I want now to consider the reasons why the Second Programme failed to achieve its targets and to consider the reasons put forward in this mid-term review which have a good deal of validity, although I would not entirely agree with the emphasis based on it. First of all, there is reference in the mid-term review to the effect of external conditions. While it is fair to say that these are not overstressed, there is no attempt to pretend that what went wrong was solely or even mainly due to things that happened outside our control in other countries. Nevertheless, I think perhaps too little emphasis is placed on this factor. It is true that during the period of the Second Programme one had the setback of the British import levy and this had some temporary effect on our exports, but due to the speed and the skill which the Government acted in that matter— and they are to be congratulated on it— the bad effects which might have come from the British import levy were greatly mitigated and the effect on our exports was by no means as great as had initially been feared. So much is this true, indeed, that over the whole period of the four years covered by this review our exports increased faster than the planned rate. The target originally set was exceeded despite the effects of the British import levy.
This being the case, one can hardly say that our failure to achieve the target of the Programme was due to the levy, and the levy did not, in fact, prevent us achieving the very target to which it was relevant, the export target. What actually happened was that industrial exports expanded much more rapidly than had been provided for in the Programme and agricultural exports lagged behind, stagnating completely for three years up to 1966, and then jumping ahead up to 1967, partly in response to higher price levels and, indeed, due to the increase in export revenue in that year affecting higher export prices, and partly because of an increased volume of exports, some at least of which reflected a running down of stocks and was necessarily temporary in character.
The great bulk of improvement in exports over this period was due to industrial exports which expanded steadily, unlike agricultural exports which stagnated for three years and then jumped ahead only in the last year. However, I do not think that in view of the overall performance, despite this lag in agricultural exports, one can attribute to the external environment much of the failure to achieve our targets. What is true, as is said in the Report and I think fairly, is the fact that these external difficulties coincided with the domestic mismanagement of our affairs in 1965—these are not the precise words used in the Report, of course—but the fact that the two coincided did mean that the Government had to take more drastic action at that moment than might otherwise have been necessary, and this did have some effect on the tempo of growth. It is, however, a minor element in the failure to achieve the targets.
I referred earlier to the major element as being agriculture. I want to dwell on this for a few minutes. The more I think about it, the more I am convinced that it is in this area of policy we can find the greater proportion of the difficulties that face us. I have had to calculate for myself what, in fact, is the shortfall in agriculture under each of the main headings. This review of progress gives a comparison for agriculture only up to 1966 and does not give the figures for 1967, although the basic data was available in provisional form at the time this was produced. The agricultural output figures which appeared in the past fortnight show, like all our statistics, the traditional form of totally ignoring the fact that any targets existed in the Second Programme, thus requiring the conversion of current statistics to 1960 money values.
To make a comparison with the targets set out in the Second Programme requires the conversion of current statistics to 1960 money values. The same old stuff is churned out, therefore, a good deal of calculation and a certain amount of economic expertise is required. The Government have a duty to produce statistics to allow us see where we stand in comparison with the target set. They are not justified in continuing to give production figures in the old form, bearing no comparison with the targets they have set up themselves, Therefore, I have done the calculations myself. If I have done them wrongly, the Minister and his advisers will correct me, but I do not think they are very wrong. On my calculation, the output of cattle in 1967 was eight per cent behind target. This is very important because cattle themselves, leaving aside milk, represent something like 30 per cent of the total output of our agriculture. A shortfall of eight per cent is, therefore, important.
Milk was on target. With the possible exception of horses—a pretty minor item—it was the only item in the whole list on target. Sheep and wool were 28½ per cent behind target. The value of output in 1960 money values was £13 million against £18.2 million. Far from going forward over this period, they have gone backwards. When the Programme started, output was £15 million in 1960 money values. The Programme succeeded in reducing this to £13 million instead of the £18.2 million in the Programme.
In regard to pigs we have the same picture. The plan was that the value of output should rise from £24.6 million to £27.9 million. In fact, it went down to £23.75 million. Here we have a shortfall of 15 per cent. Poultry and eggs—there was some growth in this area, mainly because of the expansion in the broiler chicken industry, but still it was 3½ per cent behind target.
Taking the whole livestock sector together, including milk, output, which was to have risen from £165 million to £196½ million over the four-year period of the Programme, increased only to £180½ million. In other words, only half of the progress planned was achieved in the livestock sector. The shortfall here is of almost £16 million or eight per cent behind target, dominated by the failure in the cattle sector. This was partly offset by the fact that milk was on target; but that was more than outweighed by the appalling shortfall in sheep and pigs, where output has actually fallen, so deficient have been the policies of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries.
