able to make a more effective and unified effort to attain a majority.
One of the most objectionable features of the present system is the disproportionate effort and expense both for the State and political Parties involved in by-elections. Under present circumstances the Returning Officer must make arrangements for all the voters in a large area to vote to elect a fraction of their representation. Party organisations must try to persuade all these voters, who already have from 2 to 4 representatives, that it is important to elect another who may be from a distant part of the constituency or even from another county or province. Under the proposed system the people in a fraction of these areas will be voting to elect their full representation. The arrangements for voting to be made by the Returning Officer will, therefore, be much less expensive and disruptive and more appropriate to the job to be done, while, apart from the smaller area and the smaller numbers involved, the fact that the election will be for the purpose of electing the full representation of the constituency and replacing a truly local representative will make it easier to explain to the people the importance of voting. All this will mean less demand on the physical and financial resources of political Parties, will call for less disruption of the Dáil and Seanad and will have less serious effects on the stamina and health of individual Deputies and Senators.
I do not think I need say any more on this particular provision. Whatever their public attitudes may be, it is known that the vast majority of the Members of all Parties favour the single-seat constituency, or at least they would if they thought they would be elected. Even the opposition press has admitted as much. For example, the political correspondent of the Irish Independent wrote in that paper's issue of 25th May last that: “out of all the uncertainty and confusion one thing comes through loud and clear to the observer: practically everybody now in Dáil Éireann would like to have a single-seat rather than to share his constituency with other Members. They do not agree on the means of election to the seat—some favouring the alternative vote system with its by-election attractions, others favouring the first-past-the-post system”. Later in the same article it is pointed out that in a single-seat constituency “more time would be devoted to parliamentary as opposed to bog-drain business, and many of the present indignities would be eliminated.” More recently, the political correspondent of the Irish Times writing on the 15th June, made the following remarkable admission: “Indeed one gathers in all parties that there is the unexpressed hope that somehow or another the straight vote may become operative. That is accepted, almost universally, as its one great asset: it would make for better quality TDs as each man would have to go out and make his own case in a small area where he would be well known. Later he would not be handicapped in his study of national affairs by his present role as a messenger boy for his constituents.” I am confident that among the public generally there is also the same appreciation of the value of the single-seat constituency.
Subsection 2º provides that election shall be on the relative majority system by means of the single nontransferable vote. This gives practical effect to the principle of "one-man-one-vote", as unlike the present position each voter will have only one vote and the candidate who secures the largest number of votes is elected. The amendment which was moved in the Dáil in an effort to find common ground to substitute the single transferable vote for the straight vote failed to secure acceptance by any Party. However, since some of the arguments put forward in public against the Government's proposals tend to concentrate on the method of voting, I think I should deal with the relative merits of the straight vote and the transferable vote in single-seat constituencies.
The principal argument usually advanced in favour of the alternative vote is that the candidate elected under this system has an overall majority of the votes at the final count. Under the straight vote, on the other hand, so the argument runs, a minority candidate can be elected. This argument will not stand up to critical examination. The so-called majority obtained under the transferable vote is a contrived one—contrived unjustifiably by counting the preferences of some, and only some, of the voters and crediting these preferences, some being even the lowest possible preferences, as full votes. Let us suppose, for example, that if there are three candidates A, B and C, A secures the highest number of votes, B the next highest and C the lowest. If A does not secure an overall majority, C is elimated and the second preferences on his ballot papers are now credited as No. 1 votes and distributed between the other two candidates. This may result in the election of B. The theory behind this is that the people who voted for C have been unable to elect their candidate and are entitled to a second chance. If this is valid why should not the people who voted for A, who has not been elected, be given a second chance? If they were it could well be that C and not B would be elected. This in turn would raise the question of B's second preferences which might have the result of electing A. The application of the principle of the transferable vote, therefore, in a non-discriminatory way would be very likely to show an overall majority in favour of more than one candidate. Even more absurd results are obtained where more than three candidates contest a seat. The absurdity arises from two factors—the counting of the preferences of some voters only and equating a later preference with a full vote. This is obviously not only absurd but also unjust and undemocratic. As a result we sometimes have the situation in by-elections that the outcome may depend more on who got the lowest number of votes and is first eliminated than on who got the highest number, the decision in effect being made not by the majority but by the smallest minority in the constituency.
It is quite clear that the person elected under the transferable vote system need not have a majority of the votes cast. Indeed, he may not even have the highest number of votes, measured either in terms of first preferences only or of all preferences cast. Under the straight vote, on the other hand, the winner must at least secure more votes than any other candidate, and indeed, as experience in other countries shows, he usually secures an overall majority of votes as well. It is clearly not possible to establish that there is any overall majority in favour of one candidate unless more than 50 per cent of the people vote for one particular candidate.
As to the relative effects on the political system of the two methods of voting, the position has been well summarised by Dr. F.A. Hermens, Professor of Politics at the University of Notre Dame in his book Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy, published by The Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame.