Tillage and crops: in tillage, there has been a slight increase. The whole of it was achieved in 1967. In 1966 it was lower than 1963. Yet tillage output was about six per cent behind target. Fruit, vegetables and other crops were about 24 per cent behind target. There was no increase whatever—a slight setback instead of the 30 per cent increase planned. Turf production was to have risen steadily by nearly 30 per cent; instead it was nearly 30 per cent behind target. Tillage and crops and turf together are running about 12 per cent behind target. The total output of agriculture, which was to have risen from £207 million to £244 million in 1960 money values, has risen only by £22 million, an increase of only 18 per cent. Gross output turned out a seven per cent increase in this period. Here we have a picture of a nine per cent shortfall in output in 1967. This is a miserable picture. Only one item, milk, was on target; nothing exceeded target; everything else was behind, with shortfalls of up to 30 per cent in some important products. The number of pigs and sheep actually declined over the period when a substantial increase was planned.
At the same time, the inputs into agriculture have risen more or less as planned. The increase in the inputs is very close to the planned amount. Consequently, if we have to put into agriculture almost as much as we have planned and if output falls short of what was planned, the increase in the value of agricultural products, the contribution of agriculture to the economy, is only negligible. Instead of an 18 per cent increase what we have got is an increase of 3½ per cent. Four-fifths of the increase in the contribution that agriculture was to make to the economy has not been achieved.
Surely this is a picture that demands some kind of action? If planning means anything, it means that those concerned with planning devote themselves to the achievement of certain results by the application of particular policies. The great contribution that planning can make to this country is that it pins us all down—Government, industry farmers, the lot—to some kind of commitment as to what we expect to achieve. In the first 50 years of the life of this State Government and civil servants have been able to get away with a lot by simply saying they are introducing new policies and hoping they will improve things. They do not commit themselves to what the improvement will be. Therefore, it can never be shown that their targets have not been fulfilled.
The contribution planning can make in this country is that, above all, it forces people to say what results they expect to flow from the policies they are pursuing. This means that when those results are not achieved they should and must come under pressure to justify those policies and, if they prove to be a failure, to change them. The notable cases where planning can really help the economy—and in which the target is not achieved—is agriculture. The one thing I had hoped to come from the Second Programme was that for the first time in 50 years, the deficiencies in the policies of the Department of Agriculture which have been pursued throughout successive Governments—with some improvements in some cases and setbacks in others—are being pinpointed and dealt with. For the first time, we can come to grips with the Department. We can put them on the spot. We have got them to say—and it was they who told the Department of Finance—what their targets would be. We have asked them to say what they thought would happen to Irish agriculture with their policies in this period. These were policies on which Ireland had drifted along decade after decade and nobody had done anything about it because at no point was anybody forced to say what they expected to achieve.
But when the Second Programme was produced, the Department of Finance forced the Department of Agriculture to say what policies they expected to produce. They insisted on producing their own targets when they were asked, as other Departments were. We can now see the results of this. They told us they would achieve a growth rate of almost 4 per cent and we see that four-fifths of what they expected has not been fulfilled. The policies which they said would produce these results have been shown to have failed. By the standards of those who drew them up, they have failed and they were drawn up by those who put forward these policies. It is not I who say their policies have failed; it is the Department that set the targets because these targets they set have not been achieved.
One of the things the Second Programme could do for this country, with all the weaknesses, deficiencies and some failures, would be to bring about total reform and revolution of agriculture, if this Programme is used in the way it should be used, if all of us on this side of the House and on the other side, all of us inside and outside the Government, turned on the Department of Agriculture and insisted that it justify its stand, compelled it to show what changes of policy it is going to undertake in order that targets of the Third Programme would be achieved. If that is done, I think we can forgive any deficiencies, weaknesses or failure in any other aspect of the Programme, because if for the first time agricultural policy could be changed and revolutionised, then the growth rate of this country could be totally transformed and the life of the country consequently transformed, and so many of the difficulties that we have faced for so long could be overcome.
That is why I stress this point, why I think this exposure of agricultural deficiencies comes at a good moment The Government who have drifted in regard to agricultural policy for some time past have faced a really severe shock. We see the first signs of reaction to it. We have seen the statements of the Minister for Agriculture and the Taoiseach in the past couple of days implying their willingness to reconsider the hard line about the National Agricultural Council and the NFA, the first recognition that this policy has not paid off and that something new has to be attempted, recognition that a fresh start has to be made and that it can be made only by co-operation with the farmers through an organisation which commands massive support from the Irish farmers as was shown in the recent election when they threw out all politicians, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. As Deputy Cosgrave said, they threw out both sides and said that they wanted to be a vocational organisation, playing their own part in the national life and not a political plaything of any Party, Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael.
That is a situation which should provide an opportunity for all of us on both sides to think again on agricultural policy. The policies that have been pursued in Irish agriculture have been popular policies, politically easy and acceptable policies, but they have damned Irish agriculture to stagnation. These policies have been continued up to now because politicians on all sides have not had the courage to stand up and say what needs to be done and advocate the policies of selectivity that are needed.
We have seen this in this year's Budget which did not have much to say on the subject of agriculture but which did introduce some useful changes. In last year's Budget, we saw this policy reaching its height. I hope it is the last time such a policy will be adopted in Irish agriculture. I hope we have reached the point when a fresh start can be made when, as was said in France during recent events, it will be agreed that as politicians we have a responsibility to do what we know to be right by devising and implementing life-giving agricultural policies along lines that will produce increased output and enhance the general welfare, genuinely based, and not simply a continuation of the policy of doles which we adopted on such an extensive scale hitherto.
So much for agriculture. That was a major cause of the failure of the Second Programme. It was built into it because the targets were unrealisable under the policies pursued. We look forward to an appraisal of the weaknesses and the failures and to having conclusions drawn from them. There were other weaknesses. The mid-term review points out that the lack of an incomes policy was a serious one and that nothing was done to develop such a policy. Consequently, we had a disproportionate growth of incomes to output. This slowed down growth and the Government must take some responsibility.
The tendency nowadays is to shuffle off responsibility but nobody is immune from blame. The trade unions are dragging their feet on this question. They do not want to enter into an incomes policy that might be only a wages policy. They want evidence that other incomes than wages would be restrained and they may have grounds for this foot-dragging, but up to now they have not been contributing to the formulation of an incomes policy. Since they signed the NIEC Report No. 11 the employers have given no indication that they would make any general contribution. They are afraid of anything that might affect the growth of profits or dividends. They have been as slow as the unions to accept the need for any restraint on their side as well as on the side of wages.
The Government have not accepted responsibility in this matter because the NIEC Report referred to a series of things that could be done by the Government which would change the atmosphere for an incomes policy, legislative and administrative action. The Government could then take advantage of that changed atmosphere to work a genuine incomes policy and direct changes in the attitudes of Government Departments that have been totally negative, so much so, that it has contributed to the general dragging of feet. The Government Department concerned must examine its conscience if a Government Department has a conscience, and consider the Report of the Council. We must make a fresh start on an incomes policy. The failure to control the growth of incomes during the Second Programme contributed, as this Report properly states, to failure to achieve the targets. If we are to achieve the targets set for the Third Programme, it will require some step forward in this field, of which there is, as yet, no sign.
Again, the point is made in the mid-term review—I think, properly—that there was failure to maintain a balance between consumption and savings and investment. This is certainly true. I have referred to this point already and I do not want to dwell on it here but we clearly need a new system of priorities directed towards investment and restraining the growth of consumption when things go wrong.
The next weakness I see—it is not brought out sufficiently here although it is implicit—is the lack of any adequate review process. One of the reasons the Second Programme did not succeed was that in only one sector was any attempt made to review progress during the currency of the Programme. That sector was industry and it was done in that case because the NIEC took on the job of carrying out the review. It was not left to any Government Department but was done by the Council itself. It has been handed over to the Department of Industry and Commerce but for three years it was carried out by the Council, and the industrial review is now well established, and I think will be continued by the Department of Industry and Commerce in the future.
It is only because the Council took on this task that we have had a review of the industrial sector out of which arose a whole series of problems which were then tackled. There are many still to be solved but some have been solved and some are being solved. Policies that held up progress were identified. In no other sector of government were policies subjected to review and examination of this kind. There is, of course, the lengthy statement which the Department of Agriculture produces and presents to the Dáil at the time of the Estimate. I discovered one reference at one point to one target for cattle, not repeated subsequently for any other product. It was in a year in which cattle was almost on target, and so the Department felt it might mention the fact. I could find no reference in any speech of the Minister for Agriculture, in any statement issued by the Department, in any agricultural statistics, up to the time of the publication of this document by the Department of Finance to any comparison between targets set and the progress achieved.
The Department of Finance itself in none of its publications—and goodness knows, this Department is responsible for enough of them — makes any reference to the targets set for public revenue and expenditure and the progress made towards or beyond those targets. There is no reference to that in any speech or in any financial document published by the Department until the mid-term review was published. The same is true in regard to the targets for tourism, forestry and fisheries. One would think that where the targets were being achieved there would be some reference——